

BOOKS FOR THE PEOPLE

HISTORY

OF THE

WAR IN THE PENINSULA

AND IN THE

SOUTH OF FRANCE,

FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814.

BY

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WITH MAPS AND PLANS.

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PREFACE.

FOR six years the Peninsula was devastated by the war of independence. The blood of France, Germany, England, Portugal, and Spain, was shed in the contest, and in each of those countries, authors, desirous of recording the sufferings, or celebrating the valour, of their countrymen, have written largely touching that fierce struggle. It may, therefore, happen that some will demand, why I should again relate "a thrice-told tale?" I answer, that two men observing the same object, will describe it diversely, following the point of view from which either beholds it. That which in the eyes of one is a fair prospect, to the other shall appear a barren waste, and yet neither may see aright! Wherefore, truth being the legitimate object of history, I hold it better that she should be sought for by many than by few, lest, for want of seekers, amongst the mists of prejudice, and the false lights of interest, she be lost altogether.

That much injustice has been done, and much justice left undone, by those authors who have hitherto written concerning this war, I can assert from personal knowledge of the facts. That I have been able to remedy this, without falling into similar errors, is more than I will venture to assume; but I have endeavoured to render as impartial an account of the campaigns in the Peninsula as the feelings which must warp the judgment of a contemporary historian will permit.

I was an eye-witness to many of the transactions that I relate, and a wide acquaintance with military men has enabled me to consult distinguished officers, both French and English, and to correct my own recollections and opinions by their superior knowledge. Thus assisted, I was encouraged to undertake the work, and I offer it to the world with the less fear, because it contains original documents, which will suffice to give it interest, although it should have no other merit. Many of those documents I owe to the liberality of Marshal Soult, who, disdaining national prejudices, with the confidence of a great mind, placed them at my disposal, without even a remark to check the freedom of my pen. I take this opportunity to declare that respect which I believe every British officer who has had the honour to serve against him feels for his military talents. By those talents the French cause in Spain was long upheld, and after the battle of Salamanca, if his counsel had been followed by the intrusive monarch, the fate of the war might have been changed.

Military operations are so dependent upon accidental circumstances, that, to justify censure, it should always be shown that an unsuccessful general has violated the received maxims and established principles of war. By that rule I have been guided, but, to preserve the narratives unbroken, my own observations are placed at the end of certain transactions of magnitude, where, their real source being known, they will pass for as much as they are worth, and no more : when they are not well supported by argument, I freely surrender them to the judgment of abler men.

Of those transactions, which, commencing with "the secret treaty of Fontainebleau," ended with "the Assembly of Notables" at Bayonne, little is known except through the exculpatory and contradictory publications of men interested to conceal the truth, and to me it appears that the passions of the present generation must subside, and the ultimate fate of Spain be known, before that part of the subject can be justly or usefully handled. I have, therefore, related no more of those political affairs than would

suffice to introduce the military events that followed, neither have I treated largely of the disjointed and ineffectual operations of the native armies ; for I cared not to swell my work with apocryphal matter, and neglected the thousand narrow winding currents of Spanish warfare, to follow that mighty stream of battle, which, bearing the glory of England in its course, burst the barriers of the Pyrenees, and left deep traces of its fury in the soil of France.

The Spaniards have boldly asserted, and the world has believed, that the deliverance of the Peninsula was the work of their hands ; this assertion, so contrary to the truth, I combat. It is unjust to the fame of the British general, and injurious to the glory of the British arms. Military virtue is not the growth of a day, nor is there any nation so rich and populous, that, despising it, can rest secure. The imbecility of Charles IV., the vileness of Ferdinand, and the corruption of Godoy, were undoubtedly the proximate causes of the calamities that overwhelmed Spain ; but the primary cause, that which belongs to history, was the despotism arising from the union of a superstitious court with a sanguinary priesthood, which, repressing knowledge, and contracting the public mind, sapped the foundation of all military as well as civil virtues, and prepared the way for invasion. No foreign potentate would have attempted to steal into the fortresses of a great kingdom, if the prying eyes and the thousand clamorous tongues belonging to a free press, had been ready to expose his projects, and a well-disciplined army present to avenge the insult ; but Spain, being destitute of both, was first circumvented by the wiles and then ravaged by the arms of Napoleon. She was deceived and fettered, because the public voice was stifled ; she was scourged and torn, because her military institutions were decayed.

From the moment that an English force took the field, the Spaniards ceased to act as principals in a contest carried on in the heart of their country, and involving their existence as an independent nation ; they were self-sufficient, and their pride was

wounded by insult ; they were superstitious, and their religious feelings were roused to fanatic fury by an all-powerful clergy, who feared to lose their own rich endowments ; but, after the first burst of indignation, the cause of independence created little enthusiasm. Horrible barbarities were exercised on those French soldiers that sickness or the fortune of war exposed to the rage of the invaded, and a dreadful spirit of personal hatred was kept alive by the exactions and severe retaliations of the invaders ; yet no great and general exertion to drive the latter from the soil was made, at least none was sustained with steadfast courage in the field. Manifestoes, decrees, and lofty boasts, like a cloud of canvas covering a rotten hull, made a gallant appearance, but real strength and firmness were nowhere to be found.

The Spanish insurrection presented indeed a strange spectacle ; patriotism was seen supporting a vile system of government, a popular assembly working for the restoration of a despotic monarch ; the higher classes seeking a foreign master ; the lower armed in the cause of bigotry and misrule. The upstart leaders, secretly abhorring freedom, though governing in her name, trembled at the democratic activity they had themselves excited ; they called forth all the bad passions of the multitude, and repressed the patriotism that would regenerate as well as save. The country suffered the evils without enjoying the benefits of a revolution. While tumults and assassinations terrified or disgusted the sensible part of the community, a corrupt administration of the resources extinguished patriotism, and neglect ruined the armies ; the peasant soldier, usually flying at the first onset, threw away his arms and returned to his home, or attracted by the license of the *Partidas*, joined the banners of men, who, for the most part originally robbers, were as oppressive to the people as the enemy ; these *guerilla* chiefs would, in their turn, have been quickly exterminated, but that the French, pressed by Lord Wellington's battalions, were obliged to keep in large masses. This was the secret of Spanish constancy ! Copious supplies from England, and the valour of the Anglo-Portuguese

troops, these were the supports of the war ! But it was the gigantic vigour with which the Duke of Wellington resisted the fierceness of France, and sustained the weakness of three inefficient cabinets, that delivered the Peninsula. Faults he committed—and who in war has not ?—yet shall his reputation stand upon a sure foundation, a simple majestic structure, that envy cannot undermine, nor the meretricious ornaments of party panegyric deform. The exploits of his army were great in themselves, great in their consequences ; abounding with signal examples of heroic courage and devoted zeal, they should neither be disfigured nor forgotten, being worthy of more fame than the world has yet accorded them—worthy also of a better historian.

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NOTICE.

For the notes dictated by Napoleon, and the plans of campaign sketched out by King Joseph, the author is indebted to his Grace the Duke of Wellington.

The returns of the French army were extracted from the original half monthly statements presented by Marshal Berthier to the Emperor Napoleon.

Of the other authorities it is unnecessary to say more than that the author had access to the original papers, with the exception of Dupont's memoir, of which a copy only was obtained.

General Semele's journal, referred to in this volume, is only an unattested copy; the rest of the manuscript authorities quoted or consulted are original papers belonging to, and communications received from, the Duke of Wellington, Marshal Soult, Marshal Jourdan, Mr. Stuart,* Sir J. Cradock,† Sir John Moore, and other persons employed either in the British or French armies during the Peninsular War.

The returns of the French army are taken from the Emperor Napoleon's original Muster Rolls.

At the end of the Appendix two papers are inserted, the one a letter from Major-General Frederick Ponsonby relative to a passage in the description of the battle of Talavera; the other is an original note by the Emperor Napoleon. The reader is referred to it as confirmatory of the arguments used by me when objecting to Joseph's retreat from Madrid.

* Afterwards Lord Stuart de Rothesay.

† Afterwards Lord Howden.

HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

THE hostility of the European aristocracy caused the enthusiasm of republican France to take a military direction, and forced that powerful nation into a course of policy which, however outrageous it might appear, was in reality one of necessity. Up to the treaty of Tilsit, the wars of France were essentially defensive; for the bloody contest that wasted the continent so many years was not a struggle for pre-eminence between ambitious powers, not a dispute for some accession of territory, nor for the political ascendancy of one or other nation, but a deadly conflict to determine whether aristocracy or democracy should predominate; whether equality or privilege should henceforth be the principle of European governments.

The French revolution was pushed into existence before the hour of its natural birth. The power of the aristocratic principle was too vigorous and too much identified with that of the monarchical principle, to be successfully resisted by a virtuous democratic effort, much less could it be overthrown by a democracy rioting in innocent blood, and menacing destruction to political and religious establishments, the growth of centuries, somewhat decayed indeed, yet scarcely showing their grey hairs. The first military events of the revolution, the disaffection of Toulon and Lyons, the civil war of La Vendee, the feeble, although successful resistance made to the Duke of Brunswick's invasion, and the frequent and violent change of rulers whose fall none regretted, were all proofs that the French revolution, intrinsically too feeble to sustain the physical and moral force pressing it down, was fast sinking when the wonderful genius of Buonaparte, baffling all reasonable calculation, raised and fixed it on the basis of victory, the only one capable of supporting the crude production.

Sensible, however, that the cause he upheld was not sufficiently in unison with the feelings of the age, Napoleon's first care was to disarm or neutralize monarchical and sacerdotal enmity, by restoring a church establishment, and by becoming a monarch himself. Once a sovereign, his vigorous character, his pursuits, his talents, and the critical nature of the times, inevitably rendered him a despotic one; yet while he sacrificed political liberty, which to the great bulk of mankind has never been more than a pleasing sound, he cherished with the utmost care political equality, a sensible good, that produces increasing satisfaction as it descends in the scale of society; but this, the real principle of his government, the secret of his popularity, made him the people's monarch, not the sovereign of the aristocracy; hence, Mr. Pitt called him, "the child and the champion of democracy," a truth as evident as that Mr. Pitt and his successors were the children and the champions of aristocracy; hence also the privileged

classes of Europe consistently transferred their natural and implacable hatred of the French revolution to his person, for they saw that in him innovation had found a protector; that he alone had given pre-eminence to a system so hateful to them, and that he really was what he called himself "the State."

The treaty of Tilsit, therefore, although it placed Napoleon in a commanding situation with regard to the potentates of Europe, unmasked the real nature of the war, and brought him and England, the respective champions of equality and privilege, into more direct contact: peace could not be between them while both were strong, and all that the French emperor had hitherto gained only enabled him to choose his future field of battle.

When the catastrophe of Trafalgar forbade him to think of invading England, his fertile genius conceived the plan of sapping her naval and commercial strength, by depriving her of the continental market for her manufactured goods; he prohibited the reception of English wares in any part of the continent, and he exacted from allies and dependants the most rigid compliance with his orders; but this "continental system," as it was called, became inoperative when French troops were not present to enforce his commands. It was thus in Portugal, where British influence was really paramount, although the terror inspired by the French arms seemed at times to render this doubtful; fear however, is momentary, self-interest lasting, and Portugal was but an unguarded province of England.

From Portugal and Gibraltar, English goods freely passed into Spain; and to check this traffic by force was not easy, and otherwise impossible. Spain stood nearly in the same position with regard to France that Portugal did to England; a warm feeling of friendship for the enemy of Great Britain was the natural consequence of the unjust seizure of the Spanish frigates in a time of peace; but although this rendered the French cause popular in Spain, and that the court of Madrid was from weakness subservient to the French Emperor, nothing could induce the people to refrain from a profitable contraband trade; they would not pay that respect to the wishes of a foreign power, which they refused to the regulations of their own government; neither was the aristocratical enmity to Napoleon asleep in Spain. A proclamation issued by the Prince of the Peace previous to the battle of Jena, although hastily recalled when the result of that conflict was known, sufficiently indicated the tenure upon which the friendship of the Spanish court was to be held.

This state of affairs drew the French Emperor's attention towards the Peninsula; a chain of remarkable circumstances fixed it there, and induced him to remove the reigning family, and to place his brother Joseph on the throne of Spain. He thought that the people of that country, sick of an effete government, would be quiescent under such a change; and although it should prove otherwise, the confidence he reposed in his own fortune, unrivalled talents, and vast power, made him disregard the consequences, while the cravings of his military and political system, the danger to be apprehended from the vicinity of a Bourbon dynasty, and, above all, the temptations offered by a miraculous folly which outran even his desires, urged him to a deed, that well accepted by the people of the Peninsula, would have proved beneficial; but being enforced contrary to their wishes, was unhallowed either by justice or benevolence.

In an evil hour, for his own greatness and the happiness of others, he commenced this fatal project; founded in violence, executed with fraud and cruelty, it spread desolation through the fairest portions of the Peninsula; it was calamitous to France and destructive to himself. The conflict between his hardy veterans and the bloody vindictive race he insulted, assumed a character of unmitigated ferocity disgraceful to human nature; for the Spaniards did not fail to defend their just cause with hereditary cruelty, and the French army struck a terrible balance of barbarous actions.

Napoleon observed with surprise the unexpected energy of the people, and bent his whole force to the attainment of his object; while England coming to

the assistance of the Peninsula employed all her resources to frustrate his efforts. Thus the two leading nations of the world were brought into contact at a moment when both were disturbed by angry passions, eager for great events, and possessed of surprising power.

The extent and population of the French empire, including the kingdom of Italy, the confederation of the Rhine, the Swiss Cantons, the Duchy of Warsaw, and the dependent states of Holland and Naples, enabled Buonaparte through the medium of the conscription to array an army, in number nearly equal to the great host that followed the Persian of old against Greece; like that multitude also his troops were gathered from many nations, but they were trained in a Roman discipline, and ruled by a Carthaginian genius. The organization* of Napoleon's army was simple, the administration vigorous, the manipulations well contrived. The French officers accustomed to success, were bold, enterprising, of great reputation, and feared accordingly. By a combination of discipline and moral excitement, admirably adapted to the mixed nature of his troops, the Emperor had created a power that appeared to be resistless, and, in truth, it would have been so, if applied to one great object at a time; but this the ambition of the man, or rather the force of circumstances, would not permit.

The ships of France were chained up in her harbours, and her naval strength was rebuked, but not destroyed; inexhaustible resources for building vessels, vast marine establishments, a coast line of many thousand miles, and the creative genius of Napoleon were nursing up a navy, formidable as a secondary arm; and the war then pending between the United States and Great Britain promised to nurture its growth, and to increase its efficacy.

Maritime commerce was indeed fainting in France, but her internal and continental traffic was robust; her manufactures were rapidly improving; her debt was small; her financial operations conducted on a prudent plan, and with exact economy. The supplies were all raised within the year without any very great pressure of taxation, and from a sound metallic currency; thus there seemed to be no reasonable doubt, that any war undertaken by Napoleon might be by him brought to a favourable termination.

On the other hand, England, omnipotent at sea, was little regarded as a military power. Her enormous debt was yearly increasing in an accelerated ratio; and this necessary consequence of anticipating the resources of the country, and dealing in a factitious currency, was fast eating into the vital strength of the state: for although the merchants and great manufacturers were thriving from the accidental circumstances of the times, the labourers were suffering and degenerating in character; pauperism and its sure attendant crime were spreading over the land, and the population was fast splitting into distinct classes,—the one rich and arbitrary, the other poor and discontented: the former composed of those who profited, the latter of those who suffered, by the war. Of Ireland it is unnecessary to speak; her wrongs and her misery, peculiar and unparalleled, are too well known, and too little regarded, to call for remark.

This general comparative statement, so favourable to France, would however be a false criterion of the relative strength of the belligerents, with regard to the approaching struggle in the Peninsula. A cause manifestly unjust is a heavy weight upon the operations of a general: it reconciles men to desertion—it sanctifies want of zeal—is a pretext for cowardice—renders hardships more irksome, dangers more obnoxious, and glory less satisfactory to the mind of the soldier. Now the invasion of the Peninsula, whatever might have been its real original, was an act of violence on the part of Napoleon repugnant to the

* For a description of this organization, the reader is referred to the "*Precis des Evenemens Militaires*, par Mathieu Dumas;" a work of infinite labour and research, in which the military story of ten years is told with unrivalled simplicity and elegance.

feelings of mankind. The French armies were burthened with a sense of its iniquity, the British troops exhilarated by a contrary sentiment. All the continental nations had smarted under the sword of Napoleon, but, with the exception of Prussia, none were crushed; a common feeling of humiliation, the hope of revenge, and the ready subsidies of England, were bonds of union among their governments stronger than the most solemn treaties. France could only calculate on their fears, England was secure in their self-love.

The hatred to what were called French principles was at this period in full activity. The privileged classes of every country hated Napoleon, because his genius had given stability to the institutions that grew out of the revolution, because his victories had baffled their calculations, and shaken their hold of power. As the chief of revolutionary France he was constrained to continue his career until the final accomplishment of her destiny, and this necessity, overlooked by the great bulk of mankind, afforded plausible ground for imputing insatiable ambition to the French government and to the French nation, of which ample use was made. Rapacity, insolence, injustice, cruelty, even cowardice, were said to be inseparable from the character of a Frenchman; and, as if such vices were nowhere else to be found, it was more than insinuated that all the enemies of France were inherently virtuous and disinterested. Unhappily history is but a record of crimes, and it is not wonderful that the arrogance of men, buoyed up by a spring-tide of military glory, should, as well among allies as among vanquished enemies, have produced sufficient disgust to ensure a ready belief in any accusation, however false and absurd.

Napoleon was the contriver and the sole support of a political system that required time and victory to consolidate; he was the connecting link between the new interests of mankind and what of the old were left in a state of vigour; he held them together strongly, but he was no favourite with either, and consequently in danger from both. His power, unsanctified by time, depended not less upon delicate management than upon vigorous exercise; he had to fix the foundations of, as well as to defend, an empire, and he may be said to have been rather peremptory than despotic. There were points of administration with which he durst not meddle even wisely, much less arbitrarily; customs, prejudices, and the dregs of the revolutionary licence interfered with his policy, and rendered it complicated and difficult. It was not so with his inveterate adversaries; the delusion of parliamentary representation enabled the English government safely to exercise an unlimited power over the persons and the property of the nation, and through the influence of an active and corrupt press they exercised nearly the same power over the public mind.

The vast commerce of England, penetrating by a thousand channels (open or secret) as it were into every house on the face of the globe, supplied unequalled sources of intelligence. The spirit of traffic, which seldom acknowledges the ties of country, was universally on the side of Great Britain, and those twin curses, paper-money and public credit, so truly described as "strength in the beginning but weakness in the end," were recklessly used by statesmen whose policy regarded not the interests of posterity. Such were the adventitious causes of England's power; and her natural, legitimate resources were many and great.

If any credit is to be given to the census, the increasing population of the United Kingdom, amounted at this period to nearly 20,000,000: France reckoned but 27,000,000 when Frederick the Great declared that if he were her king, "not a gun should be fired in Europe without his leave."

The French army was undoubtedly very formidable from numbers, discipline, skill, and bravery; but contrary to the general opinion, the British army was inferior to it in none of these points save the first, and in discipline it was superior, because a national army will always bear a sterner code than a mixed force will suffer. With the latter, the military not the moral crimes can be punished; men will submit to death for a breach of great regulations which

they know by experience to be useful, but the constant restraint of petty though wholesome rules they will escape from by desertion, or resist by mutiny, when the ties of custom and country are removed; for the disgrace of bad conduct attaches not to them, but to the nation under whose colours they serve; great indeed is that genius that can keep men of different nations firm to their colours, and preserve a rigid discipline at the same time. Napoleon's military system was, from this cause, inferior to the British, which if it be purely administered, combines the solidity of the Germans with the rapidity of the French, excluding the mechanical dulness of the one, and the dangerous vivacity of the other; yet, before the campaign in the Peninsula had proved its excellence in every branch of war, the English army was absurdly under-rated in foreign countries, and absolutely despised in its own. It was reasonable to suppose that it did not possess that facility of moving in large bodies which long practice had given to the French; but the individual soldier was (and is still) most falsely stigmatized as deficient in intelligence and activity, the officers ridiculed, and the idea that a British could cope with a French army, even for a single campaign, considered chimerical.

The English are a people very subject to receive and to cherish false impressions; proud of their credulity as if it were a virtue, the majority will adopt any fallacy, and cling to it with a tenacity proportioned to its grossness. Thus an ignorant contempt for the British soldiery had been long entertained, before the ill success of the expeditions in 1794 and 1799 appeared to justify the general prejudice. The true cause of those failures was not traced, and the excellent discipline afterwards introduced and perfected by the Duke of York was despised. England, both at home and abroad, was, in 1808, scorned as a military power, when she possessed, without a frontier to swallow up large armies in expensive fortresses, at least 200,000* of the best equipped and best disciplined soldiers in the universe, together with an immense recruiting establishment, and, through the medium of the militia, the power of drawing upon the population without limit. It is true that of this number many were necessarily employed in the defence of the colonies, but enough remained to compose a disposable force greater than that with which Napoleon won the battle of Austerlitz, and double that with which he conquered Italy. In all the materials of war, the superior ingenuity and skill of the English mechanics were visible, and that intellectual power that distinguishes Great Britain amongst the nations, in science, arts, and literature, was not wanting to her generals in the hour of danger.

CHAPTER II.

FOR many years antecedent to the French invasion, the royal family of Spain was distracted with domestic quarrels; the son's hand was against his mother, the father's against his son, and the court was a scene of continual broils, under cover of which artful men, as is usual in such cases, pushed their own interest forward, while they seemed to act only for the sake of the party whose cause they espoused. Charles IV. attributed this unhappy state of his house to the intrigues of his sister-in-law, the queen of the Two Sicilies. He himself, a weak and inefficient old man, was governed by his wife, and she again by Don Manuel Godoy, of whose person she was enamoured even to folly. From the rank of a simple gentleman of the Royal Guards, this person had, through

* Viz.:—about 30,000 Cavalry, 6000 Foot Guards, 170,000 Infantry of the line, 14,000 Artillery.—Total, 220,000. Of these, between 50,000 and 60,000 were employed in the Colonies and in India; the remainder were disposable, because from 80,000 to 100,000 Militia, differing from the regular troops in nothing but the name, were sufficient for the home duties. If to this force we add 30,000 marines, the military power of England must be considered prodigious.

her influence, been raised to the highest dignities ; and the title of Prince of the Peace was conferred upon a man whose name must be for ever connected with one of the bloodiest wars that fill the page of history.

Ferdinand, prince of the Asturias, naturally hated this favourite, and the miserable death of his young wife, his own youth and apparently forlorn condition, created such an interest in his favour, that the people partook of his feelings ; and the disunion of the royal family extending its effects beyond the precincts of the court, involved the nation in ruin. Those who know how a Spaniard hates, will readily comprehend why Godoy, who was really a mild, good-natured man, although a sensual and corrupt one, has been so overloaded with imprecations, as if he, and he alone, had been the cause of the disasters of Spain.

The canon Escoiquiz, a daring and subtle politician, appears to have been the chief of Ferdinand's party ; finding the influence of the Prince of the Peace too strong, he looked for support in a powerful quarter ; and under his tuition, Ferdinand wrote upon the 11th of October, 1807, to the Emperor Napoleon ; in this letter he complained of the influence which bad men had obtained over his father, prayed for the interference of the "hero destined by Providence," so ran the text, "to save Europe and to support thrones ;" asked an alliance by marriage with the Buonaparte family, and finally desired that his communication might be kept secret from his father, lest it should be taken as a proof of disrespect. To this letter he received no answer, and fresh matter of quarrel being found by his enemies at home, he was placed in arrest, and upon the 29th of October, Charles denounced him to the Emperor as guilty of treason, and of having projected the assassination of his own mother. Napoleon caught eagerly at this pretext for interfering in the domestic policy of Spain, and thus the honour and independence of a great people were placed in jeopardy by the squabbles of two of the most worthless persons in the nation.

Some short time before this, Godoy, either instigated by an ambition to found a dynasty, or fearing that the death of the king would expose him to the vengeance of Ferdinand, had made proposals to the French Court to concert a plan for the conquest and division of Portugal, promising the assistance of Spain, on condition that a principality for himself should be set apart from the spoil. At least such is the turn given by Napoleon to this affair ; but the article which provided an indemnification for the King of Etruria, a minor, who had just been obliged to surrender his Italian dominions to France, renders it very doubtful if the first offer came from Godoy. That, however, is a point of small interest, for Napoleon eagerly adopted the project if he did not propose it ; and the advantages were all on his side. Under the pretext of supporting his army in Portugal, he might fill Spain with his troops ; the dispute between the father and the son, now referred to his arbitration, placed the golden apples within his reach, and he resolved to gather the fruit if he had not planted the tree.

A secret treaty was immediately concluded at Fontainebleau, between Marshal Duroc on the part of France, and Eugenio Izquierdo on the part of Spain. This treaty, together with a convention dependent on it, was signed the 27th, and ratified by Napoleon on the 29th of October ; the contracting parties agreeing to the following conditions :

The house of Braganza to be driven forth of Portugal, and that kingdom divided into three portions, of which the province of Entre Minho e Duero and the town of Oporto, forming one, was to be given as an indemnification to the dispossessed King of Etruria, and to be called the kingdom of North Lusitania.

The Alemtejo and the Algarves to be erected into a principality for Godoy, who taking the title of Prince of the Algarves, was still to be in some respects dependent upon the Spanish crown.

The central provinces of Estremadura, Beira, and the Tras os Montes,

together with the town of Lisbon, to be held in deposit until a general peace, and then to be exchanged under certain conditions for English conquests.

The ultramarine dominions of the exiled family to be equally divided between the contracting parties, and in three years at the longest, the King of Spain to be gratified with the title of Emperor of the Two Americas.

Thus much for the treaty. The terms of the convention were :

That France should employ 25,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry. Spain 24,000 infantry, 30 guns, and 3000 cavalry.

The French contingent to be joined at Alcantara by the Spanish cavalry, artillery, and one-third of the infantry, and from thence to march at once to Lisbon. Of the remaining Spanish infantry 10,000 were to take possession of the Entre Minho e Duero and Oporto, and 6000 were to invade Estremadura and the Algarves. In the mean time a reserve of 40,000 men was to be assembled at Bayonne, ready to take the field by the 20th of November, if England should interfere, or the Portuguese people resist.

If the King of Spain or any of his family joined the troops, the chief command was to be vested in the person so joining, but with that exception, the French general was to be obeyed whenever the armies of the two nations came into contact, and during the march through Spain the French soldiers were to be fed by that country, but paid by their own government.

The revenues of the conquered provinces were to be administered by the general actually in possession, and for the benefit of the nation in whose name the province was held.

Although it is evident that this treaty and convention favoured Napoleon's ulterior operations in Spain, by enabling him to mask his views, and introduce large bodies of men into that country without creating much suspicion of his real intention ; it does not follow, as some authors have asserted, that they were contrived by the emperor for the sole purpose of rendering the Spanish royal family odious to the world, and by this far-fetched expedient to prevent other nations from taking an interest in their fate when he should find it convenient to apply the same measure of injustice to his associates that they had accorded to the family of Braganza.

To say nothing of the weakness of such a policy, founded as it must be on the error that governments acknowledge the dictates of justice at the expense of their supposed interests ; it must be observed that Portugal was intrinsically a great object. History does not speak of the time when the inhabitants of that country were deficient in spirit ; the natural obstacles to an invasion had more than once frustrated the efforts of large armies, and the long line of communication between Bayonne and the Portuguese frontier could only be supported by Spanish co-operation. Add to this, the facility with which England could, and the probability that she would, succour her ancient ally, and the reasonable conclusion is, that Napoleon's first intentions were in accordance with the literal meaning of the treaty of Fontainebleau, and that his subsequent proceedings were the result of new projects conceived as the wondrous imbecility of the Spanish Bourbons became manifest.

Again, the convention provided for the organization of a large Spanish force, to be stationed in the north and south of Portugal, that is, in precisely the two places from whence they could most readily march to the assistance of their country, if it was invaded ; and in fact the division of the Marquis of Solano in the south, and that of General Taranco in the north of Portugal, did afterwards (when the Spanish insurrection broke out) form the strength of the Andalusian and Gallician armies, the former of which gained the victory at Baylen, while the latter contended for it, although ineffectually, at Rio Seco.

The French force destined to invade Portugal was already assembled at Bayonne, under the title of the first army of the Garonne. It was commanded by General Junot, a young man of a bold ambitious disposition, but of greater reputation for military talent than he was able to support. The men were

principally conscripts, and ill fitted to endure the hardships which awaited them.

At first, by easy marches and in small divisions, Junot led his army through Spain; the inhabitants were by no means friendly to their guests; but whether from any latent fear of what was to follow, or from a dislike of foreign soldiers common to all secluded people, does not clearly appear. When the head of the columns reached Salamanca, Junot halted, intending to complete the organization of his troops in that rich country, and there to await the most favourable moment for penetrating the sterile frontier which guarded his destined prey; but political events marched faster than his calculations, and fresh instructions from the emperor prescribed an immediate advance upon Lisbon. Junot obeyed, and the family of Braganza, at his approach, fled to the Brazils. The series of interesting transactions which attended this invasion will be treated of hereafter; at present I must return to Spain already bending to the first gusts of that hurricane which was soon to sweep over her with such destructive violence.

The accusation of treason and intended parricide, preferred by Charles IV. against his son Ferdinand, gave rise to some judicial proceedings which ended in the submission of the latter; and Ferdinand being absolved of the imputed crime, wrote a letter to his father and mother, acknowledging his own faults, but accusing the persons who surrounded him of being the instigators of deeds which he abhorred. The intrigues of his advisers, however, continued, and the plans of Napoleon advanced as a necessary consequence of the divisions in the Spanish court.

By the terms of the convention of Fontainebleau, 40,000 men were to be held in reserve at Bayonne; but a greater number were assembled on different points of the frontier; and in the course of December, two corps had entered the Spanish territory, and were quartered in Vittoria, Miranda, Briviesca, and the neighbourhood. The one, commanded by General Dupont, was called the second army of observation of the "Gironde." The other, commanded by Marshal Moncey, took the title of the army of observation of the "Côte d'Océan." In the gross they amounted to 53,000 men,* of which above 40,000 were fit for duty; and in the course of the month of December, Dupont advanced to Valladolid, while a reinforcement for Junot, 4700 in number, took up their quarters at Salamanca.

It thus appeared as if the French troops were quietly following the natural line of communication between France and Portugal: but in reality Dupont's position cut off the capital from all intercourse with the northern provinces, while Moncey secured the direct road from Bayonne to Madrid.† Small divisions under different pretexts continually reinforced these two bodies, and through the Eastern Pyrenees 12,000 men, commanded by General Duhesme, penetrated into Catalonia, and established themselves in Barcelona.

In the mean time the dispute between the king and his son, or rather between the Prince of the Peace and the advisers of Ferdinand, was brought to a crisis by insurrections at Aranjuez and Madrid, which took place upon the 17th, 18th, and 19th of March, 1808. The old king, deceived by intrigues, or frightened at the difficulties which surrounded him, had determined, as it is supposed by some, to quit Spain, and, in imitation of his brother of Portugal, to retire from the turmoil of European politics, and take refuge in his American dominions. Certain it is that everything was prepared for a flight to Seville, when the prince's grooms commenced a tumult, in which the populace of Aranjuez joined, and were only pacified by the assurance that no journey was in contemplation.

Upon the 18th the people of Madrid, following the example of Aranjuez, sacked the house of the obnoxious favourite, Manuel Godoy. Upon the 19th the riots re-commenced in Aranjuez: the Prince of the Peace secreted himself

* Return of the French Army. Appendix.

† Notes of Napoleon. Appendix, No. 2.

from the fury of the mob ; but his retreat being discovered, he was maltreated, and on the point of being killed, when the soldiers of the royal guard rescued him. Upon the 18th, Charles IV., terrified by the violent proceedings of his subjects, abdicated. This event was proclaimed at Madrid on the 20th, and Ferdinand was declared king, to the great joy of the nation at large : little did the people know what they rejoiced at ; time has since taught them that the fable of the frogs and their monarch had its meaning.

During these transactions, Murat, Grand Duke of Berg, who had taken the command of all the French troops in Spain, quitted his quarters at Aranda de Duero passed the Somosierra, and entered Madrid the 23rd, with Moncey's corps and a fine body of cavalry, Dupont at the same time deviating from the road to Portugal, crossed the Duero and occupied Segovia, the Escorial, and Aranjuez.

Ferdinand arrived at Madrid on the 24th, but was not recognized by Murat as king ; nevertheless, at the demand of that powerful guest, he surrendered the sword of Francis I., which was delivered with much ceremony to the French general. Charles, who had sent a paper to Murat, declaring that his abdication had been the result of force, wrote also to Napoleon in the same strain ; and this state of affairs being unexpected by the emperor, he employed General Savary to conduct his plans, which appear to have been considerably deranged by the vehemence of the people, and the precipitation of Murat in taking possession of the capital.

Before Savary's arrival, Don Carlos, the brother of Ferdinand, departed from Madrid hoping to meet the Emperor Napoleon, whose presence in that city was confidently expected ; and upon the 10th of April, Ferdinand, having first appointed a supreme junta, of which his uncle, Don Antonio, was president, and Murat a member, commenced his own remarkable journey to Bayonne, the true causes of which certainly have not yet been developed ; and perhaps when they shall be known, some petty personal intrigue may be found to have had a greater share in producing it, than the grand machinations attributed to Napoleon, who could not have anticipated, much less have calculated, a great political measure upon such a surprising example of weakness.

The people everywhere manifested their repugnance to this journey ; at Vittoria they cut the traces of Ferdinand's carriage, and at different times several gallant men offered, at the risk of their lives, to carry him off, in defiance of the French troops quartered along the road. But Ferdinand, unmoved by their entreaties and zeal, and regardless of the warning contained in a letter that he received at this period from Napoleon (who, withholding the title of majesty, sharply reprov'd him for his past conduct, and scarcely expressed a wish to meet him), continued his progress, and on the 20th of April, 1808, found himself a prisoner, in Bayonne. In the mean time Charles, who, under the protection of Murat, had resumed his rights, and obtained the liberty of Godoy, quitted Spain, and also threw himself, his cause, and kingdom, into the hands of the emperor.

These events were in themselves quite enough to urge a more cautious people than the Spaniards into action ; but other measures had been pursued, which proved beyond the possibility of doubt, that the country was destined to be the spoil of the French. The troops of that nation had been admitted without reserve or precaution into the different fortresses upon the Spanish frontier, and, taking advantage of this hospitality to forward the views of their chief, they got possession, by various artifices, of the citadels of St. Sebastian in Guipuscoa, of Pampeluna in Navarre, and of that of Figueras, and the forts of Monjuik, and citadel of Barcelona in Catalonia ; and thus, under the pretence of mediating between the father and the son, in a time of profound peace, a foreign force was suddenly established in the capital—on the communications—and in the principal frontier fortresses ; its chief was admitted to a share of the government, and a fiery, proud, and jealous nation was laid prostrate at the

feet of a stranger, without a blow being struck, without one warning voice being raised, without a suspicion being excited in sufficient time to guard against those acts upon which all were gazing in stupid amazement.

It is idle to attribute this surprising event to the subtlety of Napoleon's policy, to the depth of his deceit, or to the treachery of Godoy. Such a fatal calamity could only be the result of bad government, and a consequent degradation of public feeling; and it matters but little to those who wish to derive a lesson from experience, whether it be a Godoy or a Savary that strikes the last bargain of corruption, the silly father or the rebellious son that signs the final act of degradation and infamy. Fortunately, it is easier to oppress the people of all countries, than to destroy their generous feelings; when all patriotism is lost among the upper classes, it may still be found among the lower. In the Peninsula it was not found, but started into life, and with a fervour and energy that ennobled even the wild and savage form in which it appeared; nor was it the less admirable that it burst forth attended by many evils. The good feeling displayed was the people's own; their cruelty, folly, and perverseness, were the effects of bad government.

There are many reasons why Napoleon should have meddled with the interior affairs of Spain; there seems to be no good one for his manner of doing it. It is true that the Spanish Bourbons could never have been sincere friends to France while Buonaparte held the sceptre, and the moment that the fear of his power ceased to operate, it was quite certain that their apparent friendship would change to active hostility; the proclamation issued by the Spanish cabinet just before the battle of Jena, is evidence of this feeling; but if the Bourbons were his enemies, it did not follow that the people sympathised with their rulers. The resources of the country were, it is said, already at his disposal; but that availed him little, as the corruption and weakness of the administration had reduced those resources to the lowest ebb. His great error was, that he looked only to the court, and treated the nation with contempt. Had Napoleon taken care to bring the people and their government into hostile contact first,—and how many points of contact would not such a government have afforded!—instead of appearing as the treacherous arbitrator in a domestic quarrel, he would have been hailed as the deliverer of a great people.

The journey of Ferdinand, the liberation of Godoy, and the flight of Charles, the appointing Murat to be a member of the governing junta, and the movements of the French troops, who were advancing from all parts towards Madrid, roused the indignation of the Spanish people; tumults and assassinations had taken place in various parts; and at Toledo a serious riot occurred on the 23rd of April; the peasants joined the inhabitants of the town, and it was only by the advance of a division of infantry and some cavalry of Dupont's corps (then quartered at Aranjuez) that order was restored. The agitation of the public mind, however, increased; the French troops were all young men, or rather boys, taken from the last conscription; and disciplined after they had entered Spain, their youth and apparent feebleness excited the contempt of the Spaniards, who pride themselves much upon individual prowess; and the swelling indignation at last broke out.

Upon the 2nd of May, a carriage being prepared (as the people supposed) to convey Don Antonio, the uncle of Ferdinand, to France, a crowd collected about it, and their language indicated a determination not to permit the last of the royal family to be spirited away: the traces of the carriage were cut, and loud imprecations against the French burst forth on every side. At that moment, Colonel La Grange, an aide-de-camp of Murat's, appearing amongst them, was assailed and maltreated; in an instant the whole city was in commotion, and the French soldiers expecting no violence, were taken unawares and killed in every quarter: above 700 fell. The hospital was attacked by the populace; but the attendants and the sick beat them off; and the alarm having spread to the camp outside the town, the French cavalry came

to the assistance of their countrymen by the gate of Alcala; while General Lanfranc, with a column of 3000 infantry, descending from the heights on the north-west quarter, entered the Calle Ancha de Bernardo. As this column crossed the street of Maravelles, in which the arsenal was situated, two Spanish officers, named Daois and Velarde, who were in a state of great excitement, discharged some guns upon the passing troops, and were immediately put to death by the voltigeurs; meanwhile, the column, continuing its march, released, as it advanced, several superior French officers, who were in a manner besieged in the houses by the mob. The cavalry at the other end of the town, treating the affair as a tumult, and not as an action, made some hundred prisoners; and by the exertions of Marshal Moncey, General Harispe, Gonzalvo O'Farril, and some others, order was soon restored.

After nightfall, the peasantry of the neighbourhood came armed and in considerable numbers towards the city, and the French guards at the different gates firing upon them, killed twenty or thirty, and wounded others; some few were also crushed to death or lamed by the cavalry in the morning.

In the first moment of irritation, Murat ordered all the prisoners to be tried by a military commission, which condemned them to death; but the municipality interfered, and represented to that prince the extreme cruelty of visiting this angry ebullition of an injured and insulted people with such severity. Murat admitted the weight of their arguments, and forbade any executions on the sentence; but it is said that General Grouchy, in whose immediate power the prisoners remained, exclaiming that his own life had been attempted! that the blood of the French soldiers was not to be spilt with impunity! and that the prisoners having been condemned by a council of war, ought and should be executed! proceeded to shoot them in the Prado; and forty were thus slain before Murat could cause his orders to be effectually obeyed. The next day some of the Spanish authorities having discovered that a colonel commanding the imperial guards still retained a number of prisoners in the barracks, applied to the Duke of Berg to have them released. Murat consented to have those prisoners also enlarged: but the colonel getting intelligence of what was passing, and being enraged at the loss of so many choice soldiers, put forty-five of the captives to death before the order could arrive to stay his bloody proceedings.*

Such were nearly the circumstances that attended this celebrated tumult, in which the wild cry of Spanish warfare was first heard; but as many authors, adopting without hesitation all the reports of the day, have represented it sometimes as a wanton and extensive massacre on the part of the French, at another as a barbarous political stroke to impress a dread of their power, I think it necessary to make the following observations.

That it was commenced by the Spaniards is undoubted; their fiery tempers, the irritation produced by passing events, and the habits of violence which they had acquired by their late successful insurrection against Godoy, rendered an explosion inevitable. But if the French had secretly stimulated this disposition, and had prepared in cold blood to make a terrible example, undoubtedly they would have prepared some check on the Spanish soldiers of the garrison, and they would scarcely have left their hospital unguarded; still less have arranged the plan so that their own loss should far exceed that of the Spaniards; and surely nothing would have induced them to relinquish the profit of such policy after having suffered all the injury. Yet Marshal Moncey and General Harispe were actively engaged in restoring order; and it is certain that, including the peasants shot outside the gates, the executions on the Prado and in the barracks of the imperial guards, the whole number of Spaniards slain did not

* I think it necessary to state that I have derived my information from officers, some French, some Italian, who were present in the tumult of the 2nd of May. On the veracity of my informants I have the firmest reliance; their accounts agreed well, and the principal facts were confirmed by the result of my personal inquiries at Madrid in the year 1812.

amount to 120 persons, while more than 700 French fell. Of the imperial guards seventy men were wounded, and this fact alone would suffice to prove that there was no premeditation on the part of Murat; for if he was base enough to sacrifice his own men with such unconcern, he would not have exposed the select soldiers of the French empire in preference to the conscripts who abounded in his army. The affair itself was certainly accidental, and not very bloody for the patriots, but policy induced both sides to attribute secret motives, and to exaggerate the slaughter. The Spaniards in the provinces, impressed with an opinion of French atrocity, were thereby excited to insurrection on the one hand; and, on the other, the French, well aware that such an impression could not be effaced by an accurate relation of what did happen, seized the occasion to convey a terrible idea of their power and severity; but, while it is the part of history to reduce such amplifications, it is impossible to remain unmoved in recording the gallantry and devotion of a populace that could thus dare to assail the force commanded by Murat, rather than abandon one of their princes; such, however, was the character of the lower classes of Spain throughout this war; fierce, confident, and prone to sudden and rash actions, they had an intuitive perception of all that was great and noble, but were miserably weak in execution.

The commotion of the 2nd of May was the forerunner of insurrections in every part of Spain, few of which were so honourable to the actors as that of Madrid. Unprincipled villains hailed this opportunity of directing the passions of the multitude, and, under the mask of patriotism, turned the unthinking fury of the people against whoever it pleased them to rob or to destroy: pillage, massacres, assassinations, cruelties of the most revolting kind, were everywhere perpetrated; and the intrinsic goodness of the cause was disfigured by the enormities committed at Cadiz, Seville, Badajos, and other places, but chiefly at Valencia, pre-eminent in barbarity at a moment when all were barbarous! The first burst of popular feeling being thus misdirected, and the energy of the people wasted in assassinations; lassitude and fear succeeded to the insolence of tumult at the approach of real danger; for it is one thing to shine in the work of butchery, and another to establish that discipline which can alone sustain the courage of the multitude in the hour of trial.

To cover the suspicious measure of introducing more troops than the terms of the convention warranted, a variety of reports relative to the ultimate intentions of the French emperor had been propagated; at one time Gibraltar was to be besieged, and officers were despatched to examine the Mediterranean coasts of Spain and Barbary; at another, Portugal was to become the theatre of great events, and a mysterious importance was attached to all the movements of the French armies, with a view to deceive a court that fear and sloth disposed to the belief of any thing but the truth, and to impose upon a people whose unsuspecting ignorance was at first mistaken for tameness.

In the mean time, active agents were employed to form a French party at the capital; but as the insurrections of Aranjuez and Madrid discovered the fierceness of the Spanish character, Napoleon enjoined more caution and prudence upon his lieutenants than the latter were disposed to practise. In fact, Murat's precipitation was the cause of hastening the discovery of his master's real views before they were ripe for execution; for Dupont's first division and cavalry crossed the Duero as early as the 14th of March, and upon the 10th of April occupied Aranjuez, while his second and third divisions took post at the Escorial and at Segovia; thus encircling the capital while Moncey's corps occupied it. Hence an intention to control the provincial government left by Ferdinand became manifest, and the riot at Toledo, although promptly quelled by the interference of the French troops, indicated the state of the public mind before the explosion at Madrid had placed the parties in a state of direct hostility.

Murat seems to have been intrusted with only a half confidence, and as his

natural impetuosity urged him to play a rash rather than a timid part, he appeared with the air of a conqueror before a ground of quarrel was laid; not that he acted entirely without grounds, for a letter addressed to him about this time by Napoleon, contained the following instructions: "The Duke of Infantado has a party in Madrid; they will attack you; dissipate them, and seize the government." But Murat's policy, as his after life proved, was too coarse and open for such difficult affairs.

At Bayonne the political events kept pace with those of Madrid. Charles IV. having reclaimed his rights in presence of Napoleon, sent orders to the infant Don Antonio, to resign his office, the presidency of the governing junta, to Murat, who, at the same time, received the title of lieutenant-general of the kingdom: this appointment, and the restoration of Charles to the regal dignity, were proclaimed in Madrid, with the acquiescence of the council of Castile, on the 10th of May; but five days previous to that period, the old monarch had again resigned his sceptre into the hands of Napoleon, and Ferdinand and himself were consigned, with large pensions, to the tranquillity of private life.

The throne of Spain being now vacant, the right to fill it was assumed by the French emperor, in virtue of the cession made by Charles IV. He desired that a king might be chosen from his own family, and after some hesitation upon the part of the council of Castile, that body, in concert with the municipality of Madrid, and the governing junta, declared that their choice had fallen upon Joseph Buonaparte, at that time king of Naples. Cardinal Bourbon, primate of Spain, first cousin of Charles IV., and Archbishop of Toledo, not only acceded to this arrangement, but actually wrote to Napoleon a letter testifying his adhesion to the new order of things.

As it was easy to foretell the result of the election, the king of Naples was already journeying towards Bayonne, and arrived there on the 7th of June. The principal men of Spain were also invited to meet in that town upon the 15th, with a view to obtain their assent to a constitution prepared by Napoleon. At this meeting, called "the Assembly of Notables," ninety-one Spaniards of eminence appeared, and, first accepting Joseph as their king, proceeded to discuss the constitution in detail, and after several sittings adopted it, and swore to maintain its provisions. Thus finished the first part of this eventful drama.

The new constitution was calculated to draw forth the resources of Spain: compared to the old system it was a blessing, and it would have been received as such under different circumstances; but now arms were to decide its fate, for in every province of Spain the cry of war had been raised. In Catalonia, in Valencia, in Andalusia, Estremadura, Galicia, and the Asturias, the people were gathering, and fiercely declaring their determination to resist French intrusion.

But Joseph, apparently contented with the acquiescence of the ninety-one notables, and trusting to the powerful support of his brother, crossed the frontier on the 9th of July; and on the 12th arrived at Vittoria. The inhabitants still nourishing the discontent caused by Ferdinand's journey to Bayonne, seemed disposed to hinder Joseph's entrance; but their opposition did not break out into actual violence, and the next morning he continued his progress by Miranda del Ebro, Briesca, Burgos, and Buitrago. The 20th of July he entered Madrid, and upon the 24th he was proclaimed King of Spain and the Indies, with all the solemnities usual upon such occasions; not hesitating to declare himself the enemy of eleven millions of people, the object of a whole nation's hatred; calling, with a strange accent, from the midst of foreign bands, upon that fierce and haughty race, to accept of a constitution which they did not understand, and which few of them had ever heard of; his only hope of success resting on the strength of his brother's arms; his claims upon the consent of an imbecile monarch, and the weakness of a few

pusillanimous nobles, in contempt of the rights of millions now arming to oppose him. This was the unhallowed part of the enterprise; this it was that rendered his offered constitution odious, covered it with a leprous skin, and drove the noble-minded far from the pollution of its touch!

CHAPTER III.

JOSEPH being proclaimed king, required the council of Castile to take the oath of allegiance prescribed by the constitution; but with unexpected boldness, that body, hitherto obedient, met his orders with a remonstrance. War, virtually declared on the 2nd of May, was at this time raging in all parts of the peninsula, and the council was secretly apprized that a great misfortune had befallen the French arms. It was no longer a question between Joseph and some reluctant public bodies, but an awful struggle between great nations; and how the spirit of insurrection breaking forth simultaneously in every province was nourished in each, until it acquired the consistence of regular warfare, I shall now relate.

Just before the tumult of Aranjuez, the Marquis of Solano y Socoro, commanding the Spanish auxiliary force in the Alentejo, received orders from Godoy to withdraw from that country with his division, and to post it on the frontier of Andalusia, to cover the projected journey of Charles IV. Napoleon was aware of these orders, but would not interrupt their execution. Solano quitted Portugal without difficulty, and in the latter end of May, observing the general agitation, repaired to his government of Cadiz, where a French squadron,* under Admiral Rossily, had just before taken refuge from the English fleet. As Solano passed through Seville (that city being in a state of great ferment), he was required to put himself at the head of an insurrection in favour of Ferdinand VII. He refused, and passed on to his own government; but there also the people were ripe for a declaration against the French; and a local government having been in the mean time established at Seville, the members at once assumed the title of the "Supreme Junta of Spain and the Indies," declared war in form against the intrusive monarch, commanded all men between the ages of sixteen and forty-five to take arms, called upon the troops of the camp of St. Roch to acknowledge their authority, and ordered Solano to attack the French squadron. That unfortunate man hesitated to commit his country in a war with a power whose strength and means he was better acquainted with than the temper of his own countrymen, and was instantly murdered: he died with a courage worthy of his amiable and unblemished character. There is too much reason to believe that his death was coolly projected, and that the junta at Seville sent an agent to Cadiz for the express purpose of exciting the populace to commit this odious assassination.

This foul stain upon the cause was intensely deepened by the perpetration of similar or worse deeds in every part of the kingdom. At Seville the Conde d'Aguilar was dragged from his carriage, and, without even the imputation of guilt, inhumanly butchered; and here again it is said that the mob were instigated by a leading member of the junta, Count Gusman de Tilly, a man described as "capable of dishonouring a whole nation by his crimes," while his victim was universally admitted to be virtuous and accomplished.

As early as April, General Castaños (then commanding the camp of St. Roch) had entered into communication with Sir Hew Dalrymple, the governor of Gibraltar; he was resolved to seize any opportunity that offered to resist the French, and he appears to have been the first, if not the only Spaniard, who united patriotism with prudent calculation, readily acknowledging the authority of the junta of Seville, and stifling the workings of self-interest with a virtue by

* Five sail of the line and one frigate.

no means common to his countrymen at that period. When the insurrection first broke out, Admiral Purvis commanded the British squadron off Cadiz, and in concert with General Spencer (who happened to be in that part of the world with 5000 men, offered to co-operate with Solano, if he would assail the French ships of war in the harbour : upon the death of that unfortunate man, this offer was renewed and pressed upon Don Thomas Morla, his successor ; but he, for reasons hereafter to be mentioned, refused all assistance, and reduced the hostile ships himself. Castaños, on the contrary, united closely with all the British commanders, and obtained from them supplies of arms, ammunition, and money ; and at the instance of Sir Hew Dalrymple, the merchants of Gibraltar advanced a loan for the service of the Spanish patriots.*

Meanwhile the assassinations at Cadiz and Seville were imitated in every part of Spain ; hardly can a town be named in which some innocent and worthy persons were not slain. Grenada had its murders ; Carthagea rivalled Cadiz in ruthless cruelty ; and Valencia was foul with slaughter. Don Miguel de Saavedra, the governor of that city, was killed, not in the fury of the moment, for he escaped the first danger and fled, but being pursued and captured, was brought back and deliberately sacrificed. Balthazar Calvo, a canon of the church of St. Isidro, then commenced a massacre of the French residents. For twelve days unchecked he traversed the streets of Valencia, followed by a band of fanatics, brandishing their knives, and filling all places with blood ; many hundred helpless people fell the victims of his thirst for murder ; and at last, emboldened by the impunity he enjoyed, Calvo proceeded to threaten the junta itself ; but there his career was checked. Those worthy personages, who (with the exception of Mr. Tupper, the English consul, then a member), had calmly witnessed his previous violence, at once found the means to crush his power when their own safety was concerned. The canon, being in the act of braving their authority, was seized by stratagem, imprisoned, and soon afterwards strangled together with 200 of his band.

The Conde de Serbelloni, captain-general of the province, placed himself at the head of the insurrection, and proceeded to organize an army ; and at the same time the old Count Florida Blanca, assumed the direction of the Murcian patriots, and those two kingdoms acted cordially together.

In Catalonia the occupation of Barcelona impeded the development of the popular effervescence, but the feeling was the same, and the insurrection breaking out at the town of Manresa, soon spread to all the unfettered parts of the province.

In Aragon the arrival of Don Joseph Palafox kindled the fire of patriotism ; he had escaped from Bayonne, and his family were greatly esteemed in a country where it was of the noblest among a people absurdly vain of their ancient descent. The captain-general, fearful of a tumult, ordered Palafox to quit the province. This circumstance, joined to some appearance of mystery in his escape, inflamed the passions of the multitude ; they surrounded his abode, and forced him to put himself at their head : the captain-general was displaced and confined, some persons were murdered, and a junta was formed. Palafox was considered by his companions as a man of slender capacity and great vanity, and there is nothing in his exploits to create a doubt of the justness of this opinion. It was not Palafox that upheld the glory of Aragon, it was the spirit of the people, which he had not excited, and could so little direct that for a long time after the commencement of the first siege, he was kept a sort of prisoner in Zaragoza ; and evident distrust of his courage and fidelity was displayed by the population which he is supposed to have ruled.

The example of Aragon aroused the Navarrese, and Logroño became the focus of an insurrection which extended along most of the valleys of that kingdom. In the northern and western provinces the spirit of independence was equally fierce, and as decidedly pronounced, accompanied also by the same

* 42,000 dollars.

brutal excesses. In Badajos the Conde de la Torre del Frenio was butchered by the populace, and his mangled carcass dragged through the streets in triumph. At Talavera de la Reyna, the corregidor with difficulty escaped a similar fate by a hasty flight. Leon presented a wide, unbroken scene of anarchy. In Valladolid, and all the great towns, the insurgent patriots laid violent hands upon every person who did not instantly concur in their wishes, and pillage was added to murder.

Gallicia seemed to hold back for a moment ; but the example of Leon, and the arrival of an agent from the Asturias, where the insurrection was in full force, produced a general movement. Filanghieri, the Governor of Coruña, an Italian by birth, was by a tumultuous crowd called upon to exercise the rights of sovereignty, and to declare war in form against the French : like every man of sense in Spain, he was unwilling to commence such an important revolution upon such uncertain grounds ; the impatient populace instantly attempted his life, which was then saved by the courage of an officer of his staff ; but his horrible fate was only deferred. He was a man of talent, sincerely attached to Spain, and he exerted himself with success in establishing a force in the province : no suspicion of guilt seems to have attached to his conduct, and his death marks the temper of the times and the inherent ferocity of the people. A part of the regiment of Navarre seized him at Villa Franca del Bierzo, planted the ground with their bayonets, and then tossing him in a blanket, let him fall on the points thus disposed, and there leaving him to struggle, they dispersed and retired to their own homes.

The Asturians were the first who proclaimed their indefeasible right of choosing a new government when the old one ceased to afford them protection. Having established a local junta, and invested it with all the functions of royalty, they declared war against the French, and despatched deputies to England to solicit assistance.

In Biscay and the Castiles, 50,000 bayonets overawed the great towns ; but the peasantry commenced a war in their own manner against the stragglers and the sick, and thus a hostile chain surrounding the French army was completed in every link.

This universal and nearly simultaneous effort of the Spanish people was beheld by the rest of Europe with astonishment and admiration : astonishment at the energy thus suddenly put forth by a nation hitherto deemed unnerved and debased ; admiration at the devoted courage of an act, which, seen at a distance, and its odious parts unknown, appeared with all the ideal beauty of Numantian patriotism. In England the enthusiasm was unbounded ; dazzled at first with the splendour of such an agreeable, unlooked-for spectacle, men of all classes gave way to the impulse of a generous sympathy, and forgot, or felt disinclined to analyse, the real causes of this apparently magnanimous exertion. But without wishing to detract from the merit of the Spanish people, and certainly that merit was very great, it may be fairly doubted if the disinterested vigour of their character was the true source of their resistance. Constituted as modern states are, with little in their systems of government or education which conduces to nourish intense feelings of patriotism, it would be miraculous indeed if such a result was obtained from the pure virtue of a nation, which for two centuries had groaned under the pressure of civil and religious despotism. It was, in fact, produced by several co-operating causes, many of which were anything but commendable.

The Spanish character, with relation to public affairs, is distinguished by inordinate pride and arrogance. Dilatory and improvident, the individual as well as the mass, all possess an absurd confidence that everything is practicable which their heated imagination suggests ; once excited, they can see no difficulty in the execution of a project, and the obstacles they encounter are attributed to treachery ; hence the sudden murder of so many virtuous men at the commencement of this commotion. Kind and warm in his attachments, but

bitter in his anger, the Spaniard is patient under privations, firm in bodily suffering, prone to sudden passion, vindictive, bloody, remembering insult longer than injury, and cruel in his revenge. With a strong natural perception of what is noble, his promise is lofty, but as he invariably permits his passions to get the mastery of his reason, his performance is mean.

In the progress of this war the tenacity of vengeance peculiar to the nation supplied the want of cool, persevering intrepidity; but it was a poor substitute for that essential quality, and led rather to deeds of craft and cruelty than to daring acts of patriotism. Now the abstraction of the royal family, and the unexpected pretension to the crown, so insultingly put forth by Napoleon, aroused all the Spanish pride. The tumults of Madrid and Aranjuez had agitated the public mind, and prepared it for a violent movement, and the protection afforded by the French to the obnoxious Godoy increased the ferment of popular feeling: a dearly cherished vengeance was thus frustrated at the moment of its expected accomplishment, and the disappointment excited all that fierceness of anger which with Spaniards is, for the moment, uncontrollable. Just then the tumult of Madrid, swollen and distorted, wrought the people to frenzy, and they arose with one accord, not to meet a danger the extent of which they had calculated, and were prepared, for the sake of independence, to confront, but to gratify the fury of their hearts, and to slake their thirst of blood.

During Godoy's administration the property of the church had been trenched upon, and it was evident, from the example of France and Italy, that, under the new system, that operation would be repeated. This was a matter that involved the interests, and, of course, stimulated the activity of a multitude of monks and priests, who found no difficulty in persuading an ignorant and bigoted people that the aggressive stranger was also the enemy of religion and accursed of God; hence processions, miracles, prophecies; distribution of reliques, and the appointment of saints to the command of the armies, were freely employed to fanaticize the mass of the patriots. In every part of the peninsula the clergy were distinguished for their active zeal, and monks or friars were leaders in the tumults, or at the side of those who were instigating them to barbarous actions. Buonaparte found the same cause produce similar effects during his early campaigns in Italy; and if the shape of that country had been as favourable for protracted resistance, and that a like support had been afforded to them by Great Britain, the heroes of Spain would have been rivalled by modern Romans!

The continental system of mercantile exclusion was another spring of this complicated machinery. It threatened to lessen the already decayed commerce of the maritime towns; but the contraband trade, which has always been carried on in Spain to an incredible extent, was certain of destruction; and with that trade the fate of 100,000 excise and custom-house officers was involved.* It required but a small share of penetration to perceive, that a system of armed revenue officers, organized after the French manner, and stimulated by a vigorous administration, would quickly put an end to the smuggling, which was, in truth, only a consequence of the monopolies and internal restrictions upon the trade of one province with another—vexations abolished by the constitution of Bayonne: hence all the activity and intelligence of the merchants engaged in foreign trade, and all the numbers and lawless violence of the smugglers, were enlisted in the cause of the country, and swelled the ranks of the insurgent patriots; and hence also the readiness of the Gibraltar merchants to advance the loan before spoken of.

The state of civilisation in Spain was likewise exactly suited to an insurrection: if the people had been a little more enlightened, they would have joined the French; if very enlightened, the invasion could not have happened at all; but, in a country where the comforts of civilized society are less needed, and therefore less attended to, than in any other part of Europe, where the warmth and dryness of the climate render it no sort of privation or even inconvenience

* Appendix, No. 9.

to sleep for the greatest part of the year in the open air, and where the universal custom is to go armed, it was not difficult for any energetic man to assemble and keep together large masses of the credulous peasantry. No story could be too gross for their belief, if it agreed with their wishes. "Es verdad, los dicen," "It is true, they say it," is the invariable answer of a Spaniard if a doubt is expressed of the truth of an absurd report. Of temperate habits, possessing little furniture, and generally hoarding all the gold he can get, the Spanish peasant is less concerned for the loss of his house than the inhabitant of another country would be : the effort that he makes in relinquishing his abode must not be measured by the scale of an Englishman's exertion in a like case : and once engaged in an adventure, the lightness of his spirits, and the brilliancy of his sky, make it a matter of indifference to the angry Spanish peasant whither he wanders.

The evils which had afflicted the country previous to the period of the French interference was another cause which tended to prepare the Spaniards for violence, and aided in turning that violence against the intruders. Famine, oppression, poverty, and disease, the loss of commerce, and unequal taxation, had pressed sorely upon them ; for such a system the people could not be enthusiastic ; but they were taught to believe, that Godoy was the sole author of the misery they suffered, and that Ferdinand would redress their grievances ; and as the French were the strenuous protectors of the former, and the oppressors of the latter, it was easy to add this bitterness to their natural hatred of the domination of a stranger ; and it was so done.

Such were the principal causes which combined to produce this surprising revolution, from which so many great events flowed, without one man of eminent talent being cast up to control or direct the spirit which was thus accidentally excited. Nothing proves more directly the heterogeneous nature of the feelings and interests which were united together than this last fact, which cannot be attributed to a deficiency of natural talent, for the genius of the Spanish people is notoriously ardent, subtle, and vigorous ; but there was no common bond of feeling which a great man could lay hold of to influence large masses. Persons of sagacity perceived very early that the Spanish revolution, like a leafy shrub in a violent gale of wind, greatly agitated but disclosing only slight unconnected stems, afforded no sure hold for the ambition of a master-spirit, if such there were. It was clear that the cause would fail unless supported by England, and then England would direct all, and not suffer her resources to be wielded for the glory of an individual, whose views and policy might hereafter thwart her own ; nor was it difficult to perceive that the downfall of Napoleon, not the regeneration of Spain, was the object of her cabinet.

The explosion of public feeling was fierce in its expression, because political passions will always be vehement at the first moment of their appearance among a people new to civil commotion, and unused to permit their heat to evaporate in public discussions. The result was certainly a wonderful change in the affairs of Europe ; it seems yet undecided whether that change has been for the better or for the worse. In the progress of their struggle, the Spaniards developed more cruelty than courage, more violence than intrepidity, more personal hatred of the French than enthusiasm for their own cause. They opened indeed a wide field for the exertions of others ; they presented a fulcrum upon which a lever was rested that moved the civilized world ; but assuredly the presiding genius, the impelling power, came from another quarter. Useful accessories they were, but as principals they displayed neither wisdom, spirit, nor skill sufficient to resist the prodigious force by which they were assailed. If they appeared at first heedless of danger, it was not because they were prepared to perish rather than submit, but that they were reckless of provoking a power whose terrors they could not estimate, and in their ignorance despised.

It is, however, not surprising that great expectations were at first formed of the heroism of the Spaniards, and those expectations were greatly augmented by their agreeable qualities. There is not upon the face of the earth a people

so attractive in the friendly intercourse of society: their majestic language, fine persons, imposing dress and lively imaginations, the inexpressible beauty of the women, and the air of romance which they throw over every action, and infuse into every feeling, all combine to delude the senses and to impose upon the judgment. As companions they are incomparably the most agreeable of mankind; but danger and disappointment attend the man who, confiding in their promises and energy, ventures upon a difficult enterprise. "Never do to-day what you can put off until to-morrow," is the favourite proverb in Spain, and, unlike most proverbs, it is rigidly attended to.

CHAPTER IV.

THE commotion of Aranjuez had undeceived the French emperor; he perceived that he was engaged in a delicate enterprise, and that the people he had to deal with were anything but tame and quiescent under insult. Determined, however, to persevere, he pursued his political intrigues, and, without relinquishing the hope of a successful termination to the affair by such means, he arranged a profound plan of military operations, and so distributed his forces, that, at the moment when Spain was pouring forth her swarthy bands, the masses of the French army were concentrated upon the most important points, and combined in such a manner, that, from their central position they had the power of overwhelming each separate province, no three of which could act in concert without first beating a French corps; and if any of the Spanish armies succeeded in routing a French force, the remaining corps of the latter could unite without difficulty, and retreat without danger. It was the skill of this disposition which enabled 70,000 men, covering a great extent of country, to brave the simultaneous fury of a whole nation: an army less ably distributed would have been trampled under foot, and lost amidst the tumultuous uproar of 11,000,000 of people.

The inconvenience in a political point of view that would have arisen from suffering a regular army to take the field was evident. To have been able to characterize the opposition of the Spanish people as a partial insurrection of peasants, instigated by some evil-disposed persons to act against the wishes of the respectable part of the nation, would have given some colour to the absorbing darkness of the invasion: but to have permitted that which was at first an insurrection of peasants to take the form and consistence of regular armies and methodical warfare, would have been a military error, and dangerous in the extreme. Napoleon who well knew that scientific war is only a wise application of force, laughed at the delusion of those who regarded the want of a regular army as a favourable circumstance, and who hailed the undisciplined peasant as the more certain defender of the country. He knew that a general insurrection can never last long, that it is a military anarchy, and incapable of real strength: he knew that it was the disciplined battalions of Valley Forge, not the volunteers of Lexington, that established American independence; that it was the veterans of Arcole and Marengo, not the republicans of Valmy, that fixed the fate of the French revolution; and consequently his efforts were directed to hinder the Spaniards from drawing together any great body of regular soldiers; an event that might easily happen, for the gross amount of the organized Spanish force was, in the month of May, about 127,000 men of all arms. Fifteen thousand of these were in Holstein, under the Marquis of Romana, but 20,000 were already partially concentrated in Portugal. The remainder, in which were comprised 11,000 Swiss and 30,000 militia, were dispersed in various parts of the kingdom, principally in Andalusia. Besides this force, there was a sort of local reserve called the urban militia, much neglected, and indeed more a name than a reality. Nevertheless the advantage of such an institution was considerable; men were to be had in abundance: and

as the greatest difficulty in a sudden crisis is to prepare the frame-work of order, it was no small resource to find a plan of service ready, the principle of which was understood by the people.

The French army in the Peninsula about the same period, although amounting to 80,000 men, exclusive of those under Junot in Portugal, had not more than 70,000 capable of active operations; the remainder were sick or in depôts. The possession of the fortresses, the central position, and the combination of this comparatively small army, gave it great strength; but it had also many points of weakness; it was made up of the conscripts of different nations, French, Swiss, Italians, Poles, and even Portuguese, whom Junot had expatriated, partly to strengthen the French army, partly to weaken the nation which he held in subjection; and it is a curious fact, that some of them remained in Spain until the end of the war. A few of the Imperial Guards were also employed, and here and there an old regiment of the line was mixed with the young troops to give them consistence; but with these exceptions the French army must be considered as a raw levy fresh from the plough and unacquainted with discipline:* so late even as the month of August many of the battalions had not completed the first elements of their drill, and if they had not been formed upon good skeletons, the difference between them and the insurgent peasantry would have been very trifling. This fact explains, in some measure, the otherwise incomprehensible checks and defeats which the French sustained at the commencement of the contest, and it likewise proves how little of vigour there was in Spanish resistance at the moment of the greatest enthusiasm.

In the distribution of these troops Napoleon attended principally to the security of Madrid. The capital city, and the centre of all interests, its importance was manifest, and the great line of communication between it and Bayonne was early and constantly covered with troops. But the imprudence with which the Grand Duke of Berg brought up the corps of Moncey and Dupont to the capital, the manner in which those corps were posted, cutting off the communication between the northern and southern provinces, and the haughty impolitic demeanour assumed by that prince, drew on the crisis of affairs before the time was ripe, and obliged the French monarch to hasten the advance of other troops, and to make a greater display of his force than was consistent with his policy; for Murat's movement, while it threatened the Spaniards and provoked their hostility, placed the French army in an isolated position, leaving the long line of communication with France unprovided with soldiers and requiring fresh battalions to fill up the void thus discovered; and this circumstance generated additional anger and suspicion at a very critical period of time. To supply the chasm left by Moncey's advance, the formation of a new corps was commenced in Navarre, and by successive reinforcements so increased, that in June it amounted to 23,000 men,† who were placed under the command of Marshal Bessieres, and took the title of the "Army of the Western Pyrenees."

Bessieres, at the first appearance of the commotion, fixed his head-quarters at Burgos and occupied Vittoria, Miranda de Ebro, and other towns, placing posts in his front towards Leon; this position, while it protected the line from Bayonne to the capital, enabled him to awe the Asturias and Biscay, and (by giving him the command of the valley of the Duero) to keep the kingdom of Leon and the province of Segovia in check. The town and castle of Burgos, being put into a state of defence, contained his depôts, and became the centre and pivot of his operations; while some intermediate posts and the fortresses connected him with Bayonne, where a reserve of 20,000 men was formed under General Drouet, then commanding the eleventh military division of France.

By the convention of Fontainebleau, the emperor was entitled to send 40,000 men into the northern parts of Spain. The right thus acquired was grossly abused, but the exercise of it being expected, created at first but little

* Napoleon's Notes, Appendix, No. 3.

† Ibid. No. 2.

alarm. It was different on the eastern frontier : Napoleon had never intimated a wish to pass forces by Catalonia ; neither the treaty nor the convention authorized such a measure, nor could the pretence of supporting Junot in Portugal be advanced as a mask.* Nevertheless, so early as the 9th of February, 11,000 infantry, 1600 cavalry, and 18 pieces of artillery, under the command of General Duhesme, crossed the frontier at La Jonquera, and marched upon Barcelona, leaving a detachment at the town of Figueras, the strong citadel of which commands the principal pass of the mountains. Arrived at Barcelona, Duhesme prolonged his residence there under the pretext of waiting for instructions from Madrid, relative to a pretended march upon Cadiz ; but his secret orders were, to obtain exact information concerning the Catalonian fortresses, depôts, and magazines,—to ascertain the state of public feeling,—to preserve a rigid discipline,—scrupulously to avoid giving any offence to the Spaniards, and to enter into close communication with Marshal Moncey, at that time commanding the whole of the French army in the north of Spain.

The political affairs were even then beginning to indicate serious results, and as soon as Duhesme's report was received, and the troops in the north were in a condition to execute their orders, he was directed to seize upon the citadel of Barcelona, and the fort of Monjuick. The citadel was obtained by stratagem ; the fort, one of the strongest in the world, was surrendered by the governor Alvarez. That brave and worthy officer, knowing the baseness of his court, was certain that he would receive no support from that quarter, and did not resist the demand of the French general, who having failed to surprise the vigilance of the garrison, impudently insisted upon a surrender of the place. Alvarez consented to relinquish his charge, although he felt the disgrace of his situation so acutely that, it is said, he had some thoughts of springing a mine beneath a French detachment during the conference ; but his mind, unequal to the occasion, betrayed his spirit, and he sunk, oppressed by the force of unexpected circumstances.

What a picture of human weakness do these affairs present ; the boldest men shrinking from the discharge of their trust like the meanest cowards, and the wisest following the march of events, confounded and without a rule of action ! If such a firm man, as Alvarez afterwards proved himself to be, could think the disgrace of surrendering his charge at the demand of an insolent and perfidious guest a smaller misfortune than the anger of a miserable court, what must the state of public feeling have been, and how can those men who, like O'Farril and Azanza, served the intruder be with justice blamed, if, amidst the general stagnation, they could not perceive the elements of a salutary tempest ? At the view of such scenes Napoleon might well enlarge his ambitious designs, his fault was not in the projection, but in the rough execution of his plan ; another combination would have ensured success, and the resistance he encountered only shows, that nations as well as individuals are but the creatures of circumstances, at one moment weak, trembling, and submissive ; at another proud, haughty, and daring ; every novel combination of events has an effect upon public sentiment distinct from, and often at variance, with what is called national character.

The treacherous game played at Barcelona was renewed at Figueras, and with equal success ; the citadel of that place fell into the hands of the detachment left there, and thus a free entrance, and a secure base of operations, was established in Catalonia, and the magazines of Barcelona being filled, Duhesme, whose corps took the name the "army of the Eastern Pyrenees," concluded that his task was well accomplished.

The affair was indeed a momentous one, and Napoleon earnestly looked for its termination before the transactions at Madrid could give an unfavourable impression of his ulterior intentions ; he saw the importance which, under certain circumstances, a war would confer upon Barcelona. With an immense

* Napoleon's Notes, Appendix, No. 2.

population, great riches, a good harbour, and almost impregnable defences, that town might be called the key of the south of France or Spain, just as it happened to be in the possession of the one or the other nation. The proximity of Sicily, where a large British force was kept in a state of constant preparation, made it more than probable that if hostilities broke out between himself and the Spaniards, an English army would be quickly carried to Barcelona, and a formidable systematic war be established upon the threshold of France. Such an occurrence would have been fatal to his projects, he felt the full extent of the danger, and at the risk of rendering abortive the efforts to create a French party at Madrid, guarded against it by this open violation of Spanish independence; but the peril of exposing Barcelona to the English was too imminent to leave room for hesitation.

Thirty or forty thousand British troops occupying an entrenched camp in front of that town, supported by a powerful fleet, and having reserve magazines and depôts in Sicily and the Spanish islands, might have been so wielded as to give ample occupation to 150,000 enemies. Under the protection of such an army, the Spanish levies might have been organized and instructed, and as the actual numbers assembled could have been at all times easily masked, increased, or diminished, and the fleet ready to co-operate, the south of France (from whence all the provisions of the enemy must have been drawn) would have been exposed to descents, and have sustained all the inconvenience of actual hostilities. The Spanish provinces of Valencia, Murcia, and even Andalusia, being thus covered, the war would have been drawn to a head, and concentrated about Catalonia, the most warlike, rugged, and sterile portion of Spain. But Duhesme's success having put an end to this danger, the affairs of Barcelona sunk into comparative insignificance. Nevertheless, the emperor kept a jealous watch upon that quarter, the corps employed there was increased to 22,000 men, the general commanding it corresponded directly with Napoleon, and Barcelona was made the centre of a system complete in itself, and distinct from that which held the other corps, rolling round Madrid as their point of attraction.

The capital of Spain is situated in a sort of basin, formed by a semicircular range of mountains, which under the different denominations of the Sierra de Guadarama, the Carpentanos, and the Sierra de Guadalupe, sweep in one unbroken chain from east to west, touching the Tagus at either end of an arch, of which that river is the chord.

All direct communications between Madrid and France, or between the former and the northern provinces of Spain, must necessarily pass over one or other of those Sierras, which are separated from the great range of the Pyrenees by the valley of the Ebro, and from the Biscayan and Austrian mountains by the valley of the Duero.

The four principal roads which lead from France directly upon Madrid are, first, the royal causeway, which passing the frontier at Irun runs under St. Sebastian, and then through a wild and mountainous country (full of dangerous defiles) to the Ebro, crosses that river by a stone bridge at Miranda, and leads upon Burgos, from which town it turns short to the left, is carried over the Duero at Aranda, and soon after encountering the Carpentanos and the Sierra de Guadalupe, penetrates them by the strong pass of the Somosierra, and descends upon the capital. Vittoria stands in a plain about half way between St. Sebastian and Burgos.

The second, which is inferior to the first, commences at St. Jean Pied de Port, and unites at Pampelona: it runs through Taffalla, crosses the Ebro at Tudela, and enters the basin of Madrid by the eastern range of the Sierra de Guadalupe, where the declination of the mountains presents a less rugged barrier than the snowy summits of the northern and western part of the chain.

The third threads the Pyrenees by the way of Jaca, passes the Ebro at Zaragoza, and uniting with the second, likewise crosses the Guadalupe ridge.

The fourth is the great route from Perpignan by Figueras and Gerona to Barcelona; from this latter town it leads by Cervera and Lerida to Zaragoza.

Hence Zaragoza, the capital of Aragon, one of the great depôts of Spain for arms and ammunition, and at that time containing fifty thousand inhabitants, was a strategical point of importance. An army in position there could operate on either bank of the Ebro, intercept the communication between the armies of the Eastern and Western Pyrenees, and block three out of the four great roads leading upon Madrid; if the French had occupied it in force, their army in the capital would have been free and unconstrained in its operations, and might have acted with more security against Valencia; and the dangerous importance of the united armies of Galicia and Leon would also have been diminished, when the road of Burgos ceased to be the only line of retreat from the capital. Nevertheless, Napoleon, neglected Zaragoza at first, because that having no citadel, a small body of troops could not control the inhabitants, and a large force would have created suspicion too soon, and perhaps have prevented the success of the attempts against Pampelona and Barcelona (objects of still greater importance); neither was the heroic defence which that city afterwards made within a reasonable calculation.

The Grand Duke of Berg and the duke of Rovigo remained at Madrid, and from that central point appeared to direct the execution of the French emperor's projects; but he distrusted their judgment, and exacted the most detailed information of every movement and transaction.

In the course of June, Murat, who was suffering from illness, quitted Spain, leaving behind him a troubled people, and a name for cruelty which was foreign to his character. Savary remained the sole representative of the new monarch: his situation was delicate; he was in the midst of a great commotion; upon every side he beheld the violence of insurrection and the fury of an insulted nation; it behoved him, therefore, to calculate with coolness and to execute with vigour.

Each Spanish province had its own junta of government; but although equally enraged, they were not equally dangerous in their anger. The attention of the Catalonians was completely absorbed by Duhesme's operations; but the soldiers of the regiments which composed the Spanish garrisons of Barcelona, Monjuick, and Figueras, quitting their ranks after the seizure of those places, flocked to the patriotic standards in Murcia and Valencia. The greatest part belonged to the Spanish and Walloon guards, and they formed a good basis for an army which the riches of the two provinces and the arsenal of Carthagena afforded ample military resources to equip.

The French had, however, nothing to fear from any direct movement of this army against Madrid, as such an operation could only bring on a battle; but if by a march towards Zaragoza, the Valencians had united with the Aragonese and then operated against the line of communication with France, the insurrection of Catalonia would have been supported, and a point of union for three great provinces fixed. In the power of executing this project lay the sting of the Valencian insurrection. To besiege Zaragoza and prevent such a junction was the remedy.

The importance of Andalusia was greater; the division of regular troops which under the command of the unhappy Solano had been withdrawn from Portugal, was tolerably disciplined; a large veteran force was assembled at the camp of St. Roque under General Castaños; and the garrisons of Ceuta, Algeziras, Cadiz, Granada, and other places being united, the whole formed a considerable mass of troops; while a superb cannon foundry at Seville, and the arsenal of Cadiz, furnished the means of equipment and the materials for a train of artillery. An active intercourse was maintained between the patriots and the English: the juntas of Grenada, Jaen, and Cordova admitted the supremacy of the junta of Seville, and the army of Estremadura consented to obey their orders. The riches of the province, its distance from Madrid, the

barrier of the Sierra Morena, which like a strong wall covered Andalusia, and favoured the insurrection, afforded the means of establishing a systematic war, and drawing together all the scattered elements of resistance in the southern and western provinces of Spain and Portugal; but this danger, although pregnant with future consequences, was not immediate: there was no line of offensive movement against the flank or rear of the French army open to the Andalusian patriots, and a march to the front against Madrid would have been tedious and dangerous; the true policy of the Andalusians was palpably defensive.

In Estremadura the activity and means of the junta were not at first sufficient to excite much attention; but in Leon, Old Castile, and Galicia, a cloud was gathering that threatened a perilous storm. Don Gregorio Cuesta was captain-general of the two former kingdoms: inimical to popular movements, and of a haughty resolute disposition, he at first checked the insurrection with a rough hand; by this conduct he laid the foundation for quarrels and intrigues, which afterwards impeded the military operations, and split the northern provinces into factions; finally, however, he joined the side of the patriots. Behind him the kingdom of Galicia, under the direction of Filanghieri, had prepared a large and efficient force. It was composed of the strong and disciplined body of troops which, under the command of Tarranco, had taken possession of Oporto, and after that General's death had returned with General Belesta to Galicia. The garrisons of Ferrol and Coruña and a number of soldiers, flying from the countries occupied by the French, swelled the regular army, the agents of Great Britain were actively employed in blowing the flame of insurrection; money, arms, and clothing, were poured into the province through their hands; Coruña afforded an easy and direct intercourse with England, and a strict connexion was maintained between the Gallician and Portuguese patriots.

The facility of establishing the base of a regular systematic war in Galicia was therefore as great as in Andalusia, the resources perhaps greater on account of the proximity of Great Britain, and the advantage of position at this time was essentially in favour of Galicia, because the sources of her strength were equally well covered from the direct line of the French operations, and the slightest offensive movement upon her part threatened the communications of the French army in Madrid, and endangered the safety of any corps marching from the capital against the southern provinces. To be prepared against the Gallician forces was, therefore, a matter of pressing importance; a defeat from that quarter would have been felt in all parts of the army; and no considerable or sustained operation could have been undertaken against the other insurgent forces until the strength of Galicia had been first broken.

In Biscay and the Asturias the want of regular troops and fortified towns, and the contracted shape of those provinces, placed them completely within the power of the French, who had nothing to fear as long as they could maintain possession of the sea-ports.

From this sketch it results that Savary, in classing the dangers of his situation, should have rated Galicia and Leon in the first, Zaragoza in the second, Andalusia in the third, and Valencia in the fourth rank, and by that scale he should have regulated his operations. It was thus Napoleon looked at the affair, but the Duke of Rovigo, wavering in his opinions, neglected or misunderstood the spirit of his instructions, lost the control of the operations, and sunk amidst the confusion which he had himself created.

Nearly 50,000 men and eighty guns were disposable for offensive operations in the beginning of June: collected into one mass such an army was more than sufficient to crush any or all of the insurgent armies combined; but it was necessary to divide it and to assail several points at the same time; in doing this the safety of each minor body depended upon the stability of the central point from whence it emanated; and again the security of that centre depended

upon the strength of its communications with France; in other words, Bayonne was the base of operations against Madrid, and this town in turn became the base of operations against Valencia, Murcia, and Andalusia.

To combine all the movements of a vast plan which would embrace the operations against Catalonia, Aragon, Biscay, the Asturias, Galicia, Leon, Castille, Andalusia, Murcia, and Valencia, in such a simple manner that the corps of the army working upon one principle might mutually support and strengthen each other, and at the same time preserve their communication with France, was the great problem to be solved. Napoleon felt that it required a master mind, and from Bayonne he put all the different armed masses in motion himself, and with the greatest caution; for it is a mistaken notion, although one very generally entertained, that he plunged headlong into this contest without precaution, as having to do with adversaries he despised.

In his instructions to the Duke of Rovigo he says, "In a war of this sort it is necessary to act with patience, coolness, and upon calculation." "In civil wars it is the important points only which should be guarded, we must not go to all places;" and he inculcates the doctrine that to spread the troops over the country without the power of uniting upon emergency would be a dangerous and useless display of activity. The principle upon which he proceeded may be illustrated by the comparison of a closed hand thrust forward and the fingers afterwards extended: as long as the solid part of the member was securely fixed and guarded, the return of the smaller portions of it and their flexible movement was feasible and without great peril; but a wound given to the hand or arm not only endangered that part but paralyzed the action of the whole limb. Hence all the care and attention with which his troops were arranged along the road to Burgos; hence all the measures of precaution already described, such as the seizure of the fortresses, and the formation of the reserves at Bayonne.

The insurrection having commenced, Bessieres was ordered to put Burgos into a state of defence,—to detach a division of 4000 or 5000 men under General Lefebvre Desnouettes against Zaragoza,—to keep down the insurgents of Biscay, Asturias, and Old Castille,—and to watch the army assembling in Galicia; he was likewise enjoined to occupy and watch with jealous care the port of St. Ander and the coast towns. At the same time a reinforcement of 9000 men was preparing for Duhesme, which, it was supposed, would enable him to tranquillize Catalonia, and co-operate with a division marching from Madrid against Valencia.

The reserve under General Drouet was nourished by drafts from the interior: it supplied Bessieres with reinforcements, and afforded a detachment of 4000 men to watch the openings of the valleys of the Pyrenees, especially towards the Castle of Jaca, which was in possession of the Spanish insurgents.* A smaller reserve was established at Perpignan, and another detachment watched the openings of the eastern frontier. All the generals commanding corps, or even detachments, were directed to correspond daily with General Drouet.

The security of the rear being thus provided for, the main body at Madrid commenced offensive operations. Marshal Moncey was directed, with part of his corps upon Cuenca, to intercept the march of the Valencian army upon Zaragoza, and General Dupont, with 10,000 men, marched towards Cadiz; the remainder of his and Moncey's troops were kept in reserve and distributed in various parts of La Mancha and the neighbourhood of Madrid. Napoleon likewise directed, that Segovia should be occupied and put in a state of defence, that a division (Gobert's) of Moncey's corps should co-operate with Bessieres on the side of Valladolid,† and that movable columns should scour the country in rear of the acting bodies, and unite again at stated times upon points of secondary interest. Thus linking his operations together, Napoleon hoped, by grasping as it were the ganglia of the insurrection, to paralyze its force, and

* Napoleon's Notes, Appendix, No. 2.

† Ibid, No. 1.

reduce it to a few convulsive motions which would soon subside. The execution of his plan failed in the feebler hands of his lieutenants, but it was well conceived, and embraced every probable immediate chance of war, and even provided for the distant and uncertain contingency of an English army landing upon the flanks or rear of the corps at either extremity of the Pyrenean frontier.

Military men would do well to reflect upon the prudence which the French emperor displayed upon this occasion. Not all his experience, his power, his fortune, nor the contempt which he felt for the prowess of his adversaries, could induce him to relax in his precautions; every chance was considered, and every measure calculated with as much care and circumspection as if the most redoubtable enemy was opposed to him. The conqueror of Europe was as fearful of making false movements before an army of peasants, as if Frederick the Great had been in his front, and yet he failed! Such is the uncertainty of war!

CHAPTER V.

ALL the insurrections of the Spanish provinces took place nearly at the same period; the operations of the French divisions were, of course, nearly simultaneous; I shall, therefore, narrate their proceedings separately, classing them by the effect each produced upon the stability of the intrusive government in Madrid, and commencing with the

FIRST OPERATIONS OF MARSHAL BESSIERES.

That officer had scarcely fixed his quarters at Burgos when a general movement of revolt took place. On his right, the bishop of St. Ander excited the inhabitants of the diocese to take arms. In his rear, a mechanic assembled some thousand armed peasants at the town of Logroño. In front, 5000 men took possession of the Spanish artillery depôt at Segovia; an equal number assembling at Palencia armed themselves from the royal manufactory at that place, and advanced to the town of Torquemada; while General Cuesta, with some regular troops and a body of organized peasantry, posted themselves on the Pisuega at Cabeçon.

Bessieres immediately divided his disposable force, which was not more than 12,000 men, into several columns, and traversed the country in all directions, disarming the towns and interrupting the combinations of the insurgents; while a division of Dupont's corps, under General Frere, marched from the side of Madrid to aid his operations. General Verdier attacked Logroño on the 6th of June, dispersed the peasantry, and put the leaders to death after the action. General Lasalle, departing from Burgos with a brigade of light cavalry, passed the Pisuega, fell upon the Spaniards at Torquemada on the 7th, broke them, and pursuing with a merciless sword, burnt that town, and entered Palencia on the 8th.

Meanwhile Frere defeated the Spanish force at Segovia taking thirty pieces of artillery; and General Merle marching through the country lying between the Pisuega and the Douero with a division of infantry, joined Lasalle at Dueñas on the 12th. From thence they proceeded to Cabeçon, where Cuesta accepted battle, and was overthrown, with much slaughter, the loss of his artillery, and several thousand muskets. The flat country being thus subdued, Lasalle's cavalry remained to keep it under; but Merle, marching northward, commenced operations, in concert with General Ducos, against the province of St. Ander. On the 20th, the latter General drove the Spaniards from the pass of Soncillo; the 21st, he forced the pass of Venta de Escudo, and descending the valley of the river Pas, approached St. Ander; on the 22nd, Merle, after some resistance, penetrated by Lantueño, and followed the course of the Besaya to Torre La Vega, then turning to his right entered St. Ander on the 23rd; and Ducos arriving at the same time, the town submitted, and the bishop fled with the greatest part of the clergy. The authorities of Segovia, Valladolid, Palencia, and St. Ander, were compelled to send deputies to take the oath of allegiance to Joseph.

By these operations, the above-named provinces were completely disarmed, and so awed by the activity of Bessieres, that no further insurrections took place, and his cavalry raised contributions and collected provisions without the least difficulty. Frere's division then returned to Toledo, and from thence marched to San Clemente, on the borders of Murcia. The imprudence of Cuesta, and the general deficiency of talent and judgment manifested by the Spaniards throughout these proceedings, were very remarkable.

While Bessieres thus broke the northern insurrections, the march of General Lefebre Desnouettes against the province of Aragon brought on the first siege of Zaragoza. Palafox being declared captain-general, recalled the retired officers into service; a number of volunteers repaired to him from distant parts, and the soldiers and officers who could escape from Pampelona and Madrid joined his standard, and among others the officers of engineers employed in the school of Alcala. With their assistance his forces were rapidly organized, and many battalions were formed and posted at different points on the roads leading towards Navarre. The Baron de Versage, an officer of the Walloon Guards, occupied Calatayud with a regiment composed of students who were volunteers; he raised more men in that quarter, kept up a communication with the juntas of Soria and Siguenza, and covered the powder-mills in Villa Felice. The arsenal of Zaragoza supplied the patriots with arms. At Tudela the people broke down the bridge over the Ebro, and Palafox detached 500 fusiliers to assist them in defending the passage of that river.

In this situation of affairs Lefebre commenced his march from Pampelona the 7th of June, at the head of 3000 or 4000 infantry, some field batteries, and a regiment of Polish cavalry. On the 9th he forced the passage of the Ebro, put the leaders of the insurrection to death after the action, and then continued his movement by the right bank to Mallen. Palafox, with 10,000 infantry, 200 dragoons, and eight pieces of artillery, awaited him there in a position behind the Huecha. The 13th, Palafox was overthrown; the 14th, the French reached the Xalon; another combat and another victory carried Lefebre across that river; and the 15th, he was on the Huerba, in front of the heroic city.

FIRST SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA.

Zaragoza contained at that period 50,000 inhabitants; situated on the right bank of the Ebro, it was connected with a suburb on the opposite side by a handsome stone bridge. The immediate vicinity is flat, and on the side of the suburb low and marshy. The small river Huerba, running through a deep cleft, cuts the plain on the right bank, and taking its course close to the walls, falls into the Ebro nearly opposite to the mouth of the Gallego, which, descending from the mountains on the opposite side, cuts the plain on the left bank. The convent of St. Joseph, built on the right of the Huerba, covered a bridge over that torrent; and, at the distance of cannon-shot, a step of land commenced, which, gradually rising, terminated at 1800 yards from the convent, in a hill called the Monte Torrero. On this hill, which commanded all the plain and overlooked the town, several storehouses and workshops, built for the use of the canal, were entrenched, and occupied by 1200 men. The canal itself, a noble work, formed a water carriage without a single lock from Tudela to Zaragoza. The city, surrounded by a low brick wall, presented no regular defences, and possessed very few guns in a state fit for service, but the houses were strongly constructed, some of stone, others of brick: they were mostly of two stories high, each story being vaulted so as to be nearly proof against fire; and the massive walls of the convents, rising like castles all round the circuit as well as inside the place, were to be seen crowded with armed men.

Such was Zaragoza when Lefebre Desnouettes first appeared before it: his previous movements had cut the direct communication with Calatayud, and obliged the Baron Versage to retire to Belchite with the volunteers and several thousand fresh levies. Palafox occupied the olive groves and houses on the step of land between the convent of St. Joseph and Monte Torrero; but his men,

cowed by their previous defeats, were easily driven from thence on the 16th, and the town was closely invested on the right bank of the Ebro. Indeed so great was the terror and confusion of the Spaniards, that some of the French penetrated without difficulty into the street of St. Engracia, and the city was on the point of being taken that day, for Palafox, accompanied by his brother Francisco, an aide-de-camp, and 100 dragoons, under pretence of seeking succour, endeavoured to go forth on the side of the suburb at the moment when the French were entering on the side of Engracia; but the plebeian leaders being suspicious of his intentions, would not suffer him to depart without a guard of infantry, and Tio Jorge* accompanied him to watch his conduct and to ensure his return. It was a strange proceeding, and ill-timed, that the chief should thus fly out at one gate while the enemy was pressing in at another, when the streets were filled with clamour, the dismayed garrison making little or no resistance, and all things in confusion. Zaragoza was that day on the very verge of destruction, when the French, either fearful of an ambuscade, or ignorant of their advantages, retired, and the people, as if inspired, changing from the extreme of terror to that of courage, suddenly fell to casting up defences, piercing loop-holes in the walls of the houses, constructing ramparts with sand-bags, and working with such vigour, that, under the direction of their engineers, in twenty-four hours they put the place in a condition to withstand an assault. Whereupon Lefebre confining his operations to the right bank of the Ebro, established posts close to the gates and waited for reinforcements.

Meanwhile Palafox crossing the Ebro at Pina, joined Versage at Belchite, and having collected 7000 or 8000 men, and four pieces of artillery, gained the Xalon in rear of the French; from thence he proposed to advance through Epila and endeavour to relieve Zaragoza by a battle. His officers, struck with the imprudence of this measure, resisted his authority, and prepared to retire to Valencia. Palafox, ignorant of war, and probably awed by Tio Jorge, expressed his determination to fight, saying, with an imposing air, "that those who feared danger might retire." Touched with shame, all agreed to follow him to Epila; and he advanced; but two French regiments, detached by Lefebre, met him on the march, and a combat commencing at nine in the evening, the Spaniards were unable to form any order of battle, and notwithstanding their superior numbers, were defeated with the loss of 3000 men. Palafox, who did not display that firmness in danger which his speech promised, must have fled early, as he reached Calatayud in the night, although many of his troops arrived there unbroken the next morning. After this disaster, Palafox, leaving Versage at Calatayud to make fresh levies, returned himself, with all the beaten troops that he could collect, to Belchite, and from thence regained Zaragoza on the 2nd of July. Meanwhile Lefebre had taken the Mont Torrero by assault on the 27th of June.

The 29th or 30th, General Verdier arrived on the Huerba with a division of infantry, and a large train of battering artillery; and the besiegers being now nearly 12,000 strong, attacked the convents of St. Joseph and the Capuchins on the same day that Palafox returned; the first assault on St. Joseph's failed, the second succeeded; but the Capuchin's, after some fighting, was set fire to by the Spaniards and abandoned. All this time the suburb was left open and free for the besieged. But Napoleon blamed this mode of attack, and sent orders to throw a bridge across the Ebro—to press the siege on the left bank,—and to profit of the previous success by raising a breaching battery in the convent of St. Joseph. A bridge was accordingly constructed at St. Lambert two hundred yards above the town, and two attacks were carried on at the same time.

Hitherto the French troops employed in Aragon formed a part of Marshal Bessieres' corps, but the emperor now directed Lefebre to repair with his brigade to reinforce that marshal, and constituting the 10,000 men who remained with

* Tio Jorge and Tio Marin, which may be rendered goodman Jorge, and goodman Marin, were two of the real chiefs whose energy saved Zaragoza in the first siege.

Verdier a separate corps, gave this last general the command of it, and promised him reinforcements.* Verdier continued to press the siege as closely as his numbers would permit, but, all around him, the insurgents were rapidly organizing small armies, and threatened to enclose him in his camp. This obliged him to send detachments against them; and it is singular, that with so few men, while daily fighting with the besieged, he should have been able to scour the country, and put down the insurrection, as far as Lerida, Barbastro, Tudela, Jacca, and Calatayud; the garrison of Pampelona only assisting him from the side of Navarre. In one of these expeditions the powder-mills of Villa Felice, thirty miles distant, were destroyed, and the Baron Versage being defeated, was forced to retire with his division towards Valencia.

During the course of July, Verdier made several assaults on the gate of El Carmen, and others on the Portillo, but he was repulsed in all. The besieged having been reinforced by the regiment of Estremadura, composed of 800 old soldiers, in return made a sally with 2000 men to retake the Monte Torrero, but they were beaten, with the loss of their commander; regular approaches were then commenced by the French against the quarter of St. Engracia and the castle of Aljaferia. The 2nd of August, the besieged were again reinforced by 200 men of the Spanish guard and volunteers of Aragon, who brought some artillery with them; the French likewise were strengthened by two old regiments of the line, which increased their numbers to 15,000 men.

On the 3rd of August, the breaching batteries opened against St. Engracia and Aljaferia; the mortar batteries threw shells at the same time, and a Spanish magazine of powder blowing up in the Cosso (a public walk formed on the line of the ancient Moorish ramparts), destroyed several houses, and killed many of the defenders. The place was then summoned to surrender on terms, but Palafox, having rejected all offers, on the 4th of August the town was stormed through a breach in the convent of St. Engracia; the French penetrated to the Cosso, and a confused and terrible scene ensued. Some defended the houses, some drew up in the streets, some fled by the suburb to the country, where the French cavalry fell upon them; cries of treason were everywhere heard, and became the signal for assassinations; all seemed lost, when a column of the assailants seeking the way to the bridge over the Ebro, got entangled in the Arco de Cineja, a long crooked street, and being attacked in that situation, were driven back to the Cosso; others began to plunder, and the Zaragozans, recovering courage, fought with desperation, and set fire to the convent of Francisco. At the close of day the French were in possession of one side of the Cosso, and the Spaniards of the other. A hideous and revolting spectacle was exhibited during the action; the public hospital being taken and fired, the madmen confined there issued forth among the combatants, muttering, shouting, singing, and moping, according to the character of their disorder, while drivelling idiots mixed their unmeaning cries with the shouts of contending soldiers.

The Spaniards now perceived, that with courage the town might still be defended: and from that day the fighting was murderous and constant, one party endeavouring to take, the other to defend the houses. In this warfare, where skill was nearly useless, Verdier's force was too weak to make a rapid progress; and events disastrous to the French arms taking place in other parts of Spain, he received, about the 10th of August, orders from the king to raise the siege, and retire to Logroña. Of this operation I shall speak in due time.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. Mere professional skill and enterprise do not constitute a great general. Lefebre Desnouettes, by his activity and boldness, with a tithe of their numbers defeated the insurgents of Aragon in several actions, and scoured the open country; but the same Lefebre, wanting the higher qualities of a general, failed miserably where that intuitive sagacity that reads passing events aright was required. There were thousands in the French army who could have done as

* Napoleon's Notes, Appendix, No. 2.

well as he ; probably not three who could have reduced Zaragoza, and yet it is manifest that Zaragoza owed her safety to accident, and that the desperate resistance of the inhabitants was more the result of chance than of any peculiar virtue.

2. The feeble defence made at Mallen, at the Xalon ; at the Monte Torrero, at Epila ; the terror of the besieged on the 16th, when the French penetrated into the town ; the flight of Palafox under the pretence of seeking succour, nay, the very assault which in such a wonderful manner called forth the energy of the Zaragozans, and failed only because the French troops plundered, and missing the road to the bridge, missed that to victory at the same time, proves, that the fate of the city was determined by accident in more than one of those nice conjunctures which men of genius know how to seize, but others leave to the decision of fortune.

3. However, it must be acknowledged that Lefebre and Verdier, especially the latter, displayed both vigour and talent ; for it was no mean exploit to quell the insurrections to a distance of fifty miles on every side, at the same time investing double their own numbers, and pushing the attack with such ardour as to reduce to extremity a city so defended.

4. The current romantic tales of women rallying the troops, and leading them forward at the most dangerous periods of this siege, I have not touched upon, and may perhaps be allowed to doubt, although it is not unlikely that when suddenly environed with horrors, the delicate sensitiveness of women driving them to a kind of frenzy, might produce actions above the heroism of men ; and in patient suffering their superior fortitude is manifest ; wherefore I neither wholly believe, nor will deny, their exploits at Zaragoza ; merely remarking that for a long time afterwards Spain swarmed with heroines, clothed in half uniforms and loaded with weapons.

5. The two circumstances that principally contributed to the success of the defence were, first, the bad discipline of the French soldiers ; and, secondly, the system of terror which was established by the Spanish leaders, whoever those leaders were. Few soldiers can be restrained from plunder when a town is taken by assault ; yet there is no period when the chances of war are so sudden and so decisive, none where the moral responsibility of a general is so great. Will military regulations alone secure the necessary discipline at such a moment ? The French army are not deficient in a stern code, and the English army, taken altogether, is probably the best regulated of modern times ; but here it is seen that Lefebre failed to take Zaragoza in default of discipline ; and in the course of this work it will appear that no wild horde of Tartars ever fell with more license upon their rich effeminate neighbours than did the English troops upon the Spanish towns taken by storm. The inference to be drawn is, that national institutions alone will produce that moral discipline necessary to make a soldier capable of fulfilling his whole duty ; yet a British statesman* was not ashamed to declare in parliament that the worst men make the best soldiers ; and this odious, narrow-minded, unworthy maxim had its admirers. That a system of terror was at Zaragoza successfully employed to protract the defence is undoubted. The commandant of Monte Torrero, ostensibly for suffering himself to be defeated, but according to some, for the gratification of private malice, was tried and put to death ; and a general of artillery was in a more summary manner killed without any trial ; the chief engineer, a man of skill and undaunted courage, was arbitrarily imprisoned ; and the slightest word or even gesture of discontent, was punished with instant death. A stern band of priests and plebeian-leaders, in whose hands Palafox was a tool, ruled with such furious energy, that resistance to the enemy was less dangerous than disobedience to their orders. Suspicion was the warrant of death, and this system once begun, ceased not until the town was taken in the second siege.

* The late Lord Melville.

CHAPTER VI.

OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.

WHEN Barcelona fell into the power of the French, the Spanish garrison amounted to nearly 4000 men; but Duhesme daily fearing a riot in the city, connived at their escape in parties, and even sent the regiment of Estremadura (which was eight hundred strong) entire to Lerida, where, strange to relate, the gates were shut against it; and thus, discarded by both parties, it made its way into Zaragoza during the siege of that place. Many thousand citizens also fled from Barcelona, and joined the patriotic standards in the neighbouring provinces.

After the first ebullition at Manresa, the insurrection of Catalonia lingered awhile; * but the junta of Gerona continued to excite the people to take arms, and it was manifest that a general commotion approached; and this was a serious affair, for there were in the beginning of June, including those who came out of Barcelona, 5000 veteran troops in the province, and in the Balearic Islands above 10,000. Sicily contained an English army, and English fleets covered the Mediterranean. Moreover, by the constitution of Catalonia, the whole of the male population fit for war are obliged to assemble at certain points of each district with arms and provisions, whenever the alarum bell called the *somaten*, is heard to ring; hence the name of *somatenes*; and these warlike peasants, either from tradition or experience, are well acquainted with the military value of their mountain holds.

Hostilities soon commenced; Duhesme, following his instructions from Bayonne, detached General Chabran and 5200 men, with orders to secure Tarragona and Tortosa, to incorporate the Swiss regiment of Wimpfen with his own troops, and to aid Marshal Moncey in an attack on Valencia. At the same time General Swartz having more than 3000 men, Swiss, Germans, and Italians, under his command, was detached by the way of Martorel and Montserrat to Manresa, with orders to raise contributions, to put down the insurrection, and to destroy the powder mills at the last town; then to get possession of Lerida, and to incorporate all the Swiss troops found there in his own brigade, placing 500 men in the citadel; after which he was to penetrate into Aragon, and to co-operate with Lefebre against Zaragoza.

These two columns quitted Barcelona the 3rd and the 4th of June. A heavy rain induced Swartz to stop all the 5th at Martorel; the 6th he resumed his march, but without any military precautions, although the object of his expedition was known, and the *somaten* ringing out among the hills, the peasants of eight districts were assembled in arms; these men took a resolution to defend the pass of Bruch, and the most active of the Manresa and Igualada districts, assisted by a few old soldiers, immediately repaired there, and posted themselves on the rocks. Swartz coming on in a careless manner, a heavy but distant fire opened from all parts on his column, and created a little confusion, but order was soon restored, and the Catalans being beaten from their strongholds, were pursued for four or five miles along the main road. At Casa Mansana, where a cross road leads to Manresa, one part broke away, the others continued their flight to Igualada. Swartz, a man evidently destitute of talent, halted at the very moment when his success was complete, and the road to Manresa open; the Catalans seeing his hesitation first rallied in the rear of Casa Mansana, then returned to the attack, and drove the advanced guard back upon the main body. The French general became alarmed, formed a square, and retired hastily towards Esparraguera, followed and flanked by clouds of *somatenes*, whose courage and numbers increased every moment; at Esparraguera, which was a long single street, the inhabitants had prepared an ambush; but Swartz, who arrived at twilight, getting intelligence of their

* Napoleon's Notes, Appendix, No. 2.

design, passed to the right and left of the houses, and continuing his flight reached Martorel the 7th, having lost a gun and many men by this inglorious expedition, from which he returned in such disorder, and with his soldiers so discouraged, that Duhesme thought it necessary to recall Chabran from Tarragona.

The country westward of the Llobregat is rugged and difficult for an army, yet Chabran reached Tarragona on the 8th without encountering an enemy; but when he attempted to return, the line of his march was intercepted by the insurgents, who took post at Vendrill, Arbos, and Villa Franca, and spread themselves along the banks of the Llobregat. As he approached Vendrill the somatenes fell back to Arbos, but a skirmish commencing at this latter place, the Catalans were defeated. Chabran set fire to the town, and proceeded to Villa Franca. Here the excesses so common at this time among the Spaniards were not spared; the governor, an old man, and several of his friends, were murdered, and the perpetrators of these crimes, as might be expected, made little or no defence against the enemy.

Meanwhile General Lechi moved out of Barcelona, and acting in concert with Swartz's brigade, which marched from Martorel, cleared the banks of the Llobregat, and formed a junction at San Felice with Chabran on the 11th. The latter, after a day's rest, having his division completed by the brigade of Swartz, marched against Manresa to repair the former disgrace; he arrived at Bruch the 14th, but the somatenes were also there, and assisted by some regular troops with artillery. Finding that in a partial skirmish he made no impression, Chabran, more timid even than Swartz, took the extraordinary resolution of retreating, or rather flying from those gallant peasants, who pursued him with scoffs and a galling fire back to the very walls of Barcelona.

This success spurred on the insurrection; Gerona, Rosas, Hostalrich, and Tarragona prepared for defence. The somatenes assembling in the Ampurdan obliged the French commandant to quit the town of Figueras, and shut himself up with 300 men in the citadel, while others gathering between the Ter and the Besos, intercepted all communication between France and Barcelona.

In this predicament Duhesme resolved to make a sudden attempt on Gerona, and for this purpose drew out 6000 of his best troops, and eight pieces of artillery; but as the fortress of Hostalrich stood in the direct road, he followed the coast line, and employed a French privateer, then in the harbour, to attend his march. The somatenes got intelligence of his designs: one multitude took possession of the heights of Moncada, which are six miles from Barcelona, and overhang the road to Hostalrich; another multitude was posted on the ridge of Mongat, which, at the same distance from Barcelona, abuts on the sea; an intrenched castle, with a battery of fifteen guns, protected their left, and their right was slightly connected with the people at Moncada.

The 17th, Duhesme, after some false show to hide his real attack, fell upon the Castle of Mongat, where the greater mass of the Catalans being posted, were defeated with slaughter; a detachment from Barcelona dispersing those of Moncada at the same time.

The 18th, the town of Mattaro being taken was plundered, although a few cannon-shot only had been fired in its defence. The somatenes were also defeated at the pass of San Pol. The 19th, the French halted at San Tione, but at nine o'clock on the morning of the 20th, they appeared before the walls of Gerona.

This town, built on the right bank of the Ter, is cut in two by the Oña. To the eastward it is confined by strong rocky hills, whose points filling the space between the right bank of the Oña and the Ter, overlook the town at different distances. Fort Mont Jouy, a regular fortification, crowned the nearest hill or table land, at 500 yards' distance, and three forts (that of the Constable, of Queen Anne, and of the Capuchins), being connected by a ditch and rampart, formed one irregular outwork, 1000 yards in length, and commanding all the

ridge to the south-east. The summit of this ridge is 500, 800, and 1200 yards from Gerona, and 1600 from Fort Mont Jouy, being separated from the latter by the narrow valley and stream of the Gallegan. South-west, between the left of the Oña and the Ter, the country, comparatively flat, is, however, full of hollows and clefts close to the town. The body of the place on that side was defended by a ditch and five regular bastions connected by a wall with towers. To the west the city was covered by the Ter, and on the east fortified by a long wall with towers having an irregular bastion at each extremity, and some small detached works placed at the opening of the valley of Gallegan. Three hundred of the regiment of Ultonia and some artillery-men composed the garrison of Gerona, but they were assisted by volunteers and by the citizens; and the somatenes also assembled on the left of the Ter to defend the passage of that river.

Duhesme, after provoking some cannon-shot from the forts, occupied the village of St. Eugenia in the plain, and making a feint as if to pass the Ter by the bridge of Salt, engaged the somatenes in a useless skirmish. Great part of the day was spent by him in preparing ladders for an attack; but at five o'clock in the evening the French artillery opened from the heights of Palau, and a column crossing the Oña passed between the outworks and the town, threw out a detachment to keep the garrison of the former in check, and assaulted the gate of El Carmen. This attempt failed completely and with great loss to the assailants. Two hours afterwards another column, advancing by the plain on the left of the Oña, made an assault on the bastion of Santa Clara, but with so little arrangement, or discipline, that the storming party moved forward without their ladders, and although the hollows favoured them so much that they arrived under the walls without being perceived, and that the Neapolitan Colonel Ambrosio, with a few others, actually gained the ramparts by means of the single ladder brought up, the confusion was too great to be remedied. And a detachment of the regiment of Ultonia coming from the other side of the town, charged the assailants, bayoneted those who were upon the walls, and drove the rest back. Another feeble effort made after dark likewise failed.

Duhesme tried some useless negotiations on the following day; but dreading a longer absence from Barcelona, broke up on the 22nd, and returned by forced marches. As he passed Mattaro he left Chabran with some troops in that town. Meanwhile the victorious somatenes of Bruch had descended the Llobregat, rallied those of the lower country, and getting artillery from Taragona and other fortresses, planted batteries at the different passages of the river, and entrenched a line from San Boy to Martorel. Regular officers now took the command of the peasants; Colonel Milans assembled a body at Granollers; Don Juan Claros put himself at the head of the peasants of the Ampurdan; and Colonel Baget took the command of those at Bruch.

General Chabran, after a few days' rest at Mattaro, made a foraging excursion through the district of El Vallés. Milans, who held the valley of the Congosta, encountered him near Granollers; both sides claimed the victory, but Chabran retired to Barcelona, and Milans remained on the banks of the Besos. The 30th Duhesme caused the somatenes on the Llobregat to be attacked; General Lechi menaced those at the bridge of Molinos del Rey, while the brigades of Bessieres and Goullus, crossing at San Boy, surprised a battery at that point and turned the whole line. Lechi then crossed the river by the bridge of Molinos, ascended the left bank, took all the artillery, burnt several villages, killed a number of the somatenes, and put the rest to flight. They rallied again, however, at Bruch and Igualada, and returning the 6th of July, infested the immediate vicinity of Barcelona, taking possession of all the hills between San Boy and Moncada, and connecting their operations with Colonel Milans. Other parties collected between the Besos and the Ter, and extended the line of insurrection to the Ampurdan; Juan Claros occupied the

flat country about Rosas, and the French garrison of Figueras having burnt the town, were blocked up in the fort of San Fernando by 2000 somatenes of the Pyrenees. A nest of Spanish privateers was formed in Palamos Bay, and two English frigates, the *Imperieuse* and the *Cambrian*, watched the coast from Rosas to Barcelona.

A supreme junta being now established at Lerida, opened an intercourse with Aragon, Valencia, Seville, Gibraltar, and the Balearic Islands, and decreed that forty tercios or regiments of 1000 men, to be selected from the somatenes, should be paid and organized as regular troops, and that forty others should be kept in reserve, but without pay.

This state of affairs being made known to Napoleon through the medium of the movable columns watching the valleys of the eastern Pyrenees, he ordered General Reille, commanding the reserve at Perpignan, to take the first soldiers at hand and march to the relief of Figueras, after which, his force being increased by drafts from the interior of France, to 9000 men, he was to assault Rosas and to besiege Gerona. The emperor imagined, that the fall of the latter place would induce the surrender of Lerida, and would so tranquillize Catalonia, that 5000 men might again be detached towards Valencia. On receiving this order, Reille with two battalions of Tuscan recruits, conducted a convoy safely to Figueras and raised the blockade, but not without difficulty, for his troops were greatly terrified and could scarcely be kept to their colours. He relieved the place the 10th of July, and the same day Duhesme, who had been preparing for a second attack on Gerona, quitted Barcelona with 6000 infantry, some cavalry, a battering train of twenty-two pieces, and a great number of country carriages to transport his ammunition and stores, General Lechi remaining in the city with 5000 men. Meanwhile Reille having victualled Figueras and received a part of his reinforcements, proceeded to invest Rosas; but he had scarcely appeared before it when Juan Claros raised the country in his rear; and Captain Otway, of the *Montague*, landing with some marines, joined the migueletes: the French were forced to retire, and lost 200 men in their retreat.

Duhesme pursued his march by the coast, whereupon the somatenes of that part broke up the road in his front; Milans hung upon his left, and Lord Cochrane, with the *Imperieuse* frigate and some Spanish vessels, cannonaded his right flank. In this dilemma he remained five days in front of Arenas de Mar; and then dividing his forces, sent one part across the mountains by Villagorguin, and another by St. Iscle; the first made an attempt on Hostalrich, but failed; the second beat away Colonel Milans and dispersed the somatenes of the Tordera; finally, Duhesme united his people before Gerona on the 22nd, but he had lost many carriages during the march. The 23rd he passed the Ter and dispersed the migueletes that guarded the left bank. The 24th General Reille coming from Figueras with 6000 men, took post at Puente Mayor, and the town was invested with a line extending from that point by the heights of San Miguel to the Monte Livio; from Monte Livio by the plain to the bridge of Salt, and from thence along the left bank of the Ter to Sarria. The garrison consisting of 500 migueletes and 400 of the regiment of Ultonia, was reinforced on the 25th by 1300 of the regiment of Barcelona, who entered the town with two guns. All the defences were in bad repair, but the people were resolute. The night of the 27th, a French column passing the valley of Galligan, gained the table land of Fort Mont Jouy, and made lodgments in three towers of masonry which the Spaniards had abandoned in the first moment of surprise. This advantage elated Duhesme so much, that he resolved, without consulting his engineers, to break ground on that side.

At this period a great change in the affairs of Catalonia took place; the insurrection had hitherto been confined to the exertions of the unorganized somatenes and was without system; but now a treaty between Lord Collingwood, who commanded the British navy in the Mediterranean, and the

Marquis of Palacios, who was Captain-General of the Balearic Isles, having been concluded, the Spanish fleet and the troops in Minorca, Majorca, and Ivica, became disposable for the service of the patriots. Palacios immediately sent 1300 to the port of San Felice di Quixols to reinforce the garrison of Gerona. These men entered that city, as we have seen, on the 25th, and Palacios himself disembarked 4000 others at Tarragona on the 22nd, together with thirty-seven pieces of artillery; an event that excited universal joy, and produced a surprising eagerness to fight the French.

The supreme junta immediately repaired to Tarragona, declared Palacios their president, and created him commander-in-chief, subject, however, to the tutelar saint Narcissus, who was appointed generalissimo of the forces by sea and land, and the ensigns of authority, with due solemnity, placed on his coffin. The first object with Palacios was to re-establish the line of the Llobregat. To effect this, the Count of Caldagues, with 1800 men and four guns, marched from Tarragona in two columns, the one moving by the coast way to San Boy, and the other by the royal road, through Villafranca and Ordal. Caldagues, in passing by the bridge of Molino del Rey, established a post there, and then ascending the left bank, fixed his quarters at Martorel, where Colonel Baget joined him with 3000 migueletes of the new levy.

The Llobregat runs within a few miles of Barcelona, but the right bank being much the steepest, the lateral communications easier, and the heights commanding a distinct view of every thing passing on the opposite side; the line taken by Caldagues was strong, and the country in his rear rough, full of defiles, and very fitting for a retreat after the loss of a battle. General Lechi, thus hemmed in on the west, was also hampered on the north, for the mountains filling all the space between the Llobregat and the Besos, approach in tongues as near as two and three miles from Barcelona; and the somatenes of the Manresa and Valls districts occupied them, and skirmished daily with the French outposts. Beyond the Besos, which bounds Barcelona on the eastward, a lofty continuous ridge extending to Hostalrich, runs parallel to, and at the distance of two or three miles from the sea coast, separating the main and the marine roads, and sending its shoots down to the water's edge. This ridge also swarmed with somatenes, who cut off all communication with Duhesme, and lay in leaguer round the castle of Mongat, in which were eighty or ninety French. The *Cambrian* and the *Imperieuse* frigates blockaded the harbour of Barcelona; and, on the 31st of July, Lord Cochrane having brought his vessel alongside of Mongat, landed his marines, and, in concert with the somatenes, took it, blew up the works, and rolled the rocks and ruins down in such a manner as to destroy the road. Thus, at the very moment that Duhesme commenced the siege of Gerona, he was cut off from his own base of operations, and the communication between Figueras and General Reille's division, was equally insecure, for the latter's convoys were attacked the 28th of July, the 3rd of August, and so fiercely on the 6th, that a Neapolitan battalion was surrounded, and lost 150 men.

Palacios, whose forces increased daily, wished to make an effort in favour of Gerona, and with this view sent the Count of Caldagues, at the head of 3000 or 4000 men (part migueletes, part regulars), to interrupt the progress of the siege, intending to follow himself with greater forces. Caldagues left Martorel the evening of the 6th, marched by Tarrasa, Sabadell, Granollers, and San Celoni, and reached Hostalrich the morning of the 10th; there his force was increased to 5000 men and four guns. The 13th he entered Llagostera; the 14th Castellar, a small place situated behind the ridges that overlook Gerona, and only five miles from the French camps. Don Juan Claros, with 2500 migueletes, mixed with some Walloon and Spanish guards from Rosas, met him at Castellar, as did also Colonel Milans with 800 somatenes.

Caldagues having opened a communication with the junta of Gerona, found that Fort Mont Jouy was upon the point of surrendering, and that the French,

who were ignorant of his approach, had, contrary to good discipline, heaped their forces in the plain between the left of the Oña and the Ter, but only kept a slender guard on the hills, while a single battalion protected the batteries raised against Mont Jouy. Being an enterprising man, Caldagues resolved to make an immediate effort for the relief of the place, and, after a careful observation on the 15th, divided his forces, and the 16th fell, with several columns, on the weakest part of the besiegers' line. The garrison sallied forth at the same time from Mont Jouy, and the French guards being taken between two fires, were quickly overpowered, and driven first to the Puente Mayor and finally over the Ter. The Spaniards reformed on the hills, expecting to be attacked; but Duhesme and Reille remained quiet until dark; then breaking up the siege, they fled away, the one to Figueras, the other to Barcelona, leaving both artillery and stores behind.

Duhesme endeavoured to pass along the coast, but, on his arrival at Callella, he discovered that the road was cut by ditches, that an English frigate was prepared to rake his columns on the march, and that all the heights were occupied by the somatenes; whereupon, destroying his ammunition, throwing his remaining artillery over the rocks, and taking to by-ways in the mountains, he forced a passage through the midst of the somatenes to Mongat, where General Lechi met him the 20th, and covered his retreat to Barcelona. Thus ended Duhesme's second attempt against Gerona.

Observation I.—Three great communications pierce the Pyrenean frontier of Catalonia, leading directly upon Barcelona.

The first, or Puycerda road, penetrates between the sources of the Segre and the Ter.

The second, or Campredon road, between the sources of the Ter and the Fluvia.

The third, or Figueras road, between the sources of the Muga and the sea-coast.

The first and second unite at Vicque; the second and third are connected by a transverse road running from Olot, by Castle Follit, to Gerona; the third also dividing near the latter town, leads with one branch through Hostalrich, and with the other follows the line of the coast. After the union of the first and second at Vicque, a single route pursues the stream of the Besos to Barcelona, thus turning the Muga, the Fluvia, the Ter, the Tordera, Besos, and an infinity of minor streams, that, descending from the mountains, in their rapid course to the Mediterranean, furrow all the country between the eastern Pyrenees and Barcelona. The third, which is the direct and best communication between Perpignan and the capital of Catalonia, crosses all the above-named rivers, whose deep channels and sudden floods offer serious obstacles to the march of an army.

All these roads, with the exception of that from Olot to Gerona, are separated by craggy ridges of mountains scarcely to be passed by troops; and the two first leading through wild and savage districts, are incommoded by defiles, and protected by a number of old castles and walled places, more or less capable of resistance. The third, passing through many rich and flourishing places, is however completely blocked to an invader by the strong fortresses of Figueras and Rosas on the Muga, of Gerona on the Ter, and Hostalrich on the Tordera. Palamos and several castles likewise impede the coast road, which is moreover skirted by rocky mountains, and exposed for many leagues to the fire of a fleet. Such is Catalonia, eastward and northward of Barcelona.

On the west, at five or six miles distance, the Llobregat cuts it off from a rough and lofty tract, through which the Cardena, the Noga, the Foix, Gaya, Anguera, and Francoli rivers, break in deep channels, descending in nearly parallel lines to the coast, and the spaces between being gorged with mountains, and studded with fortified places which command all the main roads. The plains and fertile valleys are so few and contracted, that Catalonia may, with the

exception of the rich parts about Lerida and the Urgel, be described as a huge mass of rocks and torrents, incapable of supplying subsistence even for the inhabitants, whose prosperity depends entirely upon manufactures and commerce.

Barcelona, the richest and most populous city in Spain, is the heart of the province, and whoso masters it, if he can hold it, may suck the strength of Catalonia away. A French army, without a commanding fleet to assist, can scarcely take or keep Barcelona; the troops must be supplied by regular convoys from France; the fortresses on the line of communication must be taken and provisioned, and the active intelligent population of the country must be beaten from the rivers, pursued into their fortresses, and warred down by exertions which none but the best troops are capable of; for the Catalans are robust, numerous, and brave enough after their own manner.

Observation 2.—It follows from this exposition, that Duhesme evinced a surprising want of forethought and military sagacity, in neglecting to secure Gerona, Hostalrich, and Tarragona, with garrisons, when his troops were received into those places. It was this negligence that rendered the timid operations of Swartz and Chabran capital errors; it was this that enabled some poor injured and indignant peasants to kindle a mighty war, and in a very few weeks obliged Napoleon to send 30,000 men to the relief of Barcelona.

Observation 3.—Duhesme was experienced in battles, and his energy and resources of mind have been praised by a great authority; but undoubtedly an absence of prudent calculation and arrangement, a total neglect of military discipline, marked all his operations in Catalonia; witness his mode of attack on Gerona, the deficiency of ladders, and the confusion of the assaults. Witness also his raising of the second siege, and absolute flight from Caldagues, whose rash enterprise, although crowned with success, should have caused his own destruction.

In those affairs it is certain Duhesme displayed neither talent nor vigour; but in the severities he exercised at the sacking of Mattaro, in the burning of villages, which he executed to the extreme verge of, if not beyond what the harshest laws of war will justify, an odious energy was apparent, and as the ardour of the somatenes was rather increased than repressed by these vigorous proceedings, his conduct may be deemed as impolitic as it was barbarous.*

Observation 4.—In Catalonia all the inherent cruelty of the Spaniards was as grossly displayed as in any other province of Spain. The Catalans were likewise vain and superstitious; but their courage was higher, their patriotism purer, and their efforts more sustained; the somatenes were bold and active in battle, the population of the towns firm, and the juntas apparently disinterested. The praise merited and bestowed upon the people of Zaragoza is great; but Gerona more justly claims the admiration of mankind; for the Aragonese troops were by Lefebvre driven from the open country in crowds to their capital, and little was wanted to induce them to surrender at once; it was not until the last hour that, gathering courage from despair, the people of Zaragoza put forth all their energy: whereas those of Gerona, although attacked by a greater force, and possessing fewer means of defence, without any internal system of terror to counterbalance their fear of the enemy, manfully and successfully resisted from the first. The people of Zaragoza rallied at their hearthstone; those of Gerona stood firm at the porch. But quitting these matters, I must now, following the order I have marked out, proceed to relate the occurrences in Valencia.

OPERATIONS OF MARSHAL MONCEY.

The execution of Calvo and his followers changed the horrid aspect of the Valencian insurrection; the spirit of murder was checked, and the patriotic energy assumed a nobler appearance. Murcia and Valencia were united as one province; and towards the end of June, nearly 30,000 men, armed and provided

* Napoleon's Notes, Appendix, No. 2.

with artillery, attested the resources of these rich provinces, and the activity of their chiefs. The Valencians then conceived the plan of marching to the assistance of the Aragonese ; but Napoleon had already prescribed the measures which were to render such a movement abortive.

An order, dated the 30th of May, directed Moncey to move, with a column of 10,000 men, upon Cuenca ; from that point he was to watch the country comprised between the lower Ebro and Carthagena, and he was empowered to act against the city of Valencia if he judged it fitting to do so. The position of Cuenca was advantageous ; a short movement from thence to the left would place Moncey's troops upon the direct line between Valencia and Zaragoza, and enable him to intercept all communication between those towns ; and a few marches to the right placed him upon the junction of the roads leading from Carthagena and Valencia to Madrid. If Moncey thought it essential to attack Valencia, the division of General Chabran was to co-operate from the side of Catalonia. By this combination the operations of Lefebre Desnouettes at Zaragoza, and those of Duhesme in Catalonia, were covered from the Valencians ; and at the same time the flank of the French army at Madrid was protected on the side of Murcia.

The 6th of June Moncey marched from Aranjuez by Santa Cruz, Tarancon, Carascoso, and Villa del Orma, and reached Cuenca the 11th. There he received information of the rapid progress of the insurrection, of the state of the Valencian army, and of the projected movement to relieve Zaragoza ; he immediately resolved to make an attempt against the city of Valencia, and wrote to General Chabran, whom he supposed to be at Tortosa, directing him to march upon Castellon de la Plana, a town situated at some distance eastward of the river Guadalaviar. Moncey himself proposed, by a march through Requena, to clear the country westward of that river, and fixed upon the 25th of June as the latest period at which the two columns were to communicate in the immediate vicinity of Valencia.

Halting from the 11th to the 16th at Cuenca, he marched the 17th to Tortola, the 18th to Buenaches, the 19th to Matilla, the 20th to Minglanilla, and the 21st to Pesquiera. From Buenaches to Pesquiera no inhabitants were to be seen ; the villages were deserted, and either from fear or hatred, every living person fled before his footsteps. At length, a Swiss regiment, some of the Spanish guards, and a body of armed peasantry, made a stand at the bridge of Pajaso, upon the river Cabriel ; the manner in which the country had been forsaken, the gloomy and desolate marches, and the sudden appearance of an armed force ready to dispute this important pass, prognosticated a desperate conflict ; but the event belied the omens ; and scarcely any resistance was made ; the French easily forced the passage of the bridge ; the peasants fled, and the Swiss and Spanish guards came over to the side of the victors.

Moncey informed General Chabran of this success, and appointed the 27th and 28th for a junction under the walls of Valencia. The next day he took a position at Otiel ; but hearing that the defeated patriots had rallied and being reinforced, were, to the number of 10,000 or 12,000, intrenching themselves upon his left, he quitted the direct line of march to attack them in their post of Cabrerias, which was somewhat in advance of the Siete Aguas. The Spanish position was of extraordinary strength, the flanks rested upon steep rocky mountains, and the only approach to the front was through a long narrow defile, formed by high scarped rocks, whose tops, inaccessible from the French side, were covered with the armed peasantry of the neighbourhood. A direct assault upon such a position could not succeed, and General Harispe was directed to turn it by the right, while the cavalry and artillery occupied the attention of the Spaniards in front ; after overcoming many obstacles offered by the impracticable nature of the ground, Harispe reached the main body of the Spaniards, and then easily defeated them, taking all their cannon, ammunition, and baggage. This action, which took place upon the 24th, freed the left flank

of Moncey's army, and he resumed his march upon the direct road to Valencia. The 25th he was at the Venta de Buñol, the 26th in advance of Chieva, and the 27th he arrived in front of Valencia.

A complete circuit of the ancient walls was in existence, and all the approaches were commanded by works which had been hastily repaired or newly raised by the inhabitants; the citadel was in a tolerable state of defence, and the population were preparing for a vigorous resistance. A city containing 80,000 people, actuated by the most violent passions, cannot be easily overcome, and the Valencians derived additional strength from the situation of their town, built as it was upon low ground, and encircled with numerous canals and cuts, made for the purposes of irrigation; the deep ditches of the place were filled with water, so that no approach could be made by the small force under Moncey except against the gates. It is said that the marshal had corrupted a smuggler, who promised to betray the city during the heat of the assault, and it is probable that some secret understanding of that kind induced the French commander to make an attempt which would otherwise have been rash and unmilitary.

Don Joseph Caro, a brother of the Marquis of Romana, was with 4000 men entrenched behind the canal of the Guadalaviar, which was five miles in advance of the city gates. The village of Quarte, and some thickly planted mulberry trees, helped to render this post very strong; and when Moncey attacked it upon the 27th, he met with a vigorous resistance. Caro was, however, beaten, and chased into the city, with the loss of some cannon, and on the 28th the French drove in the outposts, and occupied all the principal avenues of the town.

However enthusiastic the patriots were while their enemy was at a distance, his near approach filled them with terror, and it is possible that a vigorous assault might have succeeded at the first moment of consternation. But the favourable opportunity, if it really existed, quickly passed away; Padre Rico, a friar distinguished by his resolution, traversing the streets, with a cross in one hand and a sword in the other, aroused the sinking spirit and excited the fanaticism of the multitude; the fear of retaliation for the massacre of the French residents, and the certainty that Moncey's troops were few, powerfully seconded his efforts; and as it is usual for undisciplined masses of people to pass suddenly from one extreme to another, fear was soon succeeded by enthusiasm.

After disposing his field-pieces on the most favourable points, and while the impression of the first defeat was still fresh, Moncey summoned the governor to surrender. But the latter answered, "That he would defend the city." The French guns then opened upon the place; the heavy guns of the Spaniards, however, soon overpowered them, and a warm skirmish ensuing about the houses of the suburbs and the vicinity of the gates, the Valencians so obstinately resisted, that when the night fell, not only no serious impression had been made upon the defences, but the assailants were repulsed with loss at every point. The situation of the French marshal became delicate; the persons sent to seek Chabran could gain no intelligence of that general's movements; the secret connexions in the town, if any there were, had failed; the ammunition was nearly expended, and the army was encumbered with 700 or 800 wounded men, and among them the general of engineers. Moncey, swayed by these embarrassments, relinquished his attack, and fell back to Quarte on the 29th, being harassed by Caro and the populace in his retreat.

When it is considered that in a great city only a small number of persons can estimate justly the immense advantages of their situation, and the comparative weakness of the enemy, it must be confessed that the spirit displayed by the Valencians upon this occasion was very great; unfortunately it ended there, nothing worthy of such an energetic commencement was afterwards performed, although very considerable armies were either raised or maintained in the province.

At Quarte, Moncey, hearing that the captain-general, Serbelloni, was marching upon Almanza to intercept the communication with Chieva and Buñol,

resolved to relinquish the line of Cuenca, and to attack Serbelloni before he could quit the kingdom of Murcia. This vigorous resolution he executed with great celerity; for, directing the head of his column towards Torrente, he continued his march until night, halting a short distance from that town. And a forced march the next day brought him near Alcira, only one league from the river Xucar; from his bivouac at that place he despatched advice to General Chabran of this change of affairs.

In the mean time the Conde de Serbelloni, surprised in the midst of his movement, and disconcerted in his calculations by the decision and rapidity of Moncey, took up a position to defend the passage of the Xucar; the line of that river is strong, and offers many advantageous points of resistance; but the Spaniards imprudently occupied both banks, and in this exposed situation were attacked upon the morning of the 1st of July; the division on the French side was overthrown, and the passage forced without loss of time. Serbelloni then retired to the heights of San Felice, which covered the main road leading from Alcira to Almanza, hoping to secure the defiles in front of the latter town before the enemy could arrive there; but Moncey was again too quick for him; for leaving San Felice to his left, he continued his march on another route, and by a strenuous exertion seized upon the gorge of the defiles near Almanza late in the night of the 2nd; the Spanish troops in the mean time approached his position, but were dispersed at daybreak on the 3rd, and some of their guns captured; the road being now open, Moncey entered the town of Almanza the same day. The 4th he took post at Bonete; the 5th near Chinchilla; and the 6th at Albacete, where he got intelligence that General Frere, who should have been at St. Clemente with a division, was gone towards Mequeña.

To explain this movement it is necessary to observe that when Dupont marched towards Andalusia, and Moncey against Valencia, the remaining divisions of their corps were employed by Savary to scour the country in the neighbourhood of Madrid, and to protect the rear and connect the operations of those generals; thus General Gobert, who, following Napoleon's orders, should have been at Valladolid, was sent with the third division of Dupont towards Andalusia; and General Frere (commanding the second division of Moncey's), who should have been at San Clemente, a central point, from whence he could gain the road leading from Seville to La Mancha, and intercept the communication between Valencia and Cuenca, or seize upon the point of junction where the route from Carthagen and Murcia falls into the road of Valencia, was sent by Requena to reinforce Moncey.

Meanwhile, the inhabitants of Cuenca rose in arms, and being joined by a force of 7000 or 8000 peasants, overpowered and destroyed a French detachment left in that town. The Duke of Rovigo, fearing that Moncey's column would be compromised by this insurrection, ordered General Caulaincourt, then at Tarazona, to quell it with a force composed of cavalry and some provisional battalions. Caulaincourt arrived in front of Cuenca on the evening of the 3rd of July; finding the insurgents in position, he attacked and dispersed them with great slaughter, and the town being deserted by the inhabitants, was given up to pillage.

In the mean time, Frere, who had quitted San Clemente upon the 26th, made his way to Requena; there he received intelligence of Caulaincourt's success, and that Moncey had passed the Xucar; whereupon, retracing his steps, he returned to San Clemente, his troops being wearied, sickly, and exhausted by these long and useless marches in the heats of summer. Moncey now re-organized his forces, and prepared artillery and other means for a second attempt against Valencia; but he was interrupted by Savary, who, alarmed at the advance of Cuesta and Blake, recalled Frere towards Madrid, and Moncey, justly offended that Savary, inflated with momentary power, should treat him with so little ceremony, broke up from San Clemente, and likewise returned by the way of Ocaña to the capital.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. The result of Marshal Moncey's campaign being published by the Spaniards as a great and decisive failure, produced extravagant hopes of final success; a happy illusion if the chiefs had not partaken of it, and pursued their wild course of mutual flattery and exaggeration, without reflecting that in truth there was nothing very satisfactory in the prospect of affairs. Moncey's operation was in the nature of a movable column; the object of which was to prevent the junction of the Valencian army with the Aragonese. The attempt upon the town of Valencia was a simple experiment, which, if successful, would have produced great effects, but having failed, the evil resulting was but trifling in a military point of view.* Valencia was not the essential object of the expedition, and the fate of the general campaign depended upon the armies in Old Castile.

2. It was consoling that a rich and flourishing town had not fallen into the power of the enemy; but at the same time a want of real nerve in the Spanish insurrection was visible. The kingdoms of Murcia and Valencia acted in concert, and contained two of the richest sea-port towns in the Peninsula; their united force amounted to 30,000 organized troops, exclusive of the armed peasants in various districts; and the populace of Valencia were deeply committed by the massacre of the French residents. Here then, if in any place, a strenuous resistance was to be expected; nevertheless, Marshal Moncey, whose whole force was at first only 8000 French, and never exceeded 10,000 men, continued marching and fighting without cessation for a month, during which period he forced two of the strongest mountain passes in the world, crossed several large and difficult rivers, carried the war into the very streets of Valencia; and being disappointed of assistance from Catalonia, extricated his division from a difficult situation, after having defeated his opponents in five actions, killed and wounded a number of them, equal in amount to the whole of his own force, and made a circuit of above 300 miles through a hostile and populous country, without having sustained any serious loss, without any desertion from the Spanish battalions incorporated with his own, and what was of more importance, having those battalions much increased by desertions from the enemy. In short, the great object of the expedition had been attained, the plan of relieving Zaragoza was entirely frustrated, and the organization of an efficient Spanish force retarded.

3. Moncey could hardly have expected to succeed against the town of Valencia; for to use Napoleon's words, "a city, with 80,000 inhabitants, barricaded streets, and artillery placed at the gates, cannot be *taken by the collar*."

4. General Frere's useless march to Requena was very hurtful to the French; and the Duke of Rovigo was rated by the emperor for his want of judgment upon the occasion; "it was a folly," the latter writes, "to dream of reinforcing Moncey; because if that marshal failed in taking the city by a sudden assault, it became an affair of artillery; and 20,000 men, more or less, would not enable him to succeed." "Frere could do nothing at Valencia, but he could do a great deal at San Clemente; because from that post he could support either Madrid or General Dupont.

5. Moncey was slightly blamed by the emperor for not halting within a day's march of Valencia, in order to break the spirit of the people, and make them feel the weight of the war; but this opinion was probably formed upon an imperfect knowledge of the local details. The marshal's line of operations from Cuenca was infested by insurgent bands, his ammunition was nearly exhausted, he could hear nothing of Chabran's division, and the whole force of Murcia was collecting upon his flank and rear. The country behind him was favourable for his adversaries, and his army was encumbered by a number of wounded men; it was surely prudent, under such circumstances, to open his communication again with Madrid as quickly as possible.

* Appendix, No. 7.

By some authors, the repulse at Valencia has been classed with the inglorious defeat of Dupont at Baylen; but there was a wide difference between those events, the generals, and the results. Moncey, although an old man, was vigorous, active, and decided; and the check he received produced little effect. Dupont was irresolute, slow, and incapable, if not worse, as I shall hereafter show; but before describing his campaign, I must narrate the operations of the Gallician army.

CHAPTER VII.

OPERATIONS OF BESSIERES AGAINST BLAKE AND CUESTA.

WHILE the movable columns of Bessieres' corps ranged over the Asturian and Biscayan mountains, and dispersed the insurgent patriots of those provinces, Cuesta, undismayed by his defeat at Cabezon, collected another army at Benevente, and, in concert with the Gallician forces, prepared to advance again towards Burgos.

Filanghieri, the captain-general of Galicia, had organized the troops in that kingdom without difficulty, because the abundant supplies poured in from England were beginning to be felt; and patriotism is never more efficacious than when supported by large sums of money. Taranco's soldiers joined to the garrisons of Ferrol and Coruña were increased, by new levies, to 25,000 men, organized in four divisions, and being well equipped, and provided with a considerable train of artillery, were assembled at Manzanal, a strong post in the mountains, twelve miles behind Astorga.

The situation of that city offered great advantages to the Spaniards; the old Moorish walls which surrounded it were complete, and susceptible of being strengthened, so as to require a regular siege; but a siege could not be undertaken by a small force, while the army of Galicia was entrenched at Manzanal, and while Cuesta remained at Benevente; neither could Bessieres, with any prudence, attack the Gallicians at Manzanal while Cuesta was at Benevente, and while Astorga contained a strong garrison. Filanghieri appears to have had some notion of its value, for he commenced forming an intrenched camp in the mountains; but being slain by his soldiers, Don Joachim Blake succeeded to the command, and probably fearing a similar fate if the army remained stationary, left one division at Manzanal, and with the remainder marched towards Benevente to unite with Cuesta.

On the French side, Marshal Bessieres collected his scattered columns at Palencia; his plan, founded upon instructions from Bayonne, was to make a rapid movement against Cuesta, in the hope of beating him, while Blake was still behind Leon; then wheeling to his right, to attack and drive the Gallicians back to the mountains, to overrun the flat country with his numerous cavalry, to open a communication with Portugal, and after receiving certain reinforcements then preparing for him, to subdue Galicia, or assist Junot, as might seem most fitting at the time.*

At this period the king was on his journey to Madrid, and the military system of Napoleon was brought to its first great crisis; for unless Bessieres was successful, there could be no sure footing for the French in the capital, and as Madrid was the base of Moncey's and Dupont's operations, the farther prosecution of their plans depended upon the result of the approaching struggle in the plains of Leon. Napoleon, foreseeing this crisis, had directed Savary to occupy Segovia, to send General Gobert's division to Valladolid, and to hold Vedel's and Frere's, the one in La Mancha, a few marches from the capital, and the other at San Clemente, a central point connecting Moncey, Dupont, and Madrid. But Savary, unable to estimate justly the relative importance of the different operations, sent Vedel and Gobert into Andalusia to reinforce Dupont, when he should rather have recalled the latter to the

* Napoleon's Notes, Appendix, No. 2.

northern side of the Sierra Morena; he caused Frere, as we have seen, to quit San Clemente, and march by Requena against Valencia, at the moment when Moncey was retiring from that city through Murcia to San Clemente, and thus dispersed and harassed his reserves by long marches to the south without any definite object when the essential interests were at stake in the north; and now, struck with fear at the approach of Cuesta and Blake, whose armies he had hitherto disregarded, he precipitately recalled Frere, Vedel, Gobert, and even Dupont to Madrid, too late to take part with Bessieres in the coming battle, but exactly timed to frustrate Moncey's projects, and, as we shall hereafter find, to ensure the ruin of Dupont. In this manner steering his vessel before every wind that blew, he could not fail of storms.

Greatly was Napoleon discontented with these errors; he relied, and with reason, on the ability of Bessieres for a remedy; but to Savary he sent the following instructions, dated the 13th of July:—

"The French affairs in Spain would be in an excellent state if Gobert's division had marched upon Valladolid, and Frere's had occupied San Clemente, with a movable column, three or four marches upon the route of General Dupont. Gobert having been directed upon Dupont, Frere being with Moncey, harassed and enfeebled by marches and counter-marches, the position of the French army is become less advantageous.

"Marshal Bessieres is this day at Medina del Rio Seco with 15,000 men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery; the 15th or 16th he will attack Benevente, open a communication with Portugal, drive the rebels into Galicia, and seize upon Leon. If his operations succeed thus, and in a brilliant manner, the position of the French army will again be as good as it was.

"If General Cuesta retires from Benevente without fighting, he will move by Zamora and Salamanca to gain Avila and Segovia, certain that then Bessieres cannot pursue him, as, in that case, he would be menaced by the army of Galicia, whose advanced guard is at Leon. The general who commands at Madrid must then be able to assemble 6000 or 7000 men and march upon Cuesta; the citadel of Segovia must be occupied by 300 or 400 convalescents, with some guns and six weeks' biscuit. It was a great fault not to have occupied this citadel when the major-general ordered it; of all the possible positions, Segovia is the most dangerous for the army; the capital of a province, situated between two routes, it deprives the army of all its communications, and the enemy once posted in the citadel, the French army cannot dislodge him. Three or four hundred convalescents, a good commandant, and a squad of artillery, will render the castle of Segovia impregnable for some time, and will insure to the army the important position of Segovia.

"If General Cuesta throws himself into Galicia without fighting or suffering a defeat, the position of the army will become better; of course it will be still better if he does so after having suffered a defeat.

"If Marshal Bessieres faces Cuesta at Benevente without attacking him, or if he is repulsed by him, his object will always be to cover Burgos, and to hold the enemy in check as long as possible; he could, perhaps, be reinforced with the 300 troops of the line which accompany the king, but then there would be no room for hesitation. If Bessieres retires without a battle, he must be reinforced instantly with 6000 men. If he retreats after a battle wherein he has suffered great loss, it will be necessary to make great dispositions; to recall Frere, Gobert, Caulaincourt, and Vedel by forced marches to Madrid; to withdraw Dupont into the Sierra Morena, or even bring him nearer to Madrid (keeping him always, however, seven or eight marches off), then crush Cuesta and all the Gallician army, while Dupont will serve as an advanced guard to hold the army of Andalusia in check."

Before Bessieres could collect his troops, Blake effected a junction with Cuesta at Benevente. Three plans were open to those generals:—

1. To remove into the mountains, and take a position covering Galicia.

2. To maintain the head of the Gallician army in advance of Astorga, while Cuesta, with his Castilians, pushing by forced marches through Salamanca and Avila, reached Segovia.

3. To advance farther into the plains, and try the fate of a battle.

This last plan was rash, seeing that Bessieres was well provided with horsemen, and that the Spaniards had scarcely any; but Cuesta, assuming the chief command, left a division at Benevente to protect his stores, and advanced, much against Blake's wishes, with 25,000 infantry (regular troops), a few hundred cavalry, and from twenty to thirty pieces of artillery, in the direction of Palencia. His march, as we have seen, dismayed Savary. To use Napoleon's expressions, he who had been "hitherto acting as if the army of Galicia was not in existence," now acted "as if Bessieres was already beaten;" but that marshal, firm and experienced, rather than risk an action of such importance with insufficient means, withdrew even the garrison from the important post of St. Ander, and having quickly collected 15,000 men and thirty pieces of artillery at Palencia, moved forward on the 12th of July to the encounter. His line of battle consisted of two divisions of infantry, one of light cavalry, and twenty-four guns, his reserve was formed of four battalions and some horse grenadiers of the imperial guards, with six pieces of artillery.

The 13th he halted at Ampudia and Torre de Mormojon, from thence advancing on the 14th in two columns, he drove in an advanced guard of 150 Spanish cavalry, and arrived about nine o'clock in front of Rio Seco, where Cuesta's army was drawn up like a heavy domestic animal awaiting the spring of some active wild beast.

BATTLE OF RIO SECO.

The first line of the Spaniards was posted along the edge of a step of land, with an abrupt fall towards the French; the heaviest guns were distributed along the front. The second line, composed of the best troops, strengthened, or rather weakened, by 17,000 or 18,000 peasants, was displayed at a great distance behind the first; the town of Rio Seco was in rear of the centre.

Bessieres was at first startled at their numbers, and doubted if he should attack; but soon perceiving the vice of Cuesta's disposition, he ordered General Lasalle to make a feint against the front with the light cavalry, while he himself marching obliquely to the right, outstretched the left of the Spaniards, and suddenly thrust Merle's and Mouton's divisions and the imperial guards, horse and foot, between their lines, and threw the first into confusion; at that moment Lasalle charging furiously, the Spanish front went down at once, and 1500 dead bodies strewed the field; but the victor's ranks were disordered, and Cuesta made a gallant effort to retrieve the day, for, supported by the fire of all his remaining artillery, he fell with his second line upon the French, and with his right wing broke in boldly and took six guns; but his left hanging back, the flank of the right was exposed. Bessieres, with great readiness, immediately charged on this naked flank with Merle's division and the horse grenadiers, while the fourteenth provisional regiment made head against the front; a fierce short struggle ensued; and the Spaniards were overborne, were broken and dispersed; meanwhile the first line rallied in the town of Rio Seco, but were a second time defeated by Mouton's division, and fled over the plains, pursued by the light cavalry, and suffering severely in their flight.

From 5000 to 6000 Spaniards were killed and wounded on the field, and 1200 prisoners, eighteen guns, and a great store of ammunition, remained in the hands of the French. The vanquished sought safety in all directions, but chiefly on the side of Benevente. Blake and Cuesta separated in wrath with each other, the former making for the mountains of Galicia, the latter towards Leon, and the division left at Benevente dispersed.

The French, who had lost fifty killed and 300 wounded, remained at Rio Seco all the 15th; the 16th they advanced to Benevente, where they found

many thousand English muskets and vast quantities of ammunition, clothing, and provisions.

The communication with Portugal was now open, and Bessieres at first resolved to give his hand to Junot ; but hearing that the fugitives were likely to rally on the side of Leon, he pursued them by the road of Villa-fere. On his march, learning that Cuesta was gone to Mayorga, he turned aside to that place, and on the 22nd captured there another great collection of stores ; for the Spanish general, with the usual improvidence of his nation, had established all his magazines in the open towns of the flat country.

After this Bessieres entered the city of Leon and remained there until the 29th, during which time he received the submission of the municipality, and prepared to carry the war into Galicia. The junta of Castile and Leon, whose power had hitherto been restrained by Cuesta, now retired to Puente-Ferrada and assumed supreme authority, and the quarrel between the generals becoming rancorous, they sided with Blake. This appearing to Bessieres a favourable occasion to tamper with the fidelity of those chiefs ; he sent his prisoners back, and endeavoured, by offering the vice-royalty of Mexico to the one, and by reasoning on the hopeless state of the insurrection, and the promise of rank and honours to the other, to shake the loyalty of both ; but neither would listen to him.

This failing, he marched to Puente Orvigo the 31st, intending to break into Galicia, but he was suddenly recalled from thence to protect the retreat of the king from Madrid. Dupont had surrendered with a whole army in Andalusia, the court was in consternation, the victory of Rio Seco was rendered fruitless ; and Bessieres retracing his steps to Mayorga, took a defensive position near that town.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. As Blake was overruled by Cuesta he is not responsible for the errors of this short campaign ; but the faults were gross on both sides, and it seems difficult to decide whether Savary or Cuesta made the greatest number.

2. If the former had sent Gobert's division to Valladolid, Bessieres would have had 22,000 men and forty pieces of artillery in the field, a force, not at all too great, when it is considered that the fate of three French armies depended upon the success of a battle to which Cuesta might have brought at least double that number. The latter having determined upon an offensive movement, disregarded the powerful cavalry of his enemy, chose a field of battle precisely in the country where that arm would have the greatest advantage, and when he should have brought every man to bear upon the quarter which he did attack, he displayed his ignorance of the art of war by fighting the battle of Rio Seco with 25,000 men only, and leaving 10,000 disciplined troops guarding positions in his rear, which could not be approached until he himself was first beaten. Neither was the time well chosen for his advance ; had he waited a few days the port of St. Ander would have been attacked by eight English frigates and a detachment of Spanish troops under the command of General da Ponte, an enterprise that would have distracted and weakened Bessieres, but which was relinquished in consequence of the battle of Rio Seco.

3. Once united to Blake, Cuesta's real base of operations was Galicia, and he should have kept all his stores within the mountains, and not have heaped them up in the open towns of the flat country, exposed to the marauding parties of the enemy, or covered, as in the case of Benevente, by strong detachments which weakened his troops in the field and confined him to a particular line of operations in the plain.

4. The activity and good sense of Marshal Bessieres overbalanced the errors of Savary ; and the victory of Rio Seco was of infinite importance, because as we have seen a defeat in that quarter would have shaken the French military system to its centre and have obliged the king, then on his journey to Madrid, to halt at Vittoria, until the distant divisions of the army were recalled to the

capital, and a powerful effort made to crush the victorious enemy. Napoleon's observations are full of strong expressions of discontent at the imprudence of his lieutenant. "A check given to Dupont," he says, "would have a slight effect, but a wound received by Bessieres would give a locked jaw to the whole army. Not an inhabitant of Madrid, not a peasant of the valleys that does not feel that the affairs of Spain are involved in the affair of Bessieres; how unfortunate, then, that in such a great event you have wilfully given the enemy twenty chances against yourself." When he heard of the victory he exclaimed that it was the battle of Almanza, and that Bessieres had saved Spain.

The prospect was indeed very promising; the king had arrived in Madrid, bringing with him the veteran brigade of General Rey and some of the guards, and all fears upon the side of Leon being allayed, the affairs of Andalusia alone were of doubtful issue; for Zaragoza, hard pushed by Verdier, was upon the point of destruction in despite of the noble courage of the besieged;* nor did the subjugation of Andalusia appear in reason a hard task, seeing that Moncey was then at San Clemente, and from that point threatened Valencia without losing the power of succouring Dupont, and Frere's and Caulincourt's troops were disposable for any operation. The French army possessed the centre, and the Spaniards were dispersed upon a variety of points on the circumference without any connection with each other, and in force only upon the side of Andalusia.

5. The great combinations of the French emperor were upon the point of being crowned with success, when a sudden catastrophe overturned his able calculations and raised the sinking hopes of the Spaniards. It was the campaign in Andalusia which produced such important effects, and it offers one of the most interesting and curious examples recorded by history of the vicissitudes of war; for there disorder unaccompanied by superior valour triumphed over discipline; inexperienced officers were successful against practised generals; and a fortuitous combination of circumstances enabled the Spaniards, without any skill, to defeat in one day an immense plan wisely arranged, embracing a variety of interests, and until that moment happily conducted in all its parts. This blow, which felled Joseph from his throne, marked the French army with a dishonourable scar, the more conspicuous, because it was the only one of its numerous wounds that misbecame it.

CHAPTER VIII.

OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA.

GENERAL DUPONT received orders to march against Cadiz with a column, composed of two Swiss regiments (Preux and Reding), taken from the Spanish army, a French division of infantry under General Barbou, a division of cavalry commanded by General Fresia, a marine battalion of the imperial guards, and 18 pieces of artillery. Three thousand infantry, 500 cavalry, and 10 guns, drawn from the army of Portugal, were to join him in Andalusia, and he was to incorporate among his troops three other Swiss regiments, quartered in that province.

The latter end of May he traversed La Mancha, entered the Sierra Morena, by the pass of Despenas Perros, and proceeded by Carolina and Baylen to Andujar, where he arrived the 2nd of June; there he was informed that a supreme junta of government was established at Seville, that minor juntas ruled in Granada, Jaen, and Cordoba, that war was formally declared against the French, that the whole of Andalusia was in arms, and the Swiss regiments ranged under the Spanish banners, and finally, that General Avril, commanding the detachment expected from Portugal, had halted in Tavora, and was preparing to return to Lisbon.

* Napoleon's Notes, Appendix, No. 3.

Alarmed by this intelligence, Dupont wrote to Murat and Savary to demand reinforcements, and in the mean time closed up the rear of his columns, and established an hospital in Andujar. The 6th he crossed the Guadalquivir, and continued his march towards Cordoba, following the left bank of the river. Two leagues from that ancient city the road recrossed the Guadalquivir by a long stone bridge, at the furthest end of which stood the village of Alcolea. The French general arrived there at daybreak on the 7th, but his further progress was opposed by the Spanish General Echevaria, who, having fortified the head of the bridge, manned the works, placed twelve guns in battery on the right bank, and drawn together 3000 regular troops, and 10,000 new levies and smugglers, occupied the village, and was prepared to dispute the passage of the river. A small reserve remained in a camp close to Cordoba, and a cloud of armed peasants from the side of Jaen were also gathered on the hills behind the French army, ready to fall on its rear when the bridge should be attacked.

Dupont having observed this disposition, placed the cavalry, the Swiss regiments, and the marine battalion in reserve facing to the hills, and with the division of Barbou stormed the head of the bridge. The Spaniards making a feeble resistance, were driven across the river, and their whole line immediately fled to the camp at Cordoba. The multitude on the hills descended during the battle, but were beaten back by the cavalry with loss, and the French general, leaving the marine battalion at Alcolea to secure the bridge, marched with the rest of his forces to complete the victory. At his approach the Spaniards abandoned their new position, took refuge in the town, and being summoned to surrender, opened a fire of musketry from the walls, whereupon the French bursting the gates with their field-pieces, broke into the town, and after a short and confused fight Echevaria's men fled in disorder along the Seville road, and were pursued by the cavalry. As the inhabitants took no part in the contest, and received the French without any signs of aversion, the town was protected from pillage, and Dupont fixing his quarters there, sent his patrols as far as Ecija without meeting with an enemy.

In Seville the news of this disaster, and the arrival of fugitives, struck such a terror, that the junta were only prevented from retiring to Cadiz by their dread of the populace, and even entertained thoughts of abandoning Spain altogether, and flying to South America. Castaños, who a few days before had been declared captain-general of the armies, was at this time in march with 7000 troops of the line from San Roque; being called to Seville, he arrived there on the 9th, and after a short conference with the junta proceeded to take the command of Echevaria's forces, the greater part of which were reassembled at Carmona, but in such confusion and so moody that he returned immediately, and having persuaded the president Saavedra to accompany him, fixed his head-quarters at Utrera, where he gathered two or three thousand regulars from the nearest garrisons, and directing the new levies to repair to him, hastened the march of his own men from St. Roche. He also pressed General Spencer to disembark, and take up a position with the British forces at Xeres; but Spencer, for reasons hereafter to be mentioned, sailed to Ayamonte, a circumstance that augmented a general distrust of the English prevailing at the time, and which was secretly fomented by Morla, and by several members of the junta.

At this moment Andalusia was lost if Dupont had advanced; his inactivity saved it: instead of pushing his victory, he wrote to Savary for reinforcements, and to General Avril, desiring that he would without delay come to his assistance, but he himself remained in Cordoba, overwhelmed with imaginary dangers and difficulties; for although Castaños had in a few days collected at Carmona and Utrera 7000 or 8000 regulars, and above 50,000 new levies, and that Dupont's letters were intercepted and brought to him, such was the condition of affairs that, resigning all thoughts of making a stand, he had, under the pretence of completing the defences of Cadiz, embarked the heavy artillery.

and stores at Seville, and was prepared, if Dupont should advance, to burn the timbers and harness of his field artillery, and to retreat to Cadiz.*

Meanwhile continuing the organization of his forces, he filled up the old regiments with new levies, and formed fresh battalions, in which he was assisted by two foreigners, the Marquis de Coupigny, a crafty French emigrant, of some experience in war, and Reding, a Swiss, a bold, enterprising, honest man, but without judgment, and of very moderate talents as an officer. Castaños wished to adopt a defensive plan, to make Cadiz his place of arms, and to form an entrenched camp, where he hoped to be joined by 10,000 or 12,000 British troops, and, in security, to organize and discipline a large army; but, in reality, he had merely the name and the troubles of a commander-in-chief, without the power; for Morla was his enemy, and the junta containing men determined to use their authority for their own emolument and the gratification of private enmity, were jealous lest Castaños should control their proceedings, and thwarted him; humouring the caprice and insolence of the populace, and meddling with affairs foreign to the matter in hand.

As the numbers at Utrera increased, the general confidence augmented and a retreat was no longer contemplated: plans were laid to surround Dupont in Cordoba; one detachment of peasants, commanded by regular officers, was sent to occupy the passes of the Sierra Morena, leading into Estremadura; another marched from Grenada, accompanied by a regiment of the line, to seize Carolina, and cut off the communication with La Mancha; a third, under Colonel Valdecanas, proposed to attack the French in Cordoba without any assistance, and this eagerness for action was increased by a knowledge of the situation of affairs in Portugal, and by rumours exaggerating the strength of Filanghieri and Cuesta. It was believed that the latter had advanced to Valladolid, and offered Murat the option of abiding an attack, or retiring immediately to France by stated marches, and that, alarmed at Cuesta's power, the grand duke was fortifying the Retiro.

These reports, so congenial to the wishes and vanity of the Andalusians, caused the plan proposed by Castaños to be rejected; and when Dupont's despatches magnifying his own danger, and pressing in the most urgent manner for reinforcements were again intercepted and brought to head quarters, it was resolved to attack Cordoba immediately; but Dupont's fears outstripped their impatience.

After ten days' inactivity, by which he lost the immediate fruit of his victory at Alcolea,—the lead in an offensive campaign, and all the imposing moral force of the French reputation in arms, Dupont, finding that, instead of receiving direct reinforcements from Savary, he must wait until Moncey, having first subdued Valencia, could aid him by the circuitous route of Murcia, resolved to fall back to Andujar.

He commenced his retreat the 17th of June, being followed as far as Carpio by the advanced guard of the Andalusians, under General Coupigny.† Along the line of march, and in the town of Andujar, where he arrived the evening of the 18th, he found terrible proofs of Spanish ferocity; his stragglers had been assassinated, and his hospital taken, the sick, the medical attendants, the couriers, the staff officers, in fine, all who had the misfortune to be weaker than the insurgents, were butchered, with circumstances of extraordinary barbarity; upwards of 400 men had perished in this miserable manner since the fight of Alcolea. The fate of Colonel Renè was horrible; he had been sent on a mission to Portugal previous to the breaking out of hostilities; and was on his return, travelling in the ordinary mode, without arms, attached to no army, engaged in no operations of war, but being recognized as a Frenchman he was seized, mutilated, and then placed between two planks and sawed alive.

Dupont now collected provisions, and prepared to maintain himself in Andujar until he should be reinforced; but wishing to punish the city of Jaen,

* Appendix, No. 13.

† Napoleon's Notes, Appendix, No. 1.

from whence the bands had come that murdered his sick, he sent Captain Baste, a naval officer, with a battalion of infantry and some cavalry, to accomplish that object. The French soldiers, inflamed by the barbarity of their enemies, inflicted a severe measure of retaliation, for it is the nature of cruelty to reproduce itself in war; and for this reason, although the virtue of clemency is to all persons becoming, it is peculiarly so to an officer, the want of it leading to so many and such great evils.

The Andalusian army having remained quiet, Dupont, who knew that Vedel's division, escorting a large convoy for the army, was marching through La Mancha, sent Captain Baste with a second detachment to clear the pass of Despeñas Perros which was occupied by insurgents and smugglers from Grenada to the number of 3000: the pass itself was of incredible strength, and the Spaniards had artillery, and were partially entrenched; but their commander, a colonel of the line, deserted to the enemy, and before Baste could arrive, Vedel forced the road without difficulty and reached Carolina. He posted a detachment there to keep open the communication with La Mancha, and then descended himself to Baylen, a small town sixteen miles from Andujar.

Meanwhile other insurgents from Grenada having arrived at Jaen were preparing to move by the Linhares road to Carolina and Despeñas Perros. General Cassagne, with a brigade of Vedel's division, marched against them the 29th of June, and after fighting on the 2nd and 3rd of July, he took possession of Jaen, and drove the Grenadans back with considerable slaughter, but lost 200 men himself, and returned on the 25th to Baylen. Notwithstanding these successes, and that Vedel brought reinforcements for Barbou's division and the cavalry, Dupont's fears increased. His position at Andujar covered the main road from Seville to Carolina; but eight miles lower down the river it could be turned by the bridge of Marmolexo, and sixteen miles higher up by the roads leading from Jaen to the ferry of Mengibar and Baylen; and beyond that line by the roads from Jaen and Grenada to Uzeda, Linhares, and the passes of El Rey and the Despeñas Perros. The dryness of the season had also rendered the Guadalquivir fordable in many places. The regular force under Castaños was daily increasing in strength, the population around was actively hostile, and the young French soldiers were drooping under privations and the heat of the climate. Six hundred were in hospital, and the whole were discouraged. It is in such situations that the worth of a veteran is found: in battle the ardour of youth often appears to shame the cool indifference of the old soldier, but when the strife is between the malice of fortune and fortitude, between human endurance and accumulating hardships, the veteran becomes truly formidable, when the young soldier resigns himself to despair.

After the actions at Jaen, both sides remained quiet until the 14th of July, on which day General Gobert, who should have been at Rio Seco with Bessieres, arrived at Carolina with the greatest part of a division, the next day he joined Vedel at Baylen, and the latter general pushed on a brigade, under General Leger Bellair, to watch the ferry of Mengibar, and it was full time, for the Spanish army was already on the opposite bank of the river.

When Dupont's retreat from Cordoba had frustrated the plan of the Spaniards to surround him, Castaños returned to his old project of a rigorous defensive system. The junta at first acquiesced, but being unsettled in their policy, and getting intelligence of Vedel's march, they ordered Castaños to attack Dupont at Andujar before the reinforcements could arrive. The regular troops were about 25,000 infantry, and 2000 cavalry. A very heavy train of artillery, and large bodies of armed peasantry, commanded by officers of the line, attended the army; the numbers, of course, varied from day to day, but the whole multitude that advanced towards the Guadalquivir could not have been less than 50,000 men, hence the intelligence that Vedel had actually arrived did not much allay the general fierceness. Castaños, however, was

less sanguine than the rest, and learning that Spencer had just returned to Cadiz with his division, he once more requested him to land and advance to Xeres, to afford a point of retreat in the event of a disaster; the English general consented to disembark, but refused to advance further than Port St. Mary.

The 1st of July the Spanish army occupied a position extending from Carpio to Porcunas; the 11th a council of war being held, it was resolved that Reding's division should cross the Guadalquivir at the ferry of Mengibar, and gain Baylen; that Coupigny should cross at Villa Nueva, and support Reding; and that Castaños, with the other two divisions, advancing to the heights of Argonilla, should attack Andujar in front, while Reding and Coupigny should descend from Baylen and attack it in the rear. Some detachments of light troops under Colonel Cruz were ordered to pass the Guadalquivir by Marmolexo, and to seize the passes leading through the Morena to Estremadura.





The 13th, Reding, with the first division, and 3000 or 4000 peasantry, marched towards Mengibar; and Coupigny, with the second division, took the road of Villa Nueva. The 15th, Castaños crowned the heights of Argonilla, in front of Andujar, with two divisions of infantry, and a multitude of irregular troops. Coupigny skirmished with the French picquets at Villa Nueva; and Reding, crossing the river at Mengibar, attacked Leger Bellair; but Vedel came to the assistance of the latter, and Reding re-crossed to the left bank. When Dupont saw the heights of Argonilla covered with Spanish troops, he sent to Vedel for a brigade of infantry, broke down the bridge of Marmolexo, occupied some works that he had thrown up to cover the bridge of Andujar, put a garrison in an old tower built over one of the arches, and drew the remainder of his troops up in position on the bank of the river; his cavalry being posted in the plain behind the town, with posts watching the fords above and below the position.


The 15th, Castaños merely cannonaded the bridge; the 16th, Colonel Cruz crossed with 4000 men near Marmolexo, and fell upon Dupont's rear, while Castaños attacked him in front. Cruz was beaten, and chased into the mountains by a single battalion, and a few discharges checked Castaños. Meanwhile, Vedel, either thinking all safe at Baylen, or mistaking Dupont's meaning, instead of sending a brigade, marched during the night of the 15th with his whole division. The next day Reding again passed the Guadalquivir, and attacked Leger Bellair. General Gobert, who had just arrived at Baylen, marched to the latter's assistance; the combat became hot, Gobert fell mortally wounded, and the French retired to Baylen. General Darfour succeeded Gobert, and as Reding did not follow up his success, Darfour gave credit to a report that the Spanish general was moving by the Linhares road upon Carolina, and imprudently fell back to the latter town.

While this was passing, Dupont, already offended by Vedel's over-zeal, heard of Gobert's death, and obliged the former to return during the nights of the 16th and 17th, to Baylen, with orders to secure that important point; but Vedel also fell into the same error as Darfour, and marched the 18th to Carolina. Reding, who had never moved from Mengibar, being now joined by Coupigny, profited of this occasion to seize Baylen, and throwing out a detachment on the side of Carolina, drew up in position facing Andujar; his numbers, including the armed peasants, being about 20,000.

The armies were thus interlaced in a singular manner: Dupont being posted between Castaños and Reding; and Reding between Dupont and Vedel's division: the affair became one of time; Castaños rested tranquilly in his camp, apparently ignorant of Reding's situation; Dupont, more alive to what was passing, silently quitted Andujar on the evening of the 18th, marched all night, and at day-break came to Rio de las Tiedras, a torrent with rugged banks, two miles from the Spanish position, in front of Baylen. Reding's ground was strong, intersected with deep ravines, and planted with olive trees.

Supplementary Map
of the
BATTLE OF BAYLEN.

-  Spanish Army 16th July
-  French D^o D^o
-  Spanish D^o 19th & 20th
-  French D^o D^o



Dupont hoping that Vedel would return upon the Spanish rear, and having no choice, passed the Tiedras, and leaving Barbou with a few battalions on that stream to keep Castaños in check, if he should arrive during the action, attacked Reding.

For some time the French appeared to be gaining ground; but, fatigued with a long night march, and unable to force the principal points, they became discouraged; the Swiss brigade went over to the enemy; and at two o'clock, after losing about 2000, killed and wounded, Dupont yielded to his destiny, and sent to desire a suspension of hostilities, with a view to a convention. Reding, who could hardly maintain his position, willingly acceded to the proposal. At this moment Barbou was attacked by General La Pena, who arrived on the Tiedras with a third Spanish division; for Castaños, when he had discovered Dupont's retreat eight hours after the latter had quitted his position, sent half the troops in pursuit, and remained with the rest at Andujar.

Vedel having heard the cannonade as early as three o'clock in the morning, quitted Carolina at five o'clock, and marched in the direction of Baylen. The continued sound of artillery became more distinct as he advanced, and left no doubt of the fact of Dupont's division being seriously engaged, notwithstanding which he halted at Guarroman, two Spanish leagues from Baylen, and remained inactive for seven hours. At three o'clock in the evening, when the firing had long ceased, he put himself in motion again, and coming upon the rear of Reding's troops, enveloped and made prisoners a battalion of the detached corps which was posted by that general to watch the road leading from Carolina. These troops relying upon the faith of the armistice just agreed upon with Dupont, made no resistance; and Vedel being informed of what was passing, released them, and awaited the result of this singular crisis.

One Villontreys, an officer of the emperor's staff, opened the negotiation with Reding, by whom he was referred to Castaños, then at Andujar; thither Generals Chabert and Marescot repaired on the 20th. They demanded permission for the whole army to retire peaceably upon Madrid; and Castaños was at first inclined to grant this as the most certain and ready mode of freeing Andalusia from the French, and gaining time for further preparations; but Savary's letter to Dupont, written just before the battle of Rio Seco, to recall him to the defence of the capital, being intercepted, was brought at this moment to the Spanish head-quarters, and changed the aspect of affairs. A convention was no longer in question; Dupont's troops were required to lay down their arms and to become prisoners of war, on condition of being sent to France by sea. Vedel's troops were likewise required to surrender on condition of being sent to France with the others, but not to be considered as prisoners of war: and these terms were accepted.

Meanwhile Vedel, informed, in the night of the 20th, by Dupont, of this unexpected change, had retreated to Carolina. Castaños hearing of it, menaced Dupont with death if Vedel did not return; and the latter understanding that he was included in the capitulation, came back to Baylen and surrendered.

Thus, above 18,000 French soldiers laid down their arms on the 22nd, before a raw army incapable of resisting half that number if the latter had been led by an able man. Nor did this end the disgraceful affair; but, as if to show to what extent folly and fear combined will carry men, Captain Villontreys, with a Spanish escort, passed the Sierra Morena, and traversing La Mancha to within a short distance of Toledo, gathered up the escorts, the hospital attendants, and the detachments left by Dupont in that province, and constituting them prisoners under the capitulation, sent them to Andujar; and this unheard of proceeding was quietly submitted to by men who belonged to that army which for fifteen years had been the terror of Europe—a proof how much the firmness of soldiers depends upon the character of their immediate chief.

The capitulation, shameful in itself, was shamefully broken. The French troops, instead of being sent to France, were maltreated, and numbers of them

murdered in cold blood, especially at Lebrixa, where above eighty officers were massacred in the most cowardly manner. Although armed only with their swords, they kept the assassins for some time at bay, and gathering in a company, upon an open space in the town, endeavoured to save their lives, but a fire from the neighbouring houses was kept up until the last of those unfortunate gentlemen fell.

No distinction was made between Dupont's and Vedel's troops; all who survived the march to Cadiz, after being exposed to every species of indignity, were cast into some hulks, where the greatest number perished in lingering torments: a few hundreds, rendered desperate by their situation, contrived to escape, some years afterwards, by cutting the cables of their prison-ship, and drifting, under a heavy fire, and in the midst of a storm, upon a lee-shore, where two-thirds of them were picked up by their countrymen at that time blockading Cadiz. Dupont himself was permitted to return to France, and to take with him all the generals; and it is curious that General Privé, who had remonstrated strongly against the capitulation, and pressed Dupont on the field to force a passage through Reding's army, was the only one left behind.

Don Thomas Morla, after a vain attempt to involve Lord Collingwood and Sir Hew Dalrymple in the disgraceful transaction, formally defended the conduct of the junta in breaking the capitulation; his reasoning was worthy of the man who so soon afterwards betrayed his own country with the same indifference to honour that he displayed on this occasion.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. The gross amount of Dupont's corps when it first entered Spain was about 24,000 men, with 3500 horses; of these 21,000 were fit for duty.* It was afterwards strengthened by a provisional regiment of cuirassiers, a marine battalion of the guard, and the two Swiss regiments of Preux and Reding. It could not therefore have been less than 24,000 fighting men when Dupont arrived in Andalusia, and as the whole of Vedel's, and the greatest part of Gobert's division, had joined before the capitulation, and that 18,000 men laid down their arms at Baylen, Dupont must have lost by wounds, desertion, and deaths in hospital or the field, above 4000 men.

2. The order which directed this corps upon Cadiz was despatched from Bayonne before the Spanish insurrection broke out; it was therefore strange that Dupont should have persevered in his march when he found affairs in such a different state from that contemplated by Napoleon at the time the instructions for this expedition were framed. If the emperor considered it necessary to reinforce the division which marched under Dupont's own command, with a detachment from the army in Portugal before the insurrection broke out, it was evident that he never could have intended that that general should blindly follow the letter of his orders, when a great and unexpected resistance was opposed to him, and that the detachment of Portugal was unable to effect a junction. The march to Cordoba was therefore an error, and it was a great error, because Dupont confesses in his memoir that he advanced under the conviction that his force was too weak to obtain success, and, consequently, having no object, his operations could only lead to a waste of lives.

3. At Cordoba, Dupont remained in a state of torpor for ten days; this was the second error of a series which led to his ruin: he should either have followed up his victory and attacked Seville in the first moment of consternation, or he should have retired to Andujar while he might do so without the appearance of being compelled to it. If he had followed the first plan, the city would inevitably have fallen before him, and thus time would have been gained for the arrival of the 2nd and 3rd division of his corps.

4. It may be objected that 10,000 men durst not penetrate so far into a hostile country; but at Alcolea, Dupont boasts of having defeated 40,000 men without any loss to himself; from such armies then he had nothing to fear, and

* Return of the French Army. Appendix.

the very fact of his having pushed his small force between the multitudes that he defeated upon the 7th, proves that he despised them. "He retired from Cordoba," he says in his memoir, "because to fight a battle when victory can be of no use is against all discretion;" but to make no use of a victory when it is gained comes to the same thing; and he should never have moved from Andujar unless with the determination of taking Seville.

5. Those errors were, however, redeemable; the position behind the Guadalquivir, the checks given to the patriots at Jaen after the arrival of Vedel at Carolina upon the 27th, and, above all, the opportune junction of Gobert at the moment when Castaños and Reding appeared in front of the French line, proved that it was not fortune but common sense that deserted Dupont on this occasion, for the Spanish forces being divided and extended from Andujar to Mengibar were exposed to be beaten in detail; but their adversary was indulgent to them, and amidst the mass of errors committed upon both sides, this false disposition appeared like an act of wisdom, and being successful was stamped accordingly.

6. At Mengibar a variety of roads branch off leading to Jaen, to Linhares, to Baylen and other places. From Andujar, a road nearly parallel to the Guadalquivir runs to the ferry of Mengibar and forms the base of a triangle, of which Baylen may be taken as the apex. From this latter town to the ferry is about six miles, from the ferry to Andujar is about eighteen, from the latter to Baylen the distance may be sixteen miles. Fifteen miles above Baylen the town of Carolina, situated in the gorge of the Sierra Morena, was the point of communication with La Mancha, and the line of retreat for the French in the event of a defeat, hence Baylen, not Andujar, was the pivot of operations.

7. The French force was inferior in number to that under Castaños, yet Dupont disseminated his divisions upon several points. The natural results followed. The Spaniards, although the most unwieldy body, took the lead and became the assailants; the French divisions were worn out by useless marches; the orders of their chief were mistaken or disobeyed; one position being forced, another was of necessity abandoned; confusion ensued, and finally Dupont says he surrendered with 18,000 men, because his fighting force was reduced to 2000: such an avowal saves the honour of his soldiers, but destroys his own reputation as a general. The first question to ask is, what became of the remainder? Why had he so few when 10,000 of his army never fired a shot? It must be confessed that Dupont, unless a worse explanation can be given of his conduct, was incapable to the last degree.

8. There were two plans, either of which promised a reasonable chance of success, under the circumstances in which the French army was placed on the 14th. 1st. To abandon Andujar, send all the incumbrances into La Mancha, secure the passes, unite the fighting men at Carolina, and fall in one mass upon the first corps of Spaniards that advanced; the result of such an attack could hardly have been doubtful; but if, contrary to all probability, the Spaniards had been successful, the retreat of the French was open and safe. 2ndly. To secure Carolina by a detachment, and placing small bodies in observation at Andujar and the ferry of Mengibar, to unite the army on the 15th at Baylen, and in that central position await the enemy. If the two corps of the Spanish army had presented themselves simultaneously upon both roads, the position was strong for battle and the retreat open; if one approached before the other, each might have been encountered and crushed separately. Dupont had a force more than sufficient for this object, and fortune was not against him.

9. The direction in which Reding marched was good, but it should have been followed by the whole army. The heights of Argonilla would have screened the march of Castaños, and a few troops with some heavy guns left in front of the bridge of Andujar, would have sufficed to occupy Dupont's attention. If the latter general had attacked Castaños upon the morning of the 16th, when Vedel's division arrived from Baylen, the fourteen thousand men

thus united by accident would easily have overthrown the two Spanish divisions in front of Andujar ; and Reding, if he had lost an hour in retreating to Jaen, might have been taken in flank by the victorious troops, and in front by Gobert, and so destroyed. Instead of availing himself of this opening, the French general sent Vedel back to Baylen, and followed himself the day after ; being encountered by Reding, he vainly hoped that the divisions (which with so much pains he had dispersed) would reunite to relieve him from his desperate situation ; it is difficult to say why those divisions did not arrive during the battle, and more difficult to assign to each person a just portion of censure where all were to blame.

10. In the action Dupont clung tenaciously to the miserable system of dividing his forces ; his only chance of safety was to force Reding before Castaños could arrive upon the Tiedras ; it was therefore a wretched misapplication of rules to have a reserve watching that torrent, and to fight a formal battle with a first and second line and half a dozen puny columns of attack. An energetic officer would have formed his troops in a dense mass and broken at once through the opposing force upon the weakest point ; there are few armies so good, that such an assault would not open a passage through them ; 7000 infantry with cavalry and artillery is a powerful column of attack, and the Spanish line could not have withstood it for a moment. The battle should have been one of half an hour ; Dupont, by his ridiculous evolutions, made it one of ten hours, and yet so badly did the patriots fight, that in all that time not a single prisoner or gun fell into their hands, and the fact of Reding's entering at all into a convention, proves his fears for the final result. It is truly astonishing that Dupont, who, from his rank, must have been well acquainted with Napoleon's Italian campaigns, should have caught so little of the spirit of his master. And then the inexplicable capitulation of Vedel after his retreat was actually effected ! Vedel, who might have given battle and disputed the victory by himself without any great imprudence ! Joseph called Dupont's capitulation a "*defection* ;" * perhaps he was right.

11. Castaños, although active in preparation, discovered but little talent in the field, his movements were slow, uncertain, and generally false : the attempt to turn the French position at Andujar by detaching four thousand men across the river was ill conceived and badly supported ; it was of that class of combinations to which the separate march of Reding's corps belonged. To the latter general the chief honour of the victory is due ; yet, if Vedel had returned from Carolina upon the 19th, with the rapidity which the occasion required, Reding would have repented taking post at Baylen. It was undoubtedly a bold, energetic step ; but instead of remaining at that place, he should have descended instantly upon the rear of Dupont, leaving a corps of observation to delay the march of Vedel. Time not being taken into his calculation, Reding acted like a bold but rash and unskilful officer. Fortune, however, favoured his temerity, and with her assistance war is but a child's play.

Intelligence of the capitulation of Baylen was secretly spread among the Spaniards in Madrid as early as the 23rd or 24th of July, but the French, although alarmed by rumours of some great disaster, were unable to acquire any distinct information, until the king sent two divisions into La Mancha to open the communication : these troops arrived at Madrilejos, 120 miles from Baylen, met Captain Villontreys with his Spanish escort collecting prisoners, and apparently intending to proceed in his task to the very gates of Madrid. The extent of the disaster thus became known, and the divisions retraced their steps. Joseph called a council of war on the 29th, and Savary, enlightened by the instructions of Napoleon, proposed to unite all the French forces, to place a small garrison in the Retiro, and to fall upon the Spanish armies in succession as they advanced towards the capital ; but a dislike to the war was prevalent amongst the higher ranks of the French army. The injustice

* Appendix, No. 6.

of it was too glaring; and the reasons for a retreat, which might perchance induce Napoleon to desist, being listened to with more complacency than Savary's proposal, it was resolved to abandon Madrid and retire behind the Ebro.

The king commenced this operation on the 1st of August, marching by the Somosierra; while Bessieres posted at Mayorga, covered the movement until the court reached Burgos, and then fell back himself. In a short time the French invaders were all behind the Ebro, the siege of Zaragoza was raised, and the triumphant cry of the Spaniards was heard throughout Europe.

The retreat of the king was undoubtedly hasty and ill considered; whether as a military or political measure it was unwise. Bessieres, with 17,000 victorious troops and 40 pieces of artillery, paralyzed the northern provinces, the Spanish army of Andalusia was too distant from that of Valencia to concert a combined movement, and if they had formed a junction their united force could not have exceeded 40,000 fighting men, ill provided, and commanded by jealous independent chiefs. Now the king, without weakening Bessieres's corps too much, could have collected 20,000 infantry, 5000 cavalry, and 80 pieces of artillery, and the battle of Rio Seco shows what such an army could have effected. Every motive of prudence and of honour called for some daring action to wipe off the ignominy of Baylen.

Let it be conceded that Joseph could not have maintained himself in Madrid; the line of the Duero was the true position for the French army. Taking Aranda as a centre, and occupying the Somosierra, Segovia, Valladolid, Palencia, Burgos, and Soria on the circumference; two ordinary marches would have carried the king to the succour of any part of his position, and the northern provinces would thus have been separated from the southern; for Blake durst not have made a flank march to the Guadarama, Castaños durst not have remained in the basin of Madrid, and the siege of Zaragoza might have been continued, because from Aranda to Zaragoza the distance is not greater than from Valencia or from Madrid, and from Soria it is only three marches; hence the king could have succoured Verdier in time if the Valencians attacked him, and it was impossible for Castaños to have arrived at Zaragoza under a month; now by taking up the line of the Ebro, Napoleon's plan of separating the provinces, and confining each to its own exertions, was frustrated, and Joseph virtually resigned the throne; for however doubtful the prudence of opposing the French might have been considered before the retreat, it became imperative upon all Spaniards to aid the energy of the multitude, when that energy was proved to be efficient.

In this manner Napoleon's first effort against Spain was frustrated; not that he had miscalculated either the difficulties of his task, or the means to overcome them; for although Bessieres was the only general who perfectly succeeded in his operations, the plan of the emperor was so well combined, that it required the destruction of a whole army to shake it at all, and even when the king, by committing the great faults of abandoning Madrid and raising the siege of Zaragoza, had given the utmost force to Dupont's catastrophe; the political position only of the French was weakened, their military hold of the country was scarcely loosened, and the Spaniards were unable to follow up their victory.

The moral effect of the battle of Baylen was surprising: it was one of those minor events which, insignificant in themselves, are the cause of great changes in the affairs of nations. The defeat of Rio Seco, the preparations of Moncey for a second attack on Valencia, the miserable plight of Zaragoza, the desponding view taken of affairs by the ablest men of Spain, and, above all, the disgust and terror excited among the patriots by the excesses of the populace, weighed heavy against the Spanish cause. One victory more, and probably the moral as well as the physical force of Spain would have been crushed; but the battle of Baylen, opening as it were a new crater for the Spanish fire, all their pride, and vanity, and arrogance burst forth, the glory of past ages seemed to be renewed, every man conceived himself a second Cid, and perceived in the sur-

render of Dupont, not the deliverance of Spain, but the immediate conquest of France. "We are much obliged to our good friends the English," was a common phrase among them when conversing with the officers of Sir John Moore's army; "we thank them for their good-will, and we shall have the pleasure of escorting them through France to Calais: the journey will be pleasanter than a long voyage, and we shall not give them the trouble of fighting the French; we shall, however, be pleased at having them as spectators of our victories." This absurd confidence might have led to great things if it had been supported by wisdom, activity, or valour; but it was "a voice, and nothing more."

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

THE uninterrupted success that for so many years attended the arms of Napoleon, gave him a moral influence doubling his actual force. Exciting at once terror, admiration, and hatred, he absorbed the whole attention of an astonished world, and openly or secretly all men acknowledged the power of his wonderful genius. The continent bowed before him, and even in England an increasing number of absurd and virulent libels on his person and character indicated the growth of secret fear. His proceedings against the Peninsula were, in truth, viewed at first with anxiety rather than with the hope of arresting their progress; yet when the full extent of the injustice became manifest, the public mind was vehemently excited, and a sentiment of some extraordinary change being about to take place in the affairs of the world prevailed among all classes of society: suddenly the Spanish people rose against the man that all feared; and the admiration which energy and courage exact, even from the base and timid, became enthusiastic in a nation conscious of the same virtues.

No factious feelings interfered to check this enthusiasm: the party in power, anxious to pursue a warlike system necessary to their own political existence, saw with joy that the stamp of justice and high feeling would, for the first time, be affixed to their policy. The party out of power having always derided the impotence of the ancient dynasties, and asserted that regular armies alone were insufficient means of defence, could not consistently refuse their approbation to a struggle originating with, and carried on entirely by, the Spanish multitude. The people at large exulted that the manifest superiority of plebeian virtue and patriotism was acknowledged.

The arrival of the Asturian deputies was, therefore, universally hailed as an auspicious event. Their wishes were forestalled, their suggestions were attended to with eagerness; their demands were so readily complied with, and the riches of England were so profusely tendered to them by the ministers, that it can scarcely be doubted that the after arrogance and extravagance of the Spaniards arose from the manner in which their first applications were met; for there is a way of conferring a favour that appears like accepting one: and this secret being discovered by the English cabinet, the Spaniards soon demanded as a right what they had at first solicited as a boon. In politics it is a grievous fault to be too generous; gratitude, in state affairs, is unknown; and as the appearance of disinterested kindness never deceives, it should never be assumed.

The capture of the Spanish frigates had placed Great Britain and Spain in a state of hostility without a declaration of war. The invasion of Napoleon produced a friendly alliance between those countries without a declaration of peace, for the cessation of hostilities was not proclaimed until long after succours had been sent to the juntas.

The ministers seemed, by their precipitate measures, to be more afraid of losing the assistance of the Spaniards than prepared to take the lead in a contest which could only be supported by the power and riches of Great Britain. Instead of adopting a simple and decisive policy towards Spain, instead of sending a statesman of high rank and acknowledged capacity to sustain the insurrection, and to establish the influence of England by a judicious application of money and other supplies, the ministers employed a number of obscure men in various parts of the Peninsula, who, without any experience of public affairs, were empowered to distribute succours of all kinds at their own discretion. Instead of sifting carefully the information obtained from such agents, and consulting distinguished military and naval officers in the arrangement of some comprehensive plan of operations which, being well understood by those who were to execute it, might be supported vigorously, the ministers formed crude projects, and parcelled out the forces in small expeditions, without any definite object in view, altering their plans with every idle report, and changing the commanders as lightly as the plans.

Entering into formal relations with every knot of Spanish politicians that assumed the title of a supreme junta, the government dealt with unsparing hands enormous supplies at the demand of those self-elected authorities, yet took no assurance that the succours should be justly applied, but, with affected earnestness, disclaimed all intention of interfering with the internal arrangements of the Spaniards, when the ablest men of Spain expected and wished for such an interference to repress the folly and violence of their countrymen, and when England was entitled, both in policy and justice, not only to interfere, but to direct the councils of the insurgents. The latter had solicited and obtained her assistance; the cause was become common to both nations, and their welfare demanded, that a prudent, just, and vigorous interference on the part of the most powerful and enlightened, should prevent that cause from being ruined by a few ignorant and conceited men, accidentally invested with authority.

The numbers and injudicious choice of military agents were also the source of infinite mischief; selected, as it would appear, principally because of their acquaintance with the Spanish language; few of those agents had any knowledge of war beyond the ordinary duties of a regiment; there was no concert among them, for there was no controlling power vested in any, but each did that which seemed good to him. Readily affecting to consult men whose inexperience rendered them amenable, and whose friendship could supply the means of advancing their own interests in a disorganized state of society, the Spanish generals received the agents with a flattering and confidential politeness, that diverted the attention of the latter from the true objects of their mission. Instead of ascertaining the real numbers and efficiency of the armies, they adopted the inflated language and extravagant opinions of the chiefs, with whom they lived; and their reports gave birth to most erroneous notions of the relative strength and situation of the contending forces in the Peninsula. Some exceptions there were; but the ministers seemed to be better pleased with the sanguine than with the cautious, and made their own wishes the measure of their judgments. Accordingly, enthusiasm, numbers, courage, and talent, were gratuitously found for every occasion; but money, arms, and clothing, were demanded incessantly, and supplied with profusion; the arms were, however, generally left in their cases to rot, or to fall into the hands of the enemy; the clothing seldom reached the soldier's back, and the money, in all instances misapplied, was in some embezzled by the authorities,* into

* Appendix, No. 13, Section 5.

whose hands it fell, and in others employed to create disunion, and to forward the private views of the juntas, at the expense of the public welfare. It is a curious fact, that from the beginning to the end of the war, an English musket was rarely to be seen in the hands of a Spanish soldier. But it is time to quit this subject, and to trace the progress of Junot's invasion of Portugal, that the whole circle of operations in the Peninsula being completed, the reader may take a general view of the situation of all parties, at the moment when Sir Arthur Wellesley, disembarking at the Mondego, commenced those campaigns which form the proper subject of this history.

INVASION OF PORTUGAL BY JUNOT.

Peremptory orders obliged Junot to commence operations at an unfavourable time of year, and before his preparations were completed. In his front the roads were nearly impracticable, and a part of his troops were still in the rear of Salamanca. Hence, his march from that town to Alcantara (where he effected his junction in the latter end of November, with the part of the Spanish force that was to act under his immediate orders) was very disastrous, and nearly disorganized his inexperienced army.

The succours he expected to receive at Alcantara were not furnished, and the repugnance of the Spanish authorities to aid him was the cause of so much embarrassment, that his chief officers doubted the propriety of continuing operations under the accumulating difficulties of his situation; but Junot's firmness was unabated. He knew that no English force had landed at Lisbon, and the cowardice of the Portuguese court was notorious. Encouraged by these considerations, he undertook one of those hardy enterprises which astound the mind by their success, and leave the historian in doubt if he should praise the happy daring, or stigmatize the rashness of the deed.

Without money, without transport, without ammunition sufficient for a general action, with an auxiliary force of Spaniards by no means well disposed to aid him, Junot, at the head of a raw army, penetrated the mountains of Portugal on the most dangerous and difficult line by which that country can be invaded. He was ignorant of what was passing in the interior; he knew not if he was to be opposed, nor what means were prepared to resist him; but trusting to the inertness of the Portuguese government, to the rapidity of his own movements, and to the renown of the French arms, he made his way through Lower Beira, and suddenly appeared in the town of Abrantes, a fearful and unexpected guest. There he obtained the first information of the true state of affairs. Lisbon was tranquil, and the Portuguese fleet was ready to sail, but the court still remained on shore. On hearing this, Junot, animated by the prospect of seizing the prince regent, pressed forward, and reached Lisbon in time to see the fleet, having the royal family on board, clearing the mouth of the Tagus. One vessel dragged astern within reach of a battery, the French general himself fired a gun at her; and on his return to Lisbon, meeting some Portuguese troops, he resolutely commanded them to form an escort for his person, and thus attended, passed through the streets of the capital. Nature alone had opposed his progress; yet such were the hardships his army had endured, that of a column which had numbered 25,000 in its ranks, 2000 tired grenadiers only entered Lisbon with their general; fatigue, and want, and tempests, had scattered the remainder along 200 miles of rugged mountains, inhabited by a warlike and ferocious peasantry, well acquainted with the strength of their fastnesses, and proud of many successful defences made by their forefathers against former invaders. Lisbon itself contained 300,000 inhabitants, and 14,000 regular troops were collected there. A powerful British fleet was at the mouth of the harbour; the commander, Sir Sydney Smith, had urged the court to resist, and offered to land his seamen and marines to aid in the defence of the town; but his offers were declined; and the people, disgusted with the pusillanimous conduct of their rulers, and confounded by the strangeness of the scene, evinced no desire to impede the march of events. Thus three weak battalions sufficed

to impose a foreign yoke upon this great capital, and illustrated the truth of Napoleon's maxim:—*that in war the moral is to the physical force as three parts to one.*

The prince regent, after having, at the desire of the French government, expelled the British factory, ordered the British minister plenipotentiary away from his court, sequestered British property, and shut the ports of Portugal against British merchants; after having degraded himself and his nation by performing every submissive act which France could devise to insult his weakness, was still reluctant to forego the base tenure by which he hoped to hold his crown. Alternately swayed by fear and indolence, a miserable example of helpless folly, he lingered until the reception of a *Moniteur*, announcing that *the house of Braganza had ceased to reign*, awoke all the energy he was capable of. At that time Lord Strangford, the British minister plenipotentiary, had resigned all hope of persuading the royal family to emigrate; but Sir Sydney Smith, seizing the favourable moment, threatened to commence hostilities if the emigration should be longer delayed; and thus urged, the Prince Regent of Portugal, and the old queen his mother, and the rest of the royal family, had embarked on the 27th; and quitting the Tagus on the 29th of November,* sailed for the Brazils, a few hours only before Junot arrived with his slight escort of grenadiers.

This celebrated emigration was beneficial to the Brazils in the highest degree, and of vast importance to England in two ways, for it ensured great commercial advantages, and it threw Portugal completely into her power in the approaching conflict; but it was disgraceful to the prince, insulting to the brave people he abandoned, and impolitic, inasmuch as it obliged men to inquire how far subjects were bound to a monarch who deserted them in their need—how far the nation could belong to a man who did not belong to the nation?

It has been observed by political economists, that where a gold and paper currency circulate together, if the paper be depreciated it will drag down the gold with it, and deteriorate the whole mass; but that after a time, the metal revolts from this unnatural state, and asserts its own intrinsic superiority. So a privileged class, corrupted by power and luxury, drags down the national character; but there is a point when the people, like the gold, no longer suffering such a degradation, will separate themselves with violence from the vices of their effeminate rulers. Before that time arrives a nation may appear to be sunk in hopeless lethargy, when it is really capable of great and noble exertions. Thus it was with the Portuguese, who were at this time unjustly despised by enemies, and mistrusted by friends.

The invading army, in pursuance of the convention of Fontainebleau, was divided into three corps; the central one, composed of the French troops, and a Spanish division, under General Caraffa, had penetrated by the two roads, which from Alcantara lead, the one by Pedragoa, the other by Sobreira Formosa; but at Abrantes, Caraffa's division separated from the French, and

* This transaction furnishes an example of the imprudence of being precipitate in granting public honours. Lord Strangford's despatch relative to the emigration was written (as it is confidently asserted) not at Lisbon, but at Salt Hill, in the presence of Sir James Yeo. His lordship (unintentionally of course) impressed the ministers with an idea that to his personal exertions the emigration should be attributed; whereas the Prince Regent of Portugal, yielding to the vigorous negotiations of Sir Sydney Smith, not only embarked on the 27th, *before* Lord Strangford arrived at Lisbon, but actually sailed without his lordship's having had any official interview with his royal highness, and consequently without having had any opportunity to advance or retard the emigration. The English ministers, eager to testify their satisfaction at that event, conferred the red riband, not upon Sir Sydney Smith, who had succeeded, but upon Lord Strangford, who had failed! a result that his lordship could not have anticipated, or he would undoubtedly have written his despatch at Lisbon when the facts were fresh on his mind, and when he could have more forcibly described the admiral's share in the transaction.

took possession of Thomar. Meanwhile the right, under General Taranco, marching from Galicia established themselves at Oporto, and the Marquis of Solano, with the left, entered the Alemtejo, and fixed his quarters at Setuval. The Spanish troops did not suffer on their route; but such had been the distress of the French army, that three weeks afterwards it could only muster 10,000 men under arms, and the privations encountered on the march led to excesses which first produced that rancorous spirit of mutual hatred, so remarkable between the French and Portuguese. Young soldiers always attribute their sufferings to the ill-will of the inhabitants; it is difficult to make them understand that a poor peasantry have nothing to spare; old soldiers, on the contrary, blame nobody, but know how to extract subsistence in most cases without exciting enmity.

Junot passed the month of December in collecting his army, securing the great military points about Lisbon, and in preparations to supplant the power of a council of regency, to whom the prince at his departure had delegated the sovereign authority. As long as the French troops were scattered on the line of march, and that the fortresses were held by Portuguese garrisons, it would have been dangerous to provoke the enmity, or to excite the activity of this council, and the members were treated with studious respect; but they were of the same leaven as the court they emanated from, and the quick resolute proceedings of Junot soon deprived them of any importance conferred by the critical situation of affairs during the first three weeks.

The Spanish auxiliary forces were well received in the north and in the Alemtejo; but General Taranco dying soon after his arrival at Oporto, the French General Quesnel was sent to command that province. Junot had early taken possession of Elvas, and detached General Maurin to the Algarves, with 1600 men; and, when Solano was ordered by his court to withdraw from Portugal, nine French battalions and the cavalry, under the command of Kellerman, took possession of the Alemtejo also, and occupied the fortress of Setuval.* At the same time Junot replaced Caraffa's division at Thomar by a French force, and distributed the former in small bodies, at a considerable distance from each other, on both sides of the Tagus, immediately round Lisbon.

The provisions of the treaty of Fontainebleau were unknown to the Portuguese, a circumstance that procured the Spanish troops a better reception than the French; but that treaty was now no longer regarded by Junot, whose conduct plainly discovered that he considered Portugal to be a possession entirely belonging to France.

When all his stragglers were come up, his army recovered from its fatigues, and that he knew that a reinforcement of 5000 men had arrived at Salamanca on its march to Lisbon, Junot proceeded more openly to assume the chief authority; he commenced by exacting a forced loan of £200,000, and not only interfered with the different departments of state, but put Frenchmen into all the lucrative offices; and his promises and protestations of amity became loud and frequent in proportion to his encroachments and the increase of his power. At last being created by Napoleon Duke of Abrantes, he threw off all disguise, suppressed the council of regency, seized the reins of government himself, and while he established many useful regulations, made the nation sensibly alive to the fact that he was a despotic conqueror.

The flag and the arms of Portugal were replaced by those of France; and of the Portuguese army, 8000 men were selected and sent from the kingdom, under the command of the Marquis d'Alorna and Gomez Frere, two noblemen of the greatest reputation for military talent among the native officers. Five thousand more were attached to the divisions of Junot's army, and the rest were disbanded.

An extraordinary contribution of 4,000,000 sterling, decreed by Napoleon, was then demanded, under the curious title of a ransom for the state; this sum

* Return of the French army. Appendix, No. 28.

was exorbitant, and Junot prevailed on the emperor to reduce it one-half. He likewise on his own authority accepted the forced loan, the confiscated English merchandise, the church plate, and the royal property, in part payment; but the people were still unable to raise the whole amount, for the court had before taken the greatest part of the church plate and bullion of the kingdom, and had also drawn large sums from the people, under the pretext of defending the country, with which treasure they departed, leaving the public functionaries, the army, private creditors, and even domestic servants, unpaid.

But although great discontent and misery prevailed, the tranquillity of Lisbon, during the first month after the arrival of the French, was remarkable; no disturbance took place, the populace were completely controlled by the activity of a police, established under the prince regent's government by the Count de Novion, a French emigrant, and continued by Junot on an extended scale.

No capital city in Europe suffers so much as Lisbon from the want of good police regulations, and the French general conferred an unmixed benefit on the inhabitants by giving more effect to Novion's plans; yet so deeply rooted is the prejudice in favour of ancient customs, that no act of the Duke of Abrantes gave the Portuguese more offence than his having the streets cleansed, and the wild dogs (that infested them by thousands) killed. A French sergeant, distinguished by his zeal in destroying those disgusting and dangerous animals, was in revenge assassinated.

In the course of March and April, Junot's military system was completed; the arsenal of Lisbon, one of the finest establishments of the kind in Europe, contained all kinds of naval and military stores in abundance, and 10,000 excellent workmen in every branch of business appertaining to war; hence the artillery, the carriages, the ammunition, and all the minor equipments of the army, were soon renewed and put in the best possible condition, and the hulks of two line-of-battle ships, three frigates, and seven lighter vessels of war, were refitted, armed, and moored across the river to defend the entrance, and to awe the town. The army itself, perfectly recovered from its fatigues, reinforced, and better disciplined, was grown confident in its chief from the success of the invasion, and being well fed and clothed, was become a fine body of robust men, capable of any exertion. In March it was re-organized in three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry. General La Borde commanded the first, General Loison the second, General Travot the third, General Margaron the fourth, and General Taviel directed the artillery. General Kellerman commanded in the Alemtejo, General Quesnel at Oporto, General Maurin in the Algarves, and Junot himself in Lisbon.

The fortresses of Faro in Algarve, of Almeida, of Elvas, La-Lippe, St. Lucie, Setuval, Palmela, and those between Lisbon and the mouth of the Tagus, of Ericia and Peniche, were furnished with French garrisons; and Estremos, Aldea-Gallegos, Santarem, and Abrantes were occupied, and put in such a state of defence as their decayed ramparts would permit.

The whole army, including the French workmen and marines attached to it, amounted to above 50,000 men, of which above 44,000 were fit for duty; that is to say, 15,500 Spaniards, 5000 Portuguese, and 24,400 French. Of the latter 1000 were in Elvas and La Lippe, 1000 in Almeida, 1000 in Peniche, 1600 in the Algarves, 2892 in Setuval, 750 in Abrantes; 450 cavalry were kept in Valencia d'Alcantara, in Spanish Estremadura, and 350, distributed in the proportion of 15 men to a post, guarded the lines of communication which were established from Lisbon to Elvas, and from Almeida to Coimbra. Above 15,000 men remained disposable.*

Thus Lisbon, the capital, containing all the civil, military, and naval, and the greatest part of the commercial establishments, the only fine harbour, two-eighths of the population, and two-thirds of the riches of the whole kingdom,

* Return of the French army. Appendix, No. 28.

was secured by the main body, which formed the centre, while on the circumference a number of strong posts gave support to the operations of the movable column. By this disposition, the garrison of Peniche commanded the only harbour between the Tagus and the Mondego, in which a large disembarkation of English troops could take place; and the little port of Figueras, which was held by a small garrison, blocked the mouth of the latter river; while the division at Thomar secured all the great lines of communication to the north-east, and in conjunction with the garrison of Abrantes, commanded both sides of the Zezere.

From Abrantes to Estremos and Elvas, and from the former to Setuval, the lines of communication were short, and through an open country, suitable for the operations of the cavalry, which was all quartered on the south bank of the Tagus. Thus, without breaking up the mass of the army, the harbours were sealed against the English, and a great and rich tract was enclosed by posts, and rendered so pervious to the troops, that any insurrection could be reached by a few marches, and immediately crushed. The connection between the right and left banks of the Tagus at Lisbon was secured, and the entrance to the port defended by the vessels of war which had been refitted and armed. A light squadron was also prepared to communicate with South America, and nine Russian line-of-battle ships, and a frigate under the command of Admiral Siniavin, which had taken refuge some time before from the English fleet, were of necessity engaged in the defence of the harbour, and formed an unwilling, but not an unimportant auxiliary force.

These military arrangements were Junot's own, and suitable enough if his army had been unconnected with any other; but they clashed with the general views of Napoleon, who regarded the force in Portugal only as a division of troops, to be rendered subservient to the general scheme of subjecting the Peninsula; wherefore, in the month of May, he ordered that General Avril, with 3000 infantry, 500 cavalry, and ten guns, should co-operate with Dupont in Andalusia, and that General Loison, with 4000 infantry, should proceed to Almeida, and from thence co-operate with Bessieres in the event of an insurrection taking place in Spain.

General Thiebault complains of this order as injurious to Junot, ill combined, and the result of a foolish vanity that prompted the emperor to direct all the armies himself; yet it would be difficult to show that the arrangement was faulty. Avril's division, if he had not halted at Tavora, for which there was no reason, would have ensured the capture of Seville, and if Dupont's defeat had not rendered the victory of Rio Seco useless, Loison's division would have been eminently useful in controlling the country behind Bessieres, in case the latter invaded Galicia; and it was well placed to intercept the communication between the Castilian and the Estremaduran armies. Thus the emperor's combinations, if they had been fully executed, would have brought 70,000 men to bear on the defence of Portugal.

Such was the military attitude of the French in May; their political situation was far from being so favourable. Junot's natural capacity was very considerable; but it was neither enlarged by study, nor strengthened by mental discipline. Of intemperate habits, indolent in business, yet prompt and brave in action, quick to give offence, ready to forget an injury; at one moment a great man, the next below mediocrity, Junot was at all times unsuited to the task of conciliating and governing a people like the Portuguese, who, with passions as sudden and vehement as his own, retain a sense of injury or insult with incredible tenacity; otherwise, although he had many difficulties to encounter, and his duty towards France was in some instances incompatible with good policy towards Portugal, he was not without resources for establishing a strong French interest. But he possessed neither the ability nor disposition to soothe a nation that, without having suffered a defeat, was suddenly bowed to a foreign yoke.

The pride and the poverty of the Portuguese, and the influence of ancient

usages, interfered with Junot's policy. The monks and friars, and most of the nobility, were inimical to his sway; and all the activity of the expelled British factory, and the secret warfare of spies and writers in the pay of England, were directed to undermine his plans, and to render him and his nation odious; but on the other hand, he was in possession of the government and of the capital, he had a fine army, and he could offer novelty so dear to the multitude, and he had the name and the fame of Napoleon to assist him. The promises of power are always believed by the many; and there were abundance of grievances to remedy, and wrongs to redress in Portugal. And such a strong feeling existed among the best educated men (and especially at the universities) of dislike to the Braganza family, and in favour of a reformed system, that steps were actually taken to have Prince Eugene declared King of Portugal; and we shall find hereafter, that this spirit was not extinguished at a much later date.

With these materials, and the military vanity of the Portuguese to work upon, Junot might have established a powerful French interest; and under an active government, the people would not long have regretted the loss of an independence that had no wholesome breathing amidst the corrupt stagnation of the old system. But the arrogance of a conqueror, and the necessities of an army, which was to be subsisted and paid by an impoverished people, soon gave rise to all kinds of oppression; private abuses followed close upon the heels of public rapacity, and insolence left its sting to rankle in the wounds of the injured. The malignant humours broke out in quarrels and assassinations, and the severe punishments that ensued, many of them unjust and barbarous in the highest degree, created rage, not terror; for the nation had not tried its strength in battle, and would not believe that it was weak.

The ports were rigorously blockaded by the English fleet, the troubles in Spain interrupted the commerce in grain, by which Portugal had been usually supplied from that country, and the unhappy people suffered under the triple pressure of famine, war contributions, and a foreign yoke. With all external aliment thus cut off, and a hungry army gnawing at its vitals, the nation could not remain tranquil; and although the first five months of Junot's government were with the exception of a slight tumult at Lisbon (when the arms of Portugal were taken down), undisturbed by commotion, the whole country was soon ripe for a general insurrection. The harvest, however, proved remarkably fine, and Junot hailed the prospect of returning plenty, as a relief from his principal difficulty; but as one danger disappeared, another presented itself. The Spanish insurrection excited the hopes of the Portuguese; agents from the neighbouring juntas communicated secretly with the Spanish generals in Portugal. The capture of the French fleet in Cadiz became known, assassinations multiplied; the pope's nuncio fled on board the English fleet, and all things tended to a general explosion. The English agents were of course actively engaged in promoting this spirit; and the appearance of two English fleets at different points of the coast, having troops on board, produced great alarm among the French, and augmented the impatient fierceness of the Portuguese.

Among the various ways in which the people discovered their hatred of the invaders, one was very characteristic: an egg was marked with certain letters by a chemical process, and then placed in a nest; being taken from thence, it was exhibited, and created a great sensation; the letters were interpreted to indicate the speedy coming of Don Sebastian, King of Portugal, who, like Arthur of romantic memory, was supposed to be hidden in a secret island, waiting for the destined period when he was to re-appear and restore his country to her ancient glory. The trick was turned against the contrivers; other eggs prophesied in the most impatriotic manner, but the belief of the Sebastianists lost nothing of its zeal; many people, and those not of the most uneducated classes, were often observed upon the highest points of the hills, casting earnest looks towards the ocean, in the hopes of descrying the island in which their long lost hero was detained.

CHAPTER II.

THE first serious blow was struck at Oporto ; the news of what had taken place all over Spain was known there in June. General Bellesta, the chief Spanish officer, immediately took an honourable and resolute part. He made the French General Quesnel, with his staff, prisoners ; after which, calling together the Portuguese authorities, he declared that they were free to act as they judged most fitting for their own interests, and then marched to Gallicia with his army and captives.

The opinions of the leading men at Oporto were divided upon the great question of resistance ; but, after some vicissitudes, the boldest side was successful, and the insurrection, although at one moment quelled by the French party, was finally established in Oporto, and soon extended along the banks of the Duero and the Minho, and to those parts of Beira which lie between the Mondego and the sea-coast.

Junot being informed of this event, perceived that no time was to be lost in disarming the Spanish regiments quartered in the neighbourhood of Lisbon : but this was not an easy operation. Carraffa's division was above 6000 men, and without employing the garrisons of the citadel and forts of Lisbon, it was difficult to collect an equal force of French. The suspicions of the Spanish regiments had been already excited, they were reluctant to obey the French generals, and one quartered at Alcacer de Sal had actually resisted the orders of the general-in-chief himself. To avoid a tumult was the great object, because in Lisbon 15,000 Gallicians were ordinarily engaged as porters and water-carriers, and if a popular movement had been excited, these men would naturally have assisted their countrymen. Notwithstanding these difficulties, Junot, in the night of that day upon which he received the information of Bellesta's defection, arranged all his measures ; and the next day the Spanish troops being, under various pretexts, assembled in such numbers, and in such places, that resistance became impossible, they yielded to necessity, and were disarmed, and placed on board the hulks in the Tagus : 800 of the regiment of Murcia and 300 of that of Valencia only escaping. Thus Junot in the course of twenty-four hours, and with very little bloodshed, succeeded, by his promptness and dexterity, in averting a very serious danger.

The decision and success of this stroke against the Spanish division produced considerable effect, but not sufficient to prevent the insurrection from becoming general ; all couriers, and officers carrying orders or commanding small posts of communications, were suddenly cut off, and Junot, reduced by a single blow from 50,000 to 28,000 men, found himself isolated, and dependent upon his individual resources, and the courage of his soldiers, for the maintenance of his conquest, and even for the preservation of his army.

The Russian squadron indeed contained 6000 seamen and marines, but while they consumed a great quantity of provisions, it was evident, from certain symptoms, that they could not be depended upon as useful allies, except in the case of an English fleet attempting to force the entrance of the river. In this situation the Duke of Abrantes at first thought of seizing Badajos, with a view to secure still more effectually the best line of retreat into Spain, but the Spanish army of Estremadura had assembled there, under the command of General Galuzzo, and frustrated that scheme.

General Avril's column having failed to effect its junction with Dupont, returned to Estremos, and it is probable that Junot never intended that it should be otherwise ; for no great efforts appear to have been made by Avril to attain the object of the march. Loison was in the north, but orders were sent to him, to repair with his column to Oporto and assume the command of that city. Upon the 5th of June, one day previous to Bellesta's defection, Loison had

arrived at Almeida, and upon the 12th had made himself master of Fort Conception, a strong, but ill-placed Spanish fortification on the frontier. The commandant being partly persuaded, and partly frightened, into a surrender of his charge, retired, with his garrison, to Ciudad Rodrigo.

Upon receipt of the despatch which directed him to march to Oporto, Loison quitted Almeida, and endeavoured to penetrate into the province of Entre Minho e Duero by the route of Amarante, but his division was too weak to force his way through such a strong country (where the population was in full insurrection), and to take a great city, and it was possible that General Bellesta might have returned and fallen upon his flank. Swayed by these reasons, Loison advanced cautiously, and without vigour. Being slightly opposed at the position of Mezam Frias, and hearing that his baggage had been attacked at the same time by insurgents in his rear, he fell back at once upon Villa Real; there he engaged in another trifling skirmish, and then, quitting his first route, crossed the Douero at Lamego, and marched to Castro d'Airo, being harassed on the road by the armed peasantry of the mountains skirting his line of march. At Castro d'Airo he faced about, and dispersed the assailants with some slaughter, and then continued his movement to Celerico without further molestation; at Celerico a body of insurgents fled without firing a shot; and Loison dividing his troops, sent one half to Trancoso, and with the other marched to Guarda, intending to scour that part of the country, and to put down the insurrection; but at this time he received one of twenty-five despatches sent by Junot for the purpose of recalling him to Lisbon; all the rest had been intercepted. Loison, upon the receipt of this despatch, returned to Almeida the 1st of July. Leaving his sick, his wounded, and weak men there, and making up the garrison to the number of 1250, he removed all the palisades, guns, and materials from Fort Conception, completely ruined the defences of that place, and then prosecuted his march to Lisbon by the route of Guarda.

While these events were passing in the north, another insurrection took place in the south: General Maurin commanded in the Algarves; and some Portuguese artillerymen and other native troops were attached to the French brigade under his orders. A rising of the people commenced in the neighbourhood of Faro, and soon extended to that town, and along the coast. Maurin was confined to his bed by illness, and fell into the hands of the insurgents; Colonel Maransin supplied his place, but the country was too extensive to be controlled by 1600 men. The Portuguese soldiers went over to their countrymen: the Spaniards from Andalusia threatened to move across the Guadiana, and General Spencer, with 5000 British soldiers, appeared off Ayamonte. Maransin immediately fell back in haste upon Mertola, leaving part of his baggage, his military chest, his accounts, and above 100 prisoners, besides killed and wounded, in the hands of the patriots. At Mertola he was safe; and General Spencer merely landed a few officers, and ordered rations for 5000 men; while the Portuguese wisely remained within the range of the mountains which protect the northern frontier of Algarve.

The circle was now closing fast round Junot; emissaries from Oporto excited the people to rise as far as Coimbra. At that town a small French post was easily overpowered, and a junta formed; from thence new efforts spread the flame to Condexa, Pombal, and Leria; and a student of the Coimbra university, named Zagala, with considerable address and boldness, got possession of the small, but important fort of Figueras, at the mouth of the Mondego; the commandant (a Portuguese officer), with 100 men, capitulated; the terms were broken, but no violence seems to have been committed upon the prisoners.

On the other side, Abrantes was threatened by the insurgents of the valley of the Zezere; and the Spaniards, under Galuzzo, crossed the Guadiana at Juramenha, and occupied that place and Campo Mayor. Kellerman's headquarters were at Elvas; a great, although confused body of men menaced his

position, but, supported by the strength of the town and Fort La-Lyppe, he easily maintained himself. Avril remained unmolested at Estremos, and Evora, held by a small garrison, was tranquil; but the neighbourhood of Setuval was in commotion; the populace of Lisbon was unquiet; and at this critical moment General Spencer, whose force report magnified to 10,000 men, appeared at the mouth of the Tagus.

Junot held a council of war. After hearing the opinions of the principal general officers, he decided on the following plan: 1. To collect the sick in such hospitals as could be protected by the ships of war. 2. To secure the Spanish prisoners by moving the hulks in which they were confined as far as possible from the city. 3. To arm and provision the fortresses of Lisbon, and to remove the powder from the magazines to the ships. 4. To abandon all the other fortresses in Portugal with the exception of Setuval, Almeida, Elvas, and Peniche, and, finally, to concentrate the army in Lisbon. In the event of bad fortune, the Duke of Abrantes determined to defend the capital as long as he was able, and then to cross the Tagus, make way by the left bank upon Elvas, and from thence retreat to Madrid, Valladolid, or Segovia, as he might find expedient. This well-conceived plan was not executed, the first alarm soon died away, Spencer returned to Cadiz, and when the insurrection was grappled with, it proved to be more noisy than dangerous.

Kellerman recalled Maransin from Mertola and prepared himself to march to Lisbon, but the inhabitants of the town of Villa Viciosa having risen against a company of French troops quartered there, the latter took refuge in an old castle, and defended themselves until Kellerman sent General Avril from Estremos to succour them; this the latter effected without difficulty; the Portuguese fled the moment he appeared, and a very few were killed in the pursuit. But the town of Beja followed the example of Villa Viciosa, and Colonel Maransin, who was preparing to retire from Mertola, being informed of it, marched in that direction with such rapidity, that he passed over forty miles in eighteen hours, and falling suddenly upon the patriots, defeated them with considerable slaughter, himself losing thirty killed and fifty wounded; the town was pillaged, and some houses were burned.

General Thiebault writes, that an obstinate combat took place in the streets, but the Portuguese never made head for a moment against a strong body during the whole course of the insurrection. How, indeed, was it possible for a collection of miserable peasants, armed with scythes, pitchforks, a few old fowling pieces, and a little bad powder, under the command of some ignorant countryman or fanatic friar, to maintain a battle against an efficient and active corps of French soldiers? For there is this essential difference to be observed in judging between the Spanish and Portuguese insurrections; the Spaniards had many great and strong towns free from the presence of the French, and large provinces in which to collect and train forces at a distance from the invaders; but in Portugal the naked peasants were forced to go to battle the instant even of assembling. The loss which Maransin sustained must have arisen from the stragglers (who in a consecutive march of forty miles would have been numerous) having been cut off and killed by the peasantry. This blow, however, quieted the Alentejo for the moment, and Kellerman having cleared the neighbourhood of Elvas from the Spanish parties, placed a commandant in La-Lyppe, and concentrated the detachments under Maransin and Avril, proceeded towards Lisbon.

The Duke of Abrantes was in great perplexity; the intercepting of his couriers and isolated officers had been followed by the detection of all his spies, and he was exposed, without assistance, to every report which the fears of his army, or the ingenuity of the people, could give birth to. Now there are few nations that can pretend to vie with the Portuguese and Spaniards in the fabrication of plausible reports: among those current, the captivity of Loison was one; but nothing was certainly known except that the insurgents from the valley of

the Mondego were marching towards Lisbon. General Margaron was therefore ordered to disperse them, and, if possible, to open a communication with General Loison : he advanced, with 3000 men and six pieces of artillery, to Leria, whither the patriots had retired in disorder when they heard of his approach. The greater part dispersed at once, but those who remained were attacked on the 5th of July, and a scene similar to that of Beja ensued ; the French boasted of victory, the insurgents called it massacre and pillage.

In a combat with armed peasantry, it is difficult to know where the fighting ceases and the massacre begins : men dressed in peasants' clothes are observed firing, and moving about, without order, from place to place ; when do they cease to be enemies ? They are more dangerous when single than together ; they can hide their muskets in an instant and appear peaceable ; the soldier passes and is immediately shot from behind.

The example at Leria did not, however, deter the people of Thomar from declaring against the French ; and the neighbourhood of Alcobaça rose at the same time. Thus Margaron was placed between two new insurrections at the moment he had quelled one. English fleets, with troops on board, were said to be hovering off the coast, and the most alarming reports relative to Loison were corroborated, his safety was despaired of, when suddenly authentic intelligence of his arrival at Abrantes revived the spirits of the general-in-chief and the army.

After arranging all things necessary for the security of Almeida, Loison had quitted that town the 2nd of July, at the head of 3450 men, and arrived at Abrantes upon the 8th, having in seven days passed through Guarda, Attalaya, Sarsedas, Corteja, and Sardoval. During this rapid march he dispersed several bodies of insurgents that were assembled on the line of his route, especially at Guarda and Atalaya. It has been said that 1200 bodies were stretched upon the field of battle near the first town ; this is absurd beyond all measure. Twelve hundred slain would give, at a low average, 5000 wounded : 6200 killed and wounded by a corps of 3450 men, in half an hour ! and this without cavalry or artillery, and among fastnesses that vie in ruggedness with any in the world ! The truth is, that the peasants, terrified by the reports that Loison himself spread to favour his march, fled on all sides, and if 250 Portuguese were killed and wounded during the whole passage, it was the utmost. The distance from Almeida to Abrantes is more than 180 miles, the greatest part is a mountain pathway rather than a road, and the French were obliged to gather their provisions from the country as they passed ; now to forage, to fight several actions, to pursue active peasants well acquainted with the country so closely as to destroy them by thousands, and to march 180 miles over bad roads, and all in seven days, is impossible.

The whole French army was now concentrated ; the insurrection at Alcobaça had been quelled by Kellerman, and that of Thomar was also quieted, but the insurgents from Oporto were gathering strength at Coimbra ; the last of the native soldiers deserted the French colours ; the Spanish troops at Badajos, strengthened by a body of Portuguese fugitives, and commanded by one Moretti were preparing to enter the Alentejo, which was again in commotion : the English Admiral had opened a communication with the insurgents on the side of Setuval, and the patriots were also assembled in considerable numbers at Alcacer do Sal.

In this dilemma Junot resolved to leave the northern people quiet for a while, and to bend his force against the Alentejo, because that was his line of retreat upon Spain ; from thence only he could provision the capital, and there also his cavalry could act with the most effect. Accordingly, Loison, with 7000 infantry, 1200 cavalry, and eight pieces of artillery, crossed the Tagus the 25th of July, and marched by Os Pegoens, Vendanovas, and Montemor. At the latter place he defeated an advanced guard, which fled to Evora, where the Portuguese General Leite had assembled the mass of the insurgents ; and assisted by

3000 or 4000 Spanish troops under Moretti, had taken a position to cover the town.

When Loison came up he directed Margaron and Solignac to turn the flanks of the patriots, and fell upon their centre himself. The Spanish auxiliaries performed no service, and the Portuguese soon took to flight, but there was a great and confused concourse ; a strong cavalry was let loose upon them, and many being cut off from the main body, were driven into the town, which had been deserted by the principal inhabitants. There, urged by despair, they endeavoured to defend the walls and the streets for a few moments, but were soon overpowered, the greater part slain, and the houses pillaged. The French lost about 200 or 300 men, but the number of the Portuguese and Spaniards that fell was very considerable ; and disputes having arisen between the troops of those nations, the latter ravaged the country in their retreat with more violence than the French.*

Loison, after resting two days at Evora, proceeded to Elvas, and drove away the numerous Spanish parties which had long infested the neighbourhood of that fortress, and were become extremely obnoxious to friends and enemies. His detachments scoured the country round, and were accumulating provisions to form great magazines at Elvas, when their labours were suddenly interrupted by a despatch from the Duke of Abrantes, directing Loison to return to the right bank of the Tagus. The British army, so long expected, had descended upon the coast, and manly warfare reared its honest front amidst the desolating scenes of insurrection.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. This expedition to the Alentejo was an operation of military police, rather than a campaign. Junot wished to repress the spirit of insurrection by sudden and severe examples. The actions of General Loison were therefore of necessity harsh, but they have been represented as a series of massacres and cruelties of the most revolting nature, because he himself disseminated such stories in order to increase the terror which it was the object of his expedition to create ; and the credulity of the nation that produced the Sebastianists was not easily shocked. The Portuguese eagerly listened to tales so derogatory to their enemies and congenial to their own revengeful disposition. The anecdotes of French barbarity current for two years after the convention of Cintra, were notoriously false. The same story being related by persons remote from each other, is no argument of their truth. The reports that Loison was captured on his march from Almeida, reached Junot through fifty different channels ; there were men to declare that they had beheld him bound with cords, others to tell how he had been entrapped, some named the places he had been carried through in triumph, and his habitual and characteristic expressions were quoted. The story was complete and the parts were consistent ; yet the whole was not only false, but the rumour had not even the slightest foundation of truth.

2. The Portuguese accounts of the events of this period are but angry amplifications of every real or pretended act of French barbarity and injustice, and the crimes of individuals are made matter of accusation against the whole army. The French accounts are more plausible, but scarcely more safe as authorities, seeing that they are written by men, who being for the most part actors in the scenes they describe, are naturally concerned to defend their own characters : their military vanity also has had its share in disguising the simple facts of the insurrection ; for willing to enhance the merits of the troops, they have exaggerated the number of the insurgents, the obstinacy of the combats, and the loss of the patriots. English party writers, greedily fixing upon such relations, have changed the name of battle into massacre ; and thus prejudice, conceit, and clamour, have combined, to violate the decorum of history, and to perpetuate error.

3. It would, however, be an egregious mistake to suppose, that because the

French were not monsters, there existed no cause for the acrimony with which their conduct has been assailed. The Duke of Abrantes, although not cruel, nor personally obnoxious to the Portuguese, was a sensual and violent person, and his habits were expensive; such a man is always rapacious, and as the character of the chief influences the manners of those under his command, it may be safely assumed that his vices were aped by many of his followers. Now the virtuous General Travot was esteemed, and his person respected, even in the midst of tumult, by the Portuguese, while Loison was scarcely safe from their vengeance when surrounded by his troops. The execrations poured forth at the mere mention of "the bloody Maneta," as, from the loss of his hand, he was called, proves that he must have committed many heinous acts; and Kallerman appears to have been as justly stigmatized for rapacity, as Loison was for violence.

4. It has been made a charge against the French generals, that they repressed the hostility of the Portuguese and Spanish peasants by military executions; but in doing so they only followed the custom of war, and they are not justly liable to reproof, save where they may have carried their punishments to excess, and displayed a wanton spirit of cruelty. All armies have an undoubted right to protect themselves when engaged in hostilities. An insurrection of armed peasants is a military anarchy. Men in such circumstances cannot be restrained within the bounds of civilized warfare; they will murder stragglers, torture prisoners, destroy hospitals, poison wells, and break down all the usages that soften the enmities of modern nations. They wear no badge of an enemy, and their devices cannot, therefore, be guarded against in the ordinary mode. Their war is one of extermination, and it must be repressed by terrible examples, or the civilized customs of modern warfare must be discarded, and the devastating system of the ancients revived. Hence, the usage of refusing quarter to an armed peasantry, and burning their villages, however unjust and barbarous it may appear at first view, is founded upon a principle of necessity, and is in reality a vigorous infliction of a partial evil, to prevent universal calamity. But however justifiable it may be in theory, no wise man will hastily resort to it, and no good man will carry it to any extent.

CHAPTER III.

THE subjugation of Portugal was neither a recent nor a secret project of Napoleon's. His intentions with respect to the house of Braganza were known in 1806 to Mr. Fox, who sent Lord Roslyn, Lord St. Vincent, and General Simcoe on a politico-military mission to Lisbon, instructing them not only to warn the court that a French force destined to invade Portugal was assembling at Bayonne, but to offer the assistance of an English army to repel the danger. The cabinet of Lisbon affected to disbelieve the information, Mr. Fox died during the negotiation, and the war with Prussia diverting Napoleon's attention to more important objects, he withdrew his troops from Bayonne. The tory administration, which soon after overturned the Grenville party, thought no further of the affair, or at least did not evince as much foresight and ready zeal as their predecessors. They kept, indeed, a naval force off Lisbon, under the command of Sir Sydney Smith; but their views seem to have been confined to the emigration of the royal family, and they intrusted the conduct of the negotiations to Lord Strangford, a young man of no solid influence or experience. Suddenly, the Russian squadron, under Admiral Siniavin, took refuge in the Tagus, and this unexpected event produced in the British cabinet an activity which the danger of Portugal had not been able to excite.

It was supposed, that as Russia and England were in a state of hostility, the presence of the Russian ships would intimidate the prince regent, and prevent him from passing to the Brazils, wherefore Sir Charles Cotton, an admiral of

higher rank than Sir Sydney Smith, was sent out with instructions to force the entrance of the Tagus, and to attack Admiral Siniavin. To ensure success, General Spencer, then upon the point of sailing with 5000 men upon a secret expedition, was ordered to touch at Lisbon, and Sir John Moore, with 10,000 men, was withdrawn from Sicily, and directed to aid the enterprize; but before the instructions for the commanders were even written, the prince regent was on his voyage to the Brazils, and Junot ruled in Lisbon.

Sir John Moore, however, arrived at Gibraltar, but hearing nothing of Sir Sydney Smith, nor of General Spencer, proceeded to England, and reached Spithead the 31st of December, from whence, after a detention of four months, he was despatched upon that well-known and eminently foolish expedition to Sweden, which ended in such an extraordinary manner, and which seems from the first to have had no other object than to keep an excellent general and a superb division of troops at a distance from the only country where their services were really required.

Meanwhile, General Spencer's armament, long baffled by contrary winds, and once forced back to port, was finally dispersed in a storm, and a part arrived at Gibraltar by single ships the latter end of January. Sir Hew Dalrymple, the governor of that fortress, being informed, on the 5th of February, that a French fleet had just passed the strait, and run up the Mediterranean, became alarmed for Sicily, then scantily furnished with troops, and caused the first comers to proceed to that island the 11th. General Spencer, whose instructions were to attack Ceuta, arrived on the 10th of March, and the deficiency in his armament being supplied by a draft from the garrison of Gibraltar, a council was held for the purpose of arranging the plan of attack: the operation was, however, thought to be impracticable, and consequently relinquished. General Spencer would then have carried the remainder of his troops to Sicily, but the insurrection in Spain broke out at the moment and altered his determination. In the relation of Dupont's campaign, I have already touched upon Spencer's proceedings at Cadiz; but in this place it is necessary to give a more detailed sketch of those occurrences, which, fortunately, brought him back to the coast of Portugal at the moment when Sir Arthur Wellesley was commencing the campaign of Vimiero.

When the French first entered Spain, General Castaños commanded the Spanish troops at St. Roque; in that situation he was an object of interest to Napoleon, who sent two French officers privately to sound his disposition. Castaños secretly resolving to oppose the designs of the emperor, thought those officers were coming to arrest him, and at first determined to kill them, and fly to Gibraltar; but soon discovering his mistake, he treated them civilly, and prosecuted his original plans. Through the medium of one Viale, a merchant of Gibraltar, he opened a communication with Sir Hew Dalrymple, and the latter, who had been closely watching the progress of events, encouraged him in his views, and not only promised assistance, but recommended several important measures, such as the immediate seizure of the French squadron in Cadiz, the security of the Spanish fleet at Minorca, and a speedy communication with South America. But before Castaños could mature his plans, the insurrection took place at Seville, and he acknowledged the authority of the junta.

Meanwhile Solano arrived at Cadiz, and General Spencer, in conjunction with Admiral Purvis, pressed him to attack the French squadron, and offered to assist if he would admit the English troops into the town. Solano's mind was, however, not made up to resist the invaders, and expressing great displeasure at the proposal to occupy Cadiz, he refused to treat at all with the British. This was not unexpected by Sir Hew; he knew that most of the Spaniards were mistrustful of the object of Spencer's expedition, and the offer was made without his concurrence; thus a double intercourse was carried on between the British and Spanish authorities; the one friendly and confidential between Sir Hew and Castaños, the other of a character proper to increase the suspicions of the

Spaniards ; and when it is considered that Spain and England were nominally at war, that the English commanders were acting without the authority of their government, that the troops which it was proposed to introduce into Cadiz were in that part of the world for the express purpose of attacking Ceuta, and had already taken the island of Perexil, close to that fortress, little surprise can be excited by Solano's conduct.

His death intervening, General Morla succeeded to the command, and Spencer and Purvis renewed their offers ; but Morla likewise declined their assistance, and having himself forced the French squadron to surrender, by a succession of such ill-directed attacks, that some doubt was entertained of his wish to succeed, he commenced a series of low intrigues calculated to secure his own personal safety, while he held himself ready to betray his country if the French should prove the strongest. After the reduction of the enemy's ships, the people were inclined to admit the English troops, but the local junta, swayed by Morla's representations, were averse to it, and he, while confirming this disposition, secretly urged Spencer to persevere in his offer, saying that he looked entirely to the English troops for the future defence of Cadiz ; and thus dealing, he passed with the people for an active patriot, yet made no preparations for resistance, and by his double falsehoods preserved a fair appearance both with the junta and the English general.

With these affairs Sir Hew Dalrymple did not meddle ; he early discovered that Morla was an enemy of Castaños, and having more confidence in the latter, carried on the intercourse at first established between them without reference to the transactions at Cadiz. He also supplied the Spanish general with arms and 2000 barrels of powder, and placing an English officer near him as a military correspondent, sent another in the capacity of a political agent to the supreme junta at Seville.

Castaños being appointed commander-in-chief of the Andalusian army, as I have before related, rallied Echevaria's troops, and asked for the co-operation of the British force ; he had no objection to their entering Cadiz, but he preferred having them landed at Almeria to march to Xeres. General Spencer, however, confined his offers to the occupation of Cadiz ; and when Morla pretended that to fit out the Spanish fleet was an object of immediate importance, Colonel Sir George Smith, an officer employed by General Spencer to conduct the negotiations, promised on his own authority, money to pay the Spanish seamen, who were then in a state of mutiny. Lord Collingwood and Sir Hew Dalrymple refused to fulfil this promise, and the approach of Dupont causing Morla to wish Spencer's troops away, he persuaded that general to sail to Ayamonte, under the pretence of preventing Avril's division from crossing the Guadiana, although he knew well that the latter had no intention of doing so.

The effect produced upon Colonel Maransin by the appearance of the British force off Ayamonte has been already noticed. General Thiebault says, that Spencer might have struck an important blow at that period against the French ; but the British troops were unprovided with any equipment for a campaign, and to have thrown 5000 infantry, without cavalry and without a single place of arms, into the midst of an enemy who occupied all the fortresses, and who could bring 20,000 men into the field, would have been imprudent to the greatest degree. General Spencer, who had by this time been rejoined by his detachment from Sicily, only made a demonstration of landing, and having thus materially aided the insurrection, returned to Cadiz, from whence he was almost immediately summoned to Lisbon, to execute a new project, which proved to be both ill-considered and fruitless.

Sir Charles Cotton, after superseding Sir Sidney Smith, had blockaded the mouth of the Tagus with the utmost rigour, expecting to force the Russian squadron to capitulate for want of provisions. This scheme, which originated with Lord Strangford, never had the least chance of success ; but the privations and misery of the wretched inhabitants were so greatly aggravated thereby, that

Junot had recourse to various expedients to abate the rigour of the blockade with regard to them, and among others, employed a Portuguese, named Sataro, to make proposals to the English admiral. This man at first pretended that he came without the privity of the French, and in the course of the communications that followed, Sir Charles was led to believe that only 4000 French troops remained in Lisbon. Under this erroneous impression, he requested that General Spencer might be sent to him, for the purpose of attacking the enemy while they were so weak. Spencer, by the advice of Sir Hew Dalrymple and Lord Collingwood, obeyed the summons, but on his arrival was led to doubt the correctness of the admiral's information. Instead of 4000, it appeared that there could not be much less than 15,000 French in or near Lisbon; and the attack was of course relinquished. When Spencer returned to Cadiz, Castaños again pressing him to co-operate with the Spanish forces, he so far consented, as to disembark them at the port St. Mary, and even agreed to send a detachment to Xeres; but being deceived by Morla, who still gave him hopes of finally occupying Cadiz, he resolved to keep the greater part close to that city.

At this period the insurrection of Andalusia attracted all the intriguing adventurers in the Mediterranean towards Gibraltar and Seville, and the confusion of Agramant's camp would have been rivalled, if the prudent firmness of Sir Hew Dalrymple had not checked the first efforts of those political pests; but among the perplexing follies of the moment, one deserves particular notice, on account of some curious circumstances that attended it, the full explanation of which I must, however, leave to other historians, who may perhaps find in that and the like affairs, a key to that absurd policy, which in Sicily so long sacrificed the welfare of two nations to the whims and follies of a profligate court.

The introduction of the salique law had long been a favourite object with the Bourbons of Spain; but the nation at large would never agree to change the ancient rule of succession, which admitted females to the throne. The project was, however, secretly revived by some of the junta at this moment, and the party favouring the salique law wished to offer the regency to the Prince of Sicily, who (Ferdinand and his brothers dying without sons) would, under that law, have succeeded, to the prejudice of the princess of the Brazils. The Chevalier Robertoni, a Sicilian agent, appeared early at Gibraltar, and from thence (as if under the auspices of England,) attempted to forward the views of his court; but Sir Hew Dalrymple, being accidentally informed that the British cabinet disapproved of the object of his mission, sent him away. Meanwhile Castaños, deceived by some person engaged in the intrigue, was inclined to support the pretensions of the Sicilian prince to the regency, and proposed to make use of Sir Hew Dalrymple's name to give weight to his opinions; a circumstance which must have created great jealousy in Spain, if Sir Hew had not promptly refused his sanction.

After that, the affair seemed to droop for a moment; but in the middle of July an English man of war suddenly appeared at Gibraltar, having on board Prince Leopold of Sicily, and a complete court establishment of chamberlains with their keys, and ushers with their white wands. The Duke of Orleans, who attended his brother-in-law the prince, made no secret of his intention to negotiate for the regency of Spain, and openly demanded that he should be received into Gibraltar. Sir Hew, foreseeing all the mischief of this proceeding, promptly refused to permit the prince, or any of his attendants, to land, and the captain of the ship, whose orders were merely to carry him to Gibraltar, refused to take him back to Sicily. To relieve his royal highness from this awkward situation, Sir Hew consented to receive him as a guest, provided that he divested himself of his public character, and that the Duke of Orleans departed instantly from the fortress.

Sir William Drummond, the British envoy at Palermo; Mr. Viale; and the Duke of Orleans were the ostensible contrivers of this notable scheme, by which, if it had succeeded, a small party in a local junta would have appointed a

regency for Spain, paved the way for altering the laws of succession in that country, established their own sway over the other juntas, and created interminable jealousy between England, Portugal, and Spain; but with whom the plan originated does not very clearly appear.* Sir William Drummond's representations induced Sir Alexander Ball to provide the ship of war, nominally for the conveyance of the Duke of Orleans, but in reality for Prince Leopold, with whose intended voyage Sir Alexander does not appear to have been made acquainted. That the prince should have desired to be Regent of Spain was natural, but that he should have been conveyed to Gibraltar in a British ship of the line, when the English government disapproved of his pretensions, was really curious. Sir William Drummond could scarcely have proceeded such lengths in an affair of so great consequence, without secret instructions from some member of his own government,† yet Lord Castlereagh expressed unqualified approbation of Sir Hew's decisive conduct upon the occasion! Did the ministers act at this period without any confidential communication with each other? or was Lord Castlereagh's policy secretly and designedly thwarted by one of his colleagues? But it is time to quit this digression and turn to

THE PROCEEDINGS IN PORTUGAL.

The Bishop of Oporto being placed at the head of the insurrectional junta of that town, claimed the assistance of England. "We hope," said he, "for an aid of 300,000 cruzado novas; of arms and accoutrements complete, and of cloth for 40,000 infantry and for 8000 cavalry; 3000 barrels of cannon powder, some cargoes of salt fish, and other provisions, and an auxiliary body of 6000 men at least, including some cavalry." This extravagant demand would lead to the supposition that an immense force had been assembled by the prelate, yet he could never at any time have put 5000 organized men in motion against the French, and had probably not even thought of any feasible or rational mode of employing the succours he demanded; but the times were favourable for extravagant demands, and his were not rejected by the English ministers, who sent agents to Oporto and other parts, with power to grant supplies. The improvident system adopted for Spain being thus extended to Portugal, produced precisely the same effects, that is, cavils, intrigues, waste, insubordination, and inordinate vanity and ambition among the ignorant upstart men of the day.

More than half a year had now elapsed since Napoleon first poured his forces into the Peninsula; every moment of that time was marked by some extraordinary event, and one month had passed since a general and terrible explosion, shaking the unsteady structure of diplomacy to pieces, had left a clear space for the shock of arms; yet the British cabinet was still unacquainted with the real state of public feeling in the Peninsula and with the Spanish character; and although possessing a disposable army, of at least 80,000 excellent troops, was totally unsettled in its plans, and unprepared for any vigorous effort. Agents were indeed despatched to every accessible province; the public treasure was scattered with heedless profusion, and the din of preparation was heard in every department; but the bustle of confusion is easily mistaken for the activity of business; time removing the veil of official mystery covering those transactions, has exposed all their dull and meagre features; and it is now clear that the treasure was squandered without judgment, and the troops dispersed without meaning. Ten thousand exiled to Sweden proved the truth of Oxenstern's address to his son; as many more idly kept in Sicily were degraded into the guards of a vicious court; Gibraltar was unnecessarily filled with fighting men; and General Spencer, with 5000 excellent soldiers, being doomed to wander between Ceuta, Lisbon, and Cadiz, was seeking, like the knight of La Mancha, for a foe to combat.

A considerable force remained in England; but it was not ready for service, when the minister resolved to send an expedition to the Peninsula, and 9000

* Appendix No. 3.

† Ibid.

men collected at Cork by other hands and for other purposes, formed the only disposable army for immediate operations. The Grey and Grenville administration, so remarkable for unfortunate military enterprises, had assembled this handful of men with a view to permanent conquests in South America, upon what principle of policy it is not necessary to inquire, but such undoubtedly was the intention of that administration ; perhaps in imitation of the Roman senate, who sent troops to Spain when Hannibal was at the gates of the city. The tory administration relinquished this scheme of conquest, and directed Sir Arthur Wellesley to inform General Miranda, the military adventurer of the day, not only that he must cease to expect assistance, but that all attempts to separate the colonies of Spain from the parent state would be discouraged by the English government. Thus the troops assembled at Cork became available, and Sir Arthur Wellesley being appointed to command them, sailed on the 12th of July, to commence that long and bloody contest in the Peninsula which he was destined to terminate in such a glorious manner.

Two small divisions were soon after ordered to assemble for embarkation at Ramsgate and Harwich, under the command of Generals Anstruther and Acland, but a considerable time elapsed before they were ready to sail ; and a singular uncertainty in the views of the ministers at this period subjected all the military operations to perpetual and mischievous changes. General Spencer, supposed to be at Gibraltar, was directed to repair to Cadiz, and wait for Sir Arthur's orders ; and the latter was permitted to sail under the impression that Spencer was actually subject to his command ; but other instructions empowered Spencer at his own discretion to commence operations in the south, without reference to Sir Arthur Wellesley's proceedings ; and Admiral Purvis, who, after Lord Collingwood's arrival, had no separate command, was also authorized to undertake any enterprise in that quarter, and even to control the operations of Sir Arthur Wellesley by calling for the aid of his troops, that general being enjoined to "pay all due obedience to any such requisition !" Yet Sir Arthur himself was informed, that "the accounts from Cadiz were bad ;" that "no disposition to move either there or in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar was visible," and that "the cabinet were unwilling he should go far to the southward, whilst the spirit of exertion appeared to reside more to the northward." Again the admiral, Sir Charles Cotton, was informed that Sir Arthur Wellesley was to co-operate with him in a descent at the mouth of the Tagus ; but Sir Arthur himself had no definite object given for his own operations, although his instructions pointed to Portugal, and thus in fact no one officer, naval or military, knew exactly what his powers were, with the exception of Admiral Purvis, who, being only second in command for his own service, was really authorized to control all the operations of the land forces, provided he directed them to that quarter which had been declared unfavourable for any operations at all.

In recommending Portugal as the fittest field of action, the ministers were chiefly guided by the advice of the Asturian deputies ; although having received Sir Hew Dalrymple's despatches to a late date, their own information must have been more recent and more extensive than any that they could obtain from the deputies, who had left Spain at the commencement of the insurrection, and were ill informed of what was passing in their own province, utterly ignorant of the state of any other part of the Peninsula, and under any circumstances were incapable of judging rightly in such momentous affairs.

The inconsistent orders of the ministers were well calculated to introduce all manner of confusion, and to prevent all vigour of action, but more egregious conduct followed. In Sir Arthur Wellesley's instructions, although they were vague and undefined, as to immediate military operations, it was expressly stated that the intention of the government was to enable Portugal and Spain to throw off the French yoke, and ample directions were given to him as to his future political conduct in the Peninsula. He was informed how to demean

himself in any disputes that might arise between the two insurrectional nations, how to act with relation to the settlement of the supreme authority during the interregnum; and directed to facilitate communications between the colonies and the mother country, and to offer his good offices to arrange any differences between them. The terms upon which Great Britain would acquiesce in any negotiation between Spain and France were stated, and finally he was empowered to recommend the establishment of a paper system in the Peninsula, as a good mode of raising money, and attaching the holders of it to the national cause. The Spaniards were not, however, sufficiently civilized to adopt this recommendation, and barbarously preferred gold to credit at a time when no man's life, or faith, or wealth, or power, was worth a week's purchase. Sir Hew Dalrymple was at this time also commanded to furnish Sir Arthur with every information that might be of use to the latter in his operations.

When the tenor of these instructions, and the great Indian reputation enjoyed by Sir Arthur Wellesley are considered, it is not possible to doubt that he was first chosen as the fittest man to conduct the armies of England at this important conjuncture; yet scarcely had he sailed when he was superseded, not to make room for a man whose fame and experience might have justified such a change, but by an extraordinary arrangement, which can hardly be attributed to mere vacillation of purpose, he was reduced to the fourth rank in that army, for the future governance of which he had fifteen days before received the most extended instructions.

Sir Hew Dalrymple was appointed to the chief command, and Sir John Moore, who had suddenly and unexpectedly returned from the Baltic (having by his firmness and address saved himself and his troops from the madness of the Swedish monarch), was, with marked disrespect, directed to place himself under the orders of Sir Harry Burrard and proceed to Portugal. Thus two men, comparatively unknown and unused to the command of armies, superseded the only generals in the British service whose talents and experience were indisputable. The secret springs of this proceeding are not so deep as to baffle investigation; but that task scarcely belongs to the general historian, who does enough when he exposes the effects of envy, treachery, and base cunning, without tracing those vices home to their possessors.

Notwithstanding these changes in the command, the uncertainty of the minister's plans continued. The same day that Sir Hew Dalrymple was appointed to be commander-in-chief, a despatch, containing the following project of campaign, was sent to Sir Arthur Wellesley: "The motives which have induced the sending so large a force to that quarter* are, 1st, to provide effectually for an attack upon the Tagus; and, 2nd, to have such an additional force disposable beyond what may be indispensably requisite for that operation, as may admit of a detachment being made to the southward, either with a view to secure Cadiz, if it should be threatened by the French force under General Dupont, or to co-operate with the Spanish troops in reducing that corps, if circumstances should favour such an operation, or any other that may be concerted. His majesty is pleased to direct that the *attack upon the Tagus should be considered as the first object to be attended to*. As the whole force, of which a statement is enclosed, when assembled will amount to not less than 30,000, *it is considered that both services may be provided for amply*. The precise distribution, as between Portugal and Andalusia, both as to time and proportion of force, must depend upon circumstances, to be judged of on the spot; and should it be deemed advisable to fulfil the assurance which Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Dalrymple appears to have given to the supreme junta of Seville,† under the authority of my despatch of (no date), that it was the

* The coast of Portugal.

† This is a remarkable instance of ministerial confusion; the despatch from Sir Hew Dalrymple referred to as giving this "assurance," not only made no mention of a promise to the junta of Seville, but the junta itself was not in existence at the time his despatch was written.

intention of his majesty to employ a corps of 10,000 men to co-operate with the Spaniards in that quarter. A corps of this magnitude may, I should hope, be detached without prejudice to the main operation against the Tagus, and may be reinforced, according to circumstances, after the Tagus has been secured. But if, previous to the arrival of the force under orders from England, Cadiz should be seriously threatened, it must rest with the senior officer of the Tagus, at his discretion to detach, upon receiving a requisition to that effect, such an amount of force as may place that important place out of the reach of immediate danger, *even though it should for the time suspend operations against the Tagus.*"*

In England at this period, personal enmity to Napoleon, and violent party prejudices, had so disturbed the judgments of men relative to that monarch, that any information speaking of strength or success for him, was regarded with suspicion even by the ministers, who, as commonly happens in such cases, becoming the dupes of their own practices, listened with complacency to all those tales of mutiny among his troops, disaffection of his generals, and insurrections in France, which the cunning or folly of their agents transmitted to them. Hence sprung such projects as the one above, the false calculations of which may be exposed by a short comparative statement.

The whole English force was not much above 30,000 men, distributed off Cadiz, off the coast of Portugal, on the eastern parts of England, and in the Channel. The French force in Spain and Portugal was about 120,000 men: they possessed all the Portuguese, and most of the Spanish fortresses.

The English army had no reserve, no fixed plan, and it was to be divided, and to act upon a double line of operations. The French had a strong reserve at Bayonne, and the grand French army of 400,000 veterans was untouched, and ready to succour the troops in the Peninsula if they required it.

Happily, this visionary plan was in no particular followed by the generals entrusted with the conduct of it. A variety of causes combined to prevent the execution. The catastrophe of Baylen marred all the great combinations of the French emperor; fortune drew the scattered divisions of the English army together, and the decisive vigour of Sir Arthur Wellesley sweeping away these cobweb projects, obtained all the success that the bad arrangements of the ministers would permit.

In the next chapter, resuming the thread of the history, I shall relate the proceedings of the first British campaign in the Peninsula; but I judged it necessary first to make an exposition of the previous preparations and plans of the cabinet, lest the reader's attention not being fully awakened to the difficulties cast in the way of the English generals by the incapacity of the government, should, with hasty censure, or niggard praise, do the former injustice; for, as a noble forest hides many noisome swamps and evil things, so the Duke of Wellington's laurels have covered the innumerable errors of the ministers.

CHAPTER IV.

A FEW days after sailing from Cork, Sir Arthur Wellesley, quitting the fleet, repaired in a frigate to Coruña, where he arrived the 20th of July, and immediately held a conference with the members of the Gallician junta, by whom

* The occupation of Cadiz was a favourite project with the English government at this period. They were not discouraged by Spencer's unsuccessful efforts to gain admittance, nor by the representations of Sir Hew Dalrymple, who had grounds for believing that any attempt to introduce British troops there would bring down the greater part of Castanos' army to oppose it by force; nor by the consideration that in a political view such a measure would give a subject for misrepresentation to the enemy's emissaries, and that, in a military view, the burthen of Cadiz would clog all general operations in Portugal.

he was informed of the battle of Rio Seco ; but the account was glossed over in the Spanish manner, and the issue of that contest had caused no change in their policy, if policy that may be called, which was but a desire to obtain money and to avoid personal inconvenience ; they rejected all succour in men, but earnestly pressed for arms and gold ; and even while the conference went on, the last was supplied, for an English frigate entered the harbour with £200,000 for their use. Whereupon, the junta recommended that the British troops should be employed in the north of Portugal, and promising to aid them by sending a Spanish division to Oporto, supported their recommendation by an incorrect statement of the number of men, Spanish and Portuguese, who, they asserted, were in arms near that city, and by a still more inaccurate estimate of the forces under Junot ; and in this manner persuaded Sir Arthur not to land in their province. Yet, at the moment they were rejecting the assistance of the British troops, the whole kingdom of Galicia was lying at the mercy of Marshal Bessieres, and there were neither men nor means to impede the progress of his victorious army.

Mr. Charles Stuart, appointed to reside as British envoy near the junta, landed at Coruña, and Sir Arthur Wellesley proceeded to Oporto, where he found Colonel Browne, an active and intelligent officer, who had been sent there a short time before to collect intelligence, and to distribute supplies. From his information it appeared, that no Spanish troops were in the north of Portugal, and that all the Portuguese force was upon the Mondego, to the south of which river the insurrection had spread. A French division of 8000 men was supposed to be in their front, and some great disaster was expected, for, to use Colonel Browne's words, "with every good will in the people, their exertions were so short lived, and with so little combination, that there was no hope of their being able to resist the advance of the enemy ;" in fact, only 5000 regulars and militia, half armed, and associated with 10,000 or 12,000 peasants without any arms, were in the field at all. A large army was, however, made out upon paper by the Bishop of Oporto, who, having assembled his civil and military coadjutors in council, proposed various plans of operation for the allied forces, none of which Sir Arthur was inclined to adopt ; but after some discussion it was finally arranged that the prelate and the paper army should look to the defence of the *Tras os Montes* against Bessieres, and that the 5000 soldiers on the Mondego should co-operate with the British forces.

This being settled, Sir Arthur Wellesley hastened to consult with Sir Charles Cotton relative to the descent at the mouth of the Tagus, which had so long haunted the imaginations of the ministers. The strength of the French, the bar of the river, the disposition of the forts, and the difficulty of landing in the immediate neighbourhood, occasioned by the heavy surf playing upon all the undefended creeks and bays, convinced him that such an enterprise was unadvisable, if not impracticable. There remained the alternative of landing to the north of Lisbon at such a distance as to avoid the danger of a disputed disembarkation, or of proceeding to the southward to join General Spencer, and commence operations in that quarter against Dupont. Sir Arthur Wellesley decided against the latter, which promised no good result while Junot held Portugal, and Bessieres hung on the northern frontier. He foresaw that the jealousy of the Spaniards, evinced by their frequent refusal to admit English troops into Cadiz, would assuredly bring on a tedious negotiation, and waste the season of action before the army could obtain a place of arms, or that the campaign must be commenced without any secure base of operations. Nothing was then known of the Spanish troops, except that they were inexperienced ; but without good aid from them it would have been idle with 14,000 men to take the field against 20,000 strongly posted in the Sierra Morena and communicating freely with the main body of the French army. A momentary advance was useless ; and if the campaign was protracted, the line of operations

running nearly parallel to the frontier of Portugal, would have required a covering army on the Guadiana to watch the movements of Junot.

The double line of operations, proposed by Lord Castlereagh, was contrary to all military principle, and as Spencer's despatches announced that his division was at St. Mary's, near Cadiz, and disengaged from any connection with the Spaniards (a fortunate circumstance scarcely to have been expected), Sir Arthur sent him orders to sail to the mouth of the Mondego, whither he himself also repaired, and joined the fleet having his own army on board. Off the Mondego he received the despatches announcing Sir Hew Dalrymple's appointment and the sailing of Sir John Moore's troops.

This mortifying intelligence did not relax his activity ; he directed fast-sailing vessels to look out for Anstruther's armament, and to conduct it to the Mondego, and having heard of Dupont's capitulation, resolved, without waiting for General Spencer's arrival, to disembark his own troops and commence the campaign—a determination that marked the cool decisive vigour of his character ; for, although sure that (in consequence of Dupont's defeat) Bessieres would not enter Portugal, his information led him to estimate Junot's own force at 16,000 to 18,000 men, a number, indeed, below the truth, yet sufficient to make the hardest general pause before he disembarked with only 9000 men, and without any certainty that his fleet could remain even for a day in that dangerous offing, at a moment also when another man was coming to profit from any success that might be obtained, and when a failure would have ruined his own reputation in the estimation of the English public, always ready to deride the skill of an Indian general.

It was difficult to find a good point of disembarkation, for the coast of Portugal from the Minho to the Tagus, presents, with few exceptions, a rugged and dangerous shore ; all the harbours formed by the rivers have bars, that render most of them difficult of access even for boats, and with the slightest breeze from the seaboard a terrible surf breaks along the whole line of coast and forbids all approach, and when the south wind which commonly prevails from August to the winter months, blows, a more dangerous shore is not to be found in any part of the world.

The small peninsula of Peniché, about seventy miles northward of the Lisbon Rock, alone offered a safe and accessible bay, perfectly adapted for a disembarkation, but the anchorage was completely within range of the fort, which contained 100 guns and a garrison of 1000 men. The next best place was the Mondego river, and as the little fort of Figueras, taken, as I have before related, by the student Zagalo, and now occupied by English marines, secured a free entrance, Sir Arthur commenced landing his troops there on the 1st of August. The weather was calm, but the operation was so difficult that it was not completed before the 5th. At that moment, by a singular good fortune, General Spencer arrived ; he had not received Sir Arthur's orders, but with great promptitude had sailed for the Tagus the moment Dupont surrendered, and by Sir Charles Cotton had been directed to the Mondego. The united forces, however, only amounted to 12,300 men, because the fourth veteran battalion being destined for Gibraltar was left on board the ships.

The army being on shore, the British general repaired to Montemor Velho to confer with Don Bernardim Freire de Andrada, the Portuguese commander-in-chief. The latter proposed that the troops of the two nations should relinquish all communication with the coast, and throwing themselves into the heart of Beira, commence an offensive campaign ; he promised ample stores of provisions ; but Sir Arthur having already discovered the weakness of the insurrection, placed no reliance on those promises. He supplied Freire with 5000 stand of arms and ammunition, but refused to separate from his ships ; and seeing clearly that the insurgents were unable to give any real assistance, he resolved to act with reference to the probability of their deserting him in danger. The Portuguese general, disappointed at this refusal, reluctantly consented to join the British

army, but he pressed Sir Arthur to hasten to Leria, lest a large magazine filled, as he affirmed, with provisions for the use of the British army, should fall into the enemy's hands. After this the two generals separated, and the necessary preparations for a march being completed, the advanced guard of the English army quitted the banks of the Mondego on the 9th, taking the road to Leria. The 10th Sir Arthur Wellesley followed with the main body, and thus commenced the

FIRST CAMPAIGN IN PORTUGAL.

His plan embraced three principal objects :

1. To hold on by the sea coast, as well for the sake of his supplies as to avoid the drain upon his weak army, which the protection of magazines on shore would occasion, and also to cover the disembarkation of the reinforcements expected from England.

2. To keep his troops in a mass, that he might strike an important blow.

3. To strike that blow as near Lisbon as possible, that the affairs of Portugal might be quickly brought to a crisis.

He possessed very good military surveys of the ground in the immediate neighbourhood of Lisbon, and he was anxious to carry on his operations in a part of the country where he could avail himself of this resource ; but the utter inexperience of his commissariat staff, and the want of cavalry, rendered his movements slow, and obliged him to be extremely circumspect, especially as the insurrection, although a generous, was but a feeble effort, and its prolongation rather the result of terror than of hope. The blow had been hastily struck in the moment of suffering, and the patriots, conscious of weakness, trembled when they reflected on their own temerity.

From the English stores Bernardim Freire had received arms and equipments complete for 5000 soldiers, yet his army at Leria did not exceed 6000 men of all arms fit for action ; and besides this force, there were in all the provinces north of the Tagus only 3000 infantry, under the command of the Marquis of Valladeres, half of whom were Spaniards. Hence it appears, that nothing could be more insignificant than the insurrection, nothing more absurd than the lofty style adopted by the junta of Oporto in their communications with the British ministers.

Upon the other side, Junot, who received information of the English descent in the Mondego as early as the 2nd, was extremely embarrassed by the distance of his principal force, and the hostile disposition of the inhabitants of Lisbon. He also was acquainted with the disaster of Dupont, and exaggerated notions of the essential strength of the Portuguese insurgents were generated in his own mind and in the minds of his principal officers.

The patriots of the Alemtejo and Algarves, assisted by some Spaniards, and animated by the manifestos and promises assiduously promulgated from the English fleet, had once more assembled at Alcacer do Sal, from whence they threatened the garrisons of St. Ubes and the French posts on the south bank of the Tagus, immediately opposite to Lisbon. The capital itself was very unquiet ; the anticipation of coming freedom was apparent in the wrathful looks and stubborn manners of the populace, and superstition was at work to increase the hatred and the hopes of the multitude. It was at this time that the prophetic eggs, denouncing death to the French, and deliverance to the Portuguese, appeared ; but less equivocal indications of approaching danger were to be drawn from the hesitations of Junot, who, wavering between his fear of an insurrection in Lisbon, and his desire to check the immediate progress of the British army, gave certain proof of an intellect yielding to the pressure of events.

At this period Loison, with between 7000 and 8000 men, was in the neighbourhood of Estremos, 2500 men were in the fortresses of Elvas and Almeida, a few hundred were at Abrantes, a thousand were in Santarem, and the same number in Peniché. General Thomieres, with a brigade, was in the vicinity of

Alcobaca, and the remainder were quartered in Lisbon and on a circuit round, including both sides of the river. The Tagus itself was guarded on the north bank by the forts of Cascaes, St. Antonio, St. Julians, Belem, and the citadel, between each of which smaller works kept up a continued line of offence against ships entering by the northern passage of the harbour. On the southern bank Fort Bugio, built upon a low sandy point, crossed its fire with St. Julians in the defence of the entrance. Upon the heights of Almada or Palmela, stood the fort of Palmela. St. Ubes and Traffaria completed the posts occupied by the French on that side. The communication between the north and south banks was kept up by the refitted Portuguese ships of war, by the Russian squadron, and by the innumerable boats, most of them very fine and large, with which the Tagus is covered.

Such being the situation of the army on the 3rd, Junot ordered Loison to march by Portalegre and Abrantes, and from thence effect a junction with General Laborde, who, with 3000 infantry, 500 or 600 cavalry, and five pieces of artillery, quitted Lisbon upon the 6th, and proceeded by Villa Franca, Rio Mayor, and Candeiros, charged to observe the movements of the British, and to cover the march of Loison, with whom he expected to form a junction at Leria.

Junot himself remained in Lisbon with a view of controlling the inhabitants by his presence. He embarked all the powder from the magazines, took additional precautions to guard his Spanish prisoners, and put the citadel and forts into a state of siege; but disquieted by the patriots assembled at Alcacer do Sal, he sent General Kellerman with a movable column to disperse them, and to scour the country between that place and Setuval, ordering him to withdraw the garrison from the latter, to abandon all the French posts on the south of the Tagus except Palmela, and to collect the whole force in one mass on the heights of Almada, where an entrenched camp had been already commenced; but General Kellerman had scarcely departed when two English regiments, the one from Madeira, the other from Gibraltar, arriving off the bar of Lisbon, distracted anew the attention of the French, and increased the turbulence of the populace, and in this state of perplexity the Duke of Abrantes lingered until the 15th, when the progress of Sir Arthur Wellesley forced him to assume the command of the army in the field.

Loison entered Abrantes the 9th, and Laborde arrived at Candeiros the same day; from that point he could with facility carry his division upon Alcobaca and Leria, or form a junction with Loison upon the side of Santarem.

The armies on both sides were now in that state of attraction towards each other, which indicates an approaching shock. In the French camps the news of Bessieres' victory at Rio Seco became known, and produced a short-lived exultation; and at the same moment intelligence of Joseph's flight from Madrid reached the British army, and increased their confidence of victory. The 10th, Loison halted at Abrantes, and Laborde moved to Alcobaca, where he was joined by Thomieres and the garrison of Peniché.

Sir Arthur's advanced guard also entered Leria, and was there joined by Bernardim Freire and the Portuguese army, who immediately seized the magazine without making any distribution to the British troops. The main body of the latter arrived the 11th, and the whole marched in advance upon the 12th.

Laborde employed the 11th and 12th in looking for a position in the neighbourhood of Batalha; but the ground was too extensive for his numbers, and at the approach of the English, he fell back in the night of the 12th to Obidos, a small town, with an old Moorish castle situated on a gentle eminence in the middle of a valley. Having occupied Obidos with his piquets, and placed a small detachment at the windmill of Brilos, three miles in front, he retired the 14th to Rorica, a village four miles to the southward, situated at the intersection of the roads leading to Torres Vedras, to Montachique, and to Alcoentre, and overlooking the whole valley of Obidos.

This position enabled him to preserve his communication with Loison open, but as it uncovered Peniché, the fourth Swiss regiment, with the exception of the flank companies, was sent to re-garrison that important point, and at the same time 300 men were detached to the right by Bombarral, Cadaval, and Segura, to obtain intelligence of Loison.

That general, having made a demonstration on the side of Thomar the 11th, ascertained that Leria was in the hands of the British, and fell back the same day upon Torres Novas, then following the course of the Tagus he arrived at Santarem upon the 13th, but in such an exhausted state, that he was unable to renew his march until the 15th. Sir Arthur Wellesley's first movement had thus cut the line of communication between Loison and Laborde, caused a loss of several forced marches to the former, and obliged the latter to risk an action with more than twice his own numbers.

As the hostile troops approached each other, the Portuguese chiefs became alarmed; notwithstanding the confident language of their public manifestos and the bombastic style of their conversation, an internal conviction that a French army was invincible pervaded all ranks of the patriots. The leaders, aware of their own deficiency, and incredulous of the courage of the English soldiers, dreaded the being committed in a decisive contest, because a defeat (which they expected) would deprive them of all hope to make terms with the victors, whereas by keeping 5000 or 6000 men together, they could at any time secure themselves by a capitulation. The junta of Oporto also, who were already aiming at supreme authority, foresaw that, in the event of a successful battle, it would be more advantageous for their particular views, to be provided with an army untouched and entirely disconnected with a foreign general, and Freire being well instructed in the secret designs of his party, resolved not to advance a step beyond Leria; but, to cover his real motives, he required the British commander to supply him with provisions, choosing to forget the magazine which he had just appropriated to himself, and as readily forgetting the formal promises of the bishop of Oporto, who had undertaken to feed the English army.

This extraordinary demand, that an auxiliary force just disembarked should nourish the native soldiers, instead of being itself fed by the people, was met by Sir Arthur Wellesley with a strong remonstrance. He easily penetrated the secret motive which caused it, but feeling that it was important to have a respectable Portuguese force acting in conjunction with his own, he first appealed to the honour and patriotism of Freire, and warmly admonished him, that he was going to forfeit all pretension to either, by permitting the British army to fight without his assistance; but this argument had no effect upon Don Bernardim. He parried the imputations against his spirit and zeal by pretending that his intention was to operate independently on the line of the Tagus; and after some further discussion, Sir Arthur, as a last effort, changed his tone of rebuke to one of conciliation, and recommended to him not to risk his troops by an isolated march, but to keep in the rear of the British, and wait for the result of the first battle. This advice was so agreeable to Freire, that at the solicitation of Captain Trant, a military agent, he consented to leave 1400 infantry, and 250 cavalry, under the immediate command of the English general.

The defection of the native force was a serious evil. It shed an injurious moral influence, and deprived Sir Arthur of the aid of troops whose means of gaining intelligence, and whose local knowledge, might have compensated for his want of cavalry. Nevertheless, continuing his own march, his advanced guard entered Caldas the 15th, and that day also Junot reluctantly quitted Lisbon, with a reserve composed of 2000 infantry, 600 cavalry, and ten pieces of artillery, carrying with him his grand parc of ammunition, and a military chest, containing £40,000. General Travot was left at Lisbon, with above 7000 men, of which number two battalions were formed of stragglers and convalescents. He occupied both sides of the Tagus, distributing 2000 men in Palmela, the Bugio fort, and on the heights of Almada, in order to protect the shipping from

the insurgents of the Alemtejo, who, under the orders of the Monteiro Mor, were again gathering at Setuval. A thousand French he kept on board the vessels of war, to guard the Spanish prisoners and the spare powder; with 2400 he garrisoned the citadel and supported the police. A thousand were distributed in the forts of Belem, St. Julians, Cascaes, and Ericeia (the last-named place is situated to the northward of the rock of Lisbon, and commands a small harbour a few miles west of Mafra), and 1000 were at Santarem, protecting a large depôt of stores; thus, if the garrisons of Elvas, Peniché, and Almeida be included, nearly one half of the French army was, by Junot's combinations, rendered inactive, and those in the field were divided into three parts, without any certain point of junction in advance, yet each too weak singly to sustain an action. The Duke of Abrantes seems to have reigned long enough in Portugal to forget that he was merely the chief of an advanced corps, whose safety depended upon activity and concentration.


The French reserve was transported to Villa Franca by water, from whence it was to march to Otta; but the rope ferry-boat of Saccavem being removed by the natives, it cost twenty-four hours to throw a bridge across the creek at that place. On the 17th the troops were on their march, when Junot hastily recalled them to Villa Franca. This retrograde movement was occasioned by a report that the English had landed near the capital. When the falsehood of this rumour became known, the reserve resumed the road to Otta, under the command of General Thiebault, Junot himself pushing forward to Alcoentre, where he found Loison, and assumed the personal direction of that general's division.




During this time, Sir Arthur Wellesley was pressing Laborde. The 15th he caused the post at Brilos to be attacked, and the piquets to be driven out of Obidos. Two companies of the 95th, and two of the 5th battalion, 60th, were employed in the former operation; they carried the windmill without loss, but pursued the retiring enemy with such inconsiderate eagerness, that at the distance of three miles from their support, they were out-flanked by two superior bodies of French, and were only saved by the opportune advance of General Spencer. Two officers and twenty-seven men were killed and wounded in this slight affair, which gave a salutary check to the rashness, without lowering the confidence, of the troops.

The 16th Laborde's position was examined. The road from Caldas to Obidos runs through a valley, formed by the ramifications of the Monte Junto. The high-table land upon which Roriça is situated closed this valley to the southward, and Laborde's division being posted on a small plain immediately in front of that village, completely overlooked the country as far as Obidos. All the favourable points of defence in the valley, and on the nearest hills on each side, were occupied by small detachments. One mile in the rear, a steep ridge extending about three quarters of a mile from east to west, and parallel to the French position, offered a second line of great strength. The main road led by a deep defile over this ridge, which was called the height of Zambugeira, or Columbeira, and beyond it, very lofty mountains rose abruptly, stretching from the sea-coast to the Tagus like a wall, and filling all the space between that river and the ocean down to the rock of Lisbon.

The valley leading from Obidos to Roriça was bounded on the left by a succession of ridges that rose the one above the other like steps, until they were lost in the great mass of the Sierra de Baragueda, itself a shoot from the Monte-junto.

Laborde's situation was becoming truly embarrassing. Loison was at Alcoentre, and the reserve was at Villa Franca; that is, one and two marches distant from Roriça. If he retired upon Torres Vedras, his communication with Loison would be lost. To fall back on Montachique was to expose the line of Torres Vedras and Mafra. To march upon Alcoentre, and unite with Loison, was to open the shortest road to Lisbon (that of Montachique) for the



Explanation
 English 
 French 
 Portuguese 

SKETCH OF THE COMBAT OF RORICA

17th August 1808.

ORDOE



British army ; and to remain at Rorica, it was necessary to fight three times his own force.

Animated, however, by the danger, encouraged by the local advantages of his position, and justly confident in his own talents, Laborde resolved to abide his enemy's assault, in the feeble hope that Loison might arrive during the action.

COMBAT OF RORICA.

Sir Arthur Wellesley attacked upon the 17th.

Early in the morning of that day, a dense mass, consisting of 13,480 infantry, 470 cavalry, and 18 guns, issued from Obidos, and soon afterwards broke into three distinct columns of battle.

The left, commanded by Lieutenant-General Ferguson, was composed of his own and Major-General Bowe's brigades of infantry, reinforced by 250 riflemen, 40 cavalry, and six guns, forming a total of 4900 combatants. They marched by the crests of the hills adjoining the Sierra de Baragueda, being destined to turn the right flank of Laborde's position, and to oppose the efforts of Loison, if that general (who was supposed to be at Rio Mayor) should appear during the action.

The column of the right, under Captain Trant, composed of 1000 Portuguese infantry, and 50 horse of the same nation, moved by the village of St. Amias, with the intention of turning the left flank of the French.

The centre column, 9000 in number, with twelve guns, was commanded by Sir Arthur in person, and marched straight against the enemy by the village of Mahmed. It was composed of Generals Hill's, Nightingale's, Catlin Craufurd's, and Fane's brigades of British infantry, 400 cavalry, 250 of which were Portuguese, and 400 light troops of the same nation.

As this column advanced, General Fane's brigade, extending to its left, drove back the French skirmishers, and connected the march of Ferguson's division with the centre. When the latter approached the elevated plain upon which Laborde was posted, General Hill, who moved upon the right of the main road, being supported by the cavalry, and covered by the fire of his light troops, pushed forward rapidly to the attack. On his left General Nightingale displayed a line of infantry, preceded by the fire of nine guns. Craufurd's brigade, and the remaining pieces of artillery, formed a reserve.

At this moment, Fane's riflemen crowned the nearest hills on the right flank of the French ; the Portuguese troops showed the head of a column beyond St. Amias upon the enemy's left, and General Ferguson was seen descending from the higher grounds in the rear of Fane. Laborde's position appeared desperate ; but with the coolness and dexterity of a practised warrior, he evaded the danger, and, covered by his excellent cavalry, fell back rapidly to the heights of Zambugeira. A fresh disposition of the English became indispensable to dislodge him from that formidable and well-chosen post.

Colonel Trant continued his march, and turned the left of the new field of battle.

Ferguson and Fane being united, were directed to penetrate by the mountains, and outflank the French right.

Generals Hill and Nightingale advanced against the front, which was of singular strength, and only to be approached by narrow paths winding through deep ravines. A swarm of skirmishers starting forward, plunged into the passes, and spreading to the right and left, won their way with extreme difficulty among the rocks and tangled evergreens that overspread the steep ascent ; with still greater difficulty the supporting columns followed, and their formation was soon disordered in the confined and rugged passes. The hollows echoed with a continued roll of musketry ; the shouts of the advancing troops were loudly answered by the enemy, and the curling smoke that broke out from the sides of the mountain marking the progress of the assailants, showed how stoutly the defence was maintained. Laborde, watching anxiously for the arrival of

Loison, gradually slackened his hold on the left, but clung tenaciously to the right, in the hope of yet effecting a junction with that general. The ardour of the 9th and 29th regiments, who led the attack, favoured this skilful conduct. They pressed forward with such vigour, as to force the two strongest passes and reach the plain above, long before the flank movements of Ferguson and Trant had shaken the credit of the position; the 29th first arrived in disorder at the top; ere they could form, a French battalion came forward at a rapid pace, poured in their fire, and breaking gallantly through the midst of the English regiment, slew the colonel and many others, and made the major and fifty or sixty men prisoners; but the 29th were not to be overthrown. They rallied, and being joined by the 9th, the colonel of which also fell in this bitter fight, maintained their dangerous footing. Laborde, who brought every arm into action at the proper time and place, made repeated efforts to destroy these regiments before they could be supported; failing in that, he yet gained time to withdraw his left wing and to rally it upon the centre and right; but the English troops were gathering thickly on the upper ground, and General Ferguson, who had at first taken an erroneous direction towards the centre, now regained the true line, and was rapidly passing the right flank of the position. The French general, seeing that the day was lost, commenced a retreat by alternate masses, protecting his movements by vigorous charges of cavalry. At the village of Zambugeira he made another desperate stand, but the English troops bore on him too heavily to be resisted, and thus disputing the ground, he fell back to the Quinta de Bugagliera; there he halted until his detachments on the side of Segura had rejoined him, and then taking to the narrow pass of Ruña he marched all night to gain the position of Montechique, leaving three guns on the field of battle, and the road to Torres Vedras open for the victors.

The loss of the French was 600 killed and wounded; among the latter was Laborde himself. The British also suffered considerably; two lieutenant-colonels and nearly 500 men being killed, taken, or wounded, and as not more than 4000 men were actually engaged, this hard-fought action was very honourable to both sides.*

The firing ceased a little after four o'clock, and Sir Arthur getting intelligence that Loison's division was at Bombaral, only five miles distant, took up a position for the night in an oblique line to that which he had just forced, his left resting upon a height near the field of battle, and his right covering the road to Lourinham. Believing that Loison and Laborde had effected their junction at the Quintade Bugagliera, and that both were retiring to Montechique, he resolved to march the next morning to Torres Vedras; but before night fall he was informed that General Anstruther's and General Acland's† divisions, accompanied by a large fleet of store ships, were off the coast, the dangerous nature of which rendered it necessary to provide for their safety by a quick disembarkation. He therefore changed his plans, and resolved to seek for some convenient post, that, being in advance of his present position, would likewise enable him to cover the landing of these reinforcements. The vigour of Laborde's defence had also an influence upon this occasion; before an enemy so bold and skilful no precaution could be neglected with impunity.

The 18th Sir Arthur marched to Lourinham, and Junot at the same time quitting Cercal with Loison's division, crossed the line of Laborde's retreat, and pushed for Torres Vedras, which he reached in the evening of the same day. The 19th being joined by Laborde, and the 20th by his reserve, he re-organized his army, and prepared for a decisive battle.

* Appendix, No. 19.

† The ministers were so intent upon occupying Cadiz, and so little acquainted with the state of public feeling in Andalusia, that one of those generals carried with him his appointment as governor of that city.

CHAPTER V.

THE day on which the combat of Rorica was fought the insurgents attacked Abrantes, and the feeble garrison being ill commanded, gave way, and was destroyed.

The 19th Sir Arthur Wellesley took up a position at Vimiero, a village near the sea-coast, and from thence sent a detachment to cover the march of General Anstruther's brigade, which had, with great difficulty and some loss, been that morning landed on an open sandy beach called the bay of Maceira.

The French cavalry scoured the neighbouring country, carried off some of the women from the rear of the camp, and hemmed the army round so closely that no information of Junot's position could be obtained.

In the night of the 20th, General Acland's brigade was also disembarked, and this reinforcement increased the army to 16,000 fighting men, with 18 pieces of artillery, exclusive of Trant's Portuguese and of two British regiments, under General Beresford, which were with the fleet at the mouth of the Tagus.

Estimating Junot's whole force at 18,000 men, Sir Arthur Wellesley judged, that after providing for the security of Lisbon, the French general could not bring more than 14,000 into the field; he designed, therefore, not only to strike the first blow, but to follow it up, so as to prevent the enemy from rallying and renewing the campaign upon the frontier. In this view he had, before quitting the Mondego, written to Sir Harry Burrard, giving an exact statement of his own proceedings and intentions,* and recommending that Sir John Moore, with his division, should disembark at the Mondego, and march without delay to Santarem, by which he would protect the left of the army, block the line of the Tagus, and at the same time threaten the French communication between Lisbon and Elvas, and that without danger, because Junot would be forced to defend Lisbon against the coast army, or if, relinquishing the capital, he endeavoured to make way to Almeida by Santarem, the ground there was so strong that Sir John Moore might easily maintain it against any efforts. Moreover, the Marquis of Valladeres commanded 3000 men at Guarda, and General Freire, with 5000 men, was at Leria, and might be persuaded to support the British at Santarem.

The distance from Vimiero to Torres Vedras was about nine miles; but although the number and activity of the French cavalry completely shrouded Junot's position, it was known to be strong, and very difficult of approach, by reason of a long defile through which the army must penetrate in order to reach the crest of the mountain. There was, however, a road leading between the sea-coast and Torres Vedras, which turning Junot's position, opened a way to Mafra. Sir Arthur possessed very exact military surveys of the country through which that road led, and he projected, by a forced march, on the 21st to turn the position of Torres Vedras, and to gain Mafra with a strong advanced guard, while the main body, seizing some advantageous heights a few miles short of that town, would be in a position to intercept the French line of march to Montachique. The army was reorganized during the 20th in eight brigades of infantry, and four weak squadrons of cavalry, and every preparation was made for the next day's enterprise; but at that critical period of the campaign the ministerial arrangements, which provided three commanders-in-chief, began to work.

Sir Harry Burrard arrived in a frigate off the bay of Maceira, and Sir Arthur was checked in the midst of his operations on the eve of a decisive battle. Having repaired on board the frigate, he made his report of the situation of affairs, and renewed his former recommendation relative to the disposal of Sir John Moore's troops; but Burrard, who had previously resolved to bring the latter down to Maceira, condemned this project, and forbid any offensive

* Appendix, No. 9.

movement until the whole army should be concentrated ; whereupon Sir Arthur returned to his camp.

The ground occupied by the army, although very extensive, and not very clearly defined as a position, was by no means weak. The village of Vimiero, situated in a valley through which the little river of Maceira flows, contained the parc and commissariat stores. The cavalry and the Portuguese were on a small plain close behind the village, and immediately in its front a rugged isolated height, with a flat top, commanded all the ground to the southward and eastward for a considerable distance.

Upon this height Fane's and Anstruther's brigades of infantry with six guns were posted, the left of Anstruther's occupied a church and churchyard which blocked a road leading over the extremity of the height to the village, the right of Fane's rested on the edge of the other extremity of the hill, the base of which was washed by the Maceira.

A mountain that commenced at the coast swept in a half circle close behind the right of the hill upon which these brigades were posted, and commanded, at rather long artillery range, all its upper surface. Eight guns, and the first, second, third, fourth, and eighth brigades of infantry, occupied this mountain, which was terminated on the left by a deep ravine that divided it from another strong and narrow range of heights over which the road from Vimiero to Lourinham passed. The right of these last heights also overtopped the hill in front of the village, but the left, bending suddenly backward, after the form of a crook, returned to the coast, and ended in a lofty cliff. There was no water upon this range, and some piquets only were placed there.

The troops being thus posted, on the night of the 21th, about twelve o'clock, Sir Arthur was aroused by a German officer of dragoons, who galloped into the camp, and with some consternation reported, that Junot, at the head of 20,000 men, was coming on to the attack, and distant but one hour's march. The general, doubting the accuracy of this gentleman's information, merely sent out some patrolles, and warned the piquets and guards to be upon the alert. Before daybreak, according to the British custom, the troops were under arms ; the sun rose, and no enemy was perceived ; but at seven o'clock a cloud of dust was observed beyond the nearest hills, and at eight o'clock an advanced guard of horse was seen to crown the heights to the southward, and to send forward scouts on every side. Scarcely had this body been discovered, when a force of infantry, preceded by other cavalry, was descried moving along the road from Torres Vedras to Lourinham, and threatening the left of the British position ; column after column followed in order of battle, and it soon became evident that the French were coming down to fight, but that the right wing of the English was not their object. The second, third, fourth, and eighth brigades were immediately directed to cross the valley behind the village, and to take post on the heights before mentioned as being occupied by the piquets only. As those brigades reached the ground, the second and third were disposed in two lines facing to the left, and consequently forming a right angle with the prolongation of Fane and Anstruther's front. The fourth and eighth brigades were to have furnished a third line ; but before the latter could reach the summit the battle commenced. From the flank of all these troops, a line of skirmishers was thrown out upon the face of the descent towards the enemy ; the cavalry was drawn up in the plain a little to the right of the village of Vimiero ; and the fifth brigade and the Portuguese were detached to the returning part of the crook to cover the extreme left, and to protect the rear of the army. The first brigade under General Hill remained on the mountain which the others had just quitted, and formed a support for the centre and a reserve for the whole.

The ground between the two armies was so wooded and broken, that after the French had passed the ridge where they had been first descried, no correct view of their movements could be obtained ; and the British being so weak in

cavalry were forced to wait patiently until the columns of attack were close upon them. Junot had quitted Torres Vedras the evening of the 20th, intending to fall on the English army at daybreak; but the difficulty of the defile in his front retarded his march for many hours and fatigued his troops. When he first came in sight of the position of Vimiero, the British order of battle appeared to him as being on two sides of an irregular triangle, the apex of which, formed by the hill in front of the village, was well furnished with men, while the left face appeared naked, for he could only see the piquets on that side, and the passage of the four brigades across the valley was hidden from him. Concluding, then, that the principal force was in the centre, he resolved to form two connected attacks, the one against the apex, the other against the left face; for he thought that the left of the position was an accessible ridge, whereas a deep ravine, trenched as it were along the base, rendered it utterly impervious to an attack, except at the extremity, over which the road from Torres Vedras to Lourinham passed. Junot had nearly 14,000 fighting men organized in four divisions, of which three were of infantry and one of cavalry, with twenty-three pieces of artillery, but of small calibre. Each division was composed of two brigades, and at ten o'clock, all being prepared, he commenced the

BATTLE OF VIMIERO.

Laborde marched with one brigade against the centre; General Brennier led another against the left; Loison's division followed in the same order at a short distance. Kellerman, whose division (called the reserve) was composed of grenadiers, moved in one body behind Loison, and the cavalry under Margaron, about 1300 in number, was divided, a part being on the right of Brennier, and the remainder in rear of the reserve. The artillery was distributed among the columns, and opened their fire whenever the ground was favourable for their practice.

Junot designed that Laborde's and Brennier's attacks should be simultaneous, but the latter coming unexpectedly upon the ravine before mentioned as protecting the left, got entangled among the rocks and water courses, and Laborde alone engaged Anstruther's brigade under a heavy and destructive fire of artillery that played on its front and flank, for the eighth brigade being then in the act of mounting the heights where the left was posted, observing the advance of the columns against the centre, halted, and opened a battery on their right flank. Junot, perceiving this failure in his combinations, ordered Loison to support Laborde's attack with one brigade of his division, and directed General Solignac, with the other, to turn the ravine in which Brennier was entangled, and to fall upon the extremity of the English line.


Loison and Laborde formed one grand and two secondary columns of attack; of the latter, the one advanced against Fane's brigade, while the other endeavoured to penetrate by a road which passed between the ravine and the church on the extreme left of Anstruther; but the principal column, headed by Laborde in person, and preceded by a multitude of light troops, mounted the face of the hill with great fury and loud cries; the English skirmishers were forced in upon the lines in a moment, and the French masses arrived at the summit; but, shattered by a terrible fire of the artillery, and breathless from their exertions, and in this state, first receiving a discharge of musketry from the fifteenth regiment at the distance of half pistol shot, they were vigorously charged in front and flank, and overthrown. At the same time Fane's brigade repulsed the attack on their side, and Colonel Taylor, with the very few horsemen he commanded, passing out by the right, rode fiercely among the confused and retreating troops, and scattered them with great execution. Margaron's cavalry seeing this, came suddenly down upon Taylor, who was there slain, and the half of his feeble squadron cut to pieces, and Kellerman taking advantage of this check, threw one half of the reserve into a pine wood, that flanked the line of retreat followed by the beaten troops, and with the other endeavoured to

renew the attack by the road leading to the church, where the 43rd regiment were engaged in a hot skirmish among some vineyards.

The grenadiers coming on at a brisk pace, beat back the advanced companies of the 43rd; but to avoid the artillery that swept their left, they dipped a little into the ravine, and were taken on the other flank by the guns of the 8th and 4th brigades, and at the same time the 43rd rallying in a mass, broke down upon the head of the column at a moment when the narrowness of the way and the discharges of the artillery had somewhat disordered its formation; a short yet desperate fight took place; the enemy were repulsed in disorder, but the regiment suffered very severely.

The French being now wholly discomfited in the centre, and the woods and hollows filled with their wounded and straggling men, retired up the edge of the ravine in a direction almost parallel to the British line, and left the road from Vimiero to Torres Vedras open to their opponents; but Sir Arthur Wellesley strictly forbade any pursuit at that moment, partly because the grenadiers in the pine wood flanked the line of the French retreat, and partly because Margaron's horsemen, riding stiffly between the two armies, were not to be lightly meddled with. Meanwhile (Brennier being still hampered in the ravine), General Solignac passed along the crest of the above ridge, and came upon General Ferguson's brigade, which was posted at the left of the English position. But where the French expected to find a weak flank, they encountered a front of battle on a depth of three lines protected by deep declivities on either side; a powerful artillery swept away their foremost ranks, and on their right the 5th brigade and the Portuguese were seen marching by a distant ridge towards the Lourinham road and threatening the rear. Ferguson instantly taking the lead, bore down upon the enemy, the ridge widened as the English advanced, and the regiments of the 2nd line running up in succession, increased the front, and constantly filled the ground. The French falling fast under the fire drew back fighting, until they reached the declivity of the ridge, and their cavalry made several efforts to check the advancing troops, but the latter were too compact to be disturbed by these attempts. Solignac himself was carried from the field severely wounded, and his retiring column, continually outflanked on the left, was cut off from the line of retreat, and thrown into the low ground about the village of Perenza. There six guns were captured, and General Ferguson leaving the 82nd and 71st regiments to guard them, was continuing to press the disordered columns, when Brennier having at last cleared the ravine, came suddenly in upon those two regiments, and retook the artillery. His success was but momentary; the surprised troops rallied upon the higher ground, poured in a heavy fire of musketry, and with a shout returning to the charge, overthrew him and recovered the guns. Brennier himself was wounded and made prisoner, and Ferguson having completely separated the French brigades from each other, would have forced the greatest part of Solignac's to surrender, if an unexpected order had not obliged him to halt, and then the discomfited troops re-forming under the protection of their cavalry with admirable quickness and steadiness, made an orderly retreat, and were soon united to the broken brigades which were falling back from the attack on the centre.

Brennier, who, the moment he was taken, was brought to Sir Arthur Wellesley, eagerly demanded if the reserve under Kellerman had yet charged, and Sir Arthur, ascertaining from other prisoners that it had, was then satisfied that all the enemy's attacks were exhausted, and that no considerable body of fresh troops could be hidden among the woods and hollows in his front. It was only 12 o'clock, the battle was already won; 13 guns were in his possession, for seven had been taken in the centre; the 4th and 8th brigades had suffered very little; the Portuguese, the 5th and the 1st brigades had not fired a shot, and the latter was two miles nearer to Torres Vedras than any part of the French army, which was moreover in great confusion. The relative numbers before



SKETCH OF THE
BATTLE OF VIMIERO.
21st August 1808.

the action were considerably in favour of the English; and the result of the action had increased that disparity. A portion of Sir Arthur's army had defeated the enemy when entire; a portion then could effectually follow up his victory, and he resolved with the five brigades on the left to press Junot closely, and driving him over the Sierra da Baragueda, force him upon the Tagus, while Hill, Anstruther, and Fane, seizing the defile of Torres Vedras, should push on to Montachique and cut him off from Lisbon.

If this able and decisive operation had been executed, Junot would probably have lost all his artillery, and several thousand stragglers, and being buffeted and turned at every point, would have been glad to seek safety under the guns of Almeida or Elvas, and even that he could only have accomplished because Sir John Moore's troops were not landed at the Mondego. But Sir Harry Burrard, who was present during the action, although partly from delicacy, and partly from approving of Sir Arthur's arrangements, he had not hitherto interfered, now assumed the chief command. From him, the order which arrested Ferguson in his victorious career had emanated, by him further offensive operations were forbidden, and he resolved to wait in the position of Vimiero until the arrival of Sir John Moore. The Adjutant-General Clinton and Colonel Murray, the quarter-master-general, supported Sir Harry Burrard's views, and Sir Arthur's earnest representations could not alter his determination.

Sir Harry's decision was certainly erroneous, but error is common in an art which at best is but a choice of difficulties. The circumstances of the moment were imposing enough to sway most generals; for although the French were beaten in the attacks, they rallied with surprising quickness under the protection of a strong and gallant cavalry; Sir Harry knew that his own artillery carriages were so shaken as to be scarcely fit for service; that the draft horses were few and bad, and that the commissariat parc on the plain was in the greatest confusion. The hired Portuguese carmen were making off with their carriages in all directions; the English cavalry was totally destroyed, and finally, General Spencer had discovered a line of fresh troops on the ridge behind that occupied by the French army. Weighing all these things in his mind with the caution natural to age, Burrard was reluctant to hazard the fortune of the day upon what he deemed a perilous throw.

The Duke of Abrantes, who had displayed all that reckless courage to which he originally owed his elevation, profited by this unexpected cessation of the battle, and re-formed his broken infantry. Twelve hundred fresh men joined him at the close of the contest, and, covered by his cavalry, he retreated with order and celerity until he regained the command of the pass of Torres Vedras, so that when the day closed, the relative position of the two armies was the same as on the evening before.

One general, 13 guns, and several hundred prisoners fell into the hands of the victors, and the total loss of the French was estimated at 3000 men, an exaggeration, no doubt, but it was certainly above 2000, for their closed columns had been exposed for more than half an hour to sweeping discharges of grape and musquetry, and the dead lay thickly together. General Thiebault indeed reduces the number to 1800, and asserts that the whole amount of the French army did not much exceed 12,000 men, from which number he deducts nearly 3000 for the sick, the stragglers, and all those other petty drains which form the torment of a general-in-chief. But when it is considered that this army was composed of men selected and organized into provisional battalions expressly for the occasion; that one-half had only been in the field for a fortnight, and that the whole had enjoyed three days' rest at Torres Vedras, it is evident that the number of absentees bears too great a proportion to the combatants. A French order of battle found upon the field gave a total of 14,000 men present under arms, of which 1300 were cavalry, and this amount agrees too closely with other estimates, and also with the observations made at the time, to leave any reasonable doubt of its authenticity or correctness.

The arrangements made by Sir Harry Burrard did not remain in force a long time. Early on the morning of the 22nd, Sir Hew Dalrymple disembarked and assumed the chief command. Thus in the short space of twenty-four hours, during which a battle was fought, the army fell successively into the hands of three men, who, coming from different quarters, with different views, habits, and information, had not any previous opportunity of communing even by letter, so as to arrange a common plan of operations; and they were now brought together at a critical moment, when it was more than probable they must all disagree, and that the public service must suffer from that want of vigour which is inherent to divided councils; for when Sir Hew Dalrymple was appointed to the command, Sir Arthur Wellesley was privately recommended to him by the minister as a person who should be employed with more than usual confidence; and this unequivocal hint was backed up with too much force by the previous reputation and recent exploits of the latter, not to produce some want of cordiality; for Sir Arthur could not do otherwise than take the lead in discussing affairs of which he had more than laid the foundation, and Sir Hew would have forfeited all claims to independence in his command, if he had not exercised the right of judging for himself between the conflicting opinions of his predecessors.

After receiving information upon the most important points, and taking a hasty view of the situation of the army; although the wounded were still upon the ground, and that the wains of the commissariat were employed in removing them, Sir Hew decided to advance upon the 23rd, and gave orders to that effect; but, at the same time, he entirely agreed in opinion with Sir Harry Burrard, that the operation was a perilous one, which required the concentration of all the troops, and the application of all his means, to bring to a good conclusion; and for this reason he did not rescind the order directing Sir John Moore to fall down to Maceira. This last measure was disapproved of by Sir Arthur, who observed that the provisions on shore would not supply more than eight or nine days' consumption for the troops already at Vimiero; that the country would be unable to furnish any assistance, and that the fleet could not be calculated upon as a resource because the first of the gales common at that season of the year would certainly send it away from the coast, if it did not destroy a great portion of it. Sir Hew thought the evil of having the army separated, would be greater than the chance of distress from such events. His position was certainly difficult; the Bishop of Oporto had failed in his promise of assisting the troops with draft cattle, as indeed he did in all his promises. Both the artillery and commissariat were badly supplied with mules and horses; the cavalry was a nullity; and the enemy was, with the exception of his immediate loss in killed and wounded, suffering nothing from his defeat, which, we have seen, did not deprive him of a single position necessary to his defence.

Sir Hew, while weighing this state of affairs, was informed that General Kellerman, escorted by a strong body of cavalry, was at the outposts, and demanded an interview. It appears, that Junot having regained Torres Vedras and occupied Mafra with half his army, received news from Lisbon that gave him great uneasiness: the symptoms of an immediate explosion in that city threatened him with destruction, and he hastened to extricate himself while there was yet time. Sending forward a false account of a victory, he followed it up by a reinforcement for the garrison, and immediately afterwards called a council of war to advise with upon the measures fittest to pursue towards the English. It is an old and a sound remark, that "a council of war never fights," and Kellerman's mission was the result of the above consultation.

That general being conducted to the quarters of the commander-in-chief, demanded a cessation of arms, and proposed the ground-work of a convention under which Junot offered to evacuate Portugal without further resistance. Nothing could be more opportune than this proposition, and Sir Hew Dalrymple readily accepted of it as an advantage which would accrue, without any drawback to the

general cause of the Peninsula. He knew, from a plan of operations sketched by the chief of the French engineers, Colonel Bory de St. Vincent, and taken by the Portuguese, that Junot possessed several very strong positions in front of Lisbon, and that a retreat either upon Almeida, or across the river upon Elvas, was not only within the contemplation of that general, but considered in this report as a matter of course, and perfectly easy of execution. Hence the proposed convention was an unexpected advantage offered in a moment of difficulty, and the only subject for consideration was the nature of the articles proposed by Kellerman as a basis for the treaty. Sir Hew was of necessity ignorant of many important details which bore upon the question, and he naturally had recourse to Sir Arthur Wellesley for information. The latter, taking an enlarged view of the question in all its bearings, coincided with the opinion of the former as to the sound policy of agreeing to a convention by which a strong French army would be quietly got out of a country that it had complete military possession of, and by which not only a great moral effect in favour of the general cause would be produced, but likewise an actual gain made both of men and time, for the farther prosecution of the war in Spain. By the convention, he observed,

1. That a kingdom would be liberated, with all its fortresses, arsenals, etc., and that the excited population of the Peninsula might then be pushed forward in the career of opposition to France, under the most favourable circumstances.

2. That the Spanish army of Estremadura, which contained the most efficient body of cavalry in the Peninsula (being first reinforced with the 4000 or 5000 Spanish soldiers who were prisoners on board the vessels in the Tagus), would be enabled to unite with the other patriot armies at a critical period, when every addition of force must tend to increase the confidence, and forward the impulse, which the victory of Baylen, and the flight of Joseph, had given to the Spaniards; and, finally, that the sacrifice of lives to be expected in carrying the French positions in Portugal, all the difficulties of reducing the fortresses, and the danger of losing a communication with the fleet, would be avoided by this measure; the result of which would be as complete as the most sanguine could expect from the long course of uncertain and unhealthy operations which must follow a rejection of the proposal. But, completely coinciding, as he did, with the commander-in-chief, as to the utility of the measure itself, he differed with him as to the mode of proceeding, and a long discussion (in which Sir H. Burrard took a part) followed the opening of Kellerman's mission. Sir Arthur's first objection was, that, in point of form, Kellerman was merely entitled to negotiate a cessation of hostilities. But Sir Hew Dalrymple judged, that as the good policy and the utility of the convention were recognised, it would be unwise to drive the French to the wall for the sake of a trivial ceremony. Wherefore the proposition was accepted, and the basis of a definitive treaty was arranged, subject, however, to the final approbation of Sir Charles Cotton, without whose concurrence it was not to be binding.

Articles 1st and 2nd declared the fact of the armistice, and provided for the mode of future proceedings.

Article 3rd indicated the river Sizandre as the line of demarcation between the two armies. The position of Torres Vedras to be occupied by neither.

Article 4th. Sir Hew Dalrymple engaged to have the Portuguese included in the armistice, and their boundary line was to extend from Leria to Thomar.

Article 5th declared, that the French were not to be considered as prisoners of war, and that themselves and their property, public and private, were, without any detainer, to be transported to France. To this article Sir Arthur objected, as affording a cover for the abstraction of Portuguese property. General Kellerman replied, that it was to be taken in its fair sense of property justly obtained; and upon this assurance it was admitted.

Article 6th provided for the protection of individuals. It guaranteed from political persecution all French residents, all subjects of powers in alliance with

France, and all Portuguese who had served the invaders, or become obnoxious for their attachment to them.

Article 7th stipulated for the neutrality of the port of Lisbon as far as the Russian fleet was concerned. At first Kellerman proposed to have the Russian fleet guaranteed from capture, with leave to return to the Baltic; but this was peremptorily refused; and indeed the whole proceeding was designed to entangle the Russians in the French negotiation, that in case the armistice should be broken, the former might be forced into a co-operation with the latter.

Sir Arthur strenuously opposed this article: he argued, 1. That the interests of the two nations were not blended, and that they stood in different relations towards the British army. 2. That it was an important object to keep them separate, and that the French general, if pressed, would leave the Russians to their fate. 3. That as the British operations had not been so rapid and decisive as to enable them to capture the fleet before the question of neutrality could be agitated, the right of the Russians to such protection was undoubted, and in the present circumstances it was desirable to grant it, because, independent of the chances of their final capture, they would be prevented from returning to the Baltic, which in fact constituted their only point of interest when disengaged from the French negotiation; but, that viewed as allies of the latter, they became of great weight. Lastly, that it was an affair which concerned the Portuguese, Russians, and British, but with which the French could have no right to interfere.

Sir Hew finding that the discussion of this question became lengthened, and considering that Sir Charles Cotton alone could finally decide, admitted the article merely as a form, without acquiescing in the propriety of it.

Article 8th provided, that all guns of French calibre, and the horses of the cavalry, were to be likewise transported to France.

Article 9th stipulated, that forty-eight hours' notice should be given of the rupture of the armistice.

To this article also Sir Arthur objected; he considered it unnecessary for the interests of the British army, and favourable to the French, because if hostilities recommenced, the latter would have forty-eight hours to make arrangements for their defence, for the passage of the Tagus, and for the co-operation of the Russian fleet. Upon the other hand, Sir Hew thought it was an absolute advantage to gain time for the preparations of the British army, and for the arrival of Sir John Moore's reinforcements.

By an additional article it was provided, that all the fortresses held by the French, which had not capitulated before the 25th of August, should be given up to the British, and the basis of a convention being thus arranged, General Kellerman returned to his chief, and Colonel George Murray was ordered to carry the proposed articles to the English admiral.

Previous to his landing, Sir Hew had received none of the letters addressed to him by Sir Arthur Wellesley; he had met with no person during his voyage from whom he could obtain authentic information of the state of affairs; and his time had been completely occupied since his arrival by the negotiations with Kellerman; he was consequently ignorant of many details of importance. The day after Kellerman's departure, Don Bernardim Freire Andrada, the Portuguese commander-in-chief, came to remonstrate against the armistice just concluded. Now, from the circumstances before mentioned, it so happened that Sir Hew was utterly ignorant of the existence of Don Bernardim or his army at the time the armistice was discussed, and it was therefore difficult for him to manage this interview with propriety, because Andrada had some plausible although no real ground of complaint. His remonstrances were, however, merely intended for the commencement of an intrigue, to which I shall hereafter revert.

Colonel Murray soon reached the fleet, and presented the articles of convention to Sir Charles Cotton, but the latter refused to concur therein, and declared that he would himself conduct a separate treaty for the Russian ships. With

this answer Colonel Murray returned on the 24th, having first, in reply to a question put by the French officer who accompanied him on board the *Hibernia*, declared that nothing had passed between him and Sir Charles Cotton which ought to preclude further negotiation. Sir Hew Dalrymple was now urged by Sir Arthur Wellesley to give notice, without further explanation, that hostilities would recommence, and to leave it to General Junot to renew propositions, if he chose to do so, separately from the Russians. But Sir Hew felt himself in honour bound, by Colonel Murray's observation to the French officer, not to take advantage of the occasion; and he likewise felt disinclined to relinquish a negotiation which, from certain circumstances, he deemed upon the point of being crowned with success. He therefore despatched Colonel Murray to Lisbon, with directions, to inform Junot of the admiral's objection, and to give notice of the consequent rupture of the armistice, Murray himself being provided, however, with full powers to enter into and conclude a definitive treaty upon a fresh basis.

The army was, at the same time, pushed forward to Ramalhal, and Sir John Moore's troops commenced landing at Maceira Bay. When the order to repair to that place first reached them, a part had been already disembarked in the Mondego, and had to be re-shipped. This and contrary winds detained them for four days, and when they arrived at Maceira great difficulty was encountered, and some loss was sustained, in the getting of them ashore, an operation effected only by five days of incessant exertion on the part of the navy, for the boats were constantly swamped by the surf, and such was its fury that not more than thirty remained fit for service at the conclusion.

On the 27th, information was received from Colonel Murray that a fresh treaty was in agitation upon an admissible basis. On the 28th, the army took a new position, a part occupying Torres Vedras, and the remainder being placed in the rear of that town.

Meanwhile in Lisbon the agitation of the public mind was excessively great; hope and fear were magnified by the obscurity of affairs; and the contradictory news which was spread by the French, and by those who held communication with the country, increased the anxious feelings of joy or grief almost to phrenzy. Junot made every effort to engage Admiral Siniavin in the negotiation, and the necessity by which the latter was forced to put his ships in a hostile and guarded attitude, contributed powerfully to control the populace, and to give strength to an opinion, industriously spread, that he would make common cause with the French. Siniavin had, however, no intention of this kind, and very early gave notice that he would treat separately.

The French, thus left to themselves, rested their hopes upon their own dexterity, and brought all the ordinary machinery of diplomatic subtlety into play. Among other schemes, Junot opened a separate communication with Sir Hew Dalrymple at the moment when Colonel Murray, invested with full powers, was engaged in daily conferences with General Kellerman, and the difficulty of coming to a conclusion was much increased by the natural sources of suspicion and jealousy incident to such a singular transaction, where two foreign nations were seen bargaining, and one of them honestly bargaining, for the goods and interests of a third, yet scarcely hinting even at the existence of the latter. The French were the weakest party, and having of course the most to dread, put forward claims which they knew could not be complied with, in order to preserve the vital questions untouched. On the other hand, the Portuguese leaders being relieved from all fear of a signal defeat, were loudly remonstrating against the terms of the convention, and, taking advantage of the opportunity to attack some patrols of the French, passed the bounds of demarcation, and threatened the line of the Tagus by Santarem. This movement, and the breach of faith in attacking the patrols, were promptly and distinctly disavowed by Sir Hew; but they kept suspicion awake, and the mutual misunderstandings arose at last to such a height, that Junot, seeming for a moment

to recover all his natural energy, threatened to burn the public establishments, and to make his retreat good at the expense of the city ; a menace which nothing could have prevented him from executing. Finally, however, a definite treaty was concluded at Lisbon on the 30th, and soon afterwards ratified in form.

This celebrated convention, improperly called "of Cintra," consisted of twenty-two original, and three supplementary articles, upon the expediency of many of which, Sir Arthur Wellesley and the commander-in-chief disagreed ;* but as their disagreement had reference to the details and not to the general principle, the historical importance is not sufficient to call for remark. An informality on the part of Junot caused some delay in the ratification of the instrument ; but the British army marched notwithstanding to take up the position near Lisbon, assigned to it by the 11th article of the treaty.

On the march, Sir Hew Dalrymple met two Russian officers, who were charged to open a separate negotiation for the Russian squadron. The British general refused to receive their credentials, and referred them to Sir Charles Cotton. Baffled in this attempt to carry on a double treaty (for a naval one was already commenced), Siniavin, whose conduct appears to have been weak, was forced to come to a conclusion with the English admiral. At first he claimed the protection of a neutral port ; but singly he possessed none of that weight which circumstances had given him before the convention with Junot, and his claim was answered by an intimation, that a British flag was flying on the forts at the mouth of the Tagus ; and this was true, for the 3rd and 42nd regiments, under the command of Major-General Beresford, had landed and taken possession of them, in virtue of the convention, and the British colours were hoisted instead of the Portuguese. Foiled by this proceeding, the justice of which is somewhat doubtful, Siniavin finally agreed to surrender, upon the following terms :—

1. The Russian ships, with their sails, stores, etc., to be held by England, as a deposit, until six months after the conclusion of a peace between the two governments of the contracting parties.

2. The admiral, officers, and seamen, without any restriction as to their future services, to be transported to Russia, at the expense of the British government.

Two additional articles were, subsequently to the ratification of the original treaty, proposed by the Russians, and assented to by the English admiral. The first stipulated that the imperial flag should be displayed, even in the British harbours, as long as the Russian admiral remained on board. The second provided that the ships themselves and their stores should be delivered again at the appointed time, in the same state as when surrendered. The rights of the Portuguese were not referred to ; but Sir Charles Cotton individually was justified by his instructions in this breach of neutrality, for by them he was authorized to make prize of the Russian fleet, which thus suffered all the inconvenience of hostilities, and its commander the shame of striking his colours without having violated in any manner the relations of amity in which his nation stood with regard to the Portuguese. On the other hand, for the sake of a few old and decaying ships, the British government made an injudicious display of contempt for the independence of their ally, as, with singular inconsistency, they permitted the officers and crews, the real strength of the squadron, to return to the Baltic, although scarcely a year had elapsed since the national character was defiled to extinguish in that quarter the existence of a navy inimical to Great Britain.

This inconsistency belonged wholly to the ministers ; for the two original articles of the treaty only were confirmed by them, and they were copied verbatim from the Admiralty instructions delivered to Sir Charles Cotton four months previous to the transaction. Yet that officer, by the very men who had

* Appendix, No. 10.

framed those instructions, was, with matchless inconsistency, rebuked, for having adopted a new principle of maritime surrender!

The 2nd of September head quarters were established at Oyeras. The right of the army occupied the forts at the mouth of the river, the left rested upon the heights of Bellas.

The French army being concentrated in Lisbon, posted their piquets and guards as if in front of an enemy, and at night the sentries fired upon whoever approached their posts; the police disbanded of their own accord, and the city became a scene of turbulence, anarchy, and crime. Notwithstanding the presence of their enemies, the inhabitants of the capital testified their joy, and evinced their vengeful feelings in a remarkable manner; they refused to sell any provisions, or to deal in any manner with the French, they sung songs of triumph in their hearing, and in their sight fabricated thousands of small lamps for the avowed purpose of illuminating the streets at their departure. The doors of many of the houses occupied by the troops were marked in one night; men were observed bearing in their hats lists of Portuguese or Frenchmen designed for slaughter, and the quarters of Loison were threatened with a serious attack. Yet amidst all this disorder and violence, General Travot, and some others of the French army, fearlessly and safely traversed the streets, unguarded save by the reputation of their just and liberal conduct when in power; a fact extremely honourable to the Portuguese, and conclusive of the misconduct of Loison. Junot himself was menaced by an assassin, but he treated the affair with magnanimity, and, in general, he was respected, although in a far less degree than Travot. The dread of an explosion, which would have compromised at once the safety of the French army and of the city, induced Junot to hasten the period when an English division was to occupy the citadel and take charge of the public tranquillity.

Emissaries from the junta of Oporto fomented the disposition of the populace to commit themselves by an attack upon the French; the convention was reprobated, and endeavours were fruitlessly made to turn the tide of indignation even against the English, as abettors of the invaders. The judge of the people, an energetic, but turbulent fellow, issued an inflammatory address, calling for a suspension of the treaty, and designating the French as robbers and as insulters of religion. The Monteiro Mor, who commanded a rabble of peasantry which he dignified with the title of an army, had taken possession of the south bank of the Tagus, and from his quarters issued a protest against the convention, the execution of which he had the audacity to call upon Sir Charles Cotton to interrupt. The latter sent his communications to Sir Hew Dalrymple, who treated them with the contemptuous indignation they merited.

Sir John Hope being appointed the English commandant of Lisbon, took possession of the castle of Belem on the 10th, and of the citadel on the 12th, and, by his firm and vigorous conduct, soon reduced the effervescence of the public mind, and repressed the disorders which had arisen to a height that gave opportunity for the commission of any villainy. The Duke of Abrantes, with his staff, embarked the 13th. The first division of his army sailed the 15th, it was followed by the second and third divisions, and on the 30th all the French, except the garrisons of Elvas and Almeida, were out of Portugal.

The execution of the convention had not been carried on thus far without much trouble and contestation. Lord Proby, the English commissioner appointed to carry the articles of the treaty into effect, was joined by Major-General Beresford on the 5th, and their united labours were scarcely sufficient to meet the exigencies of a task in the prosecution of which disputes hourly arose. Anger, the cupidity of individuals, and opportunity, combined to push the French beyond the bounds of honour and decency, and several gross attempts were made to appropriate property which no interpretation of the stipulations could give a colour to; amongst the most odious were the abstrac-

tion of manuscripts and rare specimens of natural history from the national museum, and the invasion of the *deposito publico*, or funds of money awaiting legal decision for their final appropriation. Those dishonest attempts were met and checked with a strong hand, and at last a committee, consisting of an individual of each of the three nations, was appointed by the commissioners on both sides. Their office was to receive reclamations, to investigate them, and to do justice by seizing upon all contraband baggage embarked by the French. This measure was attended with excellent effect. It must, however, be observed, that the loud complaints and violence of the Portuguese, and the machinations of the Bishop of Oporto, seem to have excited the suspicions of the British, and influenced their actions more than the real facts warranted; for the national character of the Portuguese was not then understood, nor the extent to which they supplied the place of true reports, by the fabrication of false ones, generally known. Writers have not been wanting to exaggerate the grounds of complaint. The English have imputed fraud, and evasions of the most dishonourable kind to the French, and the latter have retorted by accusations of gratuitous insult and breach of faith, asserting that their soldiers when on board the British ships were treated with cruelty in order to induce them to desert. It would be too much to affirm that all the error was on one side, but it does appear reasonable and consonant to justice to decide, that as the French were originally aggressors and acting for their own interest, and that the British were interfering for the protection of the Portuguese, any indecorous zeal upon the part of the latter, if not commendable, was certainly more excusable than in their opponents. Upon the ground of its being evidently impossible for him to know what was doing in his name, the British commissioners acquitted Junot of any personal impropriety of conduct, and his public orders, which denounced severe punishments for such malpractices, corroborated this testimony; yet Kellerman, in his communications with Sir Hew Dalrymple, did not scruple to insinuate matter to the duke's disadvantage. But, amidst all these conflicting accusations, the British commander's personal good faith and scrupulous adherence to justice has never been called in question.

To define the exact extent to which each party should have pushed their claims is not an easy task; but an impartial investigator would begin by carefully separating the original rights of the French from those rights which they acquired by the convention. Much of the subsequent clamour in England against the authors of that treaty sprung from the error of confounding these essentially distinct grounds of argument. Conquest being the sole foundation of the first, defeat, if complete, extinguished them; if incomplete, nullified a part only. Now the issue of the appeal to arms not having been answerable to the justice of the cause, an agreement ensued, by which a part was sacrificed for the sake of the remainder, and upon the terms of that agreement the whole question of right hinges. If the French were not prisoners of war, it follows that they had not forfeited their claims founded on the right of conquest, but they were willing to exchange an insecure tenure of the whole for a secure tenure of a part. The difficulty consisted in defining exactly what was conceded, and what should be recovered from them. With respect to the latter, the restitution of plunder acquired anterior to the convention was clearly out of the question; if officially made, it was part of the rights bargained for, and if individually, to what tribunal could the innumerable claims which would follow such an article be referred? Abstract notions of right in such matters are misplaced. If an army surrenders at discretion, the victors may say with Brennus, "Woe to the vanquished;" but a convention implies some weakness, and must be weighed in the scales of prudence, not in those of justice.

CHAPTER VI.

THE interview that took place at Vimiero between Don Bernardim Freire d'Andrada and Sir H. Dalrymple has been already noticed as the commencement of an intrigue of some consequence. The Portuguese general objected at the time to the armistice just concluded with Kellerman, ostensibly upon general grounds, but really, as it appeared to Sir Hew, because the bishop and junta of Oporto were not named in the instrument. At the desire of Freire, one Ayres Pinto de Souza was received at the English head-quarters as the protector of Portuguese interests during the subsequent negotiation. He was soon apprised that a treaty for a definitive convention was on foot, and both himself and his general were invited to state their views and wishes before any further steps were taken. Neither of them took any notice of this invitation, but when the treaty was concluded clamoured loudly against it.

The British army was, they said, an auxiliary force, and should only act as such; nevertheless it had assumed the right of treating with the French for Portuguese interests. A convention had been concluded which protected the enemy from the punishment due to his rapine and cruelty. It was more favourable than the strength of the relative parties warranted; no notice had been taken of the Portuguese government, or of the native army in the Alemtejo. Men who were obnoxious to their countrymen for having aided the invaders were protected from a just vengeance, and finally the fortresses were bargained for, as acquisitions appertaining to the British army; a circumstance which must inevitably excite great jealousy both in Portugal and Spain, and injure the general cause, by affording an opportunity for the French emissaries to create disunion among the allied nations. They dwelt upon the importance of the native forces, the strength of the insurrection, and insinuated that separate operations were likely to be carried on notwithstanding the treaty. Noble words often cover pitiful deeds; this remonstrance, apparently springing from the feelings of a patriot whose heart was ulcerated by the wrongs his country had sustained, was but a cloak for a miserable interested intrigue.

The Bishop of Oporto, a meddling ambitious priest, had early conceived the project of placing himself at the head of the insurrectional authorities, and transferring the seat of government from Lisbon to Oporto. He was aware that he should encounter great opposition, and he hoped that by inveigling the English general to countenance these pretensions, he might, with the aid of Freire's force and his own influence, succeed in the object of his wishes. With this view he wrote a letter to Sir Charles Cotton, dated the 4th of August, in which was enclosed (as the letter describes it) "The form of government with which they (the junta of Oporto) meant to govern Portugal when the city of Lisbon should be free from the French." This letter, together with its enclosure, being transmitted to Sir Arthur Wellesley, he placed them among other public documents in the hands of Sir Hew Dalrymple when the latter first landed at Maceira. In the document itself it was declared that "The body of government had taken the glorious resolution of restoring the Portuguese monarchy in all its extent, and of restoring the crown of Portugal to its lawful sovereign, Don Juan VI., their prince, who was actually living in his estates of Brazil;" but this "glorious resolution" was burthened with many forms and restrictions; and although the junta professed the intention of restoring a regency, they provided, "that if this new regency should be interrupted by a new invasion of the French (which God forbid!) or by *any other thing*, this government will immediately take the government on themselves, and exercise the authority and jurisdiction which it has done ever since its institution."

Thus prepared for some cabal, Sir Hew Dalrymple was at no loss for an answer to Freire's remonstrance. He observed, that if the government of Portugal had not been mentioned in the treaty, neither had that of England

nor that of France. The convention was purely military, and for the present concerned only the commanders in the field. With regard to the occupation of the fortresses, and the fact of the British army being an auxiliary force, the first was merely a measure of military precaution absolutely necessary, and the latter was in no way rendered doubtful by any act which had been committed; he (Sir Hew) was instructed by his government to assist in restoring the prince regent of Portugal to his lawful rights, without any secret or interested motives; finally, the Portuguese general had been invited to assist in the negotiations, and if he had not done so, the blame rested with himself. And to this Sir Hew might have justly added, that the conduct of Freire in withdrawing his troops at the most critical moment of the campaign, by no means entitled him to assume a high tone towards those whom he had so disgracefully deserted in the hour of danger.

The Portuguese general was silenced by this plain and decided answer; but the English general was quickly convinced that the bishop and his coadjutors, however incapable of conducting great affairs, were experienced plotters. In his first interview with Andrada, Sir Hew Dalrymple had taken occasion to observe, that "no government lawful" representing the prince regent actually existed in Portugal." In fact, a junta, calling itself independent, was likewise established in Algarvé, and the members of the regency legally invested by the prince with supreme authority were dispersed, and part of them in the power of the French. This observation, so adverse to the prelate's views, was transmitted to him by Freire, together with a copy of the armistice. The junta were well aware that a definite convention, differing materially from the armistice, was upon the point of being concluded, and that the refusal of Sir Charles Cotton to concur in the latter, had rendered it null and void; but preserving silence on that point, the bishop forwarded the copy of the armistice to the Chevalier Da Souza, Portuguese minister in London, accompanied by a letter filled with invectives and misrepresentations of its provisions. The chevalier placed this letter with its inclosures, in the hands of Mr. Canning, the English secretary of state for foreign affairs, and at the same time delivered to him an official note in which, adopting the style of the prelate and junta, he spoke of them as the representatives of his sovereign, and the possessors of the supreme power in Portugal.

But the efforts of the party were not confined to formal communications with the ministers; the daily press teemed with invectives against the English general's conduct, and ex-parte statements, founded on the provisions of an armistice that was never concluded, being thus palmed upon the public (always hasty in judging of such matters), a prejudice against the convention was raised before either the terms of, or the events which led to it, were known. For, Sir Hew, forgetting the ordinary forms of official intercourse, neglected to transmit information to his government until fifteen days after the commencement of the treaty, and the ministers, unable to contradict or explain any of Souza's assertions, were placed in a mortifying situation, by which their minds were irritated and disposed to take a prejudiced view of the real treaty. Meanwhile the bishop pretended to know nothing of the convention, hence the silence of Freire during the negotiations; but those once concluded, a clamour was, by the party, raised in Portugal, similar to that which they had already excited in England; and thus both nations appeared to be equally indignant at the conduct of the general, when, in fact, his proceedings were unknown to either.

It would appear that the bishop had other than Portuguese coadjutors. The Baron Von Decken, a Hanoverian officer, was appointed one of the military agents at Oporto: he was subject to Sir Hew Dalrymple's orders, but as his mission was of a detached nature, he was also to communicate directly with the secretary of state in England. Von Decken arrived at Oporto upon the 17th August, and the same evening, in concert with the bishop, concocted a project admirably adapted to forward the views of the latter; they agreed that the pre-

late was the fittest person to be at the head of the government, and that as he could not, or pretended that he could not, quit Oporto, the seat of government ought to be transferred to that city. But two obstacles to this arrangement were foreseen ; first, the prince regent at his departure had nominated a regency, and left full instructions for the filling up of vacancies arising from death or other causes ; secondly, the people of Lisbon and of the southern provinces would certainly resist any plan for changing the seat of government.* To obviate these difficulties, Von Decken wrote largely in commendation of the proposed arrangement, vilifying the conduct of the regency, and urging Sir Hew not only to give his sanction to the ambitious project, but to employ the British troops in controlling the people of Lisbon should they attempt to frustrate the bishop's plans. To conciliate the members of the regency, it was proposed to admit a portion of them into the new government, and Francisco Noronha, Francisco da Cunha, the Monteiro Mor, and the principal Castro, were named as being the only men who were faithful to their sovereign. Now the last had accepted the office of ministre des cultes under the French, and was consequently unfaithful ; but he was the brother of the bishop, Castro being legitimately born. Under the pretext of sparing the feelings of the people of Lisbon, it was further proposed to appoint a Portuguese commandant, subject to the British governor, but with a native force under his orders, to conduct all matters of police ; and the bishop took the occasion to recommend a particular general for that office. Finally, civil dissension and all its attendant evils were foretold as the consequences of rejecting this plan.

Sir Hew Dalrymple's answer was peremptory and decisive. He reprimanded General Von Decken, and at once put an end to the bishop's hopes of support from the English army.

This second offence, for Sir Hew's answer did not reach Oporto until after Freire's report had arrived there, completed the mortification of the bishop and the junta ; they set no bounds to their violence. Efforts were made to stimulate the populace of Lisbon to attack not only the French but the English, in the hope that the terrible scene which must have ensued would effectually prevent the re-establishment of the old regency, and at the same time render the transfer of the seat of government to Oporto an easy task. Hence the outrageous conduct of the Monteiro Mor and of the judge of the people, and the former's insolent letter calling upon Sir Charles Cotton to interrupt the execution of the convention.

The 3rd of September, Sir Hew Dalrymple received instructions from home relative to the formation of a new regency, which were completely at variance with the plan arranged between the bishop and General Von Decken, yet no difficulty attended the execution. Here, as in the case of Prince Leopold, we are arrested by the singularity of the transaction. Is it likely that General Von Decken should plunge into such a delicate and important affair in one hour after his arrival at Oporto, if he had not been secretly authorized by some member of the English cabinet ; and are we to seek for a clue to these mysteries in that shameful Machiavelian policy that soon afterwards forced Lord Castlereagh to defend his public measures by a duel ?

The usual fate of plans laid by men more cunning than wise, attended the Bishop of Oporto's projects ; he was successful for a moment in rendering the convention of Cintra odious to the Portuguese, but the great mass of the people soon acknowledged with gratitude the services rendered them by the English, and rejoiced at the fulfilment of a treaty that freed their country at once from the invaders ;† and well might they rejoice when they beheld above 25,000 bold and skilful soldiers reluctantly quitting the strongholds of the kingdom, and to the last maintaining the haughty air of an army unsubdued, and capable on the slightest provocation of resorting once more to the decision of battle.

The Portuguese people were contented ; but the Spanish General Galluzzo

* Appendix, No. 11.

† Appendix, No. 23.

appears to have favoured the views of the Oporto faction. Detachments of his troops, and Portuguese refugees (principally from the northern provinces), commanded by a Spaniard, were acting in conjunction with the insurgents of the Alemtejo. Many disputes arose between the two nations, as I have already related, and the Spaniards treated Portugal as a conquered country, they denied the authority of the Portuguese General Leite, who was not of the bishop's party; * they insulted him personally, seized his military chest at Campo Mayor, and in all things acted with the utmost violence and rapacity. Galluzzo himself was required by his own government to join the Spanish armies concentrating on the Ebro; but instead of obeying, he collected his forces near Elvas, and when he heard of the convention concluded at Lisbon, invested Fort Lalippe, and refused to permit the execution of the treaty relative to that impregnable fortress. Colonel Girod de Novillard commanded the French garrison, and profiting from its situation, had compelled the inhabitants of Elvas to shut their gates against the Spaniards, and to supply the fort daily with provisions. Galluzzo's proceedings were also manifestly absurd in a military point of view; his attacks were confined to a trifling bombardment of Lalippe from an immense distance, and the utmost damage sustained, or likely to be sustained by that fortress, was the knocking away the cornices and chimneys of the governor's house, every other part being protected by bomb-proofs of the finest masonry.

Through Lord Burghersh, who had been appointed to communicate with the Spanish troops in Portugal, Galluzzo was early in September officially informed of the articles of the convention, and also that the troops of his nation confined on board the hulks at Lisbon, were by that treaty released, and would be clothed and armed and sent to Catalonia. Upon the 5th of September, Sir Hew Dalrymple wrote to the Spaniard, repeating the substance of the first communication, and requesting that his detachments might be withdrawn from the Alemtejo where they were living at the expense of the people. Galluzzo took no notice of either communication; he pretended that he had opened his fire against Lalippe before the date of the convention; that no third party had a right to interfere, and that he would grant no terms to the garrison, nor permit any but Portuguese to enter the fort. At this very moment the Spanish armies on the Ebro were languishing for cavalry, which he alone possessed; and his efforts were so despised by Girod that the latter made no secret of his intention (if the fate of the French army at Lisbon should render such a step advisable), to blow up the works, and march openly through the midst of Galluzzo's troops.

Colonel Ross, with the 20th regiment, being appointed by Sir Hew to receive the fort from Colonel Girod, and to escort the garrison to Lisbon under the terms of the convention, sent a flag of truce to the French. Major Colborne, who carried it, was furnished with an autograph letter from Kellerman, and was received by Girod with civility; but the latter refused to surrender his post without more complete proof of the authenticity of the treaty; and with the view of acquiring that, he proposed that a French officer should proceed to Lisbon to verify the information; not that he affected to doubt the truth of Colborne's information, but that he would not surrender his charge while the slightest doubt, capable of being removed, was attached to the transaction; and so acting he did well, and like a good soldier.

General Dearey, who commanded the investing force, was persuaded to grant a truce for six days, to give time for the journey of the officers appointed to go to Lisbon; but on their return it was not without great difficulty and delay that they were permitted to communicate with Colonel Girod, and no argument could prevail upon the obstinate Galluzzo to relinquish the siege. After a warm intercourse of letters, Sir Hew Dalrymple was forced to order Sir John Hope to advance to Estremos with a considerable body of troops, for the purpose of giving weight to his remonstrances, or, if pushed to extremity, of forcing the

Spaniard to desist from his unwarrantable pretensions.* It must be observed that Galluzzo was not only putting aside the convention by which he profited himself, but also violating the independence of the Portuguese who desired his absence from their territory; and he was likewise setting at naught the authority of his own government, for the army of Estremadura pretended to act under the orders of the junta of Seville: and Laguna, an accredited agent of that junta, was at this moment receiving from Sir Hew Dalrymple the Spanish prisoners liberated by the effect of the convention, together with money, arms, etc., to prepare them for immediate service in Catalonia, whither they were also to be transported in British vessels. One more effort was however made to persuade this intractable man to submit to reason, before recourse was had to violent measures which must have produced infinite evil. Colonel Graham repaired upon the 25th of September to Badajos, and his arguments being backed up by the near approach of the powerful division under Hope, were successful, and this troublesome affair ended in an amicable manner.

Colonel Girod evacuated the forts, and his garrison proceeded to Lisbon, attended by the 52nd regiment as an escort. The rival troops agreed very well together, striving to out-do each other by the vigour and the military order of their marches; but the Swiss and French soldiers did not accord, and many of the latter wished to desert. At Lisbon the whole were immediately embarked; but the transports being detained for some time in the river, Major de Bosset, an officer of the Chasseurs Britanniques, contrived to persuade near 1000 of the men to desert, who were afterwards received into the British service. Girod de Novillard complained of this as a breach of the convention, and it must be confessed that it was an equivocal act, yet one common to all armies, and if done simply by persuasion, very excusable.

The garrison of Almeida surrendered that fortress without any delay, and being marched to Oporto, were proceeding to embark, when the populace rose and would have slain them if great exertions had not been made by the British officers to prevent such a disgraceful breach of faith. The escort was weak, but resolute to sustain the honour of their nation, by firing upon the multitude if the circumstances became desperate. Nevertheless several of the French soldiers were assassinated, and in spite of every effort the baggage was landed, and the whole plundered; the excuse being that church plate was to be found amongst it, an accusation easily made, difficult to be disproved to the satisfaction of a violent mob, and likely enough to be true.

This tumult gives scope for a reflection upon the facility with which men adapt themselves to circumstances, and regulate their most furious passions, by the scale of self interest. In Oporto, the suffering, in consequence of the invasion, was trifling compared to the misery endured in Lisbon; yet the inhabitants of the former were much more outrageous in their anger. In Lisbon, the very persons who had inflicted the worst evils upon the people were daily exposed, more or less, to violence, yet suffered none; while in Oporto it was with extreme difficulty that men, until that moment unseen of the multitude, were rescued from their frantic revenge. In both cases fear regulated the degree of hatred shown, and we may conclude from hence, that national insurrections however spontaneous and vehement, if the result of hatred only, will never successfully resist an organized force, unless the mechanical courage of discipline be grafted upon the first enthusiasm.

While the vexatious correspondence with Galluzzo was going on, Sir Hew Dalrymple renewed his intercourse with Castaños, and prepared to prosecute the war in Spain. The Spanish prisoners, about 4000 in number, were sent to Catalonia; and the British army was cantoned principally in the Alemtejo along the road to Badajos, but some officers were despatched to examine the roads through Beira with a view to a movement on that line; and General Anstruther was directed to repair to the fortress of Almeida, for the purpose of regulating

* Appendix, No. 12.

everything which might concern the passage of the army, if it should be found necessary to enter Spain by that route. Lord William Bentinck was also despatched to Madrid, having instructions to communicate with the Spanish generals and with the central junta, and to arrange with them the best line of march, the mode of providing magazines, and the plan of campaign. But in the midst of these affairs, and before the garrison of Elvas arrived at Lisbon, Sir Hew Dalrymple was called home to answer for his conduct relative to the convention. The command then devolved upon Sir Harry Burrard, but after holding it for a few days he also returned to England, there to abide the fury of the most outrageous and disgraceful public clamour that was ever excited by the falsehoods of base and venal political writers.

The editors of the daily press, adopting all the misrepresentations of the Portuguese minister, and concluding that the silence of government was the consequence of its dissatisfaction at the convention, broke forth with such a torrent of rabid malevolence, that all feelings of right and justice were overborne, and the voice of truth stifled by their obstreperous cry. Many of the public papers were printed with mourning lines around the text which related to Portuguese affairs; all called for punishment, and some even talked of death to the guilty, before it was possible to know if any crime had been committed; the infamy of the convention was the universal subject of conversation, a general madness seemed to have seized all classes, and, like the Athenians after the sea fight of Arginusæ, the English people if their laws would have permitted the exploit, were ready to condemn their generals to death for having gained a victory!

A court of inquiry was assembled at Chelsea to inquire into the transactions relating to the armistice and the definite convention. Sir Arthur Wellesley, Sir Harry Burrard, Sir Hew Dalrymple, and the principal generals engaged at Vimiero, were called before it. A minute investigation of all the circumstances took place, and a detailed report was made by the board; at the end of which, it was stated that no further judicial measures seemed to be called for. This report was not satisfactory to the government, and the members of the court were required to state individually whether they approved or disapproved of the armistice and convention. It then appeared that four approved, and three disapproved, of the convention. Among the latter the Earl of Moria distinguished himself by a laboured criticism, which, however, left the pith of the question entirely untouched. The proceedings of the board were dispassionate and impartial, but the report was not luminous; a circumstance to be regretted, because the rank and reputation of the members were sufficiently great to secure them from the revenge of party, and no set of men were ever more favourably placed for giving a severe and just rebuke to popular injustice.

Thus ended the last act of the celebrated convention of Cintra, the very name of which will always be a signal record of the ignorant and ridiculous vehemence of the public feeling; for the armistice, the negotiations, the convention itself, and the execution of its provisions, were all commenced, conducted, and concluded, at the distance of thirty miles from Cintra, with which place they had not the slightest connection, political, military, or local!*

OBSERVATIONS.—RORIÇA.

i. General Thiebault says, that the scattered state of the French army, in the beginning of August, rendered its situation desperate; but that the slowness of Sir Arthur Wellesley saved it. Others again have accused the latter of rashness and temerity. Neither of these censures appears to be well founded. It is true that Junot's army was disseminated; but to beat an army in detail, a general must be perfectly acquainted with the country he is to act in, well

* Yet Lord Byron has gravely asserted in prose and verse that the convention was signed at the Marquis of Marialva's house at Cintra; and the author of "The Diary of an Invalid," improving upon the poet's discovery, detected the stains of the ink spilt by Junot upon the occasion.

informed of his adversary's movements, and rapid in his own. Now rapidity in war depends as much upon the experience of the troops as upon the energy of the chief; and the English army was raw, the staff and commissariat mere novices, the artillery scantily and badly horsed, few baggage or draft animals were to be obtained in the country, and there were only 180 cavalry mounted. Such impediments are not to be removed in a moment, and therein lies the difference betwixt theory and practice, between criticism and execution.

2. To disembark the army without waiting for the reinforcements was a bold but not a rash measure. Sir Arthur Wellesley knew that the French troops were very much scattered, although he was not aware of the exact situation of each division, and from the Bishop of Oporto's promises, he had reason to expect good assistance from the Portuguese, who would have been discouraged if he had not landed at once. Weighing these circumstances, he was justified in disembarking his troops, and the event proved that he was right, for he had full time to prepare his army, his marches were methodical, and he was superior in numbers to his enemy in each battle. His plans were characterized by a due mixture of enterprise and caution well adapted to his own force, and yet capable of being enlarged without inconvenience when the reinforcement should arrive.

3. In the action of Rorica there was a great deal to admire, and some grounds for animadversion. The movement against Laborde's first position was well conceived and executed: but the subsequent attack against the heights of Zambugeira was undoubtedly faulty. The march of Ferguson's and Trant's divisions would have dislodged Laborde from that strong ridge without any attack on the front. It is said that such was Sir Arthur's project: but that some mistake in the orders caused General Ferguson to alter the direction of his march from the flank to the centre; this if true, does not excuse the error; because the commander-in-chief being present at the attack in front, might have restrained it until Ferguson had recovered the right direction. It is more probable that Sir Arthur did not expect any very vigorous resistance, and wishing to press the French in their retreat pushed on the action too fast, and Laborde, who was unquestionably no ordinary general, made the most of both time and circumstances.

4. Towards the close of the day when the French had decidedly taken to the mountains, the line of Loison's march was in the power of the English general. If he had sent 2000 men in pursuit of Laborde, left 1000 to protect the field of battle, and with the remaining 10,000 marched against Loison, whose advanced guard could not have been far off; it is probable that the latter would have been surprised and totally defeated, and at all events he could only have saved himself by a hasty retreat, which would have broken Junot's combinations and scattered his army in all directions.

5. Sir Arthur Wellesley marched to Lourinham to cover the immediate disembarkation of his reinforcements and stores, and this was prudent, because a south-west wind would in one night have sent half the fleet on shore in a surf unequalled for fury; and such was the difficulty of a disembarkation, that a detachment from the garrison of Peniche would have sufficed to frustrate it. The existence of a French reserve estimated by report at 4000 men, was known; but its situation was unknown, and it might have been on the coast line; hence great danger to Anstruther if he attempted a landing without being covered, greater still if he remained at sea. The reasons then for the march to Lourinham were cogent, and perhaps outweighed the advantages of attacking Loison; but it seems to have been an error not to have occupied Torres Vedras on the 18th; as the disembarkation of Anstruther's force would have been equally secured, while the junction of the French army, and the consequent battle of Vimiero would have been prevented.

6. It is an agreeable task to render a just tribute of applause to the conduct of a gallant although unsuccessful enemy; and there is no danger of incurring

the imputation of ostentatious liberality in asserting that Laborde's operations were exquisite specimens of the art of war. The free and confident manner in which he felt for his enemy, the occupation of Brilos, Obidos, and Rorica in succession, by which he delayed the final moment of battle, and gained time for Loison; the judgment and nice calculation with which he maintained the position of Rorica, and the obstinacy with which he defended the heights of Zambugeira, were all proofs of a consummate knowledge of war and a facility of command rarely attained.

7. Sir Arthur Wellesley estimated Laborde's numbers at 6000 men, and his estimation was corroborated by the information gained from a wounded French officer during the action. It is possible that at Alcobaça they might have been so many, but I have thought it safer to rate them at 5000, for the following reasons: first, it is at all times very difficult to judge of an enemy's force by the eye, and it is nearly impossible to do so correctly when he is skilfully posted, and, as in the present case, desirous of appearing stronger than he really was; secondly, the 600 men sent on the 14th to Peniché, and three companies employed on the 16th and 17th to keep open the communication with Loison by Bombaral, Cadaval, and Segura must be deducted; thirdly, Laborde himself after the convention, positively denied that he had so many as 6000. General Thiebault, indeed, says, that only 1900 were present under arms; but this assertion is certainly inaccurate, and very injurious to the credit of General Laborde, because it casts ridicule upon a really glorious deed of arms. It is surprising that a well-informed and able writer should disfigure an excellent work by such trifling.

VIMIERO.

1. The battle of Vimiero was merely a short combat, but it led to important results because Junot was unable to comprehend the advantages of his situation. Profitable lessons may, however, be drawn from every occurrence in war, and Vimiero is not deficient in good subjects for military speculation.

2. To many officers the position of the British appeared weak from its extent, and dangerous from its proximity to the sea, into which the army must have been driven if defeated. The last objection is well founded, and suggests the reflection that it is unsafe to neglect the principles of the art even for a moment. The ground having been occupied merely as a temporary post, without any view to fighting a battle, the line of retreat by Lourinham was for the sake of a trifling convenience left uncovered a few hours. The accidental arrival of Sir Harry Burrard arrested the advanced movement projected by Sir Arthur Wellesley for the 21st, and in the mean time Junot took the lead, and had he been successful upon the left, there would have been no retreat for the British army.

3. The extent of the position at Vimiero, although considerable to a small army, was no cause of weakness, because the line of communication from the right to the left was much shorter and much easier for the British defence than it was for the French attack, and the centre was very strong and perfectly covered the movement of the right wing. Sir Arthur, when he placed the bulk of the combatants in that quarter, did all that was possible to remedy the only real defect in his position, that of having no line of retreat.

4. The project of seizing Torres Vedras and Mafra at the close of the battle, was one of those prompt daring conceptions that distinguish great generals, and it is absurd to blame Sir Harry Burrard for not adopting it. Men are not gifted alike, and even if the latter had not been confirmed in his view of the matter by the advice of his staff, there was in the actual situation of affairs ample scope for doubt; the facility of executing Sir Arthur's plan was not so apparent on the field of battle as it may be in the closet. The French cavalry was numerous, unharmed, and full of spirit. Upon the distant heights behind Junot's army, a fresh body of infantry had been discovered by General Spencer, and the nature of the country prevented any accurate judgment of its strength

being formed. The gun carriages of the British army were very much shaken, and they were so badly and so scantily horsed, that doubts were entertained if they could keep up with the infantry in a long march. The commissariat was in great confusion, and the natives, as we have seen, were flying with the country transport. The Portuguese troops gave no promise of utility, and the English cavalry was destroyed. To overcome obstacles in the pursuit of a great object is the proof of a lofty genius; but the single fact that a man of Sir George Murray's acknowledged abilities was opposed to the attempt, at once exonerates Sir Harry Burrard's conduct from censure, and places the vigour of Sir Arthur Wellesley's in the strongest light. It was doubtless ill-judged of the former (aware as he was of the ephemeral nature of his command) to interfere at all with the dispositions of a general who was in the full career of victory, and whose superior talents and experience were well known; but it excites indignation to find a brave and honourable veteran borne to the earth as a criminal, and assailed by the most puerile shallow writers, merely because his mind was not of the highest class. Sir Arthur Wellesley himself was the first to declare before the court of inquiry that Sir Harry Burrard had decided upon fair military reasons.

GENERAL PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN.

1. Although double lines of operation are generally disadvantageous and opposed to sound principles, the expediency of landing Sir John Moore's troops at the mouth of the Mondego, and pushing them forward to Santarem, was unquestionable, and unless the probable consequences of such a movement are taken into consideration, Sir Arthur Wellesley's foresight cannot be justly appreciated.

Lisbon, situated near the end of the tongue of land lying between the sea-coast and the Tagus, is defended to the northward by vast mountains, that rising in successive and nearly parallel ranges, end abruptly in a line extending from Torres Vedras to Alhandra on the Tagus. As these ridges can only be passed at certain points by an army, the intersections of the different roads form so many strong positions.

The great mass of the Monte Junto appears to lead perpendicularly on to the centre of the first ridge; but stopping short at a few miles distance, sends a rugged shoot called the Sierra de Barragueda in a slanting direction towards Torres Vedras, from which it is only divided by a deep defile.

From this conformation it results, that an army marching from the Mondego to Lisbon, must either pass behind the Monte Junto, and follow the line of the Tagus, or keeping the western side of that mountain, come upon the position of Torres Vedras.

If Sir Arthur Wellesley had adopted the first line of operations, his subsistence must have been drawn by convoys from the Mondego, the enemy's numerous cavalry would have cut his communications, and in that state he would have had to retreat, or to force the positions of Alhandra, Alverca, and finally the heights of Bellas, a strong position the right flank of which was covered by the creek of Saccavem, and the left flank by the impassable Sierra dos Infernos. On the other line Torres Vedras was to be carried, and then Mafra or Montechique, following the direction of Junot's retreat. If Mafra was forced (and neither it nor Montechique could be turned), a line of march, by Cassim and Queles, upon Lisbon would have been opened to the victors; but that route, besides being longer than the road through Montechique and Louras, would, while it led the English army equally away from the fleet, have entangled it among the fortresses of Ereceira, Sant Antonio, Cascaes, St. Julians, and Belem. Again, supposing the position of Montechique to be stormed, the heights of Bellas offered a third line of defence, and lastly, the citadel and forts of Lisbon itself would have sufficed to cover the passage of the river, and a retreat upon Elvas would have been secure.


Thus it is certain, that difficulties of the most serious nature awaited the English army while acting on a single line of operations; and the double

line proposed by Sir Arthur was strictly scientific. For if Sir John Moore, disembarking at the Mondego, had marched first to Santarem and then to Saccavem, he would have turned the positions of Torres Vedras and Montechique, and then Sir Arthur on the other side would have turned the heights of Bellas by the road of Quelus. Junot's central situation could not in this case have availed him, because the distance between the British corps would be more than a day's march, and their near approach to Lisbon would have caused an insurrection of the populace. The Duke of Abrantes must either have abandoned that capital and fallen vigorously upon Sir John Moore, with a view to overwhelm him and gain Almeida or Elvas, or he must have concentrated his forces, and been prepared to cross the Tagus if he lost a battle in front of Lisbon. In the first case, the strength of the country afforded Moore every facility for a successful resistance, and Sir Arthur's corps would have quickly arrived upon the rear of the French. In the second case, Junot would have had to fight superior numbers, with an inveterate populace in his rear, and if, fearing the result of such an encounter he had crossed the Tagus, and pushed for Elvas, Sir John Moore's division could likewise have crossed the river, and harassed the French in their retreat.

2. The above reasoning being correct, it follows, that to re-embark Sir John Moore's army after it had landed at the Mondego, and to bring it down to Maceira Bay, was an error which (no convention intervening) might have proved fatal to the success of the campaign. This error was rendered more important by the danger incurred from the passage; for, as the transports were not seaworthy, the greatest part would have perished had a gale of wind come on from the south-west.

3. Sir Arthur Wellesley's project of seizing Mafra by a rapid march on the morning of the 21st, was exceedingly bold; its successful execution would have obliged Junot to make a hurried retreat by Enxara dos Cavalleiros to Montechique, at the risk of being attacked in flank during his march; or if he had moved by the longer route of Ruña and Sobral, it is scarcely to be doubted that the British army would have reached Lisbon before the French. But was it possible so to deceive an enemy inured to warfare, as to gain ten miles in a march of sixteen? was it possible to evade the vigilance of an experienced general, who, being posted only nine miles off, possessed a formidable cavalry, the efforts of which could neither be checked nor interrupted by the small escort of horse in the British camp? was it in fine possible, to avoid a defeat during a flank march along a road crossed and interrupted by a river and several deep gullies, which formed the beds of mountain torrents? These are questions which naturally occur to every military man. The sticklers for a rigid adherence to system would probably decide in the negative. Sir Arthur Wellesley was, however, not only prepared to try at the time, but he afterwards deliberately affirmed that, under certain circumstances of ground an operation of that kind would succeed; and to investigate such questions is the best study for an officer.

4. A night march is the most obvious mode of effecting such an enterprise, but not always the best in circumstances where expedition is required; and great generals have usually preferred the day-time, trusting to their own skill in deceiving the enemy while their army made a forced march to gain the object in view. Thus, Turenne at Landsberg was successful against the Archduke Leopold in broad daylight, and Cæsar in a more remarkable manner overreached Afranius and Petrius near Lerida. Nor were the circumstances at Vimiero unfavourable to Sir Arthur Wellesley. He might have pushed a select corps of light troops, his cavalry, the marines of the fleet, the Portuguese auxiliaries, and a few field pieces, to the entrance of the defile of Torres Vedras before daybreak, with orders to engage the French outposts briskly, and to make demonstrations as for a general attack. There is no doubt that such a movement if skilfully conducted, would have completely occupied the enemy's



Exploratory Sketch
 (of the)
CAMPAIGN IN PORTUGAL.
in August 1808
 Scale 1:100,000
 ————— British route
 - - - - - Laborde D°
 Loison D°
 x x x x x Route of the Reserve

attention, while the main body of the army marching in great coats, and hiding the glitter of their arms, might have profited from the woods and hollows through which the by-road to Mafra led, and gained such a start as would have insured the success of the enterprise.

Let us, however, take a view of the other side ; let us suppose that Junot, instructed by his spies and patrols, or divining the intention of the British general, held the masking division in check with a small force, and carrying the remainder of his army by the Puente de Roll or some other cross road (and there were several) against the flank of the English, had fallen upon the latter while in march, hemmed in as they would be between the sea and the mountains, and entangled among hollows and torrents. What then would have been the result ? History answers, by pointing to Condé and the battle of Senef. It must, however, be confessed that it could be no ordinary general that conceived such a project, and, notwithstanding the small numbers of the opposing armies, success would have ranked Sir Arthur high among the eminent commanders of the world, if he had never performed any other exploit. "The statue of Hercules, cast by Lysippus, although only a foot high, expressed," says Pliny, "the muscles and bones of the hero more grandly than the colossal figures of other artists."

5. So many circumstances combine to sway the judgment of an officer in the field which do not afterwards appear of weight, that caution should always be the motto of those who censure the conduct of an unfortunate commander ; nevertheless, the Duke of Abrantes' faults during this campaign were too glaring to be mistaken. He lingered too long at Lisbon ; he was undecided in his plans ; he divided his army unnecessarily ; and he discovered no skill on the field of battle. The English army having landed, affairs were brought to a crisis, and Junot had only two points to consider : could the French forces under his command defend Portugal without assistance ? and, if not, how were its operations to be made most available for furthering Napoleon's general plans against the Peninsula ? The first point could not be ascertained until a battle with Sir Arthur had been tried. The second evidently required that Junot should keep his army concentrated, preserve the power of retreating into Spain, and endeavour to engage the British troops in the sieges of Elvas and Almeida. If the two plans had been incompatible, the last was certainly preferable to the chance of battle in a country universally hostile. But the two plans were not incompatible.

6. The pivot of Junot's movements was Lisbon ; he had therefore to consider how he might best fall upon and overthrow the English army, without resigning the capital to the Portuguese insurgents during the operation. He could not hope to accomplish the first effectually without using the great mass of his forces, nor to avoid the last except by skilful management, and the utmost rapidity. Now the citadel and forts about Lisbon were sufficiently strong to enable a small part of the French army to control the populace, and to resist the insurgents of the Alemtejo for a few days. The Russian admiral, although not hostile to the Portuguese, or favourable to the French, was forced by his fear of the English, to preserve a guarded attitude, and in point of fact, did materially contribute to awe the multitude, who could not but look upon him as an enemy. The Portuguese ships of war which had been fitted out by Junot, were floating fortresses requiring scarcely any garrisons, and yet efficient instruments to control the city, without ceasing to be receptacles for the Spanish prisoners, and safe depôts for powder and arms which might otherwise have fallen into the power of the populace. Wherefore, instead of delaying so long in the capital, instead of troubling himself about the assemblage of Alcacer do Sal, instead of detaching Laborde with a weak division to cover the march of Loison ; Junot should have taken the most vigorous resolutions in respect to Lisbon the moment he heard of the English descent. He should have abandoned the left bank of the Tagus, with the

would have united with Junot ; or if he had fallen back upon Almeida, they could have retired upon Elvas and La-Lyppe. In this argument the Russians have not been considered, but whatever his secret wishes might have been, Siniavin must have joined the French or surrendered his squadron in a disgraceful manner. This would have increased Junot's force by 6000 men ; and it may here be observed, that even after the arrival of Sir John Moore, only 25,000 British infantry were fit for duty.*

Let it be supposed that the forts were taken, the English fleet in the river, the resources of Lisbon organized, and the battering guns and ammunition necessary for the siege of Elvas transported to Abrantes by water. Seventy miles of land remained to traverse, and then three months of arduous operations in the sickly season, and in the most pestilent of situations, would have been the certain consequences of any attempt to reduce that fortress. Did the difficulty end there? No ! Almeida remained, and in the then state of the roads of Portugal, and taking into consideration only the certain and foreseen obstacles, it is not too much to say, that six months more would have been wasted before the country could be entirely freed from the invaders. But long before that period Napoleon's eagles would have soared over Lisbon again. The conclusion is inevitable ; the convention was a great and solid advantage for the allies, a blunder on the part of the French.

With the momentary exception of Junot's threat to burn Lisbon if his terms were not complied with, we look in vain for any traces of that vigour which urged the march from Alcantara ; we are astonished to perceive the man, who, in the teeth of an English fleet, in contempt of 14,000 Portuguese troops, and regardless of a population of 300,000 souls, dared, with a few hundred tired grenadiers, to seize upon Lisbon, so changed in half a year, so sunk in energy, that, with 25,000 good soldiers, he declined a manly effort, and resorted to a convention to save an army which was really in very little danger. But such and so variable is the human mind, the momentary slave of every attraction, yet ultimately true to self-interest. When Junot entered Portugal, power, honours, fame, emolument, nay, even a throne, was within his reach, and toil and danger was overlooked in such gorgeous society ; but when he proposed the convention he was only with the latter companions ; fame flitted at a distance, and he easily persuaded himself that prudence and vigour could not be yoked together. A saying attributed to Napoleon perfectly describes the convention in a few words. "I was going to send Junot before a council of war, but, fortunately, the English tried their generals, and saved me the pain of punishing an old friend !"

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

THE convention of Cintra being followed by the establishment of a regency at Lisbon, the plans of the bishop and junta of Oporto were disconcerted, and Portugal was restored to a state of comparative tranquillity ; for the Portuguese people being of a simple character, when they found their country relieved from the presence of a French army, readily acknowledged the benefit derived from the convention, and refused to listen to the pernicious counsels of the factious prelate and his mischievous coadjutors.

Thus terminated what may be called the convulsive struggle of the Peninsular war. Up to that period a remarkable similarity of feeling and mode of

* Appendix, No. 22.

acting betrayed the common origin of the Spanish and Portuguese people. A wild impatience of foreign aggression, extravagant pride, vain boasting, and a passionate reckless resentment, were common to both nations; but there the likeness ceased, and the finer marks of national character which had been impressed upon them by their different positions in the political world, became distinctly visible.

Spain, holding from time immemorial a high rank among the great powers, and more often an oppressor than oppressed, haughtily rejected all advice. Unconscious of her actual weakness and ignorance, and remembering only her former dignity, she ridiculously assumed an attitude which would scarcely have suited her in the days of Charles V.; while Portugal, always fearing the ambition of a powerful neighbour, and relying for safety as much upon her alliances as upon her own intrinsic strength, was from habit inclined to prudent calculation, and readily submitted to the direction of England. The turbulence of the first led to defeat and disaster; the docility and patience of the second were productive of the most beneficial results.

The difference between these nations was, however, not immediately perceptible, and at the period of the convention the Portuguese were despised, while a splendid triumph was anticipated for the Spaniards. It was affirmed and believed, that from every quarter enthusiastic multitudes of the latter were pressing forward to complete the destruction of a baffled and dispirited enemy; the vigour, the courage, the unmatched spring of Spanish patriotism, was in every man's mouth, and Napoleon's power and energy seemed weak in opposition. Few persons doubted the truth of such tales, and yet nothing could be more unsound, more eminently fallacious, than the generally-entertained opinion of French weakness and of Spanish strength. The resources of the former were unbounded, almost untouched; those of the latter were too slender even to support the weight of victory. In Spain, the whole structure of society was shaken to pieces by the violence of an effort which merely awakened the slumbering strength of France: foresight, promptitude, arrangement, marked the proceedings of Napoleon; but with the Spaniards the counsels of prudence were punished as treason; and personal interests, everywhere springing up with incredible force, wrestled against the public good. At a distance, the insurrection appeared of towering proportions and mighty strength; but in truth it was a fantastic object, stained with blood, and tottering from weakness, and the helping hand of England alone was stretched forth for its support; all other assistance was denied, for the continental powers, although nourishing secret hopes of profit from the struggle, with calculating policy, turned coldly from the patriot's cause. The English cabinet was indeed sanguine, and resolute to act; but the ministers, while anticipating success in a preposterous manner, displayed little industry and less judgment in their preparations for the struggle; nor does it appear that the real freedom of the Peninsula was much considered in their councils. They contemplated this astonishing insurrection as a mere military opening through which Napoleon might be assailed, and they neglected, or rather feared, to look towards the great moral consequences of such a stupendous event, consequences which were in truth above their reach of policy. They were neither able nor willing to seize such a singularly propitious occasion for conferring a benefit upon mankind.

It is however certain, that this opportunity for restoring the civil strength of a long degraded people, by a direct recurrence to first principles, was such as had seldom been granted to a sinking nation. Enthusiasm was aroused without the withering curse of faction; and the multitude were ready to follow whoever chose to lead. The weight of ancient authority was, by a violent external shock, thrown off. The ruling power fell from the hands of the few, and was caught by the many, without the latter having thereby incurred the odium of rebellion, or excited the malice of mortified grandeur. There was nothing to deter the cautious, for there was nothing to pull down. The foundation of the

social structure was laid bare, and all the materials were at hand for building a rare and noble monument of human genius and virtue. The architect alone was wanting. No anxiety to ameliorate the moral or physical condition of the people in the Peninsula was evinced by the ruling men of England, and if any existed amongst those of Spain, it evaporated in puerile abstract speculations. Napoleon indeed offered the blessing of regeneration in exchange for submission, but in that revolting form accompanied by the evils of war, it was rejected; and amidst the clamorous pursuit of national independence, the independence of man was trampled under foot. The mass of the Spanish nation, blinded by personal hatred, thought only of revenge. The leaders, arrogant and incapable, neither sought nor wished for any higher motive of action: without unity of design, devoid of arrangement, their policy was mean and personal, their military efforts were abortive, and a rude unscientific warfare disclosed at once the barbarous violence of Spanish character, and the utter decay of Spanish institutions.

After Joseph's retreat from Madrid, the insurrection of Spain may be said to have ceased; from that period it became a war between France and the Peninsula; the fate of the latter was intrusted to organized bodies of men, and as the first excitement subsided, and danger seemed to recede, all the meaner passions resumed their empire; but the transactions of that memorable period which intervened between the battles of Baylen and Coruña were exceedingly confused, and the history of them must necessarily partake somewhat of that confusion.

The establishment of a central supreme junta, the caprices of the Spanish generals, and their interminable disputes, the proceedings of the French army before the arrival of the emperor, the operations of the grand army after his arrival, and the campaign of the British auxiliary force, form so many distinct actions, connected it is true by one great catastrophe, yet each attended by a number of minor circumstances of no great historical importance taken separately, but when combined, showing the extent and complicated nature of the disease which destroyed the energy of Spain.

For the advantage of clearness therefore, it will be necessary to sacrifice chronological order; and as frequent reference must be made to the proceedings of a class of men whose interference had a decided, and in many cases a very disastrous, influence upon the affairs of that period, I shall first give a brief account of the English agents, under which denomination both civil and military men were employed, but the distinction was rather nominal than real; for, generally speaking, each person assumed the right of acting in both capacities.

The envoy, Mr. Charles Stuart, was the chief of the civil agents; the persons subordinate to him were, Mr. Hunter, Mr. Duff, and others, consuls and vice-consuls.

Mr. Stuart sailed with Sir A. Wellesley, and was left at Coruña when that officer touched there, previous to the operations in Portugal.

Mr. Hunter was stationed at Gihon in the Asturias.

Mr. Duff proceeded to Cadiz, and the others in like manner were employed at different ports. They were all empowered to distribute money, arms, and succours of clothing and ammunition: but the want of system and forethought in the cabinet was palpable from the injudicious zeal of the inferior agents, each of whom conceived himself competent to direct the whole of the political and military transactions. Mr. Stuart was even put to some trouble in establishing his right to control their proceedings.

The military agents were of two classes: those sent from England by the government, and those employed by the generals abroad.

Sir Thomas Dyer, assisted by Major Roche and Captain Patrick, proceeded to the Asturias. The last officer remained at Oviedo, near the junta of that province. Major Roche was sent to the head-quarters of Cuesta, and Sir Thomas Dyer after collecting some information, returned to England.

Colonel Charles Doyle having organized the Spanish prisoners at Portsmouth, sailed with them to Coruña. He was accompanied by Captain Carroll and Captain Kennedy. During the passage a singular instance of turbulent impatience occurred: the prisoners, who had been released, armed, and clothed by England, and who had been as enthusiastic in their expressions of patriotism as the most sanguine could desire, mutinied, seized the transports, carried them into different ports in the Peninsula, disembarked, and proceeded each to his own home.

Colonel Browne was despatched to Oporto, and a Major Green to Catalonia. Those employed by the generals commanding armies were Captain Whittingham, who was placed by Sir Hew Dalrymple, near General Castaños, on the first appearance of the insurrection. He accompanied the head-quarters of the Andalusian army until the battle of Tudela put an end to his functions. Major Cox (appointed also by Sir Hew Dalrymple) remained near the junta of Seville. The talents and prudent conduct of this officer were of great service. It would have been fortunate if all the persons employed as agents had acted with as much judgment and discretion. All the above-named gentlemen were in full activity previous to the commencement of the campaign in Portugal.

When the convention of Cintra opened a way for operations in Spain, Sir Hew Dalrymple sent Lord William Bentinck to Madrid, that he might arrange a plan of co-operation with the Spanish generals, and transmit exact intelligence of the state of affairs. Such a mission was become indispensable. Up to the period of Lord William's arrival in Madrid, the military intelligence received was very unsatisfactory. The letter from the armies contained abundance of commonplace expressions relative to the enthusiasm and patriotism visible in Spain. Vast plans were said to be under consideration, some in progress of execution, and complete success was confidently predicted; but, by some fatality, every project proved abortive or disastrous, without lowering the confidence of the prognosticators, or checking the mania for grand operations, which seemed to be the disease of the moment.

The English minister confirmed the appointment of Lord William Bentinck, and at the same time re-organized the system of the military agents; by marking out certain districts and appointing a general officer to superintend each. Thus, Major-General Broderick was sent to Galicia. Major-General Leith, with a large staff, proceeded to the Asturias. Major-General Sontag went to Portugal. The scope of General Leith's mission was wide; Biscay, Castile, Leon, and even Catalonia were placed under his superintendence, and he appears to have had instructions to prepare the way for the disembarkation of an English army on the coast of Biscay. At the same time Sir Robert Wilson was furnished with arms, ammunition, and clothing for organizing 3000 or 4000 men levied by the Bishop of Oporto. He took with him a large regimental staff, and a number of Portuguese refugees, and succeeded in forming a partizan corps, afterwards known by the title of the Lusitanian legion.

Brigadier-General Decken, a German, having been first destined for Spain, was countermanded at sea, and directed to Oporto, where he arrived on the 17th of August, and immediately commenced that curious intrigue which has been already mentioned in the campaign of Vimiero.

When Sir John Moore assumed the command of the army, he sent Colonel Graham to reside at the Spanish head-quarters on the Ebro, and directed Lord William Bentinck to remain at Madrid to forward the arrangements for commencing the campaign. Lord William found in Mr. Stuart an able coadjutor. and in the letters of these two gentlemen, and the correspondence of Major Coxe, then at Seville, is to be found the history of the evils which at this period afflicted unhappy Spain, and ruined her noble cause.

The power of distributing supplies, and the independent nature of their appointments, gave to those military agents immediately employed by the minister an extraordinary influence, and it was very injudiciously exercised.

They forgot the real objects of their mission, and in many cases took a leading part in affairs with which it was not politic in them to have meddled at all.

Colonel Doyle having left Captain Kennedy at Coruña, and placed Captain Carrol at the head-quarters of Blake's army, repaired in person to Madrid, where he was received with marked attention, and obtained the rank of a general officer in the Spanish service for himself, and that of Lieutenant-Colonel for Captains Carrol and Kennedy. From Colonel Doyle's letters it appears that he had a large share in conducting many important measures, such as the arrangement of a general plan of operations, and the formation of a central and supreme government. He seems to have attached himself principally to the Duke of Infantado, a young man of moderate capacity, but with a strong predilection for those petty intrigues which constituted the policy of the Spanish court. Captain Whittingham gained the confidence of General Castaños to such a degree that he was employed by him to inspect the different Spanish corps on the Ebro early in September, and to report upon their state of efficiency previous to entering upon the execution of the plan laid down for the campaign. Notwithstanding the favourable position in which these officers stood, it does not appear that either of them obtained any clear idea of the relative strength of the contending forces, and their opinions, invariably and even extravagantly sanguine, were never borne out by the result.

The Spaniards were not slow to perceive the advantages of encouraging the vanity of inexperienced men who had the control of enormous supplies; but while all outward demonstrations of respect and confidence were by them lavished upon subordinate functionaries, and especially upon those who had accepted of rank in their service, the most strenuous exertions of Lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart were insufficient to procure the adoption of a single beneficial measure, or even to establish the ordinary intercourse of official business.*

The leading Spaniards wished to obtain a medium through which to create a false impression of the state of affairs, and thus to secure supplies and succours from England without being fettered in the application of them. The subordinate agents answered this purpose, and satisfied with their docility, the generals were far from encouraging the residence of more than one British agent at their head-quarters. Captain Birch, an intelligent engineer officer, writing from Blake's camp, says, "General Broderick is expected here; but I have understood that the appearance of a British general at these head-quarters to accompany the army might give jealousy. General Blake is not communicative, but Captain Carrol appears to be on the best footing with him and his officers, and Captain Carrol tells me that he informs him of more than he does any of his generals."

The object was perfectly accomplished; nothing could be more widely different than Spanish affairs, judged of by the tenor of the military agent's reports, and Spanish affairs when brought to the test of battle. The fault did not attach so much to the agents as to the ministers who selected them. It was difficult for inexperienced men to avoid the snare. Living with the chiefs of armies actually in the field, being in habits of daily intercourse with them, holding rank in the same service, and dependent upon their politeness for every convenience, the agent was in a manner forced to see as the general saw, and to report as he wished. A simple spy would have been far more efficacious!

Sir John Moore, perceiving the evil tendency of such a system, recalled all those officers who were under his immediate control, and strongly recommended to ministers that only one channel of communication should exist between the Spanish authorities and the British army. He was convinced of the necessity of this measure, by observing, that each of the military agents considered the events passing under his own peculiar cognizance as the only occurrences of importance. Some of those officers even treated Sir Hew Dalrymple and

himself as persons commanding auxiliary bodies of men which might be moved, divided, and applied at the requisition of every inferior agent, and the forces of the British empire, a mere accessory aid, placed at their own disposal. Thus General Leith says: "Whatever may be the plan of operations, and whatever the result, I beg leave, in the strongest manner, to recommend to your consideration the great advantage of ordering all the disposable force of horse or car artillery, and light infantry, mounted on horses or mules of the country, without a moment's delay to move on Palencia, where the column or columns will receive such intelligence as may enable them to give the most effectual co-operation."

Captain Whittingham, at the same period, after mentioning the wish of General Castaños that some British cavalry should join him, says, "I cannot quit this subject without once more repeating, that the efforts of the cavalry will decide the fate of the campaign." And again: "Should it be possible for your excellency to send 1000 or 1500 horse, the advantages that would result are incalculable." While one of these pressing recommendations came from Oviedo, the other from Tudela, Colonel Doyle, writing from Madrid, thus expresses himself: "Certain it is, that if your army were here, the French would evacuate Spain before you got within a week's march of them; indeed, even the light cavalry and 2000 light troops sent on cars, to keep up with the cavalry, to show our friends the nature of outpost duty, would, I think, decide the question."—"A respectable corps of British troops, landed in Catalonia, would so impose, that I have no doubt of the good effects."

This last proposition relative to Catalonia was a favourite plan of all the leading men at Madrid; so certain were they of success on the Ebro, that finding no British force was likely to be granted for that purpose, they withdrew 8000 or 9000 men from the army near Tudela, and directed them upon Lerida.

Thus much I have thought it necessary to relate about the agents, and now quitting that subject, I shall narrate.

THE OPERATIONS OF THE SPANISH ARMIES IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE BATTLE OF BAYLEN.

When that victory caused Joseph to abandon Madrid, the patriotic troops, guided by the caprice of the generals, moved in a variety of directions, without any fixed object in view, and without the slightest concert. Indeed all persons seemed to imagine that the war was at an end, and that rejoicing and triumph alone ought to occupy the minds of good Spaniards.

The Murcian and Valencian army separated. General Llamas, with 12,000 infantry, and a few cavalry, took the road to Madrid, and arrived there before any of the other generals. General St. Marc, a Fleming by birth, with greater propriety, carried the Valencians to the relief of Zaragoza. On the road he joined his forces with those of the Baron de Versage, and the united troops, amounting to 16,000, entered Zaragoza on the 15th, one day after Verdier and Lefebvre had broken up the siege and retired to Tudela. The French left their heavy guns and many stores behind them. The Valencians and Arragonese pursued, and on the 19th their advanced guard overtook the retiring force, but were beaten by the French cavalry. On the 20th Lefebvre abandoned Tudela and took a position at Milagro. On the 21st, St. Marc and Versage occupied Tudela. The peasantry of the valleys, encouraged by the approach of a regular army, and by the successful defence of Zaragoza, assembled on the left flank of the French, and threatened their communications. Meanwhile Palafox gave himself up to festivity and rejoicing, and did not even begin to repair the defences of Zaragoza until the end of the month. He assumed supreme authority, and in various ways discovered the most inordinate and foolish presumption; and among other acts he decreed that no Arragonese should henceforward be liable to the punishment of death for any crime.

The army of Andalusia was the most efficient body of men in arms through-

out Spain: it contained 30,000 regular troops, provided with a good train of artillery, and flushed with recent victory; but they were constrained to remain idle by the junta of Seville, who detained them to aid in asserting its own supremacy over the other juntas of Andalusia, and even brought back a part to Seville to assist in an ostentatious triumph. It was not until a full month after the capitulation of Dupont, that Castaños made his entry into the capital, at the head of a single division of 7000 men, another of the same force being left at Toledo, and the rest of his army quartered at Puerto del Rey, St. Helena, and Carolina, in the Sierra Morena.

The infantry of the Estremaduran army was at first composed of new levies; but it was afterwards strengthened by the Walloon and Royal Guards, and Sir Hew Dalrymple supplied General Galluzzo with every needful equipment. According to the stipulations of a treatment between the juntas of Seville and Badajoz, the cavalry was to be placed under the command of Castaños; it was in number about 4000, and with the exception of Cuesta, no other Spanish general possessed any efficient body of horsemen. Orders and entreaties, and even the intervention of Sir Hew Dalrymple, were resorted to by the council of Castile, the generals and the military agents, to induce Galluzzo to send this body of cavalry forward to the capital; but he remained deaf to their representations, and occupied himself, as we have seen, in thwarting the execution of the convention of Cintra by a pretended siege of Fort La Lippe.

The Spanish captives, released by that treaty, were clothed, armed, and sent to Catalonia in British transports; and Sir Hew Dalrymple, at the same time, forwarded 10,000 muskets, and ammunition in proportion, for the service of the Catalans.

It has been before stated that 1500 Spaniards, commanded by the Marquis of Valladeras, co-operated with the Portuguese during the campaign of Vimiero. But they never penetrated beyond Guarda, and being destitute of money, were reduced to great distress; they could not subsist where they were, nor yet march away. From this dilemma, Sir Hew, by a timely advance of 10,000 dollars, relieved them, and Valladeras joined Blake. That general, after the defeat of Rio Seco, separated the Gallician army from the army commanded by Cuesta, and sheltered himself from the pursuit of Bessieres in the mountains behind Astorga. His reserve division had not been engaged in the battle, and the resources of the province, aided by the succours from England, were sufficient to place him again at the head of 30,000 infantry.

When Bessieres retreated after the defeat of Baylen, Blake occupied Leon, Astorga, and the pass of Mansanal: farther into the plains he durst not venture without cavalry. At this time Cuesta, with 1500 dragoons, was at Arevalo, and the junta of Castile and Leon, having taken refuge at Ponteferrada, commanded him to transfer his horsemen to Blake's army; but Cuesta, an arbitrary old man, exasperated by his defeat, and his mind rankling from his quarrel with Blake, instead of obeying, retired to Salamanca, collected 8000 or 10,000 peasants, armed them, and then annulled the proceedings of the junta, and threatened the members with punishment for resisting his authority as captain-general. On the other hand, Blake protected them, and while the generals disputed, 3000 French cavalry descending the Douero, scoured the plains, and raised contributions in the face of both their armies.

Blake finding that the obstinacy of Cuesta was invincible, quitted his cantonments early in September, and skirting the plains on the north-east, carried his army by forced marches to the Montagna St. Ander, a small rugged district, dividing Biscay from the Asturias. The junta of the latter province had received enormous and very timely succours from England, but made no exertions answerable to the amount of the assistance granted, or to the strength and importance of the district. Eighteen thousand men were said to be in arms, but only 10,000 were promised to Blake, and but 8000 joined his army.

In Catalonia the war was conducted by both sides without much connection,

or dependence on the movements of the main armies ; and at this period it had little influence on the general plan of campaign.

Thus, it appears, that one month after the capitulation of Dupont, only 19,000 infantry without cavalry, and those under the command of more than one general, were collected at Madrid ; that only 16,000 men were in line upon the Ebro, and that the remainder of the Spanish armies (exclusive of that in Catalonia computed at 11,000 men), were many days' march from the enemy, and from one another. The chiefs at discord with their respective juntas, and at variance among themselves, were inactive, or as in the case of Galluzzo, doing mischief.

The feeble and dilatory operations of the armies, were partly owing to the ineptitude of the generals ; but the principal causes were the unbounded vanity, arrogance, and selfishness of the local governments, among whom the juntas of Galicia and Seville were remarkable for their ambition. The time which should have been passed in concerting measures for pushing the victory of Baylen was spent by them in devising schemes to ensure the permanency of their own power, and the money and resources, both of England and Spain, were applied to further this pernicious object. In every part of the country a spirit of interested violence prevailed ; the ardour of patriotism was chilled, and the exertions of sensible men were rendered nugatory, or served as a signal for their own destruction.

The argument to be drawn from this state of affairs is conclusive against the policy of Joseph's retreat. Without drafting a man from the garrisons of Pampeluna, Tortosa, and St. Sebastian ; without interfering with the movable columns employed on the communications of Biscay and Navarre ; that monarch drew together about 50,000 good troops, in twenty days after he had abandoned his capital.* At the head of such a force, or even of two-thirds of it, he might have bid defiance to the inactive, half-organized, and scattered Spanish armies. It was so necessary to have maintained himself in Madrid, that scarcely any disproportion of numbers should have induced him to abandon it without an effort ; but the disaster of Dupont had created in Joseph's mind a respect for Spanish prowess, while from his sagacious brother it drew the following observation : *The whole of the Spanish forces are not capable of beating 25,000 French in a reasonable position.*† The error of abandoning the capital would, if the Spaniards had been capable of pursuing any general plan of action, been fatal ; but as if the stone of Cadmus had been cast among them, the juntas turned upon one another in hate, and forgot the common enemy.

Ferdinand was again proclaimed King of Spain, and the pomp and rejoicing attendant on this event put an end to all business, except that of intrigue. Castaños assumed the title of Captain-General of Madrid. This step seems to have been taken by him, partly to forward his being appointed generalissimo, and partly with a view to emancipate himself from the injurious control of the Seville junta ; for, although the authority of the Captains-General had been superseded in most of the provinces by the juntas, it was not universally the case. Castaños expected, and with reason, to be appointed generalissimo of the Spanish armies ; but he was of an indolent disposition, and it soon became manifest that until a central and supreme government was established, such a salutary measure would not be adopted. In the mean time the council of Castile, although not generally popular with the people, and hated by the juntas, was accepted as the provisional head of the state in the capital ; but its authority was merely nominal, and the necessity of showing some front to the enemy seems to have been the only link of connection between the Spanish armies.

The evil consequences flowing from this want of unity were soon felt. Scarcely had the French quitted Madrid, when the people of Biscay prepared to rise. Such an event, if prudently conducted and well supported, would have

* Appendix, No. 6.

† Appendix, No. 4.

been of incalculable advantage; but the nicest arrangement, and the utmost prudence, were necessary to insure success, for the Biscayans had neither arms nor ammunition, the French were close to them, and the nearest Spanish force was the feeble Asturian levy. A previous junction of Blake's army with the latter was indispensable; that once effected, and due preparation made, the insurrection of Biscay, protected by 40,000 regular troops, and supplied from the sea-board with money and stores, would have forced the French to abandon the Ebro or to fight a battle, which Blake might have risked with little danger, provided that the Andalusian, Murcian, Valencian, and Arragonese troops assembling about Tudela, were prepared to move at the same time against the left flank of the enemy. But in every point of view it was an event pregnant with important consequences, and the impatience of the Biscayans should have been restrained rather than encouraged: yet the Duke of Infantado, Colonel Doyle, and others, at Madrid, made strenuous efforts to hasten the explosion. The crude manner in which they conducted this serious affair is exposed in the following extracts from Colonel Doyle's despatches:

"I proposed to General Blake that he should send officers to Biscay to stir up the people there, and into the Asturias to beg that of their 15,000 men, 8000 might be pushed into Biscay to Bilbao, to assist the people, who were all ready, and only waited for arms and ammunition, for both of which I wrote to Mr. Hunter at Gihon, and learned from him that he had sent a large supply of both, and some money to Bilbao, where already 14,000 men had enrolled themselves. The remainder of the Asturias I begged might instantly occupy the passes from Castile into the Asturias and Biscay, that is to say, from Reynosa in the direction of Bilbao." Some days after he says,—“My measures in Biscay and Asturias have perfectly succeeded; the reinforcements of arms, ammunition, and men (5000 stand of arms, and ammunition in proportion) have reached Bilbao in safety, and the Asturias have taken possession of the passes I pointed out, so that we are all safe in that part of the world.”

In this fancied state of security affairs remained until the 16th of August; General Blake was still in the mountains of Galicia, the English succours arrived in the port of Bilbao, and the explosion took place. General Merlin, with 3000 grenadiers, immediately came down on the unfortunate Biscayans; Bilbao was taken, and to use the emphatic expression of King Joseph, “the fire of insurrection was quenched with the blood of 1200 men.” Fortunately, the stores were not landed, and the vessels escaped from the river. Thus, at a blow, one of the principal resources which Blake had a right to calculate upon in his future operations was destroyed; and although the number admitted by the Spaniards to have fallen was less than the above quotation implies, the spirit of resistance was severely checked, and the evil was unmixed and deplorable.

This unfortunate event, however, created little or no sensation beyond the immediate scene of the catastrophe. Triumphs and rejoicings occupied the people of Madrid and Zaragoza, and it is difficult to say how long the war would have been neglected, if Palafox had not been roused by the re-appearance of a French corps, which re-took Tudela, and pushed on to the vicinity of Zaragoza itself.* This movement took place immediately after the expedition against Bilbao, and was intended to suppress the insurrection of the valleys, and to clear the left flank of the French army. Palafox thus roughly aroused, wrote intemperately to the council of Castile, commanding that all the troops in the capital should be forwarded to the Ebro, and menacing the members personally for the delay which had already occurred. Being a young man without any weight of character, and his remonstrances being founded only upon his own danger, and not supported by any general plan or clear view of affairs, the presumptuous tone of his letters gave general offence; they were chiefly aimed at Castaños, who was not under his command; and

* Appendix, No. 6.

moreover, the junta of Seville refused to pay or to subsist the Andalusian army if it moved beyond the capital before a central government should be established; at the same time resorting to every kind of intrigue, to retard, if not entirely to prevent, the execution of the latter measure.

It was, however, necessary to do something, and a council of all the generals commanding armies was held at Madrid on the 5th of September. Castaños, Llamas, Cuesta, the Duke of Infantado, and some others assembled; Blake gave his proxy to the duke, and Palafox was represented by a colonel of his own staff. Cuesta proposed that a commander-in-chief should be appointed: the others were too jealous to adopt this proposal, but they agreed to pursue the following plan of operations.

Llamas, with the Murcians, to occupy Tarascona, Agreda, and Borja. La-Peña, with the two divisions of Andalusia already in the capital, to march by Soria, and take possession of Logroña and Najera. The other divisions of that army to follow in due time. When La-Peña should be established in Logroña, Llamas was to advance to Cascante, Corella, and Calahorra.

When this united force (to be called the army of the centre) was once securely fixed in its positions, Palafox, under whose command St. Marc's division acted, was to push forward to Sanguessa by the left bank of the Ebro, and to turn the enemy on the Aragon river. In the mean time it was hoped that Blake would arrive at Palencia, and form his junction with the Asturians. Cuesta promised to march upon Burgo del Osma, and to fill up the space between Blake and the army of the centre. The head of La-Peña's column was to be at Soria on the 17th of September, and the junta confidently expected that this vicious plan, in which every sound military principle was violated, and the enemy's troops, considered with regard to position, as a fixed immovable mass, would cause the total destruction of the French army. The only fear entertained was, that a hasty flight into France would save it from Spanish vengeance! Thus Captain Whittingham, echoing the sentiments of the Spanish generals with reference to this plan, writes, "As far as my poor judgment leads me, I am satisfied that if the French persist in maintaining their present position, we shall, in less than six weeks, have a second edition of the battle of Baylen!" But to enable La-Peña and Llamas to march, pecuniary aid was requisite. There was a difficulty in raising money at Madrid, and the maritime provinces intercepted all the English supplies. In this dilemma, Colonel Doyle drew bills upon the English treasury, and upon the government at Seville, making the latter payable out of two millions of dollars, just transmitted to the junta through Mr. Duff.

It is probable that such an unprincipled body would not have hesitated to dishonour the bills, but Major Coxe, before they were received, made energetic remonstrances upon the subject of the wants of the army; at first he received a haughty and evasive answer, but his representations were strongly seconded by a discovery made by the junta, that a plot against their lives, supposed to have been concocted at Madrid, was on the eve of execution. In fact, they had become hateful from their domineering insolence and selfishness, and the public feeling was strongly against them. Alarmed for the consequences, they sent off 200,000 dollars to Madrid, and published a manifesto, in which they inserted a letter, purporting to be from themselves to Castaños, dated on the 8th, and giving him full powers to act as he judged fitting for the public good. Their objects were to pacify the people, and to save their own dignity, by appearing to have acted voluntarily; but Castaños published the letter in Madrid with its true date of the 11th, and then it became manifest, that to Major Coxe's remonstrance, and not to any sense of duty, this change of conduct was due.

Doyle's bills having been negotiated, the troops were put in motion, and 40,000 fresh levies were enrolled, but the foresight and activity of Napoleon in disarming the country had been so effectual, that only 3200 firelocks could be

procured. A curious expedient then presented itself to the imagination of the Duke of Infantado, and other leading persons in Madrid: Colonel Doyle, at their desire, wrote to Sir Hew Dalrymple in the name of the supreme council, to request that *the firelocks of Junot's army, and the arms of the Portuguese people*, might be forwarded to the frontier, and from thence carried by post to Madrid; a novel proposition, and made at a time when England had already transmitted to Spain 160,000 muskets; a supply considerably exceeding the whole number of men organized throughout the country; 50,000 of these arms had been sent to Seville, but the junta shut them up in the arsenals, and left the armies defenceless; for to neglect or misuse real resources, and to fasten with avidity upon the most extravagant projects, is peculiarly Spanish. No other people could have thought of asking for a neighbouring nation's arms at such a conjuncture; no other than Spanish rulers could have imagined the absurdity of supplying their levies (momentarily required to fight upon the Ebro) with the arms of a French army still unconquered in Portugal. But this project was only one among many proofs afforded at the time, that Cervantes was as profound an observer as he was a witty reprovcr of the extravagance of his countrymen.

CHAPTER II.

INTERNAL POLITICAL TRANSACTIONS.

WITH the military affairs thus mismanaged, the civil and political transactions proceeded step by step, and in the same crooked path. Short as the period was between the first breaking forth of the insurrection, and the arrival of Mr. Stuart at Coruña, it was sufficient to create disunion of the worst kind. The juntas of Leon, of the Asturias, and of Galicia, were at open discord, and those provinces were again split into parties, hating each other with as much virulence as if they had been of a hundred years' growth. The money and other supplies sent by the English ministers were considered, by the authorities into whose hands they fell, as a peculiar donation to themselves, and appropriated accordingly. The junta of one province would not assist another with arms when there was a surplus, nor permit their troops to march against the enemy beyond the precincts of the particular province in which they were first organized. The ruling power was in the hands of the provincial nobility and gentry, men of narrow, contracted views, unused to business, proud, arrogant—as extreme ignorance suddenly clothed with authority will always be—and generally disposed to employ their newly-acquired power in providing for their relations and dependants at the expense of the common cause, which with them was quite subordinate to the local interests of their own particular province. Hence a jealousy of their neighbours regulated the proceedings of all the juntas, and the means they resorted to for increasing their own, or depressing a rival government's influence, were equally characterized by absurdity and want of principle. The junta of Galicia did their utmost to isolate that province, as if with a view to a final separation from Spain and a connection with Portugal. They complained, as of an injury, that the army of Estremadura had obeyed the orders of the junta of Seville; they at once struck up an independent alliance with the junta and Bishop of Oporto, and sent troops, as we have seen, under Valladeras, to aid the war in Portugal, but, at the same time, refused to unite in any common measure of defence with the provinces of Castile, until a formal treaty of alliance between them was negotiated, signed, and ratified. In the mean time their selfishness and incapacity created so much disgust in their own district, that plots were formed to overthrow their authority. The Bishops of Orense and St. Jago became their decided enemies; and the last-named prelate, an intriguing man, secretly endeavoured to draw Blake, with the army, into his views, and even wrote to him, to desire that he would lead the forces against the government of Coruña; but the junta having intercepted the letters, arrested

the bishop. Their own stability and personal safety were however still so insecure, that many persons applied to Mr. Stuart to aid in changing the form of government by force. The Asturians were even worse; they refused to assist Blake when his army was suffering, although the stores required by him, and supplied by England, were rotting in the harbours where they were first landed. Money also that was sent out in the *Pluto* frigate for the use of Leon was detained at Gihon, and Leon itself never raised a single soldier for the cause: and thus, only two months after the first burst of the insurrection, corruption, intrigue, and faction even to the verge of civil war, were raging in the northern parts of Spain.

The same passions were at work in the south, and the same consequences followed. The junta of Seville, still less scrupulous than that of Galicia, made no secret of their ambitious views; * they stifled all local publications, and even suppressed the public address of Florida Blanca, who, as president of the Murcian junta, had recommended the formation of a supreme central government. They wasted their time in vain and frivolous disputes, and neglecting every concern of real importance, sacrificed the general welfare to views of private advantage and interest. They made promotions in the army without regard to public opinion or merit; † they overlaid all real patriotism; bestowed on their own creatures places of emolument, to the patronage of which they had not a legal right; and even usurped the royal prerogative of appointing canons in the church, for their cupidity equalled their ambition. They intercepted, as I have already related, the pecuniary supplies necessary to enable the army to act; they complained that La Mancha and Madrid, in whose defence they said "*their* troops were sacrificing themselves," did not subsist and supply the force under Castaños; under the pretence of forming a nucleus for disciplining 30,000 levies as a reserve, they retained five battalions at Seville, and, having by this draft weakened the army in the field, they neglected the rest, and never raised a man. The canonries filled up by them had been vacant for several years, and the salaries attached to those offices were appropriated to the public service. The junta now applied the money to their own and their creatures' emolument; and at one period they appear to have contemplated an open partition of the funds received from England among themselves. Against this flagitious junta also the public indignation was rife; a plot was formed to assassinate the members; the municipal authorities remonstrated with them, the Archbishop of Toledo protested against their conduct, and the junta of Grenada refused to acknowledge their supremacy; ‡ but so great was their arrogance, so unprincipled their ambition, that the decided and resolute opposition of Castaños alone prevented them from commencing a civil war, and marching the victorious army of Baylen against the refractory Granadans. § Such was the real state of Spain, and such the patriotism of the juntas, who were at this time filling Europe with the sound of their own praise.

In the northern parts Mr. Stuart endeavoured to reduce this chaos of folly and wickedness to some degree of order, and to produce that unity of design and action without which it was impossible to resist the mighty adversary that threatened the independence of the Peninsula. He judged that to reduce the conflicting passions of the moment, a supreme authority, upon which the influence of Great Britain could be brought to bear with full force, was indispensable. To convoke the ancient cortes of the realm appeared to him the most certain and natural method of drawing the strength and energy of the nation into one compact mass; but there the foresight of Napoleon interfered; by an able distribution of the French forces, all direct communication between the northern and southern provinces was intercepted. Bessieres, Dupont, and Moncey at that time occupied a circle round Madrid, and would have prevented the local governments of the north from uniting with those of the south, if they had been inclined to do so. An union of the nearest provinces, to be

* Appendix No 13, section 5.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid.

§ Ibid.

called the northern cortex, then suggested itself to Mr. Stuart as a preliminary step, which would ensure the convocation of a general assembly when such a measure should become practicable. Accordingly he strenuously urged its adoption, but his efforts, at first, produced no good results. It was in vain that he represented the danger of remaining in a state of anarchy when so many violent passions were excited, and such an enemy was in the heart of the country. It was in vain that he pointed out the difficulties, that the want of a supreme authority fastened on the intercourse with the British cabinet, which could not enter into separate relations with every provincial junta. The Spaniards, finding that the supplies were not withheld, that their reputation for patriotism was not lowered in England by actions which little merited praise, finding, in short, that the English cabinet was weak enough to gorge their cupidity, flatter their vanity, and respect their folly, they assented to all Mr. Stuart's reasoning, but forwarded none of his propositions, and continued to nourish the disorders that, cancer-like, were destroying the common cause.

The jarring interests which agitated the northern provinces were not even subdued by the near approach of danger. The result of the battle of Rio Seco rather inflamed than allayed the violence of party feeling. If Bessieres had not been checked in his operations by the disaster of Dupont, he would have encountered few obstacles in establishing Joseph's authority in Galicia and Old Castile. The enthusiasm of those provinces never rose to a great pitch; Bessieres was prepared to use address as well as force, and among the factions he must doubtless have found support. The reinforcements continually arriving from France would have enabled him to maintain his acquisition, and then the ability of the emperor's dispositions would have become apparent; for while Bessieres held Galicia, and Dupont hung on the southern frontier of Portugal with 25,000 men, Junot could have securely concentrated his army in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, and have rendered an English disembarkation on the coast nearly impracticable.

The whole of the French monarch's combinations were overturned by the disgraceful capitulation of Baylen, and when Joseph evacuated Madrid a fresh impulse was given to the spirit of the people; but, unfortunately for Spain, as a wider scope for ambition was obtained, the workings of self-interest increased, fresh parties sprung up, and new follies and greater absurdities stifled the virtue of the country, and produced irremediable confusion, ending in ruin. The fact of Dupont's capitulation was made known to the council of Castile before King Joseph was informed of it, and the council, foreseeing all the consequences of such an event, immediately refused, as I have already related, to promulgate officially his accession to the throne. Joseph permitted this act of obedience to pass without much notice. He was naturally averse to violence, and neither he, nor his brother Napoleon, did at any period of the contest for Spain constrain a Spaniard to accept or retain office under the intrusive government. Joseph went further; before he abandoned Madrid, he released his ministers from their voluntary oath of allegiance to himself, and left them free to choose their party once more. Don Pedro Cevallos and the Marquis of Pinuelo changed with, what appeared to them, changing fortune; but five others remained steadfast, preferring an ameliorated government under a foreign prince to what they believed to be a hopeless struggle, but which, if successful, they knew must end in a degrading native despotism; perhaps, also, a little swayed by their dislike to England, and by the impossibility of obtaining that influence among their countrymen which, under other circumstances, their talents and character would have ensured.

The boldness of the council of Castile was not publicly chastised by the intruding monarch, but secretly he punished the members by a dexterous stroke of policy. General Grouchy wrote to Castaños, saying, that circumstances had arisen which required the presence of the French troops in another quarter, and he invited the Spanish general to take immediate possession of Madrid

for the preservation of public tranquillity. This communication gave rise to an opinion that the French were going to evacuate Spain; a report so congenial to the vanity and indolence of the Spaniards was greedily received, and contributed among other causes to the subsequent supineness of the nation in preparing for its defence; thus by appealing to Castaños, and affecting to treat the council of Castile as a body who had lost their influence with the nation, Joseph gave a handle to their enemies which the latter failed not to lay hold of. The juntas dreaded that the influence of such a body would destroy their own; that of Galicia would not communicate with them, affirming that, individually, the members were attached to the French, and that, collectively, they had been the most active instrument of the usurper's government. The junta of Seville endeavoured not only to destroy the authority of the existing members, but to annul that of the council, as an acknowledged tribunal of the state. The council, however, was not wanting to itself, the individuals composing it did not hesitate to seize the reins of government the moment the French had departed; and the prudence with which they preserved tranquillity in the capital, and prevented all reaction, proves that they were not without merit; and forms a striking contrast to the conduct of the provincial juntas, under whose savage sway every kind of excess was committed, and even encouraged.

Aware of the hostility they had to encounter, the members of the council lost no time in forming a party to support themselves. Don Arias Mon y Velarde, dean or president for the time being, wrote a circular letter to the local juntas, pointing out the necessity of establishing a central and supreme power, and proposing that deputies from each province, or nation, as they were sometimes called, should repair to Madrid, and there concert with the council the best mode of carrying such a measure into effect. If this proposal had been adopted, all power would inevitably have fallen into the hands of the proposers. Confessedly the first public body in the state, and well acquainted with the forms of business; the council must necessarily have had a preponderating influence in the assembly of delegates, and it appeared so reasonable that it should take the lead, when an efficient authority was required to direct the violence of the people in a useful channel, before the moment of safety was passed; that all the juntas trembled at the prospect of losing their misused power. The minor ones submitted, and agreed to send deputies. The stronger and more ambitious felt that subtlety would avail more than open opposition to the project.

The council followed up this blow by the publication of a manifesto, containing an accurate detail of the events of the revolution, defending the part taken by its members, and claiming a renewal of the confidence formerly reposed in them by the nation. This important state paper was so ably written, that a large party, especially at Valladolid, was immediately formed in favour of its authors; and the junta of Seville were so sensible of the increasing influence of the council, that they intercepted a copy of this manifesto, addressed to Sir Hew Dalrymple, and strictly suppressed all writings favourable to the formation of a supreme central authority.* Nothing they dreaded more; but it was no longer possible to resist the current, which had set strongly in favour of such a measure. The juntas, however they might oppose its progress, could not openly deny the propriety of it, and in every province, individuals of talent and consideration called for a change in the Hydra polity, which oppressed the country, and was inefficient against the enemy. Every British functionary, civil or military, in communication with the Spaniards, also urged the necessity of concentrating the executive power.

The provincial juntas were become universally odious. Some of the generals alone, who had suddenly risen to command under their rule, were favourable to them; but Palafox was independent, as a captain-general, whose power

* Appendix, No. 13, section 5.

was confirmed by success; Castaños openly declared that he would no longer serve under their control, and Cuesta was prepared to put them down by force, and to re-establish the royal audiencias and the authority of the captains-general according to the old practice. In this state of affairs, the retreat of Bessieres' army freed the communication with the southern parts, and removed all excuse for procrastination. The juntas of Galicia, Castile, Leon, and the Asturias, gave way to the unceasing remonstrances of Mr. Stuart, and at his instance agreed to meet in cortez, at Lugo; Galicia, however, first insisted upon a formal ratification of the treaty with Castile already mentioned.

When the moment of assembling arrived, the Asturians, without assigning any reason, refused to fulfil the engagement they had entered into, and the three remaining juntas held the session without them. The Bishop of Orense, and the junta of Galicia, were prepared to assert the supremacy of that province over the others, but the Bailly Valdez of Castile, an able and disinterested man, being chosen president of the convocation, proposed, on the first day of assembly, that deputies should be appointed to represent the three provinces in a supreme junta, to be assembled in some central place, for the purpose of convoking the ancient cortez of the whole kingdom according to the old forms, and of settling the administration of the interior, and the future succession to the throne. This proposition was immediately carried by the superior number of the Castilians and Leonese; but the Bishop of Orense protested against it, and the Gallician members strongly opposed an arrangement, by which their province was placed on the same footing as others, a glaring injustice (in their opinion) when the numbers of the Gallician army were taken into consideration; for the local feeling of ambition was uppermost, and the general cause disregarded. The other party answered, with great force, that the Gallician army was paid, armed, and clothed, by England, and fed by Castile and Leon.

Meanwhile the influence of the council of Castile greatly increased, and the junta of Seville, quickened by fear, took the lead in directing what they could not prevent. The convocation of the cortez they knew would be fatal to their own existence; wherefore, in a public letter, addressed to the junta of Galicia, dated one day previous to the circular of Don Arias Mon, but evidently written after the receipt of the latter, they opposed the assembling of the cortez on the ground that it was "the prerogative of the king to convoke that body, and if it was called together by any other authority, the provinces would not obey." "There would be no unanimity." The futility of this argument is apparent. The question was not one of form, but of expediency. If the nation was in favour of such a step (and after facts proved that the people were not opposed to it), the same necessity which constituted the right of the junta to declare war against the French (another prerogative of the monarch), would have sufficed to legalize the convocation of the national assembly. But their sole object was to preserve their own power. They maintained that the juntas, being chosen by the nation, were the only legitimate depositaries of authority, and that to members of their own bodies only could any of that authority be delegated; and adopting thereupon the suggestion contained in the letter of Arias Mon, they proposed that two deputies from each supreme junta should repair, not to Madrid, but to Ciudad Real, or Almagro, and at the moment of meeting should be in fact constituted governors-general of the kingdom, and as such obeyed. Nevertheless, the local governments were, with due subordination to the central junta, to retain and exercise in their own provinces all the authority with which they had already invested themselves. Thus they had only to choose subservient deputies, and their power would be more firmly fixed than before.

This arrangement would, doubtless, have been readily adopted by the junta of Galicia; but the rapidity with which Valdez carried his proposition, prevented that cause of discord from being added to the numerous disputes which already distracted the northern provinces. Mr. Stuart, impelled by the political tide, proceeded onward to Madrid, observing, wherever he passed, the same violence

of local party feeling, and the general disgust occasioned by the conduct of the oligarchical provincial governments. Pride, vanity, corruption, and improvidence, were everywhere obtrusively visible.

The dispute between Blake and Cuesta, which was raging at the period of the battle of Rio Seco, a period when division was most hurtful to the military operations, was now allayed between the generals; but their political partizans waged war with more bitterness than ever, as if with the intent to do the greatest possible mischief, by continuing the feud among the civil branches of the government, when union was most desirable in that quarter. The seeds of division had taken deep root. The Bailly Valdez chosen, as I have said, a deputy to the supreme junta, was obnoxious to General Cuesta, a man not to be offended with impunity when he had power to punish.

Don Gregorio Cuesta was haughty and incredibly obstinate. He had been president of the council of Castile, and he was captain-general of Castile and Leon when the insurrection first broke out. Disliking all revolutionary movements, although as inimical to a foreign domination as any of his countrymen, he endeavoured to repress the public effervescence, and to maintain the tranquillity of the country at the risk of losing his life as a traitor. He was an honest man, insomuch as the Spanish and French interests being put in competition, he would aid the former, but, between his country's cause and his own passions, he was not honest. He disliked, and with reason, the sway of the local juntas, and with consistency of opinion, he wished to preserve the authority of the captains-general and the royal audiencias, both of which had been overturned by the establishment of those petty governments; but, sullen and ferocious in his temper, he supported his opinion with an authority and severity which had no guide but his own will, and he was prepared, if an opportunity offered, to exercise military influence over the supreme as well as over the subordinate juntas. He had himself appointed one for Leon and Castile as a sort of council, subordinate to the authority of captain-general; but, after the battle of Rio Seco, the members fled to Ponteferrada, assumed the supreme authority, and putting themselves under the protection of his enemy Blake, disregarded Cuesta's orders, and presumed to command him, their superior, to deliver up his cavalry to the former general; wherefore he annulled all their proceedings at Ponteferrada, and now asserting that the election of Valdez and his colleagues was void, as being contrary to the existing laws, he directed new juntas to be assembled in a manner more conformable to existing usages, and a fresh election to be made.

His mandates were disregarded; Valdez and the other deputies proceeded in defiance of them towards the place appointed for the assembly of the central and supreme government, and Cuesta, in return, without hesitation, abandoned the operations of the campaign, which, in the council of war held at Madrid, he had promised to aid, and falling back to Segovia with 12,000 men, seized the deputies, and shut up Valdez a close prisoner in the tower of that place, declaring his intention to try him by a military tribunal for disobedience; and such was the disorder of the times, that Cuesta was not without plausible arguments to justify this act of stubborn violence; for the original election of members to form the junta of Castile and Leon had been anything but legal; several districts had been omitted altogether in the representation of those kingdoms, many deputies had been chosen by the city of Leon alone, and Valdez was named president, although neither a native nor a proprietor, and for those reasons ineligible to be a deputy at all. The kingdom of Leon also had appointed representatives for those districts in Castile which were under the domination of the French, and when the enemy retired, the Castilians in vain demanded a more equitable arrangement.

However, amidst all this confusion and violence, the plan of uniting to form a central government gained ground all over the kingdom. Seville, Catalonia, Arragon, Murcia, Valencia, and Asturias, appointed their deputies. Fresh disputes relative to the place of assembly now arose, but after some time it was

agreed to meet at Aranjuez. This royal residence was chosen contrary to the wishes of many, and notably against the opinion of Jovellanos, an eloquent person, and of great reputation for integrity, but of a pertinacious temper, unsuitable to the times. He urged that the capital was the meetest spot; but he was answered, that the turbulent disposition of the inhabitants of Madrid would impede the formation of a government, and that the same objection would exist against the choice of any other large town. It is extraordinary that such an argument should be held in Spain at a moment when the people were, in all the official and public papers, represented as perfectly enthusiastic, and united in one common sacred pursuit, and in the British parliament were denominated the "universal Spanish nation!"

To seek thus for protection in a corner, instead of manfully and confidently identifying themselves with the people, and courting publicity, augured ill for the intentions of the deputies, nor was the augury belied by the event. The junta of Seville, who had so bitterly reviled the council of Castile, for having partially submitted to the usurper, had, notwithstanding, chosen for their own deputies, Don Vincente Hore, a known creature of the Prince of Peace, and the Count de Tilly Gusman, who was under the stigma of a judicial sentence for robbery. Hore declined the appointment; but Tilly, braving the public disgust, repaired to Aranjuez, and his place as resident with the head-quarters of the Andalusian army was filled up by Miñiano, another member of the junta, who received an enormous salary for performing the mischievous duties of that office. The instructions given by the different provinces to the deputies were to confine their deliberations and votes to such subjects as they should, from time to time, receive directions from their constituents to treat of. Seville again took the lead in this fraudulent policy, and when public indignation and the remonstrances of some right-minded persons, obliged the juntas of that town and of Valencia to rescind these instructions, both substituted secret orders of the same tenor; in short, the greater part of the deputies were the mere tools of the juntas; agents, watching over the interests of their employers, and (conscious of demerit) anxious to hide themselves from the just indignation of the public until they had consolidated their power; hence the dislike to large towns and the intrigues for fixing the government at Aranjuez.

Count Florida Blanca, a man in the last stage of decrepitude, was chosen first president in rotation for three months, and all idea of choosing an independent executive was abandoned; Jovellanos proposed to establish a regency selected from their own body; but his plan was rejected on the ground that the members were not authorized to delegate their powers even to one another. It was palpable that the juntas had merely appeared to comply with the public wish for a central government, but were determined not to part with one iota of their own real power.

The first act of authority executed by the assembly was, however, a necessary assertion of its own dignity, which had been violated in the case of Valdez. Cuesta, who was personally unpopular, and feared by the central, as well as by the provincial juntas, was summoned to release his captive, and to repair to Aranjuez, that cognizance might be taken of his proceedings; he was at the same time denounced by the juntas of Castile and Leon as a traitor, and exposed to great danger of popular commotion. At first Cuesta haughtily repelled the interference of Castaños and Florida Blanca, but finally he was forced to bend, and after a sharp correspondence with Mr. Stuart, whose influence was usefully employed to strengthen the central government, he released his prisoner, and quitting the command of the army, appeared at Aranjuez. No formal proceedings were had upon the case; but after much mutual recrimination, Valdez was admitted to the exercise of his functions, and the old general was detained at the seat of government, a kind of state prisoner at large, until, for the misfortune of his country, he was, by subsequent events, once more placed at the head of an army.

About this time Lord William Bentinck joined Mr. Stuart at Madrid. Perfectly coinciding in opinions, they laboured earnestly to give a favourable turn to affairs, by directing the attention of the central junta to the necessity of military preparations and active exertion for defence; but the picture of discord, folly, and improvidence exhibited in the provinces, was here displayed in more glaring colours. The lesser tribunals being called upon to acknowledge the authority of the assembled deputies, readily obeyed; but the council of Castile, reluctant to submit, and too weak to resist, endeavoured to make terms; they were forced, however, to an unconditional submission.

A good management of the revenue, a single chief for the army, and, above all, the total suppression of the provincial juntas, were the three objects of public anxiety. With respect to the army, no doubt was at first entertained that Castaños would be appointed commander-in-chief; his services entitled him to the office, and his general moderation and conciliating manners fitted him for it at a time when so much jealousy was to be soothed and so many interests to be reconciled. The past expenditure of the money received from England was also a subject of great importance, and it was loudly required that an account of its disbursement should be demanded of the local juntas, and a surrender of the residue instantly enforced. These just expectations lasted but a short time; scarcely were the deputies assembled, when every prospect of a vigorous administration was blasted. Dividing themselves into sections, answering in number to the departments of state under the old king, they appointed a secretary not chosen from their own body, to each, and declared all and every one of these sections, supreme and independent, having equal authority.

Florida Blanca informed Mr. Stuart and Lord William Bentinck that Castaños would be named generalissimo, and the latter was even appointed to confer with him upon the plan of campaign for the British troops, then marching from Portugal to the assistance of the Spaniards. The necessity of having a single chief at the head of the armies was imperious, and acknowledged by every individual, military or civil; yet such was the force of jealousy, and so stubborn were the tools of the different juntas, that all the exertions of Mr. Stuart and Lord William Bentinck, and all the influence of the British cabinet, failed to get one appointed. The generals were all confirmed in their separate and independent commands, the old and miserable system of the Dutch deputies in Marlborough's time, and of the commissaries of the convention, during the French revolution, was partially revived, and the expressed wishes of the English government were totally disregarded at a time when it had supplied Spain with 200,000 muskets, clothing, ammunition of all kinds in proportion, and ten millions of dollars. Such ample succours, if rightly managed, ought to have secured to the English cabinet unlimited influence; but as the benefits came through one set of persons, and the demands through another, the first were taken as of right, the last unheeded, and the resources of Great Britain were wasted without materially improving the condition of Spain; the armies were destitute, the central government was without credit, and notwithstanding the ample subsidies, contracted a large debt.

The provincial juntas were still permitted to retain their power within their own districts, and the greatest timidity marked all the proceedings of the central government in relation to those obnoxious bodies. Attentive, however, to their own interests, the members of the supreme junta decreed, 1st, that their persons should be inviolable; 2nd, that the president should have the title of highness, with a salary of 25,000 crowns a year; 3rd, that each of the deputies, taking the title of excellency, should have a yearly salary of 5000 crowns; and lastly, that the collective body should be addressed by the title of majesty. Thinking that they were now sufficiently confirmed in power to venture upon a public entry into Madrid, the junta made preparations to ensure a favourable reception from the populace. They resolved to declare a general

amnesty, to lower the duties on tobacco, and to fling large sums among the people during the procession; but, in the midst of all this pomp and vanity, the presence of the enemy on the soil was scarcely remembered, and the details of business were totally neglected, a prominent evil that extended to the lowest branches of administration.* Self-interest, indeed, produced abundance of activity, but every department, almost every man, seemed struck with torpor when the public welfare was at stake; and withal, an astonishing presumption was common to the highest and the lowest.

To supply the place of a generalissimo, a council or board of general officers was projected, on whose reports the junta proposed to regulate the military operations. Castaños was destined to be president; but some difficulty arising relative to the appointment of the other members, the execution of the plan was deferred, with the characteristic remark, "that when the enemy was driven across the frontier, Castaños would have leisure to take his seat." The idea of a defeat, the possibility of failure, never entered their minds; the government evincing neither apprehension, nor activity, nor foresight, were contented if the people believed the daily falsehoods they promulgated relative to the enemy; and the people, equally presumptuous, were content to be so deceived; in fine, all the symptoms of a ruined cause were already visible to discerning eyes. The armies neglected even to nakedness, and the soldier's constancy under privations cruelly abused; disunion, cupidity, incapacity, in the higher orders; the patriotic ardour visibly abating among the lower classes; the rulers grasping, improvident, and boasting; the enemy powerful; the people insubordinate, and the fighting men without arms or bread; as a whole, and in all its parts, the government unfitted for its task; cumbrous and ostentatious, its system, to use the comprehensive words of Mr. Stuart, "was neither calculated to inspire courage nor to increase enthusiasm."

The truth of this picture will be recognized by men who are yet living, and whose exertions were as incessant as unavailing to remedy those evils at the time. It will be recognized by the friends of a great man, who fell a victim to the folly and base intrigues of the day; and finally, it will be recognized by that general and army, who, afterwards winning their own unaided way through Spain, found that to trust Spaniards in war was to lean against a broken reed. To others it may appear exaggerated; for without having seen it is difficult to believe the extent of a disorder that paralyzed the enthusiasm of a whole people.

EXTERNAL POLITICAL RELATIONS OF SPAIN.

At first these were of necessity confined to a few foreign courts; England, Sicily, and Portugal; the rest of the Old World was either subject to Buonaparte or directly under his influence; but in the New World it was different: the Brazils, after the emigration of the royal family of Braganza, became important under every point of view, and relations were established between the junta and that court, that afterwards under the cortez created considerable interest, and threatened serious embarrassments to the operations of the Duke of Wellington.

The ultra-marine possessions of Spain were, of course, a matter of great anxiety to both sides; Napoleon's activity balanced the natural preponderance of the mother country. The slowness of the local juntas, or rather their want of capacity to conduct such an affair, gave the enemy a great advantage. It was only owing to the exertions of Mr. Stuart in the north, and of Sir Hew Dalrymple and Lord Collingwood in the south, that, after the insurrection broke out, vessels were despatched to South America to confirm the colonists in their adherence to Spain, and to arrange the mode of securing the resources of those great possessions for the parent state. The hold which Spain retained over her colonies was, however, very slight; her harsh restrictive system had long before weakened the attachment of the South Americans; the expedition of Miranda, although unsuccessful, had kindled a fire which could not be extinguished; and

* Appendix, No. 13, section 6.

it was apparent to all able statesmen, that Spain must relinquish her arbitrary mode of governing, or relinquish the colonies altogether; the insurrection at home only rendered this more certain; every argument, every public manifesto put forth in Europe, to animate the Spaniards against foreign aggression, told against them in America. Yet for a time the latter transmitted the produce of the mines, and many of the natives served in the Spanish armies.

Napoleon, notwithstanding his activity, and the offers which he made of the vice-royalty of Mexico to Cuesta, Castaños, Blake, and probably to others residing in that country, failed to create a French party of any consequence. The Americans were unwilling to plunge into civil strife for a less object than their own independence: the arrogance and injustice of Old Spain, however, increased, rather than diminished, under the sway of the insurrectional government, and at last, as it is well known, a general rebellion of the South American States established the independence of the fairest portion of the globe, and proved, how little the abstract love of freedom influenced the resistance of the old country to Napoleon.

The intercourse with the English court, which had been hitherto carried on through the medium of the deputies, who first arrived in London to claim assistance, was now placed upon a regular footing. The deputies, at the desire of Mr. Canning, were recalled, and Admiral Apodaca was appointed envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at St. James's, and Mr. John Hookham Frere was accredited, with the same diplomatic rank, near the central junta.

Mr. Stuart, whose knowledge of the state of the country, whose acquaintance with the character of the leading persons, and whose able and energetic exertions had so much contributed to the formation of a central government, was superseded by this injudicious appointment, and thus a great political machine, with every wheel in violent action, was, at the critical moment, left without any controlling power or guiding influence; for Mr. Stuart, who, on his own responsibility, had quitted Coruña, and repaired to Madrid, and had remitted the most exact and important information of what was passing, remained for three months without receiving a single line from Mr. Canning, approving or disapproving of his proceedings, or giving him instructions how to act at this important crisis: a strange remissness, indicating the bewildered state of the ministers, who slowly and with difficulty followed, when they should have been prepared to lead. Their tardy abortive measures demonstrated, how wide the space between a sophist and a statesman, and how dangerous to a nation is that public feeling which, insatiable of words, disregards the actions of men, esteeming more the interested eloquence and wit of an orator like Demades, than the simple integrity, sound judgment, and great exploits, of a general like Phocion.

Such were the preparations made by Spain in September and October, to meet the exigencies of a period replete with danger and difficulty. It would be instructive to contrast the exertions of the "enthusiastic Spaniards" during these three months of their insurrection, with the efforts of "discontented France," in the 100 days of Napoleon's second reign. The junta were, however, not devoid of ambition, for even before the battle of Baylen, that of Seville was occupied with a project of annexing the Algarves to Spain, and the treaty of Fontainebleau was far from being considered as a dead letter.

CHAPTER III.

THE French emperor, although surprised and chagrined at the disgrace which, for the first time, his armies had sustained, was nothing dismayed by a resistance which he had early contemplated as not improbable. With a piercing glance he had observed the efforts of Spain, and calculated the power of foreign influence in keeping alive the spirit of resistance. Assigning a just value to the

succours which England could afford, he foresaw the danger which might accrue, if he suffered an insurrection of peasants, that had already dishonoured the glory of his arms, to attain the consistency of regular government, to league with powerful nations, and to become disciplined troops.

To defeat the raw levies which the Spaniards had hitherto opposed to his soldiers, was an easy matter, but it was necessary to crush them to atoms, that a dread of his invincible power might still pervade the world, and the secret influence of his genius remain unabated. The constitution of Bayonne would, he was aware, weigh heavy in the scale against those chaotic governments, neither monarchical, nor popular, nor aristocratic, nor federal, which the Spanish revolution was throwing up; but before the benefit of that could be felt by the many, before he could draw any advantages from his moral resources, it was necessary to develop all his military strength. The moment was critical and dangerous. He was surrounded by enemies whose pride he had wounded, but whose means of offence he had not destroyed. If he bent his forces against the Peninsula, England might again excite the continent to arms, and Russia and Austria once more banding together, might raise Prussia and renew the eternal coalitions. The designs of Austria, although covered by the usual artifices of that cunning, rapacious court, were not so hidden but that, earlier or later, a war from that quarter was to be expected as a certain event.

The inhabitants of Prussia, subdued and oppressed, could not be supposed tranquil: the secret societies, that, under the name of Tugenbunde, Gymnasiasts, and other denominations, have since been persecuted by those who were then glad to avail themselves of such assistance, were just beginning to disclose their force and plans. A Baron de Nostiz, Stein, the Prussian counsellor of state, Generals Sharnhost and Gneizenau, and Colonel Schill, appear to have been the principal contrivers and patrons of these societies, so characteristic of Germans, who, regular and plodding, even to a proverb in their actions, possess the most extravagant imaginations of any people on the face of the earth. Whatever the ulterior views of these associations may have been, at this period they were universally inimical to the French; their intent was to drive the latter over the Rhine, and they were a source of peril to the emperor, the more to be feared, as the extent of their influence could not be immediately ascertained.

Russia also, little injured by her losses, was more powerful perhaps from her defeats, because more enlightened as to the cause of them: Napoleon felt, that the hostility of such a great empire would require all his means to repel, and that, consequently, his Spanish operations must be confined in a manner unsuitable to the fame of his arms. Of a long-sighted policy he had, however, prepared the means of obviating this danger, by drawing the Emperor of Russia into a conference at Erfurth, whither the French monarch repaired, confident in the resources of his genius for securing the friendship of the czar.

At this period, it may be truly said, that Napoleon supported the weight of the world; every movement of his produced a political convulsion; yet so sure, so confident was he, of his intellectual superiority, that he sought but to gain one step, and doubted not to overcome all resistance, and preserve his ascendancy. Time was to him victory; if he gained the one, the other followed. Sudden and prompt in execution, he prepared for one of those gigantic efforts which have stamped this age with the greatness of antiquity.

His armies were scattered over Europe. In Italy, in Dalmatia, on the Rhine, the Danube, the Elbe; in Prussia, Denmark, Poland, his legions were to be found. Over that vast extent, above 500,000 disciplined men maintained the supremacy of France. From those bands he drew the imperial guards, the select soldiers of the warlike nation he governed, and the terror of the other continental troops. The veterans of Jena, of Austerlitz, of Friedland, reduced in number, but of confirmed hardihood, were collected into one corps, and marched towards Spain. A host of cavalry, unequalled for enterprise and knowledge of war, were also directed against that devoted land, and a long

train of gallant soldiers followed, until 200,000 men, accustomed to battle, had penetrated the gloomy fastnesses of the western Pyrenees. Forty thousand men of inferior reputation, drawn from the interior of France, from Naples, from Tuscany, and from Piedmont, were assembled at Perpignan.

The march of this multitude was incessant, and as they passed the capital, Napoleon, neglectful of nothing which could excite their courage and swell their military pride, addressed to them one of those nervous orations that shoot like fire to the heart of a real soldier. In the tranquillity of peace it may seem inflated, but on the eve of battle it is thus a general should speak.

"Soldiers! after triumphing on the banks of the Vistula and the Danube, with rapid steps you have passed through Germany. This day, without a moment of repose, I command you to traverse France. Soldiers! I have need of you! The hideous presence of the leopard contaminates the peninsula of Spain and Portugal. In terror he must fly before you. Let us bear our triumphal eagles to the pillars of Hercules, there also we have injuries to avenge! Soldiers! you have surpassed the renown of modern armies, but have you yet equalled the glory of those Romans who, in one and the same campaign, were victorious upon the Rhine and the Euphrates, in Illyria and upon the Tagus! A long peace, a lasting prosperity, shall be the reward of your labours. A real Frenchman could not, ought not, to rest until the seas are free and open to all. Soldiers! all that you have done, all that you will do, for the happiness of the French people and for my glory, shall be eternal in my heart!"

Thus saying, he caused his troops to proceed towards the frontiers of Spain, and himself hastened to meet the Emperor Alexander at Erfurth. Their conference, conducted upon the footing of intimate friendship, produced a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive, and the fate of Spain, was by the one, with calm indifference, abandoned to the injustice of the other.

The accession of strength which this treaty, and the manifest personal partiality of Alexander, gave to the French Emperor, inspired him perhaps with the idea, that the English cabinet would, if a fair occasion offered, gladly enter into negotiations for a general peace. The two emperors wrote a joint letter to the King of England. "The circumstances of Europe had," they said, "brought them together; their first thought was to yield to the wish and the wants of every people, and to seek, in a speedy pacification, the most efficacious remedy for the miseries which oppressed all nations. The long and bloody war which had torn the continent was at an end, without the possibility of being renewed. Many changes had taken place in Europe, many states had been overthrown; the cause was to be found in the state of agitation and misery in which the stagnation of maritime commerce had placed the greatest nations: still greater changes might yet take place, and all of them contrary to the policy of the English nation. Peace, then, was, at once, the interest of the people of the continent, as it was the interest of the people of Great Britain. We entreat your majesty," they concluded, "we unite to entreat your majesty to listen to the voice of humanity, to silence that of the passions; to seek, with the intention of arriving at that object, to conciliate all interests, and thus preserve all powers which exist, ensure the happiness of Europe and of this generation, at the head of which Providence has placed us."

To this joint letter Mr. Canning replied by two letters to the French and Russian ministers, accompanied by an official note. In that addressed to the Russian, he observed, that "however desirous the king might be to reply personally to the emperor, he was prevented, by the unusual mode of communication adopted, which had deprived it of a private and personal character. It was impossible to pay that mark of respect to the emperor, without at the same time acknowledging titles which he had never acknowledged. The proposition for peace would be communicated to Sweden, and to the existing government of Spain. It was necessary that his majesty should receive an immediate assurance, that France acknowledged the government of Spain as a party to the

negotiation. That such was the intention of the emperor could not be doubted, when the lively interest manifested by his imperial majesty for the welfare and dignity of the Spanish monarchy was recollected. No other assurance was wanted, that the emperor could not have been induced to sanction by his concurrence or approbation, usurpations, the principles of which were not less unjust than their example was dangerous to all legitimate sovereigns."

The letter addressed to Mons. de Champagny, Duke of Cadore, merely reiterated the claim for Sweden and Spain being admitted as parties to the negotiation. The official note commenced by stating the king's desire for peace, on terms consistent with his honour, his fidelity to his engagements, and the permanent repose of Europe. The miserable condition of the continent, the convulsions it had experienced, and those with which it was threatened, were not imputable to his majesty. If the cause of so much misery was to be found in the stagnation of commercial intercourse, although his majesty could *not be expected to hear with unqualified regret*, that the system devised for the destruction of the commerce of his subjects had recoiled upon its authors or its instruments; yet, as it was neither the disposition of his majesty, nor in the character of the people over whom he reigned to rejoice in the privations and unhappiness even of the nations which were combined against him, he anxiously desired the termination of the sufferings of the continent. The note, after stating that the progress of the war had imposed new obligations upon Great Britain, claimed for Sicily, for Portugal, for Sweden, and for Spain, a participation in the negotiations. Treaties, it stated, existed with the three first, which bound them and England in peace and war. With Spain indeed no formal instrument had yet been executed, but the ties of honour were, to the King of England, as strong as the most solemn treaties; wherefore it was assumed, that the central junta, or government of Spain, was understood to be a party to any negotiation, in which his majesty was invited to engage.

The reply of Russia was peremptory. The claims of the sovereigns, allies of Great Britain, she would readily admit. But the insurgents of Spain, Russia would not acknowledge as an independent power. The Russians (and England, it was said, could recollect one particular instance) had always been true to this principle; moreover, the emperor had acknowledged Joseph Buonaparte as King of Spain, and was united to the French emperor for peace and for war; he was resolved not to separate his interests from those of Napoleon. After some further arguments touching the question, the reply concluded by offering to treat upon the basis of the "*uti possidetis*," and the respective power of the belligerent parties, or upon *any basis*; for the conclusion of an honourable, just, and equal peace.

The insulting tone of Mr. Canning's communication produced an insulting reply from Monsieur de Champagny, which also finished by proposing the "*uti possidetis*" as a basis for a treaty, and expressing a hope, that without losing sight of the inevitable results of the force of states, it would be remembered, that between great powers there could be no solid peace but that which was equal and honourable for both parties. Upon the receipt of these replies, the English minister broke off the negotiations, and all chance of peace vanished; but previous to the conclusion of this remarkable correspondence, Napoleon had returned to Paris.

What his real views in proposing to treat were, it is difficult to determine; he could not have expected that Great Britain would relinquish the cause of Spain, he must therefore have been prepared to make some arrangement upon that head, unless the whole proceeding was an artifice to sow distrust among his enemies. The English ministers asserted that it was so; but what enemies were they among whom he could create this uneasy feeling? Sweden, Sicily, Portugal; the notion as applied to them was absurd; it is more probable that he was sincere. He said so at Saint Helena, and the peculiar circumstances of the period at which the conferences of Erfurth took place, warrant a belief in

that assertion. The menacing aspect of Austria, the recent loss of Portugal, the hitherto successful insurrection of Spain, the secret societies of Germany, the desire of consolidating the Polish dominions, and placing, while he might, a barrier to the power of Russia on that side, the breach which the events of the Peninsula made in his continental system of excluding British goods, and the commercial distresses of Europe, were cogent reasons for a peace; they might well cause him to be suspicious of the future, and render him anxious for an excuse to abandon an unjust contest, in which he could not fail to suffer much, and to risk more than he could gain. In securing the alliance of Russia, he only disentangled a part of the Gordian knot of politics; to cut the remainder with his sword was at this conjuncture a task which even he might have been doubtful of. The fact that his armies were marching upon Spain, proves nothing to the contrary of this supposition. Time was to him of the utmost consequence. His negotiations proving abortive, it would have been too late to have reinforced his troops on the Ebro; and the event evinced the prudence of his measures in that respect. The refusal to admit the Spaniards as a party to the conferences for peace is scarcely more conclusive; to have done that would have been to resign the weapon in his hands before he entered the lists. That England could not abandon the Spaniards is unquestionable; but that was not a necessary consequence of continuing the negotiations. There was a bar put to the admission of a Spanish diplomatist, but no bar was thereby put to the discussion of Spanish interests; the correspondence of the English minister would not of necessity have compromised Spanish independence, it need not have relaxed in the slightest degree the measures of hostility, nor retarded the succours preparing for the patriots; and when we consider the great power of Napoleon's arms, the subtlety and force of his genius, the good fortune which had hitherto attended his progress in war, and the vast additional strength which the alliance of Russia conferred at the moment, and when, to oppose all this, we contrast the scanty means of Spain, and the confusion into which she was plunged, it does appear as if her welfare would have been better consulted by an appeal to negotiation rather than to battle. It is true that Austria was arming; but Austria had been so often conquered, was so sure to abandon the cause of the patriots, and every other cause when pressed, so certain to sacrifice every consideration of honour or faith to the suggestions of self-interest, that the independence of Spain through the medium of war could only be regarded as the object of uncertain hope, a prize to be gained, if gained at all, by wading through torrents of blood, and sustaining every misery that famine, and the fury of devastating armies could inflict. To avoid, if possible, such dreadful evils by negotiating was surely worth trial, and the force of justice, when urged by the minister of a great nation, would have been difficult to withstand; no power, no ambition can resist it and be safe. But such an enlarged mode of proceeding was not in accord with the shifts and subterfuges that characterized the policy of the day,* when it was thought wise to degrade the dignity of such a correspondence by a ridiculous denial of Napoleon's titles; and praiseworthy to render a state paper, in which such serious interests were discussed, offensive and mean by miserable sarcasms, evincing the pride of an author more than the gravity of a statesman. Mr. Whitbread declared in the House of Commons that he saw no reason for refusing to treat with France at that period; and although public clamour afterwards induced him to explain away this expression, he had no reason to be ashamed of it, for if the opinion of Cicero, that an unfair peace is preferable to the justest war, was ever worthy of attention, it was so at this period, when the success of Spain was doubtful, her misery certain, her salvation only to be obtained through the baptism of blood!

* There is good reason to believe, that a silly intrigue carried on through the medium of the Princess of Tour and Taxis with Talleyrand, and some others, who were even then ready to betray Napoleon, was the real cause of the negotiation having been broken off by Mr. Canning.

Upon the 18th of October Napoleon returned to Paris, secure of the present friendship and alliance of Russia, but uncertain of the moment when the stimulus of English subsidies would quicken the hostility of Austria into life; but if his peril was great, his preparations to meet it were likewise enormous. First he called out two conscriptions, of which the one taken from the classes of 1806, 7, 8, and 9, afforded 80,000 men arrived at maturity; these were destined to replace the veterans directed against Spain.

The second conscription, taken from the class of 1810, also produced 80,000, which were disposed of as reserves in the depôts of France.

The force in Germany was concentrated on the side of Austria. Denmark was evacuated, and 100,000 soldiers were withdrawn from the Prussian states.

The army of Italy was powerfully reinforced, and placed under the command of Prince Eugene, who was assisted by Marshal Massena. Murat also, who had succeeded Joseph in the kingdom of Naples, was directed to assemble a Neapolitan army on the shores of Calabria, and to threaten Sicily. In short, no measures that prudence could suggest were neglected by this wonderful man, to whom the time required by Austria for the mere preparation of a campaign seemed sufficient for the subjection of the whole Peninsula.

The session of the legislative body was opened on the 24th of October; the emperor, in his speech from the throne, after giving a concise sketch of the political situation of Europe, touched upon Spain. "In a few days I go," said he, "to put myself at the head of my armies, and, with the aid of God, to crown the King of Spain in Madrid, and to plant my eagles on the towers of Lisbon," and then departing from Paris he repaired to Bayonne; but the labours of his ministers continued; their speeches and reports, more elaborately explicit than usual, exposed the vast resources of France, and were well calculated to impress upon the minds of men the danger of provoking the enmity of such a powerful nation. From those documents it appeared that the expenses of the year (including the interest of the national debt), being between twenty-nine and thirty millions sterling, were completely covered by the existing taxes, drawn from a metallic currency, and that no fresh burthens would be laid upon the nation. Numerous public works were in progress, internal trade, and that commerce which was carried on by land, were flourishing, and nearly one million of men were in arms!

The readiness with which Mr. Canning broke off the negotiation of Erfurth, and defied this stupendous power, would lead to the supposition that on the side of Spain at least he was prepared to encounter it with some chance of success; but no trace of a matured plan is to be found in the instructions to the generals commanding in Portugal previous to the 25th of September, nor was the project then adopted one which discovered any adequate knowledge of the force of the enemy, or of the state of affairs. Indeed the conduct of the cabinet relative to the Peninsula was scarcely superior to that of the central junta itself. Several vague projects, or rather speculations, were communicated to the generals in Portugal, but in none of them was the strength of the enemy alluded to; in none was there a settled plan of operations visible. It was evident that the prodigious activity of the emperor was not taken into consideration, and that a strange delusion relative to his power, or to his intentions, existed among the English ministers.

It was the 6th of October before a despatch, containing the first determinate plan of campaign, arrived at Lisbon. Thirty thousand infantry and 5000 cavalry were to be employed in the north of Spain; of these numbers 10,000 were to be embarked at the English ports, and the remainder were to be composed of regiments, drafted from the army then in Portugal. Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore was appointed to command the whole, and he was authorized (at his own discretion) to effect a junction by a voyage round the coast, or by a march through the interior. He chose the latter (1) because a voyage at that season of the year would have been tedious and precarious; (2) because the

intention of Sir Hew Dalrymple had been to enter Spain by Almeida, and the few arrangements which that general had power to make were made with a view to such a march; and (3) because he was informed that the province of Galicia was scarcely able to equip the force coming from England, under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir David Baird. Sir John Moore was directed to take the field with the troops under his own immediate command without delay; and he was to fix upon some place either in Galicia or on the borders of Leon for concentrating the whole army. The specific plan of operations was to be concerted afterwards with the Spanish generals.

This was a light and idle proceeding, promising no good result, for the Ebro was to be the theatre of war. The head of the great French host coming from Germany was already in the passes of the Pyrenees, and the local difficulties impeding the English general's progress were abundant, and of a nature to render that which was ill begun, end worse, and that which was well arranged, fail. To be first in the field is a great and decided advantage; but here the plan of operations was not even arranged, when the enemy's first blows were descending.

Sir John Moore had, indeed, much to execute, and with little help. First, he was to organize an army of raw soldiers; then, in a poor and unsettled country, just relieved from the pressure of a harsh and griping enemy, he was to procure the transport necessary for his stores, ammunition, and even for the conveyance of the officers' baggage. Assisted by an experienced staff, such obstacles do not very much impede a good general; but here, few, if any, of the officers, except the commander-in-chief, had served a campaign; and every branch of the administration, civil and military, was composed of new men, very zealous and willing, but ignorant of a service, where no energy can prevent the effects of inexperience from being severely felt.* The roads through Portugal were very bad; the rainy season, so baleful to an army, was upon the point of setting in; time pressed sorely, it was essential to be quick, but gold, that turns the wheels of war, was wanting; and this, at all times a great evil, was the more grievously felt at the moment, inasmuch as the Portuguese, accustomed to fraud on the part of their own government, and to forced contributions by the French, could not readily be persuaded that an army of foreigners, paying with promises alone, might be trusted; nor was this natural suspicion allayed by observing, that while the general and his troops were thus kept without money, all the subordinate agents dispersed throughout the country were amply supplied. Sir David Baird, who, with his portion of troops, was to land at Coruña, and to equip in a country already exhausted by Blake's army, was likewise encompassed with difficulties. From Coruña to the nearest point where he could effect a junction with the forces marching from Lisbon was two hundred miles, and he also was without money.†

No general-in-chief was appointed to command the Spanish armies; nor was Sir John Moore referred by the English ministers to any person with whom he could communicate at all, much less concert a plan of operations for the allied forces.‡ He was unacquainted with the views of the Spanish government, he was uninformed of the numbers, composition, or situation of the troops with which he was to act, as well as those with whom he was to contend, and 25,000. in his military chest, and his own genius, constituted his resources for a campaign, which would probably lead the army far from the coast, and from all its means of supply. He was first to unite the scattered portions of his forces by a winter march of 300 miles; another 300 were to be passed before he reached the Ebro; then he was to concert a plan of operations with generals acting each independent of the other; their corps reaching from the northern sea-coast to Zaragoza; themselves jealous and quarrelsome, their men insubordinate, differing in customs, discipline, language, and religion from the English, and despising all foreigners; and this was to be accomplished in time to defeat an enemy who

* Appendix, No. 13, sections 1 and 3.

† Ibid, section 1.

‡ Ibid, section 4.

was already in the field, accustomed to great movements, and conducted by the most rapid and decided of men. It must be acknowledged that the ministers' views were equally vast and inconsiderate, and their miscalculations are the more remarkable, as there was not wanting a man in the highest military situation to condemn their plan at the time, and to propose a better.

The Duke of York, in a formal minute drawn up for the information of the government, observed, that the Spanish armies being unconnected, and occupying a great extent of ground, were weak; that the French being concentrated, and certain of reinforcements, were strong; that there could be no question of the relative value of Spanish and French troops, and that, consequently, the allies might be beaten before the British could arrive at the scene of action; the latter would then unaided have to meet the French army; hence it was essential to provide a sufficient number of troops to meet such an emergency; that number, he judged, should not be less than 60,000 men, and by a detailed statement, he proved that such a number could have been furnished without detriment to any other service.*

At this period, also, the effects of that incredible folly and weakness which marked all the proceedings of the central junta, were felt throughout Spain. In any other country the conduct of the government would have been attributed to insanity. So apathetic with respect to the enemy as to be contemptible; so active in pursuit of self-interest as to become hateful. The junta was occupied in devising how to render itself at once despotic and popular; how to excite enthusiasm and check freedom of expression; how to enjoy the luxury of power without its labour; how to acquire great reputation without trouble; how to be indolent and victorious at the same moment. Fear prevented it from removing to Madrid after every preparation had been made for a public entrance into that capital. The members passed decrees, repressing the liberty of the press on the ground of the deceptions practised upon the public; but themselves never hesitated to deceive the British agents, the generals, the government, and their own countrymen, by the most flagitious falsehoods upon every subject, whether of greater or less importance. They hedged their own dignity round, with ridiculous and misplaced forms opposed to the vital principle of an insurrectional government; they devoted their attention to abstract speculations, recalled the exiled Jesuits, and inundated the country with long and laboured state papers, but left the pressing business of the moment to shift for itself. Every application on the part of Lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart, even for an order to expedite a common courier, was met by difficulties and delays, and it was necessary to have recourse to the most painful solicitations to obtain the slightest attention; nor did that mode always succeed.†

Sir John Moore strenuously grappled with the difficulties besetting him: well knowing the value of time in military transactions, he urged forward the preparations with all possible activity. He was very desirous that troops who had a journey of 600 miles to make previous to meeting the enemy, should not, at the commencement, be overwhelmed by the torrents of rain which in Portugal descend at this period with such violence as to destroy the shoes, ammunition, and accoutrements of a soldier, and render him almost unfit for service. The Spanish generals recommended that the line of march should be conducted by Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, Salamanca, Valladolid, and Burgos, and that the magazines for the campaign should be formed at one of the latter towns; and as this coincided with the previous preparations, the army was organized in three columns, two of which were directed upon Almeida, by the routes of Coimbra and Guarda, and the third, comprising the artillery, the cavalry, and the regiments quartered in the Alemtejo, was destined to move by Alcantara, upon Ciudad Rodrigo. Almeida itself was chosen for a place of arms, and all the reserve-stores and provisions were forwarded there, as time and circumstances would permit; but the want of money, the unsettled state of

* Appendix, No 24.

† Appendix, No. 13, section 6.

the country, and the inexperience of the commissariat, rendered it difficult to procure the means of transport even for the light baggage of the regiments, although the quantity of the latter was reduced so much as to create discontent.* One Sattaro (the same person who has been already mentioned as an agent of Junot's in the negotiation with Sir Charles Cotton) engaged to supply the army, but dishonestly failing in his contract, so embarrassed the operations, that the general resigned all hope of being able to move with more than the light baggage, the ammunition necessary for immediate use, and a scanty supply of medicines. The formation of the magazines at Almeida was also retarded, and the future subsistence of the troops was thus thrown upon a raw commissariat, unprovided with money. The general, however, relying upon its increasing experience, and upon the activity of Lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart, did not delay his march, but sent agents to Madrid and other places to make contracts, and to endeavour to raise money, for such was the policy of the ministers, that they supplied the Spaniards with gold, and left the English army to get it back in loans.

Many of the regiments were actually in movement when an unexpected difficulty forced the commander-in-chief to make a fresh disposition of the troops. The state of the Portuguese roads north of the Tagus was unknown; the native officers and the people declared that they were impracticable for artillery. The opinion of Colonel Lopez, a military commissary, sent by the Spanish government to facilitate the march of the British, coincided with this information, and the reports of one of the most intelligent and enterprising of the officers of the quarter-master-general's department, who were employed to examine the lines of route, corroborated the general opinion.† Junot, indeed, with infinite pains, had carried his guns along these roads, but his carriages had been broken, and the batteries rendered unserviceable by the operation. In this dilemma, Sir John Moore reluctantly determined to send his artillery and cavalry by the south bank of the Tagus, to Talavera de la Reyna, from whence they might gain Naval Carneiro, the Escorial, the pass of the Guadarama mountains, Espiñar, Arevalo, and Salamanca. He would have marched the whole army by the same route, if this disagreeable intelligence respecting the northern roads had been obtained earlier; but when the arrangements were all made for the supplies to go to Almeida, and when most of the regiments were actually in movement towards that town, it was too late to alter their destination.

This separation of the artillery violated a great military principle, which prescribes that the point of concentration for an army should be beyond the reach of the enemy. But it was a matter of apparent necessity, and, moreover, no danger was apprehended from the offensive operations of an adversary represented to be incapable of maintaining his own line of defence. Valladolid and Burgos were considered by the Spaniards as safe places for the English magazines, and Sir John Moore shared so much of the universal confidence in the Spanish enthusiasm and courage, as to suppose that Salamanca would not be an insecure point of concentration for his columns, under the protection of such numerous patriotic armies as were said to be on the Ebro. One brigade of six

* Appendix, No. 13, section 3.

† Sir Walter Scott, in his *Life of Napoleon*, inaccurately asserts, that Sir John Moore, "sent 10,000 men, under Sir David Baird, by sea, to Coruña," and that "*the general science of war, upon the most extended scale*, seems to have been so little understood or practised by the English generals at this time, that instead of the country being carefully reconnoitred by officers of skill, the march of the army was arranged by such hasty and inaccurate information as could be collected from the peasants. *By their reports General Moore was induced to divide his army*"——What "*the general science of war upon an extended scale*" may mean, I cannot pretend to say; but that Sir David Baird was sent by the government from England direct to Coruña, and that Sir John Moore *was not induced* by the reports of the peasants to divide his army, may be ascertained by a reference to the Appendix, No. 13, section 2.

pounders he retained with the head-quarters, the remainder of his artillery, twenty-four pieces; the cavalry, amounting to 1000 troopers; the great parc of the army, contained many hundred carriages, and escorted by 3000 infantry, he sent by the road of Talavera, under the command of Sir John Hope, an officer qualified by his talents, firmness, and zeal, to conduct the most important enterprises.

The rest of the army marched in three columns, the first by Alcantara, the second by Abrantes, the third by Coimbra, in the direction of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo; and with such energy did the general overcome all obstacles, that the whole of the troops were in movement, and head-quarters quitted Lisbon by the 26th of October, just twenty days after the receipt of the despatch which appointed him to the chief command; a surprising diligence, but rendered necessary by the pressure of circumstances. "The army," to use his own words, "run the risk of finding itself in front of the enemy with no more ammunition than the men carried in their pouches:" "but had I waited," he adds, "until everything was forwarded, the troops would not have been in Spain until the spring, and I trust that the enemy will not find out our wants as soon as they will feel the effects of what we have."

The Spaniards, however, who expected "everybody to fly except themselves," thought him slow, and were impatient, and from every quarter indeed letters arrived, pressing him to advance. Lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart, witnesses of the sluggish incapacity of the Spanish government, judged that such a support was absolutely necessary to sustain the reeling strength of Spain. The supreme government were even awakened for a moment. Hitherto, as a mask for its ignorance, it had treated the French power with contempt, and the Spanish generals and the people echoed the sentiments of the government: but now, a letter addressed by the governor of Bayonne to General Jourdan, stating, that 60,000 infantry, and 7000 cavalry, would reinforce the French armies between the 16th of October and the 16th of November, was intercepted, and made the junta feel that a crisis for which it was unprepared was approaching. With the folly usually attendant on improvidence, these men, who had been so slow themselves, required that others should be supernaturally quick when danger pressed.

In the mean time Sir David Baird's forces arrived at Coruña. Lord William Bentinck had given intimation of their approach, and the central junta had repeatedly assured him, that every necessary order was given, and that every facility would be afforded, for the disembarkation and supply of the troops. This was untrue; no measures of any kind had been taken, no instructions issued, and no preparations were made. The junta of Coruña disliked the personal trouble of a disembarkation in that port, and in the hope that Baird would be driven to another, refused him permission to land, until a communication was had with Aranjuez; but fifteen days elapsed before an answer could be obtained from a government, who were daily pestering Sir John Moore with complaints of the tardiness of his march.*

Sir David Baird came without money, Sir John could only give him £8000, a sum which might have been mistaken for a private loan, if the fact of its being public property were not expressly mentioned. But at this time Mr. Frere, the plenipotentiary, arrived at Coruña, with 2,000,000 of dollars, intended for the use of the Spaniards;† and while such large sums, contrary to the earnest recommendations of Mr. Stuart and Major Cox, were lavished in that quarter, the penury of the English general obliged him to borrow from the funds in Mr. Frere's hands. Thus assisted, the troops were put in motion; but, wanting all the equipments essential to an army, they were forced to march by half battalions, conveying their scanty stores on country cars, hired from day to day, nor was that meagre assistance obtained but at great expense, and by compliance with a vulgar mercenary spirit predominant among the authorities of Galicia. The

* Appendix, No. 13, section 1.

† Ibid, sections 5 and 6.

junta frequently promised to procure the carriages, but did not; the commissaries pushed to the wall by the delay, offered an exorbitant remuneration: the cars were then forthcoming, and the procrastination of the government proved to be a concerted plan, to defraud the military chest. In fine, the local rulers were unfriendly, crafty, fraudulent, the peasantry suspicious, fearful, rude, disinclined towards strangers, and indifferent to public affairs. A few shots only were required to render theirs a hostile instead of a friendly greeting.

With Mr. Frere came a fleet conveying a Spanish force, under the Marquis of Romana. When the insurrection first broke forth, that nobleman commanded 14,000 or 15,000 troops, who were serving with the French armies. How to recover this disciplined body of men from the enemy was a subject of early anxiety with the junta of Seville; and Castaños, in his first intercourse with Sir Hew Dalrymple, signified his wish that the British government should adopt some mode of apprising Romana, that Spain was in arms, and should endeavour to extricate him and his army from the toils of the enemy. A gentleman named M'Kenzie was employed by the English ministers to conduct the enterprise; the Spanish troops were quartered in Holstein, Sleswig, Jutland, and the islands of Funen, Zealand, and Langeland; Mr. M'Kenzie, through the medium of one Robertson, a catholic priest, opened a communication with Romana. Neither the general, nor the soldiers he commanded, hesitated, and a judicious plan being concerted, Sir Richard Keats, with a squadron detached from the Baltic fleet, suddenly appeared off Nyborg, in the island of Funen. A majority of the Spanish regiments quartered in Sleswig immediately seized all the Danish craft in the different harbours of that coast, and pushed across the channel to Funen, where Romana, with the assistance of Keats, had already seized the port and castle of Nyborg without opposition, save from a small ship of war that was moored across the mouth of the harbour. From Nyborg Romana passed to Langeland, and there awaited the arrival of Sir James Saumarez with the English fleet, on board of which he embarked with about 9500 men. Of the remainder, some were disarmed, or overawed by the Danish troops in Zealand, and some did not escape from Sleswig. This enterprise was conducted with prudent activity, and the unhesitating patriotism of the Spanish soldiers was very honourable, but the danger was trifling; Mr. Robertson incurred the most. Romana, after touching at England, repaired to Coruña; his troops did not, however, land at that port, but after a while coasted to St. Andero, and being there disembarked, and equipped from the English stores, proceeded by divisions to join Blake's army in Biscay.

Among the various subjects calling for Sir John Moore's attention, there was none of greater interest than the appointment of a generalissimo to the Spanish armies. Impressed with the imminent danger of procrastination, or uncertainty in such a matter, he desired Lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart to urge the central government with all their force upon that head; to Lord Castlereagh he represented the injury that must accrue to the cause, if the measure was delayed, and he proposed to go himself to Madrid, with a view of adding weight to his representations. Subsequent events, which left him no time for the journey, frustrated this intention, and there seems no reason to imagine, that his personal remonstrances would have weighed with a government, described by Mr. Stuart, after a thorough experience of their qualities, as, "never having made a single exertion for the public good, neither rewarding merit nor punishing guilt," and being for all useful purposes "absolutely null." The junta's dislike to a single military chief was not an error of the head, and reason is of little avail against the suggestions of self-interest.

The march of the British troops was as rapid as the previous preparations had been. Head-quarters reached Almeida on the 8th of November. The infantry were already assembled at that town. The condition of the men was superb, and their discipline exemplary; on that side all was well, but from the obstacles encountered by Sir David Baird, and the change of direction in the

artillery, it was evident, that no considerable force could be brought into action before the end of the month. Meanwhile, the Spaniards were hastening events. Despatches from Lord William Bentinck announced that the enemy remained stationary on the Ebro, although reinforced by 10,000 men; that Castaños was about to cross that river at Tudela; and that the army of Aragon was moving by Sor upon Roncevalles, with a view to gain the rear of the French, while Castaños assailed their left flank. The general, judging that such movements would bring on a battle, the success of which must be very doubtful, became uneasy for his own artillery: his concern was increased by observing, that the guns might have kept with the other columns; "and if anything adverse happens, I have not," he wrote to General Hope, "necessity to plead; the road we are now travelling, that by Villa Velha and Guarda, is practicable for artillery. The brigade under Wilmot has already reached Guarda, and as far as I have already seen, the road presents few obstacles, and those easily surmounted; this knowledge was, however, only acquired by our own officers; when the brigade was at Castello Branco, it was not certain if it could proceed." Wherefore, he desired Hope no longer to trust any reports, but seek a shorter line, by Placentia, across the mountains to Salamanca.

Up to this period, all reports from the agents, all information from the government at home, all communications public and private, coincided upon one subject. The Spaniards were an enthusiastic, a heroic people, a nation of unparalleled energy! their armies were brave; they were numerous; they were confident! 180,000 men were actually in line of battle, extending from the sea-coast of Biscay to Zaragoza; the French, reduced to a fourth of this number, cooped up in a corner, shrunk from an encounter; they were deserted by the emperor; they were trembling; they were spiritless! Nevertheless, the general was somewhat distrustful; he perceived the elements of disaster in the divided commands, and the lengthened lines of the Spaniards; and early in October he had predicted the mischief that such a system would produce. "As long as the French remain upon the defensive," he observed, "it will not be so much felt; but the moment an attack is made, some great calamity must ensue." However, he was not without faith in the multitude and energy of the patriots, when he considered the greatness of their cause.

Castaños was at this time pointed out by the central junta as the person with whom to concert a plan of campaign, and Sir John Moore, concluding that it was a preliminary step towards making that officer generalissimo, wrote to him in a conciliatory style, well calculated to ensure a cordial co-operation. This was an encouraging event; the English general believed it to be the commencement of a better system, and looked forward with more hope to the opening of the war; but this favourable state soon changed. Far from being created chief of all, Castaños was superseded in the command he already held, the whole folly of the Spanish character broke forth, and confusion and distress followed. But even at that moment clouds were arising in a quarter, which had hitherto been all sunshine. The military agents, as the crisis approached, lowered their tone of confidence; they no longer dwelt upon the enthusiasm of the armies; they admitted, that the confidence of the troops was sinking, and that even in numbers they were inferior to the French.* In truth, it was full time to change their note, for the real state of affairs could no longer be concealed, and a great catastrophe was at hand; but what of wildness in their projects, or of skill in the enemy's; what of ignorance, vanity, and presumption in their generals; what of fear among their soldiers; and what of fortune in the events; combined to hasten the ruin of the Spaniards, and how that ruin was effected, I, quitting the English army for a time, will now relate.

* Appendix, No. 13, section 7.

CHAPTER IV.

IN the preceding chapters I have exposed the weakness, the folly, the improvidence of Spain, and shown how the bad passions and sordid views of her leaders were encouraged by the unwise prodigality of England. I have dissected the full boast and meagre preparations of the governments in both countries; laying bare the bones and sinews of the insurrection; and by comparing their loose and feeble structure with the strongly knitted frame and large proportions of the enemy, prepared the reader for the inevitable issue of a conflict between such ill-matched champions. In the present book, I shall recount the sudden and terrible manner in which the Spanish armies were overthrown, and the tempestuous progress of the French emperor.

But previous to relating these disasters I must revert to the period immediately following the retreat of King Joseph, and trace those early operations of the French and Spanish forces which, like a jesting prologue to a deep tragedy, unworthily ushered in the great catastrophe.

CAMPAIGN OF THE FRENCH AND SPANISH ARMIES BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF THE EMPEROR.

After General Cuesta was removed from the command, and that the junta of Seville was, by Major Cox, forced to disgorge so much of the English subsidy as sufficed for the immediate relief of the troops in Madrid, all the Spanish armies closed upon the Ebro.

General Blake, reinforced by 8000 Asturians, established his base of operations at Reynosa, opened a communication with the English vessels off the port of St. Andero, and directed his views towards Biscay.

The Castilian army, conducted by General Pignatelli, resumed its march upon Burgo del Osma and Logroña.

The two divisions of the Andalusian troops under Lapeña, and the Murcian division of General Llamas, advanced to Tarazona and Tudela.

Palafox, with the Aragonese and Valencian divisions of St. Marc, operated from the side of Zaragoza.

Fourteen or fifteen thousand of the Estremaduran troops were drafted, and placed under the conduct of the Conde de Belvedere, a weak youth, not twenty years of age. They were at first directed upon Logroña, as forming part of Castaños's command, but finally, as we shall find, received another destination.

Between these armies there was neither concert nor connexion; their movements were regulated by some partial view of affairs, or by the silly caprices of the generals, who were ignorant of each other's plans, and little solicitous to combine operations. The weak characters of many of the chiefs, the inexperience of all, and the total want of system, opened a field for intriguing men, and invited unqualified persons to interfere in the direction of affairs. Thus we find Colonel Doyle making a journey to Zaragoza, and priding himself upon having prevailed with Palafox to detach 7000 men to Sangüessa; and Captain Whittingham, without any knowledge of Doyle's interference, earnestly dissuading the Spaniards from such an enterprise. The first affirmed, that the movement would "turn the enemy's left flank, threaten his rear, and have the appearance of cutting off his retreat." The second argued, that Sangüessa, being seventy miles from Zaragoza, and only a few leagues from Pampeluna, the detachment would itself be cut off. Doyle judged that it would draw the French from Caprosa and Milagro, and expose those points to Llamas and La-Peña; that it would force the enemy to recall the reinforcements said to be marching against Blake, and enable that general to form a junction with the Asturians, when he might, with 40,000 men, possess himself of the Pyrenees; and if the French army, estimated at 35,000 men, did not fly, cut it off from France, or by moving on Miranda, sweep clear Biscay and Castile. Palafox,

pleased with this plan, sent Whittingham to inform Llamas and La-Peña, that O'Neil would, with 6000 men, march on the 15th of September to Sanguessa. Those generals disapproved of the movement as dangerous, premature, and at variance with the plan arranged in the council of war held at Madrid. Palafox, regardless of their opinion, persisted. O'Neil occupied Sanguessa; drew the attention of the enemy, and was immediately driven across the Alagon river.

In this manner all their projects, characterized by a profound ignorance of war, were lightly adopted and as lightly abandoned, or ended in disasters; yet victory was more confidently anticipated, than if consummate skill had presided over the arrangements; and this vain-glorious feeling, extending to the military agents, was by them propagated in England, where the fore-boasting was nearly as loud, and as absurd, as in the Peninsula. The delusion was universal; even Lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart, deceived by the curious consistency of the Spanish falsehoods, doubted if the French army was able to maintain its position; and believed that the Spaniards had obtained a moral ascendancy in the field. Drunk with vanity and folly, the leading Spaniards in the capital, feeling certain that the "remnants," as they were called, of the French army on the Ebro, estimated at from 35,000 to 40,000 men, would be immediately destroyed, proposed that the British army should be directed upon Catalonia, and when they found that this proposal was not acceded to, they withdrew 10,000 men from the Murcian division, and sent them to the neighbourhood of Lerida.

The natural pride and arrogance of the Spaniards were greatly aided by the timid and false operations of King Joseph. Twenty days after the evacuation of Madrid, that monarch was at the head of above 50,000 fighting men, exclusive of 8000 employed to maintain the communications, and to furnish the garrisons of Pampeluna, Tolosa, Irun, St. Sebastian, and Bilbao.*

The French army of Catalonia, 17,000 in number, was, as we have seen, distinct from the king's command; but a strong reserve, assembled at Bayonne, under General Drouet, supplied him with reinforcements, and was itself supported by drafts from the dépôts in the interior of France.

Six thousand men, divided into several movable columns, watched the openings of the Pyrenees, from St. Jean Pied de Port to Rousillon, and guarded the frontier from Spanish incursions; and a second reserve, composed of Neapolitans, Tuscans, and Piedmontese, was commenced at Belgrade, with a view of supporting Duhesme in Catalonia.

How the king quelled the nascent insurrection at Bilbao, and how he dispersed the insurgents of the valleys in Aragon, I have already related. After those operations the French army was re-organized and divided into three grand divisions and a reserve. Marshal Bessieres retained the command of the right wing; Marshal Moncey assumed that of the left; and Marshal Ney arriving at this period from Paris, took charge of the centre; while the reserve, chiefly composed of detachments from the imperial guard, remained near the person of the king. The old republican general, Jourdan, a man whose day of glory belonged to another æra, re-appeared upon the military stage, and filled the office of major-general to the army.

With such a force, and so assisted, there was nothing in Spain, turn which way he would, capable of opposing King Joseph's march; but the incongruity of a camp with a court is always productive of indecision and of error; the truncheon does not fit every hand, and the French army soon felt the inconvenience of having at its head a monarch who was not a warrior. Joseph remained on the defensive; but he did not understand the force of the maxim, *that offensive movements are the foundation of a good defence*. He held Bilbao; but he abandoned Tudela contrary to the advice of the generals who had conducted the operations on that side, and in its place Milagro, a small town, situated upon the rivers Arga and Aragon, just above their confluence with the

Ebro, was by him chosen as the position of battle for the left wing.* As long as Bessieres held Burgos in force, his cavalry commanded the valley of the Douero, menaced Palencia and Valladolid, and scouring the plains, kept Blake and Cuesta in check. Instead of reinforcing a post so advantageous, the king relinquished Burgos as a point beyond his line of defence, and Bessieres' troops were posted in successive divisions behind it, as far as Puente Lara on the Ebro. Ney's force lined that river down to Logroña; the reserve was quartered behind Miranda; and Trevino, a small obscure place, was chosen as the point of battle, for the right and centre. In this disadvantageous situation the army, with some trifling changes, remained from the middle of August until late in September. During that time the artillery and carriages of transport were repaired, magazines were collected, the cavalry remounted, and the preparations made for an active campaign when the reinforcements should arrive from Germany.

The line of resistance thus offered to the Spaniards, evinced a degree of timidity which the relative strength of the armies by no means justified; the left of the French evidently leaned towards the great communication with France, and seemed to refuse the support of Pampeluna. Tudela was abandoned, and Burgos resigned to the enterprise of the Spaniards. All this indicated fear, a disposition to retreat if the enemy advanced. The king complained with what extreme difficulty he obtained intelligence; yet he neglected by forward movements to feel for his adversaries. Wandering as it were in the dark, he gave a loose to his imagination, and conjuring up a phantom of Spanish strength, which had no real existence, anxiously waited for the development of their power, while they were exposing their weakness by a succession of the most egregious blunders.

Joseph's errors did not escape the animadversion of his brother, whose sagacity enabled him, although at a distance, to detect, through the glare of the insurrection, all the inefficiency of the Spaniards; but, despising them as soldiers, he dreaded the moral effect produced by their momentary success, and he was preparing to crush the rising hopes of his enemies. Joseph's retreat, and subsequent position, therefore, displeased him; and he desired his brother to check the exultation of the patriots, by acting upon a bold and well-considered plan, of which he sent him the outline.

His notes, dictated upon the occasion, are replete with genius, and evince his absolute mastery of the art of war. "It was too late," he said, "to discuss the question, whether Madrid should have been retained or abandoned? Idle to consider, if a position, covering the siege of Zaragoza, might not have been formed; useless to examine, if the line of the Douro was not better than that of the Ebro for the French army.† The line of the Ebro was actually taken, and it must be kept; to advance from that river without a fixed object would create indecision; this would bring the troops back again, and produce an injurious moral effect; but why abandon Tudela? Why relinquish Burgos? Those towns were of note, and of reputation; the possession of them gave a moral influence, and moral force constituted two-thirds of the strength of armies. Tudela and Burgos had also a relative importance; the first possessing a stone bridge, was on the communication of Pampeluna and Madrid. It commanded the canal of Zaragoza. It was the capital of a province. When the army resumed offensive operations, their first enterprise would be the siege of Zaragoza; from that town to Tudela, the land carriage was three days, but the water carriage was only fourteen hours; wherefore to have the besieging artillery and stores at Tudela was the same as to have them at Zaragoza. If the Spaniards got possession of the former, all Navarre would be in a state of insurrection, and Pampeluna exposed. Tudela then was of vast importance; but Milagro was of none. It was an obscure place, without a bridge, and commanding no communication; in short it was without interest, defending

* Napoleon's notes. Appendix, Nos. 4. and 5.

† Appendix, No. 5.

nothing! led to nothing! A river," said this great commander, "though it should be as large as the Vistula, and as rapid as the Danube at its mouth, is nothing, unless there are good points of passage, and a head quick to take the offensive. The Ebro as a defence was less than nothing, a mere line of demarcation! and Milagro was useless. The enemy might neglect it, be at Estella, and from thence gain Tolosa, before any preparation could be made to receive him; he might come from Soria, from Logroña, or from Zaragoza. Again, Burgos was the capital of a province, the centre of many communications, a town of great fame, and of relative value to the French army. To occupy it in force, and offensively, would threaten Palencia, Valladolid, Aranda, and even Madrid. It is necessary," observed the emperor, "to have made war a long time to conceive this. It is necessary to have made a number of offensive enterprises to know how much the smallest event, or even indication, encourages or discourages, and decides the adoption of one enterprise instead of another. In short, if the enemy occupies Burgos, Logroña, and Tudela, the French army will be in a pitiful position. It is not known if he has left Madrid; you are ignorant of what has become of the Gallician army, and we have reason to suspect that it may have been directed upon Portugal; in such a state to take up, instead of a bold, menacing, and honourable position like Burgos, a confined, shameful one like Trevino, is to say to the enemy, 'you have nothing to fear, go elsewhere, we have made our dispositions to go farther, or we have chosen our ground to fight; come there, without fear of being disturbed.' But what will the French general do if the enemy marches the next day upon Burgos? Will he let the citadel of that town be taken by 6000 insurgents? or if the French have left a garrison in the castle, how can 400 or 500 men retire in such a vast plain? and, from that time, all is gone; the enemy master of the citadel, it cannot be retaken; if, on the contrary, we should guard the citadel, we must give battle to the enemy, because it cannot hold out more than three days, and if we wish to fight a battle, why should Bessieres abandon the ground where we wish to fight? These dispositions appear badly considered, and when the enemy shall march, our troops will meet with such an insult as will demoralize them if there are only insurgents or light troops advancing against them. If 15,000 insurgents enter into Burgos, retrench themselves in the town, and occupy the castle, it will be necessary to calculate a march of several days to enable us to post ourselves there, and to retake the town, which cannot be done without some inconvenience. If, during the time, the real attack is upon Logroña or Pampeluna, we shall have made countermarches without use, which will have fatigued the army. If we hold it with cavalry only, is it not to say we do not intend stopping, and to invite the enemy to come there? It was the first time," he said, "that an army had quitted all its offensive positions to take up a bad defensive line, and to affect to choose its field of battle, when the thousand and one combinations which might take place, and the distance of the enemy, did not leave a probability of being able to foresee if the battle would take place at Tudela, between Tudela and Pampeluna, between Soria and the Ebro, or between Burgos and Miranda;" and then followed an observation which may be studied with advantage by those authors who, unacquainted with the simplest rudiments of military science, censure the conduct of a general, and are pleased, from some obscure nook to point out his errors to the world; authors who, profoundly ignorant of the numbers, situation, and resources of the opposing armies, pretend, nevertheless, to detail with great accuracy the right method of executing the most difficult and delicate operations of war. As the rebuke of Turenne, who frankly acknowledged to Louvois that he could pass the Rhine at a particular spot if the latter's finger were a bridge, has been lost upon such men, perhaps the more recent opinion of Napoleon may be disregarded. "But it is not permitted," says that consummate general, "it is not permitted, at the distance of 300 leagues, and without even a state of the situation of the army, to direct what should be done!"

After having thus protected himself from the charge of presumption, the emperor proceeded to recommend certain dispositions for the defence of the Ebro. The Spaniards, he said, were not to be feared in the field; 25,000 French in a good position would suffice to beat all their armies united, and this opinion he deduced from the events of Dupont's campaign, of which he gave a short analysis. Let Tudela, he said, be retrenched if possible, at all events it should be occupied in force, and offensively towards Zaragoza. Let the general commanding there collect provisions on all sides; secure the boats, with a view to future operations when the reinforcements should arrive, and maintain his communication with Logroña by the right bank if he can, but certainly by the left. Let his corps be considered as one of observation; if a body of insurgents only approach, he may fight them, or keep them constantly on the defensive by his movements against their line or against Zaragoza. If regular troops attack him, and he is forced across the Ebro, let him then manœuvre about Pampeluna until the general-in-chief has made his dispositions for the main body. In this manner no prompt movement upon Estella and Tolosa can take place, and the corps of observation will have amply fulfilled its task. Let Marshal Bessieres, with all his corps united, and reinforced by the light cavalry of the army, encamp in the wood near Burgos; let the citadel be well occupied, the hospital, the depôts, and all encumbrances sent over the Ebro; let him keep in a condition to manœuvre, be under arms every day at three o'clock in the morning, and remain until the return of his patrols. He should send parties to a great extent, as far as two days' march. Let the corps of the centre be placed at Miranda and Briviesca, and all the encumbrances be likewise sent across the Ebro behind Vittoria. This corps should be under arms every morning, and send patrols by the road of Soria, and wherever the enemy may be expected. It must not be lost sight of, that these two corps, being to be united, they should be connected as little as possible with Logroña, and consider the left wing as a corps detached, having a line of operations upon Pampeluna, and a separate part to act. Tudela is preserved as a post contiguous to the line. Be well on the defensive, he continues, in short, make war, that is to say, get information from the alcaldes, the curates, the posts, the chiefs of convents, and the principal proprietors; you will then be perfectly informed; the patrols should always be directed upon the side of Soria, and of Burgos, upon Palencia, and upon the side of Aranda. They could thus form three posts of interception, and send three reports of men arrested; these men should be treated well, and dismissed, after they had given the information desired of them. Let the enemy then come, and we can unite all our forces; hide our marches from him, and fall upon his flank at the moment he is meditating an offensive movement."

With regard to the minor details, the emperor thus expressed himself: "Soria is not, I believe, more than two short marches from the actual position of the army; that town has constantly acted against us; an expedition sent there to disarm it, to take thirty of the principal people as hostages, and to obtain provisions, would have a good effect. It would be useful to occupy St. Ander. It will be of advantage to move by the direct road of Bilbao to St. Ander. It will be necessary to occupy and disarm Biscay and Navarre. Every Spaniard taken in arms there should be shot.* The manufactories of arms at Palencia should be watched, to hinder them from working for the rebels. The port of Pancorbo should be armed and fortified with great activity; ovens, and magazines of provisions and ammunition, should be placed there. Situated nearly half way between Madrid and Bayonne, it is an intermediate post for the army, and a point of support for troops operating towards Galicia. The interest of the enemy," he resumes, "is to mask his forces. By hiding the true point of attack, he operates in such a manner, that the blow he means to

* Navarre and Biscay being within the French line of defence, the inhabitants were, according to the civilians, *de facto* French subjects.

strike is never indicated in a positive way, and the opposing general can only guess it by a well-matured knowledge of his own position, and of the mode in which he makes his offensive system act, to protect his defensive system. We have no accounts of what the enemy is about; it is said that no news can be obtained, as if this case was extraordinary in an army, as if spies were common: they must do in Spain, as they do in other places: Send parties out. Let them carry off, sometimes the priest, sometimes the alcalde, the chief of a convent, the master of the post or his deputy, and, above all, the letters. Put them under arrest until they speak. Question them twice each day, or keep them as hostages. Charge them to send foot messengers, and to get news. When we know how to take measures of vigour and force, it is easy to get news. All the posts, all the letters, must be intercepted. The single motive of procuring intelligence will be sufficient to authorize a detachment of 4000 or 5000 men, who will go into a great town, will take the letters from the post, will seize the the richest citizens, their letters, papers, gazettes, etc. It is beyond doubt, that even in the French lines, the inhabitants are all informed of what passes; of course, out of that line, they know more; what, then, should prevent you from seizing the principal men? Let them be sent back again without being ill treated. It is a fact, that when we are not in a desert, but in a peopled country, if the general is not well instructed, it is because he is ignorant of his trade. The services which the inhabitants render to an enemy's general, are never given from affection, nor even to get money. The truest method to obtain them is by safeguards and protections to preserve their lives, their goods, their towns, or their monasteries!"

Joseph, although by no means a dull man, seems to have had no portion of his brother's martial genius, and the operations recommended by the latter did not appear to the king to be applicable to the state of affairs. He did not adopt them, but proposed others; in discussing which, he thus defended the policy of his retreat from Madrid.*

"When the *defection* of 22,000 men (Dupont's) caused the king to quit the capital, the disposable troops remaining were divided in three corps: that immediately about his person; that of Marshal Bessieres; and that of General Verdier, then besieging Zaragoza: but these bodies were spread over a hundred leagues of ground, and with the last the king had little or no connexion. His first movement was to unite the two former at Burgos, and afterwards to enter into communication with the third. The line of defence on the Ebro was adopted." This operation Joseph affirmed to have been dictated by sound reason.—Because "when the events of Andalusia foreboded a regular and serious war, prudence did not permit three corps, the strongest of which was only 18,000 men, to separate to a greater distance than six days' march, in the midst of 11,000,000 of people in a state of hostility. But 50,000 French could defend with success a line of sixty leagues, guarding the two grand communications of Burgos and Tudela, against enemies who had not, up to that period, been able to carry to either point above 25,000 men; because 15,000 French could be united upon either."

Joseph was dissatisfied with Napoleon's plans, and preferred his own. The disposable troops at his command, exclusive of those in Bilbao, were 50,000; these he distributed as follows. The right wing occupied Burgos, Pancorbo, and Puente Lara. The centre was posted between Haro and Logroña; the left extended from Logroña to Tudela; the latter town was not occupied. He contended that this arrangement, at once offensive and defensive, might be advantageously continued, if the great army directed upon Spain arrived in September, since it tended to refit the army already there, and menaced the enemy; but that it could not be prolonged until November, because in three months the Spaniards must make a great progress, and would very soon be in a state to take the offensive with grand organized corps, obedient to a central

administration, which would have time to form in Madrid. Everything announced, he said, that the month of October was one of those decisive epochs which gave to the party who knew how to profit from it, the priority of movements and success, the progress of which it was difficult to calculate.

In this view of affairs, the merits of six projects were discussed by the king.

First. To remain in the actual position. This was declared to be unsustainable, because the enemy could attack the left with 40,000, the centre with 40,000, the right with as many. Tudela and Navarre, as far as Logroña, required 25,000 men to defend them. Burgos could not be defended but by an army in a state to resist the united forces of Blake and Cuesta, which would amount to 80,000 men and it was doubtful if the 20,000 bayonets which could be opposed, could completely beat them; if they did not, the French would be harassed by the insurgents of the three provinces (Biscay, Navarre, and Guipuscoa), who would interpose between the left wing and France.

Second project. To carry the centre and reserve by Tudela, towards Zaragoza or Albazan; united with the left, they would amount to 30,000 men, who might seek for, and, doubtless, would defeat the enemy, if he was met with on that side. In the mean time, the right wing, leaving garrisons in the citadel of Burgos and the fort of Pancorbo, could occupy the enemy, and watch any movements in the Montagna St. Ander, or disembarkations that might take place at the ports; but this task was considered difficult, because Pancorbo was not the only defile accessible to artillery. Three leagues from thence, another road led upon Miranda, and there was a third passage over the point of the chain which stretched between Haro and Miranda.

Third project. To leave the defence of Navarre to the left wing. To carry the centre, the reserve, and the right wing, to Burgos, and to beat the enemy before he could unite; an easy task, as the French would be 30,000 strong. Meanwhile, Moncey could keep the Spaniards in check on the side of Tudela, or if unable to do that, he was to march up the Ebro, by Logroña and Briviesca, and join the main body. The communication with France would be thus lost, but the army might maintain itself until the arrival of the emperor. A modification of this project proposed that Moncey, retiring to the entrenched camp of Pampeluna, should there await either the arrival of the emperor, or the result of the operations towards Burgos.

Fourth project. To pass the Ebro in retreat, and to endeavour to tempt the enemy to fight in the plain between that river and Vittoria.

Fifth project. To retire, supporting the left upon Pampeluna, the right upon Montdragon.

Sixth project. To leave garrisons, with the means of a six weeks' defence, in Pampeluna, St. Sebastian, Pancorbo, and Burgos. To unite the rest of the army, march against the enemy, attack him wherever he was found, and then wait either near Madrid or in that country, into which the pursuit of the Spaniards, or the facility of living, should draw the army. This plan relinquished the communications with France entirely, but it was said that the grand army could easily open them again, and the troops already in Spain would be sufficiently strong to defy all the efforts of the enemy, to disconcert all his projects, and to wait in a noble attitude the general impulse which would be given by the arrival of the emperor.

Of all these projects the last was the favourite with the king, who strongly recommended it, and asserted, that if it was followed, affairs would be more prosperous when the emperor arrived than could be expected from any other plan. Marshal Ney and General Jourdan approved of it; but it would appear that Napoleon had other views, and too little confidence in his brother's military judgment, to intrust so great a matter to his guidance.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. It is undoubted, that there must always be some sympathy of genius in the man who is to execute another's conception in military affairs. Without that species of harmony between their minds, the thousand accidental occurrences and minor combinations which must happen contrary to expectation, will inevitably embarrass the executor to such a degree, that he will be unable to see the most obvious advantages, and in striving to unite the plan he has received with his own views, he will adopt neither, but steer an unsteady reeling course between both, and fail of success. The reason of this appears to be, that a strong, and, if the term may be used, inveterate attention must be fixed upon certain great principles of action in war, to enable a general to disregard the minor events and inconveniences which cross his purpose; minor they are to the great object, but in themselves sufficient to break down the firmness and self-possession of any but extraordinary men.

2. The original memoir from which Joseph's projects have been extracted is so blotted and interlined, that it would be unfair to consider it as a matured production. The great error which pervades it, is the conjectural data upon which he founds his plans, and the little real information which he appears to have had relative to the Spanish forces, views, or interior policy. Thus he was prepared to act upon the idea, that the central junta would be able and provident; the parties united, and the armies strong and well administered; none of which things really took place. Again, he estimated Cuesta and Blake's armies at 80,000, and considered them as one body; but they were never united at all, and if they had, they would scarcely have amounted to 60,000. The bold idea of throwing himself into the interior came too late; he should have thought of that before he quitted Madrid, or at least before the central government was established at that capital. His operations might have been successful against the miserable armies opposed to him; against good and movable troops they would not, as the emperor's admirable notes prove.

The first project, wanting those offensive combinations discussed by Napoleon, was open to all his objections, as being timid and incomplete. The second was crude and ill-considered, for, according to the king's estimate of the Spanish force, 30,000 men on each wing might oppose the heads of his columns, 60,000 could still have been united at Logroña, pass the Ebro, excite an insurrection in Navarre, Guipuscoa, and Biscay, seize Tolosa and Miranda, and fall upon the rear of the French army, which thus cut in two, and its communications intercepted, would have been extremely embarrassed. The third was not better judged. Burgos as an offensive post, protecting the line of defence, was very valuable, and to unite a large force there was so far prudent; but if the Spaniards retired, and refused battle with their left, while the centre and right operated by Logroña and Sanguessa, what would have been the result? the French right must without any definite object either have continued to advance, or remained stationary without communication, or returned to fight a battle for those very positions which they had just quitted. The fourth depended entirely upon accident, and is not worth argument. The fifth was an undisguised retreat. The sixth was not applicable to the actual situation of affairs. The king's force was no longer an independent body, it was become the advanced guard of the great army, marching under Napoleon. It was absurd, therefore, to contemplate a decisive movement, without having first matured a plan suitable to the whole mass that was to be engaged in the execution. In short, to permit an advanced guard to determine the operations of the main body, was to reverse the order of military affairs, and to trust to accident instead of design. It is curious, that while Joseph was proposing this irruption into Spain, the Spaniards and the military agents of Great Britain were trembling lest he should escape their power by a precipitate flight. *War is not a conjectural art!*

CHAPTER V.

THE emperor over-ruled the offensive projects of the king, and the latter was forced to distribute the centre and right wing in a manner more consonant to the spirit of Napoleon's instructions ; but he still neglected to occupy Tudela, and covered his left wing by the Aragon river.

The 18th of September the French army was posted in the following manner : *

Right wing. Marshal Bessieres.	15,595	under arms.	} Three divisions of infantry in front of Pancorbo, at Briviesca, Santa Maria, and Cuba ; light cavalry behind Burgos.
Centre. Marshal Ney.	13,756	under arms.	
Left wing. Marshal Moncey.	16,636	under arms.	} Logroña, Nalda, and Najera.
Reserve of the king.			
Gen. Saligny	...	5413	} Miranda, Haro, and Puente Lara.
Imperial guard.			
Gen. Dorsenne	...	2423	} Pampeluna.
Total	...	7833	
Garrisons	...	6004	} Bilbao.
Gen. Monthion	...	1500	
Gen. La Grange	...	6979	} Composed of small garrisons and movable columns, guarding the communications of Biscay, Alava, and Guipuscoa.
Grand reserve.			
Movable cols	...	1984	} Bayonne, and watching the valleys of the Pyrenees opening into Navarre.
Stationary	...	200,005	
Total, comm. by			}
Gen. Drouet	...	21,989	

Total 90,289 present under arms, exclusive of the troops in Catalonia. Hence the communication being secured, the fortresses garrisoned, and the fort of Pancorbo armed, there remained above 50,000 sabres and bayonets disposable on a line of battle extending from Bilbao to Alfaro.

To oppose this formidable force the Spanish troops were divided into three principal masses, denominated the armies of the right, centre, and left.

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Guns.	1st Line.	
The first, composed of the divisions of St. Marc and O'Neil, numbered about	17,500 500 24	} Men. Guns. 75,400 86
The second, composed of the divisions of La Pena, Llamas, and Caro	26,000 1,300 36	
The third, consisting entirely of Gallicians, about	30,000 100 26	
					2d Line.
In the second line the Castilians were at Segovia	12,000	} 57,000
The Estremadurans at Talavera	13,000	
Two Andalusian divisions were in La Mancha	14,000	
And the Asturians (posted at Llanes) were called	18,000	

This estimate, founded upon a number of contemporary returns and other documents, proves the monstrous exaggerations put forth at this time to deceive the Spanish people and the English government. The Spaniards pretended that above 140,000 men in arms were threatening the French positions on the Ebro, whereas less than 76,000 were in line of battle, and those exceedingly ill armed and provided. The right, under Palafox, held the country between Zaragoza and Sangüessa, on the Aragon river ; the centre, under Castaños, occupied Borja, Tarazona, and Agreda ; the left, under Blake, was posted at Reynosa, near the sources of the Ebro.

* Appendix, No. 28.

The relative position of the French and Spanish armies was very disadvantageous for the latter. From the right to the left of their line, that is, from Reynosa to Zaragoza, was twice the distance between Bayonne and Vittoria, and the roads more difficult; the reserve under Drouet was consequently in closer military communication with King Joseph's army, than the Spanish wings were with another. The patriots were acting without concert upon double external lines of operation, and against an enemy far superior in quickness, knowledge, and organization, and even in numbers. The French were superior in cavalry, and the base of their operations rested on three great fortresses, Bayonne, St. Sebastian, and Pampeluna; and they could in three days carry the centre and the reserve to either flank, and unite 30,000 combatants without drawing a man from their garrisons. The Spaniards held but one fortress (Zaragoza), and being disseminated in corps under different generals of equal authority, they could execute no combined movement with rapidity or precision, nor under any circumstances could they unite more than 40,000 men at any given point.

In this situation of affairs, General Blake, his army organized in six divisions (each 5000 strong), of which four were numbered, and the other two called the advanced guard and the reserve, broke up from Reynosa on the 17th of September. One division advanced on the side of Burgos, to cover the march of the main body, which, threading the valley of Villarcayo, turned the right of Marshal Bessieres, and reached the Ebro. Two divisions occupied Traspaderna and Frias, and established a post at Oña, on the right bank of that river; a third division took a position at Medina, and a fourth held the town of Erran and the Sierra of that name. A fifth halted in the town of Villarcayo, to preserve the communications with Reynosa, and at the same time, 8000 Asturians under General Acevedo, quitted the camp at Llanes, and advanced to St. Ander. General Broderick now arrived in the Spanish camp; Blake importuned him for money, and obtained it, but treated him otherwise with great coldness, and withheld all information relative to the movements of the army.

English vessels hovering on the coast were prepared to supply the Biscayans with arms and ammunition, and General Blake thought himself in a situation to revive the insurrection in that province, and to extend it to Guipuscoa. With this view he detached his 4th division, and five guns, under the command of the Marquis of Portazgo, to attack General Monthion at Bilbao. The king getting knowledge of the march of this division, ordered a brigade from his right wing to fall on its flank by the valley of Orduña, and caused General Merlin to reinforce Monthion by the valley of Durango. Bessieres aided these dispositions by a demonstration on the side of Frias, but the combination was made too late. Portazgo was already master of Bilbao. Monthion retired on the 20th to Durango, and Bessieres fell back with his corps to Miranda, Haro, and Puente Lara, having first injured the defences of Burgos.

The king took post with the reserve at Vittoria. Marshal Ney immediately abandoned his position on the Ebro, and carried his whole force by a rapid march to Bilbao, where he arrived on the evening of the 26th. At the same time, General Merle's division executed a combined movement from Miranda upon Osma and Barbaceña. Portazgo being overmatched, occupied the heights above Bilbao, until nightfall, and then retreated to Valmaceda, where he found the 3rd division, for Blake had changed his position, and now occupied Frias with his right, Quincoes with his centre, and Valmaceda with his left. In this situation, holding the passes of the mountain, he awaited the arrival of the Asturians, who were marching by the valley of Villarcayo. All the Spanish artillery remained in the town of that name, being guarded by a division of infantry. Thus the second effort to raise Biscay failed of success.

In the mean time, O'Neil, following Colonel Doyle's plan before mentioned, entered Sanguessa, and was beaten out of it again, with the loss of two guns. However, the Castilian army approached the Ebro by the road of Soria. General

La-Peña occupied Logroña, Nalda, and Najera. Llamas and Caro occupied Corella, Cascante, and Calahorra, and O'Neil took post in the mountains, on the left bank of the Aragon facing Sanguessa. The peasantry of the valleys assembled in considerable numbers, and the country between Zaragoza and the Aragon river appeared to be filled with troops. Marshal Moncey withdrew from the Ebro, and took a position, with his left flank at the pass of Sanguessa, his centre at Falces, and his right at Estella. Ney, leaving Merlin with 3000 men at Bilbao, returned to the Ebro; but finding that Logroña was occupied in force by the Spaniards, halted at Guardia on the 5th of October, and remained in observation.

On the 4th the king and Bessieres, at the head of Mouton's and Merle's divisions, quitted Miranda, and advanced along the road of Osma, with the intention of feeling for Blake on the side of Frias and Medina, but the Spaniards were in force at Valmaceda. Joseph, deceived by false information, imagined that they were again in march towards Bilbao, and pushed on to Lodio, with the intention of attacking Blake during his movement. At Lodio the king ascertained the truth and halted. He was uneasy about Moncey, and therefore returned to Murquía on the 7th. In that town he left Merle to protect the rear of the troops at Bilbao, and proceeded to Miranda with the division of Mouton. On the 12th, Blake, still intent upon the insurrection of Biscay, placed a division at Orduña, and attacked Bilbao with 15,000 men. Merlin retired fighting up the valley of Durango as far as Zornosa, but being joined there by General Verdier, at the head of six battalions, he turned and checked the pursuit. At this time the leading columns of the great French army were passing the Spanish frontier, and Laval's division advanced to Durango. Sebastiani, with 6000 men, relieved Merle at Murquía; the latter repaired to Miranda, and Verdier returned to Vittoria. Marshal Lefebvre, Duke of Dantzic, assumed the command of the three divisions posted at Durango.

On the Spanish side, the Marquis of Romana's division disembarked on the 9th at St. Ander, and being completely equipped and provided from the English stores, the infantry, 8000 in number, proceeded by slow marches to join Blake. The Asturians halted at Villarcayo; but the Estremaduran army, under the Conde de Belvedere, was put in motion, and the Castilian forces arrived upon the Ebro. The first and third divisions of the Andalusian army were on the march from La Mancha, and Castaños, quitting Madrid, proceeded towards Tudela. All things announced the approach of a great crisis. Yet such was the apathy of the supreme junta, that the best friends of Spain hoped for a defeat, as the only mode of exciting sufficient energy in the government to save the state, and by some it was thought, that even that sharp remedy would be insufficient. A momentary excitement was, however, caused by the intercepted letter to Jourdan before spoken of. The troops in the second line were ordered to proceed to the Ebro by forced marches, letters were written pressing for the advance of the British army, and Castaños was enjoined to drive the enemy, without delay, beyond the frontier; but this sudden fury of action ended with those orders. Sir David Baird's corps was detained in the transports at Coruña, waiting for permission to land; no assistance was afforded to Sir John Moore, and although the subsidies already paid by England amounted to ten millions of dollars, and that Madrid was rich, and willing to contribute to the exigencies of the moment, the central junta, although complaining of the want of money, would not be at the trouble of collecting patriotic gifts, and left the armies "to all the horrors of famine, nakedness, and misery." The natural consequence of such folly and wickedness ensued; the people ceased to be enthusiastic, and the soldiers deserted in crowds.

The conduct of the generals was scarcely less extraordinary. Blake had voluntarily commenced the campaign without magazines, and without any plan, except that of raising the provinces of Biscay and Guipuscoa. With the usual blind confidence of a Spaniard, he pressed forward, ignorant of the force or

situation of his adversaries, never dreaming of a defeat, and so little experienced in the detail of command, that he calculated upon the ordinary quantity of provision contained in an English frigate, which cruised off the coast, as a resource for his army, if the country should fail to supply him with subsistence. His artillery had only seventy rounds for each gun, his men were without great coats, many without shoes, and the snow was beginning to fall in the mountains. That he was able to make any impression is a proof that King Joseph possessed little military talent: the French marshals, from the habitude of war, were able to baffle Blake without difficulty, but the strategical importance of the valley of Orduña they did not appreciate, or he would have been destroyed. The lesson given by Napoleon, when he defeated Wurmser in the valley of the Brenta, might have been repeated, under more favourable circumstances, at Orduña and Durango; but if genius was asleep with the French, it was dead with the Spaniards.

As long as Blake remained between Frias and Valmaceda his position was tolerably secure from an attack, because the Montagna St. Ander is exceedingly rugged, and the line of retreat by Villacayo was open; but he was cooped up in a corner, and ill placed for offensive movements, which were the only operations he thought of. Instead of occupying Burgoñ, and repairing the citadel, he descended on Bilbao with the bulk of his army, thereby discovering his total ignorance of war; for several great valleys, the upper parts of which were possessed by the French, met near that town, and it was untenable. The flank of his army was exposed to an attack from the side of Orduña, and his line of retreat was always in the power of Bessieres. To protect his flank and rear, Blake detached largely, but that weakened the main body without obviating the danger, nor did he make amends for his bad dispositions by diligence, for his movements were slow, his attacks without vigour, and his whole conduct displayed temerity without decision, and rashness without enterprise.

The armies of the centre and right were not better conducted. Castaños, having quitted Madrid on the 8th of October, arrived at Tudela on the 17th, and on the 20th held a conference with Palafox at Zaragoza. The aggregate of their forces did not much exceed 45,000 men, of which from 2000 to 3000 were cavalry. Sixty pieces of artillery followed the divisions, and the whole was posted in the following manner:—

ARMY OF THE CENTRE.—27,000.

General Pignatelli, with 10,000 Castilian infantry, 1500 cavalry and 14 guns, at Logroña.

General Grimarest, with the second division of Andalusia, 5000 men, at Lodosa.

General La-Peña, with the fourth division, 5000 infantry, at Calahorra.

The parc of artillery, and a division of infantry, 4000 at Centruenigo.

The remainder at Tudela and the neighbouring villages.

ARMY OF ARAGON.—18,000.

O'Neil, with 7500 men, held Sos, Lumbar, and Sanguessa.



Thirty miles in the rear, St. Marc occupied Exca, with 5500 men.


Palafox, with 5000 men, remained in Zaragoza.

The Ebro rolled between these two corps. Taken as one army, their front lines occupied two sides of an irregular triangle, of which Tudela was the apex, and Sanguessa and Logroña the extremities of the base. Those points being taken as the chord, the rivers Ebro and Aragon meeting at Milagro, describe, in their double course, an arc, the convex of which was opposed to the Spaniards. The streams of the Ega, the Arga, and the Zidasco rivers, descending from the Pyrenees in parallel courses, cut the chord of this arc at nearly equal distances, and fall, the two first into the Ebro, and the last into the Aragon. All the roads leading from Pampeluna to the Ebro follow the course of those torrents.

Marshal Moncey's right was at Estella on the Ega, his centre held Falces and Tafalla on the Arga and the Zidasco, his left was in front of Sanguessa on the Aragon. The bridges of Olite and Peralta were secured by advanced

Explanatory Sketch
of the
FRENCH & SPANISH POSITIONS
the 26th Oct. 1808.

Spanish troops 
French D^o 



parties, and Caparosa, where there was another bridge, he occupied in force. In this situation he could operate freely between the torrents, which intersected his line; he commanded all the roads leading to the Ebro, and he could, from Caparosa, at any moment, issue forth against the centre of the Spanish armies. Now from Tudela to Sanguessa is 50 miles, from Tudela to Logroña is 60 miles, but from Tudela to Caparosa is only 12 miles of good road; wherefore, the extremities of the Spanish line were above 100 miles, or six days' march from each other, while a single day would have sufficed to unite the French within two hours' march of the centre.

The weakness of the Spaniards' position is apparent. If Palafox, crossing the Aragon at Sanguessa, advanced towards Pampeluna, Moncey would be on his left flank and rear; if he turned against Moncey, the garrison of Pampeluna would fall upon his right. If Castaños, to favour the attack of Palafox, crossed the Ebro at Logroña, Ney, being posted at Guardia, was ready to take him in flank; if the two wings endeavoured to unite, their line of march was liable to be intercepted at Tudela by Moncey, and the rear of Castaños attacked by Ney, who could pass the Ebro at Logroña or Lodosa. If they remained stationary, they might easily be beaten in detail. Any other than Spanish generals would have been filled with apprehension on such an occasion. But Palafox and Castaños, heedless of their own danger, tranquilly proceeded to arrange a plan of offensive operations singularly absurd. They agreed that the army of the centre, leaving a division at Lodosa and another at Calahorra, should make a flank march to the right, and take a position along the Aragon, the left to be at Tudela, the right at Sanguessa; that is, with less than 20,000 men to occupy 50 miles of country close to a powerful enemy. In the mean time, Palafox, with the Aragonese, crossing the river at Sanguessa, was to extend in an oblique line to Roncesvalles, covering the valleys of Talay, Escay, and Roncal, with his centre, and reinforcing his army by the armed inhabitants, who were ready to flock to his standard. Blake was invited to operate, in combination with them, by Guipuscoa, and to pass in the rear of the whole French army, so as to unite with Palafox, and thus cut off the enemy's retreat into France, and intercept his reinforcements at the same time.

Castaños returned to Tudela on the 23rd, and proceeded to Logroña on the 25th; the grand movement being to commence on the 27th. But on the 21st, Grimarest had pushed forward strong detachments across the Ebro to Mendavia, Andosilla, Sesma, and Carcur, and one over the Ega to Lerim. The Castilian outposts also occupied Viana on the left bank of the Ebro. The Aragonese divisions were already closing upon Sanguessa, and a multitude of peasants crowded to the same place in the hope of obtaining arms and ammunition. Moncey, deceived by this concourse of persons, estimated the force in Sanguessa at 20,000, when, in fact, it was only 8000 regular troops. His report, and the simultaneous movements of the Spaniards on both extremities, made the king to apprehend a triple attack from Logroña, Lodosa, and Sanguessa. He immediately reinforced Ney with a division (Merlin's) of Bessieres' corps, and directed him to clear the left bank of the Ebro, while a second division (Bonnet's) of Bessieres descended the right bank from Haro to Briones. A division of Moncey's corps, stationed at Estella, received orders to follow the course of the Ega, and second Ney's operations; and a part of the garrison of Pampeluna, posted at Montreal and Salinas, was commanded to advance upon Nardues, and make a demonstration against Sanguessa.

When Castaños arrived at Logroña these operations were in full activity. Ney had advanced on the 24th, driven back the Castilian outposts, crowned the height opposite that town on the 25th, and was cannonading the Spaniards' position. On the 26th, he renewed his fire briskly until 12 o'clock, at which time Castaños, after giving Pignatelli strict orders to defend his post unless he was turned by a force descending the right bank of the Ebro, proceeded himself to Lodosa and Calahorra. As the road winded by the river, the

Spanish general was exposed to the fire of light troops posted in a wood on the opposite side, but escaped without injury. Meanwhile the French from Estella falling down the Ega, drove the Spanish parties out of Mendavia, Andosilla, Carcur, and Sesma; and Grimarest retired from Lodosa to La Torre with such precipitation, that he left Colonel Cruz, a valuable officer, with a light battalion, and some volunteers, at Lerim. A squadron of cavalry escaped, but Cruz, with the infantry, being surrounded in a convent, was, after a creditable resistance, taken. Pignatelli, regardless of Castaños' orders, retired from Logroña, and abandoned all his guns at the foot of the Sierra de Nalda, only a few miles from the enemy, then crossing the mountains gained Centruenigo in such disorder, that his men continued to arrive for 24 hours consecutively. On the right, O'Neil skirmished with the garrison of Pampeluna, and lost six men killed, and eight wounded; but, in the Spanish fashion, announced, that, after a hard action of many hours, the enemy was completely overthrown. On the 27th, Merlin's division rejoined Bessieres at Miranda, and Bounet, retiring from Briones, took post in front of Pancorbo. Castaños, incensed at the ill conduct of the Castilians, dismissed Pignatelli, and incorporated his troops with the Andalusian divisions. Fifteen hundred men of the latter, commanded by the Conde de Cartoajal, being sent back to Nalda, recovered the lost guns, and brought them safe to Centruenigo.

Internal dissensions succeeded to external troubles. Palafox arrogantly censured Castaños, and a cabal, of which General Coupigny appears to have been the principal mover, was formed against the latter. The junta, exasperated that Castaños had not already driven the enemy beyond the frontier, encouraged his traducers, and circulated slanderous accusations themselves, as if his inaction alone enabled the French to remain in Spain. Don Francisco Palafox, brother of the captain-general, and a member of the supreme junta, was sent to headquarters avowedly to facilitate, but really to interfere with, and control the military operations. He arrived at Alfaro on the 29th, accompanied by Coupigny and the Conde de Montejo, a turbulent, factious man, shallow and vain, but designing and unprincipled. Castaños waited upon the representative of the government, and laid before him the denuded state of the army, and the captain-general, Palafox, coming up from Zaragoza, a council of war was held at Tudela on the 5th of November. The rough manner in which the troops were driven from the left bank of the Ebro was not sufficient to divert the attention of the Spanish generals from the grand project of gaining the rear of the French army. The council agreed to persevere, although certain advice was received that the enemy were strengthened by 30,000 fresh men. Deeming it, however, fitting, that Blake should act the first, it was resolved to await his time, but, as an intermediate operation, it was agreed that the army of the centre, leaving 6000 men at Calahorra, and a garrison at Tudela, should cross the Ebro and attack Caparosa. French parties were, however, pushed as far as Voltierra, and in the skirmishes which ensued, the conduct of the Castilian battalions was discreditable.

Joseph Palafox returned to Zaragoza, and the deputy separated himself from Castaños. The loss sustained by desertion and the previous combats was considerable, but some Murcian levies, and a part of the 1st and 3rd Andalusian divisions joined the army of the centre, which now mustered 26,000 infantry, and nearly 3000 cavalry under arms, with 50 or 60 pieces of artillery. The positions of the army extended from Calahorra, by Haro, to Tudela. La-Peña held the first town with 5000 men; Grimarest and Caro commanded 8000 at the second; and head-quarters, with 13,500 men, were fixed in the last. Cartoajal remained with 1100 in the Sierra de Nalda, and 800 were posted at Ansejo.

In pursuance of the plan arranged, the troops were in movement to cross the Ebro, when despatches from Blake announced that he had met with some disaster on the 31st, the extent of which he did not communicate. This news

arrested the attack; and the preposterous transactions that ensued, resembled the freaks of Caligula rather than the operations of real war. First, it was arranged that the army should abandon Tudela, and take a position in two lines, the extremities of the one to rest on Calahorra and Amedo, the second to extend from Alfaro to Fitero. The deputy ordered O'Neil, with the army of Aragon, to occupy the latter of these lines forthwith, but O'Neil refused to stir without instructions from the captain-general. This was on the 9th, on the 10th the plan was changed. Castaños fixed his head-quarters at Centruenigo, and the deputy proposed that O'Neil should descend the right bank of the Aragon river, and attack Caparosa in the rear; that the troops in Tudela should attack it in front; and that a division should make a demonstration of passing the Ebro in boats, opposite to Milagro, in order to favour this attack. Castaños assented. On the 12th a division assembled opposite Milagro, and La-Peña with two divisions marched against Caparosa. Suddenly, the whimsical deputy sent them orders to repair to Lodosa, forty miles higher up the Ebro, and attack the bridge at that place, while Grimarest crossing in the boats at Calahorra, should ascend the left bank of the Ebro, and take it in rear. La-Peña and Villarcayo, confounded by this change, wrote to Castaños for an explanation. This was the first intimation that the latter, who was lying sick at Centruenigo, received of the altered dispositions. He directed his lieutenants to obey; but being provoked beyond endurance, wrote sharply to the junta, demanding to know who was to command the army; and after all this insolence and vapouring on the part of Francisco Palafox, no operation took place at all. He declared, that his intention was merely to make a demonstration, ordered the troops to their quarters, and then, without assigning any reason, deprived La-Peña of his command, and appointed Cartoajal in his place.

It was at this time that Sir John Moore's letter arrived; but Castaños, no longer master of his own operations, could ill concert a plan of campaign with the general of another army. He could not even tell what troops were to be at his nominal disposal; for the Estremaduran force, originally destined for his command, was now directed by the junta upon Burgos, and the remainder of his own first and third division was detained in Madrid. His enemies, especially Montijo, were active in spreading reports to his disadvantage; the deserters scattered over the country declared that all the generals were traitors, and the people of the towns and villages, deceived by the central junta, and excited by false rumours, respected neither justice nor government, and committed the most scandalous excesses.

Blake's situation was not more prosperous.

The road from Bayonne to Vittoria was encumbered with the advancing columns of the great French army. An imperial decree, issued early in September, commanded that the troops already in Spain should be incorporated with the grand army then marching from Germany. The united forces were to compose eight divisions, called "*Corps d'Armée*," an institution analogous to the Roman legion, because each "*Corps d'Armée*," although adapted to act with facility as a component part of a large army, was also provided with light cavalry, a parc, and train of artillery, engineers, sappers, and miners, and a complete civil administration, to enable it to take the field as an independent force. The imperial guards and the heavy cavalry of the army were not included in this arrangement; the first had a constitution of their own, and at this time all the heavy cavalry, and all the artillery, not attached to the "*Corps d'Armée*," were formed into a large reserve. As the columns arrived in Spain, they were united to the troops already there, and the whole was disposed conformably to the new organization.

Marshal Victor, Duke of Belluno,	commanded the first corps.
Marshal Bessieres, Duke of Istria	... second corps.
Marshal Moncey, Duke of Cornegliano	... third corps.

Marshal Lefebre, Duke of Dantzic,	commanded the fourth corps.
Marshal Mortier, Duke of Treviso fifth corps.
Marshal Ney, Duke of Elchingen sixth corps.
General St. Cyr. seventh corps.
General Junot, Duke of Abrantes eighth corps.

The seventh corps was appropriated to Catalonia; the remainder were in the latter end of October assembled or assembling in Navarre and Biscay. General Merlin, with a division, held Zornosa, and observed Blake, who remained tranquilly at Bilbao. Two divisions of the fourth corps occupied Durango and the neighbouring villages. One division and the light cavalry of the first corps was at Vittoria, a second division of the same corps guarded the bridge of Murguia on the river Bayas, and commanded the entrance to the valley of Orduña. Haro, Puente Lara, Miranda, and Pancorbo were maintained by the infantry of the king's body guard and the second corps, and the light cavalry of the latter covered the plains close up to Briviesca.

The reinforcements were daily crowding up to Vittoria, and the king, restrained by the emperor's orders to a rigorous system of defence, occupied himself with the arrangements attendant on such an immense accumulation of force, and left Blake in quiet possession of Bilbao. The latter mistook this apparent inactivity for timidity; he was aware that reinforcements, in number equal to his whole army, had joined the enemy; but, with wonderful rashness, he resolved to press forward, and readily agreed to attempt a junction with Palafox, in the rear of the French position. At this time Romana's infantry were approaching Bilbao, and the Estremadurans were in march for Burgos; but the country was nearly exhausted of provisions; both armies felt the scarcity, and desertion prevailed among the Spaniards. The Biscayans, twice abandoned, were fearful of a third insurrection. Prudence dictated a retreat towards Burgos. Blake resolved to advance.

Having posted General Acevedo with the Asturians and the second division at Orduña, he left a battalion at Miravelles, to preserve the communication with Bilbao, and the 24th of October marched himself at the head of 17,000 fighting men, divided in three columns, to attack Zornosa. The right ascended the valley of Durango by Galdacano, the centre by Larabezua, the left by Rigoytia; at the same time General Acevedo penetrated through the mountains of Gorbea by Ozoco and Villaro, with a view to seize Manares and St. Antonia d'Urquitiola. It was intended by this operation to cut the communication between Miranda on the Ebro, and the town of Durango, and thus to intercept the retreat of Marshal Ney, and oblige him to surrender with 16,000 men; for Blake was utterly ignorant of his adversary's position, and imagined that he had only two corps to deal with. He believed that the king, with one, was in his front at Durango and Mont Dragon, and that Ney, with the other, was at Miranda, when in fact, the latter was at that moment attacking Pignatelli at Logroña. As the Spanish army approached Zornosa, Merlin abandoned the town, and drew up on some heights in the rear. Bad weather, and the want of provisions, checked further operations until the 25th. On the evening of that day, the Spanish division at Rigoytia attempted to turn the right flank of the French. At the same time Blake marched against the centre and left, and Merlin fell back to Durango.

The Duke of Dantzic, alarmed by these movements, concentrated his whole force, consisting of two divisions of infantry (Sebastiani's and Laval's), and a Dutch brigade at Durango; his third division (Valence's) being yet in France. The king reinforced him with a division of the first corps (Villatte's), and ordered Merlin's troops, which were composed of detachments, to join their respective regiments. From the 25th to the 30th the armies remained quiet; but at daybreak on the 31st, the Spaniards were formed in order of battle, five miles beyond Zornosa, and close to the enemy's position. The vanguard drew up across the road to Durango; the reserve at some distance in the rear. The

third and fourth divisions occupied the intermediate space, so disposed as to outflank the others, in a chequer shape. The first division occupied a height on the left of the road, and behind the reserve.

The Duke of Dantzic, apprised by these previous movements, that he was going to be attacked, became impatient; the state of the atmosphere prevented him from discovering the order of march, or the real force of the Spaniards; he knew that Blake had the power of uniting nearly 50,000 men, and concluding that such a force was in his front, he resolved to anticipate his adversaries by a sudden and vigorous assault. In fact, the Spanish generals were so little guided by the rules of war, that before their incapacity was understood, their very errors being too gross for belief contributed to their safety. Blake had commenced a great offensive movement, intending to beat the troops in his front, and to cut off and capture Ney's corps of 16,000 men. In six days, although unopposed, he advanced less than 15 miles, and so disposed his forces, that out of 36,000 men, he concentrated only 17,000 infantry, without artillery, upon the field of battle!

The Duke of Dantzic, at the head of 25,000 men, formed in three columns of attack; descended the heights of Durango. A thick fog covering the mountain sides, filled all the valleys; and a few random shots alone indicated the presence of the hostile armies. Suddenly Villatte's division appeared close to the Spanish vanguard; and with a brisk onset forced it back upon the third division. Sebastiani's and Leval's followed in succession; a fire of artillery, to which Blake could make no reply, opened along the road; the day cleared, and the Spanish army, heaped in confused masses, was, notwithstanding the example of personal courage given by Blake, and the natural strength of the country, driven from one position to another. At mid-day it was beyond Zornosa, and at three o'clock in full flight for Bilbao, which place it gained in a state of great confusion during the night. The next day Blake crossed the Salcedon, and took a position at Nava. The Duke of Dantzic pursued as far as Guenes, and then leaving General Villatte, with 7000 men, to observe the enemy, returned to Bilbao. Twelve vessels, laden with English stores, were in the river, but contrived to escape.

The king was displeased with the precipitancy of Marshal Lefebvre, but endeavoured to profit from the result. The division of the first corps, stationed at Murguia, was ordered to descend the valley of Orduña, as far as Amurio, to aid the operations of the fourth corps. At the same time, Mouton's division was detached from the second corps towards Barbareña, from whence it was, according to circumstances, either to join the troops in the valley of Orduña, or to watch Medina and Quincoes, and press Blake in his retreat, if he retired by Villarcayo. The French were ignorant of the situation of General Acevedo. On the day of the action at Zornosa, that general was at Villaro, from whence he endeavoured to rejoin Blake, by marching to Valmaceda. He reached Miravalles, in the valley of Orduña, on the 3rd, at the moment when the head of the French troops coming from Murguia appeared in sight. After a slight skirmish, the latter thinking they had to deal with the whole of Blake's army, retired to Orduña, and Acevedo immediately pushed for the Salcedon river. Villatte first got notice of his march, and dividing his own troops, posted one half at Orantia, on the road leading from Miravalles to Nava, the other on the road to Valmaceda, thus intercepting the line of retreat.

Blake, who was informed of Acevedo's danger, in the night of the 4th, with great decision and promptitude, instantly passed the bridge of Nava, and at daybreak crowned the heights of Orantia with three divisions, meaning to fall suddenly upon the French; but they were aware of his intention, and sending a detachment to occupy Gordujuela, a pass in the mountains, leading to Bilbao, rejoined Villatte on the Valmaceda road. Five Spanish divisions and some of Romana's troops were now assembled at Orantia: Blake left two in reserve, detached one against Gordujuela, and marched with the other two against the

French position. Villatte was overpowered and driven across the Salcedon ; but rallied on the left bank and renewed the action. At this moment Acevedo appeared in sight ; he sent two battalions by a circuit to gain the rear of the French, and with the remainder joined in the combat. Villatte retired fighting, and encountering the two battalions in his retreat, broke through them, and reached Gueñes, but not without considerable loss of men, and he also left one gun and part of his baggage in the hands of the Spaniards. Thus ended a series of operations and combats, which had lasted for eleven days.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. The Duke of Dantzic's attack at Zornosa was founded upon false data ; it was inconsistent with the general plan of the campaign, hasty, ill-combined, and feebly followed up. It was an unpardonable fault to leave Villatte without support, close to an army that had met with no signal defeat, and that was five times his strength. The march of Victor's division was too easily checked at Miravalles. For five days, General Acevedo, with at least 8000 men, was wandering unmolested in the midst of the French columns, and finally escaped without any extraordinary effort.

2. General Blake's dispositions, with the exception of his night-march from Nava to Orantia, will, if studied, afford useful lessons in an inverse sense. From the 24th of October to the 4th of November, he omitted no error that the circumstances rendered it possible to commit ; and then, as if ashamed of the single judicious movement that occurred, he would not profit by it. Romana's infantry being partly arrived, and the remainder in the vicinity of Nava, the whole Spanish army was, contrary to all reasonable expectation, concentrated ; Blake had then above 30,000 fighting men united in one mass, harassed, but not much discouraged, and the Conde de Belvedere, with 12,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, and thirty pieces of artillery, was close to Burgos.

If Blake had been at all acquainted with the principles of his art, he would have taken advantage of Villatte's retreat, to march by Espinosa, and Villarcayo, to the upper Ebro ; from thence have gained Burgos ; brought up the artillery from Reynosa ; united Belvedere's troops to his own ; opened a communication with the English army ; and in that position, with a plentiful country behind him, his retreat open, and his army provided with cavalry, he might have commenced a regular system of operations ; but with incredible obstinacy and want of judgment, he determined to attack Bilbao again, and to renew the ridiculous attempt to surround the French army and unite with Palafox at the foot of the Pyrenees.

Such were the commanders, the armies, the rulers, upon whose exertions the British cabinet relied for the security of Sir John Moore's troops, during their double march from Lisbon and Coruña. It was in such a state of affairs that the English ministers, anticipating the speedy and complete destruction of the French forces in Spain, were sounding the trumpet for an immediate invasion of France ! Of France, defended by a million of veteran soldiers, and governed by the mightiest genius of 2000 years ! As if the vast military power of that warlike nation had suddenly become extinct ; as if Báylen were a second Zama, and Hannibal flying to Adrumetum instead of passing the Iberus ! But Napoleon, with an execution more rapid than other men's thoughts, was already at Vittoria, and his hovering eagles cast a gloomy shadow over Spain.*

* Appendix, No. 13, section 8.

BOOK IV.

CHAPTER I.

AFTER the opening of the legislative sessions, the emperor quitted Paris, and repaired to Bayonne. He arrived there on the 3rd of November. It was his intention that the presumption of the Spanish generals should be encouraged by a strict defensive system until the moment, when the blow he was prepared to strike, could fall with the greatest effect. The precipitate attack at Zornosa displeased him, and he was also dissatisfied with the subsequent measures of the king. He thought that the safety of Mouton's division would be compromised between the armies of Blake and the Conde de Belvedere. To prevent any accident, he judged it necessary that Bessieres should advance with the whole of the second corps to Burgos; that Marshal Victor should march by Amurio to Valmaceda; and that Marshal Le-Febre should immediately renew his attack on that position, from the side of Bilbao. These dispositions were executed, and thus at the very moment when Blake was leading his harassed and starving troops back to Bilbao, two corps, amounting to 50,000 men, were in full march to meet him, and a third had already turned his right flank, and was on his rear.

The Spanish general advanced from Valmaceda on the 7th, and thinking that only 1500 men were in Guenes, prepared to surround them. Two divisions making a circuit to the left, passed through Abellana and Sopoerte, with a view to gain the bridge of Sodupe, in the rear of Guenes, while two other divisions attacked that position in front; the remainder of the army followed at some distance. The advanced guard of the fourth corps was in Guenes, and after an action of two hours, the Spaniards were thrown into confusion; but the night saved them from a total rout. The same day, one of their flanking divisions was encountered and beaten near Sopoerte, and the retreat of the other being intercepted on the side of Abellana, it was forced to make for Portagalete on the sea-coast, and from thence to St. Andero. Blake's eyes being now opened a little to the peril of his situation, he resolved to retreat to Espinosa de los Monteros, a strong mountain position, two days' march in the rear; intending to rest his troops there, and to draw supplies from the magazines at Reynosa. Retreating during the night to Valmaceda, he gained Nava on the 8th, and finally reached Espinosa on the 9th. The remainder of Romana's infantry came up during this retreat, and the whole army was, with the exception of the division cut off at Abellana, concentrated in a strong position, which covered the intersection of the roads from St. Andero, Villarcayo, and Reynosa.

Napoleon, accompanied by the Dukes of Dalmatia and Montebello, quitted Bayonne the morning of the 8th, and reached Vittoria in the evening. He was met by the civil and military chiefs at the gates of the town; but refusing to go to the house prepared for his reception, he jumped off his horse, entered the first small inn that he observed, and calling for his maps, and a report of the situation of the armies on both sides, proceeded to study the plan of his campaign.

The first and fourth corps, after uniting at Valmaceda, had separated again at Nava on the 9th, Victor pursuing the track of Blake, and Lefebre marching upon Villarcayo by Medina. The second corps was concentrating at Briviesca, the third corps occupied Tafalla, Peraltes, Caparosa, and Estrella. The sixth corps, the guards, and the reserve, were distributed from Vittoria to Miranda, and a division, under the command of General La Grange, was at Guardia, connecting the positions of the third and sixth corps. The fifth corps was still behind the frontier, and the eighth composed of the troops removed from

Portugal by the convention of Cintra, was marching from the French sea-ports, where it had disembarked.

On the Spanish side, the Conde de Belvedere was at Burgos; Castaños and Palafox, unknowing of their danger, were planning to cut off the French army; and Blake was flying to Espinosa. The English army were scattered from Coruña to Talavera de la Reyna.

In two hours the emperor had arranged his plans. Moncey was directed to leave a division in front of Pampeluna, to observe the Spaniards on the Aragon, to concentrate the remainder of the third corps at Lodosa, and to remain on the defensive until further orders. Lagrange was reinforced by Colbert's brigade of light cavalry from the sixth corps, and directed upon Logroña. The first and fourth corps were to press Blake without intermission. The sixth to march towards Aranda de Douero. The Duke of Dalmatia was appointed to command the second corps, and ordered to fall headlong upon the Conde de Belvedere. The emperor, with the imperial guards and the reserve, followed the movement of the second corps.

These instructions being issued, the enormous mass of the French army was put in motion with a celerity that marked the vigour of Napoleon's command. Marshal Soult having departed on the instant for Briviesca, arrived there at daybreak on the 9th, received the second corps from the hands of Bessieres, and in a few hours, the divisions composing it were in full march for the terrace of Monasterio, which overlooks the plains of Burgos. Head-quarters were established there, and, during the night, General Franceschi's brigade of light cavalry took the road of Zaldueño to Arlanzon, having orders to cross the river of that name, and descending the left bank, to cut the communication of the Spaniards with Madrid, and to prevent them from rallying at the convent of the Chartreuse, if defeated near Burgos.

At four o'clock on the morning of the 10th, the French were in march from Monasterio, and at six o'clock General Lassalle's cavalry reached Villa Fria. The Conde de Belvedere, being informed of their approach, posted the Spanish army at Gamonal, and taking 4000 infantry, eight guns, and the whole of his cavalry, fell upon Lassalle. The latter skirmished for awhile, and then following his orders, retired slowly to Rio Bena. At eight o'clock, the French infantry, which had advanced by two roads, was re-united at this town, and immediately pushed forward on Villa Fria. Belvedere was soon driven back upon Gamonal, and the Spanish army was discovered in line of battle. The right occupied a wood, leaving a clear space of some extent between it and the river Arlazon. The left was posted in the walled park of Vellimer. Thirty pieces of artillery covered the front, and 7000 or 8000 armed peasants were arrayed on the heights, immediately behind the regular troops. These latter amounted to 11,150 infantry, and 1150 cavalry, following a field state of their numbers, found after the action. This was the best army at that time in Spain; it was composed of the Walloon and Spanish guards, the regiments of Majorca, Zafra, and Valencia de Alcantara; the hussars of Valencia, the royal carbineers, and some volunteers of good families. It was completely equipped, and armed principally from the English stores; but its resistance was even more feeble than that made by the half-famished peasants of Blake's force.

BATTLE OF GAMONAL.

General Lassalle, with the light cavalry, led down upon the Spanish right, and filled the plain between the river and the wood. At the same moment the Spanish artillery opened along the whole of their line, and the French infantry formed in columns of regiments arrived. Mouton's division, composed of old soldiers, broke at once into the wood at a charging pace. General Bonnet followed closely, but so rapid and effectual was the assault of Mouton's veterans, that Bonnet's troops never fired a shot. The Spaniards fled in disorder, the left wing, although not attacked, followed the example of the right, and the whole mass, victors and vanquished, rushed into the town of Burgos with extra-

ordinary violence and uproar. At the same moment, Bessieres, who retained the command of all the heavy cavalry, passed at full gallop toward the Madrid road, where it crosses the Arlazon, sabring the fugitives, and taking all the guns which had escaped Mouton's vehement attack; and on the other side of the river, Franceschi was seen to cut in pieces some Catalonian light troops stationed there, and to bar all hopes of flight. Never was a defeat more instantaneous, or more complete. Two thousand five hundred Spaniards were killed; 20 guns, 30 ammunition waggons, six pair of colours, and 900 men, were taken on the field. Four thousand muskets were found unbroken, and the fugitives were dispersed far and wide. Belvedere himself escaped to Lerma, where he arrived in the evening of the day on which the battle was fought. Meeting some battalions, principally composed of volunteers, on their march to join his army, he retired with them to Aranda de Douero during the night; but first, with true Spanish exaggeration, wrote a despatch, in which he asserted, that the French were repulsed in two desperate attacks; but that after thirteen hours' hard fighting, they succeeded in a third.*

All the ammunition and stores of the Spanish army were captured in Burgos; and the indefatigable Marshal Soult, who was still upon the post-horse, which he mounted at Briviesca; not content with travelling from Bayonne to Burgos, taking the latter town, and gaining a decisive victory within the space of fifty hours; now rallied his corps, and detaching one column in pursuit on the side of Lerma, and another towards Valencia and Valladolid, marched himself with a third, on the very day of the battle, towards Reynosa, where he hoped to intercept Blake's line of retreat to the plains of Leon.

This last-mentioned general reached Espinosa, as we have seen, on the evening of the 9th, with six divisions, including Romana's infantry, who also dragged with them six guns of a small calibre. The separation of the fourth division at Abellana, the deserters, and the losses sustained in battle, had reduced the army below 25,000 fighting men. The parc of ammunition and the artillery, guarded by 2000 infantry, were behind Reynosa, at Aguilar del Campo, on the road to Leon. Blake's position was strong, and he hoped to remain in it for some days unmolested. His left wing, composed of the Asturians, and the first division occupied some heights which covered the road of St. Andero. The centre, consisting of the third division and the reserve, formed a line across the road of Reynosa, which led through Espinosa directly to the rear. The second division was established on a commanding height, a little on the right hand of the town; Romana's infantry were posted in a wood, two miles in advance of the right; and the vanguard, with six guns, formed a reserve behind the centre of the position.

BATTLE OF ESPINOSA.

At two o'clock in the afternoon of the 10th, the head of Marshal Victor's columns drove back Romana's infantry,† and seized the wood; but the Spaniards, reinforced by the third division, renewed the combat. A second French column, however, opened its fire upon the Spanish centre, thus weakened by the advance of the third division; and at the same time some light troops ascending the heights on the left, menaced that wing of Blake's army. The contest on the right was maintained with vigour, and the Spaniards, supported by the fire of the six guns in their centre, appeared to be gaining ground, when the night closed and put an end to the action, leaving the French in possession of the wood, and of a ridge of hills, which, at the distance of a cannon shot, run

* Appendix No. 15.

† In the winter of 1812, Captain Hill, of the Royal Navy, was sent to Cronstadt to receive Spanish prisoners who had been taken by the Russians. Of 5000 Spaniards that were delivered to him, above 4000 were men who had escaped with Romana from the Danish isles in 1808. Captives at Espinosa, they had entered the French ranks, served in Napoleon's continental wars, and being made prisoners by the Russians in the retreat from Moscow, were once more brought back to Spain in English vessels. This is a curious commentary upon the silly stories that have been promulgated relative to the desperate

parallel to the centre of the position. Generals St. Roman and Riquielmé were mortally wounded this day on the Spanish side.

At daylight the next morning, Victor, who had relieved his left with fresh troops during the night, renewed the attack. General Maison throwing out a cloud of skirmishers along the front of the Spanish centre and left wing, under cover of their fire, passed rapidly to his own right, and fell upon the Asturians and the first division. Blake, observing this movement, detached a column of grenadiers to reinforce the latter, and advanced in person with three regiments from the centre to take Maison in flank during his march. It was too late. Three Asturian generals fell at the first fire, and the troops of that kingdom fled without waiting for the enemy. They were soon followed by the first division, and Maison, continuing his course without a check, intercepted the line of retreat by St. Andero, and also that by the town of Espinosa. In the mean time, the French troops posted on the parallel ridge before spoken of, attacked the centre, and the division in the wood advancing against the right of the Spaniards, their whole army gave way in terrible confusion and distress, and crowded towards the river Trueba, which encircled the rear of the position. Some tried the fords, some rushed to the town, others fled to the right and left; but the weather was bad, the roads deep, the country rugged and difficult, and the overthrow was fatal. Those who escaped went to their own provinces, carrying dismay into the remotest parts of Galicia, Asturias, Leon, and Castile. The guns, the baggage, and ammunition, fell into the hands of the French. Blake himself reached Reynosa on the 12th, and there rallied about 7000 fugitives, but without arms, without spirit, and without hope.

The line of retreat by Aguilar del Campo, where his artillery remained, was still open to him; and he proposed to remain at Reynosa as long as the enemy would permit him; to restore order, and then to retire through Leon upon Sir David Baird's division, the head of which was now near Astorga. But his total ignorance of the French operations and strength again misled him. He looked only to the side of Espinosa, and already Soult's cavalry was upon his line of retreat, and the Duke of Dantzic was hastening by the valley of Villarcayo towards Reynosa. Upon the 13th, he was attacked by the advanced guard of the second corps, and being now utterly confounded, he fled with 4000 or 5000 men through the valley of Cabuerniga, and took refuge at Arnedo, in the heart of the Asturian mountains. There the Marquis of Romana joined him, and assumed the command of all that remained of the unfortunate army of the left.

Blake being thus disposed of, the fourth French corps, after a halt of a few days to refresh the troops, took the road of Carrion and Valladolid; but Soult recalling his detachments, concentrated the second corps at Reynosa, seized St. Ander, and captured a quantity of English stores; leaving a division there under General Bonnet, he then spread his columns over the whole of the Montagna, pursuing, attacking, and dispersing every body of Spaniards that yet held together, capturing their baggage, and filling all places with alarm. After some partial actions with unconnected parties, everything military belonging to the patriots was driven over the snowy barrier of the Asturian hills; and

fighting of Blake's army, and the devoted courage, with which, *Spartan-like*, Romana's soldiers died to a man upon the field of battle.

Landed at Gihon, 9th October, 1808	9404
Deduct cavalry, which never joined Blake's army			1404

Prisoners delivered to Captain Hill	8000
			4500

3500

Now, if we make allowance, 1. For natural and violent deaths during four years of service under Napoleon, 2. For those who might not have been taken by the Russians, and if we believe that some *might possibly have escaped from Espinosa alive*, the number of Spartans will probably be thought not to have exceeded the classical number of 300.

Soult having left a detachment at St. Vincent de Barqueira, scoured the banks of the Deba, took the town of Potes, and overran Leon with his cavalry as far as Sahagan and Saldana. Meanwhile the Duke of Belluno quitting Espinosa, joined the emperor, whose head-quarters were fixed at Burgos, after the defeat of Belvedere.

The battles of Espinosa and Gamonal, and the subsequent operations of Marshal Soult, laid the north of Spain prostrate, and secured the whole coast from St. Sebastian to the frontier of the Asturias. By a judicious arrangement of small garrisons, and movable columns, the provinces of Guipuscoa, Navarre, Biscay, and the Baston de Laredo were fettered; the communication of the army with France could no longer be endangered by insurrections in the rear; and the wide and fertile plains of Old Castile and Leon were thrown open to the French, and forbidden to the separated divisions of the British army. These great advantages, the result of Napoleon's admirable combinations, the fruits of ten days of active exertion, obtained so easily, and yet so decisive of the fate of the campaign, prove the weakness of the system upon which the Spanish and British governments were at this time acting; if that can be called a system where no one general knew what another had done—was doing—or intended to do.

Burgos, instead of Vittoria, was now become the pivot of operations, and the right of his army being secured, the emperor prepared to change his front, and bear down against the armies of Castaños and Palafox, with a similar impetuosity; but it was first necessary to ascertain the exact situation of the British force. Napoleon believed that it was concentrated at Valladolid, and he detached three divisions of cavalry, and 24 pieces of artillery, by Lerma and Palencia, with orders to cross the Douero, to turn the flank of the English, threaten their communications with Portugal, and thus force them to retire. It was soon discovered that the heads of their columns had not penetrated beyond Salamanca and Astorga, and that many days must elapse before they could be concentrated, and in a condition to act offensively. Certain of this fact, the emperor let loose his three divisions of cavalry, and 8000 horsemen sweeping over the plains, vexed all Leon and Castile. The authorities showed no firmness; the captain-general, Pignatelli, fled in consternation; the people submissive and fearful, displayed no enthusiasm, and disconcerted by the rapid movements of the French, spread a thousand confused and contradictory reports. The incursions of the cavalry extended to the neighbourhood of Astorga, to Benevente, Zamora, Tora, Tordesillas, and even to the vicinity of Salamanca. Such was the fear, or the apathy of the inhabitants, that 30 dragoons were sufficient to raise contributions at the gates of the largest towns; and after the overthrow of Espinosa was known, ten troopers could safely traverse the country in any direction.

The front of the French army being now changed, the 2nd corps, hitherto the leading column of attack, became a corps of observation, covering the right flank, and protecting the important point of Burgos, where large magazines were establishing, and upon which the reinforcements continually arriving from France were directed. The exact situation of the other corps was as follows: The 1st corps, the guards, and a part of the reserve were at Burgos; and Ney, with the 6th, occupied Aranda de Douero; the march of his force from the Ebro had been made with a view to intercept the army of Estremadura on the side of Madrid; but the sudden destruction of that body of troops having rendered this precaution useless, Ney was equally well placed to cut the communication of Castaños with the capital. General Lagrange occupied Logroña, and Moncey, with three divisions of infantry and his light cavalry, was at Lodosa. The Spanish army of the centre was consequently turned and cut off from Madrid even before Castaños was aware that the campaign had commenced.

In passing the mountains near Tolosa, Marshal Lannes, Duke of Montebello, fell from his horse, and was left at Vittoria; his hurts were dangerous, but a

rapid and interesting cure being effected by wrapping him in the skin of a sheep newly slain, the emperor directed him to assume the command of Lagrange's division and Colbert's light cavalry, to unite them with the 3rd corps at Lodosa, and to fall upon Castaños in front. At the same time he ordered Ney to ascend the course of the Douero with the light cavalry and two divisions of the 6th corps, to connect his left with the right of Lannes, and to gain Agreda by the road of Osma and Soria, from whence he could intercept the retreat of Castaños, and place himself on the rear of the Spanish army. To support this operation, the 1st corps, and Latour Maubourg's division of heavy cavalry being drawn from the reserve, proceeded by Lerma and Aranda, and from thence slowly followed the direction of Ney's march. The emperor, with the guards, and the remainder of the reserve, continued at Burgos, the citadel was repaired and armed, magazines were formed, and arrangements made to render it the great depôt of the army. All the reinforcements coming from France were directed upon this town, and proclamations were issued assuring the country people of protection if they would be tranquil and remain in their houses.

Ten days had now elapsed since Napoleon, breaking forth from Vittoria, had deluged the country with his troops, and each day was marked by some advantage gained over the Spaniards; but these misfortunes were still unknown at Tudela and disregarded at the capital. The remnants of Belvedere's army having rallied in the pass of the Somosierra and on the side of Segovia, the troops belonging to the army of the centre, which had been detained in Madrid, were forwarded to the former place, and those left behind from Cuesta's levies were ordered to the latter. General St. Juan, an officer of high reputation, took the command at the Somosierra, General Heredia repaired to Segovia, and an intermediate camp of detachments being formed at Sepulveda, the men thus collected were, by the junta, magnified into a great army sufficient to protect Madrid.

That the left wing of the French army was still upon the Ebro, the central junta attributed, not to the enemy's strength, but to the dilatory proceedings of Castaños, and depriving him of the command, they gave it to Romana, precisely at the moment when it was impossible for the latter to reach the army he was to lead. The junta wanted a battle, and, uncorrected by Blake's destruction, doubted not of victory.

The proceedings at Tudela were also worthy of the times; there the madness of the generals, and the folly of the deputy, increased rather than abated. The freaks of Francisco Palafox, and their ridiculous termination on the 12th of November, I have already related. A few days sufficed to give birth to new plans equally absurd, but more dangerous, as the crisis approached nearer. This time Castaños took the lead. He knew upon the 10th that the Estremaduran army was at Burgos, and that the French were marching on that town; from that moment, despairing of the junction of the British army, and likewise of his own first and third divisions, which were in Madrid, he sent orders to Belvedere to unite himself with Blake; but his letters never reached that officer, who was defeated before they were written, and Castaños, feeling that he himself was in a dangerous position, and that some decided measure was required, conceived so extraordinary a plan, that it would be difficult to credit it upon any authority but his own. He proposed to carry the army of the centre, reduced in numbers and ill-disciplined as it was, by the Concha de Haro and Soria, towards Burgos, and to fall upon the emperor's rearguard; and, as a preliminary step, he determined to beat the army in his front; but Palafox had also a plan, of attacking Moncey on the side of Sanguessa, and the first measure necessary was to combine these double operations. It was agreed that Caparosa should be garrisoned by 4000 infantry, that the bridge-head at that place should be fortified, and that O'Neil should be reinforced at Sanguessa by detachments from the centre until his force amounted to 19,000.

infantry and 1200 cavalry. He was then to break down the bridge, place guards at all the passages on the Aragon, and by a flank march gain Caparosa, cross the river, and threaten Peraltes and Olite on the 17th; but on the 18th turning suddenly to the left to get in rear of Lodosa, while General La-Peña and Coupigny, marching from Centruenigo, should attack Moncey in front.

This great movement was openly talked of at the head-quarters of the Spanish generals for several days before its execution, and these extraordinary commanders, who were ignorant of Blake's disasters, announced their intention of afterwards marching towards Vittoria to lighten the pressure on that officer if he should be in difficulty, or if (as his despatches of the 5th had assured them) he was successful, then to join in a general pursuit. Castaños, however, concealed his real project, which was to move by the Concha de Haro towards Burgos.

It was found impossible to procure a sufficient number of boats to lay a bridge over the Ebro at Alfaro: thus the reinforcements intended for O'Neil were forced to make a circuit by Tudela, and lost three or four days. On the 14th O'Neil arrived at Caparosa, after breaking the bridge of Sanguessa; the 15th the reinforcements joined him. On the 17th, the day appointed for the execution of the plan, Castaños received notice of his own dismissal from the command, but he persevered in his project; La-Peña and Coupigny were put in motion to pass the bridges of Logroña and Lodosa, and the fords between them; but General O'Neil, instead of executing his part, first refused to stir without an order from Joseph Palafox, who was at Zaragoza, and then changing his ground, complained that he was without bread. Castaños besought him to move upon the 18th, urging the necessity of the measure, and the danger of delay. But the deputy, Palafox, who had hitherto approved of the project, suddenly quitted the head-quarters, and went to Caparosa, from whence, in concert with O'Neil, he wrote to demand a farther reinforcement from the centre, of 6000 infantry and some more cavalry, without which they affirmed that it would be dangerous to pass the Aragon river. Castaños preserved his temper, invited the deputy to return to the right bank of the Ebro, and opposed the demand for more troops on the ground of the delay it would cause; but now the captain-general, Palafox, agreeing with neither side, proposed a new plan. It is difficult to say how long these strange disputes would have continued if an umpire had not interposed, whose award was too strongly enforced to be disregarded.

Castaños was with the divisions of Coupigny and La-Peña at Calahorra on the 19th, when he received information that a French corps was advancing upon Logroña. It was Lannes', with Lagrange's and Colbert's troops, but the Spaniard concluded it to be Ney, for he was ignorant of the changes which had taken place since the 8th of the month. It was likewise reported, that Moncey, whose force he estimated at 12,000, when it really was above 20,000, had concentrated at Lodosa, and, at the same time, the Bishop of Osma announced that 12,000 men, under Dessolles, were marching from the side of Aranda de Douero. On the 21st, the intelligence that Dessolles had passed Almazan, and that Moncey was in motion, was confirmed. Then Castaños, relinquishing his offensive projects, prepared to retire, and it was full time. For Marshal Ney, who left Aranda on the 19th, had passed Almazan on the 20th, dispersed several small bands of insurgents, and entered Soria on the 21st, so that when Castaños determined to fall back on the 21st, his flank was already turned, and his retreat upon Madrid in the enemy's power. His artillery was at Centruenigo, and a large detachment of his army was with O'Neil at Caparosa.

During the night of the 21st and 22nd he retired to the heights which extend from Tudela by Cascante, Novellas, Tarazona, and Monteguda. The advanced guard of Lannes was in sight of the Spanish rearguard at Calahorra on the morning of the 22nd. At this moment the only supply of money which the central junta had yet transmitted for the use of the army arrived at Tudela, and,

to complete the picture of distracted councils, O'Neil refused to fall back from Caparosa without the orders of the captain-general. The latter, however, fortunately arrived at Tudela in person, and a conference taking place between him and Castaños the same day, they agreed that the Aragonese army should cross the Ebro, and occupy the heights over Tudela, while the rest of the troops should stretch away in line as far as Tarazona; but in defiance of all orders, entreaties, or reasoning, the obstinate O'Neil remained in an olive wood on the right bank of the river during the night of the 22nd, leaving the key of the position open to the enemy.

A council of war was held, but the discussion was turbulent, and the opinions were discordant. Palafox insisted on the defence of Aragon, as the principal, or rather the only, object to be attended to, and he wished the whole army to pass to the left bank of the Ebro, and confine its operations to the protection of Zaragoza on that side, a proposal which alone was sufficient to demonstrate his total incapacity for military affairs. Castaños reasoned justly against this absurdity, but the important moments passed in useless deputation, and the generals came to no conclusion.

In the mean time, Marshal Lannes, bringing with him a division of the 6th corps (Maurice Mathieu's), which had just arrived from France, concentrated above 30,000 infantry, 4000 or 5000 cavalry, and 60 pieces of artillery, at Lodosa on the 22nd, and marching by Alfaro, appeared, at eight o'clock in the morning of the 23rd, in front of the Spanish outposts, close to Tudela, just at the moment when the Aragonese were passing the bridge and ascending their position. From 40 to 50 guns were distributed along the front of the Spanish army, which, numbering about 45,000 fighting men, was extended on a range of easy hills from Tudela to Tarazona, a distance of more than ten miles. Two divisions of the army of the centre connected the Aragonese with the 4th division, which occupied Cascante. Three divisions were in Tarazona, and there were no intermediate posts between these scattered bodies. The weakness attendant on such an arrangement being visible to the enemy at the first glance, Lannes hastened to make his dispositions, and at nine o'clock commenced

THE BATTLE OF TUDELA.

General Morlot, with one division, attacked the heights above the town. Maurice Mathieu, supported by the cavalry of Lefebre Desnouettes, assailed the centre, and General Lagrange advanced against Cascante. The whole of the artillery followed the columns of attack. The Aragonese resisted Morlot with vigour, and even pressed him in the plain at the foot of the hills, but Maurice Mathieu having gained possession of an olive wood, and a small ridge which was connected with the centre of the Spanish position, after some sharp fighting pierced the line, and Lefebre, breaking through the opening with his cavalry, wheeled up to his left, and threw the right wing into hopeless confusion. The defeated soldiers fled towards the bridge of Tudela, pursued by the victorious horsemen. In the mean time La-Peña, descending from Cascante with the 4th division, drove in Lagrange's advanced guard of cavalry, and pressed forward briskly; but being met at a charging pace by the infantry, was beaten, and fell back to Tarazona, where three divisions remained during the whole of the action, which, strictly speaking, was confined to the heights above Tudela. Palafox, with the right wing and the centre, fled to Zaragoza with such speed that some of the fugitives are said to have arrived there the same evening.

When La-Peña was driven back upon Tarazona, the four divisions of the left wing commenced an orderly retreat towards Borja, but some cavalry, detached by Ney from the side of Soria, coming in sight, the Spaniards got into confusion; a magazine blew up, and in the midst of the disorder cries of treason were heard, the columns dissolved in a few moments, the road to Borja was covered with a disorganised multitude; and so ended the celebrated battle of Tudela, in which 40,000 men were beaten and dispersed by an effort that, being

in itself neither very vigorous nor well sustained, was nevertheless sufficient for its purposes, and demonstrative of the incapacity of Spanish generals, and the want of steadiness in Spanish soldiers.

Several thousand prisoners, 30 pieces of artillery, and all the ammunition and baggage, fell into the hands of the French, who rated the killed and wounded very high. The total loss may be estimated at 8000 or 9000 men. Fifteen thousand escaped to Zaragoza; a detachment of 2000, under the Conde de Cartoajal and General Lille, left in the mountains of Nalda, were cut off by the result of the action, and two divisions, whose numbers were increased by fugitives from the others, were rallied at Calatayud on the 25th, but they were half starved and mutinous.

At Calatayud, Castaños received two despatches from the central junta, virtually restoring him to the command. For the first empowered him to unite the Aragonese army with his own; and the second, informing him that St. Juan was at the Somosierra, required his co-operation with that general to protect the capital. The battle of Tudela disposed of the first despatch, the second induced Castaños to march by Sigüenza upon Madrid.

In the mean time, Napoleon, recalling the greatest part of his cavalry from the open country of Castile, left 7000 or 8000 men in Burgos, and fixed his head-quarters at Aranda de Douero on the 23rd. From the difficulty of transmitting despatches through a country in a state of insurrection, intelligence of the victory at Tudela only reached him on the 26th. He was exceedingly discontented that Castaños should have escaped the hands of Ney. That marshal had been instructed to reach Soria by the 21st, to remain there until Lannes should be in front of the Spaniards, and then to pass by Agreda, and intercept the retreat of the latter.

On the evening of the 21st, General Jomini and Colonel D'Esmenard, staff-officers of the 6th corps, arrived at Soria with an escort of 80 cavalry. That town is situated upon a rocky height, with a suburb below, and the Conde de Cartoajal, who was retiring from the mountain of Nalda, happening to be in the upper part, the magistrates endeavoured to entrap the French officers. The latter were met at dusk by the municipality, and invited to enter the town with great appearance of cordiality; but their suspicions were excited, and the plan failed. Cartoajal marched during the night, and the next day the 6th corps occupied the place.

General Jomini, whose profound knowledge of the theory of war enabled him to judge accurately of the events which were likely to occur, urged Ney to continue his march upon Calatayud, without any rest; but the marshal, either offended with the heat of Jomini's manner, or from some other cause, resolved to follow the letter of his instructions, and remained at Soria the 23rd and 24th, merely sending out some light cavalry on the side of Medina Celi and Agreda. On the 25th he marched to the latter town; the 26th he crossed the field of battle, passing through Cascante. The 27th, he arrived, with one division, at Mallen, a town situated between Tudela and Zaragoza, his advanced guard being at Arlazon on the Zilo.

To the erroneous direction and dilatory nature of these movements, Castaños owed the safety of the troops, which were reassembled at Calatayud. Ney must have been acquainted with the result of the battle on the 25th, and it is remarkable that he should have continued on the road towards Agreda, when a single march by Medina Celi would have brought him upon the line of retreat from Calatayud to Sigüenza. By some writers these errors have been attributed to Ney's jealousy of Marshal Lannes; by others it has been asserted that the plunder of Soria detained him. The falsehood of the latter charge is evident from the fact, that, with the exception of a requisition for some shoes and great coats, no contribution was exacted from Soria, and no pillage took place at all; and with respect to the former accusation, a better explanation may be found in the peculiar disposition of this extraordinary man, who was notoriously

indolent, and unlearned in the abstract science of war. It was necessary for him to see, in order to act; his character seemed to be asleep until some eminent danger aroused all the marvellous energy and fortitude with which nature had endowed him.

The success at Tudela fell short of what Napoleon had a right to expect from his previous dispositions, but it sufficed to break the Spanish strength on that side, and to lay the kingdoms of Aragon and Navarre, and the province of New Castile, as bare as the northern part of Spain was laid by the victory of Espinosa. From the frontiers of France to those of Portugal, from the sea-coast to the Tagus, the country was now overwhelmed. Madrid, Zaragoza, and the British army, indeed, lifted their heads a little way above the rising waters, but the eye looked in vain for an efficient barrier against the flood, which still poured on with unabated fury. The divided, weak state of the English troops led the emperor to conclude that Sir John Moore would instantly retire into Portugal. Lannes he commanded to pursue Palafox, to seize the important position of Monte Toreño, to summon Zaragoza, and to offer a complete amnesty to all persons in the town, without reservation, thus bearing testimony to the gallantry of the first defence. His own attention was fixed on Madrid. That capital was the rallying point of all the broken Spanish, and of all his own pursuing divisions, and it was the centre of all interests, a commanding height from whence a beneficial stream of political benefits might descend to allay, or a driving storm of war pour down to extinguish, the fire of insurrection.

CHAPTER II.

THE French patrols sent towards the Somosierra ascertained, on the 21st, that above 6000 men were entrenching themselves in the gorge of the mountains; that a small camp at Sepulveda blocked the roads leading upon Segovia; and that General Heredia was preparing to secure the passes of the Guadarama. Napoleon, however, having resolved to force the Somosierra, and reach the capital before Castaños could arrive there, ordered Ney to pursue the army of the centre without intermission, and directed the 4th corps to continue its march from Carion by Palencia, Valladolid, Olmedo, and Segovia.

The movement of this corps is worthy of the attention of military men. We shall find it confusing the spies and country people; overawing the flat country of Leon and Castile; protecting the right flank of the army; menacing Galicia and Salamanca; keeping the heads of Moore's and Baird's columns from advancing, and rendering it dangerous for them to attempt a junction; threatening the line of Hope's march from the Tagus to the Guadarama; dispersing Heredia's corps, and finally turning the pass of Somosierra, without ever ceasing to belong to the concentric movement of the great army upon Madrid.

The time lost in transmitting the intelligence of the victory at Tudela was productive of serious consequences. The officer despatched with these fresh instructions, found Ney and Moncey (Lannes remained sick at Tudela), each advanced two days' march in the wrong direction.

The first, as we have seen, was at Mallen, preparing to attack Zaragoza; the second was at Almunio, near Calatayud, pursuing Castaños. They were consequently obliged to countermarch, and during the time thus lost, the people of Zaragoza recovering from the consternation into which they were at first thrown by the appearance of the flying troops, made arrangements for a vigorous defence. Castaños also escaped to Sigüenza, without any further loss than what was inflicted in a slight action at Burvieca, where General Maurice Mathieu's division came up with his rearguard.

The emperor quitted Aranda on the 28th with the guards, the 1st corps, and the reserve, and marched towards Somosierra. Head-quarters were at

Boucequillas on the 29th. A detachment sent to attack the camp at Sepulveda failed, with a loss of 50 or 60 men; but the Spaniards, struck with a panic after the action, quitted their post, which was very strong, and fled in disorder towards Segovia. The 30th, the French advanced guard reached the foot of the Somosierra. General St. Juan, whose force now amounted to 10,000 or 12,000 men, was judiciously posted; 16 pieces of artillery, planted in the neck of the pass, swept the road along the whole ascent, which was exceedingly steep and favourable for the defence. The infantry were advantageously placed on the right and left, in lines, one above another, and some intrenchments made in the more open parts strengthened the whole position.

PASSAGE OF THE SOMOSIERRA.

At daybreak, three French battalions attacked St. Juan's right, three more assailed his left, and as many marched along the causeway in the centre; six guns supported the last column. The French wings soon spread over the mountain side, and commenced a warm skirmishing fire. At this moment Napoleon arrived. He rode into the mouth of the pass, and attentively examined the scene before him. The infantry were making no progress; a thick fog mixed with smoke hung upon the ascent; suddenly, as if by inspiration, he ordered the Polish lancers of his guard to charge up the causeway, and seize the Spanish battery. The first squadron was thrown into confusion, by a fire which levelled the foremost ranks. General Krazinski rallied them in a moment, and under cover of the smoke, and the thick vapours of the morning, the regiment, with a fresh impetus, proceeded briskly up the mountain, sword in hand. As those gallant horsemen passed, all the Spanish infantry fired, and fled from the entrenchments on each side, towards the summit of the causeway; so that, when the Poles fell in among the gunners, and took the battery, the whole Spanish army was in flight, abandoning arms, ammunition, baggage, and a number of prisoners.

This surprising exploit, in the glory it conferred upon one party, and the disgrace it heaped upon the other, can hardly be paralleled in the annals of war. It is indeed almost incredible, even to those who are acquainted with Spanish armies, that a position, in itself nearly impregnable, and defended by 12,000 men, should, without any panic, but merely from a deliberate sense of danger, be abandoned, at the wild charge of a few squadrons, which two companies of good infantry would have effectually stopped. Yet some of the Spanish regiments so shamefully beaten here, had been victorious at Baylen a few months before; and General St. Juan's dispositions at Somosierra were far better than Reding's at the former battle; but thus absolutely does Fortune govern in war!

The charge of the Poles, viewed as a simple military operation, was extravagantly foolish, but taken as the result of Napoleon's sagacious estimate of the real value of Spanish troops, and his promptitude in seizing the advantage offered by the smoke and fog that clung to the side of the mountain, it was a felicitous example of intuitive genius.

The routed troops were pursued towards Buitrago by the French cavalry. St. Juan himself broke through the French on the side of Sepulveda, and gained the camp of Heredia at Segovia; but the cavalry of the 4th corps approached, and the two generals crossing the Guadarama, united some of the fugitives from Somosierra, on the Madrid side of the mountains, and endeavoured to enter that capital. The appearance of a French patrol terrified the vile cowards that followed them; the multitude once more fled to Talavera de la Reyna, and there consummated their intolerable villany by murdering their unfortunate general, and fixing his mangled body to a tree; after which, dispersing, they carried dishonour and fear into their respective provinces.

The Somosierra being forced, the imperial army came down from the mountains; the 6th corps hastened up from the side of Alcala and Guadalaxara; the central junta fled from Aranjuez; and the remnant of the forces under

Castaños, being intercepted on the side of Madrid, and pressed by Ney in the rear, turned towards the Tagus. The junta, while flying with indecent haste, spread a thousand false reports, and with more than ordinary pertinacity, endeavoured to deceive the people and English general; a task, in which they were strongly aided by the weak credulity of Mr. Frere, the British plenipotentiary, who accompanied them in their flight to Badajos. Mr. Stuart, with greater discretion and firmness, remained at Madrid until the enemy had actually commenced the investment of that town.

The army of the centre, after the combat of Burvieca, had continued its retreat unmolested by Ney. The time lost, in the false movement upon Mallen, was never recovered. The Spaniards escaped the sword, but their numbers daily diminished; their sufferings increased, and their insubordination kept pace with their privations. At Alcazar del Rey, Castaños resigned the command to General La-Peña, and proceeded to Truxillo himself, with an escort of 30 infantry and 15 dragoons, a number scarcely sufficient to protect his life from the ferocity of the peasants, who were stirred up and prepared, by the falsehoods of the central junta, and the villany of the deserters, to murder him.

Madrid was in a state of anarchy seldom equalled. A local and military junta were formed, to conduct the defence; the inhabitants took arms, a multitude of peasants from the neighbourhood entered the place, and the regular forces, commanded by the Marquis of Castelar, amounted to 6000 men, with a train of 16 guns. The pavement was taken up, the streets were barricaded, the houses were pierced, and the Retiro, a weak irregular work, which commanded the city, was occupied in strength. Don Thomas Morla, and the Prince of Castelfranco, were the chief men in authority. The people demanded ammunition, and when they received it, discovered, or said, that it was mixed with sand. Some person accused the Marquis of Perales, a respectable old general, of the deed; a mob rushed to his house, murdered him, and dragged his body about the streets. Many others of inferior note fell victims to this fury, for no man was safe, none durst assume authority to control, none durst give honest advice; the houses were thrown open, the bells of the convents and churches rung incessantly, and a band of ferocious armed men traversed the streets in all the madness of popular insurrection.

Eight days had now elapsed since the first preparations for defence were made; each day the public effervescence increased, the dominion of the mob became more decisive, their violence more uncontrollable, and the uproar was extreme, when, on the morning of the 2nd of December, three heavy divisions of French cavalry suddenly appeared on the high ground to the north-west, and like a dark cloud overhung the troubled city.

At 12 o'clock the emperor himself arrived, and the Duke of Istria, by his command, summoned the town. The officer employed was upon the point of being massacred by the irregulars, when the Spanish soldiers, ashamed of such conduct, rescued him. This determination to resist was, notwithstanding the fierceness displayed at the gates, very unpalatable to many of the householders, numbers of whom escaped from different quarters; deserters also came over to the French, and Napoleon, while waiting for his infantry, examined all the weak points of the city.

Madrid was for many reasons incapable of defence. First, there were no bulwarks; secondly, the houses, although strong and well built, were not, like many Spanish towns, fire proof; thirdly, there were no outworks, and the heights on which the French cavalry were posted, the palace, and the Retiro, completely commanded the city; fourthly, the perfectly open country around would have enabled the French cavalry to discover and cut off all convoys, and no precaution had been taken to provide subsistence for the 150,000 people contained within the circuit of the place.

The desire of the central junta, that this metropolis should risk the horrors

of a storm, was equally silly and barbarous. Their own criminal apathy had deprived Madrid of the power of procrastinating its defence until relieved from without, and there was no sort of analogy between the situation of Zaragoza and this capital. Napoleon knew this well; he was not a man to plunge headlong into the streets of a great city, among an armed and excited population; he knew that address in negotiation, a little patience, and a judicious employment of artillery, would soon reduce the most outrageous to submission, and he had no wish to destroy the capital of his brother's kingdom.*

In the evening the infantry and artillery arrived; they were posted at the most favourable points; the night was clear and bright, the French camp was silent and watchful; but the noise of tumult was heard from every quarter of the city, as if some mighty beast was struggling and howling in the toils.

At midnight a second summons was sent through the medium of a prisoner. The captain-general, Castellar, attempted to gain time by an equivocal reply, but he failed in his object. The French light troops then stormed some houses, and one battery of thirty guns opened against the Retiro, while another threw shells from the opposite quarter, to distract the attention of the inhabitants.

The Retiro, situated on a rising ground, was connected with a range of buildings erected on the same side of the Prado, a public walk which nearly encircled the town. Some of the principal streets opened into the Prado nearly opposite to those buildings. In the morning a practicable breach being made in the Retiro wall, the difference between military courage and ferocity became apparent, for Villatte's division breaking in easily, routed the garrison, and pursuing its success, seized the public buildings above spoken of, crossed the Prado, gained the barriers erected at the entrance of the streets, and took possession of the immense palace of the Duke of Medina Celi, which was in itself the key to the city on that side. This vigorous commencement created great terror, and the town was summoned for the third time.

In the afternoon, Morla and another officer came out to demand a suspension of arms, necessary, they said, to persuade the people to surrender. Being admitted to the emperor's presence, he addressed Morla in terms of great severity; he reproached him for scandalous conduct towards Dupont's army. "Injustice and bad faith," he exclaimed, "always recoil upon those who are guilty of either." This saying was well applied to that Spaniard, and Napoleon himself confirmed its philosophic truth in after times. "The Spanish ulcer destroyed me," was an expression of deep anguish which escaped from him in his own hour of misfortune.

Morla returned to the town: his story was soon told: before six o'clock the next morning Madrid must surrender or perish. A division of opinion arose; the violent excitement of the populace was considerably abated, but the armed peasantry from the country, and the poorest inhabitants, still demanded to be led against the enemy. A constant fire was kept up from the houses in the neighbourhood of the Prado; the French General Maison was wounded, and General Bruyeres was killed; but the disposition to fight became each moment weaker, and Morla and Castelfranco prepared a capitulation. The captain-general, Castellar, refused to sign it, and as the town was only invested on one side, he effected his escape with the regular troops during the night, carrying with him 16 guns. The people now sunk into a quiescent state, and at eight o'clock in the morning of the 4th, Madrid surrendered.

That Morla was a traitor there is no doubt, and his personal cowardice was excessive; but Castelfranco appears to have been rather weak and ignorant than treacherous, and certainly the surrender of Madrid was no proof of his guilt; that event was inevitable. The boasting uproar of the multitude when they are permitted to domineer for a few days is not enthusiasm. The retreat of Castellar with the troops of the line during the progress of the negotiation was the wisest course to pursue, and proves that he acquiesced in the propriety

of surrendering. That the people neither could nor would defend the city is quite evident, for it is incredible that Morla and Castelfranco should have been able to carry through a capitulation in so short a period, if the generals, the regular troops, the armed peasantry, and the inhabitants, had been all, or even a part of them, determined to resist.

The emperor, cautious of giving offence to a population so lately and so violently excited, carefully provided against any sudden reaction, and preserved the strictest discipline. A soldier of the imperial guard was shot in one of the squares for having a plundered watch in his possession. The infantry were placed in barracks and convents, and the cavalry were kept ready to scour the streets at the first alarm. The Spaniards were disarmed, and Napoleon fixed his own quarters at Chamartin, a country house four miles from Madrid. In a few days everything presented the most tranquil appearance; the shops were opened, the public amusements recommenced, and the theatres were frequented. The inhabitants of capital cities are easily moved, and easily calmed; self-interest and the pursuit of pleasure unfit them for noble and sustained efforts; they can be violent, ferocious, cruel, but are seldom constant and firm.

It was during this operation that La-Peña, after escaping from the 6th corps, arrived at Guadalajara with about 5000 men. On the 2nd, the Dukes of Infantado and Albuquerque having left Madrid, joined him, and on the 4th, Venegas came up with 2000 men. While the generals were hesitating what course to pursue, Napoleon being apprized of their vicinity, directed Bessieres with 16 squadrons upon Guadalajara, supporting him by Ruffin's division of the 1st corps. At the approach of the cavalry, the main body retired through the hills by Sanctorcaz towards Aranjuez, and the artillery crossed the Tagus at Sacedon. Ruffin's division immediately changed its direction, and cut the Spaniards off from La Mancha by the line of Ocaña. A mutiny among the Spanish troops having forced La-Peña to resign his command, the Duke of Infantado was chosen in his place, the army crossed the Tagus at several points, and after some slight actions with the advanced cavalry of the French, this miserable body of men finally saved themselves at Cuenca. Many deserters and fugitives, and the brigades of Cartoajal and Lilli, which had escaped the different French columns, also arrived there, and the duke proceeded to organize another army.

In the mean time the 4th French corps reached Segovia, passed the Guadarama, dispersed some armed peasants assembled at the Escorial, and then marched toward Almaraz, to attack General Galluzzo, who, having assembled 5000 or 6000 men to defend the left bank of the Tagus, was, with the usual skill of a Spanish general, occupying a line of forty miles. The 1st corps entered La Mancha; Toledo immediately shut its gates, and the junta of that town publicly proclaimed their resolution to bury themselves under the ruins of the city; but at the approach of a French division, betrayed the most contemptible cowardice.

Thus, six weeks had sufficed to dissipate the Spanish armies; the glittering bubble burst, and a terrible reality remained. From St. Sebastian to the Asturias, from the Asturias to Talavera de la Reina, from Talavera to the gates of the noble city of Zaragoza, all was submission, and beyond that boundary all was apathy or dread. Ten thousand French soldiers could safely (as far as regarded the Spaniards) have marched from one extremity of the Peninsula to the other.

After the fall of Madrid, King Joseph remained at Burgos, issuing proclamations, and carrying on a sort of underplot, through the medium of his native ministers. The views of the latter being naturally turned towards the Spanish interests as distinct from the French, a source of infinite mischief to Joseph's cause was opened: for that monarch, anxious to please and conciliate his subjects, ceased to be a Frenchman without becoming a Spaniard. At this time Napoleon assumed and exercised all the rights of conquest; and it is

evident, from the tenor of his speeches, proclamations, and decrees, that some ulterior project, in which the king's personal interests were not concerned, was contemplated by him. It appeared as if he wished the Spaniards to offer the crown to himself a second time, that he might obtain a plausible excuse for adopting a new line of policy by which to attract the people, or at least to soften their pride, which was now the main obstacle to his success.

An assemblage of the nobles, the clergy, the corporations, and the tribunals of Madrid, waited upon him at Chamartin, and presented an address, in which they expressed their desire to have Joseph among them again. The emperor's reply was an exposition of the principles upon which Spain was to be governed, and offers a fine field for reflection upon the violence of those passions which induce men to resist positive good, and eagerly seek for danger, misery, and death, rather than resign their prejudices.

"I accept," said he, "the sentiments of the town of Madrid. I regret the misfortunes that have befallen it, and I hold it as a particular good fortune that I am enabled, under the circumstances of the moment, to spare that city, and to save it from yet greater misfortunes.

"I have hastened to take measures fit to tranquillize all classes of citizens, knowing well that to all people, and to all men, uncertainty is intolerable.

"I have preserved the religious orders; but I have restrained the number of monks. No sane person can doubt that they are too numerous. Those who are truly called to this vocation by the grace of God will remain in their convents; those who have lightly adopted their vocation, or from worldly motives, will have their existence secured among the secular ecclesiastics, from the surplus of the convents. I have provided for the wants of the most interesting and useful of the clergy, the parish priests.

"I have abolished that tribunal against which Europe and the age alike exclaimed. Priests ought to guide consciences; but they should not exercise any exterior and corporal jurisdiction over men.

"I have taken the satisfaction which was due to myself and to my nation, and the part of vengeance is completed. Ten* of the principal criminals bend their heads before her; but for all others there is absolute and entire pardon.

"I have suppressed the rights usurped by the nobles during civil wars, when the kings have been too often obliged to abandon their own rights to purchase tranquillity and the repose of their people.

"I have suppressed the feudal rights; and every person can now establish inns, mills, ovens, weirs, and fisheries, and give free play to their industry; only observing the laws and customs of the place. The self-love, the riches, and the prosperity of a small number of men, was more hurtful to your agriculture than the heats of the dog days.

"As there is but one God, there should be in one estate but one justice; wherefore all the particular jurisdictions having been usurped, and being contrary to the national rights, I have destroyed them. I have also made known to all persons that which each can have to fear, and that which they may hope for.

"The English armies I will drive from the Peninsula. Zaragoza, Valencia, Seville, shall be reduced either by persuasion or by the force of arms.

"There is no obstacle capable of retarding for any length of time the execution of my will. But that which is above my power, is to constitute the Spaniards a nation, under the orders of the king, if they continue to be imbued with the principle of division, and of hatred towards France, such as the English partizans and the enemies of the continent have instilled into them.

* Dukes of Infantado, of Híjar, Medina Celi, and Ossuna; Marquis Santa Cruz; Counts Fernán, Miñez, and Altamira; Prince of Castello Franco, Pedro Cevallos, and the Bishop of St. Ander, were proscribed, body and goods, as traitors to France and Spain.

I cannot establish a nation, a king, and the Spanish independence, if that king is not sure of the affection and fidelity of his subjects.

"The Bourbons can never again reign in Europe. The divisions in the royal family were concerted by the English. It was not either King Charles or his favourite, but the Duke of Infantado, the instrument of England, that was upon the point of overturning the throne. The papers recently found in his house prove this; it was the preponderance of England that they wished to establish in Spain. Insensate project! which would have produced a land war without end, and caused torrents of blood to be shed.

"No power influenced by England can exist upon the continent. If any desire it, their desire is folly, and sooner or later will ruin them. I shall be obliged to govern Spain, and it will be easy for me to do it by establishing a viceroy in each province. However, I will not refuse to concede my rights of conquest to the king, and to establish him in Madrid, when the 30,000 citizens assemble in the churches, and on the holy sacrament take an oath, not with the mouth alone, but with the heart, and without any jesuitical restriction, 'to be true to the king, to love and support him.' Let the priests from the pulpit and in the confessional, the tradesmen in their correspondence and their discourses, inculcate these sentiments in the people; then I will relinquish my rights of conquest, then I will place the king upon the throne, and I will take a pleasure in showing myself the faithful friend of the Spaniards.

"The present generation may differ in opinions; too many passions have been excited; but your descendants will bless me as the regenerator of the nation: they will mark my sojourn among you as memorable days, and from those days they will date the prosperity of Spain. These are my sentiments: go, consult your fellow citizens, choose your part, but do it frankly, and exhibit only true colours."

The dispositions now made by Napoleon indicated a vast plan of operations. It would appear that he intended to invade Galicia, Andalusia, and Valencia, by his lieutenants, and to carry his arms to Lisbon in person. Upon the 20th December the sixth corps, the guards, and the reserve, were assembled under his own immediate control. The first corps was stationed at Toledo, but the light cavalry attached to it scoured the roads leading to Andalusia, up to the foot of the Sierra Morena. The fourth corps was at Talavera, on the march towards the frontier of Portugal. The second corps was on the Carrion river, preparing to advance against Galicia. The eighth corps was broken up; the divisions composing it ordered to join the second, and Junot, who commanded it, repaired to the third corps, to supply the place of Marshal Moncey, who was called to Madrid for a particular service; doubtless an expedition against Valencia. The fifth corps, which had arrived at Vittoria, was directed to reinforce the third, then employed against Zaragoza. The seventh was always in Catalonia.

Vast as this plan of campaign appears, it was not beyond the emperor's means; for without taking into consideration his own genius, activity, and vigour, he counted on his muster-rolls, above 330,000 men, and above 60,000 horses; above 200 pieces of field artillery followed the corps to battle, and as many more remained in reserve. Of this monstrous army, 255,000 men, and 50,000 horses, were actually under arms, with their different regiments; 32,000 were detached or in garrisons, preserving tranquillity in the rear, and guarding the communications of the active force.* The remainder were in hospital, and so slight had been the resistance of the Spanish armies, that only 1900 prisoners were to be deducted from this multitude. Of the whole host, 213,000 were native Frenchmen, the residue were Poles, Germans, and Italians.

Of the disposable troops, 35,000 men and 5000 horses were appropriated to Catalonia, and about the same number to the siege of Zaragoza. Above

* Appendix, No. 28.

180,000 men, and 40,000 horses, were therefore available for any enterprise, without taking a single man from the service of the lines of communication.

What was there to oppose this fearful array? What consistency or vigour in the councils? What numbers? What discipline and spirit in the armies of Spain? What enthusiasm among the people? What was the disposition, the means? What the activity of the allies of that country? The answers to these questions demonstrate, that the fate of the Peninsula hung at this moment upon a thread, and that the deliverance of that country was due to other causes than the courage, the patriotism, or the constancy of the Spaniards.

First, with regard to their armies. The Duke of Infantado resided among, rather than commanded, a few thousand wretched fugitives at Cuenca, destitute, mutinous, and cowed in spirit. At Valencia there was no army, for that which belonged to the province was shut up in Zaragoza, and dissensions had arisen between Palafox and the local junta in consequence.

The passes of the Sierra Morena were occupied by 5000 raw levies, hastily made by the junta of Seville, after the defeat of St. Juan. Galluzzo, who had undertaken to defend the Tagus, with 6000 timid and ill-armed soldiers, was at this time in flight, having been suddenly attacked and defeated at Almaraz by a detachment of the fourth corps. Romana was near Leon, at the head of 18,000 or 20,000 runaways, collected by him after the dispersion at Reynosa; but of this number only 5000 were armed, and none were subordinate or capable of being disciplined; for when checked for misconduct, the marquis complained that they deserted. In Galicia there was no army; in the Asturias, the local government were so corrupt, so faithless, and so oppressive, that the spirit of the people was crushed, and patriotism reduced to a name.*

The central junta, having first repaired to Badajos, were terrified, and fled from thence to Seville, and their inactivity was more conspicuous in this season of adversity than before, and contrasted strangely with the pompous and inflated language of their public papers. Their promises were fallacious, their incapacity glaring, their exertions ridiculous and abortive; and the junta of Seville, still actuated by their own ambitious views, had now openly reassumed all their former authority.

In short, the strength and spirit of Spain was broken, the enthusiasm was null, except in a few places, and the emperor was, with respect to the Spaniards, perfectly master of his operations. He was in the centre of the country; he held the capital; the fortresses; the command of the great lines of communication between the provinces; and on the wide military horizon, no dark cloud intercepted his view, save the heroic city of Zaragoza on the one side, and a feeble British army on the other. Sooner or later, he observed, and with truth, that the former must fall; it was an affair of artillery calculation. The latter, he naturally supposed to be in full retreat for Portugal; but the fourth corps were nearer to Lisbon than the British general; a hurried retreat alone could bring the latter in time to that capital, and consequently no preparations for defence could be made sufficient to arrest the 60,000 Frenchmen which the emperor could carry there at the same moment. The subjugation of Spain appeared inevitable, when the genius and vigour of one man frustrated Napoleon's plans at the very moment of execution; and the Austrian war breaking out at the instant, drew the master-spirit from the scene of contention. England then put forth all her vast resources; fortunately those resources were wielded by a general equal to the task of delivering the Peninsula, and it was delivered. But through what changes of fortune; by what unexpected helps; by what unlooked-for and extraordinary events; under what difficulties; and by whose perseverance, and in despite of whose errors, let posterity judge; for in that judgment only will impartiality and justice be found.

CHAPTER III.

THE 20th of December, Napoleon became aware that Sir John Moore (having relinquished his communication with Lisbon, and adopted a new one upon Coruña) was menacing the French line of operations on the side of Burgos. This intelligence obliged him to suspend all his designs against the south of Spain and Portugal, and to fix his whole attention upon

THE OPERATIONS OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

The reasons which induced the English general to divide his army, and to send General Hope with one column by the Tagus, while the other marched under his own personal command, by Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, have been already related; as likewise the arrangements which brought Sir David Baird to Coruña, without having permission to land his troops, and without money to equip them, when they were at last suffered to disembark.

The 8th of November, Sir John Moore being at Almeida, on the frontier of Portugal, his artillery was at Truxillo, in Spanish Estremadura, and Sir David Baird's division was at Coruña.

General Blake pursued by 50,000 enemies, was that day flying from Nava to Espinosa, and Castaños and Palafox were quarrelling at Tudela.

The Conde de Belvedere was at Burgos, with 13,000 bad troops.

Napoleon was at Vittoria with 100,000 good troops.

At this time the letters of Lord William Bentinck and Colonel Graham, exposing all the imprudence of the Spanish generals, being received, created uneasiness in the mind of Sir John Moore; he already foresaw that his junction with the other divisions of his army might be impeded by the result of an action, which the Spaniards appeared to be courting, contrary to all sound policy; but as no misfortune had yet befallen them, he continued his march, hoping, "that all the bad which might happen, would not happen!"

The 11th he crossed the frontier of Spain, and marched to Ciudad Rodrigo; on that day Blake was completely discomfited at Espinosa, and the Estremaduran army, beaten the day before at Gamonal, was utterly ruined and dispersed.

The 13th the head of the British columns entered Salamanca, at the moment when Blake's fugitive force was finally disorganized at Reynosa, leaving the first, second, and fourth French corps, amounting to near 70,000 men, free to act against any quarter.

Sir John Moore participated at first in the universal belief, that the nation was enthusiastic, and fixed in a determination to dispute every step with the invaders; even after he had detected the exaggerations of the military agents, and perceived the want of capacity in the Spanish generals and rulers, he trusted that the spirit of the people would compensate for their deficiency of skill, and his mind was bent upon succouring them with all his power; * what then was his surprise to find, that the defeat of the Conde de Belvedere, an event which laid Castile open to the incursions of the enemy, which uncovered the march of the British, and compromised their safety, had created no sensation among the people; that the authorities had spread no alarm, taken no precautions, delivered out no arms, although many thousands were stored in the principal towns, and neither encouraged the inhabitants by proclamations, nor enrolled any of them for defence? He himself was informed of this important occurrence a full week after it had happened, and then through a single official channel. Valladolid was but three marches from Salamanca, and only 4000 British troops had arrived in the latter town; if the enemy had advanced in force, a retreat upon Ciudad Rodrigo would have become inevitable. The general, therefore, assembled the local authorities, explained to them the danger of his position, and endeavoured to excite their ardour; his exhortations produced no effect,

either upon the junta or the people; the latter loudly declared their detestation of the invaders, but remained tranquil; the former were timid and stupid. The first feeling of indignation against the French was exhausted, and there was nothing to supply its place; the fugitives from the armies passed daily, without shame, and without reproach from their countrymen. Notwithstanding this unfavourable appearance, Sir John Moore resolved not to retire until forced to do so; but hastening the arrival of his own rear divisions, he sent orders to Sir David Baird and to Sir John Hope to concentrate their troops, yet to be prepared for a retreat if the enemy advanced.

In this state he remained until the 18th. His army was closing up, and the French cavalry withdrew from Valladolid to Placencia. But the news of Blake's defeat now reached Salamanca, not by rumour, or by any direct communication from the Montaña-St. Ander, but through Mr. Stuart, eight days subsequent to the date of the action; the central junta did not even inform the minister plenipotentiary until thirty hours after having received official intelligence of it themselves.

The want of transport and supplies obliged the British to march in small and successive divisions. It was therefore, the 23rd of November before the centre, consisting of 12,000 infantry, and a battery of six guns, were concentrated at Salamanca. On that day Castaños and Palafox were defeated at Tudela, their armies scattered without a chance of rallying again in the field, and the third and sixth French corps became disposable.

The emperor, victorious on both flanks, and with a fresh base of operations fixed at Burgos, was free to move, with the guards and the reserve, either against Madrid or in the direction of Salamanca; and detachments of his army were already in possession of Valladolid; the very town which, a few days before, the Spanish government had indicated for the base of Sir John Moore's operations, and the formation of his magazines.

The 26th the head of Sir David Baird's column was in Astorga, but the rear extended beyond Lugo. The head of General Hope's division was at the Escorial, the rear at Talavera. The second French corps was on the Deba, threatening Leon and the Asturias; the cavalry covered the plains; the fourth corps was descending by Carrion and Valladolid, to seize the pass of the Guadarama; and the emperor himself was preparing to force the Somosierra.

From this summary of contemporary events, it is evident, that notwithstanding Sir John Moore had organized, equipped, supplied, and carried his troops 400 miles in the space of six weeks, he was too late in the field. The campaign was decided against the Spaniards before the British had, strictly speaking, entered Spain as an army; it is also certain, that if, instead of being at Salamanca, Escorial, and Astorga, on the 23rd, the troops had been united at Burgos on the 8th, such was the weakness of the Spanish forces, the strength of his enemy, and such the skill with which Napoleon directed his movements, that a difficult and precarious retreat was the utmost favour that could be expected from Fortune by the English general.

The situation in which he was placed on his arrival at Salamanca, gave rise to serious reflections in the mind of Sir John Moore. He had been sent forward without a plan of operations, or any data upon which to found one. By his instructions he was merely directed to open communication with the Spanish authorities, for the purpose of "framing the plan of campaign;" but General Castaños, with whom he was desired to correspond, was superseded immediately afterwards, and the Marquis of Romana, his successor, was engaged in rallying the remains of Blake's force in the Asturias, at a distance of 200 miles from the only army with which any plan of co-operation could be formed, and of whose proceedings he was as ignorant as Sir John Moore.* No channel of intelligence had been pointed out to the latter, and as yet a stranger in the country, and without money, he could not establish any certain one for himself. It was the will of the people of England, and the orders of the government, that he should

* Appendix No. 13, sections 1 and 4.

push forward to the assistance of the Spaniards; and he had done so, without magazines, and without money to form them; trusting to the official assurance of the minister, that above 100,000 Spanish soldiers covered his march, and that the people were enthusiastic and prepared for any exertion to secure their deliverance; but he found them supine and unprepared; the French cavalry, in parties as weak as twelve men, traversed the country, and raised contributions, without difficulty or opposition. This was the state of Castile.

The letters of Mr. Stuart and Lord William Bentinck amply exposed the incapacity, selfishness, and apathy of the supreme government at Aranjuez.*

The correspondence of Colonel Graham painted in the strongest colours the confusion of affairs on the Ebro, the jealousy, the discord of the generals, the worse than childish folly of the deputy, Palafox, and his creatures.†

Sir David Baird's experience proved, that in Galicia the people were as inert as in Castile, and Leon and the authorities more absurd and more interested. General Hope expressed a like opinion as to the ineptitude of the central junta; and even the military agents, hitherto so sanguine, had lowered their tone of exultation in a remarkable manner.‡

The real force of the enemy was unknown to Sir John Moore, but he knew that it could not be less than 80,000 fighting men, and that 30,000 more were momentarily expected, and might have arrived; he knew that Blake and the Conde de Belvedere were totally defeated, and that Castaños must inevitably be so if he hesitated to retreat.

The only conclusion to be drawn from these facts was, that the Spaniards were unable, or unwilling, to resist the enemy, and that the British would have to support the contest alone, unless they could form a junction with Castaños, before the latter was entirely discomfited and destroyed; but there was no time for such an operation, and the first object was, to unite the parcelled divisions of the English army. From Astorga to Salamanca was four marches, from Salamanca to the Escorial was six marches; but it would have required five days to close up the rear upon Salamanca, six days to enable Hope to concentrate at the Escorial, and sixteen to enable Baird to assemble at Astorga. Under twenty days it would have been impossible for the English army to unite and act in a body; and to have advanced in their divided state would have been equally contrary to military principle and to common sense.

A retreat, although it was prescribed by the rules of scientific war, and in unison with the instructions of the government, which forbade the general to commit his troops in any serious affair, before the whole were united, would have been (while the Spanish army of the centre still held the field) ungenerous, and the idea was repugnant to the bold and daring spirit of Moore. Rather than resort to such a remedy for the false position his government had placed him in, he contemplated a hardy and dangerous enterprise, such as none but great minds are capable of. He proposed, if he could draw the extended wings of his army together in good time, to abandon all communication with Portugal, and throwing himself into the heart of Spain, to rally Castaños's army (if it yet existed) upon his own, to defend the southern provinces, and trust to the effect which such an appeal to the patriotism and courage of the Spaniards would produce. § But he considered that the question was not purely military; the Spanish cause was not one which could be decided by the marches of a few auxiliary troops; its fate rested on the vigour of the rulers, the concert of the generals, the unity of the exertions, and the fixed resolution of the people to suffer all privations, and die rather than submit. To Sir John Moore it appeared doubtful that such a spirit, or the means of creating it, existed, and more doubtful that there was capacity in the government to excite or to direct it when aroused. No men of talent had yet appeared, and good-will was in itself nothing if improperly treated.

* Appendix, No. 13, sections 5 and 6.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid.

§ Appendix, No. 14.

With the English plenipotentiary, who had just superseded Mr. Stuart near the central junta, the general had been directed by the ministers to communicate upon all important points, and to receive with deference his opinion and advice. The present was an occasion to which those instructions were peculiarly applicable. Mr. Frere had come fresh from the English government, he was acquainted with its views, and he was in the most suitable position to ascertain what degree of elasticity the Spanish cause really possessed. The decision of the question belonged as much to him as to the general; it involved the whole policy of the English cabinet with respect to Spain. As a simple operation of war the proposed movement was rash; all the military and many political reasons called for a retreat upon Portugal, which would take the army back upon its own resources, ensure its concentration, increase its strength, protect British interests, and leave it free either to return to Spain if a favourable opportunity should occur, or to pass by sea to Andalusia, and commence the campaign in the south.

Such were the reflections that induced Sir John Moore to solicit Mr. Frere's opinion upon the general policy of the proposed operation, but in so doing he never had the least intention of consulting him upon the mode of executing the military part, of which he conceived himself to be the best judge.

While awaiting the reply, he directed Sir David Baird, if the enemy showed no disposition to molest him, to push the troops on to Salamanca as fast as they should arrive at Astorga. Sir David was proceeding to do so, when Blake advised him that a considerable French force was collecting at Rio Seco and Ampudia with a view of interrupting the march. This arrested the movement, and Baird, after destroying some of his stores at Astorga, fell back to Villa Franca. As Sir John Moore's information led him to believe that Blake's report was false, he recalled Baird; but valuable time was thus lost. It was the march of the fourth corps, then traversing the line from Carrion to the Guadarama, that gave rise to the contradictory intelligence.

At this time, the various changes in the French positions, and the continual circulation of their light cavalry through the plains, bewildered the spies and the peasants. The force of the enemy on different points also confused the higher agents, who, believing the greatest amount of the invading army to be from 100,000 to 120,000 men, could never reconcile the reports with this standard, and therefore concluded that Napoleon exaggerated his real numbers to create terror.

Sir John Moore wrote to Mr. Frere on the 27th of November, and the arrangements for the execution of his project were all prepared. Baird was to march by Benevente on the 1st, Hope was to move on Tordesillas, and the force at Salamanca was to advance to Zamora and Toro; but in the night of the 28th, a despatch from Mr. Stuart made known the disaster at Tudela. This changed the aspect of affairs; the question proposed to Mr. Frere was no longer doubtful; the projected movement had been founded upon *the chance of rallying the Spanish armies behind the Tagus*; a hazardous and daring experiment when first conceived; but now that Castaños had no longer an army, now that the strength of Spain was utterly broken, to have persisted in it would have been insanity.* The French could be over the Tagus before the British, and there were no Spanish armies to rally. The defeat at Tudela took place the 23rd of November; Baird's brigades could not be united at Astorga before the 5th of December, and to concentrate the whole of the army at Salamanca required a flank march of several days over an open plain; an operation not to be thought of, within a few marches of a skilful enemy who possessed such an overwhelming force of artillery and cavalry. As long as Castaños and Palafox kept the field there was reason to believe that the French stationed at Burgos would not make any serious attempt on the side of Astorga, but that check being now removed, an unmilitary flank march would naturally draw their

* Appendix, No. 14.

attention, and bring them down upon the parcelled divisions of the English troops. The object of succouring the Spaniards called for great but not for useless sacrifices. The English general was prepared to confront any danger and to execute any enterprise which held out a chance of utility, but he also remembered that the best blood of England was committed to his charge, that not an English army, but the very heart, the pith of the military power of his country was in his keeping, it was entrusted to his prudence, and his patriotism spurned the idea of seeking personal renown by betraying that sacred trust.

The political reasons in favour of marching towards Madrid, scarcely balanced the military objections before the battle of Tudela; but after that event, the latter acquiring double force, left no room for hesitation in the mind of any man capable of reasoning at all; and Sir John Moore resolved to fall back into Portugal. He ordered Sir David Baird to regain Coruña or Vigo, and to carry his troops by sea to Lisbon; but wishing, if possible, to unite with Hope before the retrograde movement commenced, he directed Baird to show a bold front for a few days in order to attract the enemy's attention.

The negligence, the false intelligence, the frauds, the opposition approaching to hostility, experienced by Sir David Baird during his march from Coruña, had so reduced that general's hopes, that he prepared to retreat without reluctance. He was in direct communication with Romana, but the intercourse between them had rather confirmed than weakened the impression on Sir David's mind, that it was impossible to depend upon the promises, the information, or the judgment of any Spanish general.*

In the mean time, Napoleon forced the Somosierra, and summoned Madrid. The supreme junta fled to Badajos. St. Juan was murdered at Talavera. The remnant of Castaños's army was driven towards the Tagus; and as the fourth corps approached Segovia, Sir John Hope's situation became very critical. His column, consisting of 3000 infantry, 900 cavalry, the artillery, and the great parc of ammunition had been obliged, from the want of money and supplies, to move in six divisions, each being a day's march behind the other. At Almaraz, Hope endeavoured to discover a way across the mountains to Ciudad Rodrigo; a road did exist, but the peasants and muleteers declared it to be impracticable for carriages, and consequently unfit for the convoy. The truth of their assertions was much doubted; but Sir John was daily losing horses from the glanders, and, with a number but just sufficient to drag his guns and convoy along a good road, he feared to explore a difficult passage over the Sierras.

When his leading division had reached Talavera, Don Thomas Morla, then secretary at war, anxious to have the troops more minutely divided, proposed that the regiments should march through Madrid in ten divisions on as many successive days, the first to reach the capital on the 22nd of November, which would exactly have brought the convoy into the jaws of the French army. Hope immediately repaired in person to Madrid, held a conference with Morla, and quickly satisfied himself that everything was in confusion, and that the Spanish government had neither arranged a general plan, nor was capable of conducting one.† Convinced of this unfortunate truth, he paid no attention to Morla's proposition, but carried his troops at once to the Escorial by the road of Naval Carnero. At the Escorial he halted to close up the rear, and to obtain bullocks to assist in dragging the parc over the Guadarama. The 28th he crossed the mountain, and entered the open flat country. The 28th and 29th the infantry and guns were at Villa Castin and St. Antonia, the parc being at Espinar, and the cavalry advanced on the road to Arevalo. General Heredia was still at Segovia. The Duke of Dantzic was at Valladolid and Placentia, and his patrols were heard of at Coca, only a few miles from Arevalo.

In the course of the day a despatch from Mr. Stuart announced the catastrophe at Tudela, and the flight from the camp of Sepulveda. At the same

* Appendix, No. 13, section 5.

† Ibid, section 6.

time the outposts of cavalry in the front reported that 400 French horse were at Olmedo, only twelve miles from Arevalo, and that 4000 others were in the neighbourhood. The scouts at St. Garcia, on the right, also tracked the French again at Añaya, near Segovia. The general's situation was now truly embarrassing. If he fell back to the Guadarama, the army at Salamanca would be without ammunition or artillery. If he advanced, it must be by a flank march of three days, with a heavy convoy, over a flat country, and within a few hours' march of a very superior cavalry. If he delayed where he was even for a few hours, the French on the side of Segovia might get between him and the pass of Guadarama, and then, attacked in front, flank, and rear, he would be reduced to the shameful necessity of abandoning his convoy and guns to save his men in the mountains of Avila. A man of less intrepidity and calmness would have been ruined; but Hope, as enterprising as he was prudent, without any hesitation ordered the cavalry to throw out parties cautiously towards the French, and to maintain a confident front if the latter approached; then moving the infantry and guns from Villacastin, and the convoy from Espinosa by cross roads to Avila, he continued his march day and night until they reached Peneranda: the cavalry covering this movement closed gradually to the left, and finally occupied Fontiveros on the 2nd of December.

The infantry and the draft animals were greatly fatigued, but the danger was not over; the patrols reported that the enemy to the number of 10,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and 40 guns, were still in Olmedo. This was the eternal fourth corps, which thus traversing the country, continually crossed the heads of the English columns, and seemed to multiply the forces of the French at all points. Hope now drew his infantry and cavalry up in position, but obliged the artillery and the convoy to proceed without rest to Alba de Tormes, where a detachment from Salamanca met them, and covered their march to that town. This vigorous and skilful operation concluded, the division remained at Peneranda, collected its stragglers, and pushed outposts to Medina del Campo, Madrigal, and Torecilla, while the fourth corps unwittingly pursued its march to the Guadarama.

Sir John Moore's resolution to retreat upon Portugal created a great sensation at Madrid and at Aranjuez. The junta feared, and with reason, that such a palpable proof of the state to which their negligence and incapacity had reduced the country would endanger their authority, and perhaps their lives; and although they were on the point of flying to Badajos themselves, they were anxious that others should rush headlong into danger. Morla, and those who, like him, were prepared to abandon the cause of their country, felt mortified at losing an opportunity of commemorating their defection by a signal act of perfidy. The English plenipotentiary was surprised and indignant that a general of experience and reputation should think for himself, and decide upon a military operation without a reference to his opinion. Mr. Frere, although a person of some scholastic attainments, greatly overrated his own talent for public affairs. He was ill qualified for the duties of his situation, which at this moment required temper, sagacity, and judgment. He had come out to Spain impressed with false notions of what was passing in that country, and clinging tenaciously to the pictures of his imagination, he resented the intrusion of reason, and petulantly spurned at facts. The defeat of the Conde de Belvedere at Gamonal, a defeat that broke the centre of the Spanish line, uncovered the flank and rear of Castaños's army, opened a way to Madrid, and rendered the concentration of the British divisions unsafe, if not impossible; he curiously called the "unlucky affair of the 10th at Burgos." After the battle of Tudela he estimated the whole French army on the side of Burgos and Valladolid at 11,000 men, when they were above 100,000; and yet, with information so absurdly defective, he was prompt to interfere with, and eager to control, the military combinations of the general, although they were founded upon the true and acknowledged principles of the art of war.

While Sir John Moore was anxiously watching the dangerous progress of Sir John Hope, he was suddenly assailed by the representations and remonstrances of all these offended, mortified, and disappointed persons. The question of retiring was, by the defeat of Tudela, rendered so purely military, and the necessity of it was so palpable, that the general, although anticipating some expressions of discontent from the Spanish government, was totally unprepared for the torrent of puerile impertinencies with which he was overwhelmed. Morla, a subtle man, endeavoured first to deceive Mr. Stuart; by treating the defeat of Castaños lightly, and stating officially that he had saved the greatest part of his army at Sigüenza, and was on the march to join St. Juan at the Somosierra; to this he added, that there were only small bodies of French cavalry in the flat country of Castile and Leon; and no force on that side capable of preventing the junction of Sir John Moore's division. This was on the evening of the 30th. The emperor had forced the pass of the Somosierra on that morning, and the Duke of Dantzic was at Valladolid. The same day Mr. Frere, writing from Aranjuez, (in answer to the general's former communication, and before he was acquainted with his intention to fall back), deprecated a retreat upon Portugal, and asserted, that the enthusiasm of the Spaniards was unbounded, except in Castile and Leon, where he admitted they were more passive than they should be. He even stated, that 20,000 men were actually assembled in the vicinity of the capital, and that Castaños was falling back upon them; that reinforcements were arriving daily from the southern provinces, and that the addition of the British army would form a force greatly superior to any the French could bring against that quarter, in sufficient time. It was certain, he said, that the latter were very weak, and would be afraid to advance, while the whole country, from the Pyrenees to the capital, was in arms upon their left flank. Rumours also were rife that the conscription had been resisted, and this was the more probable, because every great effort made by France was accompanied by weakness and internal disturbance; and a pastoral letter of the bishop of Carcassonne seemed to imply that it was so at that time. "Good policy, therefore, required, that the French should be attacked before their reinforcements joined them, as any success obtained at that moment would render a conscription for a third attempt infinitely difficult, if not impracticable; but if, on the other hand," said this inconsiderate person, "the French are allowed, with their present forces, to retain their present advantages, and to wait the completion of their conscription, they would pour into Spain, with a number of troops which would give them immediate possession of the capital and the central provinces." Two days after the date of this letter, the emperor was actually at the capital; and Mr. Frere, notwithstanding the superior Spanish force which his imagination had conjured up, was, with the junta, flying in all haste from those very central provinces: France remaining, meanwhile, strong, and free from internal dissension. This rambling letter was not despatched when the general's intention to fall back upon Portugal was made known to Mr. Frere; but the latter thought it so admirably calculated to prevent a retreat, that he forwarded it, accompanied by a short explanatory note, which was offensive in style, and indicative of a petulant disposition.

At this time, Don Augustin Bueno and Don Ventura Escalante arrived at head-quarters. These two generals were deputed by the junta to remonstrate against Sir John Moore's intended retreat; and they justified the choice of their employers, being in folly and presumptuous ignorance the very types of the government they represented. They began by asserting, that St. Juan, with 20,000 men under his command, had so fortified the pass of the Somosierra, that it could not be forced by any number of enemies, and then affirming that reinforcements were daily joining him, they were proceeding to create immense Spanish armies, when the general stopped their garrulity by introducing Colonel Graham, who had been a witness of the dispersion of Castaños's army, and had just left the unfortunate St. Juan at Talavera, surrounded by the villainous

runagates, who murdered him the next day. It may be easily supposed, that such representations and from such men could have no weight with the commander of an army; in fact, the necessity of retreating was rendered more imperious by these glaring proofs that the junta and the English plenipotentiary were totally ignorant of what was passing around them. But Napoleon was now in full career; he had raised a hurricane of war, and directing its fury as he pleased, his adversaries were obliged to conform their movements to his, and as the circumstances varied from hour to hour, the determination of one moment was rendered useless in the next.

The appearance of the French cavalry in the plains of Madrid sent the junta and Mr. Frere headlong to Badajos; but the people of Madrid, as we have seen, shut their gates, and displayed the outward signs of a resolution to imitate Zaragoza. The neighbouring peasants flocked in to aid the citizens, and a military junta (composed of the Duke of Infantado, the Prince of Castel Franco, the Marquis of Castellar, and Don Thomas Morla) was appointed to manage the defence. Morla now resolved to make a final effort to involve the British army in the destruction of his own country, and as the Duke of Infantado was easily persuaded to quit Madrid on a mission to the army of the centre, the traitor was left sole master of the town, because the duke and himself only had any influence with that armed mob, which had murdered the Marquis of Perales, and filled the city with tumult.

When the French emperor summoned the junta to surrender, Morla, in concert with the Prince of Castel Franco, addressed a paper to Sir John Moore, in which it was stated that 25,000 men under Castaños, and 10,000 from the Somosierra, were marching in all haste to the capital, where 40,000 others were in arms; but that, apprehending an increase of force on the enemy's side, the junta hoped that the English army would either march to the assistance of the capital, or take a direction to fall upon the rear of the French, and not doubting that the English general had already formed a junction with Blake's army, they hoped he would be quick in his operations. This paper was sent by a government messenger to Salamanca; but ere he could reach that place, Morla, who had commenced negotiations, before the despatch was written, capitulated, and Napoleon was in Madrid. This communication alone would not have been sufficient to arrest Sir John Moore's retrograde movement. He was become too well acquainted with what facility Spanish armies were created on paper, to rely on any statement of their numbers; but Mr. Stuart also expressed a belief that Madrid would make a vigorous resistance, and the tide of false information having set in with a strong current, every moment brought fresh assurances that a great spirit had arisen.

On the day that Morla's communication arrived, there also appeared at headquarters one Charmilly, a French adventurer. This man, who has been since denounced in the British parliament as an organizer of assassination in St. Domingo, and a fraudulent bankrupt in London, came as the confidential agent of Mr. Frere. He had been in Madrid during the night of the 1st, and left it (immediately after having held a conference with Morla), on the morning of the 2nd. Taking the road to Talavera, he met with the plenipotentiary, to whom he spoke with enthusiasm of the spirit and preparations of the inhabitants in the capital. Mr. Frere readily confided in him, and imparting his own views, not only intrusted this stranger with letters to the British general, but charged him with a mission to obstruct the retreat into Portugal. Thus instructed, Charmilly hastened to Salamanca, and presented Mr. Frere's first missive, in which that gentleman, after alluding to former representations, and to the information of which Colonel Charmilly was the bearer, viz., the enthusiasm in the capital, made a formal remonstrance, to the effect that propriety and policy demanded an immediate advance of the British to support this generous effort. Charmilly also demanded a personal interview, which was granted; but Sir John Moore having some suspicion of the man, whom he had seen before, listened to his

tale of the enthusiasm and vigorous character displayed at Madrid, with an appearance of coldness that baffled the penetration of the adventurer, who retired under the impression that a retreat was certain.

For many years so much ridicule had been attached to the name of an English expedition, that weak-headed men claimed a sort of prescriptive right to censure, without regard to subordination, the conduct of their general. It had been so in Egypt, where a cabal was formed to deprive Lord Hutchinson of the command; it had been so at Buenos Ayres, at Ferrol, and in Portugal. It was so at this time in Sir John Moore's army; and it will be found in the course of this work, that the superlative talents, vigour, and success of the Duke of Wellington, could not at a late period of the war secure him from such vexatious folly. The three generals who commanded the separate divisions of the army, and who were in consequence acquainted with all the circumstances of the moment, were perfectly agreed as to the propriety of a retreat; but in other quarters indecent murmurs were so prevalent among officers of rank as to call for rebuke. Charmilly, ignorant of the decided character of the general-in-chief, concluded that this temper was favourable to the object of his mission, and presented a second letter, which Mr. Frere had charged him to deliver, should the first fail of effect. The purport of it was to desire that if Sir John Moore still persisted in his intention of retreating, "the bearer might be previously examined before a council of war;" in other words, that Mr. Frere, convinced of Sir John Moore's incapacity and want of zeal, was determined to control his proceedings even by force. And this to a British general of long experience and confirmed reputation, and by the hands of a foreign adventurer! The indignation of a high spirit at such a foolish, wanton insult, may be easily imagined. He tore the letter in pieces, and ordered Charmilly to quit the cantonments of the British army without delay. His anger, however, soon subsided. Quarrels among the servants of the public could only prove detrimental to his country, and he put his personal feelings on one side. The information brought by Charmilly, separated from the indecorum of his mission, was in itself important. It confirmed the essential fact, that Madrid was actually resisting, and that the spirit and energy of the country was awaking. Hitherto his own observation had led Sir John Moore to doubt if the people took sufficient interest in the cause to make any effectual effort; all around himself was apathetic and incapable, and his correspondents, with the exception of Mr. Frere, nay, even the intercepted letters of French officers, had agreed in describing the general feeling of the country as subsiding into indifference.* To use his own words, "Spain was without armies, generals, or a government." But now the fire essential to the salvation of the nation appeared to be kindling, and Moore feeling conscious of ability to lead a British army, hailed the appearance of an enthusiasm which promised success to a just cause, and a brilliant career of glory to himself.

That the metropolis should thus abide the fury of the conqueror was surprising. It was a great event, and full of promise. The situation of the army was likewise improved; General Hope's junction was accomplished, and as the attention of the French was turned towards Madrid, there was no reason to doubt that Baird's junction could likewise be effected.† On the other hand, there was no certainty that the capital would remain firm when danger pressed, none that it would be able to resist, none that the example would spread; yet without it did so, nothing was gained, because it was only by a union of heart and hand throughout the whole country, that the great power of the French could be successfully resisted.

In a matter so balanced, Sir John Moore, as might be expected from an enterprising general, adopted the boldest and most generous side. He ordered Sir David Baird to concentrate his troops at Astorga, and he himself prepared for an advance; but as he remained without any further information of the fate

* Appendix, No. 13, section 7.

† Appendix, No. 14.

of Madrid, he sent Colonel Graham to obtain intelligence of what was passing, and to carry his answer to Morla. This resolution being taken, he wrote to Mr. Frere, calmly explaining the reasons for his past conduct, and those which actuated him in forming a fresh plan of operation. "I wish anxiously," said this noble-minded man in conclusion, "I wish anxiously, as the king's minister, to continue upon the most confidential footing with you, and I hope as we have but one interest, the public welfare, though we occasionally see it in different aspects, that this will not disturb the harmony which should subsist between us. Fully impressed as I am with these sentiments, I shall abstain from any remarks upon the two letters from you delivered to me last night and this morning by Colonel Charmilly, or on the message which accompanied them. I certainly at first did feel and expressed much indignation at a person like him being made the channel of a communication of that sort from you to me. Those feelings are at an end, and I dare say they never will be created towards you again."

The plan of operations now occupied his mind. The Somosierra and the Guadarama were both in possession of the enemy, no direct movement could therefore be made towards Madrid; besides, the rear of Baird's troops was still several marches behind Astorga, and a general movement on the side of the capital could not commence before the 12th of the month. Zaragoza, the general knew, was determined to stand a second siege, and he had the guarantee of the first that it would be an obstinate stand. He had received from the junta of Toledo a formal assurance of their resolution to bury themselves under the ruins of the town sooner than submit; and he was informed from several quarters that the southern provinces were forwarding crowds of fresh levies. Romana at this time also was in correspondence with him, and with the usual exaggeration of a Spaniard, declared his ability to aid him with an army of 20,000 men. Upon this data Sir John Moore formed a plan, bearing the stamp of genuine talent and enterprise, whether it be examined as a political or a military measure.

He supposed the French emperor to be more anxious to strike a heavy blow against the English, and to shut them out of Spain, than to overrun any particular province, or get possession of any town in the Peninsula. He resolved, therefore, to throw himself upon the communications of the French army, hoping, if fortune was favourable, to inflict a severe loss upon the troops which guarded them before aid could arrive. If Napoleon, suspending his operations against the south, should detach largely, Madrid would thereby be succoured; if he did not detach largely, the British could hold their ground. Sir John Moore knew well that a great commander would in such a case be more likely to unite his whole army, and fall upon the troops which thus ventured to place themselves on his line of operations. But, to relieve the Spaniards at a critical moment, and to give time for the southern provinces to organise their defence and recover courage, he was willing thus to draw the whole of the enemy upon himself.* He felt that in doing so, he compromised the safety of his own army, that he must glide along the edge of a precipice, that he must cross a gulf on a rotten plank; but he also knew the martial qualities of his soldiers, he had confidence in his own genius; and the occasion being worthy of a great deed, he dared essay it even against Napoleon.

Colonel Graham returned on the 9th, bringing the first intimation of the capitulation of the capital. He had been able to proceed no further than Talavera, where he encountered two members of the supreme junta. By them he was told that the French, being from 20,000 to 30,000 strong, possessed the Retiro, but that the people retained their arms, and that La-Peña, with 30,000 men of the army of the centre, was at Guadalaxara; that 14,000 of St. Juan's and Heredia's forces were assembled at Almaraz, and that Romana, with whom they anxiously desired that Sir John Moore would unite, had likewise an army of 30,000 fighting men: finally, they assured Colonel Graham that the most

energetic measures were in activity wherever the enemy's presence did not control the patriots.

Mortifying as it was to find that Madrid, after so much boasting, should have held out but one day, the event itself did not destroy the ground of Sir John Moore's resolution to advance. Undoubtedly it was so much lost; it diminished the hope of arousing the nation, and it increased the danger of the British army by letting loose a greater number of the enemy's troops; but as a diversion for the south it might still succeed; and as long as there was any hope, the resolution of the English general was fixed, to prove that he would not abandon the cause even when the Spaniards were abandoning it themselves.

CHAPTER IV.

THE forward movement of the British army commenced on the 11th of December. Sir John Moore's first intention was to march with his own and Hope's division to Valladolid, with a view to cover the advance of his stores and to protect the junction of Sir David Baird's troops, the rear of which was still several marches behind Astorga. The preparations for a retreat upon Portugal were, however, continued, and Sir David was ordered to form magazines at Benevente, Astorga, Villa Franca, and Lugo. This arrangement secured two lines of operation, and permitted a greater freedom of action.

The 13th head-quarters were at Alaejos. Two brigades, and the cavalry under Lord Paget at Toro. General Hope was at Torrecilla. The cavalry under Brigadier-General Charles Stewart, was at Rueda; having the night before surprised a French post of 50 infantry and 30 dragoons, killing or taking almost the whole number. The prisoners declared that in the French army it was believed that the English were retreating to Portugal.

At Alaejos an intercepted despatch of the Prince of Neufchatel was brought to head-quarters; the contents were important enough to change the direction of the march. It was addressed to the Duke of Dalmatia. Madrid was said to be perfectly tranquil, the shops opened, and the public amusements going forward as in a time of profound peace. The 4th corps of the army was at Talavera, on its way towards Badajos; this movement, it was observed, would force the English to retire to Portugal, if, contrary to the emperor's belief, they had not already done so. The 5th corps were on the march to Zaragoza, and the 8th to Burgos. The duke was directed to drive the Spaniards into Galicia, to occupy Leon, Benevente, and Zamora, and to keep the flat country in subjection, for which purpose his two divisions of infantry, and the cavalry brigades of Franceschi and Debelle, were considered sufficient. It is remarkable that the first correct information of the capitulation of Madrid should have been acquired by the perusal of this document, ten days after the event had taken place; nor is it less curious, that while Mr. Frere's letters were filled with vivid descriptions of Spanish enthusiasm, Napoleon should have been so convinced of their passiveness as to send this important despatch by an officer, who rode post, without an escort and in safety, until his abusive language to the post-master at Valdestillos created a tumult, by which he lost his life. Captain Waters, an English officer sent to obtain intelligence, happening to arrive in that place, heard of the murder, and immediately purchased the despatch for twenty dollars. The accidental information thus obtained was the more valuable, that neither money nor patriotism had induced the Spaniards to bring any intelligence of the enemy's situation, and each step the army had hitherto made was in the dark.*

It was now certain that Burgos was or would be strongly protected, and that Baird's line of march was unsafe if Soult, following these instructions, advanced. On the other hand, as the French appeared to be ignorant of the British move-

* Appendix, No. 13, section 5.

ments, there was some chance of surprising and beating the 2nd corps before Napoleon could come to its succour. Hope immediately passed the Douero at Tordesillas, and directed his march upon Villepando; head-quarters were removed to Toro, and Valderás was given as the point of junction to Baird's division, the head of which was now at Benevente.

The 16th, Mr. Stuart arrived at Toro, accompanied by Don F^e. X^e. Caro, a member of the Spanish government, who brought two letters, the one from the junta, the other from Mr. Frere. That from the junta complained, that when Romana proposed to unite 14,000 picked men to the British army with a view to make a forward movement, his offer had been disregarded, and a retreat determined upon, in despite of his earnest remonstrances; this retreat they declared to be uncalled for, and highly impolitic, "as the enemy was never so near his ruin as in that moment." If the Spanish and British armies should unite, they said, it would give "liberty to the Peninsula," that "Romana, with his 14,000 select men," was still ready to join Sir John Moore, and that "30,000 fresh levies would in a month be added to the ranks of the allied force."

This tissue of falsehoods, for Romana had approved of the intention to retreat, and never had above 6000 men armed, was addressed to Mr. Frere, and by him transmitted to the general, together with one from himself, which, in allusion to the retreat upon Portugal, contained the following extraordinary passages: "I mean the immense responsibility with which you charge yourself by adopting, upon a supposed military necessity, a measure which must be followed by immediate, if not final, ruin to our ally, and by indelible disgrace to the country with whose resources you are intrusted." "I am unwilling to enlarge upon a subject in which my feelings must be stifled, or expressed at the risk of offence, which, with such an interest at stake, I should feel unwilling to excite, but this much I must say, that if the British army had been sent abroad for the express purpose of doing the utmost possible mischief to the Spanish cause, with the single exception of not firing a shot against their troops, they would, according to the measures now announced as about to be pursued, have completely fulfilled their purpose."

These letters were dated at Truxillo; for the junta, not thinking themselves safe at Badajos, had proceeded so far on their way to Seville. On that side the French had continued to advance, the remnants of the Spanish armies to fly, and everything bore the most gloomy appearance. Mr. Frere knew this.* In a subsequent letter he acknowledged that the enthusiasm was extinguished, and a general panic commencing, at the moment when he was penning these offensive passages. He was utterly ignorant of the numbers, the situation, and the resources of the enemy, but he formed hypotheses, and upon the strength of them insulted Sir John Moore, and compromised the interest of his country; and in this manner the British general, while struggling with unavoidable difficulties, had his mind harassed by a repetition of remonstrances and representations in which common sense, truth, and decency were alike disregarded. On this occasion he furnished a remarkable instance of the control he exercised over his personal feelings, when the public welfare was at stake. As Mr. Frere had acknowledged the receipt of a letter of the 10th, it was probable that he had also received the general's answer (written before the 10th) to the communication made through Charmilly; but as he did not say so, Sir John Moore took advantage of the omission, and with singular propriety and dignity thus replied to him: "With respect to your letter delivered to me at Toro by Mr. Stuart, I shall not remark upon it. It is in the style of the two which were brought to me by Colonel Charmilly, and consequently was answered by my letter of the 6th, of which I send you a duplicate; that subject is I hope at rest!"

At Toro Sir John Moore ascertained that Romana, although aware of the

* Appendix, No. 13, section 7.

advance of the British, and engaged to support them, was retiring into Galicia. That nobleman, nominally commander-in-chief of the Spanish armies, was at the head of a few thousand miserable soldiers ; for the Spaniards, with great ingenuity, contrived to have no general when they had an army, and no army when they had a general. After the dispersion of Blake's people at Reynosa, Romana rallied about 5000 men at Renedo, in the valley of Cabernigo, and endeavoured to make a stand on the borders of the Asturias, but without any success, for the vile conduct of the Asturian junta, joined to the terror created by the French victories, had completely subdued the spirit of the peasantry, and ruined the resources of that province. Romana complained that, when checked for misconduct, his soldiers quitted their standard ; indeed, that any should have been found to join their colours is to be admired ; for among the sores of Spain there were none more cankered, more disgusting, than the venality, the injustice, the profligate corruption of the Asturian authorities, who, without a blush, openly divided the English subsidies, and defrauded, not only the soldiers of their pay and equipments, but the miserable peasants of their hire, doubling the wretchedness of poverty, and deriding the misery they occasioned by pompous declarations of their own virtue.* From the Asturias the marquis led the remnants of Blake's force to Leon about the period of Sir John Moore's arrival at Salamanca ; like others, he had been deceived as to the real state of the country, and at this time repented that he had returned to Spain.†

Romana was a person of talent, quickness, and information, but disqualified by nature for military command ; a lively principle of error pervaded all his notions of war ; no man ever bore the title of a general who was less capable of directing an army, neither was he exempt from the prevailing weakness of his countrymen. At this moment, when he had not the strength to stand upright, his letters were teeming with gigantic offensive projects, and although he had before approved of the intention to retreat, he was now as ready to urge a forward movement, promising to co-operate with 20,000 soldiers when he could scarcely muster a third of that number of men, who, half armed, were hardly capable of distinguishing their own standards ; and at the very time he made the promise, he was retiring into Galicia ; not that he meant to deceive, for he was as ready to advance as to retreat, but this species of boasting is inherent in his nation, and Romana was a true Spaniard.

It has been asserted that Caro offered the chief command of the Spanish armies to Sir John Moore, and that the latter refused it ; this is not true : Caro had no power to do so, and if he had, there were no armies to command ; but that gentleman in his interview either was, or affected to be, satisfied of the soundness of the English general's views, and ashamed of the folly of the junta.

The 18th, head-quarters were at Castro Nuevo ; from that place Sir John Moore wrote to Romana, informing him of his intention to fall upon Soult, desiring his co-operation, and requesting that the marquis would, according to his own plan given to the British minister in London, reserve the Asturias for his line of communication, and leave the Gallicias open to the British.

The army was now in full march, Baird was at Benevente, Hope at Villapando ; the cavalry scoured the country on the side of Valladolid, and in several successful skirmishes took a number of prisoners. The French could be no longer ignorant of the march, and the English general brought forward his columns rapidly. On the 20th the whole of the forces were united ; the cavalry at Melgar Abaxo, and the infantry at Mayorga, and as much concentrated as the necessity of obtaining cover in a country devoid of fuel, and deep with snow, would permit. The weather was exceedingly severe, and the marches long, but a more robust set of men never took the field : their discipline was admirable, and there were very few stragglers ; the experience of one or two campaigns alone was wanting to make a perfect army.

* Appendix, No. 13, section 5.

† Ibid, section 7.

The number was however small ; nominally it was nearly 35,000, but four regiments were still in Portugal, and three more were left by Sir David Baird at Lugo and Astorga. One thousand six hundred and eighty-seven men were detached, and 4005 were in hospital. The actual number present under arms on the 19th of December was only 19,053 infantry, 2278 cavalry, and 1358 gunners, forming a total of 23,583 men, with 60 pieces of artillery : the whole being organized in three divisions, a reserve, and two light brigades of infantry, and one division of cavalry.* Of the artillery, four batteries were attached to the infantry, and two to the cavalry ; one was kept in reserve.

Romana, who had been able to bring forward very few men, promised to march in two columns by Almanzer and Guarda, and sent some information of the enemy's position ; but Sir John Moore depended little upon his intelligence, when he found him, even so late as the 19th of December (upon the faith of information from the junta), representing Madrid as still holding out ; and when the advanced posts were already engaged at Sahagun, proposing an interview at Benevente to arrange the plan of operations.

On the French side, Soult's corps was concentrating on the Carrion. After the rapid and brilliant success of this marshal at the opening of the campaign, his corps was ordered to remain on the defensive until the movements against Tudela and Madrid were completed ; the despatches commanding him to recommence his offensive operations were, as we have seen, intercepted on the 12th, but on the 16th he became acquainted with the advance of the English army. At that period General Bonnet's division occupied Barquera de San Vincente and Potes, on the Deba ; and watched some thousand Asturians that Ballasteros had collected near Llanes. Merle's and Mermet's divisions were on the Carrion ; Franceschi's dragoons at Valladolid ; and General Debelle's at Sahagun. The whole formed a total of 16,000 or 17,000 infantry, and 1200 cavalry, present under arms, of which only 11,000 infantry and 1200 cavalry could, without uncovering the important post of St. Andero, be opposed to the advance of the British. Soult, alarmed at this disparity of force, required General Mathieu Dumas, commandant at Burgos, to direct all the divisions and detachments passing through that town (whatever might be their original destination) upon the Carrion ; and this decisive conduct was approved of by the emperor. The 21st, Bonnet's division remaining on the Deba, Mermet's occupied the town of Carrion ; Merle's was at Saldaña ; and Franceschi's cavalry retired from Valladolid to Riberos de la Cuesca. Debelle's continued at Sahagun, and 1300 dragoons, under General Lorge, arrived at Palencia from Burgos.

Meanwhile, the 15th and 10th British hussars quitting Melgar Abaxo during the night, arrived close to Sahagun before daylight on the 21st ; the 10th marched straight to the town, the 15th turned it by the right, and endeavoured to cut off the enemy, but meeting with a patrol, the alarm was given, and when Lord Paget, with 400 of the 15th, arrived at the rear of the village, he was opposed by a line of 600 French dragoons. The 10th not being in sight, the 15th, after a few movements, charged, broke the enemy's line, and pursued them for some distance. Fifteen to 20 killed, two lieutenant-colonels, and 11 other officers, with 154 men prisoners, were the result of this affair, which lasted about 20 minutes. Debelle then retired to Santerbas.

The English infantry occupied Sahagun, and head-quarters were established there. Romana remained at Mancilla, and it was evident that no assistance could be expected from him ; the truth was, that ashamed of exposing the weakness and misery of his troops, he kept away, for, after all his promises, he could not produce 6000 fighting men ; his letters, however, were, as usual, extremely encouraging. *The French force in Spain was exceedingly weak ; Palafox had not been defeated at Tudela ; Soult, including Bonnet's division, had scarcely 9000 men of all arms. It was an object to surround and destroy him before he could be succoured—and other follies of this nature.*

* Appendix, No. 25.

The English troops having outmarched their supplies, halted the 22nd and 23rd. Soult, whose intention was to act on the defensive, hastened the march of the reinforcements from the side of Burgos, and being fearful for his communication with Placentia, abandoned Saldaña on the 23rd, and concentrated his infantry at Carrion. Debelle's cavalry again advanced to Villatilla and Villacuenta, Franceschi remained at Riberos, the dragoons of General Lorge occupied Paredes, and General Dumas pushed on the divisions of the 8th corps, of which Laborde's was already arrived at Palencia, and Loison's and Heudelet's followed at the distance of two days' march; but these last were very weak.

Sir John Moore's plan was to move during the night of the 23rd, so as to arrive at Carrion by daylight on the 24th, to force the bridge, and afterwards ascending the river, fall upon the main body of the enemy, which his information led him to believe was still at Saldaña. This attack was, however, but a secondary object; his attention was constantly directed towards Madrid. He might beat the corps in his front, but the victory could be of little use beyond the honour of the day, for the 8th and 3rd corps were too near to admit of farther success. The whole operation was one of time, a political bait to tempt the emperor, whose march from Madrid must be the signal for a retreat that sooner or later was inevitable. To draw Napoleon from the south was the great object, but it behoved the man to be alert that interposed between the lion and his prey.

The 23rd, Romana gave notice that the French were in motion on the side of Madrid. The night of the 23rd the troops were in march towards Carrion, when Romana's intelligence was confirmed by the general's spies; all their reports agreed that the whole French army was in movement to crush the English. The 4th corps had been halted at Talavera, the 3rd at Vittoria, the 8th was closing up to reinforce the 2nd, and the emperor in person was marching towards the Guadarama; the principal objects of Sir John Moore's advance were thus attained. The siege of Zaragoza was delayed, the southern provinces were allowed to breathe, and it now remained for him to prove, by a timely retreat, that this offensive operation, although hazardous, was not the result of improvident rashness, nor weakness of mind, but the hardy enterprise of a great commander acting under peculiar circumstances: as a military measure, his judgment condemned it; as a political one, he thought it of doubtful advantage, because Spain was really passive, but he was willing to give the Spaniards an opportunity of making one more struggle for independence. That was done. If they could not, or would not profit of the occasion, if their hearts were faint or their hands feeble, the shame and the loss were their own; the British general had done enough, enough for honour, enough for utility, more than enough for prudence; but the madness of the times required it. His army was already on the verge of destruction, the enemy's force was hourly increasing in his front; the first symptoms of a retreat would bring it headlong on; and in the meantime the emperor threatened the line of communications with Galicia, and by the rapidity of his march left no time for consideration.

After the first burst, by which he swept the northern provinces, and planted his standards on the banks of the Tagus, that monarch had put all the resources of his subtle genius into activity, endeavouring to soften the public mind, and by engrafting benefits on the terror his victories had created, to gain over the people; but, at the same time, he was gathering in his extended wings, and preparing for a new flight, which would have carried him over the southern kingdoms of the Peninsula, and given him the rocks of Lisbon as a resting-place for his eagles.

Madrid was tranquil; Toledo, notwithstanding her heroic promises, never shut her gates; one division of the 1st corps occupied that town, another was in Ocaña, and the light cavalry scoured the whole of La Mancha, even to the borders of Andalusia. The 4th corps, and Milhaud's and Lasalle's horsemen,

were at Talavera preparing to march to Badajos, and 60,000 men, with 150 guns and 15 days' provisions in carts, were reviewed at the gates of Madrid upon the 19th. Three days afterwards they were in full march to intercept the line of Sir John Moore's retreat.

The emperor was informed of that general's advance on the 21st; in an instant the Spaniards, their juntas, and their armies were dismissed from his thoughts; the different corps were arrested in their movements, 10,000 men were left to control the capital, and on the evening of the 22nd, 50,000 men were at the foot of the Guadarama. A deep snow choked the passes of the Sierra, and, after 12 hours of ineffectual toil, the advanced guards were still on the wrong side; the general commanding reported that the road was impracticable, but Napoleon, rebuking him fiercely, urged the columns to another attempt, and the passage of the mountain was effected amidst storms of hail and drifting sleet. The cold and fatigue were so intense that many soldiers and draft animals died during the two days that the operation lasted.

Personally urging on the troops with unceasing vehemence the emperor arrived at Villacastin, 50 miles from Madrid, on the 24th, and the 26th he was at Tordesillas with the guards and the divisions of La-Pisse and Dessolles. The dragoons of La Houssaye were at Valladolid on the same day, and Marshal Ney, with the 6th corps, was at Rio Seco. From Tordesillas Napoleon communicated with Soult, informed him of these movements, and concluded his despatch thus: "Our cavalry scouts are already at Benevente. If the English pass to-day in their position, they are lost; if, on the contrary, they attack you with all their force, retire one day's march: the farther they proceed the better for us. If they retreat, pursue them closely;" and then, full of hope, he hastened to Valderas, but had the mortification to learn that, notwithstanding his rapid march, having scarcely rested night or day, he was 12 hours too late. The British were across the Esla!

In fact, Soult was in full pursuit when this letter was written, for Sir John Moore, who was well aware of his real situation, had given orders to retreat the moment the intelligence of Napoleon's march from Madrid reached him. The heavy baggage and stores had been immediately moved to the rear; but the reserve, the light brigades, and the cavalry remained at Sahagun, the latter pushing their patrols up to the enemy's lines and skirmishing, with a view to hide the retrograde march. The 24th, General Hope, with two divisions, fell back by the road of Mayorga, and General Baird, with another, by that of Valencia de San Juan, where there was a ferry-boat to cross the Esla river. The Marquis of Romana undertook to guard the bridge of Mansilla. The enemy's dragoons, under Lorge, arrived the same day at Frechilla, and the division of Laborde at Paredes. The 25th the general-in-chief, with the reserve and light brigades, followed the route of Hope's column to Valderas; the 26th Baird passed the Esla at Valencia, and took post on the other side, but with some difficulty, for the boat was small, the fords deep, and the river rising. The troops, under the commander-in-chief, approached the bridge of Castro Gonzalo early in the morning of the 26th. The stores and baggage were a long time passing, a dense fog intercepted the view, and so nicely timed was the march that the scouts of the imperial horsemen were already infesting the flank of the column, and even carried off some of the baggage. The left bank of the river being high, and completely commanding the bridge, the 2nd light brigade, under General Robert Crawford, and two guns, were posted on that side to protect the passage, for the cavalry were still on the march from Sahagun, and Soult, aware of the retreat, was pressing forward vigorously. When Lord Paget had passed Mayorga he discovered a strong body of horse, appertaining to Ney's corps, embattled on a swelling mound close to the road. The soil was deep, and soaked with snow and rain. Two squadrons of the 10th riding stiffly against the enemy, mounted the hill, and notwithstanding the superiority of numbers and position, overthrew him, killed 20 men, and

took 100 prisoners. This was a bold and hardy action; but the English cavalry had been engaged more or less for 12 successive days, and with such fortune and bravery that above 500 prisoners had already fallen into their hands, and their leaders being excellent, their confidence was unbounded. From Mayorga Lord Paget proceeded to Benevente, but the Duke of Dalmatia, with great judgment, directed his march towards Astorga by the road of Mancilla; and Romana, leaving 3000 men and two guns to defend the bridge at that place, fell back to Leon.

Thus by a critical march, Sir John Moore had recovered his communications with Astorga and so far baffled the emperor; but his position was by no means safe, or even tenable. The town of Benevente, a rich open place, remarkable for a small but curious Moorish palace or castle containing a fine collection of ancient armour, is situated in a plain that, extending from the Gallician mountains to the neighbourhood of Burgos, appeared to be boundless. On the left it was skirted by the hills near the town of Leon, which was enclosed with walls, and capable of resisting a sudden assault. The river Esla wound through the plain about four miles in front of Benevente, and the bridge of Castro Gonzalos was the key to the town, but the right bank of the Esla, as I have before observed, was completely commanded from the further side, and there were many fords. Eighteen miles higher up, at Valencia de San Juan, a shorter road from Mayorga to Astorga, crossed the river by the ferry-boat, and at Mancilla, the passage being only defended by Spaniards, was, in a manner, open to Soult, for Romana had not destroyed the arches of the bridge. In this exposed situation Sir John Moore resolved to remain no longer than was necessary to clear out his magazines at Benevente, and to cover the march of his stores; but the road to Astorga by Leon being much shorter than that through Benevente, he wrote to Romana to request that he would maintain himself at Leon as long as he could; hearing also that the marquis intended to retreat into Galicia, Sir John repeated his desire to have that road left open for the English army. Romana, who assented to both these requests, had a great rabble with him, and as Leon was a walled place, and that a number of citizens and volunteers were willing, and even eager, to fight, the town might have made a formidable resistance. Sir John Moore hoped that it would do so, and gave orders to break down the bridge at Castro Gonzalo in his own front, the moment the stragglers and baggage should have passed.

At this time the bad example of murmuring given by officers of high rank had descended lower; many regimental officers neglected their duty, and what with the dislike to a retreat, the severity of the weather, and the inexperience of the army, the previous fine discipline of the troops was broken down. Very disgraceful excesses had been committed at Valderas, and the general issued severe orders, justly reproaching the soldiers for their evil deeds, and appealing to the spirit of the men and of the officers, to amend them.

On the night of the 26th, the chasseurs of the imperial guard rode close up to the bridge of Castro Gonzalo, and captured some women and baggage.*

* The following remarkable instance of courage and discipline deserves to be recorded. John Walton, a native of the south of Ireland, and Richard Jackson, an Englishman, were posted in a hollow road on the plain beyond the bridge, and at a distance from their piquet. If the enemy approached, one was to fire, run back to the brow of the hill, and give notice if there were many or few; the other was to maintain his ground. A party of cavalry following a hay cart stole up close to these men, and suddenly galloped in, with a view to kill them and surprise the post. Jackson fired, but was overtaken, and received 12 or 14 severe wounds in an instant; he came staggering on, notwithstanding his mangled state, and gave the signal. Walton, with equal resolution and more fortune, defended himself with his bayonet, and wounded several of the assailants, who retreated, leaving him unhurt; but his cap, his knapsack, his belts, and his musket were cut in above 20 places, and his bayonet was bent double, his musket covered with blood, and notched like a saw from the muzzle to the lock. Jackson escaped death during the retreat, and finally recovered of his wounds.

The 27th, the cavalry and the stragglers being all over the river, General Crawford commenced the destruction of the bridge; torrents of rain and snow were descending; and half the troops worked, while the other half kept the enemy at bay from the heights on the left bank, for the cavalry scouts of the imperial guards were spread over the plain. At ten o'clock at night a large party following some waggons endeavoured to pass the piquets and gallop down to the bridge; that failing, a few dismounted, and extending to the right and left, commenced a skirmishing fire, while others remained ready to charge, if the position of the troops, which they expected to ascertain by this scheme, should offer an opportunity; but the event did not answer their expectations. This anxiety to interrupt the work induced General Crawford to destroy two arches of the bridge, and to blow up the connecting buttress; but the masonry was so solid and difficult to pierce, that it was not until 12 o'clock in the night of the 28th that all the preparations were completed. The troops then descended the heights on the left bank, and passing with the greatest silence by single files over planks laid across the broken arches, gained the other side without loss; an instance of singular good fortune, for the night was dark and tempestuous; the river rising rapidly with a roaring noise, was threatening to burst over the planks, and the enemy was close at hand. To have resisted an attack in such an awkward situation would have been impossible, but happily the retreat of the troops was undiscovered, and the mine being sprung with good effect, Crawford marched to Benevente, where the cavalry and the reserve still remained.*

The army gained two days' rest at Benevente, but as very little could be done to remove the stores, the greater part of them were destroyed. The troops were, and had been from the first, without sufficient transport, the general was without money to procure it, and the ill-will of the Spaniards, and the shuffling conduct of the juntas, added infinitely to these difficulties. The 28th, Hope's and Fraser's divisions marched to Labaneza; and the 29th, to Astorga, where Baird's division joined them from Valencia San Juan. On the same day the reserve and Crawford's brigade quitted Benevente, but the cavalry remained in the town, leaving parties to watch the fords of the Esla. Soon after day-break, General Lefebvre Desnouettes, seeing only a few cavalry posts on the great plain, rather hastily concluded that there was nothing to support them, and crossing the river at a ford a little way above the bridge with 600 horsemen of the imperial guards, he advanced into the plain. The piquets at first retired fighting, but being joined by a part of the 3rd German hussars, they charged the leading French squadrons with some effect. General C. Stewart then took the command, and the ground was obstinately disputed. At this moment the plain was covered with stragglers, and baggage-mules, and followers of the army; the town was filled with tumult; the distant piquets and vedettes were seen galloping in from the right and left; the French were pressing forward boldly, and every appearance indicated that the enemy's whole army was come up and passing the river. Lord Paget ordered the 10th hus-

* Several thousand infantry slept in the long galleries of an immense convent built round a square; the lower corridors were filled with the horses of the cavalry and artillery, so thickly stowed that it was scarcely possible for a single man to pass them, and there was but one entrance. Two officers returning from the bridge, being desirous to find shelter for their men, entered the convent, and with horror perceived that a large window shutter being on fire, and the flame spreading to the rafters above, in a few moments the straw under the horses would ignite, and 6000 men and animals would inevitably perish in the flames. One of the officers, (Captain Lloyd, of the 43rd,) a man of great activity, strength, and presence of mind, made a sign to his companions to keep silence, and springing on to the nearest horse, run along the backs of the others until he reached the flaming shutter, which he tore off its hinges and cast out of the window; then returning quietly, awakened some of the soldiers, and cleared the passage without creating any alarm, which in such a case would have been as destructive as the flames. Captain Lloyd was a man of more than ordinary talents; his character has been forcibly and justly depicted in that excellent little work called the "Life of a Sergeant."

sars to mount and form under the cover of some houses at the edge of the town; he desired to draw the enemy, whose real situation he had detected at once, well into the plain before he attacked. In half an hour, everything being ready, he gave the signal: the 10th hussars galloped forward, the piquets, that were already engaged, closed together, and the whole charged. In an instant the scene changed: the enemy were seen flying at full speed towards the river, and the British close at their heels; the French squadrons, without breaking their ranks, plunged into the stream, and gained the opposite heights, where, like experienced soldiers, they wheeled instantly, and seemed inclined to come forward a second time; but a battery of two guns being opened upon them, after a few rounds they retired. During the pursuit in the plain, an officer was observed separating from the main body, and making towards another part of the river; being followed, and refusing to stop when overtaken, he was cut across the head and brought in a prisoner. He proved to be General Lefebvre.

Although the imperial guards were outnumbered in the end, they were very superior at the commencement of this fight, which was handsomely contested on both sides. The British lost 50 men killed and wounded; the French left 55 killed and wounded on the field, and 70 prisoners, besides the general and other officers. According to Baron Larrey, 70 other wounded men escaped, making a total loss of above 200 excellent soldiers. Lord Paget maintained his posts on the Esla under an occasional cannonade until the evening, and then withdrew to La Baneza.

While these things were passing, Napoleon arrived at Valderas, Ney at Villaton, and Lapisse at Toro; the French troops were worn down with fatigue, yet the emperor still urged them forward. The Duke of Dalmatia, he said, would intercept the retreat of the English at Astorga, and their labours would be finally rewarded; but the destruction of the bridge of Castro Gonzalo was so well accomplished, that 24 hours were required to repair it, and the fords were now impassable. It was the 30th before Bessieres could cross the Esla; but on that day he passed through Benevente with 9000 cavalry, and bent his course towards La Baneza. The same day, Franceschi forced the bridge of Mansilla de las Mulas by a single charge of his light horsemen, and captured the artillery and one-half of the division left by Romana to protect it. The latter immediately abandoned Leon and many stores. The 31st the Duke of Dalmatia entered that town without firing a shot, and the Duke of Istria, with his cavalry, took possession of La Baneza; the advanced posts were pushed forward to the Puente d'Orvigo on one side, and the Puente de Valembre on the other.

The rear of the English army was still in Astorga, the head-quarters having arrived there on the day before. In the preceding month large stores had been gradually brought up to that town by Sir David Baird, and as there were no means of transport to remove them, orders were given, after supplying the immediate wants of the army, to destroy them; but Romana, who would neither defend Leon nor Mansilla, had, contrary to his promises, pre-occupied Astorga with his fugitive army; and when the English divisions marched in, such a tumult and confusion arose, that no orders could be executed with regularity, no distribution made, nor the destruction of the stores be effected. The disorder thus unexpectedly produced was very detrimental to the discipline of the troops, which the unwearied efforts of the general had partly restored. The resources which he had depended on for the support of his soldiers became mischievous, and contributed to disorganise instead of nourishing them, and he had the farther vexation to hear Romana, the principal cause of this misfortune, proposing (with an army unable to resist a thousand light infantry) to commence offensive operations and plans, in comparison of which the visions of Don Quixote were wisdom.

The 31st, the light brigades separated from the army at Bonillas, and bent

their course by cross roads towards Orense and Vigo. This detachment was made to lessen the pressure on the commissariat, and to cover the flanks of the army. Fraser's and Hope's divisions entered Villa Franca; Baird's division was at Bembibre. The reserve, with the head-quarters, halted at Cambarros, a village six miles from Astorga, but the cavalry fell back in the night to the same place, and then the reserve marched to Bembibre.

The Marquis of Romana, after doing so much mischief by crossing the line of march, left his infantry to wander as they pleased, and retired with his cavalry and guns to the valley of the Mincio.

Upon the 1st of January the emperor took possession of Astorga. On that day 70,000 French infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 200 pieces of artillery, after many days of incessant marching, were there united. The congregation of this mighty force, while it evinced the power and energy of the French monarch, attested also the genius of the English general, who, with a handful of men, had found the means to arrest the course of the conqueror, and to draw him, with the flower of his army, to this remote and unimportant part of the Peninsula, at the moment when Portugal, and the fairest provinces of Spain, were prostrate beneath the strength of his hand. That Spain being in her extremity, Sir John Moore succoured her, and in the hour of weakness intercepted the blow which was descending to crush her, no man of candour and honesty can deny; for what troops, what preparations, what courage, what capacity, was there in the south to have resisted, even for an instant, the progress of a man, who, in ten days, and in the depth of winter, crossing the snowy ridge of the Carpentinos, had traversed 200 miles of hostile country, and transported 50,000 men from Madrid to Astorga in a shorter time than a Spanish diligence would have taken to travel the same distance?

This stupendous march was rendered fruitless by the quickness of his adversary; but Napoleon, though he had failed to destroy the English army, resolved, nevertheless, to cast it forth of the Peninsula, and being himself recalled to France by tidings that the Austrian storm was ready to burst, he fixed upon the Duke of Dalmatia to continue the pursuit, adding for this purpose three divisions of cavalry and three of infantry to his former command; but of these last, the two commanded by Generals Loison and Heudelet, were several marches in the rear, and General Bonnet's remained always in the Montagna de St. Ander; hence the whole number bearing arms, which the duke led immediately to the pursuit, was about 25,000 men, of which 4200 were cavalry.* The guns were 54. Loison's and Heudelet's divisions, however, followed him by forced marches, and he was supported by Marshal Ney with the 6th corps, wanting its third division; but mustering above 16,000 men under arms (the flower of the French army), together with 37 pieces of artillery. Thus, including Laborde, Heudelet, and Loison's division, nearly 60,000 men and 91 guns were put on the track of the English army.

The emperor returned to Valladolid, where he received the addresses of the notables and deputies from Madrid and the great towns, and strove, by promises and other means, to win the good opinion of the public. Appointing Joseph to be his lieutenant-general, he allotted separate provinces for each *corps d'armée*; and directing the imperial guard to return to France, after three days he departed himself with scarcely any escort, but with a speed that frustrated the designs that (as some say) the Spaniards had formed against his person.

CHAPTER V.

THE Duke of Dalmatia, a general, who, if the emperor be excepted, was no-wise inferior to any of his nation, commenced his pursuit of the English army

* Lorges's dragoons, 1,400; LaHoussaye's ditto, 1,450; Franceschi's light cavalry, 1,350; total 4,200.

with a vigour that marked his eager desire to finish the campaign in a manner suitable to the brilliant opening at Gamonal.

The main body of his troops followed the route of Foncevadon and Ponteferrada, a second column took the road of Cambarros and Bembibre, and General Franceschi, with the light cavalry, entering the valley of the Syl, ascended the course of that river, and turned the position of Villa Franca del Bierzo. Thus Sir John Moore, after having twice baffled the emperor's combinations, was still pressed in his retreat with a fury that seemed to increase every moment. The separation of his light brigades, a measure which he adopted, after the advice of his quarter-master-general, weakened the army by 3000 men; but he still possessed 19,000 of all arms, good soldiers to fight, and strong to march, yet by the disorders at Valderas and Astorga, much shaken in their discipline; for the general's exertions to restore order and regularity were by many officers slightly seconded, and by some with scandalous levity disregarded.

There was no choice but to retreat. The astonishing rapidity with which the emperor had brought up his overbearing numbers, and thrust the English army into Galicia, had rendered the natural strength of the country unavailing. The resources were few, even for an army in winter quarters, and for a campaign in that season, there were none at all. All the draft cattle that could be procured would scarcely have supplied the means to transport ammunition for two battles, but the French, sweeping the rich plains of Castile with their powerful cavalry, might have formed magazines at Astorga and Leon, and from thence have been supplied in abundance, while the English were starving.

Before he advanced from Salamanca, Sir John Moore, foreseeing that his movement must sooner or later end in a retreat, had sent officers to examine the roads of Galicia and the harbours which offered the greatest advantages for embarkation. By the reports of those officers, which arrived from day to day, and by the state of the magazines he had directed to be formed, his measures were constantly regulated.* The magazines of Astorga, Benevente, and Labaneza, we have seen, were, by untoward circumstances, and the deficiency of transport, rendered of no avail beyond the momentary supply they afforded; and part of their contents falling into the enemy's hands, gave him some cause of triumph; but those at Villa Franca and Lugo contained about fourteen days' consumption; and there were other small magazines formed on the line of Orenze and Vigo; more than this could not have been accomplished.

It was now only the fifteenth day since Sir John Moore had left Salamanca, and already the torrent of war, diverted from the south, was foaming among the rocks of Galicia. Nineteen thousand British troops, posted in strong ground, might have offered battle to very superior numbers; but where was the use of merely fighting an enemy who had 300,000 men in Spain?† Nothing could be gained by such a display of courage; but the English general, by a quick retreat, might reach his ships unmolested, embark, and carrying his army from the narrow corner in which it was cooped, to the southern provinces, establish there a good base of operations, and renew the war under favourable circumstances. It was by this combination of a fleet and army, that the greatest assistance could be given to Spain, and the strength of England become most formidable. A few days' sailing would carry the troops to Cadiz; but six weeks' constant marching would not bring the French army from Galicia to that neighbourhood. The northern provinces were broken, subdued in spirit, and possessed few resources. The southern provinces had scarcely seen an enemy, were rich and fertile, and there also was the seat of government. Sir John Moore reasoned thus, and resolved to fall down to the coast and embark, with as little loss or delay as might be. Vigo, Coruña, and Ferrol were the principal harbours; and their relative advantages could not be determined except by the reports of the engineers, none of which were yet received, so rapidly had the crisis of affairs

* Appendix, No. 13, sections 2 and 8.

† Appendix, No. 28.

come on ; but as those reports could only be obtained from day to day, the line of retreat became of necessity subject to daily change.

When the Duke of Dalmatia took the command of the pursuing army, Hope's and Fraser's divisions were, as I have said, at Villa Franca, Sir David Baird's at Bemibre, the reserve and cavalry at Cambarros, six miles from Astorga. Behind Cambarros the mountains of Galicia rose abruptly, but there was no position, because, after the first rise at the village of Rodrigatos, the ground continually descended to Calcabellos, a small town, only four miles from Villa Franca, and the old road of Foncevadon and Ponteferrada, which turned the whole line, was choked with the advancing columns of the enemy.* The reserve and the cavalry marched during the night to Bemibre : on their arrival Baird's division proceeded to Villa Franca, but the immense wine vaults of Bemibre had such temptations, that many hundreds of his men remained behind inebriated ; the followers of the army crowded the houses, and a number of Romana's disbanded men were mixed with this heterogeneous mass of marauders, drunkards, muleteers, women, and children ; the weather was dreadful, and, notwithstanding the utmost exertions of the general-in-chief, when the reserve marched the next morning, the number of those unfortunate wretches was not diminished. Leaving a small guard to protect them, Sir John Moore proceeded to Calcabellos ; but scarcely had the reserve marched out of the village, when some French cavalry appeared. In a moment the road was filled with the miserable stragglers, who came crowding after the troops, some with loud shrieks of distress and wild gestures, others with brutal exclamations ; many, overcome with fear, threw away their arms. Those who preserved theirs were too stupidly intoxicated to fire ; and kept reeling to and fro, alike insensible to their danger and to their disgrace. The enemy's horsemen perceiving this confusion, bore down at a gallop, broke through the disorderly mob, cutting to the right and left as they passed, and riding so close to the columns, that the infantry were forced to halt in order to check their audacity.

At Calcabellos the reserve took up a position, and the general-in-chief went on to Villa Franca. In that town great excesses had been committed by the preceding divisions ; the magazines were plundered, the bakers driven away from the ovens, the wine-stores forced, and the commissaries prevented from making the regular distributions ; the doors of the houses were broken, and the scandalous insubordination of the soldiers proved that a discreditable relaxation of discipline on the part of the officers had taken place. The general immediately arrested this disorder, caused one man taken in the act of plundering a magazine to be shot in the market-place, and issued severe orders to prevent a recurrence of such inexcusable conduct, after which he returned to the reserve at Calcabellos.

The Guia, a small but at this season of the year a deep stream, run through that town, and was crossed by a stone bridge. On the Villa Franca side, a lofty ridge, rough with vineyards and stone walls, was occupied by 2500 infantry, with a battery of six guns. Four hundred† riflemen and about the same number of cavalry were posted on a hill two miles beyond the river, to watch the two roads of Bemibre and Foncevadon. The 3rd of January, a little after noon, the French General Colbert approached this hill with six or eight squadrons ; but observing the ground behind Calcabellos strongly occupied, he demanded reinforcements. Marshal Soult, believing that the English did not mean to make a stand, sent orders to Colbert to charge without delay ; and the latter, stung by the message, obeyed with precipitate fury. From one of those errors so frequent in war, the British cavalry, thinking a greater force was riding against them, retired at speed to Calcabellos. The riflemen, who, following their orders, had withdrawn when the French first came in sight, were just passing the bridge, when a crowd of staff officers, the cavalry, and the enemy, came in upon them in one mass ; in the confusion 30 or 40 men were taken, and Colbert crossing the river, charged

* Appendix, No. 13, section 2.

† 95th regiment.

on the spur up the road. The remainder of the riflemen threw themselves into the vineyards, and permitting the enemy to approach within a few yards, suddenly opened such a deadly fire, that the greatest number of the French horsemen were killed on the spot, and among the rest Colbert himself. His fine martial figure, his voice, his gestures, and, above all, his daring valour had excited the admiration of the British, and a general feeling of sorrow was predominant when the gallant soldier fell. The French voltigeurs now crossed the river; a few of the 52nd regiment descended from the upper part of the ridge to the assistance of the riflemen, and a sharp skirmish commenced, in which 200 or 300 men of both sides were killed or wounded: towards evening Merle's division of infantry appeared on the hills in front of the town, and made a demonstration of crossing the river opposite to the left of the English position; but the battery of the latter checked this movement, and night coming on the combat ceased.

From Villa Franca to Lugo the road led through a rugged country; the cavalry were therefore sent on to the latter town at once. During the night the French patrols broke in upon the rifle piquets, and wounded some men, but were beaten back without being able to discover that the English troops had abandoned the position.

The reserve reached Herrerias, a distance of 18 miles, on the morning of the 5th. Baird's division was at Nogales, Hope's and Fraser's near Lugo. At Herrerias, Sir John Moore, who constantly directed the movements of the rear-guard himself, received the first reports of the engineers relative to the harbours. It appeared that Vigo, besides its greater distance, offered no position to cover the embarkation, but Coruña and Betanzos did. This induced him to relinquish his first intention of going to Vigo, and made him regret the absence of his light brigades. The transports were now ordered round from Vigo to Coruña; and in the mean time the general sent orders to the leading division to halt at Lugo, his intention being to rally the army there, to restore discipline, and to offer battle to the enemy if he was inclined to accept it.

These orders were carried to Sir David Baird by one of the aides-de-camp of the commander-in-chief; but Sir David forwarded them by a private dragoon, who got drunk and lost the despatch. This blamable irregularity was ruinous to General Fraser's troops; in lieu of resting two days at Lugo, that general unwittingly pursued his toilsome journey towards St. Jago de Compostella, and then returned without food or rest, losing by this pilgrimage above 400 stragglers. The 4th, the reserve reached Nogales, having by a forced march of 36 miles gained 12 hours' start of the enemy. At the entrance of this village they met a large convoy, consisting of English clothing, shoes, and ammunition; intended for Romana's army but moving towards the enemy; a circumstance perfectly characteristic of the Spanish mode of conducting public affairs. There was a bridge at Nogales which the engineers failed to destroy; but this was a matter of little consequence, as the river was fordable above and below; indeed the general was unwilling, unless for some palpable advantage, which seldom presented itself, to injure the communications of a country that he was unable to serve. The bridges were commonly very solidly constructed, and the arches having very little span, could be rendered passable again in a shorter time than they could be destroyed.

At this period of the retreat the road was crowded with stragglers and baggage; the peasantry, although armed, did not molest the French; but fearing both sides alike, drove their cattle and carried off their effects into the mountains on each side of the line of march; even there the villanous marauders contrived to find them, and in some cases were by the Spaniards killed; a just punishment for quitting their colours. Under the most favourable circumstances, the tail of a retreating force exhibits terrible scenes of distress; and on the road near Nogales, the followers of the army were dying fast from cold and hunger. The soldiers, barefooted, harassed, and weakened by their excesses at Bemibre and

Villa Franca, were dropping to the rear by hundreds. Broken carts, dead animals, and the piteous appearance of women with children, struggling or falling exhausted in the snow, completed a picture of war, which, like Janus, has a double face.

Towards evening the French recovered their lost ground, and passed Nogales, galling the rearguard with a continual skirmish; and here it was that dollars to the amount of £25,000 were abandoned. This small sum was kept near head-quarters to answer sudden emergencies, and the bullocks that drew it being tired, the general, who could not save the money without risking an ill-timed action, had it rolled down the side of the mountain; part of it was gathered by the enemy, part by the Gallician peasants.*

This day also, General Franceschi, who after turning Villa Franca and scouring the valley of the Syl, had ascended the banks of the Minho with his cavalry, fell into the line of march at Becerea, and rejoined the French army. Towards evening the reserve approached Constantino; the French were close upon the rear, and a hill within pistol-shot of the bridge offered them such an advantage, that there was little hope to effect the passage without great loss. The general caused the riflemen and artillery to take possession of the hill, under cover of which the remainder of the reserve hastily passed across the river without being perceived by the enemy, who were unusually cautious, and not aware of the vicinity of the bridge; the guns then descended at a trot, the riflemen followed, and when the French, now undeceived, came up at a brisk pace, the passage was effected, and a good line of battle formed at the other side; a fight commenced, but notwithstanding that the assailants were continually reinforced as their columns of march arrived, General Paget maintained the post with two regiments until nightfall, and then retired to Lugo, in front of which the whole army was assembled. A few of the French cavalry showed themselves on the 6th, but the infantry did not appear.

The 7th, Sir John Moore, in a general order, gave a severe but just rebuke to the officers and soldiers for their previous want of discipline, and at the same time announced his intention to offer battle. It has been well said, that a British army may be gleaned in a retreat, but cannot be reaped. Whatever may be their misery, the soldiers will always be found clean at review, and ready at a fight. Scarcely was this order issued, when the line of battle, so attenuated before, was filled with vigorous men, full of confidence and valour. Fifteen hundred had fallen in action, or dropped to the rear; but as three fresh battalions left by Sir David Baird in his advance to Astorga had joined the army between Villa Franca and Lugo, 19,000 combatants were still under arms when the French columns appeared in sight. The right of the English position was in comparatively flat ground, and partially protected by a bend of the Minho. The centre was amongst vineyards, with low stone walls. The left, which was somewhat withdrawn, rested on the mountains, being supported and covered by the cavalry. It was the intention of the general to engage deeply with his right

* I am aware that the returns laid before Parliament in 1809 make the sum £60,000, and the whole loss during the campaign nearly £77,000; but it is easier to make an entry of one sum for a Treasury return, than to state the details accurately. The money agents were, like the military agents, acting independently, and all losses went down under the head of abandoned treasure. My information is derived from officers actually present, and who all agree that the only treasure abandoned was that at Nogales, and that the sum was £25,000. When it was ordered to be rolled over the brink of the hill, two guns, and a battalion of infantry, were actually engaged with the enemy to protect it, and some person in whose charge the treasure was, exclaiming "it is money!" the general replied, "so are shot and shells." The following anecdote will show how such accidents may happen in war. An officer had charge of the cars that drew this treasure; in passing a village, a lieutenant of the 4th regiment observing that the bullocks were exhausted, took the pains to point out where fresh and strong animals were to be found, and advised that the tired ones should be exchanged for others more vigorous, which were close at hand; but the escorting officer, either ignorant of, or indifferent to, his duty, took no notice of this recommendation, and continued his march with the exhausted cattle.

and centre before he closed with his left wing, in which he had posted the flower of his troops, hoping thus to bring on a decisive battle, and trusting to the valour of the men to handle the enemy in such sort as that he should be glad to let the army continue its retreat unmolested. Other hope than this, to re-embark the troops without loss, there was none, except by stratagem; for Soult, an experienced general, commanding soldiers habituated to war, might be tempted, but could never be forced to engage in a decisive battle among those rugged mountains, where whole days would pass in skirmishing, without any progress being made towards crippling an adversary.

It was midday before the French marshal arrived in person at the head of 10,000 or 12,000 men; the remainder of his power followed in some disarray; for the marches had not been so easy but that many even of the oldest soldiers had dropped behind. As the French columns came up, they formed in order of battle along a strong mountainous ridge fronting the English. The latter were not distinctly seen, from the inequalities of the ground, and Soult feeling doubtful if they were all before him, took four guns, and some squadrons commanded by Colonel Lallemande, advanced towards the centre, and opened a fire, which was soon silenced by a reply from 15 pieces. The marshal being then satisfied that something more than a rearguard was in his front, retired. About an hour after he made a feint on the right, and at the same time sent a column of infantry and five guns against the left. On that side the three regiments which had lately joined were drawn up. The French pushed the outposts hard, and were gaining the advantage; when the English general-in-chief arriving, rallied the light troops, and with a vigorous charge broke the adverse column, and treated it very roughly in the pursuit. The estimated loss of the French was between 300 and 400 men.

As it was now evident that the British meant to give battle, the Duke of Dalmatia hastened the march of Laborde's division, which was still in the rear, and requested Marshal Ney, who was then at Villa Franca, to detach a division of the 6th corps by the Val des Orres to Orense. Ney, however, merely sent some troops into the valley of the Syl, and pushed his advanced posts in front as far as Nogales, Poyo, and Dancos.

At daybreak on the 8th the two armies were still embattled. On the French side, 17,000 infantry, 4000 cavalry, and 50 pieces of artillery were in line, but Soult deferred the attack until the 9th. On the English part, 16,000 infantry, 1800 cavalry, and 40 pieces of artillery impatiently awaited the assault, and blamed their adversary for delaying a contest which they ardently desired; but darkness fell without a shot having been fired, and with it fell the English general's hope to engage his enemy on equal terms.

What was to be done? Assail the French position? remain another day in expectation of a battle? or, in secrecy, gain a march, get on board without being molested, or at least obtain time to establish the army in a good situation to cover the embarkation? The first operation was warranted neither by present nor by future advantages, for how could an inferior army expect to cripple a superior one, posted as the French were, on a strong mountain, with an overbearing cavalry to protect their infantry should the latter be beaten; and when 20,000 fresh troops were at the distance of two short marches in the rear? The British army was not provided to fight above one battle. There were no draft cattle, no means of transporting reserve ammunition, no magazines, no hospitals, no second line, no provisions. A defeat would have been ruin, a victory useless. A battle is always a serious affair; but two battles under such circumstances, though both should be victories, would have been destruction.

But why fight at all, after the army had been rallied, and the disasters of the march from Astorga had been remedied? What if, beating first Soult and then Ney, the British had arrived once more above Astorga, with perhaps 10,000 infantry, and half as many hundred cavalry? From the mountains of Galicia their general might have cast his eyes as far as the Sierra Morena, without being

cheered by the sight of a single Spanish army; none were in existence to aid him, none to whom he might give aid. Even Mr. Frere acknowledged that at this period 6000 ill-armed men collected at Despeñas Peros formed the only barrier between the French and Seville, and Sir John Moore was sent out not to waste English blood in fruitless battles, but to assist the universal Spanish nation!

The second proposition was decided by the state of the magazines; there was not bread for another day's consumption remaining in the stores at Lugo. It was true that the army was in heart for fighting, but distressed by fatigue and bad weather, and each moment of delay increased privations that would soon have rendered it inefficient for a campaign in the south, which was the only point where its services could now be effectual. For two whole days Sir John Moore had offered battle; this was sufficient to rally the troops, to restore order, and to preserve the reputation of the army. Lugo was strong ground in itself but it did not cover Coruña. The road leading from Orense to St. Jago de Compostella turned it; the French ought to have been on that line, and there was no reason to suppose that they were not. Soult, we have seen, pressed Ney to follow it. It was then impossible to remain at Lugo, and useless if it had been possible.

The general adopted the third plan, and prepared to decamp in the night; he ordered the fires to be kept bright, and exhorted the troops to make a great exertion, which he trusted would be the last required of them.

The country immediately in the rear of the position was intersected by stone walls and a number of intricate lanes; precautions were taken to mark the right tracks, by placing bundles of straw at certain distances, and officers were appointed to guide the columns. At ten o'clock the troops silently quitted their ground, and retired in excellent order; but a moody fortune pursued Sir John Moore throughout this campaign, baffling his prudence, and thwarting his views, as if resolved to prove the unyielding firmness of his mind. A terrible storm of wind and rain, mixed with sleet, commenced as the army broke up from the position; the marks were destroyed, and the guides lost the true direction; only one of the divisions happily gained the main road, the other two were bewildered, and when daylight broke, the rear columns were still near to Lugo. The fatigue, the depression of mind, occasioned by this misfortune, and the want of shoes, broke the order of the march, and the stragglers were becoming numerous, when unfortunately, one of the generals commanding a leading division, thinking to relieve the men during a halt which took place in the night, desired them to take refuge from the weather in some houses a little way off the road. Complete disorganization followed this imprudent act: from that moment it became impossible to make the soldiers of the division keep their ranks; plunder succeeded, the example was infectious, and what with real suffering, and evil propensity encouraged by this error of inexperience, the main body of the army, which had *bivouacked* for six hours in the rain, arrived at Betanzos on the evening of the 9th, in a state very discreditably to its discipline.

The commander-in-chief, with the reserve and the cavalry, as usual, covered the march; in the course of it he ordered several bridges to be destroyed, but the engineers failed of success in every attempt. Fortunately, the enemy did not come up with the rear before the evening, and then only with their cavalry, otherwise many prisoners must have fallen into their hands. The number of stragglers uncovered by the passage of the reserve was so numerous, that being pressed by the enemy's horse, they united in considerable bodies and repulsed them, a signal proof that the disorder was occasioned as much by insubordination in the regiments as by the fatigue of the march.

The reserve, commanded by General Edward Paget, an officer distinguished during the retreat by his firmness, ability, and ardent zeal, remained in position, during the night, a few miles from Betanzos. The rest of the army was quartered in that town, and as the enemy could not gather in strength on the

10th, the commander-in-chief halted that day, and the cavalry passed from the rearguard to the head of the column.

The 11th, the French interrupted those employed to destroy the bridge of Betanzos; the 28th regiment repulsed the skirmishers, but the bridge, though constructed of wood, was only partially destroyed.

In the mean time Sir John Moore assembled the army in one solid mass. The loss of men in the march from Lugo to Betanzos had been greater than that in all the former part of the retreat, added to all the waste of the movement in advance and the loss sustained in the different actions: nevertheless 14,000 infantry were still in column, and by an orderly march to Coruña under the personal direction of the commander-in-chief, demonstrated that inattention and the want of experience in the officers was the true cause of those disorders which had afflicted the army far more than the sword of the enemy or the rigour of the elements.*

As the troops approached Coruña the general's looks were directed towards the harbour; an open expanse of water painfully convinced him, that to Fortune at least he was no way beholden; contrary winds detained the fleet at Vigo, and the last consuming exertion made by the army was thus rendered fruitless! The men were now put into quarters, and their leader awaited the progress of events. Three divisions occupied the town and suburbs, the reserve was posted with its left at the village of El Burgo, and its right on the road of St. Jago de Compostella. For twelve days these hardy soldiers had covered the retreat, during which time they had traversed eighty miles of road in two marches, passed several nights under arms in the snow of the mountains, were seven times engaged with the enemy, and they now assembled at the outposts, having fewer men missing from the ranks (including those who had fallen in battle) than any other division in the army. An admirable instance of the value of good discipline, and a manifest proof of the malignant injustice with which Sir John Moore has been accused of precipitating his retreat beyond the measure of human strength.

The bridge of El Burgo was immediately destroyed, and an engineer was sent to blow up that of Cambria, situated a few miles up the Mero river; this officer was mortified at the former failures, and so anxious to perform his duty in an effectual manner, that he remained too near the mine, and was killed by the explosion; but there was also a bridge at Celas, two leagues higher up, and at that place Franceschi's cavalry crossed on the 12th, intercepted some stores coming from St. Jago, and made a few prisoners.

The town of Coruña, although sufficiently strong to oblige an enemy to break ground before it, was weakly fortified, and to the southward commanded by some heights close to the walls. Sir John Moore caused the land front to be repaired and strengthened, and also disarmed the sea face of the works, and occupied the citadel. The inhabitants cheerfully and honourably joined in the labour, although they were fully aware that the English intended to embark, and that they compromised their own safety by aiding the operation. Such flashes of light from the dark cloud which at this moment covered Spain may startle the mind of the reader, and make him doubt if the Spaniards could have been so insufficient to their own defence as they have been represented in the course of this history. I can only answer, that the facts were as I have told them, and that it was such paradoxical indications of character that deceived the world at this time, and induced men to believe that the reckless daring defiance of the power of France so loudly proclaimed by the patriots, would be strenuously supported. Of proverbially vivid imagination and quick resentments, the Spaniards feel and act individually rather than nationally; and during this war, that which appeared to be in them constancy of purpose, was in reality a repetition of momentary fury, a succession of electric sparks generated by a constant collision with the French army, and daily becoming

fainter as custom reconciled them to those injuries and insults which are commonly the attendants of war.

Procrastination and improvidence are the besetting sins of the nation : at this moment a large magazine of arms and ammunition was in Coruña ; these stores had been sent in the early part of the preceding year from England, and they were still unappropriated and unregarded by a nation infested with 300,000 enemies, and possessing 100,000 soldiers unclothed and without weapons.

Three miles from the town, 4000 barrels of powder were piled in a magazine built upon a hill ; a smaller quantity, collected in another storehouse, was at some distance from the first : to prevent these magazines from falling a prey to the enemy, they were both exploded on the 13th. The inferior one blew up with a terrible noise and shook the houses in the town ; but when the train reached the great store, there ensued a crash like the bursting forth of a volcano, the earth trembled for miles, the rocks were torn from their bases, and the agitated waters rolled the vessels as in a storm ; a vast column of smoke and dust, shooting out fiery sparks from its sides, arose perpendicularly and slowly to a great height, and then a shower of stones, and fragments of all kinds, bursting out of it with a roaring sound, killed several persons who remained too near the spot. A stillness, only interrupted by the lashing of the waves on the shore, succeeded, and the business of the war went on.

The ground in front of Coruña is impracticable for cavalry, and as the horses still left alive were generally foundered, and that it was impossible to embark them all in the face of an enemy, a great number were reluctantly ordered to be shot. These poor animals, already worn down and feet broken, would otherwise have been distributed among the French cavalry, or used as draft cattle, until by procrastinated sufferings of the nature they had already endured, they should be killed.

The enemy were now collecting in force on the Mero, and it became necessary to choose a position of battle. A chain of rocky elevations commencing on the sea-coast, north-west of the place, and ending on the Mero just behind the village of El Burgo, offered an advantageous line of defence ; covered by a branch of the Mero, which, washing a part of the base, would have obliged the enemy to advance by the road of Compostella ; but this ridge was too extensive for the English army, and if not wholly occupied, the French might have turned it by the right, and moved along a succession of eminences to the very gates of Coruña. There was no alternative but to take post on an inferior range, enclosed as it were within the other, and completely commanded by it within cannon-shot.

The French army had been so exhausted by continual toil, that it was not completely assembled on the Mero before the 12th. The infantry took post opposite El Burgo ; the cavalry of La Houssaye lined the river as far as the ocean, and Franceschi, as we have seen, crossed at the bridge of Celas, seven miles higher up. The 14th, the bridges of El Burgo being rendered practicable for artillery, two divisions of infantry, and one of cavalry, passed the river. To cover this march some guns opened on the English posts at El Burgo, but were soon silenced by a superior fire. The same evening, the transports from Vigo hove in sight, and soon after entered the harbour of Coruña, and the dismounted cavalry, the sick, all the best horses, and 52 pieces of artillery, were embarked during the night ; eight British and four Spanish guns were, however, retained on shore ready for action.

The 15th, Laborde's division arrived, and the French occupied the great ridge enclosing the British position, placing their right on the intersection of the roads leading from St. Jago and Betanzos, and their left upon a rocky eminence which overlooked both lines. Towards evening, their cavalry, supported by some light troops, extended towards the left, and a slight skirmish took place in the valley below. At the same time the English piquets opposite the right of the French, got engaged, and being galled by the fire of

two guns, Colonel M'Kenzie of the 5th, at the head of some companies, endeavoured to seize the battery; but a line of infantry, hitherto concealed by some stone walls, arose, and poured in such a fire of musketry, that the colonel was killed, and his men forced back with loss.

In the course of the night, Marshal Soult with great difficulty established a battery of eleven guns (eight and twelve-pounders,) on the rocks which formed the left of his line of battle. Laborde's division was posted on the right; half of it occupied the high ground, the other half was placed on the descent towards the river. Merle's division was in the centre. Mermet's division formed the left. The position was covered in front of the right by the villages of Palavia Abaxo and Portosa, and in front of the centre by a wood; the left was strongly posted on the rugged heights where the great battery was established. The distance from that battery to the right of the English line was about 1200 yards, and, midway, the little village of Elvina was held by the piquets of the latter nation.

The late arrival of the transports, the increasing force of the enemy, and the disadvantageous nature of the ground, augmented the difficulty and danger of the embarkation so much, that several general officers proposed to the commander-in-chief, that he should negotiate for leave to retire to his ships upon terms. There was little chance of such a proposal being agreed to by the enemy, and there was no reason to try. The army had suffered, but not from defeat; its situation was dangerous, but far from desperate; and the general would not consent to remove the stamp of energy and prudence which marked his retreat, by a negotiation that would have given an appearance of timidity and indecision to his previous operations, as opposite to their real character as light is to darkness. His high spirit and clear judgment revolted at the idea, and he rejected the degrading advice without hesitation.

All the encumbrances of the army were shipped in the night of the 15th and on the morning of the 16th, and everything was prepared to withdraw the fighting men as soon as the darkness would permit them to move without being perceived. The precautions taken would, without doubt, have insured the success of this difficult operation, but a more glorious event was destined to give a melancholy but graceful termination to the campaign. About two o'clock in the afternoon a general movement along the French line gave notice of the approaching

BATTLE OF CORUÑA.

The British infantry, 14,500 strong, occupied the inferior range of hills already spoken of. The right was formed by Baird's division, and, from the oblique direction of the ridge, approached the enemy, while the centre and left were of necessity withheld in such a manner that the French battery on the rocks raked the whole of the line. General Hope's division, crossing the main road, prolonged the line of the right's wing, and occupied strong ground abutting on the muddy bank of the Mero.* A brigade from Baird's division remained in column behind the extremities of his line, and a brigade of Hope's was posted on different commanding points behind the left wing. The reserve was drawn up near Airis, a small village situated in the rear of the centre. This last point commanded the valley which separated the right of Baird's division from the hills occupied by the French cavalry; the latter were kept in check by a regiment detached from the reserve, and a chain of skirmishers extending across the valley connected this regiment with the right of Baird's line. General Fraser's division remaining on the heights immediately before the gates of Coruña, was prepared to advance to any point, and also watched the coast road. These dispositions were as able as the unfavourable nature of the ground would admit of, but the advantage was all on the enemy's side. His light cavalry, under Franceschi, reaching nearly to the village of St. Christopher, a mile in the rear of Baird's division, obliged Sir John Moore to weaken his front by keeping back

* *Vide* Plan of the Battle.

Fraser's division until Soult's plan of attack should be completely developed. There was, however, one circumstance to compensate for these disadvantages. In the Spanish stores were found many thousand English muskets; the troops exchanged their old rusty and battered arms for these new ones; their ammunition also was fresh, and their fire was therefore very superior to their adversary's in proportion to the numbers engaged.

General Laborde's division being come up, the French force could not be less than 20,000 men; and the Duke of Dalmatia having made his arrangements, did not lose any time in idle evolutions, but distributing his lighter guns along the front of his position, opened a heavy fire from the battery on his left, and instantly descended with three solid masses to the assault. A cloud of skirmishers led the way, and the British piquets being driven back in disorder, the village of Elvina was carried by the first column, which afterwards dividing, one-half pushed on against Baird's front, the other turned his right by the valley. The second column made for the centre. The third engaged the left by the village of Palavia Abaxo. The weight of the French guns overmatched the English six-pounders, and their shot swept the position to the centre.

Sir John Moore observing that, according to his expectations, the enemy did not show any body of infantry beyond that which, moving up the valley, outflanked Baird's right, ordered General Paget to carry the reserve to where the detached regiment was posted, and, as he had before arranged with him, to turn the left of the French attack and menace the great battery. Then directing Fraser's division to support Paget, he threw back the 4th regiment, which formed the right of Baird's division, opened a heavy fire upon the flank of the troops penetrating up the valley, and with the 50th and 42nd regiments met those breaking through Elvina.

The ground about that village was intersected by stone walls and hollow roads; a severe, scrambling fight ensued, but in half an hour the French were borne back with great loss. The 50th regiment entered the village with them, and after a second struggle drove them for some distance beyond it. Meanwhile the general bringing up a battalion of the brigade of guards to fill the space in the line left vacant by those two regiments, the 42nd mistook his intention, and retired, and at that moment the enemy, being reinforced, renewed the fight beyond the village, the officer commanding the 50th* was wounded

* The author's eldest brother. He was returned amongst the killed. When the French renewed the attack at Elvina he was, with a few men, somewhat in advance of the village, for the troops were broken into small parties by the vineyard walls and narrow lanes. Being hurt, he endeavoured to return, but the enemy coming down, he was stabbed, and thrown to the ground with five wounds; and death appeared inevitable, when a French drummer rescued him from his assailants, and placed him behind a wall. A soldier with whom he had been struggling, irritated to ferocity, returned to kill him, but was prevented by the drummer. The morning after the battle the Duke of Dalmatia being apprised of Major Napier's situation, had him conveyed to good quarters, and with a kindness and consideration very uncommon, wrote to Napoleon, desiring that his prisoner might not be sent to France, which (from the system of refusing exchanges) would have been destruction to his professional prospects. The marshal also obtained for the drummer the decoration of the legion of honour. The events of the war obliged Soult to depart in a few days from Coruña, but he recommended Major Napier to the attention of Marshal Ney; and that marshal also treated his prisoner with the kindness of a friend rather than the rigour of an enemy, for he quartered him with the French consul, supplied him with money, gave him a general invitation to his house on all public occasions, and refrained from sending him to France. Nor did Marshal Ney's kindness stop there; for when the flag of truce arrived, and that he became acquainted with the situation of Major Napier's family, he suddenly waived all forms, and instead of answering the inquiry by a cold intimation of his captive's existence, sent him, and with him the few English prisoners taken in the battle, at once to England, merely demanding that none should serve until regularly exchanged. I should not have dwelt thus long upon the private adventures of an officer, but that gratitude demands a public acknowledgment of such generosity, and the demand is rendered imperative by the after misfortunes of Marshal Ney. The fate of that brave and noble-minded man is well known. He who had fought 500 battles for France, not one against her, was shot as a traitor!

and taken prisoner, and Elvina became the scene of a second struggle; this being observed by the commander-in-chief, who directed in person the operations of Baird's division, he addressed a few animating words to the 42nd, and caused it to return to the attack. General Paget, with the reserve, now descended into the valley, and the line of skirmishers being thus supported, vigorously checked the advance of the enemy's troops in that quarter, while the 4th regiment galled their flank. At the same time the centre and left of the army also became engaged; Sir David Baird was severely wounded, and a furious action ensued along the line, in the valley, and on the hills.



Sir John Moore, while earnestly watching the result of the fight about the village of Elvina, was struck on the left breast by a cannon shot; the shock threw him from his horse with violence; he rose again in a sitting posture, his countenance unchanged, and his stedfast eye still fixed upon the regiments engaged in his front; no sigh betrayed a sensation of pain; but in a few moments, when he was satisfied that the troops were gaining ground, his countenance brightened, and he suffered himself to be taken to the rear. Then was seen the dreadful nature of his hurt; the shoulder was shattered to pieces, the arm was hanging by a piece of skin, the ribs over the heart broken, and bared of flesh, and the muscles of the breast torn into long strips, which were interlaced by their recoil from the dragging of the shot. As the soldiers placed him in a blanket his sword got entangled, and the hilt entered the wound. Captain Hardinge, a staff officer, who was near, attempted to take it off, but the dying man stopped him, saying, "It is as well as it is. I had rather it should go out of the field with me." And in that manner, so becoming to a soldier, Moore was borne from the fight.


During this time the army was rapidly gaining ground. The reserve, overthrowing everything in the valley, and obliging La Houssaye's dragoons (who had dismounted) to retire, turned the enemy's left, and even approached the eminence upon which the great battery was posted. On the left, Colonel Nicholls, at the head of some companies of the 14th, carried Palavio Abaxo (which General Foy defended but feebly), and in the centre, the obstinate dispute for Elvina terminated in favour of the British; so that when the night set in their line was considerably advanced beyond the original position of the morning, and the French were falling back in confusion.

If at this time General Fraser's division had been brought into action along with the reserve, the enemy could hardly have escaped a signal overthrow; for the little ammunition Soult had been able to bring up was nearly exhausted, the river Mero, with a full tide, was behind him, and the difficult communication by the bridge of El Burgo was alone open for a retreat. On the other hand, to continue the action in the dark was to tempt fortune, for the French were still the most numerous, and their ground was strong. The disorder they were in offered such a favourable opportunity to get on board the ships, that Sir John Hope, upon whom the command of the army had devolved, satisfied with having repulsed the attack, judged it more prudent to pursue the original plan of embarking during the night, and this operation was effected without delay; the arrangements being so complete that neither confusion nor difficulty occurred.

The piquets kindling a number of fires, covered the retreat of the columns, and were themselves withdrawn at daybreak, and embarked, under the protection of General Hill's brigade, which was posted near the ramparts of the town. When the morning dawned, the French, observing that the British had abandoned their position, pushed forward some battalions to the heights of St. Lucie, and about midday succeeded in establishing a battery, which playing upon the shipping in the harbour, caused a great deal of disorder among the transports. Several masters cut their cables, and four vessels went ashore; but the troops being immediately removed by the men-of-war's boats, the stranded vessels were burnt, and the whole fleet at last got out of harbour. General Hill's brigade then embarked from the citadel; but General Beresford, with a

SKETCH OF THE
BATTLE OF CORUÑA
16th JAN^y 1809.

English 
French 



rearguard, still kept possession of that work until the 18th, when the wounded being all put on board, his troops likewise embarked.* The inhabitants faithfully maintained the town against the French, and the fleet sailed for England.

Thus ended the retreat to Coruña ; a transaction which, up to this day, has called forth as much of falsehood and malignity as servile and interested writers could offer to the unprincipled leaders of a base faction, but which posterity will regard as a genuine example of ability and patriotism.

From the spot where he fell, the general who had conducted it was carried to the town by a party of soldiers. The blood flowed fast, and the torture of his wound increased ; but such was the unshaken firmness of his mind, that those about him judging from the resolution of his countenance that his hurt was not mortal, expressed a hope of his recovery. Hearing this, he looked stedfastly at the injury for a moment, and then said, "No, I feel that to be impossible." Several times he caused his attendants to stop and turn him round, that he might behold the field of battle, and when the firing indicated the advance of the British he discovered his satisfaction, and permitted the bearers to proceed. Being brought to his lodgings the surgeons examined his wound, but there was no hope ; the pain increased, and he spoke with great difficulty. At intervals he asked if the French were beaten, and addressing his old friend Colonel Anderson, he said, "You know that I always wished to die this way." Again he asked if the enemy were defeated, and being told they were, observed, "It is a great satisfaction to me to know we have beaten the French." His countenance continued firm, and his thoughts clear ; once only, when he spoke of his mother, he became agitated. He inquired after the safety of his friends, and the officers of his staff, and he did not even in this moment forget to recommend those whose merit had given them claims to promotion. His strength was failing fast, and life was just extinct, when, with an unsubdued spirit, as if anticipating the baseness of his posthumous calumniators, he exclaimed, "I hope the people of England will be satisfied ! I hope my country will do me justice !" The battle was scarcely ended, when his corpse, wrapped in a military cloak, was interred by the officers of his staff in the citadel of Coruña. The guns of the enemy paid his funeral honours, and Soult, with a noble feeling of respect for his valour, raised a monument to his memory.

Thus ended the career of Sir John Moore, a man whose uncommon capacity was sustained by the purest virtue, and governed by a disinterested patriotism more in keeping with the primitive than the luxurious age of a great nation. His tall graceful person, his dark searching eyes, strongly defined forehead, and singularly expressive mouth, indicated a noble disposition and a refined understanding. The lofty sentiments of honour habitual to his mind, adorned by a subtle playful wit, gave him in conversation an ascendancy that he could well preserve by the decisive vigour of his actions. He maintained the right with a vehemence bordering upon fierceness, and every important transaction in which he was engaged increased his reputation for talent, and confirmed his character as a stern enemy to vice, a steadfast friend to merit, a just and faithful servant of his country. The honest loved him, the dishonest feared him ; for while he lived, he did not shun but scorned and spurned the base, and, with characteristic propriety, they spurned at him when he was dead.

* The loss of the English army was never officially returned, but was estimated by Sir John Hope at about 800. The French loss I have no accurate account of. I have heard from French officers that it was above 3000 men ; this number, I confess, appears to me exaggerated ; but that it was very great I can readily believe. The arms of the British were all new, the ammunition quite fresh, and it is well known that, whether from the peculiarity of our muskets, the physical strength and coolness of the men, or both combined, the fire of an English line is at all times the most destructive known. The nature of the ground also prevented any movement of the artillery on either side ; hence the French columns in their attacks were exposed to a fire of grape which they could not return, because of the distance of their batteries.

A soldier from his earliest youth, he thirsted for the honours of his profession, and feeling that he was worthy to lead a British army, hailed the fortune that placed him at the head of the troops destined for Spain. The stream of time passed rapidly, and the inspiring hopes of triumph disappeared, but the austere glory of suffering remained; with a firm heart he accepted that gift of a severe fate, and confiding in the strength of his genius, disregarded the clamours of presumptuous ignorance; opposing sound military views to the foolish projects so insolently thrust upon him by the ambassador, he conducted a long and arduous retreat with sagacity, intelligence, and fortitude. No insult could disturb, no falsehood deceive him, no remonstrance shake his determination; fortune frowned without subduing his constancy; death struck, and the spirit of the man remained unbroken when his shattered body scarcely afforded it a habitation. Having done all that was just towards others, he remembered what was due to himself. Neither the shock of the mortal blow, nor the lingering hours of acute pain which preceded his dissolution, could quell the pride of his gallant heart, or lower the dignified feeling with which (conscious of merit) he asserted his right to the gratitude of the country he had served so truly.

If glory be a distinction, for such a man death is not a leveller!

CHAPTER VI.

OBSERVATIONS.—GENERAL VIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN.

MR. CANNING, in an official communication to the Spanish deputies in London, observed, that "the conduct of the campaign in Portugal was unsatisfactory, and inadequate to the brilliant successes with which it opened." In the relation of that campaign it has been shown how little the activity and foresight of the cabinet contributed to those successes, and the following short analysis will prove that, with respect to the campaign in Spain, the proceedings of the ministers were marked by tardiness and incapacity.

Joseph abandoned Madrid the 3rd of August, and on the 11th of the same month the French troops from the most distant parts of Europe were in motion to remedy the disasters in the Peninsula.

The 1st of September a double conscription, furnishing 160,000 men, was called out to replace the troops withdrawn from Poland and Germany.

The 4th of September the emperor announced to the senate, that "he was resolved to push the affairs of the Peninsula with the greatest activity, and to destroy the armies which the English had disembarked in that country."

The 11th, the advanced guard of the army coming from Germany reached Paris, and was there publicly harangued by the emperor.

The 8th of November he burst into Spain at the head of 300,000 men, and the 5th of December not a vestige of the Spanish armies remaining, he took possession of Madrid.

Now the Asturian deputies arrived in London the 6th of June.

The 20th of August (the battle of Vimiero being then unfought, and, consequently, the fate of the campaign in Portugal uncertain), the English minister invited Sir Hew Dalrymple to discuss three plans of operations in Spain, each founded upon data utterly false, and all objectionable in the detail. He also desired that Sir Arthur Wellesley should go to the Asturias to ascertain what facilities that country offered for the disembarkation of an English army; and the whole number of troops disposable for the campaign (exclusive of those already in Portugal) he stated to be 20,000, of which one-half was in England and the other in Sicily. He acknowledged that no information yet received had enabled the cabinet to decide as to the application of the forces at home, or the ulterior use to be made of those in Portugal, yet, with singular rashness, the whole of the southern provinces, containing the richest cities, finest harbours, and most numerous armies, were discarded from consideration, and

Sir Hew Dalrymple, who was well acquainted with that part of Spain, and in close and friendly correspondence with the chiefs, was directed to confine his attention to the northern provinces, of which he knew nothing.

The reduction of Junot's army in Portugal, and the discomfiture of Joseph's on the Ebro, were regarded as certain events. The observations of the minister were principally directed, not to the best mode of attacking, but to the choice of a line of march that would insure the utter destruction or captivity of the whole French army; nay, elated with extravagant hopes and strangely despising Napoleon's power, he instructed Lord William Bentinck to urge the central junta to an invasion of France, as soon as the army on the Ebro should be annihilated.

Thus it appears that the English ministers were either profoundly ignorant of the real state of affairs, or that with a force scattered in England, Portugal, and Sicily, and not exceeding 45,000 men, they expected in one campaign, first to subdue 26,000 French under Junot, and then destroying 80,000 under Joseph, to turn the tide of war, and to invade France.

The battle of Vimiero took place, and Sir Arthur Wellesley naturally declined a mission more suitable to a staff captain than a victorious commander; but before Sir Hew's answer, exposing the false calculations of the minister's plans, could be received in England, a despatch, dated the 2nd of September, announced the resolution of the government to employ an army in the northern provinces of Spain, and directed 20,000 men to be held in readiness to unite with other forces to be sent from England; nevertheless, this project also was so immature, that no intimation was given how the junction was to be effected, whether by sea or land; nor had the ministers even ascertained that the Spaniards would permit English troops to enter Spain at all; for three weeks later, Lord William Bentinck, writing from Madrid, says, "I had an interview with Florida Blanca: he expressed his surprise that there should be a doubt of the Spaniards wishing for the assistance of the English army." Such also was the confusion at home, that Lord Castlereagh repeatedly expressed his fears lest the embarkation of Junot's troops should have "absorbed all the means of transport" in the Tagus, when a simple reference to the transport office in London would have satisfied him, that although the English army should also be embarked, there would still remain a surplus of 12,000 tons.

When the popular cry arose against the convention of Cintra, the generals in chief were recalled in succession, as rapidly as they had been appointed; the despatches addressed to one generally fell into the hands of his successor; but the plans of the ministers becoming at last mature, on the 6th of October, Sir John Moore was finally appointed to lead the forces into Spain. At this period the head of the grand French army was already in the passes of the Pyrenees, and the hostile troops on the Ebro coming to blows. The Spaniards were weak and divided, and the English were 40 marches from the scene of action; yet, said the minister to Sir John Moore, "there will be full time to concert your plan of operations with the Spanish generals before the equipment of your army can be completed." Was this the way to oppose Napoleon! Could such proceedings lead to aught but disaster! It has been said, that Sir Hew Dalrymple's negligence was the cause of this delay; that he should have had the troops in readiness: but that general could not prudently incur the expense of equipping for a march an army that was likely to be embarked; he could not, in short, divine the plans of the ministers before they were formed; and it is evident that the error attaches entirely to the government.

The incapacity of the Spanish generals has been already sufficiently exposed by occasional observations in the narrative; their faults, glaring and fatal, call for no further remark; but the exact combinations, the energy and rapidity of the French emperor, merit the most careful examination; his operations were not, as they have been generally considered, a pompous display of power, to

create an appearance of conquest that was unreal, not a mere violent irruption with a multitude of men, but a series of skilful and scientific movements, worthy of so great a general and politician. It is true that his force was immense, and that the Spaniards were but contemptible soldiers ; but he never neglected the lessons of experience, nor deviated from the strictest rules of art. With astonishing activity, and when we consider the state of his political relations on the continent, we may add, with astonishing boldness, he first collected ample means to attain his object, then deceiving his enemies with regard to his numbers, position, and intentions, and choosing his time with admirable judgment, he broke through the weak part of their line, and seized Burgos, a central point, which enabled him to envelop and destroy the left wing of the Spaniards before their right could hear of his attack, the latter being itself turned by the same movement, and exposed to a like fate. This position also enabled him to menace the capital, to keep the English army in check, and to cover the formation of those magazines and stores which were necessary to render Burgos the base and pivot of further operations.

Napoleon's forces were numerous enough to have attacked Castaños and Palafox, while Blake was being pursued by the 1st and 4th corps ; but trusting nothing to chance, he waited for 12 days, until the position of the English army was ascertained, the strength of the northern provinces quite broken, and a secure place of arms established. Then leaving the 2nd corps to cover his communications, and sending the 4th corps into the flat country, to coast, as it were, the heads of the English columns on his right, and to turn the passes of the Carpentino mountains, he caused the Spanish right wing to be destroyed, and himself approached the capital, at a moment when not a vestige of a national army was left, when he had good reason to think that the English were in full retreat, when the whole of his own corps were close at hand, and consequently when the greatest moral effect could be produced, and the greatest physical power concentrated at the same time to take advantage of it. Napoleon's dispositions were indeed surprisingly skilful ; for although Marshal Lefebvre's precipitation at Zornoza, by prolonging Blake's agony, lost six days of promise, it is certain that reverses in battle could neither have checked the emperor, nor helped the Spaniards.

For if Soult had been beaten at Gamonal, Napoleon was close at hand to support the 2nd corps, and the 6th corps would have fallen upon the flank and rear of the Spaniards.

If the 1st corps had been defeated at Espinosa, the 2nd and 4th corps, and the emperor's troops, would have taken Blake in flank and rear.

If Lasnes had been defeated at Tudela, he could have fallen back on Pampeluna ; the 5th and 8th corps were marching to support him, and the 6th corps would have taken the Spaniards in flank.

If the emperor had been repulsed at the Somosierra, the 6th corps would have turned that position by Guadalaxara, and the 4th corps by Guadarama.

If Sir John Moore had retreated on Portugal, the 4th corps was nearer to Lisbon than he was.

If he had overthrown Soult, the 5th and 8th corps were ready to sustain that marshal, and Napoleon, with 50,000 men, as we have seen, was prepared to cut the British line of retreat into Galicia. In short, no possible event could have divided the emperor's forces, and he constantly preserved a central position that enabled him to unite his masses in sufficient time to repair any momentary disaster. By a judicious mixture of force and policy also, he obliged Madrid to surrender in two days, and thus prevented the enthusiasm which would doubtless have arisen if the capital had been defended for any time, and the heart-burnings if it had been stormed. The second sweep that he was preparing to make when Sir John Moore's march called off his attention from the south would undoubtedly have put him in possession of the remaining great cities of the Peninsula. Then the civil benefits promised in his decrees

and speeches would have produced their full effect, and the result may be judged of by the fact that in 1811 and 1812, Andalusia and Valencia were, under the able administration of Marshals Soult and Suchet, as tranquil and submissive as any department of France, and the former even raised numerous Spanish battalions, and employed them not only to preserve the public peace, but to chase and put down the guerillas of the neighbouring provinces.

Sir John Moore's talents saved the Peninsula from this great danger, and here perhaps a military error of Napoleon's may be detected. Forgetting that war is not a conjectural art, he took for granted that the English army was falling back to Portugal, and without ascertaining that it was so, acted upon the supposition. This apparent negligence, so unlike his usual circumspection, leads to the notion, that through Morla he might have become acquainted with the peculiar opinions and rash temper of Mr. Frere, and trusted that the treacherous arts of the Spaniard, in conjunction with the presumptuous disposition of the plenipotentiary, would so mislead the English general, as to induce him to carry his army to Madrid, and thus deliver it up entire and bound. It was an error; but Napoleon could be deceived or negligent only for a moment. With what vigour he recovered himself, and hastened to remedy his error! How instantaneously he relinquished his intentions against the south, turned his face away from the glittering prize, and bent his whole force against the only man among his adversaries that had discovered talent and decision! Let those who have seen the preparations necessary to enable a small army to act, even on a pre-conceived plan, say what uncontrollable energy that man possessed, who, suddenly interrupted in such great designs, could, in the course of a few hours, put 50,000 men in movement on a totally new line of operations, and in the midst of winter execute a march of 200 miles with a rapidity hardly to be equalled under the most favourable circumstances.

The indefatigable activity of the Duke of Dalmatia greatly contributed to the success of the whole campaign, and it is a remarkable circumstance that Soult and Napoleon, advancing from different bases, should have so combined their movements, that (after marching, the one above 100, and the other 200 miles, through a hostile country) they effected their junction at a given point, and at a given hour, without failure; and it is no less remarkable that such a decided and well-conducted operation should have been baffled by a general at the head of an inexperienced army.

OBSERVATIONS ON SIR JOHN MOORE'S RETREAT.

When Sylla, after all his victories, styled himself a happy, rather than a great general, he discovered his profound knowledge of the military art. Experience had taught him that the urgent speed of one legion, the inactivity of another, the obstinacy, the ignorance, or the treachery of a subordinate officer, was sufficient to mar the best concerted plan; nay, that the intervention of a shower of rain, an unexpected ditch, or any apparently trivial accident, might determine the fate of a whole army. It taught him that the vicissitudes of war are so many, that disappointment will attend the wisest combinations; that a ruinous defeat, the work of chance, often closes the career of the boldest and most sagacious of generals; and that to judge of a commander's conduct by the event alone, is equally unjust and unphilosophical, a refuge for vanity and ignorance.

These reflections seem to be peculiarly applicable to Sir John Moore's campaign, which has by sundry writers been so unfairly discussed. Many of the subsequent disasters of the French can now be distinctly traced to the operations of the British army. It can be demonstrated that the reputation of that excellent man was basely sacrificed at the period of his death, and that the virulent censures passed upon his conduct have been as inconsiderate as they were unmerited and cruel.

The nature of the commands held by Sir John Moore in the years 1807-8-9, forced him into a series of embarrassments from which few men could have

extricated themselves. After refusing the charge of the absurd expedition to Egypt in 1806, which ended, as he judged it must do, unfavourably, he succeeded to the command of the troops in Sicily, a situation which immediately involved him in unpleasant discussions with the Queen of Naples and the British envoy: discussions to which the subsequent well-known enmity of the cabinet of that day may be traced. By his frank conduct, clear judgment, and firm spirit, he obtained an influence over the wretched court of Palermo that promised the happiest results. The queen's repugnance to a reform was overcome, the ministers were awed, and the miserable intrigues of the day were for the time put down. The Sicilian army was reorganized, and a good military system was commenced under the advice of the British general. This promising state of affairs lasted but a short time; the Russian fleet put into the Tagus, the French threatened Portugal, and Sicily was no longer considered! Sir John Moore was ordered to quit that island, and to assemble a large force at Gibraltar for a specific service; but the troops to be gathered were dispersed in the Mediterranean from Egypt to the straits, and their junction could not be effected at all unless the English ambassador at Constantinople should succeed in bringing a negotiation then pending between the Turks and Russians to a happy issue. The special service in question had two objects—first, to aid Sir Sydney Smith in carrying off the royal family of Portugal to the Brazils; and second, to take possession of Madeira; but neither was made known to the general before his arrival at Gibraltar, which was not until after Junot had taken possession of Lisbon. Sir John Moore then (following his instructions) proceeded home, and thus our interests in Sicily were again abandoned to the vices and intrigues of the court of Palermo. On the passage he crossed General Spencer going with a force against Ceuta, and soon after he had reached England he was despatched to Sweden, without any specific object, and with such vague instructions, that an immediate collision with the unfortunate Gustavus was the consequence. Having with much dexterity and judgment withdrawn himself and his army from the capricious violence of that monarch, Sir John was superseded and sent to Portugal, with the third rank in an army which at that time no man had such good claims to command as himself.*

The good fortune of England was never more conspicuous than at this period, when her armies and fleets were thus bandied about, and a blind chance governed the councils at home. For first a force collected from all parts of the Mediterranean was transported to the Baltic Sea, at a time when an expedition composed of troops which had but a short time before come back from the Baltic were sailing from England to the Mediterranean. An army intended to conquer South America was happily assembled in Ireland at the moment when an unexpected event called for their services in Portugal, and a division destined to attack the Spaniards at Ceuta arrived at Gibraltar at the instant when the insurrection of Andalusia fortunately prevented them

* Sir John Moore's sentiments upon this occasion are expressed in the following letter, which displays the pure and elevated patriotism that distinguished him through life, and rendered his death heroic:—

“Portsmouth, 23rd July, 1808.

“MY LORD,—I am this instant honoured with your lordship's letter (by messenger), of yesterday's date. As I have already had the honour to express my sentiments to your lordship fully at my last interview, it is, I think, unnecessary to trouble you with a repetition of them now.

“I am about to proceed on the service on which I have been ordered, and it shall be my endeavour to acquit myself with the same zeal by which I have ever been actuated when employed in the service of my country. The communication which it has been thought proper to make to his majesty cannot fail to give me pleasure; I have the most perfect reliance on his majesty's justice, and shall never feel greater security than when my conduct, my character, and my honour, are under his majesty's protection.

“I have the honour to be, etc. etc.

“*To the Right Honourable Viscount Castlereagh.* (Signed) JOHN MOORE.”

from making an attempt that would have materially aided Napoleon's schemes against the Peninsula. Again, three days after Sir John Moore had withdrawn his army from Sweden, orders arrived to employ it in carrying off the Spanish troops under Romana, an operation for which it was not required, and which would have retarded, if not entirely frustrated, the campaign in Portugal; nor was it the least part of that fortune, that in such long-continued voyages in bad seasons, no disaster befell those huge fleets thus employed in bearing the strength of England from one extremity of Europe to the other.

After the convention of Cintra, Sir John Moore was again placed at the head of an army; an appointment unexpected by him, for the frank and bold manner in which he expressed himself to the ministers on his return from Gottingen left him little to hope; but the personal good-will of the king, and other circumstances, procured him this command. Thus, in a few months after he had quitted Sweden, Moore, with an army not exceeding 24,000 men, was in the heart of Spain, opposed to Napoleon, who having passed the Pyrenees at the head of 330,000 men, could readily bring 200,000 to bear on the British; a vast disproportion of numbers, and a sufficient answer to all the idle censures passed upon the retreat to Coruña.

The most plausible grounds of accusation against Sir John Moore's conduct rest on three alleged errors—first, that he divided his forces; second, that he advanced against Soult; third, that he made a precipitate and unnecessary retreat.

When a general, aware of the strength of his adversary, and of the resources to be placed at his own disposal, arranges a plan of campaign, he may be strictly judged by the rules of art; but if, as in the case of Sir John Moore, he is suddenly appointed to conduct important operations without a plan being arranged, or the means given to arrange one, then it is evident that his capacity or incapacity must be judged of by the energy he displays, the comprehensive view he takes of affairs, and the rapidity with which he accommodates his measures to events that the original vice of his appointment will not permit him to control.

The first separation of the English army was the work of the ministers, who sent Sir David Baird to Coruña. The after separation of the artillery was Sir John Moore's act; the reasons for which have been already stated; but it is worth while to examine what the effect of that measure was, and what it might have been; and here it may be observed, that, although a brigade of light six-pounders did accompany the troops to Almeida, the road was *not practicable*; for the guns were in some places let down the rocks by ropes, and in others, carried over the difficult places; a practicable affair with one brigade; but how could the great train of guns and ammunition waggons that accompanied Sir John Hope have passed such places without a loss of time that would have proved more injurious to the operations than the separation of the artillery?

The advance of the army was guided by three contingent cases, any one of which arising would have immediately influenced the operations—first, Blake on the left, or Castaños and Palafox upon the right, might have beaten the French, and advanced to the Pyrenees; second, they might have maintained their position on the Ebro; third, the arrival of reinforcements from France might have forced the Spaniards to fall back upon the Upper Douero, on one side, and to the mountains of Guadalaxara on the other. In the first case there was no risk in marching by divisions towards Burgos, which was the point of concentration given by the British and Spanish ministers; in the second case, the army could safely unite at Valladolid; and in the third case, if the division of Sir David Baird had reached Toro early in November (and this it was reasonable to expect, as that general arrived at Coruña on the 13th of October), the retrograde movement of the Spanish armies would probably have drawn the English to the Guadarama, as a safe and central


point between the retiring Spanish wings. Now the artillery marching from the Alentejo by the roads of Talavera and Naval Carnero, to Burgos, would pass over 102 Spanish leagues; to Aranda de Douero, 89 leagues; to Valladolid, 92 leagues; while the columns that marched by Almeida and Salamanca would pass over 116 leagues to Burgos, and 98 to Valladolid. Wherefore supposing the Spaniards successful, or even holding their own, the separation of the artillery was an advantage, and if the Spaniards were driven back, their natural line of retreat would have brought them towards Madrid, Blake by Aranda to the Somosierra, and Castaños and Palafox by Sigüenza and Llancon, to cover the capital, and to maintain an interior communication between the Somosierra and the Henares river. The British artillery would then have halted at Espinar, after a march of only 80 leagues, and Baird and Moore's corps uniting at Salamanca early in November, might, by a flank march to Arevalo, have insured the concentration of the whole army.

Thus, in the three anticipated cases, the separation of the artillery was prudent, and promised to be advantageous. There was indeed a fourth case, that which really happened. All the Spanish armies were dispersed in an instant!—utterly effaced! but Sir John Moore could not have divined such a catastrophe, while his ears were ringing with the universal clamour about the numbers and enthusiasm of the patriots; and if he had foreseen even a part of such disasters, he would never have advanced from Portugal. With the plans of the Spanish government he was unacquainted; but he was officially informed that above 140,000 Spanish soldiers were between him and a feeble dispirited enemy; and as the intercepted letter from the governor of Bayonne stated that reinforcements would only arrive between the 18th of October and the 18th of November, it was reasonable to suppose that the French would not commence offensive operations before the latter period, and that ample time would be afforded to concentrate the English troops under the protection of the Spanish armies. If Sir John Moore could have suspected the delusion under which the British government acted, the incredible folly of the central junta and the Spanish generals, or the inaccuracy of the military agents; if he could have supposed that the Spanish armies were weak in numbers, weaker in spirit, and destitute of food and clothing; or that, while the Spanish authorities were pressing him to advance, they would wantonly detain Sir David Baird's troops 17 days on board the transports; if he could have imagined all this, undoubtedly his arrangements ought and would have been different, his army would have been kept together, and the road through Coria, however difficult, would have been preferred to a divided march.

The dangerous and absurd position of the Spanish armies, and the remote situation of the British troops in October, may be explained by the annexed diagram. Lisbon being taken as a centre, and the distance A between Lisbon and Coruña being the radius, let a circle passing through Madrid be described. Let the tangential line C be drawn perpendicular to the radius A, meeting the secant B at Sanguessa.

The extreme right of the Spaniards was posted at Sanguessa. Castaños was at Calahorra, and Blake was near Durango, but the main body of the French was at Vittoria; and not only divided the Spaniards, but was actually 25 miles nearer to Burgos and Valladolid (the points of concentration for Moore's and Baird's corps), than either Castaños or Blake, and 75 miles nearer than Palafox.

The 10th, the emperor struck the first blow, by beating Belvedere and seizing Burgos. Sir David Baird did not march from Coruña until the 12th, and did not bring up the whole of his troops to Astorga before the 4th of December; hence it is clear, that whatever road the artillery had taken, the British army could not have averted the ruin of the Spaniards. Let us suppose the troops assembled at Salamanca on the 13th of November. They must have advanced either to Valladolid or to Madrid. If to Valladolid, the emperor was at Burgos with the imperial guards, 10,000 or 12,000 cavalry, and 100 pieces of



artillery. The 1st corps was within a day's march, the 2nd and 4th corps within three marches, and the 6th corps within two marches. Above 100,000 French soldiers could, therefore, have been concentrated in three days; and it is to be observed that Sir John Moore never had 25,000 in the field.

It is said, he might have gone to Madrid: in that case the separation of the artillery was a decided advantage, and the separation of Baird's corps (which was not the general's arrangement) was the error. The army could not have marched from Salamanca to Madrid in less than seven days; on the 21st of November then, 24,000 British soldiers could have been collected in the capital; but the 4th French corps, which reached Segovia the 1st of December, would have cut off their communication with Portugal, and the emperor with 40,000 men was at Aranda de Douero. Castaños was defeated on the 23rd; the remnants of his army were only at Guadalaxara about the 1st of December, and the 6th corps was in full pursuit of them. The English general must then have done one of three things: advanced to the relief of Castaños's retreating army, joined St. Juan at the Somosierra, or retreated across the Tagus. In the first case, the emperor would have forced the Somosierra, and uniting with the 4th corps, have placed 60,000 men upon Sir John Moore's rear; in the second case, the 6th and 4th corps, turning both his flanks, would have effected a junction behind the Somosierra, and cut him off from Madrid, while Napoleon, with 40,000 men, assailed him in front. To retreat over the Tagus was to adopt the southern provinces for a new base of operations, and might have been useful if the Spaniards would have rallied round him with enthusiasm and courage; but would they have done so when the emperor was advancing with his enormous force? After-experience proves that they would not. The Duke of Dalmatia, in 1810, with an army very inferior to that under Napoleon, reached the gates of Cadiz without a serious blow being struck to oppose him, and at this time the people of the south were reckless of the opportunity procured for them by Sir John Moore's march on Sahagun; but it has been said that 24,000 British troops acting vigorously, could have checked the emperor, and raised the courage of the Spaniards. To such an observation I will oppose a fact. In 1815, Napoleon crossed the Sambre with 115,000 men, and the 210,000 regular troops in his front, among which were more than 30,000 English, could with difficulty stop his progress after four days' fighting, in three of which he was successful.

If Sir John Moore, at a subsequent period, was willing to risk the danger of a movement on the capital, it was because he was misinformed of the French strength, and the Spaniards were represented to be numerous and confident; he was also unacquainted with the defeat at Tudela. His object was, by assisting Castaños, to arouse the spirit of the patriots: and nothing more strongly evinces his hardihood and prompt judgment, for, in his letter to Mr. Frere, he distinctly stated the danger to be incurred, and carefully separating the military from the political reasons, only proposed to venture the army if the envoy was satisfied that the Spanish government and people would answer to such an appeal, and that the British cabinet would be willing to incur the risk for such an object. If he did not follow up his own proposal, it was because he had discovered that the army of Castaños was, not simply defeated, but destroyed; because the Somosierra had been forced by a charge of cavalry, and because the passes of the Guadarama, on his line of march to Madrid, were seized by the enemy before his own army could be concentrated.

Why then did he not retreat into Portugal? Because Napoleon having directed the mass of his forces against the capital, the British army was enabled to concentrate; because Madrid shut her gates; because Mr. Frere and the Spanish authorities deceived him by false information; because the solemn declaration of the junta of Toledo, that they would bury themselves under the ruins of that town rather than surrender, joined to the fact that Zaragoza was fighting heroically, seemed to guarantee the constancy and vigour of that

patriotic spirit which was apparently once more excited ; because the question was again become political, and it was necessary to satisfy the English people, that nothing was left undone to aid a cause which they had so much at heart ; and, finally, because the peculiar position of the French army at the moment, afforded the means of creating a powerful diversion in favour of the southern provinces. These are the unanswerable reasons for the advance towards Sahagun. In the details of execution, that movement may be liable to some trifling objections ; perhaps it would have been better to have carried the army on the 21st at once to Carrion and neglected Sahagun and Saldanha ; but in its strategical and political character it was well conceived and well timed, hardy and successful.

The irritating interference that Sir John Moore was called upon to repel, and the treachery and the folly, equal in its effects to treachery, that he was obliged to guard against, have been sufficiently dwelt upon already ; but before discussing the retreat from Astorga, it may be of some military interest to show that the line of Portugal, although the natural one for the British army to retire upon, was not at this period necessarily either safe or useful, and that greater evils than those incurred by a retreat through Galicia would probably have attended a retrograde march upon Lisbon.

The rugged frontier of Portugal lying between the Douero and the Tagus, is vulnerable in many points to an invading army of superior force. It may be penetrated between the Douero and Pinhel, and between Pinhel and Guarda, by roads leading into the valleys of the Zezere and the Mondego. Between the Sierra de Estrella and the Sierra de Gata, by the road from Alfayates to Sabugal and Penamacor, or that by Guarda and Coria. Again, it may be pierced between the Sierra de Gata and the Tagus by Idanha Velha, Castello Branco, and Sobreira Formosa ; and from the Tagus to the Guadiana, a distance of about 20 leagues, the Alemtejo presents an open country without any strong fortress, save Lalippe, which may be disregarded and passed without danger.

Sir John Moore commenced his forward movement from Salamanca on the 12th of December, and at that period the 4th corps, being at Talavera de la Reyna, was much nearer to Lisbon than the British army was, and the emperor was preparing to march on that capital with the 6th corps, the guards, and the reserve. He could, as the Duke of Berwick did, penetrate by both sides of the Tagus, and what was to prevent him from reaching Lisbon before the British force, if the latter had retreated from Salamanca ? He marched on a shorter line and a better road ; he could supply his troops by requisitions, a system that, however fatal it may be in the end, is always advantageous at first. Sir John Moore must, from a scanty military chest, have purchased his supplies from a suspicious peasantry, rendered more distrustful by the retreat. In Lisbon, Sir John Craddock commanded 6000 infantry and 258 cavalry ; but the provisional government, who had only organized a few ill-composed battalions, were so inactive, that it was not until the 8th of December that a proclamation, calling on the people to arm, was issued. In the arsenal there were scarcely muskets and equipments for 8000 men, and the new levies were only required to assemble when Portugal should be actually invaded. Sir Robert Wilson, indeed, having with great activity organized about 2000 of the Lusitanian legion, marched in the middle of December from Oporto ; but this was all that could be opposed to an army more numerous, more favourably situated for invasion, and incomparably better commanded than that with which Massena invaded the country in 1810. Thus it may be affirmed, that if a retreat from Lisbon was advisable, before Napoleon took Madrid, it was not a safe operation after that event, and it is clear that Sir John Moore neither lightly nor injudiciously adopted the line of Galicia.

The arguments of those who deny the necessity of falling back, even behind the Esla, are scarcely worth notice ; a simple reference to the numbers under

the emperor, and the direction of his march, is sufficient to expose their futility; but the necessity of the continued, and as it has been unjustly called, the precipitate retreat to Coruña, may not be quite so obvious. The advance to Sahagun was intended to create a diversion, and give the Spaniards an opportunity of making head in the south; but although it succeeded in drawing away the enemy, the Spaniards did not make any head. The central junta displayed no energy or wisdom; a few slight demonstrations by the Marquis of Palacios, on the side of the Sierra Morena, and by the Duke of Infantado on the side of Cuença, scarcely disturbed the 1st corps, which remained in La Mancha; 10,000 men were sufficient to maintain Madrid in perfect tranquillity, and a part of the 4th corps even marched from Talavera by Placentia on Salamanca. By the letters of Mr. Stuart, and the reports of his own spies, Sir John Moore was informed of all these disheartening circumstances; but the intelligence arrived slowly and at intervals, and he, hoping that the Spaniards would finally make an effort, announced his intention to hold the Gallicias; but Mr. Stuart's correspondence deprived him of that hope; and the presence of the emperor, the great amount of his force, and the vehemence with which he pressed forward, confirmed the unhappy truth that nothing could be expected from the south.

Sir John Moore could not with 23,000 men maintain himself against the whole French army, and until he reached Astorga his flanks were always exposed. From thence, however, he retreated in comparative security; but the natural strength of the country between that town and Coruña misled persons of shallow judgment, who have since inconsiderately advanced many vague accusations, such as that passes where 100 men could stop an army were lightly abandoned; that the retreat was a flight, and the general's judgment clouded by the danger of his situation. There might be some foundation for such observations if military commanders were like prize-fighters, bound to strike always at the front; but as long as armies are dependent for their subsistence and ammunition, upon lines of communication, their flanks and rear must be considered as of consequence. Sir John Moore was perfectly aware that he could fight any number of men in some of the mountainous positions on the road to Coruña; but unless he could make a permanent defence, such battles would have been worse than useless, and a permanent defence was impossible, inasmuch as there were none but temporary magazines nearer than Coruña, and there were neither carriages of transport, nor money to procure them; a severe winter had just set in, and the province being poor, and the peasantry disinclined to aid the troops, few resources could be drawn from the country itself, neither was there a single position between Astorga and Coruña which could be maintained for more than a few days against a superior force, for that of Rodrigatos could be turned by the old road leading to Villa Franca, Villa Franca itself by the valley of the Syl, and from thence the whole line to Coruña might be turned by the road of Orense, which also led directly to Vigo, and until he reached Nogales, Sir J. Moore's intention was to retire to Vigo.* The French could have marched through the richest part of Galicia to St. Jago and Coruña on the left, or from the Asturias, by the way of Mondonedo, on the right. If it be asked why they did not do so, the answer is prompt. The emperor having quitted the army, the jealousies and misunderstandings usual between generals of equal rank impeded the operations. A coolness subsisted between Marshal Ney and the Duke of Dalmatia, and without entering into the grounds of their difference it is plain that, in a military point of view, the judgment of the latter was the soundest. The former committed a great error by remaining at Villa Franca instead of pushing his corps, or a part of it (as recommended by Soult), along the valley of Orense to St. Jago de Compostella. The British army would have been lost if the 6th corps had reached Coruña before it; and what would have been the chances in the battle if three additional French divisions had been engaged?

* Appendix, No. 13, section 2.

Granting, therefore, that the troops could have been nourished during the winter, Villa Franca, Nogales, Constantino, and Lugo were not permanently defensible by an army whose base of operations was at Coruña. Hence it was that Sir John Moore resolved to regain his ships with the view to renew the war in the south, and Hannibal himself could have done no more. Nor was the mode of executing the retreat at all unbecoming the character of an able officer.

Lord Bacon observes, that "honourable retreats are no ways inferior to brave charges, as having less of fortune, more of discipline, and as much of valour." That is an honourable retreat in which the retiring general loses no trophies in fight, sustains every charge without being broken, and finally, after a severe action, re-embarks his army in the face of a superior enemy without being seriously molested. It would be honourable to effect this before a foe only formidable from numbers, but it is infinitely more creditable when the commander, while struggling with bad weather and worse fortune, has to oppose veterans with inexperienced troops, and to contend against an antagonist of eminent ability, who scarcely suffers a single advantage to escape him during his long and vigorous pursuit. All this Sir John Moore did, and finished his work by a death as firm and glorious as any that antiquity can boast of.

Put to Lord Bacon's test, in what shall the retreat to Coruña be found deficient? something in discipline perhaps, but that fault does not attach to the general. Those commanders who have been celebrated for making fine retreats were in most instances well acquainted with their armies; and Hannibal, speaking of the elder Scipio, derided him, although a brave and skilful man, for that, being unknown to his own soldiers, he should presume to oppose himself to a general who could call to each man under his command by name: thus inculcating, that, unless troops be trained in the peculiar method of a commander, the latter can scarcely achieve anything great. Now Sir John Moore had a young army suddenly placed under his guidance, and it was scarcely united, when the superior numbers of the enemy forced it to a retrograde movement under very harassing circumstances; he had not time, therefore, to establish a system of discipline, and it is in the leading events, not the minor details, that the just criterion of his merits is to be sought for.

Was the retreat uncalled for? Was it unnecessarily precipitate? Was any opportunity of crippling the enemy lost? Was any weakness to be discovered in the personal character of the general? These are the questions that sensible men will ask; the first has been already examined, the second is a matter of simple calculation. The rearguard quitted Astorga on the 1st of January; on the 3rd, it repulsed the enemy in a sharp skirmish at Calcabelos; the 6th it rejoined the main body at Lugo, having three times checked the pursuers during the march. It was unbroken, and lost no gun, suffered no misfortune; the whole army offered battle at Lugo for two successive days, it was not accepted, and the retreat recommencing, the troops reached Betanzos on the morning of the 10th, and Coruña on the 11th; thus in eleven days, three of which were days of rest, a small army passed over 150 miles of good road. Now Napoleon, with 50,000 men, left Madrid on the 22nd of December; the 28th he was at Villapando, having performed a march, on bad roads, of 164 miles in seven days. The retreat to Coruña was consequently not precipitate, unless it can be shown that it was unnecessary to retreat at all beyond Villa Franca, neither can it be asserted that any opportunity of crippling the enemy was lost. To fight a battle was the game of the French marshal, and if any censure will apply to his able campaign, it is that he delayed to attack at Lugo; victorious or beaten, the embarrassments of his adversary must have been increased; Sir John Moore must have continued his retreat encumbered with the wounded, or the latter must have been abandoned without succour in the midst of winter.

At Coruña the absence of the fleet necessarily brought on a battle; that it was honourable to the British troops is clear from the fact that they embarked without loss after the action; and that it was absolutely necessary to embark

notwithstanding the success, is as certain a proof how little advantage could have been derived from any battle fought farther inland, and how prudently Sir John Moore acted in declining an action the moment he had rallied his army at Lugo, and restored that discipline which the previous movements had shaken; but, notwithstanding the clamour with which this campaign has been assailed, as if no army had ever yet suffered such misfortunes, it is certain that the nominal loss was small, the real loss smaller, and that it sinks into nothing when compared with the advantages gained. An army which, after marching in advance or retreat above 500 miles before an enemy of immensely superior force, has only lost, including those killed in battle, 4000 men, or a sixth part of its numbers, cannot be said to have suffered severely, nor would the loss have been so great but for the intervention of the accidental occurrences mentioned in the narrative.* Night marches are seldom happy; that from Lugo to Betanzos cost the army in stragglers more than double the number of men lost in all the preceding operations;† nevertheless the reserve in that, as in all the other movements, suffered little; and it is a fact, that the light brigades detached by the Vigo road, which were not pursued, made no forced marches, slept under cover, and were well supplied, left, in proportion to their strength, as many men behind as any other part of the army; thus accumulating proof upon proof that inexperience was the primary and principal cause of the disorders which attended the retreat. Those disorders were sufficiently great, but many circumstances contributed to produce an appearance of suffering and disorganization which was not real. The intention of Sir John Moore was, to have proceeded to Vigo, in order to restore order before he sailed for England: instead of which the fleet steered home directly from Coruña; a terrible storm scattered it; many ships were wrecked, and the remainder, driving up the Channel, were glad to put into any port. The soldiers, thus thrown on shore, were spread from the Land's End to Dover. Their haggard appearance, ragged clothing, and dirty accoutrements, things common enough in war, struck a people only used to the daintiness of parade, with surprise; the usual exaggerations of men just escaped from perils and distresses were increased by the uncertainty in which all were as to the fate of their comrades; a deadly fever, the result of anxiety and of the sudden change from fatigue to the confinement of a ship, filled the hospitals at every port with officers and soldiers, and thus the miserable state of Sir John Moore's army became the topic of every letter, and a theme for every country newspaper along the coast. The nation, at that time unused to great operations, forgot that war is not a harmless game, and judging of the loss positively, instead of comparatively, was thus disposed to believe the calumnies of interested men, who were eager to cast a shade over one of the brightest characters that ever adorned the country. Those calumnies triumphed for a moment, but Moore's last appeal to his country for justice will be successful. Posterity, revering and cherishing his name, will visit such of his odious calumniators as are not too contemptible to be remembered with a just and severe retribution; for thus it is that time freshens the beauty of virtue and withers the efforts of baseness; and if authority be sought for in a case where reason speaks so plainly, future historians will not fail to remark, that the man whose talents exacted the praises of Soult, of Wellington, and of Napoleon, could be no ordinary soldier.

"Sir John Moore," says the first, "took every advantage that the country afforded to oppose an active and vigorous resistance, and he finished by dying in a combat that must do credit to his memory."‡

Napoleon more than once affirmed, that if he committed a few trifling errors they were to be attributed to his peculiar situation, for that his talents and firmness alone had saved the English army from destruction.

"In Sir John Moore's campaign," said the Duke of Wellington, "I can see but one error; when he advanced to Sahagun he should have considered it as a movement of retreat, and sent officers to the rear to mark and prepare the

* Appendix, No. 26.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid, No. 16.

halting-places for every brigade ; but this opinion I have formed after long experience of war, and especially of the peculiarities of a Spanish war, which must have been seen to be understood ; finally, it is an opinion formed after the event."

BOOK V.

CHAPTER I.

THE effect produced in England by the unfortunate issue of Sir John Moore's campaign, was not proportionable to the importance of the subject. The people, trained to party politics, and possessing no real power to rebuke the folly of the cabinet, regarded disasters and triumphs with factious rather than with national feelings, and it was alike easy to draw the public attention from affairs of weight, and to fix it upon matters of little moment. In the beginning of 1809, the Duke of York's conduct being impeached, a parliamentary investigation followed ; and to drag the private frailties of that prince before the world, was thought essential to the welfare of the country, when the incapacity which had caused England and Spain to mourn in tears of blood was left unprobed. An insular people only, who are protected by their situation from the worst evils of war, may suffer themselves to be thus deluded ; but if an unfortunate campaign were to bring a devastating enemy into the heart of the country, the honour of a general, and the whole military policy of the cabinet, would no longer be considered as mere subjects for the exercise of a vile sophist's talents for misrepresentation.

It is true that the ill success of the British arms was a topic, upon which many orators in both houses of parliament expatiated with great eloquence, but the discussions were chiefly remarkable, as examples of acute debating without any knowledge of facts. The opposition speakers, eager to criminate the government, exaggerated the loss and distress of the retreat, and comprehending neither the movements nor the motives of Sir John Moore, urged several untenable accusations against their adversaries. The ministers, disunited by personal feelings, did not all adopt the same ground of defence. Lord Castlereagh and Lord Liverpool, passing over the errors of the cabinet by which the general had been left only a choice of difficulties, asserted, and truly, that the advantages derived from the advance to Sahagun more than compensated for the losses in the subsequent retreat. Both those statesmen paid an honourable tribute to the merits of the commander ; but Mr. Canning, unscrupulously resolute to screen Mr. Frere, assented to all the erroneous statements of the opposition, and endeavoured with malignant dexterity to convert them into charges against the fallen general. Sir John Moore was, he said, answerable for the events of the campaign ; whether the operations were glorious or distressful, whether to be admired or deplored, they were his own, for he had kept the ministers ignorant of his proceedings. Being pressed closely on that point by Mr. C. Hutchinson, Mr. Canning repeated this assertion. Not long afterwards, Sir John Moore's letters written, almost daily and furnishing exact and copious information of all that was passing in the Peninsula, were laid before the house.

The reverses experienced in Spain had somewhat damped the ardour of the English people ; but a cause so rightful in itself, was still popular, and a treaty having been concluded with the junta, by which the contracting powers bound themselves to make common cause against France, and to agree to no peace except by mutual consent, the ministers appeared resolute to support the contest. But while professing unbounded confidence in the result of the struggle, they

already looked upon the Peninsula as a secondary object ; for the preparations of Austria, and the reputation of the Archduke Charles, whose talents were foolishly said to exceed Napoleon's, had awakened the dormant spirit of coalitions. It was more agreeable to the aristocratic feelings of the English cabinet, that the French should be defeated by a monarch in Germany, than by a plebeian insurrection in Spain. The obscure intrigues carried on through the Princess of Tour and Taxis, and the secret societies of Germany emanating as they did from patrician sources, engaged all the attention of the ministers, and exciting their sympathy, nursed those distempered feelings, which led them to see weakness and disaffection in France, when, throughout that mighty empire, few desired and none dared openly to oppose the emperor's wishes, when even secret discontent was confined to some royalist chiefs and splenetic republicans, whose influence was never felt until after Napoleon had suffered the direst reverses.

Unable to conceive the extent of that monarch's views, and the grandeur of his genius, the ministers attributed the results of his profound calculations to a blind chance, his victories to treason, to corruption, to anything but that admirable skill, with which he wielded the most powerful military force that ever obeyed the orders of a single chief. And thus self-deluded, and misjudging the difficulties to be encountered, they adopted every idle project, and squandered their resources without any great or decided effort. While negotiating with the Spanish junta for the occupation of Cadiz, they were also planning an expedition against Sicily ; and while loudly asserting their resolution to defend Portugal, reserved their principal force for a blow against Holland ; their preparations for the last object being, however, carried on with a pomp and publicity little suitable to war. With what a mortal calamity that pageant closed, shall hereafter be noticed ; but at present it is fitting to describe the operations that took place in Spain, coincident with and subsequent to the retreat of Sir John Moore.

It has been already stated, that when the capital surrendered to the emperor, he refused to permit Joseph to return there, unless the public bodies and the heads of families would unite to demand his restoration, and swear, without any mental reservation, to be true to him. Registers had consequently been opened in the different quarters of the city, and 28,600 heads of families inscribed their names, and voluntarily swore, in presence of the host, that they were sincere in their desire to receive Joseph. After this, deputations from all the councils, from the junta of commerce and money, the hall of the Alcaldes, and from the corporation, waited on the emperor at Valladolid, and being there joined by the municipality of that town, and by deputies from Astorga, Leon, and other places, presented the oath, and prayed that Joseph might be king. Napoleon thus entreated, consented that his brother should return to Madrid, and reassume his kingly functions.

It would be idle to argue from this apparently voluntary submission to the French emperor, that a change favourable to the usurpation had been produced in the feelings of the Spanish people ; but it is evident that Napoleon's victories and policy had been so far effectual, that in the capital, and many other great towns, the multitude as well as the notables were, either from fear or conviction, submissive to his will ; and it is but reasonable to suppose, that if his conquests had not been interrupted by extraneous circumstances, this example would have been generally followed, in preference to the more glorious, but ineffectual, resistance made by the inhabitants of those cities, whose fortitude and whose calamities have forced from mankind a sorrowful admiration. The cause of Spain at this moment was in truth lost ; if any cause depending upon war, which is but a succession of violent and sudden changes, can be called so ; for her armies were dispersed, her government bewildered, and her people dismayed ; the cry of resistance had ceased, and in its stead the stern voice of Napoleon, answered by the tread of 300,000 French veterans, was heard throughout the

land. But the hostility of Austria having arrested the emperor's career in the Peninsula, the energy of the Spaniards revived at the abrupt cessation of his terrific warfare.

Joseph, escorted by his French guards, in number between 5000 and 6000, entered Madrid in state the 23rd of January. He was, however, a king without revenues, and he would have been without even the semblance of authority, if he had not been likewise nominated the emperor's lieutenant in Spain, by virtue of which title he was empowered to move the French army at his will. This power was one extremely unacceptable to the marshals, and he would have found it difficult to enforce it, even though he had restrained the exercise to the limits prescribed by his brother. But disdaining to separate the general from the monarch, he conveyed his orders to the French army, through his Spanish ministers, and the army in its turn disdained and resisted the assumed authority of men, who, despised for their want of military knowledge, were also suspected as favouring interests essentially differing from those of the troops.

The iron grasp that had compressed the pride and the ambitious jealousy of the marshals being thus relaxed, the passions that had ruined the patriots began to work among their enemies, producing indeed less fatal effects, because their scope was more circumscribed, but sufficiently pernicious to stop the course of conquest. The French army, no longer a compact body, terrible alike from its massive strength, and its flexible activity, became a collection of independent bands, each formidable in itself, but, from the disunion of the generals, slow to combine for any great object; and plainly discovering, by irregularities and insubordination, that they knew when a warrior and when a voluptuous monarch was at their head; but these evils were only felt at a later period; and the distribution of the troops, when Napoleon quitted Valladolid, still bore the impress of his genius.

The 1st corps was quartered in La Mancha.

The 2nd corps was destined to invade Portugal.

The 3rd and 5th corps carried on the siege of Zaragoza.

The 4th corps remained in the valley of the Tagus.

The 6th corps, wanting its third division, was appointed to hold Galicia.

The 7th corps continued always in Catalonia.

The imperial guards, directed on Vittoria, contributed to the security of the great communication with France until Zaragoza should fall, and were yet ready to march when wanted for the Austrian war.

General Dessolles, with the third division of the 6th corps, returned to Madrid. General Bonnet, with the fifth division of the 2nd corps, remained in the Montagna St. Andero.

General Lapisse, with the second division of the 1st corps, was sent to Salamanca, where he was joined by Maupetit's brigade of cavalry, which had crossed the Sierra de Bejar.

The reserve of heavy cavalry being broken up, was distributed, by divisions, in the following order :—

Latour Maubourg's joined the 1st corps. Lorge's and La Houssaye's were attached to the 2nd corps. Lassalle's was sent to the 4th corps. The 6th corps was reinforced with two brigades. Milhaud's division remained at Madrid, and Kellerman's guarded the lines of communication between Tudela, Burgos, and Palencia.

Thus, Madrid being still the centre of operations, the French were so distributed, that by a concentric movement on that capital, they could crush every insurrection within the circle of their positions; and the great masses, being kept upon the principal roads diverging from Madrid to the extremities of the Peninsula, intercepted all communication between the provinces; while the 2nd corps, thrust out, as it were, beyond the circumference, and destined, as the 4th corps had been, to sweep round from point to point, was sure of finding a supporting army, and a good line of retreat, at every great route leading from

Madrid to the yet unsubdued provinces of the Peninsula. The communication with France was, at the same time, secured by the fortresses of Burgos, Pampeluna, and St. Sebastian; and by the divisions posted at St. Ander, Burgos, Bilbao, and Vittoria; and it was supported by a reserve at Bayonne.

The northern provinces were parcelled out into military governments, the chiefs of which corresponded with each other; and, by the means of movable columns, repressed every petty insurrection. The 3rd and 5th corps, also, having their base at Pampeluna, and their line of operations directed against Zaragoza, served as an additional covering force to the communication with France, and were themselves exposed to no flank attacks, except from the side of Cuença, where the Duke of Infantado commanded; but that general was himself watched by the 1st corps.

All the lines of correspondence, not only from France but between the different corps, were maintained by fortified posts, having greater or lesser garrisons, according to their importance. Between Bayonne and Burgos there were 11 military stations. Between Burgos and Madrid, by the road of Aranda and Somosierra, there were eight; and 11 others protected the more circuitous route to the capital by Valladolid, Segovia, and the Guadarama. Between Valladolid and Zaragoza the line was secured by 15 intermediate points. The communication between Valladolid and St. Ander contained eight posts; and nine others connected the former town with Villa Franca del Bierzo, by the route of Benevente and Astorga; finally, two were established between Benevente and Leon.

At this period, the force of the army, exclusive of Joseph's French guards, was 324,411 men, about 39,000 being cavalry.*

Fifty-eight thousand men were in hospital.

The depôts, governments, garrisons, posts of correspondence, prisoners, and "battalions of march," composed of stragglers, absorbed about 25,000 men.

The remainder were under arms, with their regiments; and, consequently, more than 240,000 men were in the field: while the great line of communication with France was (and the military reader will do well to mark this, the key-stone of Napoleon's system) protected by above 50,000 men, whose positions were strengthened by three fortresses and 64 posts of correspondence, each more or less fortified.

Having thus shewn to the reader the military state of the French, I shall now proceed with the narrative of their operations; following a local rather than a chronological arrangement of events.

OPERATIONS IN ESTREMADURA AND LA MANCHA.

The defeat of Galluzzo has been incidentally touched upon before. The Duke of Dantzic having observed that the Spanish general, with 6000 raw levies, pretended to defend a line of 40 miles, made a feint of crossing the Tagus, at Arzobispo, and then suddenly descending to Almaraz, forced a passage over that bridge, on the 24th of December, killed and wounded many Spaniards, and captured four guns: and so complete was the dispersion, that for a long time after, not a man was to be found in arms throughout Estremadura. The French cavalry were at first placed on the tracks of the fugitives;† but intelligence of Sir John Moore's advance to Sahagun being received, the pursuit ceased at Merida,‡ and the 4th corps, which had left 830 men in garrison at Segovia, took post between Talavera and Placentia. The Duke of Dantzic was then recalled to France, and General Sebastiani succeeded to the command of the 4th corps. It was at this period that the 1st corps (of which the division of Lapisse only had followed the emperor to Astorga) moved against Toledo, and that town was occupied without opposition. The French outposts were then pushed towards Cuença on the one side, and towards the Sierra Morena on the other.

Meanwhile, the central junta, changing its first design, retired to Seville,

* Appendix, No. 1, section 1.

† Ibid, No. 2, sections 2 and 3.

‡ Ibid.

instead of Badajos; and being continually urged, both by Mr. Stuart and Mr. Frere, to make some effort to lighten the pressure on the English army, ordered Palafox and the Duke of Infantado to advance; the one from Zaragoza towards Tudela, the other from Cuença towards Madrid. The Marquis of Palacios, who had been removed from Catalonia, and was now at the head of 5000 or 6000 levies in the Sierra Morena, was also directed to advance into La Mancha; and Galluzzo, deprived of his command, was constituted a prisoner, along with Cuesta, Castaños, and a number of other culpable or unfortunate officers, who, vainly demanding a judgment on their cases, were dragged from place to place by the government.

Cuesta was, however, so popular in Estremadura, that the central junta, although fearing and detesting him, consented to his being placed at the head of Galluzzo's fugitives, part of whom had, when the pursuit ceased, rallied behind the Guadiana, and were now, with the aid of fresh levies, again taking the form, rather than the consistence, of an army. This appointment was an act of deplorable weakness and incapacity. The moral effect was to degrade the government by exposing its fears and weakness; and, in a military view, it was destructive, because Cuesta was physically and mentally incapable of command. Obstinate, jealous, and stricken in years, he was heedless of time and circumstances, of disposition and fitness. To punish with a barbarous severity, and to rush headlong into battle, constituted, in his mind, all the functions of a general.

The president, Florida Blanca, being 81 years of age, died at Seville, and the Marquis of Astorga succeeded him;* but the character of the junta was in no manner affected by the change. Some fleeting indications of vigour had been produced by the imminence of the danger during the flight from Aranjuez, but a large remittance of silver, from South America, having arrived at Cadiz, the attention of the members was so absorbed by this object, that the public weal was blotted from their remembrance,† and even Mr. Frere, ashamed of their conduct, appeared to acquiesce in the justness of Sir John Moore's estimate of the value of Spanish co-operation.‡

The number of men to be enrolled for the defence of the country had been early fixed at 500,000, but scarcely one-third had joined their colours; nevertheless, considerable bodies were assembling at different points, because the people, especially those of the southern provinces, although dismayed, were obedient, and the local authorities, at a distance from the actual scene of war, rigorously enforced the law of enrolment, and sent the recruits to the armies, hoping thereby either to stave the war off from their own districts, or to have the excuse of being without fighting men, to plead for quiet submission.

The fugitive troops also readily collected again at any given point, partly from patriotism, partly because the French were in possession of their native provinces, partly that they attributed their defeats to the treachery of their generals, and partly that, being deceived by the gross falsehoods and boasting of the government, they, with ready vanity, imagined that the enemy had invariably suffered enormous losses. In fine, for the reasons mentioned in the commencement of this history, men were to be had in abundance; but, beyond assembling them and appointing some incapable person to command, nothing was done for defence.

The officers who were not deceived had no confidence either in their own troops or in the government, nor were they themselves confided in or respected by their men. The latter were starved, were misused, ill-handled, and they possessed neither the compact strength of discipline nor the daring of enthusiasm. Under such a system, it was impossible that the peasantry could be rendered energetic soldiers; and they certainly were not active supporters of their country's cause; but, with a wonderful constancy, they suffered for it, enduring fatigue and sickness, nakedness and famine, with patience, and displaying, in

* Appendix, No. 31, section 2. † Ibid, No. 13. ‡ Ibid, No. 31, section 2.

all their actions and in all their sentiments, a distinct and powerful national character. This constancy and the iniquity of the usurpation hallowed their efforts in despite of their ferocity, and merits respect, though the vices and folly of the juntas and the leading men rendered the effect of those efforts nugatory.

Palacios, on the receipt of the orders above mentioned, advanced, with 5000 men, to Vilharta, in La Mancha, and the Duke of Infantado, anticipating the instructions of the junta, was already in motion from Cuença. His army, reinforced by the divisions of Cartoajal and Lilli and by fresh levies, was about 20,000 men, of which 2000 were cavalry. To check the incursions of the French horsemen, he had, a few days after the departure of Napoleon from Madrid, detached General Senra and General Venegas with 8000 infantry and all the horse to scour the country round Tarancon and Aranjuez; the former halted at Horcajada, and the latter endeavoured to cut off a French detachment, but was himself surprised and beaten by a very inferior force.

Marshal Victor, however, withdrew his advanced posts, and, concentrating Ruffin's and Villatte's divisions of infantry and Latour Maubourg's cavalry, at Villa de Alorna, in the vicinity of Toledo, left Venegas in possession of Tarancon. But, among the Spanish generals, mutual recriminations succeeded this failure: the Duke of Infantado possessed neither authority nor talents to repress their disputes, and in this untoward state of affairs receiving the orders of the junta, he immediately projected a movement on Toledo, intending to seize that place and Aranjuez, to break down the bridges, and to maintain the line of the Tagus.

Quitting Cuença on the 10th, he reached Horcajada on the 12th, with 10,000 men, the remainder of the army, commanded by Venegas, being near Tarancon.

The 13th, the duke having moved to Carascosa, a town somewhat in advance of Horcajada, met a crowd of fugitives, and heard, with equal surprise and consternation, that the corps under Venegas was already destroyed, and the pursuers close at hand.

ROUT OF UCLES.

It appeared that Victor, uneasy at the movements of the Spanish generals, but ignorant of their situation and intentions, had quitted Toledo also on the 10th, and marched to Ocaña, whereupon Venegas, falling back from Tarancon, took a position at Ucles. The 12th, the French continued to advance in two columns, of which the one, composed of Ruffin's division and a brigade of cavalry, lost its way, and arrived at Alcazar; but the other, commanded by Victor himself, and composed of Villatte's division, the remainder of the cavalry, and the parc of artillery, took the road of Ucles, and came upon the position of Venegas early in the morning of the 13th.

This meeting was unexpected by either party, but the French attacked without hesitation, and the Spaniards, flying towards Alcazar, fell in with Ruffin's division, and were totally discomfited. Several thousands laid down their arms, and many, dispersing, fled across the fields; some, however, keeping their ranks, made towards Ocaña, where, coming suddenly upon the French parc of artillery, they received a heavy discharge of grape-shot, and dispersed. Of the whole force, a small party only, under General Giron, succeeded in forcing its way by the road of Carascosa, and so reached the Duke of Infantado, who immediately retreated to Cuença, and without further loss, as the French cavalry were too fatigued to pursue briskly.

From Cuença the duke sent his artillery towards Valencia, by the road of Tortola; but himself, with the infantry and cavalry, marched by Chinchilla, and from thence to Tobarra, on the frontiers of Murcia.

At Tobarra he turned to his right, and made for Santa Cruz de Mudela, a town situated near the entrance to the defiles of the Sierra Morena. There he halted in the beginning of February, after a painful and circuitous retreat of more than 200 miles, in a bad season. But all his artillery had been captured

at Tortola, and his forces were, by desertion and straggling, reduced to a handful of discontented officers and a few thousand dispirited men, worn out with fatigue and misery.

Meanwhile, Victor, after scouring a part of the province of Cuenca and disposing of his prisoners, made a sudden march upon Vilharta, intending to surprise Palacios; but that officer, apprized of the retreat of Infantado, had already effected his junction with the latter at Santa Cruz de Mudela. Whereupon the French marshal recalling his troops, again occupied his former position at Toledo. The prisoners taken at Ucles were marched to Madrid, those who were weak and unable to walk were (according to Mr. Rocca) shot by the orders of Victor, because the Spaniards had hanged some French prisoners. If so, it was a barbarous and a shameful retaliation, unworthy of a soldier; for what justice or honour is there in revenging the death of one innocent person by the murder of another?

When Victor withdrew his posts the Duke of Infantado and Palacios proceeded to re-organize their forces under the name of the Carolina army. The levies from Grenada and other parts were ordered up, and the cavalry, commanded by the Duke of Alburquerque, endeavoured to surprise a French regiment of dragoons at Mora, but the latter getting together quickly, made a bold resistance and effected their retreat with scarcely any loss. Alburquerque having failed in this attempt retired to Consuegra, and was attacked the next day by superior numbers, but retired fighting and got safely off. The Duke of Infantado was now displaced, and the junta conferred the command on General Urbina Conde de Cartaojal, who applied himself to restore discipline, and after a time finding no enemy in front advanced to Ciudad Real, and taking post on the left bank of the Upper Guadiana opened a communication with Cuesta. At this period the latter's force amounted to 16,000 men, of which 3000 were cavalry; for, as the Spaniards generally suffered more in their flights than in their battles, the horsemen escaped with little damage and were easily rallied again in greater relative numbers than the infantry.

The 4th corps having withdrawn, as I have already related, to the right bank of the Tagus, Cuesta advanced from the Guadiana and occupied the left bank of that river, on a line extending from the mountains in front of Arzobispo to the Puerto de Mirabeté. The French, by fortifying an old tower, held the command of the bridge of Arzobispo, but Cuesta immediately broke down that of Almaraz, a magnificent structure, the centre arch of which was more than 150 feet in height.

In these positions the troops on either side remained tranquil both in La Mancha and Estremadura, and so ended the exertions made to lighten the pressure upon the English army. Two French divisions of infantry and as many brigades of cavalry had more than sufficed to baffle them, and hence the imminent danger that menaced the south of Spain, when Sir John Moore's vigorous operations drew the emperor's forces to the north, may be justly estimated.

CHAPTER II.

CONTINUATION OF THE OPERATIONS IN ARAGON.

FROM the field of battle at Tudela, all the fugitives of O'Neil's, and a great part of those from Castaños's army, fled to Zaragoza, and with such speed as to bring the first news of their own disaster. With the troops, also, came an immense number of carriages and the military chests, for the roads were wide and excellent and the pursuit was slack.

The citizens and the neighbouring peasantry were astounded at this quick and unexpected calamity. They had, with a natural credulity, relied on the vain and boasting promises of their chiefs, and being necessarily ignorant of the true state of affairs never doubted that their vengeance would be sated by a

speedy and complete destruction of the French. When their hopes were thus suddenly blasted ; when they beheld troops, from whom they expected nothing but victory, come pouring into the town with all the tumult of panic ; when the peasants of all the villages through which the fugitives passed, came rushing into the city along with the scared multitude of flying soldiers and camp followers ; every heart was filled with consternation, and the date of Zaragoza's glory would have ended with the first siege, if the success at Tudela had been followed up by the French with that celerity and vigour which the occasion required.

Napoleon, foreseeing that this moment of confusion and terror would arrive, had with his usual prudence provided the means and given directions for such an instantaneous and powerful attack as would inevitably have overthrown the bulwark of the eastern provinces.* But the sickness of Marshal Lannes, the difficulty of communication, the consequent false movements of Moncey and Ney, in fine, the intervention of fortune, omnipotent as she is in war, baffled the emperor's long-sighted calculations, and permitted the leaders in the city to introduce order among the multitude, to complete the defensive works, to provide stores, and finally, by a ferocious exercise of power, to insure implicit obedience to their minutest orders. The danger of resisting the enemy appeared light, when a suspicious word or even a discontented gesture was instantaneously punished by a cruel death.

The 3rd corps having thus missed the favourable moment for a sudden assault, and being reduced by sickness, by losses in battle, and by detachments to 17,400 men, including the engineers and artillery, was too weak to invest the city in form, and therefore remained in observation on the Xalon river. Meanwhile, a battering train of 60 guns, with well-furnished parcs, which had been by Napoleon's orders previously collected in Pampeluna, was dragged by cattle to Tudela and embarked upon the canal leading to Zaragoza.

Marshal Mortier, with the 5th corps, was also directed to assist in the siege, and he was in march to join Moncey, when his progress also was arrested by Sir John Moore's advance towards Burgos. But the utmost scope of that general's operation being soon determined by Napoleon's counter-movement, Mortier resumed his march to reinforce Moncey, and, on the 20th of December, their united corps, forming an army of 35,000 men of all arms, advanced against Zaragoza. At this time, however, confidence had been restored in that town, and all the preparations necessary for a vigorous defence were completed.

The nature of the plain in which Zaragoza is situated, the course of the rivers, the peculiar construction of the houses, and the multitude of convents have been already described, but the difficulties to be encountered by the French troops were no longer the same as in the first siege. At that time but little assistance had been derived from science, but now, instructed by experience, and inspired as it were by the greatness of their resolution, neither the rules of art nor the resources of genius were neglected by the defenders.

Zaragoza offered four irregular fronts, of which the first, reckoning from the right of the town, extended from the Ebro to a convent of barefooted Carmelites, and was about 300 yards wide.

The second, 1200 yards in extent, reached from the Carmelites to a bridge over the Huerba.

The third, likewise of 1200 yards, stretched from this bridge to an oil manufactory built beyond the walls.

The fourth, being on an opening of 400 yards, reached from the oil manufactory to the Ebro.

The first front, fortified by an ancient wall and flanked by the guns on the Carmelites, was strengthened by some new batteries and ramparts, and by the castle of Aljaferia, commonly called the Castle of the Inquisition, which stood a little in advance. This was a fort of a square form, having a bastion

and tower at each corner, and a good stone ditch, and it was connected with the body of the place by certain walls loop-holed for musketry.

The second front was defended by a double wall, the exterior one being of recent erection, faced with sun-dried bricks, and covered by a ditch with perpendicular sides 15 feet deep and 20 feet asunder. The flanks of this front were derived from the convent of the Carmelites, from a large circular battery standing in the centre of the line, from a fortified convent of the Capuchins, called the Trinity, and from some earth works protecting the head of the bridge over the Huerba.

The third front was covered by the river Huerba, the deep bed of which was close to the foot of the ramparts. Behind this stream a double entrenchment was carried from the bridge-head to the large projecting convent of Santa Engracia, a distance of 200 yards. Santa Engracia itself was very strongly fortified and armed; and, from thence to the oil manufactory, the line of defence was prolonged by an ancient Moorish wall, on which several terraced batteries were raised, to sweep all the space between the rampart and the Huerba. These batteries, and the guns in the convent of Santa Engracia, likewise overlooked some works raised to protect a second bridge that crossed the river, about cannon-shot below the first.

Upon the right bank of the Huerba, and a little below the second bridge, stood the convent of San Joseph, the walls of which had been strengthened and protected by a deep ditch with a covered way and pallisade. It was well placed to impede the enemy's approaches, and to facilitate sorties on the right bank of the river; and it was, as I have said, open, in the rear, to the fire of the works at the second bridge, and both were again overlooked by the terraced batteries, and by the guns of Santa Engracia.

The fourth front was protected by the Huerba, by the continuation of the old city wall, by new batteries and entrenchments, and by several armed convents and large houses.

Beyond the walls the Monte Torrero, which commanded all the plain of Zaragoza, was crowned by a large, ill-constructed fort, raised at the distance of 1800 yards from the convent of San Joseph. This work was covered by the royal canal, the sluices of which were defended by some field-works, open to the fire of the fort itself.

On the left bank of the Ebro the suburb, built in a low marshy plain, was protected by a chain of redoubts and fortified houses. Finally, some gunboats, manned by seamen from the naval arsenal of Carthagen, completed the circuit of defence. The artillery of the place was, however, of too small a calibre. There were only 60 guns carrying more than 12-pound balls; and there were but eight large mortars. There was, however, no want of small arms, many of which were English, that had been supplied by Colonel Doyle.

These were the regular external defences of Zaragoza, most of which were constructed at the time, according to the skill and means of the engineers; but the experience of the former siege had taught the people not to trust to the ordinary resources of art, and, with equal genius and resolution, they had prepared an internal system of defence infinitely more efficacious.

It has been already observed that the houses of Zaragoza were fire-proof, and, generally, of only two stories, and that, in all the quarters of the city, the numerous massive convents and churches rose like castles above the low buildings, and that the greater streets, running into the Broadway called the Cosso, divided the town into a variety of districts, unequal in size, but each containing one or more large structures. Now, the citizens, sacrificing all personal convenience, and resigning all idea of private property, gave up their goods, their bodies, and their houses to the war, and being promiscuously mingled with the peasantry and the regular soldiers, the whole formed one mighty garrison, well suited to the vast fortress into which Zaragoza was transformed: for the doors and windows of the houses were built up, and their fronts loop-holed; internal

communications were broken through the party-walls, and the streets were trenched and crossed by earthen ramparts, mounted with cannon, and every strong building was turned into a separate fortification. There was no weak point, because there could be none in a town which was all fortress, and where the space covered by the city was the measurement for the thickness of the ramparts : nor in this emergency were the leaders unmindful of moral force.

The people were cheered by a constant reference to the former successful resistance ; their confidence was raised by the contemplation of the vast works that had been executed ; and it was recalled to their recollection that the wet, usual at that season of the year, would spread disease among the enemy's ranks, and would impair, if not entirely frustrate, his efforts. Neither was the aid of superstition neglected : processions imposed upon the sight, false miracles bewildered the imagination, and terrible denunciations of the divine wrath shook the minds of men, whose former habits and present situation rendered them peculiarly susceptible of such impressions. Finally, the leaders were themselves so prompt and terrible in their punishments that the greatest cowards were likely to show the boldest bearing in their wish to escape suspicion.

To avoid the danger of any great explosion, the powder was made as occasion required ; and this was the more easily effected because Zaragoza contained a royal depôt and refinery for saltpetre, and there were powder-mills in the neighbourhood, which furnished workmen familiar with the process of manufacturing that article. The houses and trees beyond the walls were all demolished and cut down, and the materials carried into the town. The public magazines contained six months' provisions ; the convents were well stocked, and the inhabitants had, likewise, laid up their own stores for several months. General Doyle also sent a convoy into the town from the side of Catalonia, and there was abundance of money, because, in addition to the resources of the town, the military chest of Castaños's army, which had been supplied only the night before the battle of Tudela, was, in the flight, carried to Zaragoza.

Companies of women, enrolled to attend the hospitals and to carry provisions and ammunition to the combatants, were commanded by the Countess of Burita, a lady of an heroic disposition, who is said to have displayed the greatest intelligence and the noblest character during both sieges. There were 13 engineer officers, and 800 sappers and miners, composed of excavators formerly employed on the canal, and there were from 1500 to 2000 cannoneers.

The regular troops that fled from Tudela, being joined by two small divisions, which retreated, at the same time, from Sanguessa and Caparosa, formed a garrison of 30,000 men, and, together with the inhabitants and peasantry, presented a mass of 50,000 combatants, who, with passions excited almost to frenzy, awaited an assault amidst those mighty entrenchments, where each man's home was a fortress and his family a garrison. To besiege, with only 35,000 men, a city so prepared was truly a gigantic undertaking.

SECOND SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA.

The 20th of December, the two marshals, Moncey and Mortier, having established their hospitals and magazines at Alagon on the Xalon, advanced in three columns against Zaragoza.

The first, composed of the infantry of the 3rd corps, marched by the right bank of the canal.

The second, composed of General Suchet's division of the 5th corps, marched between the canal and the Ebro.

The third, composed of General Gazan's division of infantry, crossed the Ebro opposite to Tauste, and from thence made an oblique march to the Gallego river.

The right and centre columns arrived in front of the town that evening. The latter, after driving back the Spanish advanced guards, halted at a distance of a league from the Capuchin convent of the Trinity ; the former took post on both sides of the Huerba, and, having seized the aqueduct by which the canal

is carried over that river, proceeded, in pursuance of Napoleon's orders, to raise batteries, and to make dispositions for an immediate assault on Monte Torrero. Meanwhile General Gazan, with the left column, marching by Cartejon and Zuera reached Villa Nueva, on the Gallego river, without encountering an enemy.

The Monte Torrero was defended by 5000 Spaniards, under the command of General St. Marc; but, at daybreak on the 21st, the French opened their fire against the fort, and one column of infantry having attracted the attention of the Spaniards, a second, unseen, crossed the canal under the aqueduct, and, penetrating between the fort and the city, entered the former by the rear, and, at the same time, a third column stormed the works protecting the great sluices. These sudden attacks, and the loss of the fort, threw the Spaniards into confusion, and they hastily retired to the town, which so enraged the plebeian leaders that the life of St. Marc was with difficulty saved by Palafox.

It had been concerted among the French that General Gazan should assault the suburb, simultaneously with the attack on the Torrero; and that officer, having encountered a body of Spanish and Swiss troops placed somewhat in advance, drove the former back so quickly that the Swiss, unable to make good their retreat, were, to the number of 300 or 400, killed or taken. But, notwithstanding this fortunate commencement, Gazan did not attack the suburb itself until after the affair at Monte Torrero was over, and then only upon a single point, and without any previous examination of the works. The Spaniards, recovering from their first alarm, soon reinforced this point, and Gazan was forced to desist, with the loss of 400 men. This important failure more than balanced the success against the Monte Torrero. It restored the shaken confidence of the Spaniards at a most critical moment, and checking in the French, at the outset, that impetuous spirit, that impulse of victory, which great generals so carefully watch and improve, threw them back upon the tedious and chilling process of the engineer.

The 24th of December the investment of Zaragoza was completed on both sides of the Ebro. General Gazan occupied the bridge over the Gallego with his left, and covered his front from sorties by inundations and cuts that the low, marshy plan where he was posted enabled him to make without difficulty.

General Suchet occupied the space between the Upper Ebro and the Huerba.

Morlot's division of the 3rd corps encamped in the broken hollow that formed the bed of that stream.

General Meusnier's division crowned the Monte Torrero, and General Grandjean continuing the circuit to the Lower Ebro, communicated with Gazan's posts on the other side. Several Spanish detachments that had been sent out to forage were thus cut off, and could never re-enter the town; and a bridge of boats being constructed on the Upper Ebro completed the circle of investment, and insured a free intercourse between the different quarters of the army.

General La Coste, an engineer of reputation, and aide-de-camp to the emperor, directed the siege. His plan was, that one false and two real attacks should be conducted by regular approaches on the right bank of the Ebro, and he still hoped to take the suburb by a sudden assault. The trenches being opened on the night of the 29th of December, the 30th the place was summoned, and the terms dictated by Napoleon when he was at Aranda de Duero, were offered. The example of Madrid was also cited to induce a surrender. Palafox replied, that—If Madrid had surrendered, Madrid had been sold: Zaragoza would neither be sold nor surrender! On the receipt of this haughty answer the attacks were commenced; the right being directed against the convent of San Joseph; the centre against the upper bridge over the Huerba; the left, which was the false one, against the castle of Aljaferia.

The 31st, Palafox made sorties against all the three attacks. From the right and centre he was beaten back with loss, and he was likewise repulsed on the left at the trenches; but some of his cavalry gliding between the French

parallel and the Ebro surprised and cut down a post of infantry stationed behind some ditches that intersected the low ground on the bank of that river. This trifling success exalted the enthusiasm of the besieged, and Palafox gratified his personal vanity by boasting proclamations and orders of the day, some of which bore the marks of genius, but the greater part were ridiculous.

The 1st of January, the second parallels of the two attacks were commenced. The next day Palafox caused the attention of the besiegers to be occupied on the right bank of the Ebro, by slight skirmishes, while he made a serious attack from the side of the suburb on General Gazan's lines of contrevallation. This sally was repulsed with loss, but, on the right bank, the Spaniards obtained some success.

Marshal Moncey being called to Madrid, Junot assumed the command of the 3rd corps, and, about the same time, Marshal Mortier was directed to take post at Balatayud, with Suchet's division of the 5th corps, for the purpose of securing the communication with Madrid. The gap in the circle of investment left by this draft of 8000 men, being but scantily stopped by extending General Morlot's division, a line of contrevallation was constructed at that part to supply the place of numbers.

The besieged, hoping and expecting each day that the usual falls of rain taking place would render the besiegers' situation intolerable, continued their fire briskly, and worked counter-approaches on to the right of the French attacks: but the season was unusually dry, and a thick fog rising each morning covered the besiegers' advances and protected their workmen, both from the fire and from the sorties of the Spaniards.

The 10th of January, 32 pieces of French artillery being mounted and provisioned, the convent of San Joseph and the head of the bridge over the Huerba, were battered in breach, and, at the same time, the town was bombarded. San Joseph was so much injured by this fire that the Spaniards, resolving to evacuate it, withdrew their guns. Nevertheless, 200 of their men made a vigorous sortie at midnight, and were upon the point of entering one of the French batteries, when they were taken in flank by two guns loaded with grape, and were, finally, driven back, with loss of half their number.

The 11th, the besiegers' batteries continued to play on San Joseph with such success that the breach became practicable, and, at four o'clock in the evening, some companies of infantry, with two field-pieces, attacked by the right, and a column was kept in readiness to assail the front, when this attack should have shaken the defence. Two other companies of chosen men were directed to search for an entrance by the rear, between the fort and the river.

The defences of the convent were reduced to a ditch 18 feet deep, and a covered way which, falling back by both flanks to the Huerba, was then extended along the banks of that river for some distance. A considerable number of men still occupied this covered way: but, when the French field-pieces on the right raked it with a fire of grape, the Spaniards were thrown into confusion, and crossing the bed of the river took shelter in the town. At that moment the front of the convent was assaulted; but, while the depth of the ditch and the Spanish fire checked the impetuosity of the assailants at that point, the chosen companies passed round the works, and finding a small bridge over the ditch crossed it, and entered the convent by the rear. The front was carried by escalade, almost at the same moment, and the few hundred Spaniards that remained were killed or made prisoners.

The French, who had suffered but little in this assault, immediately lodged themselves in the convent, raised a rampart along the edge of the Huerba, and commenced batteries against the body of the place and against the works at the head of the upper bridge, from whence, as well as from the town, they were incommoded by the fire that played into the convent.

The 15th, the bridge-head, in front of Santa Engracia, was carried with the loss of only three men; but the Spaniards cut the bridge itself, and sprung a

mine under the works; the explosion, however, occasioned no mischief, and the third parallels being soon completed, and the trenches of the two attacks united, the defences of the besieged were thus confined to the town itself. They could no longer make sallies on the right bank of the Huerba without overcoming the greatest difficulties. The passage of the Huerba was then effected by the French, and breaching and counter-batteries, mounting 50 pieces of artillery, were constructed against the body of the place. The fire of these guns played also upon the bridge over the Ebro, and interrupted the communication between the suburb and the town.

Unshaken by this aspect of affairs, the Spanish leaders, with great readiness of mind, immediately forged intelligence of the defeat of the emperor, and, with the sound of music, and amidst the shouts of the populace, proclaimed the names of the marshals who had been killed; asserting, also, that Palafox's brother, the Marquis of Lazan, was already wasting France. This intelligence, extravagant as it was, met with implicit credence, for such was the disposition of the Spaniards throughout this war, that the imaginations of the chiefs were taxed to produce absurdities proportionable to the credulity of their followers; hence the boasting of the leaders and the confidence of the besieged augmented as the danger increased, and their anticipations of victory seemed realized when the night-fires of a succouring force were discerned blazing on the hills behind Gazan's troops.

The difficulties of the French were indeed fast increasing, for while enclosing Zaragoza they were themselves encircled by insurrections, and their supplies so straitened that famine was felt in their camp. Disputes amongst the generals also diminished the vigour of the operations, and the bonds of discipline being relaxed, the military ardour of the troops naturally became depressed. The soldiers reasoned openly upon the chances of success, which, in times of danger, is only one degree removed from mutiny.

The nature of the country about Zaragoza was exceedingly favourable to the Spaniards. The town, although situated in a plain, was surrounded, at the distance of some miles, by strong and high mountains, and, to the south, the fortresses of Mequinenza and Lerida afforded a double base of operations for any forces that might come from Catalonia and Valencia. The besiegers drew all their supplies from Pampeluna, and consequently their long line of operations, running through Alagon, Tudela, and Caparosa, was difficult to defend from the insurgents, who, being gathered in considerable numbers in the Sierra de Muela and on the side of Epila, threatened Alagon, while others, descending from the mountain of Soria, menaced the important point of Tudela.

The Marquis of Lazan, anxious to assist his brother, had drafted 5000 men from the Catalanian army, and taking post in the Sierra de Liciñena, or Alcubierre, on the left of the Ebro, drew together all the armed peasantry of the valleys as high as Sanguessa, and extending his line from Villa Franca on the Ebro to Zuera on the Gallego, hemmed in the division of Gazan, and even sent detachments as far as Caparosa to harass the French convoys coming from Pampeluna.

To maintain their communications and to procure provisions the besiegers had placed between 2000 or 3000 men in Tudela, Caparosa, and Tafalla, and some hundreds in Alagon and at Montalbarra. Between the latter town and the investing army 650 cavalry were stationed: a like number were posted at Santa Fé, to watch the openings of the Sierra de Muela, and 1600 cavalry with 1200 infantry, under the command of General Wathier, were pushed towards the south as far as Fuentes. Wathier, falling suddenly upon an assemblage of 4000 or 5000 insurgents that had taken post at Belchite, broke and dispersed them, and then pursuing his victory took the town of Alcanitz, and established himself there in observation for the rest of the siege. But Lazan still maintained himself in the Alcubierre.

In this state of affairs Marshal Lannes, having recovered from his long

sickness, arrived before Zaragoza, and took the supreme command of both corps on the 22nd of January. The influence of his firm and vigorous character was immediately perceptible; he recalled Suchet's division from Calatayud, where it had been lingering without necessity, and, sending it across the Ebro, ordered Mortier to attack Lazan. At the same time a smaller detachment was directed against the insurgents in Zuera, and, meanwhile, Lannes repressing all disputes, restored discipline in the army, and pressed the siege with infinite resolution.

The detachment sent to Zuera defeated the insurgents and took possession of that place and of the bridge over the Gallego. Mortier encountered the Spanish advanced guard at Perdeguera, and pushed it back to Nuestra Señora de Vagallar, where the main body, several thousand strong, was posted. After a short resistance, the whole fled, and the French cavalry took four guns; Mortier then spreading his troops in a half circle, extending from Huesca to Pina on the Ebro, awed all the country lying between those places and Zaragoza, and prevented any further insurrections.

A few days before the arrival of Marshal Lannes, the besieged being exceedingly galled by the fire from a mortar-battery, situated at some distance behind the second parallel of the central attack, 80 volunteers, under the command of Don Mariano Galindo, endeavoured to silence it. They surprised and bayoneted the guard in the nearest trenches, and passing on briskly to the battery, entered it, and were proceeding to spike the artillery, when unfortunately the reserve of the French arrived, and, the alarm being given, the guards of the first trenches also assembled in the rear of this gallant band, intercepting all retreat. Thus surrounded, Galindo, fighting bravely, was wounded and taken, and the greatest part of his comrades perished with as much honour as simple soldiers can attain.

The armed vessels in the river now made an attempt to flank the works raised against the castle of Aljaferia, but the French batteries forced them to drop down the stream again; and between the nights of the 21st and the 26th of January the besiegers' works being carried across the Huerba, the third parallels of the real attacks were completed. The oil manufactory and some other advantageous posts, on the left bank of the above-named river, were also taken possession of and included in the works, and at the false attack a second parallel was commenced at the distance of 150 yards from the castle of Aljaferia; but these advantages were not obtained without loss. The Spaniards made sallies, in one of which they spiked two guns and burnt a French post on the right.

The besiegers' batteries had, however, broken the wall of the town in several places. Two practicable breaches were made nearly fronting the convent of San Joseph; a third was commenced in the convent of Saint Augustin, facing the oil manufactory. The convent of San Engracia was laid completely open to an assault; and, on the 29th, at 12 o'clock, the whole army being under arms, four chosen columns rushed out of the trenches, and burst upon the ruined works of Zaragoza.

On the right, the assailants twice stormed an isolated stone house that defended the breach of Saint Augustin, and twice they were repulsed, and finally driven back with loss.

In the centre the attacking column, regardless of two small mines that exploded at the foot of the walls, carried the breach fronting the oil manufactory, and then endeavoured to break into the town; but the Spaniards re-trenched within the place, opened such a fire of grape and musketry that the French were content to establish themselves on the summit of the breach, and to connect their lodgment with the trenches by new works.

The third column was more successful; the breach was carried, and the neighbouring houses also, as far as the first large cross street; beyond that, the assailants could not penetrate, but they were enabled to establish themselves

within the walls of the town, and immediately brought forward their trenches, so as to comprehend this lodgment within their works.

The assault of the fourth column, which was directed against San Engracia, was made with such rapidity and vigour that the Polish regiment of the Vistula not only carried that convent itself, but the one adjoining to it; and the victorious troops, unchecked by the fire from the houses, and undaunted by the simultaneous explosion of six small mines planted in their path, swept the ramparts to the left as far as the bridge over the Huerba; and, at that moment, the guards of the trenches, excited by the success of their comrades, broke forth, without orders, mounted the walls, pushed along the ramparts to the left, bayoneted the artillerymen at their guns in the Capuchin convent, and, continuing their career, endeavoured some to reach the semicircular battery and the Misericordia, and others to break into the town.

This wild assault was soon checked by grape from two guns planted behind a traverse on the ramparts, and by a murderous fire from the houses. As their ranks were thinned, the ardour of the French sunk, and the courage of their adversaries increased. The former were, after a little, driven back upon the Capuchins; and the Spaniards were already breaking into that convent in pursuit, when two battalions, detached by General Morlot from the trenches of the false attack, arrived, and secured possession of that point, which was moreover untenable by the Spaniards, inasmuch as the guns of the convent of Santa Engracia saw it in reverse. The French took, on this day, more than 600 men. But General La Coste immediately abandoned the false attack against the castle, fortified the Capuchin convent and a house situated at an angle of the wall abutting upon the bridge over the Huerba, and then joining them by works to his trenches, the ramparts of the town became the front line of the French.

The walls of Zaragoza thus went to the ground, but Zaragoza herself remained erect; and, as the broken girdle fell from the heroic city, the besiegers started at the view of her naked strength. The regular defences had, indeed, crumbled before the skill of the assailants; but the popular resistance was immediately called, with all its terrors, into action; and, as if Fortune had resolved to mark the exact moment when the ordinary calculations of science should cease, the chief engineers on both sides were simultaneously slain. The French general, La Coste, a young man, intrepid, skilful, and endowed with genius, perished like a brave soldier; but the Spanish colonel, San Genis, died not only with the honour of a soldier, but the glory of a patriot; falling in the noblest cause, his blood stained the ramparts which he had himself raised for the protection of his native place.

CHAPTER III.

THE war being now carried into the streets of Zaragoza; the sound of the alarm-bell was heard over all the quarters of the city; and the people, assembling in crowds, filled the houses nearest to the lodgments made by the French. Additional traverses and barricades were constructed across the principal streets; mines were prepared in the more open spaces; and the communications from house to house were multiplied, until they formed a vast labyrinth, of which the intricate windings were only to be traced by the weapons and the dead bodies of the defenders. The members of the junta, become more powerful from the cessation of regular warfare, with redoubled activity and energy urged the defence, but increased the horrors of the siege by a ferocity pushed to the very verge of frenzy. Every person, without regard to rank or age, who excited the suspicions of these furious men, or of those immediately about them, was instantly put to death; and amidst the noble bulwarks of war, a horrid array of gibbets was to be seen, on which crowds of wretches were suspended each night, because their courage had sunk beneath the accumu-

lating dangers of their situation, or because some doubtful expression or gesture of distress had been misconstrued by their barbarous chiefs.

From the heights of the walls which he had conquered, Marshal Lannes contemplated this terrific scene ; and, judging that men so passionate, and so prepared, could not be prudently encountered in open battle, he resolved to proceed by the slow but certain process of the mattock and the mine : and this was also in unison with the emperor's instructions. Hence from the 29th of January to the 2nd of February, the efforts of the French were directed to the enlargement of their lodgments on the walls ; and they succeeded, after much severe fighting and several explosions, in working forward through the nearest houses ; but, at the same time, they had to sustain many counter-assaults from the Spaniards ; especially one, exceedingly fierce, made by a friar on the Capuchins' convent of the Trinity.

It has been already observed that the crossing of the large streets divided the town into certain small districts, or islands of houses. To gain possession of these, it was necessary not only to mine but to fight for each house. To cross the large intersecting streets, it was indispensable to construct traverses above or to work by underground galleries ; because a battery raked each street, and each house was defended by a garrison that, generally speaking, had only the option of repelling the enemy in front or dying on the gibbet erected behind. But, as long as the convents and churches remained in possession of the Spaniards, the progress of the French among the islands of small houses was of little advantage to them, because the large garrisons in the greater buildings enabled the defenders not only to make continual and successful sallies, but also to countermine their enemies, whose superior skill in that kind of warfare was often frustrated by the numbers and persevering energy of the besieged.

To overcome these obstacles the breaching batteries opposite the fourth front fired upon the convents of Saint Augustine and Saint Monica, and the latter was assaulted on the 31st of January. At the same time a part of the wall in another direction being thrown down by a petard, a body of the besiegers poured in, and, taking the main breach in rear, cleared not only the convent but several houses around it. The Spaniards undismayed immediately opened a gallery from Saint Augustin and worked a mine under Saint Monica, but at the moment of its being charged the French discovered and stifled the miners.

The 1st of February the breach in Saint Augustin, also, became practicable, and the attention of the besieged being drawn to that side, the French sprung a mine which they had carried under the wall from the side of Saint Monica and immediately entered by the opening. The Spaniards, thus unexpectedly taken in the rear, were thrown into confusion and driven out with little difficulty. They, however, rallied in a few hours after and attempted to retake the structure, but without success, and the besiegers animated by this advantage broke into the neighbouring houses and, at one push, carried so many as to arrive at the point where the street called the Quemada joined the Cosso, or public walk. The besieged rallied, however, at the last house of the Quemada, and renewed the combat with so much fury that the French were beaten from the greatest part of the houses they had taken, and suffered a loss of above 100 men.

On the side of San Engracia a contest still more severe took place ; the houses in the vicinity were blown up, but the Spaniards fought so obstinately for the ruins that the Polish troops were scarcely able to make good their lodgment—although two successive and powerful explosions had, with the buildings, destroyed a number of the defenders.

The experience of these attacks induced a change in the mode of fighting on both sides. Hitherto the play of the French mines had reduced the houses to ruins, and thus the soldiers were exposed completely to the fire from the next Spanish posts. The engineers, therefore, diminished the quantity of powder that the interior only might fall and the outward walls stand, and this method

was found successful. Hereupon the Spaniards, with ready ingenuity, saturated the timbers and planks of the houses with rosin and pitch, and setting fire to those which could no longer be maintained, interposing a burning barrier which often delayed the assailants for two days, and always prevented them from pushing their successes during the confusion that necessarily followed the bursting of the mines. The fighting was, however, incessant; a constant bombardment, the explosion of mines, the crash of falling buildings, clamorous shouts, and the continued echo of musketry deafened the ear, while volumes of smoke and dust clouded the atmosphere and lowered continually over the heads of the combatants, as hour by hour, the French with a terrible perseverance pushed forward their approaches to the heart of the miserable but glorious city.

Their efforts were chiefly directed against two points, namely, that of San Engracia, which may be denominated the left attack, and that of Saint Augustin and Saint Monica, which constituted the right attack. At San Engracia they laboured on a line perpendicular to the Cosso, from which they were only separated by the large convent of the Daughters of Jerusalem, and by the hospital for madmen, which was entrenched, although in ruins since the first siege. The line of this attack was protected on the left by the convent of the Capuchins, which La Coste had fortified to repel the counter-assaults of the Spaniards. The right attack was more diffused, because the localities presented less prominent features to determine the direction of the approaches; and the French having mounted a number of light six-inch mortars, on peculiar carriages, drew them from street to street, and house to house, as occasion offered. On the other hand, the Spaniards continually plied their enemies with hand grenades, which seem to have produced a surprising effect, and in this manner the never-ceasing combat was prolonged until the 7th of February, when the besiegers, by dint of alternate mines and assaults, had worked their perilous way at either attack to the Cosso, but not without several changes of fortune and considerable loss. They were, however, unable to obtain a footing on that public walk, for the Spaniards still disputed every house with undiminished resolution.

Meanwhile, Lannes having caused trenches to be opened on the left bank of the Ebro, a battery of 20 guns played against an isolated structure called the Convent of Jesus, which covered the right of the suburb line. On the 7th of February this convent was carried by storm, and with so little difficulty that the French, supposing the Spaniards to be panic-stricken, assailed the suburb itself, but were quickly driven back with loss; they, however, made good their lodgment in the convent.

On the town side the 8th, 9th, and 10th were wasted by the besiegers in vain attempts to pass the Cosso; they then extended their flanks—on the right with a view to reach the quay, and so connect this attack with that against the suburb, and on the left to obtain possession of the large and strongly built convent of Saint Francisco, in which, after exploding an immense mine and making two assaults, they finally established themselves.

The 11th and 12th, mines were worked under the university, a large building on the Spanish side of the Cosso, in the line of the right attack; but their play was insufficient to open the walls, and the storming party was beaten, with the loss of 50 men. Nevertheless, the besiegers continuing their labours during the 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th, passed the Cosso by means of traverses, and prepared fresh mines under the university, but deferred their explosion until a simultaneous effort could be combined on the side of the suburb.

At the left attack also, a number of houses bordering on the Cosso being gained, a battery was established that raked that great thoroughfare above ground, while under it six galleries were carried, and six mines loaded to explode at the same moment; but the spirit of the French army was now exhausted; they had laboured and fought without intermission for 50 days; they had crumbled the walls with their bullets, burst the convents with their

mines, and carried the breaches with their bayonets,—fighting above and beneath the surface of the earth, they had spared neither fire nor the sword, their bravest men were falling in the obscurity of a subterranean warfare; famine pinched them, and Zaragoza was still unconquered!

"Before this siege," they exclaimed, "was it ever heard of, that 20,000 men should besiege 50,000?" Scarcely a fourth of the town was won, and they, themselves, were already exhausted. "We must wait," they said, "for reinforcements or we shall all perish among their cursed ruins, which will become our own tombs, before we can force the last of these fanatics from the last of their dens."

Marshal Lannes, unshaken by these murmurs and obstinate to conquer, endeavoured to raise the soldiers' hopes. He pointed out to them that the losses of the besieged so far exceeded their own, that the Spaniards' strength would soon be wasted and their courage must sink, and that the fierceness of their defence was already abated,—but if contrary to expectation they should renew the example of Numantia, their utter destruction must quickly ensue from the united effects of battle, misery, and pestilence.

These exhortations succeeded, and on the 18th, all the combinations being complete, a general assault took place. The French at the right attack, having opened a party-wall by the explosion of a petard, made a sudden rush through some burning ruins, and carried, without a check, the island of houses leading down to the quay, with the exception of two buildings. The Spaniards were thus forced to abandon all the external fortifications between Saint Augustin and the Ebro, which they had preserved until that day. And while this assault was in progress, the mines under the university, containing 3000 lbs. of powder were sprung, and the walls tumbling with a terrific crash, a column of the besiegers entered the place, and after one repulse secured a lodgment. During this time 50 pieces of artillery thundered upon the suburb and ploughed up the bridge over the Ebro, and by mid-day opened a practicable breach in the great convent of Saint Lazar, which was the principal defence on that side. Lannes, observing that the Spaniards seemed to be shaken by this overwhelming fire, immediately ordered an assault, and Saint Lazar being carried forthwith, all retreat to the bridge was thus intercepted, and the besieged falling into confusion, and their commander, Baron Versage, being killed, were all destroyed or taken, with the exception of 300 men, who braving the terrible fire to which they were exposed, got back into the town. General Gazan immediately occupied the abandoned works, and having thus cut off above 2000 men that were stationed on the Ebro, above the suburb, forced them also to surrender.

This important success being followed on the 19th by another fortunate attack on the right bank of the Ebro, and by the devastating explosion of 1600 lbs. of powder, the constancy of the besieged was at last shaken. An aide-de-camp of Palafox came forth to demand certain terms, before offered by the marshal, adding thereto that the garrison should be allowed to join the Spanish armies, and that a certain number of covered carriages should follow them. Lannes rejected these proposals, and the fire continued, but the hour of surrender was come. Fifty pieces of artillery on the left bank of the Ebro, laid the houses on the quay in ruins. The church of Our Lady of the Pillar, under whose especial protection the city was supposed to exist, was nearly effaced by the bombardment, and the six mines under the Cosso, loaded with many thousand pounds of powder, were ready for a simultaneous explosion, which would have laid a quarter of the remaining houses in the dust. In fine, war had done its work, and the misery of Zaragoza could no longer be endured.

The bombardment, which had never ceased since the 10th of January, had forced the women and children to take refuge in the vaults, with which the city abounded. There the constant combustion of oil, the closeness of the atmosphere, unusual diet, and fear and restlessness of mind, had combined to produce a pestilence which soon spread to the garrison. The strong and the

weak, the daring soldier and the shrinking child, fell before it alike, and such was the state of the atmosphere and the predisposition to disease that the slightest wound gangrened and became incurable. In the beginning of February the deaths were from 400 to 500 daily; the living were unable to bury the dead, and thousands of carcasses, scattered about the streets and courtyards, or piled in heaps at the doors of the churches, were left to dissolve in their own corruption, or to be licked up by the flames of the burning houses as the defence became contracted.

The suburb, the greatest part of the walls, and one-fourth of the houses were in the hands of the French; 16,000 shells thrown during the bombardment, and the explosion of 45,000 lbs. of powder in the mines, had shaken the city to its foundations; and the bones of more than 40,000 persons, of every age and sex, bore dreadful testimony to the constancy of the besieged.


Palafox was sick, and of the plebeian chiefs, the curate of St. Gil, the lemonade seller of the Cosso, and the Tios, Jorge, and Marin, having been slain in battle, or swept away by the pestilence, the obdurate violence of the remaining leaders was so abated, that a fresh junta was formed, and after a stormy consultation, the majority being for a surrender, a deputation waited upon Marshal Lannes on the 20th of February, to negotiate a capitulation.

They proposed that the garrison should march out with the honours of war; that the peasantry should not be considered as prisoners; and at the particular request of the clergy, they also demanded that the latter should have their full revenues guaranteed to them, and punctually paid. This article was rejected with indignation, and, according to the French writers, the place surrendered at discretion; but the Spanish writers assert, that Lannes granted certain terms, drawn up by the deputation at the moment, the name of Ferdinand the Seventh being purposely omitted in the instrument, which in substance run thus:—The garrison to march out with the honours of war; to be constituted prisoners, and marched to France; the officers to retain their swords, baggage, and horses, the men their knapsacks; and persons of either class, wishing to serve Joseph, to be immediately enrolled in his ranks. The peasants to be sent to their homes. Property and religion to be guaranteed.

With this understanding the deputies returned to the city; but fresh commotions had arisen during their absence. The party for protracting the defence, although the least numerous, were the most energetic; they had before seized all the boats on the Ebro, fearing that Palafox and others, of whom they entertained suspicions, would endeavour to quit the town; and they were still so menacing and so powerful, that the deputies durst not pass through the streets, but retired outside the walls to the castle of Aljaferia, and from thence sent notice to the junta of their proceedings. The dissentient party would, however, have fallen upon the others the next day, if the junta had not taken prompt measures to enforce the surrender. The officer in command of the walls near the castle, by their orders, gave up his post to the French during the night, and on the 21st of February, from 12,000 to 15,000 sickly beings laid down those arms which they were scarcely able to support; and this cruel and memorable siege was finished.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. When the other events of the Spanish war shall be lost in the obscurity of time or only traced by disconnected fragments, the story of Zaragoza, like some ancient triumphal pillar standing amidst ruins, will tell a tale of past glory; and already men point to the heroic city, and call her Spain, as if her spirit were common to the whole nation; yet it was not so, nor was the defence of Zaragoza itself the effect of unalloyed virtue. It was not patriotism, nor was it courage, nor skill, nor fortitude, nor a system of terror, but all these combined under peculiar circumstances that upheld the defence; and this combination, and how it was brought about, should be well considered; because it is not so much by catching at the leading resemblances, as by studying the differences of



great affairs, that the exploits of one age can be made to serve as models for another.

2. The defence of Zaragoza may be examined under two points of view : as an isolated event, and as a transaction bearing on the general struggle in the Peninsula. With respect to the latter, it was a manifest proof that neither the Spanish people, nor the government, partook of the Zaragoza energy. For it would be absurd to suppose that, in the midst of 11,000,000 of people, animated by an ardent enthusiasm, 50,000 armed men could for two months be besieged, shut in, destroyed, they and their works, houses, and bodies, mingled in one terrible ruin, by less than 35,000 adversaries, and that without one effort being made to save them.

Deprive the transaction of its dazzling colours, and the simple outline comes to this : 35,000 French, in the midst of insurrections, in despite of a combination of circumstances peculiarly favourable to the defence, reduced 50,000 of the bravest and most energetic men in Spain. It is true, the latter suffered nobly ; but was their example imitated ? Gerona, indeed, although less celebrated, rivalled, and perhaps more than rivalled, the glory of Zaragoza ; but elsewhere her fate spoke, not trumpet-tongued to arouse, but with a wailing voice, that carried dismay to the heart of the nation.

3. As an isolated transaction, the siege of Zaragoza is very remarkable ; but it would be a great error to suppose, that any town, the inhabitants of which were equally resolute, might be as well defended. Fortitude and bravery will do much ; but the combinations of science are not to be defied with impunity. There are no miracles in war ! If the houses of Zaragoza had not been nearly incombustible, the bombardment alone would have caused the besieged to surrender, or to perish with their flaming city.

4. That the advantage offered by the peculiar structure of the houses, and the number of the convents and churches, was ably seized by the Spaniards, is beyond doubt. General Rogniat, La Coste's successor, indeed, treats his opponents' skill in fortification with contempt ; but Colonel San Genis's talents are not to be judged of by the faulty construction of a few outworks, at a time when he was under the control of a disorderly and ferocious mob. He knew how to adapt his system of defence to the circumstances of the moment, and no stronger proof of real genius can be given. "Do not consult me about a capitulation," was his common expression. "I shall never be of opinion that Zaragoza can make no further defence." But neither the talents of San Genis, nor the construction of the houses, would have availed, if the people within had not been of a temper adequate to the occasion, and to trace the passions by which they were animated to their true causes is a proper subject for historical and military research.

5. That they did not possess any superior courage is evident from the facts that the besieged, although twice the number of the besiegers, never made any serious impression by their sallies, and that they were unable to defend the breaches. In large masses, the standard of courage which is established by discipline may be often inferior to that produced by fanaticism, or any other peculiar excitement ; but the latter never lasts long, neither is it equable, because men are of different susceptibility, following their physical and mental conformation. Hence a system of terror has always been the resource of those leaders who, engaged in great undertakings, have been unable to recur to discipline. Enthusiasm stalked in front of their bands, but punishment brought up the rear ; and Zaragoza was no exception to this practice.

6. It may be said that the majority of the besieged not being animated by any peculiar fury, a system of terror could not be carried to any great length ; but a close examination explains this seeming mystery. The defenders were composed of three distinct parties,—the regular troops, the peasantry from the country, and the citizens ; but the citizens, who had most to lose, were naturally the fiercest, and accordingly, amongst them, the system of

terror was generated. The peasantry followed the example, as all ignorant men, under no regular control, will do; the soldiers meddled but little in the interior arrangements, and the division of the town into islands of posts rendered it perfectly feasible for violent persons, already possessed of authority, to follow the bent of their inclinations: there was no want of men, and the garrison of each island found it their own interest to keep those in front of them to their posts, that the danger might be the longer staved off from themselves.

7. Palafox was only the nominal chief of Zaragoza; the laurels gathered in both sieges should adorn plebeian brows, but those laurels dripped with kindred as well as foreign blood. The energy of the real chiefs, and the cause in which that energy was exerted, may be admired; the acts perpetrated by this ruling band were, in themselves, atrocious; and Palafox, although unable to arrest their savage proceedings, can claim but little credit for his own conduct. For more than a month preceding the surrender, he never came forth of a vaulted building, which was impervious to shells, and in which, there is too much reason to believe, he and others, of both sexes, lived in a state of sensuality, forming a disgusting contrast to the wretchedness that surrounded them.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE FRENCH OPERATIONS.

1. Before the arrival of Marshal Lannes, the operations were conducted with little vigour. The want of unity, as to time, in the double attack of the Monte Torrero and the suburb, was a flagrant error, that was not redeemed by any subsequent activity; but, after the arrival of that marshal, the siege was pursued with singular intrepidity and firmness. General Rogniat appears to disapprove of Suchet's division having been sent to Calatayud, yet it seems to have been a judicious measure, inasmuch as it was necessary, first, to protect the line of correspondence with Madrid; second, to have a corps at hand, lest the Duke of Infantado should quit Cuença, and throw himself into the Guadalaxara district, a movement that would have been extremely embarrassing to the king. Suchet's division, while at Calatayud, fulfilled these objects, without losing the power of succouring Tudela, or, by a march on the side of Daroca, of intercepting the Duke of Infantado if he attempted to raise the siege of Zaragoza; but, when the Spanish army at Cuença was directed on Ucles, and that of the Marquis of Lazan was gathering strength on the left bank of the Ebro, it was undoubtedly proper to recall Suchet.

2. It may not be misplaced here to point out the errors of Infantado's operations. If, instead of bringing on a battle with the 1st corps, he had marched to the Ebro, established his depôts and places of arms at Mequinenza and Lerida, opened a communication with Murcia, Valencia, and Catalonia, and joined the Marquis of Lazan's troops to his own, he might have formed an entrenched camp in the Sierra de Alcubierre, and from thence have carried on a methodical war with, at least, 25,000 regular troops; the insurrections on the French flanks and line of communication with Pampeluna would then have become formidable; and, in this situation, having the fortresses of Catalonia behind him, with activity and prudence he might have raised the siege.

3. From a review of all the circumstances attending the siege of Zaragoza, we may conclude that fortune was extremely favourable to the French. They were brave, persevering, and skilful, and they did not lose above 4000 men; but their success was owing partly to the errors of their opponents, principally to the destruction caused by the pestilence within the town; for, of all that multitude said to have fallen, 6000 Spaniards only were slain in battle. Thirteen convents and churches had been taken; but, when the town surrendered, 40 remained to be forced.

Such are the principal circumstances of this memorable siege. I shall now relate the contemporary operations in Catalonia.

CHAPTER IV.

OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.

IT will be remembered, that when the second siege of Gerona was raised, in August, 1808, General Duhesme returned to Barcelona, and General Reille to Figueras; after which, the state of affairs obliged those generals to remain on the defensive. Napoleon's measures to aid them were as prompt as the occasion required. While the siege of Gerona was yet in progress, he had directed troops to assemble at Perpignan in such numbers, as to form with those already in Catalonia, an army of more than 40,000 men, to be called the "7th corps." Then appointing General Gouvion St. Cyr to command it, he gave him this short but emphatic order: "Preserve Barcelona for me. If that place be lost, I cannot retake it with 80,000 men."

The troops assembled at Perpignan were the greatest part but raw levies; Neapolitans, Etruscans, Romans, and Swiss: there were, however, some old regiments; but as the preparations for the grand army under the emperor absorbed the principal attention of the administration in France, General St. Cyr was straitened in the means necessary to take the field; and his undisciplined troops, suffering severe privations, were depressed in spirit, and inclined to desert.

The 1st of November, Napoleon, who was at Bayonne, sent orders to the "7th corps" to commence its operations; and St. Cyr, having put his divisions in motion on the 3rd, crossed the frontier, and established his head-quarters at Figueras on the 5th.

In Catalonia, as in other parts of Spain, lethargic vanity, and abuses of the most fatal kind, had succeeded to the first enthusiasm, and withered the energy of the people. The local junta issued, indeed, abundance of decrees, and despatched agents to the supreme junta, and to the English commanders in the Mediterranean and in Portugal, all charged with the same instructions, namely, to demand arms, ammunition, and money. And although the central junta treated their demands with contempt, the English authorities answered them generously and freely. Lord Collingwood lent the assistance of his fleet. From Malta and Sicily arms were obtained; and Sir Hew Dalrymple having completely equipped the Spanish regiments released by the convention of Cintra, despatched them to Catalonia in British transports. Yet it may be doubted if the conduct of the central junta were not the wisest; for the local government established at Tarragona had already become so negligent, or so corrupt, that the arms thus supplied were, instead of being used in defence of the country, sold to foreign merchants! and such being the political state of Catalonia, it naturally followed that the military affairs should be ill conducted.

The Count of Caldagues, who had relieved Gerona, returned by Hostalrich, and resumed the line of the Llobregat; and 1500 men, drawn from the garrison of Carthagen, having reached Tarragona, the Marquis of Palacios, accompanied by the junta, quitted the latter town, and fixed his head-quarters at Villa Franca, within 20 miles of Caldagues. The latter disposed his troops, 5000 in number, at different points between Martorel and San Boy, covering a line of 18 miles, along the left bank of the river.

General Duhesme rested a few days, and then marching from Barcelona with 6000 men in the night, arrived the 2nd of September at day-break on the Llobregat, and immediately attacked Caldagues' line in several points, but principally at San Boy and Molino del Rey. The former fort was carried, some guns and stores were captured, and the Spaniards were pursued to Vegas, a distance of seven or eight miles; but at Molino del Rey the French were repulsed, and Duhesme then returned to Barcelona.

It was the intention of the British ministers, that an auxiliary force should

have sailed from Sicily about this period, to aid the Catalans; and doubtless it would have been a wise and timely effort: but Napoleon's foresight prevented the execution; for he directed Murat to menace Sicily with a descent; and that prince, feigning to collect forces on the coast of Calabria, spread many reports of armaments being in preparation, and, as a preliminary measure, attacked and carried the island of Capri; upon which occasion Sir Hudson Lowe first became known to history, by losing in a few days a post that, without any pretensions to celebrity, might have been defended for as many years. Murat's demonstrations sufficed to impose upon Sir John Stuart, and from 10,000 to 12,000 British troops were thus paralyzed at a most critical period: but such will always be the result of a policy which has no fixed and definite object in view. When statesmen cannot see their own way clearly, the executive officers will seldom act with vigour.

The Spanish army was now daily increasing; the tercios of Migueletes were augmented in number, and a regiment of hussars, that had been most absurdly kept in Majorca ever since the beginning of the insurrection, arrived at Taragona.

Mariano Alvarez, the governor of Gerona, was appointed to the command of the vanguard, composed of the garrisons of Gerona and Rosas, and of the corps of Juan Claros, and other partisans.

Francisco Milans and Milans de Bosch, with their Migueletes, kept the mountains to the northward and eastward of Barcelona; and while the latter hemmed in the French right, the former covered the district of El Vallés, and like a bird of prey watched the French foragers in the plain surrounding Barcelona.

Palacios remained at Villa Franca, and the Count of Caldagues continued to guard the line of the Llobregat.

The little port of St. Felice de Quixols, near Palamos Bay, was filled with privateers, and the English frigates off the coast not only aided the Spaniards in all their enterprises, but carried on a littoral warfare in the gulf of Lyons with great spirit and success.

During the month of September several petty skirmishes happened between the French marauding parties and the Migueletes about Barcelona; but on the 10th of October, Duhesme attacked and dislodged Francisco Milans from the mountains to the north of that city; and designing to forage the district of El Vallés, sent on the 11th a column of 2000 men along the sea-coast towards Mattaro, with orders to turn from thence to the left, clear the heights beyond the Besos of Migueletes, and push for Granollers on the route to Vich; this column he supported by a second of nearly equal strength, under General Millossewitz.

The first column reaching Granollers on the 12th, put the local junta of that district to flight, captured some provisions and other stores, and, finally, joined the second column, which was posted at Mollet. Millossewitz, leaving a part of his force at the pass of Moncada, then proceeded to San Culgat. Caldagues, hearing of this excursion, drew together 3000 infantry, 150 cavalry, and six guns from his line on the Llobregat, and was in full march by the back of the mountains for the pass of Moncada, expecting to intercept the French in their return to Barcelona: but, falling in with them at San Culgat, a confused action ensued, and both sides claimed the victory; the French, however, retreated across the mountains to Barcelona without having foraged the district, and Caldagues returned to his former position, justly proud of this vigorous and soldier-like movement.

The 28th of October, Palacios quitted Catalonia to command the levies in the Sierra Morena. General Vives succeeded him, and the army was again reinforced by some infantry from Majorca. The Spanish regiments, released by the convention of Cintra, also arrived at Villa Franca, and 7000 or 8000 Granadian levies were brought up to Tarragona by General Reding, and, at the same time, 6000 men drafted from the army of Aragon, reached Lerida, under the command of the Marquis de Lazan.

The whole force, including the garrisons of Hostalrich, Gerona, and Rosas, was now not less than 36,000 men; of which 22,000 infantry, and 1200 cavalry, were in the neighbourhood of Barcelona, or in march for the Llobregat. This force organised in six divisions, of which the troops in the Ampurdan formed one, took the name of the *army of the right*, and Vives seeing himself at the head of such a power, and in possession of all the hills and rivers encircling Barcelona, resolved to besiege that city.

The 3rd of November, he transferred his head-quarters to Martorel; the 8th he commenced a series of trifling skirmishes, to drive the French posts back into the town: but they repulsed him; and, from that time until the blockade was raised, a warfare of the most contemptible nature was carried on by the Spaniards: the French, who were about 10,000 strong, always maintaining their outposts.

Notwithstanding this appearance of strength, Catalonia was a prey to innumerable disorders. Vives, a weak, indolent man, had been a friend of Godoy, and was not popular; he it was that, commanding in the islands, had retained the troops in them with such tenacity as to create doubts of his attachment to the cause; but, although the supreme junta privately expressed their suspicions, and requested Lord Collingwood to force Vives to an avowal of his true sentiments, they, at the same time, wrote to the latter, publicly, in the most flattering terms, and, finally, appointed him captain-general of Catalonia. By the people, however, both he and others were vehemently suspected, and, as the mob governed throughout Spain, the authorities, civil and military, were more careful to avoid giving offence to the multitude than anxious to molest the enemy. Catalonia was full of strong places; but they were neither armed nor provisioned, and, like all other Spaniards, the Catalans were confident that the French only thought of retreating.

Such was the state of the province and of the armies when, Napoleon being ready to break into the northern parts of Spain, General St. Cyr commenced his operations. His force (including a German division of 6000 men, not yet arrived at Perpignan) amounted to more than 30,000 men, ill-composed, however, and badly provided; and St. Cyr himself was extremely discontented with his situation. The emperor had given him discretionary powers to act as he judged fitting, only bearing in mind the importance of relieving Barcelona; but Marshal Berthier neglected the equipment of the troops; and Duhesme declared that his magazines would not hold out longer than December.

To march directly to Barcelona was neither an easy nor an advantageous movement. That city could only be provisioned from France; and, until the road was cleared, by the taking of Gerona and Hostalrich, no convoys could pass except by sea, yet, to attack these places with prudence, it was essential to get possession of Rosas, not only to secure an intermediate port for French vessels passing with supplies to Barcelona, but to deprive the English of a secure harbour, and the Spaniards of a point from whence they could, in concert with their allies, intercept the communications of the French army: and even blockade Figueras, which, from the want of transport, could not be provisioned at this period. These considerations having determined St. Cyr to commence by the siege of Rosas, he repaired to Figueras, in person, the 6th of November; and, on the 7th, General Reille being charged to conduct the operation, after a sharp action, drove in the Spaniards before the place and completed the investment.

SIEGE OF ROSAS.

This town was but a narrow slip of houses built along the water's edge, at the head of the gulf of the same name.

The citadel, a large irregular pentagon, stood on one side of the town, and, on the other, the mountains that skirt the flat and swampy plain of the Ampurdan, rose, bluff and rocky, at the distance of half a mile. An old redoubt was built at the foot of these hills, and, from thence to the citadel, an entrenchment

had been drawn to cover the houses. Hence, Rosas, looking towards the land, had the citadel on the left hand, the mountains on the right, and the front covered by this entrenchment. The roadstead permitted ships of the line to anchor within cannon-shot of the place; and, on the right hand coming up the gulf, a star fort, called the Trinity, crowned a rugged hill about a mile and a quarter distant from the citadel, the communication between it and the town being by a narrow road carried between the foot of the hills and the water's edge.

The garrison of Rosas consisted of nearly 3000 men, two bomb-vessels and an English 74 (the *Excellent*) were anchored off the town, and Captain West, the commodore, reinforced the garrisons of the Trinity and the citadel with marines and seamen from these vessels; but the damages sustained in a former siege had been only partially repaired; both places were ill-found in guns and stores, and the Trinity was commanded at the distance of pistol-shot from a point of the mountains called the Puig Rom.

The force under Reille, consisting of his own and General Pino's Italian division, skirmished daily with the garrison; but the rain, which fell in torrents, having flooded the Ampurdan, the roads became impassable for the artillery, and delayed the opening of the trenches. Meanwhile, Souham's division took post between the Fluvia and Figueras, to cover the operations of the siege on the side of Gerona, and an Italian brigade, under General Chabot, was posted at Rabos and Espollas, to keep the Somatenes down.

But, before Chabot's arrival, Reille had detached a battalion to that side; and, being uneasy for its safety, sent three more to its assistance: this saved the battalion, which was in great danger; and two companies were actually cut off by the Somatenes. This loss, however, proved beneficial, as it enraged the Italians, and checked their disposition to desert; and St. Cyr, unwilling to pursue the system of burning villages, and yet anxious to repress the insidious hostility of the peasants, in reprisal for the loss of his two companies, seized an equal number of villagers, and sent them prisoners to France.

The inhabitants of Rosas having embarked or taken refuge in the citadel, the houses, and the entrenchments covering them, were left to the French; but the latter were prevented, by the fire of the English ships, from effecting a permanent lodgment in the deserted town; and, after a few days, a detachment from the garrison, consisting of soldiers and townsmen, established a post there.

The 8th, Captain West, in conjunction with the governor, made a sally, but was repulsed; and, on the 9th several yards of the citadel ramparts crumbled; but, with the assistance of the British seamen, the breach was repaired in the night before the enemy became aware of the accident.

The 15th, an obstinate assault made on the Trinity was repulsed, the English seamen bearing a principal share in the success.

The 16th, the roads being passable, the French battering-train was put in motion. The way leading up to the Puig Rom was repaired, and two battalions were posted there, on the point commanding the Trinity.

The 19th, three guns were mounted against the Trinity, and the trenches were opened at the distance of 400 yards from the citadel.

The 20th, the fire of some French mortars obliged the vessels of war to anchor beyond the range of the shells. During this time, Souham was harassed by the Migueletes from the side of Gerona. The French cavalry, unable to find forage, were sent back to France; and Napoleon, rendered uneasy by the reports of General Duhesme, ordered the 7th corps to advance to Barcelona, so as to arrive there by the 26th of November; but St. Cyr refused to abandon the siege of Rosas without a positive order.

The assistance afforded to the besieged by Captain West was represented to the junta as an attempt of that officer to possess himself of the place. The junta readily believed this tale, and entered into an angry correspondence with

Don Pedro O'Daly, the governor, relative to the supposed treachery ; but no measures were taken to raise the siege. During this correspondence, the *Excellent* sailed from Rosas, and was succeeded by the *Fame*, Captain Bennet. This officer landed some men under the Trinity on the 23rd, and endeavoured, but ineffectually, to take the battery opposed to that fort.

The 27th, the besiegers assaulted the Spaniards, who, to the number of 500, had entrenched themselves in the deserted houses of the town. A hundred and sixty were taken, and 50 escaped into the citadel ; the rest were slain. Breaching batteries were immediately commenced among the ruins of the houses, and the communication with the shipping rendered so unsafe, that Lazan, who had come from Lerida to Gerona with 6000 men, and had collected provisions and stores at the mouth of the Fluvia, with the intention of supplying Rosas by sea, abandoned his design. The ruinous condition of the front, exposed to the fire of besiegers, now induced Reille to summon the place a second time ; but the governor refused to surrender.

The 30th of November, the engineers reported that the breach in the Trinity was practicable, and an assault was ordered ; although an Italian officer appointed to lead the storming party of 50 men, and who had formerly served in the fort, asserted that the breach was not a true one. The Spanish commandant thought his post untenable ; and two days before, the marines of the *Fame* had been withdrawn by Captain Bennet : but at this time, Lord Cochrane, a man of infinite talent in his profession, and of a courage and enterprise that have seldom, if ever, been surpassed, arrived in the *Imperieuse* frigate, and immediately threw himself, with 80 men, into the fort.

The Italian's representations being unheeded, he advanced to the assault like a man of honour, and was killed, together with all his followers, excepting four, two of whom escaped back to their own side ; the other two being spared by the English seamen, were drawn up with cords into the fort. The breach had, however, been practicable at first ; but it was broken in an old gallery, which Lord Cochrane immediately filled with earth and hammocks, and so cut off the opening. In the course of a few days, a second assault was made, but the French were again repulsed with loss. Meanwhile the breaching batteries opened against the citadel, and a false attack was commenced on the opposite side.

The 4th December the garrison made a sally, in the night, from the citadel, and with some success ; but the walls were opened by the enemy's fire, and the next day O'Daly, hopeless of relief, surrendered with 2400 men, of which 200 were wounded. Lord Cochrane, also, blew up the magazine, and abandoned Fort Trinity. General St. Cyr observes that the garrison of Rosas might have been easily carried off, at night, by the British shipping ; but to embark 2500 men, in the boats of two ships, and under a heavy fire, whether by night or day, is not an easy operation ; nevertheless, the censure seems well founded, because sufficient preparation might have been previously made.

The defence of Rosas (with the exception of Lord Cochrane's efforts) cannot be deemed brilliant, whether with relation to the importance of the place, the assistance that might have been rendered from the sea, or the number of the garrison compared with that of the besiegers. It held out, however, 30 days, and, if that time had been well employed by the Spaniards, the loss of the garrison would have been amply repaid ; but Vives, wholly occupied with Barcelona, was indifferent to the fate of Rosas. A fruitless attack on Souham's posts, by Mariano Alvarez, was the only effort made to interrupt the siege, or to impede the farther progress of the enemy. Lazan, although at the head of 6000 or 7000 men, could not rely upon more than 3000 ; and his applications to Vives for a reinforcement were unheeded.

The fall of Rosas enabled St. Cyr to march to the relief of Barcelona, and he resolved to do so : yet the project, at first sight, would appear rather insane than hardy ; for the roads, by which Gerona and Hostalrich were to be turned,

being mere paths impervious to carriages, no artillery, and little ammunition, could be carried, and the country was full of strong positions. The Germans had not yet arrived at Perpignan; it was indispensable to leave Reille in the Ampurdan, to protect Rosas and Figueras; and, these deductions being made, less than 18,000 men, including the cavalry, which had been recalled from France, remained disposable for the operation.

But, on the Spanish side, Reding having come up, there were 25,000 men in the camp before Barcelona, and 10,000 others, under Lazan and Alvarez, were at Gerona. All these troops were, however, exceedingly ill organized. Two-thirds of the Migueletes only carried pikes, and many were without any arms at all. There was no sound military system; the Spanish generals were ignorant of the French movements and strength; and their own indolence and want of vigilance drew upon them the contempt and suspicion of the people.

The 8th of December, St. Cyr united his army on the left bank of the Fluvia. The 9th, he passed that river, and, driving the Spaniards over the Ter, established his head-quarters at Medinyà, ten miles from Gerona. He wished, before pursuing his own march, to defeat Lazan, lest the latter should harass the rear of the army; but, finding that the marquis would not engage in a serious affair, he made a show of sitting down before Gerona on the 10th, hoping thereby to mislead Vives, and render him slow to break up the blockade of Barcelona: and this succeeded; for the Spaniard remained in his camp, irresolute and helpless, while his enemy was rapidly passing the defiles and rivers between Gerona and the Besos.

The nature of the country between Figueras and Barcelona has already been described; referring to that description, the reader will find that the only carriage-routes by which St. Cyr could march were, one by the sea-coast, and one leading through Gerona and Hostalrich. The first, exposed to the fire of the English vessels, had also been broken up by Lord Cochrane, in August; and, to use the second, it was necessary to take the fortresses, or to turn them by marching for three days through the mountains. St. Cyr adopted the latter plan, trusting that rapidity and superior knowledge of war would enable him to separate Lazan and Alvarez from Vives, and so defeat them all in succession.

The 11th, he crossed the Ter and reached La Bisbal; here he left the last of his carriages, delivered out four days' biscuit and 50 rounds of ammunition to the soldiers, and with this provision, a drove of cattle, and a reserve of ten rounds of ammunition for each man, he commenced his hardy march the 12th of December, making for Palamos. On the route he encountered and beat some Migueletes that Juan Claros had brought to oppose him, and, when near Palamos, he suffered a little from the fire of the English ships; but he had gained a first step, and his hopes were high.

The 13th, he turned his back upon the coast, and, by a forced march, reached Vidreras and Llagostera, and thus placed himself between Vives and Lazan, for the latter had not yet passed the heights of Casa de Selva.

The 14th, marching by Mazanet de Selva and Martorel, he reached the heights above Hostalrich, and encamped at Grions and Masanas. During this day's journey, his rear was slightly harassed by Lazan and Claros; but he was well content to find the strong banks of the Tordera undefended by Vives. The situation of the army was, however, extremely critical. Lazan and Claros had, the one on the 11th, the other on the 12th, informed Vives of the movement; hence the bulk of the Spanish force before Barcelona might be expected, at any moment, in some of the strong positions in which the country abounded, and the troops from Gerona were, as we have seen, close in the rear; the Somatenes were gathering thickly on the flanks, Hostalrich was in front, and the French soldiers had only 60 rounds of ammunition.

St. Cyr's design was to turn Hostalrich, and get into the main road again behind that fortress. The smugglers of Perpignan had affirmed that there was

no pathway, but a shepherd assured him that there was a track by which it could be effected ; and, when the efforts of the staff-officers to trace it failed, St. Cyr himself discovered it, but nearly fell into the hands of the Somatenes during the search.

The 15th, at daybreak, the troops being put in motion, turned Hostalrich and gained the main road. The garrison of that place, endeavouring to harass their rear, were repulsed ; but the Somatenes on the flanks, emboldened because the French, to save ammunition, did not return their fire, became exceedingly troublesome ; and, near San Celoni, the head of the column encountered some battalions of Migueletes, which Francisco Milans had brought up from Arenas de Mar, by the pass of Villa Gorguin.

Milans, not being aware of St. Cyr's approach, was soon beaten, and his men fell back, part to Villa Gorguin, part to the heights of Nuestra Señora de Cordera : the French thus gained the defile of Treintapasos. But they were now so fatigued that all desired to halt, save St. Cyr, who insisted upon the troops clearing the defile, and reaching a plain on the other side : this was not effected before ten o'clock. Lazan's troops did not appear during the day ; but Vives' army was in front, and its fires were seen on the hills between Cardadeu and Llinas.

Information of St. Cyr's march, as I have already observed, had been transmitted to Vives on the 11th, and there was time for him to have carried the bulk of his forces to the Tordera before the French could pass that river ; but intelligence of the battle of Tudela, and of the appearance of the French near Zaragoza, arrived at the same moment, and the Spanish general betrayed the greatest weakness and indecision, at one moment resolving to continue before Barcelona, at another designing to march against St. Cyr. He had, on the 9th, sent Reding with six guns, 600 cavalry, and 1000 infantry, to take the command in the Ampurdan ; but, the 12th, after receiving Lazan's report, he reinforced Reding, who was still at Granollers, and directed him upon Cardadeu.

The 14th, he ordered Francisco Milans to march by Mattaro and Arenas de Mar, to examine the coast road, and, if the enemy was not in that line, to repair also to Cardadeu.

The 15th, Milans, as we have seen, was beaten at St. Celoni ; but, in the night, he rallied his whole division on the heights of Cordera, thus flanking the left of the French forces at Llinas.

A council of war was held on the 13th. Caldagues advised that 4000 Migueletes should be left to observe Duhesme, and that the rest of the army should march at once to fight St. Cyr. Good and soldier-like advice ; but Vives was loth to abandon the siege of Barcelona, and, adopting half-measures, left Caldagues, with the right wing of the army, to watch Duhesme, and carried the centre and the left, by the route of Granollers, to the heights between Cardadeu and Llinas, where (exclusive of Milan's division) he united, in the night of the 15th, about 8000 regulars, besides several thousand Somatenes.* Duhesme immediately occupied the posts abandoned by Vives, and thus separated him from Caldagues.

St. Cyr's position, on the morning of the 16th, would have been dangerous, if he had been opposed by any but Spanish generals and Spanish troops. Vives and those about him, irresolute and weak as they were in action, were not deficient in boasting words ; they called the French army, in derision, "the succour ;" and, in allusion to the battle of Baylen, announced that a second "bull-fight," in which Reding was again the "matador," would be exhibited. But Dupont and St. Cyr were men of a different stamp : the latter justly judging that the Spaniards were not troops to stand the shock of a good column, united his army in one solid mass, at daybreak on the 16th, and marched straight against the centre of the enemy, giving orders that the head of the column should go headlong on, without either firing or forming line.

BATTLE OF CARDADEU.

The hills which the Spaniards occupied were high and wooded ; the right was formed by Reding's division, the left by Vives', and the Somatenes hung on the sides of a lofty ridge, which was only separated from the right of the position by the little river Mogent. The main road from Llinas led straight upon the centre, and there was a second road conducting to Mataro, which, branching off from the first, run between the Mogent and the right of Reding's ground.

When the French commenced their march, the Somatenes galled their left flank, and General Pino, whose division headed the column of attack, instead of falling upon the centre, sent back for fresh instructions, and meanwhile extended his first brigade in a line to the left. St. Cyr, who had reiterated the order to fight in column, was sorely troubled at Pino's error, the ill effects of which were instantly felt, because Reding advancing against the front and flank of the extended brigade, obliged it to commence a fire, which it was impossible to sustain for want of ammunition.

In this difficulty the French general acted with great ability and vigour : Pino's second brigade was directed to do that which the first should have done. Two companies were sent to menace the left of the Spaniards, and St. Cyr, at the same time, rapidly carried Souham's division, by the Mataro road, against Reding's extreme right. The effect was instantaneous and complete ; the Spaniards overthrown on their centre and right, and charged by the cavalry, were beaten and dispersed in every direction, leaving all their artillery and ammunition, and 2000 prisoners behind.

Vives, escaping on foot across the mountain, reached Mataro, where he was taken on board an English vessel. Reding fled on horseback by the main road ; and the next day, having rallied some of the fugitives at Monmalo, retreated by the route of San Culgat to Molino del Rey. The loss of the French was 600 men ; but the battle, which lasted only one hour, was so complete, that St. Cyr resolved to push on to Barcelona immediately, without seeking to defeat Milans or Lazan, whom he judged too timid to venture an action : moreover, he hoped that Duhesme, who had been informed, on the 7th, of the intended march, and who could hear the sound of the artillery, would intercept and turn back the flying troops.

The French army had scarcely quitted the field of battle when Milans arrived ; but, finding how matters stood, retired to Arenas de Mar, and gave notice to Lazan, who retreated to Gerona. St. Cyr's rear was thus cleared ; but Duhesme, heedless of what was passing at Cardadeu, instead of intercepting the beaten army, sent Lecchi to attack Caldagues. The latter general, however, concentrated his division on the evening of the 16th, repulsed Lecchi, and retired behind the Llobregat, but left behind some artillery and the large magazines which Vives had collected for the siege and accumulated in his camp.

St. Cyr reached Barcelona without encountering any of Duhesme's troops, and, in his Memoirs of this campaign, represents that general as astonishingly negligent, seeking neither to molest the enemy nor to meet the French army ; treating everything belonging to the service with indifference, making false returns, and conniving at gross malversation in his generals.

St. Cyr, now reflecting upon the facility with which his opponents could be defeated, and the difficulty of pursuing them, resolved to rest a few days at Barcelona, in hopes that the Spaniards, if unmolested, would re-assemble in numbers behind the Llobregat, and enable him to strike an effectual blow, for his design was to disperse their forces so as they should not be able to interrupt the sieges which he meditated ; nor was he deceived in his calculations. Reding joined Caldagues, and rallied from 12,000 to 15,000 men behind the Llobregat, and Vives, having re-landed at Sitjes, sent orders to Lazan and Milans to march likewise to that river by the district of Vallés. The arrival of the latter was, however, so uncertain that the French general, judging it better to attack Reding

at once, united Chabran's division to his own, on the 20th, and advanced to St. Felieu de Llobregat.

The Spaniards were drawn up on the heights behind the village of San Vicente; their position was lofty and rugged, commanding a free view of the approaches from Barcelona. The Llobregat covered the front, and the left flank was secure from attack, except at the bridge of Molino del Rey, which was entrenched, guarded by a strong detachment, and protected by heavy guns. Reding's cavalry amounted to 1000, and he had 50 pieces of artillery, the greatest part of which were in battery at the bridge of Molino del Rey; but his right was accessible, because the river was fordable in several places. The main road to Villa Franca led through this position, and, at the distance of 10 or 12 miles in the rear, the pass of Ordal offered another post of great strength.

Vives was at San Vicente on the 19th, but returned to Villa Franca the same day; hence, when the French appeared on the 20th, the camp was thrown into confusion.

A council of war being held, one party was for fighting, another for retreating to Ordal: an officer was then sent to Vives for orders, but he returned with a message, that Reding might retreat if he could not defend his post. The latter, however, fearing that he should be accused, and perhaps sacrificed for returning without reason, resolved to fight, although he anticipated nothing but disaster. The season was extremely severe; snow was falling, and both armies suffered from the cold and wet. The Spanish soldiers were dispirited by past defeats, and the despondency and irresolution of their generals could not escape observation: but the French and Italian troops were confident in their commander, and flushed with success. In these dispositions the two armies passed the night before

THE BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY.

St. Cyr observing that Reding's attention was principally directed to the bridge of Molino, ordered Chabran's division to that side, with instructions to create a diversion, by opening a fire from some artillery, and then retiring, as if his guns could not resist the weight of the Spanish metal; in short, to persuade the enemy that a powerful effort would be made there; but when the centre and right of the Spaniards should be attacked, Chabran was to force the passage of the bridge, and assail the heights beyond it. This stratagem succeeded; Reding massed his troops on the left, and neglected his right, which was the real point of attack.

The 21st of December, Pino's division crossed the Llobregat at daylight, by a ford in front of St. Felieu, and marched against the right of the Spanish position: Chabot's division followed; and Souham's, which had passed at a ford lower down, and then ascended by the right bank, covered Pino's passage. The light cavalry were held in reserve behind Chabot's division, and a regiment of cuirassiers was sent to support Chabran at Molino del Rey.

The Spanish position consisted of two mountain heads, separated by a narrow ravine and a torrent; and as the troops of the right wing were exceedingly weakened, they were immediately chased off their headland by the leading brigade of Pino's division. Reding then seeing his error, changed his front, and drew up on the other mountain, on a new line, nearly perpendicular to the Llobregat; but he still kept a strong detachment at the bridge of Molino, which was thus in rear of his left. The French divisions formed rapidly for a fresh effort—Souham on the right, Pino in the centre, Chabot on the left. The latter gained ground in the direction of Villa Franca, and endeavoured to turn the Spaniards' right, and cut off their retreat; while the light cavalry making way between the mountain and the river, sought to connect themselves with Chabran at Molino.

St. Cyr's columns, crossing the ravine that separated them from the Spaniards, soon ascended the opposite mountain. The Catalans had formed quickly, and opposed their enemies with an orderly, but ill-directed fire. Their front line

then advanced, and offered to charge with an appearance of great intrepidity ; but their courage sunk, and they turned as the hostile masses approached. The reserves immediately opened a confused volley upon both parties ; and in this disorder, the road to Villa Franca being intercepted by Chabot, the right was forced upon the centre, the centre upon the left, and the whole pushed back in confusion upon Molino del Rey.

Meanwhile a detachment from Chabran's division had passed the Llobregat above Molino, and so blocked the road to Martorel ; and in this miserable situation the Spaniards were charged by the light cavalry, and scarcely a man would have escaped if Chabran had obeyed his orders, and pushing across the bridge of Molino had come upon their rear ; but that general, at all times feeble in execution, remained a tranquil spectator of the action, until the right of Souham's division reached the bridge ; and thus the routed troops escaped, by dispersing, and throwing away everything that could impede their flight across the mountains. Vives reached the field of battle just as the rout was complete, and was forced to fly with the rest. The victorious army pursued in three columns ; Chabran's in the direction of Igualada, Chabot's by the road of San Sadurni, which turned the pass of Ordal, and Souham's by the royal route of Villa Franca, at which place the head-quarters were established on the 22nd. The posts of Villa Nueva and Sitjes were immediately occupied by Pino, while Souham pushed the fugitives to the gates of Tarragona.

The loss of the Spaniards, owing to their swiftness, was less than might have been expected ; not more than 1200 fell into the hands of the French, but many superior officers were killed or wounded ; and, on the 22nd, the Count de Caldagues was taken, a man apparently pedantic in military affairs, and wanting in modesty, but evidently possessed of both courage and talent. The whole of the artillery, and vast quantities of powder, were captured, and with them a magazine of English muskets, quite new. Yet many of the Migueletes were unarmed, and the junta were unceasing in their demands for succours of this nature ; but the history of any one province was the history of all Spain.

CHAPTER V.

BARCELONA was now completely relieved, and the captured magazines supplied it for several months. There was no longer a Spanish army in the field ; and in Tarragona, where some 8000 or 9000 of the Spanish fugitives, from this and the former battle, had taken refuge, there was terrible disorder. The people rose tumultuously, broke open the public stores, and laying hands on all the weapons they could find, rushed from place to place, as if searching for something to vent their fury upon. The head of Vives was called for ; and to save his life, he was cast into prison by Reding, who was proclaimed general-in-chief.

The regular officers were insulted by the populace, and there was as usual a general cry to defend the city, mixed with furious menaces against traitors, but there were neither guns, nor ammunition, nor provisions ; and during the first moment of anarchy, St. Cyr might certainly have rendered himself master of Tarragona by a vigorous effort. But the opportunity soon passed away ; the French general sought only to procure subsistence, and occupied himself in forming a train of field artillery ; while Reding, who had been almost without hope, proceeded to rally the army, and place the town in a state of defence.

The 1st of January 11,000 infantry and 800 cavalry were re-assembled at Tarragona and Reus ; and a Swiss regiment from Majorca and two Spanish regiments from Granada, increased this force. Three thousand four hundred men arrived from Valencia on the 5th, and from thence also 5000 muskets, ammunition in proportion, and 10,000 pikes which had just been landed from England, were forwarded to Tarragona. A supply of money, obtained from the British agents at Seville, completed the number of fortuitous and fortunate

events that combined to remedy the disaster of Molino del Rey. These circumstances, and the inactivity of St. Cyr, who seemed suddenly paralyzed, restored the confidence of the Catalonians, but their system remained unchanged ; for confidence among the Spaniards always led to insubordination, but never to victory.

Meanwhile, a part of the troops flying from Molino had taken refuge at Bruch, and being joined by the Somatenes, chose Major Green, one of the English military agents, for their general, thinking to hold that strong country, which was considered as impregnable ever since the defeats of Chabran and Swartz. St. Cyr, glad of this opportunity to retrieve the honour of the French arms, detached Chabran himself, on the 11th of January, to take his own revenge ; but that general was still depressed by the recollection of his former defeat. To encourage him, Chabot was directed from San Sadurni upon Igualada, by which the defile of Bruch was turned, and a permanent defence rendered impossible. The Spaniards, however, made little or no resistance ; and eight guns were taken, and a considerable number of men killed. The French pursued to Igualada ; and a detachment, without orders, even assailed and took Montserrat itself, and afterwards rejoined the main body without loss. Chabot was then recalled to San Sadurni, and Chabran was quartered at Martorel.

While these events were passing beyond the Llobregat, the Marquis of Lazan was advancing, with 7000 or 8000 men, towards Castellon de Ampurias. The 1st of January he drove back a battalion of infantry upon Rosas with considerable loss ; but the next day General Reille, having assembled about 3000 men, intercepted Lazan's communications, and attacked him in his position behind the Muga. The victory seems to have been undecided ; but in the night, Lazan regained his communications, and returned to Gerona.

The battle of Molino del Rey checked, for a time, the ardour of the Catalans, and Reding at first avoided serious actions, leaving the Somatenes to harass the enemy. This plan being followed during the months of January and February, was exceedingly troublesome to St. Cyr, because he was obliged to send small parties continually to seek for subsistence, and the country people, hiding their provisions with great care, strove hard to protect their scanty stores. But in the beginning of February the country between the Llobregat and Tarragona was almost exhausted of food. The English ships continued to vex the coast-line ; and the French, besides deserters, lost many men, killed and wounded, in the innumerable petty skirmishes sustained by the marauding parties. Still St. Cyr maintained his positions ; and the country people, tired of a warfare in which they were the chief sufferers, clamoured against Reding, that he, with a large regular force, should look calmly on, until the last morsel of food was discovered, and torn from their starving families. The townspeople, also feeling the burden of supporting the troops, impatiently urged the general to fight ; nor was this insubordination confined to the rude multitude.

Lazan, although at the head of 9000 men, had remained perfectly inactive after the skirmish at Castellon de Ampurias ; but when Reding required him to leave a suitable garrison in Gerona, and bring the rest of his troops to Igualada, he would not obey ; and this difference was only terminated by Lazan's marching, with 5000 men, to the assistance of Zaragoza. The result of his operations there has been already related in the narrative of that siege.

The army immediately under Reding was, however, very considerable : the Swiss battalions were numerous and good, and some of the most experienced of the Spanish regiments were in Catalonia. Every fifth man of the robust population had been called out after the defeat of Molino del Rey ; and, although the people, averse to serve as regular soldiers, did not readily answer the call, the forces under Reding were so augmented that, in the beginning of February, it was not less than 28,000 men. The urban guards were also put in activity, and about 15,000 Somatenes assisted the regular troops ; but there

was more show than real power, for Reding was incapable of wielding the regular troops skilfully; and the Migueletes being ill-armed, without clothing, and insubordinate, devastated the country equally with the enemy.

The Somatenes, who only took arms for local interests, would not fight, except at the times and in the manner and place that suited themselves; and not only neglected the advice of the regular officers, but reviled all who would not adopt their own views; causing many to be removed from their commands; and, with all this, the Spanish generals never obtained good information of the enemy's movements, yet their own plans were immediately made known to the French; because, at Reding's head-quarters, as at those of Castaños before the battle of Tudela, every project was openly and ostentatiously discussed. Reding himself was a man of no military talent; his activity was of body, not of mind, but he was brave and honourable and popular; because, being without system, arrangement, or deep design, and easy in his nature, he thwarted no man's humours, and thus floated in the troubled waters until their sudden reflux left him on the rocks.

The Catalanian army was now divided into four distinct corps.

Alvarez, with 4000 men, held Gerona and the Ampurdan.

Lazan, with 5000, was near Zaragoza.

Don Juan Castro, an officer, accused by the Spaniards of treachery, and who did afterwards attach himself to Joseph's party, occupied, with 16,000 men, a line extending from Olesa, on the Upper Llobregat, to the pass of San Cristina, near Tarragona, and this line running through Bruch, Igualada, and Llacuna, was above 60 miles long. The remainder of the army, amounting to 10,000 or 12,000 men under Reding himself, were quartered at Tarragona, Reus, and the immediate vicinity of those places.

The Spaniards were fed from Valencia and Aragon (the convoys from the former being conveyed in vessels along the coast). Their magazines were accumulated on one or two points of the line, and those points being chosen without judgment fettered Reding's movements and regulated those of the French, whose only difficulty, in fact, was to procure food.

Early in February, St. Cyr, having exhausted the country about him, and having his communications much vexed by the Somatenes and by descents from the English ships, closed his posts and kept his divisions in masses at Vendril, Villa Franca, San Sadurni, and Martorel. The 7th corps at this period having been reinforced by the German division, and by some conscripts, amounted to 48,000 men, of which 41,000 were under arms; but the force immediately commanded by St. Cyr did not exceed 23,000 of all arms.*

The relative position of the two armies was, however, entirely in favour of the French general; his line extending from Vendril, by Villa Franca, to Martorel, was not more than 30 miles, and he had a royal road by which to retreat to Barcelona. The Spanish posts covering, as I have said, an extent of above 60 miles, formed a half-circle round the French line, and their communications were more rugged than those of St. Cyr. Nevertheless, it is not to be doubted that, by avoiding any serious action, the Catalans would have obliged the French to abandon the country, between the Llobregat and Tarragona. Famine and the continued drain of men, in a mountain warfare, would have forced them away; nor could they have struck any formidable blow to relieve themselves, seeing that all the important places were fortified towns requiring a regular siege. The never-failing arrogance of the Spanish character, and the unstable judgment of Reding, induced him to forego these advantages. The closing of the French posts and some success in a few petty skirmishes were magnified, the last into victories and the first into a design on the part of the enemy to fly.

An intercourse opened with some of the inhabitants of Barcelona likewise gave hopes of regaining that city by means of a conspiracy within the walls.

* Appendix, No. 30, section 6.

The Catalans had before made proposals to General Lecchi to deliver up the citadel of that place, nor is there anything that more strongly marks the absurd self-sufficiency of the Spaniards, during this war, than the repeated attempts they made to corrupt the French commanders. As late as the year 1810, Martin Carrera, being at the head of about 2000 ragged peasants, half-armed, and only existing under the protection of the English outposts, offered to Marshal Ney, then investing Ciudad Rodrigo, rank and honours in the Spanish army if he would desert!

Reding, swayed by the popular clamour, resolved to attack, and in this view he directed Castro to collect his 16,000 men and fall upon the right flank and rear of St. Cyr, by the routes of Llacuna and Igualada, and to send a detachment to seize the pass of Ordal, and thus cut off the French line of retreat to Barcelona. Meanwhile, advancing with 8000 by the road of Vendril and St. Cristina, Reding himself was to attack the enemy in the front. All the Migueletes and Somatenes between Gerona and the Besos were to aid in these operations, the object being to surround the French, a favourite project with the Spaniards at all times; and as they publicly announced this intention, the joy was universal, and the destruction of the hostile army was as usual anticipated with the utmost confidence.

The Catalans were in motion on the 14th of February, but St. Cyr kept his army well in hand until the Spaniards being ready to break in upon him, he judged it politic to strike first. Souham's division remained at Vendril, to keep Reding in check, but on the 16th St. Cyr marched from Villa Franca, with Pino's division, and overthrew Castro's advanced posts which were at Lacuña and Saint Quinti. The Spanish centre thus pierced, and their wings completely separated, Castro's right was thrown back upon Capellades.

The 17th, St. Cyr, continuing his movement with Pino's division, reached Capellades, where he expected to unite with Chabot and Chabran, who had orders to concentrate there,—the one from San Sadurin, the other from Martorel. By this skilful movement the French general avoided the pass of Bruch, and massed three divisions on the extreme right of Castro's left wing and close to his magazines, which were at Igualada.

Chabot arrived the first, and, being for a little time unsupported, was attacked and driven back with loss, but when the other divisions came up, the action was restored, and the Spaniards put to flight; they rallied again at Pobla de Claramunt, between Capellades and Igualada, a circumstance agreeable to St. Cyr, because he had sent Mazzuchelli's brigade from Llacuna direct upon Igualada, and if Chabot had not been so hard pressed, the action at Capellades was to have been delayed until Mazzuchelli had got into the rear; but scarcely was the head of that general's column descried, when Castro, who was at Igualada with his reserves, recalled the troops from Pobla de Claramunt. The French being close at their heels, the whole passed through Igualada, fighting and in disorder, after which losing all courage, the Spaniards broke, and, throwing away their arms, fled by the three routes of Cervera, Calaf, and Manresa. They were pursued all the 17th, and the French returned the next day, but with few prisoners, because, says St. Cyr, "the Catalans are endowed by nature with strong knees."

Having thus broken through the centre of the Spanish line, defeated a part of the left wing and taken the magazines, St. Cyr posted Chabot and Chabran at Igualada, to keep the beaten troops in check, but himself, with Pino's division, marched the 18th to fall upon Reding, whose extreme left was now at St. Magi. Souham had been instructed, when by preconcerted signals he should know that the attack at Igualada had succeeded, to force the pass of Cristina, and push forward to Villa Radoña, upon which town St. Cyr was now marching,

The position of St. Magi was attacked at four o'clock in the evening of the 18th, and carried without difficulty, but it was impossible to find a single peasant to guide the troops, on the next day's march to the abbey of Santa Creus. In

this perplexity, a wounded Spanish captain, who was prisoner, demanded to be allowed to go to Tarragona. St. Cyr assented and offered to carry him to the Creus, and thus the prisoner unconsciously acted as a guide to his enemies. The march being long and difficult, it was late ere they reached the abbey. It was a strong point, and being occupied in force by the troops that had been beaten from San Magi the evening before, the French, after a fruitless demonstration of assaulting it, took a position for the night. Meanwhile, Reding hearing of Castro's defeat, had made a draft of men and guns from the right wing, and marched by Pla and the pass of Cabra, intending to rally his left. His road being just behind St. Creus, he was passing at the moment when the French appeared before that place, but neither general was aware of the other's presence, and each continued his particular movement.

The 20th, St. Cyr crossed the Gaya river under a fire from the abbey, and continued his rapid march upon Villa Radoña, near which place he dispersed a small corps; but finding that Souham was not come up, he sent an officer, escorted by a battalion, to hasten that general, whose non-arrival gave reason to believe that the staff-officers and spies, sent with the previous instructions, had all been intercepted. This caused the delay of a day and a half, which would otherwise have sufficed to crush Reding's right wing, surprised as it would have been, without a chief, in the plain of Tarragona.

While St. Cyr rested at Villa Radoña, Reding pursued his march to St. Coloma de Querault, and having rallied many of Castro's troops, the aspect of affairs was totally changed; for the defile of San Cristina being forced by Souham, he reached Villa Radoña on the 21st, and, at the same time, all the weakly men, who had been left in charge of the head-quarters at Villa Franca, also arrived. Thus more than two-thirds of the whole French army were concentrated at that town at the moment when the Spanish commander, being joined by the detachment beaten from San Cristina and by the battalion at the abbey, also rallied the greatest part of his forces, at St. Coloma de Querault. Each general could now, by a rapid march, overwhelm his adversary's right wing; but the troops left by Reding, in the plain of Tarragona, might have retired upon that fortress, while those left by St. Cyr, at Igualada, were without support. Hence, when the latter commander, continuing his movement on Tarragona, reached Valls the 22nd, and heard of Reding's march, he immediately carried Pino's division to Pla and the pass of Cabra, resolved, if the Spanish general should advance towards Igualada, to follow him with a sharp spur.

The 23rd, the French halted: Souham at Valls to watch the Spanish troops in the plain of Tarragona; Pino's division at Pla and Cabra, sending, however, detachments to the abbey of Creus and towards Santa Coloma to feel for Reding. In the evening these detachments returned with some prisoners; the one from Creus reported that the abbey was abandoned; the other that the Spanish general was making his way back to Tarragona, by the route of Sarreal and Momblanch. Hereupon St. Cyr, remaining in person with Pino's division at Pla, pushed his advanced posts on the right to the abbey of San Creus, and in front to the defile of Cabra, designing to encounter the Spaniards, if they returned by either of those roads. Souham's division took a position in front of Valls, with his left on the Francoli river, his right towards Pla, and his advanced guard at Pixa Moxons, watching for Reding by the road of Momblanch.

The 24th, the Spanish general, being at St. Coloma, called a council of war, at which Colonel Doyle, the British military agent, assisted. One party was for fighting St. Cyr, another for retreating to Lerida, a third for attacking Chabran at Igualada, a fourth for regaining the plain of Tarragona. There were many opinions, but neither wisdom nor resolution; and, finally, Reding, leaving General Wimpfen, with 4000 men, at San Coloma, decided to regain Tarragona, and took the route of Momblanch with 10,000 of his best troops, following the

Spanish accounts, but St. Cyr says with 15,000. Reding knew that Valls was occupied, and that the line of march was intercepted, but he imagined the French to be only 5000 or 6000, for the exact situation and strength of an enemy were particulars that seldom troubled Spanish generals.

The 25th of February the head of Reding's column was suddenly fired upon, at daybreak, by Souham's detachment, at Pixa Moxons. The French were immediately driven back upon the main body, and, the attack being continued, the whole division was forced to give way. During the fight the Spanish baggage and artillery passed the Francoli river; and the road to Tarragona being thus opened, Reding might have effected his retreat without difficulty, but he continued to press Souham until St. Cyr, who had received early intelligence of the action, came down in all haste, from Pla, upon the left flank of the Spaniards, and the latter seeing the French dragoons, who preceded the infantry, enter in line, retired in good order across the Francoli, and took a position behind that river. From this ground Reding proposed to retreat in the evening; but St. Cyr obliged him to fight there.

BATTLE OF VALLS.

It was three o'clock when, Pino's division having come up, St. Cyr's recommenced the action. The banks of the Francoli were steep and rugged, and the Spanish position strong and difficult of access; but the French general, as he himself states, wishing to increase the moral ascendancy of his soldiers, forbade the artillery, although excellently placed for execution, to play upon Reding's battalions, fearing that otherwise the latter would fly before they could be attained by the infantry, and, under this curious arrangement, the action was begun by the light troops.

The French, or rather the Italians, were superior in numbers to the Spaniards, and the columns, covered by the skirmishers, passed the river with great alacrity, and ascended the heights under an exceedingly regular fire, which was continued until the attacking troops had nearly reached the summit of the position; but then both Swiss and Catalans began to waver, and, ere the assailants could close with them, broke, and were charged by the French cavalry. Reding, after receiving several sabre wounds, saved himself at Tarragona, where the greatest number of the vanquished also took refuge, but the remainder fled in the greatest disorder on the routes of Tortosa and Lerida.

The count of Castal d'Orius, general of the cavalry, many superior officers, and the whole of the artillery and baggage were taken, and 4000 men were killed or wounded; the loss of the French was about 1000; and, during all these movements and actions, Reding received no assistance from the Somatenes; nor is this surprising, for it may be taken as an axiom in war, that armed peasants are only formidable to stragglers. When the regular forces engage, the peasant, sensible of his own weakness, gladly quits the field.

The 26th, Souham's division, descending into the plain of Tarragona, took possession of the large and rich town of Reus, from which, contrary to the general custom, the inhabitants had not fled. Pino's division occupied Pla, Alcover, and Valls; detachments were sent to Salou and Villaseca, on the sea-coast, west of Tarragona; and Chabot, being recalled from Igualada, was posted at the abbey of Santa Creus, to watch the troops under Wimpfen, who was still at St. Coloma de Querault.

The battle of Valls finished the regular warfare in Catalonia. Those detachments, which by the previous movements had been cut off from the main body of the army, joined the Somatenes, and, acting as Partizan corps, troubled the communications of the French; but St. Cyr had no longer a regular army to deal with in the field; and Tortosa, which was in a miserably defenceless condition, and without provisions, must have fallen, if after the battle any attempt had been made against it. But the whole country was filled with confusion; nor was the disorder momentary; for although Lazan, after his defeat near Zaragoza, carried a few men to Tortosa, he declared himself

independent of Reding's command. The fall of Zaragoza, also, had stricken terror far and wide; and the neighbouring provinces feared and acted each for its own safety, without regard to any general plan.

The fugitives from Valls, joined to the troops already in Tarragona, crowded the latter place; and an infectious disorder breaking out, a great mortality ensued.

St. Cyr, satisfied that sickness should do the work of the sword, begirt the city, and resolved to hold his positions while food could be procured. In this policy he remained steadfast until the middle of March, although Wimpfen attacked and drove Chabran in succession from Igualada, Llacuna, and St. Quinti, to Villa Franca; and although the two Milans and Claros, acting between the Besos and the Llobregat, cut the communication with Barcelona, and in conjunction with the English squadron, renewed the blockade of that city. This plan was injudicious; for notwithstanding the sickness in Tarragona, the subjugation of Catalonia was retarded by the cessation of active hostilities. The object of the general should have been, while the terror of his victories was fresh, to gain secure posts, such as Tortosa, Tarragona, Gerona, or Lerida, from whence he could issue out, and clear the country, from time to time, of the bands that might be assembled. His inactivity after the battle of Molino del Rey, and at this period, enabled the Catalonians to recover from their fears, and to put these towns in a state of defence.

Towards the middle of March the resources of the country being all exhausted, St. Cyr at last determined to abandon the plains of Tarragona, and take some position where he could feed his troops, cover the projected siege of Gerona, and yet be at hand to relieve Barcelona. The valleys about Vich alone offered all these advantages; but as Claros and the Milans were in force at Molino del Rey, he ordered Chabran to drive them from that point, that the sick and wounded men might be first transferred from Valls to Barcelona.

The 10th of March, Chabran sent a battalion with one piece of artillery on that service. The Migueletes thinking it was the advanced guard of a greater force, abandoned the post; but being undeceived, returned, beat the battalion, and took the gun. The 12th, Chabran having received orders to march with his whole division, consisting of eight battalions and three squadrons, reached the bridge, but returned without daring to attack. St. Cyr repeated his orders, and on the 14th the troops, apparently ashamed of their general's irresolution, fell on vigorously, and, having carried the bridge, established themselves on the heights on both sides of the river.

The communication thus opened, it was found that Duhesme, pressed by the Migueletes without, was also extremely fearful of conspiracies within the walls: that his fears, and the villainous conduct of his police, had at last excited the inhabitants to attempt that which their enemies seemed so much to dread; and in March, an insurrection being planned in concert with the Migueletes and with the English squadron, the latter came close in and cannonaded the town on the 10th, expecting that Wimpfen, the Milans, and Claros would have assaulted the gates, which was to have been the signal for the insurrection within.

The inhabitants were the more sanguine of success, because there were above 2000 Spanish prisoners in the city; and outside the walls there were two tercios secretly recruited and maintained by the citizens: these men being without uniforms, constantly passed in and out of the town, and Duhesme was never able to discover or to prevent them. This curious circumstance is illustrative of the peculiar genius of the Spaniards, which in all matters of surprise and stratagem is unrivalled. The project was, however, baffled by Chabran's action at Molino del Rey, on the 14th, which dispersed the Partizan corps outside the walls; and the British squadron being exposed to a heavy gale, and disappointed in the co-operation from the land, sailed away on the 11th.

St. Cyr intended to commence his retrograde movement on the 18th; but on the 17th a cannonade was heard on the side of Momblanch, which was ascertained to proceed from a detachment of 600 men, with two guns, under the

command of Colonel Briche. This officer being sent by Mortier to open the communication with St. Cyr, after the fall of Zaragoza. had forced his way through the Spanish Partizan corps. To favour his return the army halted two days ; but the enterprise, after a trial, appeared so dangerous, that he relinquished it, and attached himself to the 7th corps.

The inactivity that succeeded the battle of Valls, and the timidity displayed by Chabran in the subsequent skirmishes, having depressed the spirits of the troops, they contemplated the approaching retreat with great uneasiness ; and many officers, infected with panic doubt, advised the general to hide his movements from the enemy : but he, anxious to restore their confidence, took the part of giving the Spaniards a formal notice of his intentions ; and desired of Reding that he would send proper officers to take over the hospitals which had been fitted up at Valls, as well as some of the French wounded that could not be moved. This done, the army commencing its retreat, reached Villa Franca the 21st of March ; and the 22nd passed the Llobregat, followed, but not molested, by some feeble Spanish detachments.

The 23rd, General Pino attacked and defeated Wimpfen, who having rallied the corps of Claros and the Milans, after the affair on the 24th, had taken a position at Tarrasa. Pino pursued him to the vicinity of Manresa, foraged that country, and returned with sufficient provisions to feed the army, without drawing on the magazines of Barcelona.

During these proceedings, Reding died in Tarragona of his wounds. He had been received there with great dissatisfaction after the battle of Valls, and the interference of the British consul was necessary to save him from the first fury of the populace, who were always ready to attribute a defeat to the treachery of the general. His military conduct was, by his own officers, generally and justly condemned ; but although his skill in war was slight, his courage and honesty were unquestionable ; and he was of distinguished humanity ; for, at this unhappy period, when the French prisoners in every part of Spain were tortured with the most savage cruelty, when to refrain from such deeds was to incur suspicion, Reding had the manliness, not only to repress all barbarities within the range of his command, but even to conclude a convention with St. Cyr, under which the wounded men on both sides were to receive decent treatment, and to be exchanged as soon as their hurts were cured.

In his last moments Reding complained that he had been ill-served as a general ; that the Somatenes had not supported him ; that his orders were neglected ; his plans disclosed to the enemy ; and that he could never get true intelligence ; complaints which the experience of Moore, Baird, Cradock, Murray, and, above all, of Wellington, proved to be applicable to every part of Spain, and every period of the war.

Coupigny succeeded Reding, but he was soon superseded by General Blake, who, for reasons hereafter to be mentioned, was appointed captain-general of the "Coronilla," or Little Crown, a title given to the three provinces of Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia, when united ; and, as the warfare in Aragon thus became immediately connected with that in Catalonia, I shall here give a short account of what was passing in the former province.

When Zaragoza fell, Marshal Lasnes was recalled to France ; Mortier, who succeeded him in the command, sent detachments against Jaca and Monzon ; and threatened Mequinenza and Lerida. The Fort of Monzon, commanding a passage over the Cinca river, was abandoned by the Spaniards, and the town and citadel of Jaca surrendered : whereby the French opened a new and important communication with France. But, Lerida being fruitlessly summoned, and some slight demonstrations made against Mequinenza having failed, Mortier cantoned his troops on both sides of the Ebro, from Barbastro to Alcanitz, and despatched Colonel Briche, as we have seen, to open a communication with the 7th corps ; but, in April, the 5th corps marched for Castile, and General Junot was left with a part only of the 3rd corps to maintain Aragon.

Many of the French artillerymen and non-commissioned officers had been withdrawn from Spain to serve in Germany. One brigade of the 3rd corps also was employed to protect the communications on the side of Navarre, and another was detached to escort the prisoners from Zaragoza to Bayonne. These drafts, added to the loss sustained during the siege, reduced the number of troops in Aragon to about 12,000 disposable men under arms.

Junot, being sick, returned to France, and General Suchet succeeded him. The weakness of the army gave great uneasiness to the new general,—an uneasiness which was not allayed by finding that men and officers were, from various causes, discontented and dispirited. Suchet was, however, no ordinary man; and, with equal prudence and vigour, he commenced a system of discipline in his corps, and of order in his government, that afterwards carried him, with scarcely a check, from one success to another, until he obtained the rank of marshal for himself, and the honour for his corps of being the only one in Spain that never suffered any signal reverse.

Suchet hoped that the battle of Valls, and other defeats sustained by the Spaniards at this period, would give him time to re-organize his troops in tranquillity—but this hope soon vanished. The peasantry, observing the weakness of the 3rd corps, only waited for a favourable opportunity to rise, and the Migueletes and Somatenes of the mountains about Lerida and Mequinenza were, under the command of Colonel Pereña and Colonel Baget, already in activity.

While the Duke of Abrantes yet held the command, Blake's appointment took place; and that general drawing troops from Valencia and Tarragona, and being joined by Lazan, fixed his quarters at Morella, on the frontier of Aragon. Designing to operate in that province rather than in Catalonia, he endeavoured to re-kindle the fire of insurrection; nor was fortune adverse to him. A part of the garrison of Monzon having made an unsuccessful marauding excursion beyond the Cinca, the citizens fell upon those who remained, and obliged them to abandon that post, which was immediately occupied by Pereña. The Duke of Abrantes sent eight companies of infantry and 30 cuirassiers to retake the place: but Baget having reinforced Pereña, the French were repulsed, and the Cinca suddenly overflowing behind them, cut off their retreat. The cavalry, plunging with their horses into the river, escaped by swimming; but the infantry finding the lower passages guarded by the garrison of Lerida, and the upper cut off by the Partizan corps, after three days' marching and skirmishing, surrendered to Pereña and Baget. The prisoners were carried to Tarragona, and soon afterwards exchanged, in pursuance of a convention made by Reding and St. Cyr.

This little success was, as usual, sufficient to excite the most extravagant hopes, and the garrison of Mequinenza having, about the same time, burnt a bridge of boats which the French had thrown over the Ebro at Caspe, Blake immediately advanced, and, driving back the French from Beceyta and Val de Ajorfa, entered Alcanitz. The beaten troops retired in haste and with loss to Samper and Ixar; and it was at this moment, when the French were harassed on both banks of the Ebro, and their wings separated by the destruction of the bridge at Caspe, that Suchet arrived to take the command of the 3rd corps. Seeing his divisions disseminated over a great tract of country, and in danger of being beaten in detail, he immediately ordered General Habert to abandon the left bank of the Ebro, cross that river at Fuentes, and follow in reserve upon Ixar, where Suchet himself rallied all the rest of the troops, with the exception of a small garrison left in Zaragoza.

BATTLE OF ALCANITZ.

The French battalions were fearful and disorderly: but the general, anxious to raise their spirits, marched towards Blake on the 23rd of May. The latter was in position in front of Alcanitz, a bridge over the Guadalupe was immediately behind his centre, which was covered by a hill; his left was well posted near some pools of water, but his right was rather exposed. The French

had about 8000 infantry and 700 cavalry in the field, and the Spaniards about 12,000 of all arms.

Suchet observing Blake's dispositions, judged that if he could carry the hill in the centre, and so separate the Spanish wings, the latter would be cut off from the bridge of Alcanitz, and obliged to surrender. In this design he directed a column against each wing, to draw Blake's attention to his flanks; but, when the skirmishers were well engaged, 3000 men, pushing rapidly along the main road, attacked the hillock. A brisk fire of musketry and artillery, however, checked their progress; the Spaniards stood firm, and the French, after a feeble effort to ascend the hill, began to waver, and, finally, fled outright. Suchet, who was himself slightly wounded, rallied them in the plain, and remained there for the rest of the day, but without daring to renew the action. In the night he retreated; and, although not pursued, his troops were seized with panic, and, at daylight, came pouring into Samper with all the tumult and disorder of a rout. Blake's inactivity enabled Suchet to restore order; he caused the man who first commenced the alarm to be shot; and then, encouraging the troops that they might not seem to fly, he rested in position two whole days, after which he retreated to Zaragoza.

This action at Alcanitz was a subject of triumph and rejoicing all over Spain. The supreme junta conferred an estate upon Blake; the kingdom of Murcia was added to his command; his army rapidly augmented; and he himself greatly elated and confirmed in a design he had formed to retake Zaragoza, turned his whole attention to Aragon, and totally neglected Catalonia, to which province it is time to return.

St. Cyr remained in Barcelona for a considerable period, during which he endeavoured to remedy the evils of Duhesme's government, and to make himself acquainted with the political disposition of the inhabitants. He filled the magazines with three months' provisions; and, as the prisoners within the walls were an incumbrance, on account of their subsistence, and a source of uneasiness from their numbers, he resolved to send them to France. The 15th of April, having transferred his sick and weakly men to the charge of Duhesme, and exchanged Chabran's for Lecchi's division, he recommenced his march, and reached Granollers, giving out that he was returning to the frontier of France, lest the Catalans should remove their provisions from Vich, and thus frustrate his principal object.

The Migueletes, under the two Milans and Claros, were, however, on the watch to harass the army, and had taken post beyond Garriga on each side of a long and narrow defile in the valley of the Congosto. This pass of surprising natural strength was barricaded with trees and pieces of rock, and mined in several places; and Wimpfen also held his corps at a little distance, ready to join Claros at the first alarm. The 16th, Lecchi's division, escorting 2000 prisoners, appeared at the head of this defile, and an action commenced, but in an hour the Migueletes fled on all sides; for St. Cyr, fully aware of the strength of the position, had secretly detached Pino to attack Wimpfen; and, while Lecchi was engaged at the entrance, Souham and Chabot, traversing the mountain, arrived, the one upon the flank, and the other at the further end of this formidable pass.

The 18th, the army was established in the valley and town of Vich; but the inhabitants, with the exception of the bishop and a few old men, fled to the mountains with their effects, leaving, however, their provisions behind. St. Cyr then posted Chabot's and Pino's divisions at Centellas, San Martin, Tona, and Collespino, to guard the entrance into the valley. Souham remained at Vich, his right being at Roda and Manlieu on the Ter, and his advanced posts at Gulp, St. Sebastian, and St. Eularia. The 24th, Lecchi marched, with the prisoners, by Filieu de Pallerols to Besalu on the Fluvia; he was attacked several times on the route, but succeeded in delivering his charge to General Reille, and then returned with the first information received by St. Cyr of Napoleon's arrival in Paris, and

the certainty of a war with Austria. To balance this, a movable column sent to Barcelona brought back the pleasing intelligence that Rear-Admiral Comaso with a French squadron, having baffled the extreme vigilance of Lord Collingwood, had reached that city with ample supplies. Thus what may be called the irregular movements in Catalonia terminated, and the more methodical warfare of sieges commenced; but this part was committed to other hands. General Verdier had succeeded Reille in the Ampurdan, and Marshal Augereau was on the road to supersede St. Cyr.

OBSERVATIONS.


1. General St. Cyr's marches were hardy, his battles vigorous and delivered in right time and place; but his campaign, as a whole, may be characterised as one of great efforts without corresponding advantages. He himself attributes this to the condition of the 7th corps, destitute and neglected, because *the emperor disliked and wished to ruin its chief*; a strange accusation, and unsustained by reason or facts. What! Napoleon wilfully destroy his own armies! sacrifice 40,000 men, that a general, whom he was not obliged to employ at all, might be disgraced! General St. Cyr acknowledges, that when he received his instructions from the emperor, he observed the affliction of the latter at the recent loss of Dupont's force; yet he would have it believed, that, in the midst of this regret, that monarch, with a singular malice, was preparing greater disasters for himself, merely to disgrace the general commanding the 7th corps, and why? because the latter had formerly served with the army of the Rhine! Yet St. Cyr met with no reverses in Catalonia, and was afterwards made a marshal by this implacable enemy.

2. That the 7th corps was not well supplied, and that its commander was thereby placed in a difficult situation, is not to be disputed in the face of the facts stated by General St. Cyr; but if war were a state of ease and smoothness, the fame which attends successful generals would be less. Napoleon selected General St. Cyr because he thought him a capable commander; in feeble hands, he knew the 7th corps would be weak, but, with St. Cyr at its head, he judged it sufficient to overcome the Catalonians; nor was he much mistaken. Barcelona, the great object of solicitude, was saved; Rosas was taken; and if Tarragona and Tortosa did not also fall, the one after the battle of Molino del Rey, the other after that of Valls, it was because the French general did not choose to attack them. Those towns were without the slightest preparation for defence, moral or physical, and must have surrendered; nor can the unexpected and stubborn resistance of Gerona, Zaragoza, and Valencia be cited against this opinion. The latter cities were previously prepared and expectant of a siege; and yet, in every instance, except Valencia, there was a moment of dismay and confusion, not fatal, only because the besieging generals wanted that ready vigour which is the characteristic of great commanders.

3. General St. Cyr, aware that a mere calculation of numbers and equipment is but a poor measure of the strength of armies, exalts the enthusiasm and the courage of the Catalans, and seems to tremble at the danger which, owing to Napoleon's suicidal jealousy, menaced, at that period, not only the 7th corps but even the south of France. In answer to this, it may be observed that M. de St. Cyr did not hesitate, with 18,000 men having no artillery, and carrying only 60 rounds of musket-ammunition, to plunge into the midst of those terrible armies, to march through the mountains for weeks, to attack the strongest positions with the bayonet alone, nay, even to dispense with the use of his artillery, when he did bring it into action, lest his men should not have a sufficient contempt for their enemies. And who were these undaunted soldiers, so high in courage, so confident, so regardless of the great weapon of modern warfare? Not the select of the imperial guards, the conquerors in 100 battles, but raw levies, the dregs and scrapings of Italy, the refuse of Naples and of Rome, states which to name as military was to ridicule.

4. With such soldiers, the battles of Cardadeu, Molino, Igualada, and Valls,

Sketch Explanatory
of the
OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA,
IN
1808 and 1809.



were gained ; yet General St. Cyr does not hesitate to call the Migueletes, who were beaten at those places, the best light troops in the world. The best *light troops* are neither more nor less than the best troops in the world ; but if, instead of 15,000 Migueletes, the 4000 men composing Wellington's light division had been on the heights of Cardadeu, General St. Cyr's 60 rounds of ammunition would scarcely have carried him to Barcelona. The injurious force with which personal feelings act upon the judgment are well known, or it might excite wonder that so good a writer and so able a soldier should advance such fallacies.

5. General St. Cyr's work, admirable in many respects, bears, nevertheless, the stamp of carelessness. Thus, he affirms that Dupont's march to Andalusia encouraged the tumults of Aranjuez ; but the tumults of Aranjuez happened in the month of March, nearly three months previous to Dupont's movement, which took place in May and June. Again, he says that Napoleon, to make a solid conquest in the Peninsula, should have commenced with Catalonia, instead of overrunning Spain by the northern line of operations ; an opinion quite unsustainable. The progress of the 7th corps was impeded by the want of provisions, not by the enemy's force. Twenty thousand men could beat the Spaniards in the field, but they could not subsist. What could 300,000 men have done? Would it have given a just idea of Napoleon's power to employ the strength of his empire against the fortified towns in Catalonia? In what would the greater solidity of this plan have consisted? While the French were thus engaged, the patriots would have been organizing their armies ; England would have had time to bring all her troops into line, and 200,000 men placed between Zaragoza and Tortosa, or breaking into France by the western Pyrenees, while the Austrians were advancing to the Rhine, would have sorely shaken the solidity of General St. Cyr's plan.

6. The French emperor better understood what he was about ; he saw a nation intrinsically powerful and vehemently excited, yet ignorant of war, and wanting the aid which England was eager to give. All the elements of power existed in the Peninsula, and they were fast approximating to a centre, when Napoleon burst upon that country, and as the gathering of a waterspout is said to be sometimes prevented by the explosion of a gun, so the rising strength of Spain was dissipated by his sudden and dreadful assault. If the war was not then finished, it was because his lieutenants were tardy and jealous of each other.

7. St. Cyr appears to have fallen into an error, common enough in all times, and one very prevalent among the French generals in Spain. He considered his task as a whole in itself, instead of a constituent part of a greater system. He judged very well what was wanting for the 7th corps, to subjugate Catalonia in a solid manner, but he did not discern that it was fitting that the 7th corps should forget Catalonia, to aid the general plan against the Peninsula. Rosas surrendered at the very moment when Napoleon, after the victories of Baylen, Espinosa, Tudela, and the Somosierra, was entering Madrid as a conqueror. The battles of Cardadeu and Molino del Rey may, therefore, be said to have completely prostrated Spain, because the English army was isolated, the Spanish army destroyed, and Zaragoza invested. Was that a time to calculate the weight of powder and the number of pick-axes required for a formal siege of Tarragona? The whole Peninsula was shaken to the centre, the proud hearts of the Spaniards sunk with terror, and in that great consternation, to be daring was, on the part of the French generals, to be prudent. St. Cyr was not in a condition to besiege Tarragona, formally, but he might have assaulted it with less danger than he incurred by his march to Barcelona. The battle of Valls was another epoch of the same kind ; the English army had re-embarked, and the rout of Ucles had taken place. Portugal was invaded and Zaragoza had just fallen. That was a time to render victory fruitful, yet no attempt was made against Tortosa.

8. St. Cyr, who justly blames Palacios and Vives for remaining before Barcelona instead of carrying their army to the Ter and the Fluvia, seems inclined to applaud Reding for conduct equally at variance with the true principles of war. It was his own inactivity after the battle of Molino that produced the army of Reding, and the impatient folly of that army, and of the people, produced the plan which led to the route of Igualada and the battle of Valls. But, instead of disseminating his 30,000 men on a line of 60 miles, from Tarragona to the Upper Llobregat, Reding should have put Tarragona and Tortosa into a state of defence, and, leaving a small corps of observation near the former, have made Lerida the base of his operations. In that position, and keeping the bulk of his force in one mass, he might have acted on St. Cyr's flanks and rear effectually, by the road of Cervera—and without danger to himself; nor could the French general have attempted aught against Tarragona.

But it is not with reference to the 7th corps alone that Lerida was the proper base of the Spanish army. Let us suppose that the supreme junta had acted for a moment upon a rational system; that the Valencian troops, instead of remaining at Morella, had been directed on Mequinenza and that the Duke of Infantado's force had been carried from Cuenca to the same place instead of being routed at Ucles. Thus, in the beginning of February, more than 50,000 regular troops would have been assembled at Lerida, encircled by the fortresses of Monzon, Balaguer, Mequinenza, Tarragona, and Tortosa. Its lines of operations would have been as numerous as the roads. The Seu d'Urgel, called the granary of Catalonia, would have supplied corn, and the communication with Valencia would have been direct and open. On this central and impregnable position such a force might have held the 7th corps in check, and also raised the siege of Zaragoza; nor could the 1st corps have followed Infantado's movements without abandoning the whole of the emperor's plans against Portugal and Andalusia.

9. St. Cyr praises Reding's project for surrounding the French, and very gravely observes that the *only method* of defeating it was by taking the offensive himself. Nothing can be juster; but he should have added that it was a *certain method*; and, until we find a great commander acting upon Reding's principles, this praise can only be taken as an expression of civility towards a brave adversary. St. Cyr's own movements were very different; he disliked Napoleon personally, but he did not dislike his manner of making war. Buonaparte's campaign in the Alps against Beaulieu was not an unheeded lesson. There is, however, one proceeding of St. Cyr's for which there has been no precedent, and which it is unlikely will ever be imitated, namely, the stopping of the fire of the artillery when it was doing infinite execution, that a moral ascendancy over the enemy might be established. It is impossible to imagine a more cutting sarcasm on the courage of the Catalans than this fact; yet General St. Cyr states that his adversaries were numerous, and fought bravely. Surely he could not have commanded so long without knowing that *there is in all battles a decisive moment, when every weapon, every man, every combination of force that can be brought to bear, is necessary to gain the victory.*

10. If General St. Cyr's own marches and battles did not sufficiently expose the fallacy of his opinions relative to the vigour of the Catalans, Lord Collingwood's correspondence would supply the deficiency. That able and sagacious man, writing at this period, says—

"In Catalonia, everything seems to have gone wrong since the fall of Rosas. The Spaniards are in considerable force, yet are dispersed and panic-struck whenever the enemy appears."—"The applications for supplies are unlimited; they want money, arms, and ammunition, of which no use appears to be made when they get them."—"In the English papers, I see accounts of successes, and convoys cut off, and waggons destroyed, which are not true. What has been done in that way has been by the boats of our frigates, which have, in two or three instances, landed men and attacked the enemy with great gallantry.

The Somatenes range the hills in a disorderly way, and fire at a distance, but retire on being approached."—"The multitudes of men do not make a force."

Add to this the Spanish historian Cabane's statements that the Migueletes were always insubordinate, detested the service of the line, and were many of them armed only with staves, and we have the full measure of the Catalans' resistance.

11. It was not the vigour of the Catalans, but of the English, that in this province, as in every part of the Peninsula, retarded the progress of the French. Would St. Cyr have wasted a month before Rosas? Would he have been hampered in his movements by his fears for the safety of Barcelona? Would he have failed to besiege and take Tarragona and Tortosa, if a French fleet had attended his progress by the coast, or if it could even have made two runs in safety? To Lord Collingwood, who, like the Roman Bibulus, perished of sickness on his decks rather than relax in his watching,—to his keen judgment, his unceasing vigilance, the resistance made by the Catalans was due. His fleet it was that interdicted the coast-line to the French, protected the transport of the Spanish supplies from Valencia, assisted in the defence of the towns, aided the retreat of the beaten armies; in short, did that which the Spanish fleets in Cadiz and Carthagená should have done. But the supreme junta, equally disregarding the remonstrances of Lord Collingwood, the good of their own country, and the treaty with England, by which they were bound to prevent their ships from falling into the hands of the enemy, left their fleets to rot in harbour, although money was advanced, and the assistance of the British seamen offered, to fit them out for sea.

Having now related the principal operations that took place in the eastern and central provinces of Spain, which were so suddenly overrun by the French emperor; having shown that, however restless the Spaniards were under the yoke imposed upon them, they were unable to throw it off; I shall turn to Portugal, where the tide of invasion still flowing onward, although with diminished volume, was first stayed, and finally overpowered and forced back, by a counter flood of mightier strength.

BOOK VI.

CHAPTER I.

TRANSACTIONS IN PORTUGAL.

WHEN Sir John Moore marched from Portugal, the regency, established by Sir Hew Dalrymple, nominally governed that country; but the weak characters of the members, the listless habits engendered by the ancient system of misrule, the intrigues of the Oporto faction, and the general turbulence of the people soon produced an alarming state of anarchy. Private persons usurped the functions of government, justice was disregarded, insubordination and murder were hailed as indications of patriotism. War was the universal cry, but military preparations were wholly neglected; for the nation, in its foolish pride, believed that the French had neither strength nor spirit for a second invasion.*

In Lisbon there was a French faction. The merchants were apprehensive, the regency was unpopular, the public mind unsettled; and, in Oporto, the violence of both people and soldiers was such, that Sir Harry Burrard sent two British regiments there, by sea, to preserve tranquillity; in fine, the seeds of disorder were widely cast and sprouting vigorously before the English cabinet thought fit to accredit a responsible diplomatist near the government, or to

* Appendix, No. 32, section 1.

place a permanent chief at the head of the forces left by Sir John Moore. The convention of Cintra was known in England in September. The regency was established, and the frontier fortresses occupied by British troops in the same month; yet it was not until the middle of December that Mr. Villiers and Sir John Cradock, charged with the conduct of the political and military proceedings in Portugal, reached Lisbon, and thus the important interval, between the departure of Junot and their arrival, was totally neglected by the English cabinet.

Sir Hew Dalrymple, who had nominated the regency; Sir Arthur Wellesley, who, to local knowledge and powerful talents, added the influence of a victorious commander; Burrard, Spencer, were all removed from Portugal at the very moment when the presence of persons acquainted with the real state of affairs was essential to the well-being of the British interests in that country; and this error was the offspring of passion and incapacity; for, if the convention of Cintra had been rightly understood, the ministers, appreciating the advantages of that treaty, would have resisted the clamour of the moment, and the generals would not have been withdrawn from the public service abroad to meet unjust and groundless charges at home.

It may be disputed whether Portugal was the fittest theatre for the first operations of a British army; but, when that country was actually freed from the presence of an enemy; when the capital and the frontier fortresses were occupied by English troops; when Sir John Moore, leaving his hospitals, baggage, and magazines there, as in a place of arms, had marched to Spain, the question was on longer doubtful. The ancient relations between England and Portugal, the greatness of the port of Lisbon, the warlike disposition of the Portuguese, and, above all, the singularly-happy circumstance that there was neither court nor monarch to balance the English influence, and that even the nomination of the regency was the work of an English general, offered such great and obvious advantages as could nowhere else be obtained. It was a miserable policy that, neglecting such an occasion, retained Sir Arthur Wellesley in England, while Portugal, like a drunken man, at once weak and turbulent, was reeling on the edge of a precipice.

The 5th of December Sir John Cradock, being on his voyage to Lisbon, touched at Coruña. Fifteen hundred thousand dollars had just arrived there in the *Lavinia* frigate; but, Sir John Moore's intention to retreat upon Portugal being known, Cradock divided this sum, and carried away 800,000 dollars, proposing to leave a portion at Oporto, and to take the remainder to Lisbon, that Moore might find, on whatever line he retreated, a supply of money.

From Coruña he proceeded to Oporto, and landed to gather information of the state of affairs. Here he found that Sir Robert Wilson had succeeded in organizing, under the title of the Lusitanian Legion, about 1300 men, and that others were on their way to reinforce him; but, this excepted, nothing at Oporto, civil or military, bespoke either arrangement or common sense.* The bishop, still intent upon acquiring supreme rule, was deeply engaged with secret intrigues, and, under him, a number of factious and designing persons instigated the populace to violent actions, with a view to profit from their excesses.

The formation of the Lusitanian Legion was originally a project of the Chevalier da Souza, the Portuguese minister in London. Souza was one of the bishop's faction, and the prelate calculated upon this force not so much to repel the enemy as to give weight to his own party against the government. The men were promised higher pay than any other Portuguese soldiers, to the great discontent of the latter, and they were clad in uniforms differing in colour from the national troops. The regency, who dreaded the machinations of the turbulent priest, entertained the utmost jealousy of the legion, which, in truth,

* Appendix, No. 32, section 2.

was a most anomalous force, and, as might be expected from its peculiar constitution, was productive of much embarrassment.

Sir John Cradock left 300,000 dollars at Oporto, and having directed the two British battalions which were in that neighbourhood to march to Almeida, he took on board a small detachment of German troops, and set sail for Lisbon; but, before his departure, he strongly advised Sir Robert Wilson to move such of his legionaries as were sufficiently organized to Villa Real, in Tras os Montes, a place appointed by the regency for the assembly of the forces in the north. Sir Robert, tired of the folly and disgusted with the insolence and excesses of the ruling mob, readily adopted this advice, so far as to quit Oporto, but, having views of his own, took the direction of Almeida instead of Villa Real.*

The state of the capital was little better than that of Oporto. There was arrangement neither for present nor for future defence, and the populace, albeit less openly encouraged to commit excesses, were quite uncontrolled by the government.† The regency had a keener dread of domestic insurrection than of the return of the French, whose operations they regarded with even less anxiety than the bishop did, as being further removed than he was from the immediate theatre of war. Their want of system and vigilance, evinced by the following fact, was truly surprising. Sattaro and another person, having contracted for the supply of the British troops, demanded, in the name of the English general, all the provisions in the public stores of Portugal, and then sold them to the English commissaries for his own profit.

Sir John Cradock's instructions directed him to reinforce Sir John Moore's army, and, if the course of events should bring that general back to Portugal, he was not to be interfered with. In fact, Cradock's operations were limited to the holding of Elvas, Almeida, and the capital; for, although he was directed to encourage the formation of a native army upon a good and regular system, and even to act in concert with it on the frontier, he was debarred from political interference; and even his relative situation, as to rank, was left unsettled until the arrival of Mr. Villiers, to whose directions all political and many military arrangements were entrusted.‡

It is evident that the influence of a general thus fettered, and commanding only a small force, which was moreover much scattered, must be feeble and insufficient to produce any real amelioration in the military situation of the country. But the English ministers, attentive to the false information obtained from interested agents, still imagined that not only the Spanish, but the Portuguese armies were numerous, and to be relied upon; and they confidently expected, that the latter would be able to take an active part in the Spanish campaign.

Cradock, feeling the danger of this illusion, made it his first object to ascertain, and to transmit home, exact information of the real strength and efficiency of the native regular troops. They were nominally 20,000; but Miguel Percira Forjas, military secretary to the regency, and the ablest public man Portugal possessed, acknowledged that this force was a nullity, and that there were not more than 10,000 stand of serviceable arms in the kingdom, the greatest part of which were English. The troops themselves were undisciplined and unruly; and the militia and the "ordenanza," or armed peasantry, animated rather by a spirit of outrage than of enthusiasm, evinced no disposition to submit to regulation, neither was there any branch of administration free from the grossest disorder.

The Spanish dollar had a general acceptance in Portugal. The regency, under the pretence that a debased foreign coin would drive the Portuguese coin out of circulation, deprived the dollar of its current value. This regulation, true in principle, and applicable, as far as the Portuguese gold coin (which is

* Appendix, No. 35, section 1.

† Appendix, No. 32, section 5.

‡ Appendix, No. 33, section 1.

of peculiar fineness) was concerned, had, however, a most injurious effect. The Spanish dollar was in reality finer than the Portuguese silver cruzado-nova, and would finally have maintained its value, notwithstanding this decree. But a slur being thus thrown upon it by the government, the money changers contrived to run its value down for the moment, a matter of infinite importance; for the English soldiers and sailors being all paid in these dollars, at 4s. 6d., which was the true value, were thus suddenly mulcted fourpence in each, by the artificial depreciation of the moment. The men attributed this to fraud in the shopkeepers; the retail trade of Lisbon was interrupted, and quarrels between the tradesmen and the soldiers took place hourly.

To calm this effervescence, a second decree was promulgated, directing that the dollar should be received at the mint and in the public offices at its real value. It then appeared that the government could profit by coining the dollar of 4s. 6d. into cruzado-novas, a circumstance which gave the whole affair the appearance of an unworthy trick to recruit the treasury. This happened in October; and as the financial affairs were ill managed, and the regency destitute of vigour or capacity, the taxes were unpaid, the hard cash exhausted, and the treasury paper at a heavy discount when Cradock arrived. Upon the scroll thus unfolded he could only read confusion, danger, and misfortune; for such being the fruits of victory, what could be expected from disaster? and at this period (the middle of December) Sir John Moore was supposed to be in full retreat upon Portugal, followed by the emperor with one French army, while another threatened Lisbon by the line of the Tagus. The English troops in the kingdom did not amount to 10,000 men, including the sick, and they were ill equipped and scattered; moreover, the capital was crowded with women and children, with baggage and non-combatants, belonging as well to the army in Spain as to that in Portugal.

There were in the river three Portuguese ships of the line, two frigates, and eight smaller vessels of war; but none were in a state for sea, and the whole likely to fall into the hands of the enemy: for in the midst of this confusion Sir Charles Cotton was recalled, without a successor being appointed; and although the zeal and talents of Captain Halket, the senior officer on the station, amply compensated for the departure of the admiral, as far as professional duties were concerned, he could not aid the general, nor deal with the regency as vigorously as an officer of higher rank, and formally accredited, could have done.

Sir John Cradock, although fully sensible of his own difficulties, with a very disinterested zeal, resolved to make the reinforcing of Sir John Moore's army his first care; but his force at this time was, as I have already said, less than 10,000 men of all arms. It consisted of eight British and four German battalions of infantry, four troops of dragoons, and 30 pieces of artillery, of which, however, only six were horsed so as to take the field. There was, also, a battalion of the 60th regiment, but it was composed principally of Frenchmen, recruited from the prison ships, and had been sent back from Spain, as the soldiers could not be trusted near their countrymen.

Of these 13 battalions two were in Abrantes, one in Elvas, three at Lamego on the Duero, one in Almeida, and the remaining six at Lisbon. Three of the four battalions in the north were immediately directed to join Sir John Moore by the route of Salamanca; and of those in the south, two, accompanied by a demi-brigade of artillery, were sent to him from Abrantes, by the road of Castello Branco and Ciudad Rodrigo.

The 19th of December, Mr. Villiers having arrived, Sir John Cradock forwarded to the regency a strong representation of the dangerous state of Portugal. He observed that there was neither activity in the government nor enthusiasm among the people; that the army, deficient in numbers, and still more so in discipline, was scattered and neglected; and, notwithstanding that the aspect of affairs was so threatening, the regency were apparently without

any system, or fixed principle of action. He proposed, therefore, that a general enrolment of all the people should take place; and from the British stores he offered a supply of 1000 muskets and 10,000 pikes. This giving of pikes to the people appears to have been in compliance with Mr. Villiers' wishes, and betrayed more zeal than prudence; for certainly a general levy and arming with pikes of the turbulent populace of a capital city, at such a conjuncture, was more likely to lead to confusion and mischief than to any effectual defence. But the main objects pressing upon the general's attention were sufficiently numerous and contradictory to render it difficult for him to avoid errors.

It was a part of his instructions, and of manifest importance, to send reinforcements to Sir John Moore. But it was equally necessary to keep a force towards the frontier on the line of the Tagus, seeing that the 4th French corps had just passed that river at Almaraz, had defeated Galluzzo's army and menaced Badajos, which was without arms, ammunition, or provisions; and, moreover, the populace there were in commotion, and slaying the chief persons.* Now, Sir John Cradock's instructions directed him to keep his troops in a position that would enable him to abandon Portugal, if a very superior force should press him; but as, in such a case, he was to carry off not only the British army, but the Portuguese navy and stores, to destroy what he could not remove, and to receive on board his ships all the natives who might be desirous of escaping, it was of pressing necessity to ship the women, children, and baggage, in fine, all the encumbrances belonging to Moore's army, immediately, that his own rear might be clear for a sudden embarkation.† In short, he was to send his troops to Spain, and yet defend Portugal; to excite confidence in the Portuguese, and yet openly to carry on the preparations for abandoning that country.

The populace of Lisbon were, however, already uneasy at the rumours of an embarkation, and it was doubtful if they would permit even the British non-combatants to get on board quietly, much less suffer the forts to be dismantled, and the ships of war to be carried off, without a tumult, which, at such a conjuncture, would have been fatal to all parties. Hence it was imperative to maintain a strong garrison in Lisbon and in the forts commanding the mouth of the river; and this draft, together with the troops absorbed by the fortresses of Almeida and Elvas, reduced the fighting men in the field to insignificance.

The regency, knowing the temper of the people, and fearing to arm them, were not very eager to enforce the levy; yet, anxious to hide their weakness, they promised, at the urgent solicitations of the English general, to send 6000 troops to Alcantara, on the Spanish frontier, with a view to observe the march of the 4th corps,—a promise which they never intended, and indeed were unable, to perform. Forjas, who was supposed to be very inimical to the British influence, frankly declared that they neither could nor would move without an advance of money, and Sir John Cradock, although he recommended that this aid should be given, had no power to grant it himself.

Letters from Sir John Cradock, dated at Salamanca, now reached Lisbon: they increased the anxiety to reinforce the army in Spain; but, as they clearly showed that reverses were to be expected, Cradock, although resolved to maintain himself in Portugal as long as it was possible to do so without a breach of his instructions, felt more strongly that timely preparation for an embarkation should be made, especially as the rainy season, in which south-west winds prevail, had set in, and rendered the departure of vessels from the Tagus very uncertain. Meanwhile the internal state of Portugal was in no wise amended, or likely to amend.

The government had, indeed, issued a decree, on the 23rd of December, for organizing the population of Lisbon in 16 legions, but only one battalion each was to parade at the same moment for exercise, and those only on Sundays, nor were the legions, at any time, to assemble without the order of the general

* Appendix, No. 31, section 1.

† Ibid, No. 33, section 1.

commanding the province; and this regulation, which rendered the whole measure absurd, was dictated by the fears of the regency.

A proposal to prepare the Portuguese vessels for sea was acceded to, without any apparent dissatisfaction; but the government, secretly jealous of their allies, fomented or encouraged discontent and suspicion among the people. No efforts were made to improve the regular force, none to forward the march of troops to Alcantara; and so inactive or so callous were the regency to the rights of humanity, that a number of French prisoners, captured at various periods by the Portuguese, and accumulated at Lisbon, were denied subsistence.* Sir John Cradock, after many fruitless representations, was forced to charge himself with their supply, to avert the horrors of seeing them starved to death. The provisions necessary for Fort La Lippe were also withheld, and General Leite, acting upon the authority of the regency, strenuously urged that the British troops should evacuate that fortress.†

The march of the reinforcements for Sir John Moore left only 300 dragoons and seven battalions available for the defence of Portugal, of which four were necessarily in garrison, and the remainder were unable to take the field, in default of mules, of which animal the country seemed bereft; yet, at this moment, as if in derision, Mr. Frere, the central junta, the junta of Badajos, and the regency of Portugal, were, with common and characteristic foolishness, pressing Sir John Cradock to march into the south of Spain, although there was scarcely a Spanish soldier there in arms to assist him; and such a movement, if it had been either prudent or practicable, was directly against his instructions.

Towards the end of December, the communication with Sir John Moore was suddenly interrupted, and the line of the Tagus acquired greater importance. The troops going from Elvas to the army in Spain were, therefore, directed to halt at Castello Branco, and General Richard Stewart, who commanded them, being reinforced with 200 cavalry, was ordered, for the moment, to watch the roads by Salvatierra and the two Idanhas, and to protect the flying bridges at Abrantes and Vilha Velha from the enemy's incursions. At the same time, a promise was obtained from the regency that all the Portuguese troops in the Alemtejo should be collected at Campo Mayor and Portalegre.

Sir John Cradock fixed upon Sacavem as the position in which his main body should be concentrated, intending to defend that point as long as he could with so few troops; and, as he knew that Almeida, although full of British stores, and important in every way, was, with respect to its own defence, utterly neglected by the regency, and that even the presence of a British force there was viewed with jealousy, he sent Brigadier-General A. Cameron, with instructions to collect the convalescents of Moore's army, to unite them with the two battalions still at Almeida, and then to make his way to the army in Spain; but if the attempt should be judged too dangerous, Cameron was to return to Lisbon. In either case, the stores and the sick men lying at Almeida were to be directed upon Oporto.

The paucity of cavalry was severely felt on the frontier. It prevented the general from ascertaining the real strength and objects of the enemy's parties, and the Portuguese reports were notoriously contradictory and false. The 14th dragoons, 700 strong, commanded by Major-General Cotton, had been disembarked since the 22nd of December, and were destined for the army in Spain; but such was the penury of the country, or the difficulty of drawing forth its resources, that the commissary-general doubted if he could forward that small body, even by detachments. Nor is this surprising, for many of the debts left by Moore's army were yet unpaid, and sufficient confidence was not established among the peasantry to induce them to bring forward the necessary supplies upon credit.

Rumours of reverses in Spain were now rife, and acquired importance, when it became known that 4000 infantry and 2000 cavalry, the advanced guard of

* Appendix, No. 32, section 4.

† Ibid, section 5.

30,000 French troops, were actually at Merida, on the road to Badajos, which town, as I have already said, was not only in a state of anarchy, but destitute of provisions, arms, and ammunition. If, at this time, the Portuguese force had been assembled at Alcantara, Sir John Cradock would have supported them with the British brigades, at Abrantes and Castello Branco ; but not a man had been put in motion, and he, feeling no confidence either in the troops or in the promises of the regency, resolved to concentrate his own army near Lisbon. General Stewart was, therefore, directed to destroy the bridges of Vilha Velha and Abrantes, and to fall back to Sacavem.

Meanwhile, the Lisbon populace, supposing that the English general designed to abandon them without necessity, were violently excited. The regency, either from fear or folly, made no effort to preserve tranquillity, and the people, feeling their own strength, proceeded from one excess to another, until it became evident that, in a forced embarkation, the British would have to fight their allies as well as their enemies. At this gloomy period, when ten marches would have brought the French to Lisbon, when a stamp of Napoleon's foot would have extinguished that spark of war which afterwards blazed over the Peninsula, Sir John Moore made his daring movement upon Sahagun ; and Portugal, gasping as in a mortal agony, was instantly relieved.

CHAPTER II.

It was the advanced guard of the 4th corps that had approached Merida with the intention of proceeding to Badajos, and the emperor was, as we have seen, preparing to follow ; but, in the night of the 26th of December, an officer carrying the intelligence of Moore's movement, reached Merida, and, next morning, the French fell back, and marching hastily to the Tagus, crossed it, and rejoined their main body, from which another powerful detachment was immediately directed upon Placentia.* This retrograde movement obviated the immediate danger ; and Sir John Cradock endeavoured to pacify the people of Lisbon.

He ordered General Stewart's brigade, strengthened by two German battalions, to halt at Santarem. He explained his own motives to the Portuguese, and urged the regency to a more frank and vigorous system than they had hitherto followed ; for, like the Spanish juntas, they promised everything, and performed nothing ; neither would they, although consenting, verbally, to all the measures proposed, ever commit themselves by writing, having the despicable intention of afterwards disclaiming that which might prove disagreeable to the populace, or even to the French.† Sir John Cradock, however, had no power beyond his own personal influence to enforce attention to his wishes. No successor to Sir Charles Cotton had yet arrived, and Mr. Villiers seems to have wanted the decision and judgment required to meet such a momentous crisis.

In the north, General Cameron, having sent the sick men and part of the stores from Almeida towards Oporto, gave up that fortress to Sir Robert Wilson ; and, on the 5th of January, marched, with two British battalions and a detachment of convalescents, by the Tras os Montes to join the army in Spain. On the 9th, hearing of Sir John Moore's retreat to Coruña, he would have returned to Almeida, but Lapisse, who had taken Zamora, threatened to intercept the line of march ; wherefore Cameron turned towards Lamego, giving notice of his movement to Sir Robert Wilson, and advising him also to retire to the same place. Colonel Blunt, with seven companies of the 3rd regiment, escorting a convoy for Sir John Moore's army, was likewise forced to abandon his route, and take the road to Oporto, on which town everything British in the north of Portugal was now directed.

* Appendix, No. 31, sections 1 and 2.

† Ibid, No. 32, section 5.

Notwithstanding the general dismay, Sir Robert Wilson rejected Cameron's advice, and, being reinforced by some Spanish troops, Portuguese volunteers, and straggling convalescents, belonging to Moore's army, proceeded to put in practice all the arts of an able partizan: issuing proclamations, enticing the French to desert, spreading false reports of his numbers, and, by petty enterprises and great activity, arousing a spirit of resistance throughout the Ciudad Rodrigo country.

The continued influx of sick and stores at Oporto, together with the prospect of General Cameron's arrival there, became a source of uneasiness to Sir John Cradock. Oporto, with a shifting bar and shoal water, is the worst possible harbour for vessels to clear out, and one of the most dangerous for vessels to lie off, at that season of the year; hence, if the enemy advanced in force, a great loss, both of men and stores, was to be anticipated.

The departure of Sir Charles Cotton had diminished the naval means at Captain Halket's disposal, and, for 17 successive days, such was the state of the wind that no vessel could leave the Tagus; he, however, contrived at last to send tonnage for 2000 persons, and undertook to keep a sloop of war off Oporto. Sir Samuel Hood also despatched some vessels from Vigo, but the weather continued for a long time so unfavourable that these transports could not enter the harbour of Oporto, and the encumbrances hourly increasing, at last produced the most serious embarrassments.

Sir John Moore having now relinquished his communications with Portugal, Sir John Cradock had to consider how, relying on his own resources, he could best fulfil his instructions and maintain his hold of that country without risking the utter destruction of the troops intrusted to his care.

For an inferior army, Portugal has no defensible frontier. The rivers, generally running east and west, are fordable in most places, subject to sudden rises and falls, offering but weak lines of resistance; and with the exception of the Zezere, presenting no obstacles to the advance of an enemy penetrating by the eastern frontier. The mountains, indeed, afford many fine and some impregnable positions, but such is the length of the frontier line and the difficulty of lateral communications, that a general who should attempt to defend it against superior forces would risk to be cut off from the capital, if he concentrated his troops; and if he extended them his line would be immediately broken.

The possession of Lisbon constitutes, in fact, the possession of Portugal, south of the Douro, and an inferior army can only protect Lisbon by keeping close to that capital. Sensible of this truth, Sir John Cradock adopted the French colonel Vincente's views for the defence of Lisbon; and proceeded, on the 4th of January, with 1700 men, to occupy the heights behind the creek of Sacavem—leaving, however, 3000 men in the forts and batteries at Lisbon.

At the earnest request of the regency, who in return promised to assemble the native troops at Thomar, Abrantes, and Vilha Velha, General Stewart's brigade, 2700 strong, was ordered to halt at Santarem. But it had been marching incessantly for a month, and in the rain, the men's clothes were worn out, their accoutrements nearly destroyed, and in common with the rest of the army, they were suffering severely from the want of shoes.

Thus, Cameron being on the Douro, the main body between Santarem and Lisbon, and Colonel Kemmis at Elvas, with the 40th regiment, an army of 10,000 men—with the encumbrances of an army of 40,000—was placed at the three points of a triangle, the shortest side of which was above 150 miles. The general commanding could not bring into the field above 5000 men; nor could that number be assembled in a condition for service at any one point of the frontier, under three weeks or a month; moreover, the uncertainty of remaining in the country at all, rendered it difficult to feed the troops, for the commissaries being unable to make large contracts for a fixed time, were forced to carry on, as it were, a retail system of supply.

Mr. Frere, however, with indefatigable folly, was urging Sir John Cradock to

make a diversion in Spain ; and while Mr. Frere was calling for troops in the south, Mr. Villiers was as earnest that a force might be sent by sea to Vigo. The minister's instructions prescribed the preservation of Lisbon, Elvas, and Almeida ; the assembling, in concert with the Portuguese government, a combined force on the frontier, and the sending succours of men to Moore ; but although Sir John Cradock's means were so scanty that the fulfilment of any one of these objects was scarcely possible, Mr. Canning writing officially to Mr. Villiers at this epoch, as if a mighty and well-supplied army was in Portugal, enforced the "necessity of continuing to maintain possession of Portugal, as long as could be done with the force intrusted to Sir John Cradock's command, *remembering always that not the defence of Portugal alone, but the employment of the enemy's military force*, and the diversion which would be thus created in favour of the south of Spain, were objects not to be abandoned, except in case of the most extreme necessity." The enemy's military force ! It was 300,000 men, and this despatch was a pompous absurdity ; but the ministers and their agents, eternally haunted by the phantoms of Spanish and Portuguese armies, were incapable of perceiving the palpable bulk and substance of the French hosts. The whole system of the cabinet was one of shifts and expedients ; every week produced a fresh project,—minister and agent, alike, followed his own views, without reference to any fixed principle : and the generals were the only persons not empowered to arrange military operations.

The number of officers despatched to seek information of the French movements enabled Sir John Cradock, notwithstanding the direct communications were cut off, to obtain intelligence of Moore's advance towards Sahagun, and being still anxious to assist that general, he again endeavoured to send a reinforcement into Spain, by the route of Almeida ; but the difficulty of obtaining supplies finally induced him to accede to Mr. Villiers' wishes, and he shipped 600 cavalry and 1300 infantry, on the 12th of January, meaning to send them to Vigo ; the vessels were, however, still in the river when authentic intelligence of Sir John Moore's retreat upon Coruña with the intention of embarking there, was received, and rendered this project useless.

The 14th of January, the *Conqueror* line-of-battle-ship, having Admiral Berkeley on board, reached the Tagus, and for the first time since Sir John Cradock took the command of the troops in Portugal, he received a communication from the ministers in England.

It now appeared that their thoughts were less intently fixed upon the defence of Portugal, than upon getting possession of Cadiz. Their anxiety upon this subject had somewhat subsided after the battle of Vimeira, but it revived with greater vigour when Sir John Moore, contemplating a movement in the south, suggested the propriety of securing Cadiz as a place of arms ; and in January an expedition was prepared to sail for that town, with the design of establishing a new base of operations for the English army. The project failed, but the transaction deserves notice, as affording proof of the perplexed and unstable policy of the day.

NEGOTIATION FOR THE OCCUPATION OF CADIZ.

While it was still unknown in England that the supreme junta had fled from Aranjuez, Sir George Smith, who had conducted Spencer's negotiation in 1808, was sent to Cadiz to prepare the way for the reception of an English garrison. Four thousand men destined for that service were soon afterwards embarked at Portsmouth, under the command of General Sherbrooke, but this officer's instructions were repeatedly altered. He was first directed to touch at Lisbon in his way to Cadiz ; he was afterwards commanded to make for Coruña, to receive orders from Sir John Moore, but, on the 14th of January, his force being increased to 5000 men, he sailed under his first instructions ; and Mr. Frere was directed to negotiate for the admission of these troops into Cadiz, as the only condition upon which a British army could be employed to aid the Spanish cause in that part of the Peninsula.

When the reverses in the north of Spain became known, the importance of Cadiz increased, and the importance of Portugal decreased in the eyes of the English ministers. Sir John Cradock was then made acquainted with Sherbrooke's destination ; * he was himself commanded to obey any requisition for troops that might be made by the Spanish junta ; and so independent of the real state of affairs were the ministerial arrangements, that Cradock, whose despatches had been one continued complaint of his inability to procure horses for his own artillery, was directed to furnish them for Sherbrooke's. †

Sir George Smith, a man somewhat hasty, but of remarkable zeal and acuteness, left England about the middle of December ; and, on his arrival at Cadiz, at once discovered that there, as in every other part of the Peninsula, all persons being engaged in theories or intrigues, nothing useful for defence was executed. The ramparts of the city were in tolerable condition, but scarcely any guns were mounted ; and yet, two miles in front of the town, an outwork had been commenced on such a scale that it could not possibly be finished under four months ; and, after the slow mode of Spanish proceedings, would have taken as many years to complete.

For a solid defence of all the fortifications, Sir George Smith judged that 20,000 good troops would be requisite, but that 10,000 would suffice for the city. There were, however, only 5000 militia and volunteers in the place, and not a regular soldier under arms, neither any within reach. The number of guns mounted and to be mounted exceeded 400 ; to serve them, 250 peasants and volunteers were enrolled, and, being clothed in uniforms, were called artillerymen.

Knowing nothing of Sir John Moore's march to Sahagun, Sir George Smith naturally calculated upon the immediate approach of the French ; and seeing the helpless state of Cadiz, and being assured that the people would willingly admit an English garrison, he wrote to Sir John Cradock for troops. The latter, little thinking that, at such a conjuncture, the supreme junta would be more jealous of their allies than fearful of their enemies ; and judging also, from the tenor of his latest instructions, that obedience to this requisition would be consonant to the minister's wishes, immediately ordered Colonel Kemmis to proceed from Elvas with the 40th regiment, by the route of Seville, and, at the same time, embarked about 3000 of the best troops at Lisbon, and sent them to Cadiz. This force, commanded by Major-General Mackenzie, sailed the 2nd of February, and reached their destination the 5th of the same month.

Meanwhile, Mr. Frere, although acquainted with the sailing of Mackenzie's armament, was ignorant that Sir George Smith had applied to the governor of Cadiz for permission to take military possession of that town, for Smith had no instructions to correspond with Mr. Frere ; and the latter had opened a separate negotiation with the central junta at Seville, in which he endeavoured to pave the way for the occupation by proposing to have the troops admitted as guests, and he sent Mr. Stuart to arrange this with the local authorities. ‡

Mr. Frere had, however, meddled much with the personal intrigues of the day : he was, moreover, of too slender a capacity to uphold the dignity and just influence of a great power on such an occasion ; and the flimsy thread of his negotiation snapped under the hasty touch of Sir George Smith. The supreme junta, averse to everything that threatened to interrupt their course of sluggish indolence, had sent the Marquis de Villedieu, a member of their own body, to Cadiz, avowedly to prepare the way for the admission of the troops, but, in reality, to thwart that measure. The circumstance of Mackenzie's arrival, with an object different from that announced by Mr. Frere, was instantly taken advantage of to charge England with treachery. For the junta, knowing Mr. Frere to be their own dupe, believed, or affected to believe, that he was also the dupe of the English minister ; and that the whole transaction was an artifice, on the part of the latter, to get possession of the city with a felonious intent.

* Appendix, No. 37.

† Ibid, No. 34.

‡ Ibid, No. 38.

The admission of the British troops was nevertheless earnestly desired by the inhabitants of Cadiz, and of the neighbouring towns ;* and this feeling was so well understood by Mr. Stuart and Sir George Smith, that they would, notwithstanding the reluctance of the supreme junta, have brought the affair to a good conclusion ; but, at the most critical period of the negotiation, the former was sent on a secret mission to Vienna, by the way of Trieste, and the latter, who was in bad health, dying about the same period, the negotiation failed for want of a head to conduct it.

General Mackenzie, like Sir George Smith, thought that the object might be attained : he observed, indeed, that the people, far from suspecting any danger, were ignorant of, or incredulous of, the reverses in the north ; that nothing had been done towards equipping the fleet for sea ; and that, notwithstanding the earnest remonstrances of Admiral Purvis and Mr. Stuart, the Spaniards would neither work themselves nor permit the English sailors to work for them. Still the general feeling was favourable to the British army, and the good wishes of the inhabitants were openly avowed : Mackenzie had, however, only a negative power, the affair being in the hands of Mr. Frere.

In the course of the negotiations carried on by that minister, the supreme junta proposed—

1. That the troops should land at Port St. Mary's, and be quartered there and in the neighbouring towns.
2. That they should join Cuesta's army.
3. That they should go to Catalonia.
4. That they should be parcelled out in small divisions, and attached to the different Spanish armies.

Nay, untaught by their repeated disasters, and pretending to hold the English soldiery cheap, these self-sufficient men proposed that the British should garrison the minor fortresses on the coast, in order to release an equal number of Spaniards for the field.

Mr. Frere wished to accept the first of these proposals, but General Mackenzie, Sir George Smith, and Mr. Stuart agreed that it would be injurious for many reasons ; not the least urgent of which was, that as the troops could not have been embarked again without some national dishonour, they must have marched towards Cuesta, and thus have been involved in the campaign without obtaining that which was their sole object, *the possession of Cadiz as a place of arms.*†

Mr. Frere then suggested a modification of the second proposal, namely, to leave a small garrison in Cadiz, and to join Cuesta with the remainder of the troops. Sir G. Smith was dead ; Mr. Stuart had embarked for Trieste ; and General Mackenzie, reluctant to oppose Mr. Frere's wishes, consented to march, if the necessary equipments for his force could be procured ; but he observed, that the plan was contrary to his instructions, and to the known wishes of the English government, and liable, in part, to the objections against the first proposition.

His letter was written the 18th of February, and on the 22nd a popular tumult commenced in Cadiz.

The supreme junta, to prove that that city did not require an English garrison, had ordered two regiments, composed of Poles, Germans, and Swiss, prisoners or deserters from the French, to march there. The people, aware that the junta disliked and intended to disarm the volunteers, were offended that deserters should be trusted in preference to themselves. They arose, and stopped the courier, with despatches from Seville, and imprisoned the Marquis of Villedieu, who was obnoxious, because, while mild to persons suspected of favouring the French, he had been harsh, or rather brutal, in his conduct to some ladies of rank in Cadiz.

The populace, proceeding from one violence to another, endeavoured to kill

* Appendix, No. 38.

† Ibid.

the state prisoners ; and being prevented in this bloody object, committed several excesses, and murdered Don Joseph Heredia, the collector of the public rents. During the tumult, which lasted two days, the disembarkation of the English troops was repeatedly called for by the mob ; and two British officers being sent on shore as mediators, were received with enthusiasm, and obeyed with respect, a manifest proof of the correct view taken by Sir George Smith.

The 24th, tranquillity was restored ; and the 25th, General Mackenzie, not having received from Mr. Frere an answer to his letter of the 18th, suggested, that of the three English battalions then in the harbour, two should be placed in Cadiz ; and that the third, proceeding to Seville, should there unite with the 40th regiment, and both together march to join Cuesta.*

Mr. Frere, however, instead of addressing the junta with an authority and dignity becoming the representative of a great nation, on whose support the independence of the whole Peninsula rested, had been endeavouring to gain his end by subtlety. The object was one that England had a right to seek, and the Spanish rulers no right to refuse ; for the people wished to further it, and the threat of an appeal to them would soon have silenced the feeble negative of such a despicable and suspected government ; but Mr. Frere, incapable of taking a single enlarged view, was pressing and discussing, with the secretary of the junta, a variety of trifling points, as if to show his epistolary dexterity ; and, finally, when his opponent had conceded the point of admitting troops at all, broke off the negotiation, upon the question, as to whether the number to be admitted should be 1000 or 2000 men, as if the way to drive a wedge was with the broad end foremost.

Self-baffled in that quarter, the British plenipotentiary, turning towards Cuesta, the avowed enemy of the junta, and one much feared by them, sought to secure his assistance by holding out the lure of having a British force added to his command, but the sarcastic old general derided the diplomatist. "Although I do not," said he, "discover any great difficulty in the actual state of things, which should prevent his British majesty's troops from garrisoning Cadiz under such terms, and for the purpose which your excellency proposes ; I am far from supposing that the supreme junta, which is fully persuaded of the importance of our union with England, is not grounded in its objections ; and your excellency knows that it is sufficient that they should have them, to prevent my giving any opinion on so important a measure, *unless they should consult me*. With regard to the 4300 men, which your excellency is pleased to mention, there is no doubt that I stand in need of them ; but I flatter myself, England, sensible of the importance of Estremadura, will even lend me much greater assistance, particularly if, from any change of circumstances, the supreme junta should no longer manifest the repugnance we speak of."

This answer having frustrated the projected intrigue, Mr. Frere, conscious perhaps of diplomatic incapacity, returned with renewed ardour to the task of directing the military affairs, in every part of the Peninsula. He had seen an intercepted letter of Soult's addressed to the king, in which the project of penetrating into Portugal was mentioned ; and immediately concluding that General Mackenzie's troops would be wanted for the defence of that kingdom, counselled him to abandon Cadiz and return to Lisbon ; but the general, who knew that, even should he return, a successful defence of Portugal with so few troops would be impossible, and that every precaution was already taken for an embarkation in the last extremity, observed, that "the danger of Lisbon rendered the occupation of Cadiz more important."

General Mackenzie's reply was written the 26th of February. On the 3rd of March he received another despatch from Mr. Frere.† Cadiz, and the danger of Portugal, seemed to have passed from the writer's mind, and were unnoticed ; but entering into a minutely inaccurate statement of the situation of the French and Spanish armies, he observed, that Soult having failed in an attempt to pene-

* Appendix, No. 38.

† Ibid.

trate Portugal by the Minho, *it was impossible, from the position of the Spanish forces, assisted as they were by the Portuguese, that he could persevere in his plan.* Wherefore, he proposed that the British force then in the harbour of Cadiz should proceed immediately to Tarragona, to aid Reding; and this wild scheme was only frustrated by an unexpected despatch from Sir John Cradock, recalling the troops to Lisbon.*

They arrived there on the 12th of March; and thus ended a transaction clearly indicating an unsettled policy, shallow combinations, and a bad choice of agents on the part of the English cabinet, and a most unwise and unworthy disposition in the supreme junta. General Mackenzie attributed the jealousy of the latter to French influence; Mr. Frere to the abrupt proceedings of Sir George Smith, and to fear lest the junta of Seville, who were continually on the watch to recover their ancient power, should represent the admission of the British troops as a treasonable proceeding on the part of the supreme government. It is, however, evident that the true cause was the false position in which the English ministers had originally placed themselves, by inundating Spain with arms and money, without at the same time asserting a just influence, and making their assistance the price of good order and useful exertion.

CHAPTER III.

THE effort made to secure Cadiz was an act of disinterested zeal on the part of Sir John Cradock. The absence of his best troops exposed him to the most galling peevishness from the regency, and to the grossest insults from the populace. With his reduced force, he could not expect to hold even a contracted position at the extremity of the rock of Lisbon against the weakest army likely to invade Portugal; and, as there was neither a native force nor a government to be depended upon, there remained for him only the prospect of a forced and, consequently, disgraceful embarkation, and the undeserved obloquy that never fails to follow disaster.

In this disagreeable situation, as Elvas and Almeida no longer contained British troops, the general's attention was necessarily fixed upon Lisbon and Oporto. The violence of the gales rendered the latter a sealed port; but the hospitals and magazines of Almeida, and even of Salamanca, being evacuated upon Lamego, that town was crowded with 1500 sick men, besides escorts, and the hourly accumulating stores. The river had overflowed its banks, the craft could not ply; and one large boat, attempting to descend, was upset, and 80 persons, soldiers and others, perished.

General Cameron, hearing of this confusion, relinquished the idea of embarking his detachment at Oporto, and, re-crossing the Douro, made for Lisbon, where he arrived the beginning of February with about 2000 men; but they were worn down by fatigue, having marched 800 miles under continued rains.

Sir Robert Wilson sent his guns to Abrantes, by the road of Idanha Nova; but, partly from a spirit of adventure, partly from an erroneous idea that Sir John Cradock wished him to defend the frontier, he remained with his infantry in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo.† His force had been increased by a Spanish detachment under Don Carlos d'España, and by some volunteers; but it was still weak, and his operations were necessarily confined to a few trifling skirmishes: yet, like many others, his imagination so far outstripped his judgment that, when he had only felt the advanced post of a single division, he expressed his conviction that the French were going to abandon Spain altogether.‡

Sir John Cradock entertained no such false expectations; he was informed of the battle of Coruña and the death of Moore; he knew too well the vigour

* Appendix, No. 37.

† Ibid, No. 35, section 1.

‡ Ibid.

and talent of that general to doubt that he had been oppressed by an overwhelming force ; he knew that Zaragoza had fallen, and that 25,000 French troops were thus free to act in other quarters ; he knew that Soult, with at least 20,000 men, was on the Minho ; that Romana was incapable of making any head, that Portugal was one wide scene of helpless confusion, and that a French army was again in the neighbourhood of Merida, threatening Lisbon by the line of the Tagus ; in fine, that his own embarrassments were hourly increasing, and that the moment was arrived when the safety of his troops must become the chief consideration.

The tenor of the few despatches he had received from England led him to suppose that the ministers designed to abandon Portugal ; * but, as their intentions on that head were never clearly explained, he resolved to abide by the literal interpretation of his first instructions, and to keep his hold of the country as long as it was possible to do so without risking the utter destruction of his army. To avoid that danger, he put every encumbrance at Lisbon on board the transports in the Tagus, proceeded to dismantle the batteries at the mouth of the river, and, in concert with the admiral, made preparations for carrying away or destroying the military and naval stores in the arsenal. At the same time, he renewed his efforts to embark the sick men and stores at Oporto ; but the weather continued so unfavourable that he was finally obliged to remove the invalids and many stores by land, yet he could not procure carriages for the whole.

After the arrival of Cameron's detachment, the effective British force under arms, including convalescents and 1500 stragglers from Sir John Moore's army, was about 8000 men ; but, when the security of the forts and magazines, and the tranquillity of Lisbon, was provided for, only 5000 men, and those not in the best order, could be brought into the field.† As this force was infinitely too weak to cover such a town as Lisbon, the general judged that it would be unwise to take up a position in advance, whence he should be obliged to retreat through the midst of a turbulent and excited population, which had already given too many indications of ill-temper to leave any doubt of its hostility under such circumstances. He, therefore, came to the resolution of withdrawing from Sacavem and Lisbon, and concentrating his whole force on a position at Passa D'Arcos, near the mouth of the river, where he could embark with least danger, and where he had the best chance of defending himself, if necessary, against superior numbers.‡

This reasoning was sound, and Cradock's intention was undoubtedly, not to abandon the country, unless driven from it by force, or in pursuance of orders from England : but his arrangements seem to have carried more the appearance of alarm than was either politic or necessary ; for the position of Passa D'Arcos might have been prepared, and the means necessary for an embarkation secured, and yet the bulk of the troops kept in advance until the last moment. To display a bold and confident front in war is, of all things, the most essential, as well to impose upon friends as upon enemies ; and Sir John Cradock did not fail to experience the truth of this maxim.

The population of Lisbon, alarmed by the reverses in Spain, and yet, like all the people in the Peninsula, confident in their own prowess and resolution until the very moment of attack, became extremely exasperated ; and the regency, partly from their natural folly and insincerity, but more from the dread of the lower orders, countenanced, if they did not instigate, the latter to commit excesses, and to interrupt the proceedings of the British naval and military authorities.

Although the measures of precaution relative to the forts had originated with the regency, they now formally protested against them ; § and, with a view to hamper the general, encouraged their subalterns to make many false and

* Appendix, No. 39. section 1.

† Ibid, No. 39, section 2 and 3.

‡ Ibid, No. 40.

§ Ibid, No. 32, section 5.

even ridiculous charges against the British executive officers; and it would appear that the remonstrances of the admiral and generals were but imperfectly supported by Mr. Villiers.

In this manner the people's violence was nourished until the city was filled with tumult; mobs, armed with English pikes and muskets, collected night and day in the streets and on the high-roads, and, under the pretext of seeking for, and killing, Frenchmen, attacked, indiscriminately, all foreigners, even those in the British service and wearing the British uniform.* The guards, who endeavoured to protect the victims of this ferocity, were insulted. Couriers, passing with despatches, were intercepted and deprived of their papers; English officers were outraged in the streets; and such was the audacity of the people that the artillery was placed in the squares, in expectation of an affray. In fine, the state of Lisbon was similar to what it had been at the period of Junot's convention; and, if the British had abandoned the country at this time, they would have been assailed with as much obloquy by the Portuguese, for such has been, and will be, the fate of all unsuccessful auxiliaries: a reflection that should render historians cautious of adopting accusations upon the authority of native writers on the like occasions.

This spirit was not confined to Lisbon. In Oporto the disposition to insult the British was more openly encouraged than in the capital, and the government of the multitude was more decidedly pronounced. From the cities it spread to the villages.† The people of the Alemtejo frontier were, indeed, remarkably apathetic; but, from the Minho to the Tagus, the country was in horrible confusion; the soldiers were scattered, without regard to military system,‡ and, being unpaid, lived at free quarters; the peasantry of the country assembling in bands, and the populace of the towns in mobs, intercepted the communications, appointed or displaced the generals at their pleasure, and massacred all persons of whom they were suspicious. The ammunition which had been supplied from England was wasted, by constant firing in token of insubordination; and, as if the very genius of confusion was abroad, some of the British troops, principally *malingersers*,§ of Sir John Moore's army, added their quota of misconduct, to increase the general distress.||

The leading instigator of the excesses at Oporto was one Raymundo, a coadjutor and creature of the bishop's, a turbulent and cruel fellow, who, by taking a share in the first insurrection against the French, obtained a momentary influence, and has since been elevated, by a very credulous writer, into a patriotic hero. He was, however, a worthless coward, fitted for secret villany, but incapable of a noble action.

This state of affairs, productive of so much misery and danger, continuing, without intermission, caused many of the upper classes to despair of their country's safety by war, and increased the number of those who, wishing to attach themselves to the fortune of France, were ready to accept a foreign prince for their sovereign, if, with him, they could obtain tranquillity and an ameliorated constitution; and when, soon afterwards, the edge of the enemy's sword, falling upon the senseless multitude, filled the streets of Oporto with blood, there was a powerful French party already established in Portugal. The bulk of the people were, however, staunch in their country's cause; they were furious and disorderly, but imbued with hatred of the French; ready at the call of honour; and susceptible of discipline, without any loss of energy.

The turbulence of the citizens, the remonstrances of the regency, and the representations of Mr. Villiers, who was in doubt for the personal safety of the British subjects residing in Lisbon, convinced Sir John Cradock that political circumspection and adroitness were as important as military arrangement, to

* Appendix, No. 32, section 6.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid.

§ An appellation given among soldiers to men who, under pretence of sickness, shrink from the performance of their duties in the field.

|| Appendix, No. 35, section 2.

prevent a catastrophe at this critical period ; and as, contrary to what might have been expected, the enemy had not yet made any actual movement across the frontier, he was induced to suspend his design of falling back to Passa D'Arcos ; and in this unsettled state affairs remained until March, when intelligence arriving that the French fleet was at sea, two of the line-of-battle ships in the Tagus were despatched to reinforce Sir Thomas Duckworth's squadron, and the batteries at the mouth of the river were again armed.

Meanwhile, Soult was making progress in the north ; the anarchy at Oporto was continually increasing, and the English government had certainly come to the resolution of abandoning Portugal if the enemy advanced ; for, although Sir John Cradock was not informed of their views, an officer in England, well acquainted with Portuguese customs, actually received orders, and was embarking, to aid the execution of this measure, when, suddenly, the policy of the cabinet once more changed, and it was resolved to reinforce the army. This resolution, which may be attributed partly to the Austrian war, partly to the failure at Cadiz, and partly to the necessity of satisfying public opinion in England, was accompanied by a measure judicious in principle and of infinite importance, inasmuch as it formed the first solid basis on which to build a reasonable hope of success.

The Portuguese government, whether spontaneously or brought thereto by previous negotiation, had offered the command of all the native troops to an English general,* with power to alter and amend the military discipline, to appoint British officers to the command of the regiments, and to act, without control, in any manner he should judge fitting to ameliorate the condition of the Portuguese army ; and this was the more important, because the military polity of Portugal, although fallen into neglect, was severe, precise, and admirably calculated to draw forth the whole strength of the kingdom, for the regular army could be completed by coercion, and the militia were bound to assemble in regiments, numbered, clothed, and armed like the regulars, but only liable to serve within the frontier. The whole of the remaining population, capable of bearing arms, were enrolled under the names of *ordenanças*, numbered by battalions in their different districts and obliged, under very severe punishments, to assemble at the order of the local magistrates either to work, to fight, or to assist the operations of the other forces.

The English government, accepting of this offer, agreed to supply arms, ammunition, and other succours, granted a subsidy for the payment of the regular forces, and thus obtained, for the first time, a firm hold of the military resources of Portugal, and a position in the Peninsula suitable to the dignity of England and to the great contest in which she was engaged.

The Portuguese government wished that Sir Arthur Wellesley should be their general ; and the English cabinet offered the situation to him, but he refused it ; and it is said, that Sir John Doyle, Sir John Murray (he who afterwards failed at Tarragona), General Beresford, and even the Marquis of Hastings, then Earl of Moira, sought for the appointment. The last was, undoubtedly, a man well fitted by his courtly manners, his high rank, and his real talents, both in the cabinet and in the field, for such an office ; but powerful parliamentary interest prevailing, Major-General Beresford was appointed, to the great discontent of many officers of superior rank, who were displeased that a man, without any visible claim to superiority, should be placed over their heads.

Information of this change was instantly conveyed to Sir John Cradock, and General Sherbrooke was ordered to put into Lisbon. The latter was overtaken at the mouth of Cadiz harbour ; and his and General Mackenzie's divisions arriving in the Tagus together, on the 12th of March, gave a new turn to the affairs of Portugal. But if Mr. Frere's plan had been pursued—if General Sherbrooke's troops had not been detained by bad weather at sea†—if the first

* Appendix, No. 35.

† Ibid, No. 37.

had proceeded to Tarragona, and nothing but a foul wind prevented it—if the second, sailing from port to port without any artillery had, as was most probable, been engaged in some other enterprise—if Victor, obeying his orders, had marched to Abrantes—if any one of these events had happened, Sir John Cradock must have abandoned Portugal; and then how infinitely absurd these proceedings of the English ministers would have appeared, and how justly their puerile combinations would have been the scorn of Europe!

Marshal Beresford arrived at Lisbon the beginning of March; and having received the confirmation of his power from the regency, fixed his head-quarters at Thomar, collected the Portuguese troops in masses, and proceeded to recast their system on the model of the British army; commencing, with stern but wholesome rigour, a reform that, in process of time, raised out of chaos an obedient, well-disciplined, and gallant army, worthy of a high place among the best in Europe; for the Portuguese people, though easily misled and excited to wrath, are of a docile and orderly disposition, and very sensible of a just and honourable conduct in their officers. But this reform was not effected at once, nor without many crosses, and difficulties being raised by the higher orders and by the government—difficulties that General Beresford could never have overcome, if he had not been directed, sustained, and shielded, by the master spirit under whom he was destined to work.

The plan of giving to English officers the command of the Portuguese troops was at first proceeded on with caution; but after a time, the ground being supposed safe, it was gradually enlarged, until almost all the military situations of emolument and importance were held by Englishmen; and this, combined with other causes, gave rise to numerous intrigues, not entirely confined to the natives, and as we shall find, in after times, seriously threatening the power of the marshal, the existence of the British influence, and the success of the war.

Sir John Cradock's situation was now materially alleviated. The certainty of the Austrian war produced a marked change in the disposition of the regency. The arrival of Sherbrooke's and Mackenzie's divisions having increased the British force to 14,000 men, the populace became more cautious of offering insults; and, about the middle of March, 2000 men being left to maintain tranquillity in Lisbon, the remainder of the army was encamped at Lumiar and Sacavem; and while these things were passing at Lisbon, the aspect of affairs changed also in other parts of the kingdom. For, the bulk of the Portuguese regular troops, amounting to 10,000 or 12,000 men, was collected by Marshal Beresford, between the Tagus and the Mondego.

Beyond the valley of the Mondego, Colonel Trant commanded a small corps of volunteers, students from the university; and General Vittoria was at the head of two regular battalions in Upper Beira.

The Bishop of Oporto was preparing to defend that town, with a mixed but ferocious and insubordinate multitude. General Silveira, with 4000 or 5000 men, had taken post in the *Tras os Montes*; and Romana, who had collected 7000 or 8000 at Monterey, was in communication with him.

Sir Robert Wilson was at the head of about 3000 men; he had withdrawn the legion from Almeida, sent a detachment to Bejar, and remained himself on the Agueda, watching the advanced posts of Lapisse. A few Portuguese regiments were extended from Salvatierra and Idanha to Alcantara. There was a permanent bridge of boats over the Tagus at Abrantes, and there were small garrisons in that town and at Elvas.

But all these forces united would not, with the exception of the British, have been capable of sustaining the shock of 10,000 French soldiers for half an hour; and the whole mass of the latter, then hanging on the frontier of Portugal, was above 50,000. Gathering like clouds on the horizon, they threatened many points, but gave no certain indication of where the storm would break. Soult, indeed, with about 20,000 men, was endeavouring to pass the Minho; but Lapisse, although constantly menacing Ciudad Rodrigo, kept his principal

masses at Salamanca and Ledesma ; while Victor had concentrated his between the Alberche and the Tietar.

Thus Lapisse might join either Soult or Victor ; and the latter could march by Placentia against Ciudad Rodrigo, while Soult attacked Oporto ; or he might draw Lapisse to him, and penetrate Portugal by Alcantara. He might pass the Tagus, attack Cuesta, and pursue him to Seville ; or, after defeating him, he might turn short to the right, and enter the Alemtejo.

In this uncertainty, Sir John Cradock, keeping the British concentrated at Lumiar and Sacavem, waited for the enemy to develop his plans, and, in the mean time, endeavoured to procure the necessary equipments for an active campaign. He directed magazines to be formed at Coimbra and Abrantes ; urged the regency to exertion ; took measures to raise money, and despatched officers to Barbary to procure mules. But while thus engaged, intelligence arrived that Victor had suddenly forced the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz, and was in pursuit of Cuesta on the road to Merida ; that Soult, having crossed the Minho, and defeated Romana and Silveira, was within a few leagues of Oporto ; and that Lapisse had made a demonstration of assaulting Ciudad Rodrigo.

The junta of Oporto now vehemently demanded aid from the regency, and the latter, although not much inclined to the bishop's party, proposed that Sir John Cradock should unite a part of the British forces to the Portuguese troops under Marshal Beresford, and march to the succour of Oporto. Beresford was averse to trust the Portuguese under his immediate command, among the mutinous multitude in that city, but he thought the whole of the British army should move in a body to Leiria, and from thence either push on to Oporto, or return, according to the events that might occur in the latter town, and he endeavoured to persuade Cradock to follow this plan.

It was doubtful, he said, if Victor and Soult intended to co-operate in a single plan ; but, on the supposition that it was so, he considered it essential to drive back or to overcome one before the other could come to his assistance.* Victor was then in pursuit of Cuesta ; if he continued that pursuit, it must be to enter Seville, or to cripple his opponent previous to the invasion of Portugal ; in either case he would be in the Sierra Morena before he could hear of the march from Leiria, and, as Cradock had daily intelligence of Victor's movements, there would be full time to relieve Oporto, and to return again to the defence of Lisbon. If, however, Soult depended on the co-operation of Victor, he would probably remain on the right of the Douro until the other was on the Tagus, and Lapisse also would be contented for the present with capturing Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida.

This reasoning, so evidently unsound, did not weigh with Sir John Cradock, who resolved to preserve his central position, covering the capital at such a distance as to preclude the danger of being cut off from it by one army while he was engaged with another. Lisbon and Oporto, he observed, were the enemy's objects ; the former was of incomparably greater importance than the latter.† Portugal was in a state of anarchy equally incompatible with firm resistance and rapid movements. The peasantry were tumultuous and formidable to everybody but the enemy ; and Beresford himself acknowledged that the regular forces were mutinous, disregarding their officers, choosing when and where to rest ; when to fight, and when to remain in quarters ; and altogether unfit to be trusted within the circle of the Oporto mischief. The British troops, therefore, were the only solid resource ; but they were too few to divide, and must act in a body, or not at all.

Was it most desirable to protect Lisbon or Oporto ? The first was near, the second 200 miles off ; and, although the utmost exertions had been made, the army was not yet equipped for an active campaign. The troops were ill-clothed, and wanted shoes ; the artillery was unhorsed ; the commissariat

* Appendix, No. 41, section 1.

† Appendix, No. 41, section 2.

possessed only a fourth part of the transport necessary for the conveyance of provisions and ammunition, and no activity could immediately supply these deficiencies, inasmuch as some of the articles required were not to be had in the country, and, to obtain others, the interference of the regency was necessary, but hitherto all applications to that quarter had been without any effect. Was it wise to commence offensive operations in the north? Soult and Lapisse together were estimated at 30,000 men, of which above 5000 were cavalry, and he himself could only bring 15 guns and 12,000 men, of all arms, into the field; yet, if the British army, marched with the avowed intention of relieving Oporto, it must accomplish it, or be dishonoured!

Was it consistent with reason to march 200 miles in search of a combat, which the very state of Oporto would render it almost impossible to gain, and for an object perhaps already lost? Suspicion was alive all over the country: if Oporto was already taken, the army must come back; that would be the signal for fresh tumults—for renewed cries that the country was to be abandoned; Lisbon would instantly be in a state of insurrection, and would be even more formidable to the British than the enemy; besides, it was impossible to reckon upon Cuesta's aid in keeping Victor employed. He was personally inimical to the English, and his principal object was to gain time for the increase and discipline of his own force.

Victor was apparently pursuing Cuesta, but his parties had already appeared in the neighbourhood of Badajos, and there was nothing but a weak Portuguese garrison in Elvas to impede his march through the Alemtejo. To cover Lisbon and the Tagus was the wisest plan: fixed in some favourable position, at a prudent distance from that capital, he could wait for the reinforcements he expected from England. He invited the Portuguese troops to unite with him; a short time would suffice to establish subordination, and then the certainty that the capital could not be approached, except in the face of a really formidable army, would not only keep the enemy in check, but, by obliging him to collect in greater numbers for the attempt, would operate as a diversion in favour of Spain.

The general soundness of this reasoning is apparent, and it must not be objected to Sir John Cradock that he disregarded the value of a central position, which might enable him to be beforehand with the enemy in covering Lisbon, if the latter should march on his flank. The difficulty of obtaining true intelligence from the natives and his own want of cavalry rendered it utterly unsafe for him to divide his army, or to trust it any distance from the capital.

Marshal Beresford's plan, founded on the supposition that Cradock could engage Soult at Oporto, and yet quit him, and return at his pleasure to Lisbon, if Victor advanced, was certainly fallacious; the advantages rested on conjectural, the disadvantages on positive data: it was conjectural that they could relieve Oporto; it was positive that they would endanger Lisbon; the proposition was, however, not made upon partial views. But, at this period, other men, less qualified to advise, pestered Sir John Cradock with projects of a different stamp, yet deserving of notice, as showing that the mania for grand operations, which I have before marked as the malady of the time, was still raging.

To make a suitable use of the British army was the object of all these projectors, but there was a marvellous variety in their plans. While the regency desired that the Portuguese and English troops should, without unfurnishing Lisbon, co-operate for the relief of Oporto, and while Marshal Beresford recommended that the latter only should march, the bishop was importunate to have a detachment of the British army placed under his command, and he recalled Sir Robert Wilson to the defence of Oporto. It appeared reasonable that the legion should defend the city in which it was raised; but Mr. Frere wrote from Seville that Sir Robert could do better where he was; and the latter, dreading the anarchy in Oporto, accepted Spanish rank, and refused obedience to the

prelate's orders, yet retained his troops. The regency, however, adopted the Lusitanian legion as a national corps, and approved of Sir Robert's proceedings. Meanwhile Romana was earnest with Sir John Cradock for money, and that 1000 British soldiers might be sent to aid the insurrection at Vigo; and at the same time Mr. Frere and Colonel D'Urban, a corresponding officer placed at Cuesta's head-quarters, proposed other plans of higher pretensions.

Zaragoza, said the latter, has fallen; and 10,000 French troops being thus released, are marching towards Toledo; this is the moment to give a fatal blow to Marshal Victor! It is one of those critical occasions that seldom recur in war! In a day or two Sir Robert Wilson will be on the Tietar with 2500 men; augment his force with a like number of Portuguese, who may be drawn from Sobreira, Idanha, and Salvatierra. He shall thus turn the right and rear of Victor's army, and his movement cannot be interrupted by the French force now at Salamanca and Alva; because the communication from thence to the Tagus by the passes of Banos and Tornevecas is sealed up; and while Sir Robert Wilson thus gets in the rear of Victor with 5000 men, Cuesta, with 12,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry, shall attack the latter in front—matter of easy execution; because Cuesta can throw a pontoon bridge over the Tagus, near Almaraz, in an hour and a half; and the Conde de Cartoajal, who is at Monzaneres in La Mancha, with 10,000 infantry and 2000 horse, will keep Sebastiani in check. The hope is great, the danger small; and if a few British troops can be added to the force on the Tietar, the success will be infallible.

There were, however, some grave objections to this infallible plan. General Cuesta was near Almaraz, Sir John Cradock was at Lisbon, and Sir Robert Wilson was at Ciudad Rodrigo. This circuitous line of correspondence being above 400 miles long, it is not very clear how the combination was to be effected with that rapidity which was said to be essential to the success. Neither is it very evident, that operations to be combined at such a distance, and executed by soldiers of different nations, would have been successful at all. On the one side, 20,000 Portuguese and Spanish recruits were to act on double external lines of operations; on the other, 25,000 French veterans waited in a central position, with their front and flanks covered by the Tagus and the Tietar. In such a contest it is possible to conceive a different result from that anticipated by Colonel D'Urban.

Mr. Frere's plans were not less extensive, and he was equally sanguine. When his project for assisting Catalonia had been frustrated, by the recall of General Mackenzie from Cadiz, he turned his attention to the north. Soult, he wrote to Sir John Cradock, tired of the resistance he has met with, will probably desist from his "unaccountable project of entering Portugal, and occupying Galicia at the same time."* Let the British army, therefore, make a push to drive the enemy out of Salamanca, and the neighbouring towns; while the Asturians, on their side, shall take possession of Leon and Astorga, and thus open the communication between the northern and southern provinces.

Fearing, however, that if this proposal should not be adopted, the English general might be at a loss for some enterprise, Mr. Frere also recommended that the British army should march to Alcantara; and that the 40th regiment, which hitherto he had retained at Seville, contrary to Sir John Cradock's wishes, should join it at that place; and then, the whole operating by the northern bank of the Tagus, might, in concert with Cuesta, "beat the French out of Toledo, and consequently out of Madrid."

Now, with respect to the first of these plans, Soult never had the intention of holding Galicia, which was Marshal Ney's province; but he did propose to penetrate into Portugal, and he was not likely to abandon his purpose; because, the only army capable of opposing him was quitting that kingdom, and making a "push" of 400 miles to drive Lapisse out of Salamanca; moreover, the Asturians were watched by General Bonnet's division on one side, and by

* Appendix, No. 36.

Kellerman on the other ; and the 5th corps, not 10,000, but 15,000 strong, having quitted Zaragoza, were at this time in the Valladolid country, and therefore close to Leon and Astorga.

With respect to the operations by the line of the Tagus, which were to drive Joseph out of Madrid, and consequently to attract the attention of all the French corps, it is to be observed, that Sir John Cradock could command about 12,000 men, Cuesta 16,000, Cartoajal 12,000, making a total of 40,000. Now, Soult had 23,000, Lapisse 9000, Victor was at the head of 25,000, Sebastiani could dispose of 15,000, Mortier of a like number, the king's guards and the garrison of Madrid were 12,000, making a total of nearly 100,000 men.

But while Mr. Frere and Colonel D'Urban, confiding in Soult's inactivity, were thus plotting the destruction of Victor and Sebastiani, the first marshal stormed Oporto ; the second, unconscious of his danger, crossed the Tagus, and defeated Cuesta's army at Medellin, and at the same moment Sebastiani routed Cartoajal's at Ciudad Real.

CHAPTER IV.

HAVING described the unhappy condition of Portugal and given a general view of the transactions in Spain, I shall now resume the narrative of Soult's operations, thus following the main stream of action, for the other marshals were appointed to tranquillize the provinces already overrun by the emperor, or to war down the remnants of the Spanish armies ; but the Duke of Dalmatia's task was to push onward in the course of conquest. Nor is it difficult to trace him through the remainder of a campaign in which, traversing all the northern provinces, fighting in succession the armies of three different nations, and enduring every vicissitude of war, he left broad marks of his career and certain proofs that he was an able commander, and of a haughty resolution in adversity.

It has been observed, in a former part of this work, that the inhabitants of Coruña honourably maintained their town until the safety of the fleet which carried Sir John Moore's army from the Spanish shores was secure ; but they were less faithful to their own cause. Coruña, although weak against a regular siege, might have defied irregular operations, and several weeks must have elapsed before sufficient battering train could have been brought up to that corner of the Peninsula. Yet a short negotiation sufficed to put the French in possession of the place on the 19th of January, and the means of attacking Ferrol were immediately organized from the resources of Coruña.

The harbour of Ferrol contained eight sail of the line, and some smaller ships of war. The fortifications were regular, there was an abundance of artillery and ammunition, and a garrison of 7000 or 8000 men, composed of soldiers, sailors, citizens, and armed countrymen, but their chiefs were treacherous. After a commotion in which the Admiral Obregon was arrested, his successor Melgarejo surrendered, the 26th, upon somewhat better terms than those granted to Coruña ; and thus in ten days two regular fortresses were reduced, that with more resolution might have occupied 30,000 men for several months.

While yet before Ferrol the Duke of Dalmatia received the following despatch, prescribing the immediate invasion of Portugal :—

“Before his departure from this place (Valladolid), the emperor foreseeing the embarkation of the English army, drew up instructions for the ultimate operations of the Duke of Elchingen and yourself. He orders that when the English army shall be embarked you will march upon Oporto with your four divisions, that is to say, the division of Merle, Mermet, Delaborde, and Heudelet, the dragoons of Lorge, and La Houssaye, and Franceschi's light cavalry, with the exception of two regiments that his majesty desires you to turn over to the Duke of Elchingen, in order to make up his cavalry to four regiments.

“Your *corps d'armée*, composed of 17 regiments of infantry and 10 regiments of cavalry, is destined for the expedition of Portugal, in combination with

a movement the Duke of Belluno is going to effect. General Loison, some engineers, staff and commissariat officers, and 13 Portuguese, all of whom belonged to the army formerly in Portugal, under the Duke of Abrantes, have received instructions to join you immediately, and you can transmit your orders for them to Lugo. This is the 21st of January, and it is supposed you cannot be at Oporto before the 5th of February, or at Lisbon before the 16th. Thus, at that time, namely, when you shall be near Lisbon, the *corps d'armée* of the Duke of Belluno, composed of his own three divisions, of the division Leval, and of 10 or 12 regiments of cavalry, forming a body of 30,000 men, will be at Merida to make a strong diversion in favour of your movement, and in such a mode as that he can push the head of a column upon Lisbon, if you find any great obstacles to your entrance, which it is, however, presumed will not be the case.

"General Lapisse's division of infantry, which is at this moment in Salamanca, and General Maupetit's brigade of cavalry, will, when you shall be at Oporto, receive the Duke of Istria's orders to march upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Abrantes, where this division will again be under the command of the Duke of Belluno, who will send it instructions to join him at Merida, and I let you know this that you may be aware of the march of Lapisse, on your left flank, as far as Abrantes. Such are the last orders I am charged to give you in the name of the emperor; you will have to report to the king and to receive his orders for your ulterior operations. The emperor has unlimited confidence in your talents for the fine expedition that he has charged you with.

"ALEXANDER,

"Prince of Neuchâtel, etc."

It was further intended, by Napoleon, that when Lisbon fell, Marshal Victor should invade Andalusia, upon the same line as Dupont had moved the year before, and like him, also, he was to have been assisted by a division of the 2nd corps, which was to cross the Guadiana and march on Seville. Meanwhile, the Duke of Elchingen, whose corps, reinforced by two regiments of cavalry and the arrival of stragglers, amounted to near 20,000 men, was to maintain Galicia, confine the Asturians within their own frontier line, and keep open the communication with the 2nd corps.

Thus, nominally, 80,000, and in reality 60,000 men, were disposed for the conquest of Lisbon, and in such a manner that 40,000 would, after that had been accomplished, have poured down upon Seville and Cadiz, and at a time when neither Portugal nor Andalusia were capable of making any resistance. It remains to shew from what causes this mighty preparation failed.

The gross numbers of the 2nd corps amounted to 47,000, but General Bonnet's division remained always at St. Ander, in observation of the eastern Asturian frontier; 8000 were detached for the service of the general communications, and the remainder had, since the 9th of November, been fighting and marching incessantly among barren and snowy mountains; hence, stragglers were numerous, and 12,000 men were in hospital. The force, actually under arms, did not exceed 25,000 men, worn down with fatigue, barefooted, and without ammunition. They had outstripped their commissariat, the military chest was not come up, the draft animals were reduced in number, and extenuated by fatigue, the gun-carriages were shaken by continual usage, and the artillery parc was still in the rear; and as the 6th corps had not yet passed Lugo, two divisions of the 2nd were required to hold Coruña and Ferrol. Literally to obey the emperor's orders was consequently impossible, and Soult fixing his head-quarters at St. Jago di Compostella, proceeded to re-organize his army.

Ammunition was fabricated from the loose powder found in Coruña; shoes were obtained partly by requisition, partly from the Spanish magazines, filled as they were with stores supplied by England. The artillery was soon refitted, and, the greatest part of the stragglers being rallied, in six days, the marshal

thought himself in a condition to obey his orders, and, although his troops were still suffering from fatigue and privation, he marched, on the 1st of February, with 19,000 infantry, 4000 cavalry, and 58 pieces of artillery. But, before I narrate his operations, it is necessary to give some account of the state of Galicia at this period, and to trace the movements of the Marquis de Romana.

When the Spanish army, on the 2nd of January, crossed the line of Sir John Moore's march, it was already in a state of disorganization. Romana, with the cavalry, plunged at once into the deep valleys of the Syl and the Minho; but the artillery and a part of his infantry were overtaken and cut up by Franceschi's cavalry. The remainder wandered in bands from one place to another, or dispersed to seek food and shelter among the villages in the mountains. General Mendizabel, with a small body, halted in the Val des Orres, and, placing guards at the Puente de Bibey, a point of singular strength for defence, proposed to cover the approaches to Orense on that side; but Romana himself, after wandering for a time, collected 2000 or 3000 men, and took post, on the 15th, at Toabado, a village about 20 miles from Lugo.*

Marshal Ney, while following the route of the 2nd corps to Lugo with the main body of his troops, detached some cavalry from Villa Franca to scour the valleys on his left, and ordered a division of infantry to march by the road of Orense and St. Jago to Coruña. General Marchand, who commanded it, overthrew and dispersed Mendizabel's troops on the 17th, and, having halted some days at Orense, to patrol the neighbourhood for information and to establish an hospital, continued his march to St. Jago.

The defeat of Mendizabel and the subsequent movements of Marchand's division completed the dispersion of Romana's army; the greatest part throwing away their arms, returned to their homes, and he himself, with his cavalry, and the few infantry that would follow him, crossed the Minho, passed the mountains, and, descending into the valley of the Tamega, took refuge, on the 21st, at Oimbra, a place on the frontier of Portugal, and close to Monterey, where there was a small magazine, collected for the use of Sir John Moore's army.

In this obscure situation, unheeded by the French, he entered into communication with the Portuguese general, Silveira, and with Sir John Cradock, demanding money and arms from the latter, and endeavouring to reassemble a respectable body of troops. But Blake and other officers deserted him, and these events and the general want of patriotic spirit drew from Romana the following observation:—"I know not wherein the patriotism, so loudly vaunted, consists; any reverse, any mishap prostrates the minds of these people, and, thinking only of saving their own persons, they sacrifice their country and compromise their commander."

The people of Galicia, poor, scattered, living hardly, and, like all mountaineers, very tenacious of the little property they possess, disregarded political events which did not immediately and visibly affect their interests, and were, with the exception of those of the seaport towns, but slightly moved by the aggression of the French, as long as that aggression did not extend to their valleys; hence, at first, they treated the English and French armies alike.

Sir David Baird's division, in its advance, paid for the necessary supplies, and it was regarded with jealousy and defrauded. Soult's and Moore's armies, passing like a whirlwind, were beheld with terror, and the people fled from both. The British and German troops that marched to Vigo were commanded without judgment, and licentious, and their stragglers were often murdered; their numbers were small, and the people showed their natural hatred of strangers without disguise. On several occasions the parties, sent to collect cars for the conveyance of the sick, had to sustain a skirmish before the object could be obtained, and five officers, misled by a treacherous guide, were

scarcely saved from death by the interference of an old man, whose exertions, however, were not successful until one of the officers had been severely wounded in the head. On the other hand, General Marchand discovered so little symptoms of hostility, during his march to Orense, that he left his hospital at that town without a guard, and under the joint care of Spanish and French surgeons, and the duties of humanity were faithfully discharged by the former without hindrance from the people.

But this quiescence did not last long: the French generals were obliged to subsist their troops by requisitions extremely onerous to a people whose property chiefly consisted of cattle. The many abuses and excesses which always attend this mode of supplying an army soon created a spirit of hatred that Romana laboured incessantly to increase, and he was successful; for, although a bad general, he possessed intelligence and dexterity suited to the task of exciting a population. Moreover, the monks and friars laboured to the same purpose; and while Romana denounced death to those who refused to take arms, the clergy menaced eternal perdition; and all this was necessary, for the authority of the supreme junta was only acknowledged as a matter of necessity—not of liking.

Gallicia, although apparently calm, was, therefore, ripe for a general insurrection at the moment when the Duke of Dalmatia commenced his march from St. Jago di Compostella.

From that town several roads lead to the Minho; the principal one running by the coast line and crossing the Ulla, the Umia, the Vedra, and the Octaven, passes by Pontevedra and Redondela to Tuy, a dilapidated fortress, situated on the Spanish side of the Minho. The second, crossing the same rivers nearer to their sources, passes by the Monte de Tenteyros, and, entering the valley of the Avia, follows the course of that river to Ribadavia, a considerable town, situated at the confluence of the Avia with the Minho, and having a stone bridge over the former, and a barque ferry on the latter river. The third, turning the sources of the Avia, connects St. Jago with Orense, and from Orense another road passes along the right bank of the Minho, and connects the towns of Ribadavia, Salvatierra, and Tuy, ending at Guardia, a small fortress at the mouth of the Minho.

As the shortest route to Oporto, and the only one convenient for the artillery, was that leading by Redondela and Tuy, and from thence by the coast, the Duke of Dalmatia formed the plan of passing the Minho between Salvatierra and Guardia.

On the 1st of February, Franceschi, followed by the other divisions in succession, took the Pontevedra road. At Redondela he encountered and defeated a small body of insurgents, and captured four pieces of cannon; after which Vigo surrendered to one of his detachments, while he himself marched upon Tuy, and took possession of that town and Guardia. During these operations La Houssaye's dragoons, quitting Mellid, had crossed the Monte de Tenteyro, passed through Ribadavia, and taken possession of Salvatierra, on the Minho; and General Soult, the marshal's brother, who had assembled 3000 stragglers and convalescents, between Astorga and Carrion, received orders to enter Portugal by Puebla de Senabria, and thus join the main body.

The rainy season was now in full torrent, and every stream and river was overflowing its banks. The roads were deep, and the difficulty of procuring provisions was great. These things, and the delivering over to Marshal Ney the administration of Ferrol and Coruña, where the Spanish government and Spanish garrisons were not only retained but paid by the French, delayed the rear of the army so long that it was not until the 15th or 16th that the whole of the divisions were assembled on the Minho, between Salvatierra, Guardia, and Redondela.

The Minho, from Melgaço to the mouth, forms the frontier of Portugal, the banks on both sides being guarded by a number of fortresses, originally of

considerable strength, but at this time all in a dilapidated condition. The Spanish fort of Guardia fronted the Portuguese fort of Caminha; Tuy was opposed by Valença; and this last was garrisoned, and the works in somewhat a better condition than the rest; Lapella, Moncao, and Melgaço, completed the Portuguese line. But the best defence at this moment was the Minho itself, which, at all times a considerable river, was now a broad and raging flood, and the Portuguese *ordenanzas* and militia were in arms on the other side, and had removed all the boats.

Soult, after examining the banks with care, decided upon passing at Campo Saucos, a little village where the ground was flatter, more favourable, and so close to Caminha, that the army, once across, could easily seize that place, and the same day reach Viana, on the Lima, from whence to Oporto was only three marches. To attract the attention of the Portuguese, La Houssaye, who was at Salvatierra, spread his dragoons along the Minho, and attempted to push small parties across that river, above Melgaço, but the bulk of the army was concentrated in the neighbourhood of Campo Saucos, and a detachment seized the small sea-port of Bayona, in the rear.

A division of infantry, and 300 French marines released at Coruña, and attached to the 2nd corps, were then employed to transport some large fishing boats and some heavy guns from the harbour and fort of Guardia overland to Campo Saucos. This was effected by the help of rollers over more than two miles of rugged and hilly ground. It was a work of infinite labour, and, from the 11th to the 15th, the troops toiled unceasingly; the craft was, however, at last launched in a small lake at the confluence of the Tamuga river with the Minho.

The heavy guns being mounted in battery on the night of the 15th, 300 soldiers were embarked, and the boats, manned by the marines, dropped silently down the Tamuga into the Minho, and endeavoured to reach the Portuguese side of the latter river during the darkness; but, whether from the violence of the flood, or want of skill in the men, the landing was not effected at daybreak, and the *ordenanza* fell with great fury upon the first who got on shore: and now, the foremost being all slain, the others pulled back, and regained their own side with great difficulty. This action was infinitely creditable to the Portuguese, and it had a surprising influence on the issue of the campaign.

It was a gallant action, because it might reasonably have been expected that a tumultuous assemblage of half-armed peasants, collected on the instant, would have been dismayed at the sight of many boats filled with soldiers, some pulling across, others landing under the protection of a heavy battery that thundered from the midst of a multitude of troops, clustering on the heights, and thronging to the edge of the opposite bank in eager expectation.

It was an event of leading importance, inasmuch as it baffled an attempt that, being successful, would have ensured the fall of Oporto by the 21st of February, which was precisely the period when, General Mackenzie's division being at Cadiz, Sir John Cradock's troops were reduced to almost nothing; when the English ministers only waited for an excuse to abandon Portugal; when the people of that country were in the very extremity of disorder; when the Portuguese army was a nullity; and when the regency was evidently preparing to receive the French with submission. It was the period, also, when Soult was expected to be at Lisbon, following the emperor's orders, and, consequently, Lapisse and Victor could not have avoided to fulfil their part of the plan for the subjugation of Portugal.

The Duke of Dalmatia's situation was now, although not one of imminent danger, extremely embarrassing, and more than ordinary quickness and vigour were required to conduct the operations with success.* Posted in a narrow, contracted position, he was hemmed in on the left by the Spanish insurgents,

* See Plan 4.

who had assembled immediately after La Houssaye passed Orense, and who, being possessed of a very rugged and difficult country, were, moreover, supported by the army of Romana, which was said to be at Orense and Ribidavia.

In the French general's front was the Minho, broad, raging, and at the moment impassable, while heavy rains forbade the hope that its waters would decrease. To collect sufficient means for forcing a passage would have required 16 days, and, long before that period, the subsistence for the army would have entirely failed, and the Portuguese, being alarmed, would have greatly augmented their forces on the opposite bank. There remained then only to retrace his steps to St. Jago, or break through the Spanish insurgents, and, ascending the Minho, to open a way into Portugal by some other route.

The attempt to pass the river had been baffled on the 15th of February; on the 16th the army was in full march towards Ribidavia, upon a new line of operations, and this promptitude of decision was supported by an equally prompt execution. La Houssaye, with his dragoons, quitted Salvatierra, and keeping the edge of the Minho, was galled by the fire of the Portuguese from the opposite bank; but, before evening, he twice broke the insurgent bands, and in revenge for some previous excesses of the peasantry, burnt the villages of Morentan and Cobreira. Meanwhile the main body of the army, passing the Tea river, at Salvatierra and Puente d'Arcos, marched by successive divisions along the main road from Tuy to Ribidavia.

Between Franquera and Canizar the route was cut by the streams of the Morenta and Noguera rivers; and behind those torrents 800 Gallicians, having barricaded the bridges and repulsed the advanced parties of cavalry, stood upon their defence. The 17th, at daybreak, the leading brigade of Heudelet's division forced the passage, and pursued the Spaniards briskly; but when within a short distance of Ribidavia, the latter rallied upon 8000 or 10,000 insurgents, arrayed in order of battle on a strong hill covering the approaches to that town.

At this sight the advanced guard halted until the remainder of the division and a brigade of cavalry were come up, and then, under the personal direction of Soult, the French assailed, and drove the Gallicians, fighting, through the town and across the Avia. The loss of the vanquished was very considerable, and the bodies of 20 priests were found amongst the slain; but, either from fear or patriotism, every inhabitant had quitted Ribidavia.

The 18th, one brigade of infantry scoured the valley of the Avia, and dispersed 3000 or 4000 of the insurgents, who were disposed to make a second stand on that side. A second brigade, pushing on to Barbantes, seized a ferry-boat on the Minho, close to that place; they were joined the same evening by the infantry who had scoured the valley of the Avia the day before, and by Franceschi's cavalry, and on the 19th they entered Orense in time to prevent the bridge over the Minho from being cut. La Houssaye's dragoons then took post at Maside, and the same day the remainder of the horse and Laborde's infantry were united at Ribidavia; but the artillery were still between Tuy and Salvatierra, under the protection of Merle's and Mermet's divisions. Thus, in three days, the Duke of Dalmatia had, with an admirable celerity and vigour, extricated his army from a contracted unfavourable country, strangled a formidable insurrection in its birth, and at the same time opened a fresh line of communication with St. Jago, and an easy passage into Portugal.

The 20th, a regiment, being sent across the Minho by the ferries of Barbantes and Ribidavia, defeated the insurgents of the left bank, advanced to the Arroyo river, and took post on the heights of Merea. The army, with the exception of the division guarding the guns, was the same day concentrated at Orense. But the utmost efforts of the artillery-officers had been baffled by the difficulties of the road between Tuy and Ribidavia; and this circumstance, together with the precarious state of the communications, the daily increasing sick-list, and

the number of petty detachments necessary to protect the rear of the army, seemed to render the immediate invasion of Portugal hopeless.

To men of an ordinary stamp it would have been so ; but the Duke of Dalmatia, with a ready boldness, resolved to throw the greatest part of his artillery and the whole of his other encumbrances into Tuy, as a place of arms, and then relinquishing all communication with Galicia, for the moment, to march in one mass directly upon Oporto ; from whence, if successful, he proposed to re-open his communication with Tuy, by the line of the coast, and then, recovering his artillery and parcs, to re-establish a regular system of operations.

In pursuance of this resolution, 16 of the lightest guns and six howitzers, together with a proportion of ammunition waggons, were, with infinite labour and difficulty, transported to Ribidavia, but the remaining 36 pieces and a vast parc of carriages, carrying ammunition and hospital and commissariat stores, were put into Tuy. General La Martiniere was left there with an establishment of artillery and engineer officers, a garrison of 500 men fit to carry arms, and 900 sick. All the stragglers, convalescents, and detachments, coming from St. Jago, and the military chest, which was still in the rear, guarded by 600 infantry, were directed upon Tuy, and the gates being then shut, La Martiniere was abandoned to his own resources.

The men in hospital at Ribidavia were now forwarded to Orense, and the marshal's quarters were established at the latter town on the 24th ; but many obstacles were yet to be vanquished before the army could commence the march into Portugal. The gun-carriages had been so shaken in the transit from Tuy to Ribidavia that three days were required to repair them. It was extremely difficult to obtain provisions, and numerous bands of the peasants were still in arms ; nor were they quelled until combats had taken place at Gurzo, on the Monte Blanco, in the Val d'Ornes, and up the valley of Avia, by which the French wasted time, lost men, and expended ammunition that could not be replaced.

Marshal Soult endeavoured to soften the people's feelings by kindness and soothing proclamations ; and as he enforced a strict discipline among his troops, his humane and politic demeanour joined to the activity of his movable columns, soon abated the fierceness of the peasantry.* The inhabitants of Ribidavia returned to their houses ; those of Orense had never been very violent, and now became even friendly, and lent assistance to procure provisions. It was not, however, an easy task to restrain the soldiers within the bounds of humanity : the frequent combats, the assassination and torturing of isolated men, and the privations endured, had so exasperated the French troops, that the utmost exertions of their general's authority could not always control their revenge.

While the Duke of Dalmatia was thus preparing for a formidable inroad, his adversaries were a prey to the most horrible anarchy. The bishop, always intent to increase his own power, had assembled little short of 50,000 armed persons in Oporto ; and he had also commenced a gigantic line of entrenchments on the hills to the northward of that city. This worse than useless labour so completely occupied all persons, that the defence of the strong country lying between the Douro and the Minho was totally neglected ; and when the 2nd corps appeared on the bank of the latter river, the northern provinces were struck with terror. Then it was that the people, for the first time, understood the extent of their danger ; and that the bishop, aroused from his intrigues, became sensible that the French were more terrible enemies than the regency. Once impressed with this truth, he became clamorous for succour. He recalled Sir Robert Wilson from the Agueda ; he hurried on the labours of the entrenchments ; and he earnestly pressed Sir John Cradock for assistance, demanding arms, ammunition, and a reinforcement of British soldiers.

Sir Robert Wilson, as I have already related, disregarded his orders ; and the British general refused to furnish him with troops, but supplied him with arms, very ample stores of powder, and sent artillery and engineer officers to

* Appendix, No. 42.

superintend the construction of the defensive works, and to aid in the arrangements for a reasonable system of operations.* The people were, however, become too headstrong and licentious to be controlled, or even advised, and the soldiers being drawn into the vortex of insubordination, universal and hopeless confusion prevailed.

Don Bernadim Freire was the legal commander-in-chief of the Entre Minho e Douro, but all the generals claimed an equal and independent authority each over his own force; and this was, perhaps, a matter of self-preservation, for general and traitor were, at that period, almost synonymous; and to obey the orders of a superior against the momentary wishes of the multitude was to incur instant death: nor were there wanting men who found it profitable to inflame the passions of the mob, and to direct their blind vengeance against innocent persons; for the prelate's faction, although the most powerful, was not without opponents even in Oporto.†

Such was the unhappy state of affairs when the undisciplined gallantry of the peasants, baffling the efforts of the French to cross the Minho at Campo Saucos, obliged Soult to march by Orense. A part of the regular troops were immediately sent forward to the Cavado river, where they were joined by the *ordenanzas* and the militia of the district, but all in a state of fearful insubordination; and there were not any arrangements made for the regular distribution of provisions, or of any one necessary supply.

Among the troops despatched from Oporto was the 2nd battalion of the Lusitanian legion, 900 strong, well armed and well equipped; they were commanded by Baron Eben, a native of Prussia, who, without any known services to recommend him, had suddenly attained the rank of major in the British service. This man, destined to act a conspicuous part in Portuguese tragedy, had been left by Sir Robert Wilson in Oporto, when that officer marched to Almeida. Eben's orders were to follow with the 2nd battalion of the legion, when the men's clothing and equipment should be completed; but he, retaining the troops, remained, to push his own fortune under the prelate's auspices.

General Freire having reached the Cavado, with a small body of regular troops, was immediately joined by 14,000 or 15,000 militia and *ordenanzas*. Fixing his head-quarters at Braga, he sent detachments to occupy the posts of Salamonde and Ruivaens in his front; and, unfortunately for himself, endeavoured to restrain his troops from wasting their ammunition by wanton firing in the streets and on the roads. This exertion of command was heinously resented; for Freire, being willing to uphold the authority of the regency, had been for some time obnoxious to the bishop's faction, and already he was pointed to as a suspected person; and the multitude were inimically disposed towards him.‡

Meanwhile, General Sylveira, assuming the command of the Tras os Montes, advanced to Chaves, and put himself in communication with the Marquis of Romana, who, having remained tranquil at Oimbra and Monterey since the 21st of January, had been joined by his dispersed troops, and was again at the head of 9000 or 10,000 men. Sylveira's force consisted of about 2000 regulars and as many militia, and his army was accompanied by many of the *ordenanzas*; but here, as elsewhere, the Portuguese were licentious, insubordinate, and disdainful of their general; and the national enmity between them and the Spaniards overcoming the sense of a common cause and common danger, the latter were evilly entreated, both officers and men; and a deadly feud subsisted between the two armies.§

The generals, however, agreed to act in concert, offensively and defensively; but neither of them was the least acquainted with the numbers, intention, or even the position of their antagonists: and it is a proof of Romana's unfitness for command that he, having the whole population at his disposal, was yet

* Appendix, No. 32, section 6.

† Ibid, section 6.

‡ Ibid, section 1.

§ Ibid, No. 35, section 3.

ignorant of everything relating to his enemy that it behoved him to know. The whole of the French force in Galicia, at this period, was about 45,000 men, Romana estimated it at 21,000. The number under Soult was above 24,000, Romana supposed it to be 12,000; and among these he included General Marchand's division of the 6th corps, which he always imagined to be a part of the Duke of Dalmatia's army.

The Spanish general was so elated at the spirit of the peasants about Ribadavia, that he anticipated nothing but victory. He knew that on the Arosa, an estuary running up towards St. Jago de Compostella, the inhabitants of Villa Garcia had also risen, and, being joined by all the neighbouring districts, were preparing to attack Vigo and Tuy; and partly from his Spanish temperament, partly from his extreme ignorance of war, he was convinced that the French only thought of making their escape out of Galicia, and that even in that they would be disappointed.* But to effect their destruction more certainly, he also, as we have seen, pestered Sir John Cradock for succours in money and ammunition, and desired that the insurgents on the Arosa might be assisted with 1000 British soldiers. Cradock anxious to support the cause, although he refused the troops, sent ammunition, and £5000 in money; but, before it arrived, Romana was beaten and in flight.

The combined Spanish and Portuguese forces, amounting to 16,000 regulars and militia, besides *ordenanzas*, were posted in a straggling unconnected manner along the valley of the Tamega, and extended from Monterey, Verim, and Villaza, to near Chaves, a distance of more than 15 miles. This was the first line of defence for Portugal.

Freire and Eben, with 14 guns and 25,000 men, were at Braga, in second line, their outposts being on the Cavado, and at the strong passes of Ruivaens and Venda Nova: but of these 25,000 men, only 6000 were armed with muskets; and it is to be observed that the militia and troops of the line differed from the armed peasantry only in name, save that their faulty discipline and mutinous disposition rendered them less active and intelligent as skirmishers, without making them fitter for battle.

The bishop, with his disorderly and furious rabble, formed the third line, occupying the entrenchments that covered Oporto.

Such was the state of affairs, and such were the dispositions made to resist the Duke of Dalmatia; but his army, although galled and wearied by continual toil, and when halting, disturbed and vexed by the multitude of insurrections, was, when in motion, of a power to overthrow and disperse these numerous bands, even as a great ship feeling the wind, breaks through and scatters the gun-boats that have gathered round her in the calm.

CHAPTER V.

SECOND INVASION OF PORTUGAL.

THE Entre Minho e Douro and the Tras os Montes lying together, form the northern part of Portugal; the extreme breadth of either, when measured from the frontier to the Douro, does not exceed 70 miles.

The river Tamega, running north and south, and discharging itself into the Douro, forms the boundary line between them; but there is, to the west of this river, a succession of rugged mountain ridges, which, under the names of Sierra de Gerez, Sierra de Cabrera, and Sierra de Santa Catalina, form a second barrier, nearly parallel to the Tamega; and across some part of these ridges any invader, coming from the eastward, must pass to arrive at Oporto.

Other Sierras, running also in a parallel direction with the Tamega, cut the Tras os Montes in such a manner that all the considerable rivers flowing north and south tumble into the Douro. But as the western ramifications of the

* Appendix, No. 35, section 3.

Sierras de Gerez and Cabrera shoot down towards the sea, the rivers of the Entre Douro e Minho discharge their waters into the ocean, and consequently flow at right-angles to those of Tras os Montes. Hence it follows, that an enemy penetrating to Oporto, from the north, would have to pass the Lima, the Cavado, and the Ave, to reach Oporto; and, if coming from the east, he invaded the Tras os Montes, all the rivers and intervening ridges of that province must be crossed before the Entre Minho e Douro could be reached.

The Duke of Dalmatia was, however, now in such a position, near the sources of the Lima and the Tamega rivers, that he could choose whether to penetrate by the valley of the first into the Entre Minho e Douro, or by the valley of the second into the Tras os Montes: and there was also a third road, leading between those rivers through Montalegre upon Braga; but this latter route, passing over the Sierra de Gerez, was impracticable for artillery.

The French general had, therefore, to consider—

1. If, following the course of the Lima, he should attack and disperse the insurgents between that river and the Minho, and then recovering his artillery from Tuy, proceed against Oporto by the main road leading along the sea coast.

2. If he should descend the Tamega, take Chaves, and then decide whether to continue his route to Villa Real, near the Douro, and so take the defences of Tras os Montes in reverse, or, turning to his right, and crossing the Sierra de Cabrera by the pass of Ruivaens, enter Braga, and thus operate against Oporto.

The first project was irregular and hazardous, inasmuch as Romana and Sylveira's troops might have fallen upon the flank and rear of the French during their march through a difficult country; but as the position of those generals covered the road to Chaves, to beat them was indispensable, as a preliminary measure to either plan; and this was immediately executed.

The 4th of March the French movement commenced. The 5th, the van being at Villa Real and Penaverde, Soult sent a flag of truce to Romana, with a letter, in which, exposing fully the danger of the latter's situation, he advised him to submit: but no answer was returned; nor would the bearer have been suffered to pass the outposts, but that Romana himself was in the rear, for he dreaded that such an occurrence would breed a jealousy of his conduct, and, perhaps, cause his patriotism to be undervalued.

This failing, three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry marched the next morning against Monterey; while La Houssaye's dragoons, taking the road of Laza, covered the left flank, and pushed parties as far as La Gudina, on the route to Puebla de Senabria. The fourth division of infantry remained at Villa del Rey, to cover the passage of the sick and wounded men from Orense; for the Duke of Dalmatia, having no base of operations, transported his hospitals, and other encumbrances, from place to place as the army moved, acting in this respect after the manner of the Roman generals, when invading a barbarous country.

As the French advanced, the Spaniards abandoned their positions in succession, spiked the guns in the dilapidated works of Monterey, and after a slight skirmish at Verim, took the road to Puebla de Senabria; but Franceschi followed close, and overtaking 2000 or 3000 as they were passing a rugged mountain, he assailed their rear with a battalion of infantry, and at the same time leading his horsemen round both flanks, headed the column, and obliged it to halt.

The Spaniards, trusting to the rough ground, drew up in one large square and awaited the charge. Franceschi had four regiments of cavalry; each regiment settled itself against the face of a square, and then the whole, with loud cries, bore down swiftly upon their opponents; the latter, unsteady and dismayed, shrunk together from the fierce assault, and were instantly trampled down in heaps. Those who escaped the horses' hoofs and the edge of the sword became prisoners, but 1200 bodies were stretched lifeless on the field of battle, and Franceschi continued his movements on La Gudina.

Romana was at Semadems, several miles in the rear of Verim, when his vanguard was attacked, and there was nothing to prevent him from falling back to Chaves with his main body, according to a plan before agreed upon between him and Sylveira, but either from fear or indignation at the treatment his soldiers had received at the hands of the Portuguese, he left Sylveira to his fate, and made off with 6000 or 7000 men towards Bragança; from thence passing by Puebla de Senabria, he regained the valley of the Syl.* Meanwhile, 2000 Portuguese infantry, with some guns, issuing from the side of Villaza, cut the French line of march at the moment when Franceschi and Heudelet having passed Monterey, Laborde was approaching that place. In the slight combat that ensued the Portuguese lost their guns and were driven, fighting, down the valley of the Tamega as far as the village of Outeiro, within their own frontier.

The defeat and flight of Romana had such an effect upon the surrounding districts that the Spanish insurgents returned in crowds to their habitations and delivered up their arms. Some of the clergy, also, changing their opinions, exhorted the people to peace, and the prisoners taken on the 6th, being dissatisfied with Romana's conduct, and moved by their hatred of the Portuguese, entered the French service. These affairs occupied Soult until the 9th, during which period his outposts were pushed towards Chaves, Montalegre, and La Gudina, but the main body remained at Verim to cover the arrival of the sick, at Monterey.

Sylveira, thus beaten at Villaza, and deserted by Romana, fell back on the 7th to a strong mountain position, one league behind Chaves, from whence he could command a view of all the French movements as far as Monterey. His ground was advantageous, but his military talents were moderate; his men always insubordinate, were now become mutinous, and many of the officers were disposed to join the French. The general wished to abandon Chaves, the troops resolved to defend it, and 3500 men actually did throw themselves into that town, in defiance of Sylveira, who was already, according to the custom of the day, pronounced a traitor and declared worthy of that death which he would inevitably have suffered, but that some of his troops still continued to respect his orders.†

The 10th, the convoy of French sick was close to Monterey, and as Romana's movement was known to be a real flight, and not made with a design to create fresh insurrections in the rear, the French troops were again put in motion towards Chaves; but Merle's division remained at Verim to protect the hospital, and Franceschi's took the road of La Gudina, as if he had been going towards Salamanca. A report that he had actually entered that town reached Lisbon, and was taken as an indication that Soult would not pass the Portuguese frontier at Chaves, but Franceschi quickly returned, by Osonio and Feccs de Abaxo, and being assisted by Heudelet's division, invested Chaves on the left bank of the Tamega, while Laborde, Mermet, La Houssaye, and Lorge, descending the right bank, beat the Portuguese outposts, and getting possession of a fort close under the walls of Chaves completed the investment of that town.

The place was immediately summoned to surrender, but no answer was returned, and the garrison, like men bereft of their wits, and fighting with the air, kept up a continual and heavy fire of musketry and artillery until the 12th, when they surrendered on receiving a second summons, more menacing than the first. The 13th, the French entered the town, and Sylveira retired to Villa Real.

The works of Chaves were in a bad state, and few of the 50 guns mounted on the ramparts were fit for service; but there was a stone bridge, and the town being in many respects more suitable for a place of arms than Monterey, the sick were brought down from the latter place, and an hospital was established for 1200 men, the number now unfit to carry arms. The fighting men were reduced to 21,000, and Soult, partly from the difficulty of guarding his prisoners, partly from a desire to abate the hostility of the Portuguese, permitted the

* Appendix, No. 35, section 3.

† Ibid.

militia and *ordenanza* to return to their homes, after taking an oath not to resume their arms. To some of the poorest he gave money and clothes, and he enrolled, at their own request, the few regular troops taken in Chaves.

This wise and gentle proceeding was much blamed by some of his officers, especially by those who had served under Junot. They desired that Chaves might be assaulted, and the garrison put to the sword, for they were embued with a personal hatred of the Portuguese, and being averse to serve in the present expedition endeavoured, as it would appear, to thwart their general; but the prudence of his conduct was immediately visible in the softened feelings of the country people. The scouting parties being no longer molested spread themselves, some on the side of Bragança and Villa Real, others in the Entre Minho e Douro. The former reported that there was no enemy in a condition to make head in the Tras os Montes, but the latter fell in with the advanced guard of Freire's army at Ruivaens, on the road to Braga, and this determined the further proceedings of the army.

The possession of Chaves enabled the Duke of Dalmatia to operate against Oporto, either by the Tras os Montes or the Entre Minho e Douro. He decided on the latter; first, because the road, though crossed by stronger positions, was more direct, and more practicable for artillery than that running through the valley of the Tamega; secondly, because a numerous Portuguese army was at Braga; and, thirdly, because he could the sooner remove his communication with Tuy.

The road from Chaves to Braga enters a deep and dangerous defile, or rather a succession of defiles, that extend from Venda Nova to Ruivaens, and re-commence after passing the Cabado river. Friere's advanced guards, composed of *ordenanza*, occupied those places; and he had also a detachment under Eben on the road of Montalegre; but he recalled the latter on the 14th.

The 16th, Franceschi forced the defile of Venda Nova, and the remainder of the troops being formed in alternate masses of cavalry and infantry, began to pass the Sierra de Cabrera. Lorge's dragoons, however, descending the Tamega, ordered rations for the whole army along the road to Villa Real; and then, suddenly retracing their steps, rejoined the main body.

The 17th, Franceschi, being reinforced with some infantry, won the bridge of Ruivaens, and entered Salamonde. The Portuguese, covered by Eben's detachment, which had arrived at St. Joa de Campo, then fell back on the Pico de Pugalados, close to Braga; and the French took post at Carvalho Este, two leagues in front of that city.

Soult now expected to reach Braga without further opposition, and caused his artillery, guarded by Laborde's division, to enter the pass of Venda Nova; but the *ordenanza*, reinforced by some men from the side of Guimaraens, immediately re-assembled, and, clustering on the mountains to the left of the column of march, attacked it with great fierceness and subtlety.

The peasants of the northern provinces of Portugal, unlike the squalid miserable population of Lisbon and Oporto, are robust, handsome, and exceedingly brave. Their natural disposition is open and obliging; and they are, when rightly handled as soldiers, docile, intelligent, and hardy. They are, however, vehement in their anger; and being now excited by the exhortations and personal example of their priests, they came rushing down the sides of the hills; and many of them, like men deprived of reason, broke furiously into the French battalions, and were there killed. The others, finding their efforts unavailing, fled, and were pursued a league up the mountain by some battalions sent out against them, but they were not yet abashed: for, making a circuit behind the hills, they fell upon the rear of the line of march, killed 50 of the stragglers, and plundered the baggage; and, thus galled, the French slowly, and with much trouble, passing the long defiles of Venda Nova, Ruivaens, and Salamonde, gathered by degrees in front of Freire's position.

That general was no more; and his troops, reeking from the slaughter of

their commander, were raging, like savage beasts, at one moment congregating near the prisons to murder some wretch within, at another rushing tumultuously to the outposts, with a design to engage the enemy. The *ordenanzas* of the distant districts also came pouring into the camp, dragging with them suspected persons, and adding to the general distraction.

It appears that the unfortunate Friere, unable to establish order in his army, had resolved to retreat; and in pursuance of that design, recalled Eben on the 14th, and gave directions to the officers at the different outposts in front of Braga to retire at the approach of the enemy. This, and his endeavour to prevent the waste of ammunition, gave effect to a plan which had been long prepared by the bishop's faction for his destruction. In passing through Braga, he was openly reviled in the streets by some of the *ordenanzas*; and as the latter plainly discovered their murderous intention, he left the army; but he was seized on the 17th at a village behind Braga, and brought back; what followed is thus described by Baron Eben, in his official report to Sir John Cradock:—

"I did not reach Braga until nine o'clock in the morning of the 17th. I found everything in the greatest disorder; the houses shut, the people flying in all directions, and part of the populace armed with guns and pikes. Passing through the streets I was greeted with loud *vivas*. Though the people knew me, I could not guess the meaning of this; at the market-place, I was detained by the rapidly-increasing populace, who took the reins of my horse, crying out loudly, that they were ready to do anything to defend the city; requesting me to assist them, and speaking in the lowest terms of their general. I promised them to do all in my power to aid their patriotic zeal; but said that I must first speak to him. Upon this they suffered me to proceed, accompanied by about 100 of them; but I had not got far on my way to his quarters, when I saw him on foot, conducted by a great armed multitude, who suffered no one to pass, and, on my attempting it, threatened to fire. I was, therefore, obliged to turn my horse, and this the people applauded. Two men had hold of the general's arms, his sword was taken from him, and the people abused him most vehemently. On my way back to the market-place, they wanted to shoot me, taking me for General Friere; but I was saved by a soldier of the legion, who explained the mistake. When I reached the market-place, I found about 1000 men drawn up. I communicated to them my determination to assist them in their laudable endeavours to defend themselves, provided they would first permit me to speak with the general, for whose actions I promised to be answerable as long as I should be with him. I had ordered a house to be got ready for my reception, where the general arrived, accompanied as before. I saluted him with respect, at which they plainly discovered their disapprobation. I repeated my proposal but they would not listen to it. I perceived the danger of the general, and proposed to take him to my quarters. My adjutant offered him his arm; when I spoke to him, he only replied, 'Save me!'

"At the entrance of my house, I was surrounded by thousands, and heard the loud cry of 'Kill! kill!' I now took hold of him and attempted to force my way into the house, and a gentleman slightly wounded him with the point of his sword under my arm. He collected all his strength, and rushed through them, and hid himself behind the door of the house. The people surrounded me, and forced me from the house. To draw the attention of the people from the general, I ordered the drummers to beat the alarm, and formed the *ordenanzas* in ranks; but they kept a constant fire upon my house, where the general still was. As a last attempt to save him, I now proposed that he should be conducted to prison, in order to take a legal trial; this was agreed to, and he was conducted there in safety. I now hoped that I had succeeded, as the people demanded to be led against the enemy, now rapidly advancing, in number about 2000. I again formed them, and advanced with them; but soon after, I heard the firing again, and was informed that the people had put the general to death with pikes and guns. I was now proclaimed general."

When this murder was perpetrated, the people seemed satisfied, and Eben announcing the approach of a British force from Oporto, sent orders to the outposts to stand fast, as he intended to fight; but another tumult arose, when it was discovered that an officer of Freire's staff, one, Villaboas, was in Eben's quarters. Several thousand *ordenanzas* instantly gathered about the house, and the unhappy man was haled forth and stabbed to death at the door, the mob all the time shouting and firing volleys in at the windows. Yet, when their fury was somewhat abated, they obliged their new general to come out and show that he had not been wounded, and expressed great affection for him.

In the course of the night the legion marched in from Pico de Pugalados, and the following morning a reinforcement of 6000 *ordenanzas* came up in one mass. Fifty thousand dollars also arrived in the camp from Oporto; for the Portuguese, like the Spaniards, commonly reversed the order of military arrangements, leaving their weapons in store, and bringing their encumbrances to the field of battle.

In the evening the corregidor and two officers of rank, together with many persons of a meaner class, were brought to the town as prisoners and put in jail, the armed mob being with difficulty restrained from slaying them on the way thither; and in this distracted manner they were proceeding when Franceschi arrived at Carvalho on the 17th, and, surely, if that bold and enterprising soldier could have obtained a glimpse of what was passing, or known the real state of affairs, he would have broken into the midst of them with his cavalry; for, of the 25,000 men composing the whole of the Portuguese force, 18,000 were only armed with pikes, the remainder had wasted the greatest part of their ammunition, and the powder in store was not made up in cartridges. But Braga, situated in a deep hollow, was hidden from him, and the rocky and wooded hills surrounding it were occupied by what appeared a formidable multitude. Hence Franceschi, although reinforced by a brigade of infantry, was satisfied by feints and slight skirmishes to alarm his opponents, and to keep them in play until the other divisions of the French army could arrive.

While these events were passing at Braga, Sylveira had again collected a considerable force of militia and *ordenanzas* in the Trás os Montes, and Captain Arentchild, one of the officers sent by Sir John Cradock to aid the bishop, rallied a number of fugitives at Guimaraens and Amarante. In Oporto, however, the multitude, obeying no command, were more intent upon murder than upon defence.

Eben's posts extended from Falperra, on the route of Guimaraens to the Ponte Porto, on the Cavado river; but the principal force was stationed on a lofty ridge called the Monte Adaufé, which, at the distance of six or seven miles from Braga, crossed the road to Chaves.

The left, or western end, which overhangs the river Cavado, covered the detachment guarding the Ponte Porto.

The right rested on a wood and on the head of a deep ravine, and beyond this wood the ridge, taking a curved and forward direction, was called the Monte Vallonga, and a second mass of men was posted there, but separated from those on the Monte Adaufé by an interval of two miles, and by the ravine and wood before mentioned.

A third body, being pushed still more in advance, crowned an isolated hill, flanking the Chaves road, being prepared to take the French in rear when the latter should attack the Monte Adaufé.

Behind the Monte Vallonga, and separated from it by a valley three miles wide, the ridge of Falperra was guarded by detachments sent both from Guimaraens and from Braga.

The road to Braga, leading directly over the centre of the Monte Adaufé, was flanked on the left by a ridge shooting perpendicularly out from that mountain, and ending in a lofty mass of rocks which overhangs Carvalho Esté.

The Portuguese neglected to occupy either these rocks or the connecting ridge, and Franceschi seized the former on the 17th.

The 18th, Soult arrived in person, and wishing to prevent a battle, released twenty prisoners, and sent them in with a proclamation couched in conciliatory language, and offering a capitulation; but the trumpeter who accompanied them was detained, and the prisoners were immediately slain.

The 19th, Eben brought up all his reserves to the Adaufé, and the Portuguese on the isolated hill in front of Monte Vallonga took possession of Lanhoza, a village half way between that hill and the rocky height occupied by Franceschi on the 17th. But two divisions of French infantry being now up, Soult caused one of them and the cavalry to attack Lanhoza, from whence the Portuguese were immediately driven, and, being followed closely, lost their own hill also. The other French division took post, part in Carvalho, part on the rocky headland, and six guns were carried to the latter during the night. In this position the French columns were close to the centre of the Portuguese, and could, by a slight movement in advance, separate Eben's wings. The rest of the army was at hand, and a general attack was arranged for the next morning.

BATTLE OF BRAGA.

The 20th, at nine o'clock, the French were in motion: Franceschi and Mermet, leaving a detachment on the hill they had carried the night before, endeavoured to turn the right of the people on the Monte Vallonga.

Laborde, supported by La Houssaye's dragoons, advanced against the centre by the ridge connecting Carvalho with the Monte Adaufé.

Heudelet, with a part of his division and a squadron of cavalry, attacked the left, and made for the Ponte Porto.

The Portuguese immediately opened a straggling fire of musketry and artillery in the centre; but, after a few rounds, the bursting of a gun created some confusion, from which Laborde's rapidly advancing masses gave them no time to recover; and by ten o'clock the whole of the centre was flying in disorder down a narrow wooded valley leading from the Adaufé to Braga.

The French followed hard, and in the pursuit, discovering one of their *voltigeurs*, who had been a prisoner, still alive, but mutilated in the most horrible manner, they gave little or no quarter. Braga was abandoned, and the victorious infantry passing through, took post on the other side; but the cavalry continued the havoc for some distance on the road to Oporto; yet, so savage was the temper of the fugitives that, in passing through Braga, they stopped to murder the corregidor and other prisoners in the jail, then, casting the mangled bodies into the street, continued the flight. Meanwhile, Heudelet, breaking over the left of the Monte Adaufé descended upon Ponte Porto, and, after a sharp skirmish, carried that bridge and the village on the other side of the Cavado.

Franceschi and Mermet found considerable difficulty in ascending the rugged sides of the Monte Vallonga, but having, at last, attained the crest, the whole of their enemies fled. The two generals then crossed the valley to gain the road of Guimaraens, and cut off that line of retreat, but fell in with the 3000 Portuguese posted above Falperra. These men, seeing the cavalry approach, drew up with their backs to some high rocks, and opened a fire of artillery. But Franceschi, placing his horsemen on either flank, and a brigade of infantry against the front, as at Verim, made all charge together, and strewed the ground with the dead. Nevertheless, the Portuguese fought valiantly at this point, and Franceschi acknowledged it.

The vanquished lost all their artillery and above 4000 men, of which 400 only were made prisoners. Some of the fugitives crossing the Cavado river, made for the Ponte de Lima, others retired to Oporto, but the greatest number took the road of Guimaraens, during the fight at Falperra. Eben appears, by his own official report, to have been at Braga when the action commenced, and to have fled among the first; for he makes no mention of the fight at Falperra, nor of the skirmish at Ponte Porto, and his narrative bears every mark of inaccuracy.

When the French outposts were established in front of Braga, General Lorge crossed the Cavado and entered Bacellos ; and the corregidor received him well, for which he was a few days after put to death by the Portuguese general, Bonteilho, who commanded between the Lima and the Minho.

Braga itself had been at first abandoned by the inhabitants, but they were induced to return the next day ; and some provisions and a large store of powder being found in the magazines, the latter was immediately made up into cartridges for the use of the troops. The gun-carriages and ammunition-waggons were again repaired, and an hospital was established for 800 sick and wounded : from whence it may be judged that the loss sustained in action, since the 15th, was not less than 600 men.

The French general, having thus broken through the second Portuguese line of defence, was in a situation either to march directly against Oporto, or to recover his communication with the depôt at Tuy. He knew, through the medium of his spies and by intercepted letters, that General La Martiniere, although besieged, was in no distress ; that he made successful sorties ; and that his artillery commanded that in the fortress of Valença. On the other hand, information was received that 60,000 troops of the line, militia, and *ordenanza*, were assembled at the entrenched camp covering Oporto, and the scouts reported that the Portuguese were also in force at Guimaraens, and had cut the bridges along the whole course of the Ave.

Meanwhile, Sylveira struck a great blow ; for, being reinforced from the side of Beira, he remounted the Tamega, invested the French in Chaves on the 20th, and, in eight days, obliged the garrison, consisting of 100 fighting men, and 1200 sick, to capitulate ; after which he took post at Amarante. But Soult, ignorant of this event, left Heudelet's division at Braga, to protect the hospitals from Bonteilho, and then continued his own movement against Oporto in three columns.

The first, composed of Franceschi's and Mermet's divisions, marched by the road of Guimaraens and San Justo, with orders to force the passage of the Upper Ave, and scour the country towards Pombeiro.

The second, which consisted of Merle's, Laborde's, and La Houssaye's divisions, was commanded by Soult, in person, and moved upon Barca de Trofa, while General Lorge, quitting Bacellos, made way by the Ponte d'Ave.

The passage of the Ave was fiercely disputed. The left column was fought within front of Guimaraens, and at Pombeiro, and again at Puente Negrellos. The last combat was rough, and the French general Jardon was killed.

The march of the centre column was arrested at Barca de Trofa, by the cutting of the bridge, and the marshal, observing the numbers of the enemy ascended the right bank, and forced the passage at San Justo : but not without the help of Franceschi, who came down the opposite side of the river, after the fight at Ponte Negrellos.

When the left and centre had thus crossed, Colonel Lallemand was detached with a regiment of dragoons to assist Lorge, who was still held in check at the Ponte Ave ; Lallemand was at first beaten back, but, being reinforced with some infantry, finally succeeded ; and the Portuguese, enraged at their defeat, brutally murdered their commander, General Vallonga, and then dispersed.

The whole French army was now in communication on the left bank of the Ave ; the way to Oporto was opened, and, on the 27th, the troops were finally concentrated in front of the entrenchments covering that city.

The action of Monterey, the taking of Chaves, and the defeat at Braga, had so damped the bishop's ardour that he was, at one time, inclined to abandon the defence of Oporto ; but this idea was relinquished when he considered the multitudes he had drawn together, and that the English army was stronger than it had been at any previous period since Cradock's arrival ; Beresford, also, was at the head of a considerable native force behind the Mondego ; and, with the hope of their support, the bishop resolved to stand the brunt.

He had collected, in the entrenched camp, little short of 40,000 men ; and among them were many regular troops, of which 2000 had lately arrived under the command of General Vittoria. This general was sent by Beresford to aid Sylveira : but when Chaves surrendered, he entered Oporto.

The hopes of the people, also, were high, for they could not believe that the French were a match for them ; the preceding defeats were attributed each to its particular case of treason, and the murder of some innocent persons had followed as an expiation. No man but the bishop durst thwart the slightest caprice of the mob ; and he was little disposed to do so, while Raymundo, and others of his stamp, fomented their fury, and directed it to gratify personal enmities. Thus, the defeat of Braga being known in Oporto, caused a tumult on the 22nd ; and Louis D' Olivera, a man of high rank, who had been cast into prison, was, with fourteen other persons, haled forth, and despatched with many stabs ; the bodies were then mutilated, and dragged in triumph through the streets.*

The entrenchments extending, as I have said, from the Douro to the coast, were complete, and armed with 200 guns. They consisted of a number of forts of different sizes, placed on the top of a succession of rounded hills ; and where the hills failed, the defences were continued by earthen ramparts, loopholed houses, ditches, and felled trees. Oporto itself is built in a hollow ; a bridge of boats, nearly 300 yards in length, formed the only communication between the city and the suburb of Villa Nova ; and this bridge was completely commanded by batteries, mounting 50 guns, planted on the bluff and craggy heights that overhang the river above Villa Nova, and overlooked, not only the city, but a great part of the entrenched camp beyond it. Within the lines, tents were pitched for even greater numbers than were assembled ; and the people ran to arms, and quickly manned their works with great noise and tumult, when the French columns, gathering like heavy thunder clouds, settled in front of the camp.

The Duke of Dalmatia arrived on the 27th. While at Braga he had written to the bishop, calling on him to calm the popular effervescence ; and now, beholding the extended works in his front, and reading their weakness even in the multitudes that guarded them, he renewed his call upon the prelate, to spare this great and commercial city the horrors of a storm. A prisoner, employed to carry the summons, would have been killed, but that it was pretended he came with an offer from Soult to surrender his army ; and notwithstanding this ingenious device, and that the bishop commenced a negotiation, which was prolonged until evening, the firing from the entrenchments was constant and general during the whole of the 28th.

The parley being finally broken off, Soult made dispositions for a general action on the 29th. To facilitate this, he caused Merle's division to approach the left of the entrenchments in the evening of the 28th, intending thereby to divert attention from the true point of attack : a prodigious fire was immediately opened from the works ; but Merle, having pushed close up, got into some hollow roads and enclosures, and maintained his ground. At another part of the line, however, some of the Portuguese pretending a wish to surrender, General Foy, with a single companion, imprudently approached them ; the latter was killed, and Foy himself made prisoner, and carried into the town. He was mistaken for Loison, and the people called out to kill *Maneta*, but with great presence of mind he held up his hands ; and the crowd, convinced of their error, suffered him to be cast into the jail.

The bishop, having brought affairs to this awful crisis, had not resolution to brave the danger himself. Leaving Generals Lima and Pareiras to command the army, he, with an escort of troops, quitted the city, and, crossing the river, took his station in Serea, a convent built on the top of the rugged hill which overhangs the suburb of Villa Nova, from whence he beheld in safety the horrors of the next day.

* See Plan 5.

The bells in Oporto continued to ring all night ; and about twelve o'clock a violent thunderstorm arising, the sound of the winds was mistaken in the camp for the approach of enemies. At once the whole line blazed with a fire of musketry ; the roar of 200 pieces of artillery was heard above the noise of the tempest, and the Portuguese calling to one another with loud cries, were agitated at once with fury and with terror. The morning, however, broke serenely ; and a little before seven o'clock the sound of the Frenchmen's trumpets and drums, and the glitter of their arms, gave notice that the whole army was in motion for the attack.

BATTLE AND STORMING OF OPORTO.

The feint made the evening before against the left, which was the weakest part of the line, had perfectly succeeded, and the Portuguese generals placed their principal masses on that side ; but the Duke of Dalmatia was intent upon the strongest points of the works, being resolved to force his way through the town, and to seize the bridge during the fight, that he might secure the passage of the river.

His army was divided into three columns ; of which the first, under Merle, attacked the left of the Portuguese centre ; the second, under Franceschi and Laborde, assailed their extreme right ; the third, composed of Mermet's division, sustained by a brigade of dragoons, was in the centre. General Lorge was appointed to cut off and attack a body of *ordenanza*, who were posted with some guns in front of the Portuguese left, and beyond the works on the road of Villa de Conde.

The battle was commenced by the wings ; for Mermet's division was withheld until the enemy's generals believing the whole of the attack was developed, had weakened their centre to strengthen their flanks. Then the French held in reserve, rushing violently forwards, broke through the entrenchments, and took the two principal forts, entering by the embrasures, and killing or dispersing all within them. Soult instantly rallied this division, and sent two battalions to take the Portuguese left wing in the rear ; while two other battalions were ordered to march straight into the town, and make for the bridge.

The Portuguese army, thus cut in two, was soon beaten on all points. Laborde carried in succession a number of forts, took 50 pieces of artillery, and reaching the edge of the city, halted until Franceschi, who was engaged still more to the left, could join him. By this movement a large body of Portuguese were driven off from the town, and forced back to the Douro, being followed by a brigade under General Arnaud. And now Merle, seeing that the success of the centre was complete, brought up his left flank, and carrying all the forts to his right in succession, killed a great number of the defenders, and drove the rest towards the sea. These last dividing, fled for refuge, one part to the fort of St. Joa, the other towards the mouth of the Douro ; where, maddened by terror, as the French came pouring down upon them, they strove, some to swim across, others to get over in small boats ; and when their general, Lima, called out against this hopeless attempt, they turned and murdered him, within musket shot of the approaching enemy ; and then renewing the attempt to cross, nearly the whole perished.

The victory was now certain, for Lorge had dispersed the people on the side of Villa de Conde, and General Arnaud had hemmed in those above the town and prevented them from plunging into the river also, as in their desperate mood they were going to do. But the battle continued within Oporto, for the two battalions sent from the centre having burst the barricades at the entrance of the streets, had penetrated, fighting, to the bridge, and here all the horrid circumstances of war seemed to be accumulated, and the calamities of an age compressed into one doleful hour.

More than 4000 persons, old and young and of both sexes, were seen pressing forward with wild tumult, some already on the bridge, others striving to gain it, and all in a state of frenzy. The batteries on the opposite bank

opened their fire when the French appeared, and at that moment a troop of Portuguese cavalry flying from the fight came down one of the streets, and remorseless in their fears, bore, at full gallop, into the midst of the miserable helpless crowd, and trampled a bloody pathway to the river. Suddenly the nearest boats, unable to sustain the increasing weight, sunk and the foremost wretches still tumbling into the river, as they were pressed from behind, perished, until the heaped bodies rising above the surface of the waters, filled all the space left by the sinking of the boats.

The first of the French that arrived, amazed at this fearful spectacle, forgot the battle, and hastened to save those who still struggled for life—and while some were thus nobly employed, others by the help of planks, getting on to the firmer parts of the bridge, crossed the river and carried the batteries on the heights of Villa Nova. The passage was thus secured.

But this terrible destruction did not complete the measure of the city's calamities; 200 men, who occupied the bishop's palace, fired from the windows and maintained that post until the French, gathering round them in strength, burst the doors, and put all to the sword. Every street and house now rung with the noise of the combatants and the shrieks of distress; for the French soldiers, exasperated by long hardships, and prone like all soldiers to ferocity and violence during an assault, became frantic with fury, when, in one of the principal squares, they found several of their comrades who had been made prisoners, fastened upright, and living, but with their eyes burst, their tongues torn out, and their other members mutilated and gashed. Those that beheld the sight spared none who fell in their way.

It was in vain that Soult strove with all his power to stop the slaughter; it was in vain that hundreds of officers and soldiers opposed, at the risk of their lives, the vengeance of their comrades, and by their generous exertions rescued vast numbers that would otherwise have fallen victims to the anger and brutality of the moment. The frightful scene of rape, pillage, and murder, closed not for many hours, and what with those who fell in battle, those who were drowned, and those sacrificed to revenge, it is said that 10,000 Portuguese died in that unhappy day! The loss of the French did not exceed 500 men.

CHAPTER VI.

THE dire slaughter at Oporto was followed up by a variety of important operations, but before these are treated of, it is essential to narrate the contemporaneous events on the Tagus and the Guadiana, for the war was wide and complicated, and the result depended more upon the general combinations than upon any particular movements.

OPERATIONS OF THE 1ST AND 4TH CORPS.

It has been already related that Marshal Victor, after making a futile attempt to surprize the Marquis of Palacios, had retired to his former quarters at Toledo, and that the Conde de Cartoajal, who succeeded the Duke of Infantado, had advanced to Ciudad Real with about 14,000 men. Cuesta, also, having rallied the remainder of Galluzzo's army, and reinforced it by levies from Grenada, and regular troops from Seville, had fixed his head-quarters at Deleytosa, broken down the bridge of Almaraz, and with 14,000 infantry and 2500 cavalry, guarded the line of the Tagus. The 4th corps remained at Talavera and Placentia, but still holding the bridge of Arzobispo.

The reserve of heavy cavalry was now suppressed, and the regiments were dispersed among the *corps d'armée*, but the whole army, exclusive of the king's guards, did not exceed 270,000 men, and 40,000 horses, showing a decrease of 65,000 men since the 15th of November. But this number includes the imperial guards, the reserve of infantry, and many detachments drafted from the corps;—in all 40,000 men, who had been struck off the rolls of the army in Spain,

with a view to the war in Germany ; hence the real loss of the French by sword, sickness, and captivity, in the four months succeeding Napoleon's arrival in the Peninsula, was about 25,000—a vast number, but not incredible, when it is considered that two sieges, 12 pitched battles, and innumerable combats had taken place during that period.

Such was the state of affairs when the Duke of Belluno, having received orders to aid Soult in the invasion of Portugal, changed places with the 4th corps. Sebastiani was then opposed to Cartoajal, and Victor stood against Cuesta. The former fixed his head-quarters at Toledo, the latter at Talavera de la Reyna, the communication between them being kept up by Montbrun's division of cavalry, while the garrison of Madrid, composed of the king's guards, and Dessolle's division, equally supported both. But to understand the connection between the 1st, 2nd, and 4th corps, and Lapisse's division, it is necessary to have a clear idea of the nature of the country on both sides of the Tagus.

That river, after passing Toledo, runs through a deep and long valley, walled up on either hand by lofty mountains. Those on the right bank are always capped with snow, and, ranging nearly parallel with the course of the stream, divide the valley of the Tagus from Old Castile and the Salamanca country. The highest parts are known by the names of the Sierra de Gredos, Sierra de Bejar, and Sierra de Gata ; and in these sierras the Alberche, the Tietar, and the Alagon, take their rise, and, ploughing the valley in a slanting direction, fall into the Tagus.

The principal mountain on the left bank is called the Sierra de Guadalupe ; it extends in a southward direction from the river, and divides the upper part of La Mancha from Spanish Estremadura. The communications leading from the Salamanca country into the valley of the Tagus are neither many nor good ; the principal passes are—

1st. The rout of Horcajada, an old Roman road, which, running through Pedrahita and Villa Franca, crosses the Sierra de Gredos at Puerto de Pico, and then descends by Montbeltran to Talavera.

2nd. The pass of Arenas, leading nearly parallel to, and at a short distance from, the first.

3rd. The pass of Tornevecas, leading upon Placentia.

4th. The route of Bejar, which, crossing the Sierra de Bejar at the pass of Baños, descends likewise upon Placentia.

5th. The route of Payo or Gata, which crosses the Sierra de Gata by the pass of Perales, and afterwards dividing, sends one branch to Alcantara, the other to Coria and Placentia. Of these five passes the two last only are, generally speaking, practicable for artillery.

The royal roads, from Toledo and Madrid to Badajos, unite near Talavera, and follow the course of the Tagus by the right bank as far as Naval Moral, but then turning to the left, cross the river at the bridge of Almaraz. Now, from Toledo, westward, to the bridge of Almaraz, a distance of above 50 miles, the left bank of the Tagus is so crowded by the rugged shoots of the Sierra de Guadalupe, that it may be broadly stated as impassable for an army, and this peculiarity of ground gives the key to the operations on both sides. For, Cuesta and Cartoajal, by reason of this impassable Sierra de Guadalupe, had no direct military communication : but Victor and Sebastiani, occupying Toledo and Talavera, could, by the royal roads above mentioned, concentrate their masses at pleasure on either line of operations.

The rallying point of the French was Madrid, and their parallel lines of defence were the Tagus, the Alberche, and the Guadaramo.

The base of Cartoajal's operations was the Sierra de Morena.

Cuesta's first line was the Tagus, and his second the Guardiana, from whence he could retreat by a flank march to Badajos, or by a direct one to the defiles of Monasterio in the Sierra Morena.

The two Spanish armies, if they had been united, would have furnished

about 26,000 infantry, and 5000 cavalry, and they had no reserve. The two French corps, united, would have exceeded 35,000 fighting-men, supported by the reserve under the king. The French, therefore, had the advantage of numbers, position, and discipline.

Following the orders of Napoleon, Marshal Victor should have been at Merida before the middle of February. In that position he would have confined Cuesta to the Sierra Morena; and with his 12 regiments of cavalry he could easily have kept all the flat country, as far as Badajoz, in subjection. That fortress itself had no means of resistance, and, certainly, there was no Spanish force in the field capable of impeding the full execution of the emperor's instructions, which were also reiterated by the king. Nevertheless, the Duke of Belluno remained inert at this critical period, and the Spaniards, attributing his inactivity to weakness, endeavoured to provoke the blow so unaccountably withheld; for Cuesta was projecting offensive movements against Victor, and the Duke of Albuquerque was extremely anxious to attack Toledo from the side of La Mancha.

Cartoajal opposed Albuquerque's plans, but offered him a small force with which to act independently. The duke complained to the junta of Cartoajal's proceedings, and Mr. Frere, whose traces are to be found in every intrigue, and every absurd project broached at this period, having supported Albuquerque's complaints, Cartoajal was directed by the junta to follow the duke's plans: but the latter was himself ordered to join Cuesta, with a detachment of 4000 or 5000 men.

ROUT OF CIUDAD REAL.

Cartoajal, in pursuance of his instructions, marched with about 12,000 men, and 20 guns, towards Toledo; and his advanced guard attacked a regiment of Polish lancers, near Consuegra: but the latter retired without loss. Hereupon, Sebastiani, with about 10,000 men, came up against him, and the leading divisions encountering at Yébenes, the Spaniards were pushed back to Ciudad Real, where they halted, leaving guards on the river in front of that town. The French, however, forced the passage, and a tumultuary action ensuing, Cartoajal was totally routed, with the loss of all his guns, 1000 slain, and several thousand prisoners. The vanquished fled by Almagro; and the French cavalry pursued even to the foot of the Sierra Morena.

This action, fought on the 27th of March, and commonly called the battle of Ciudad Real, was not followed up with any great profit to the victors. Sebastiani gathered up the spoils, sent his prisoners to the rear, and, holding his troops concentrated on the Upper Guadiana, awaited the result of Victor's operations: thus enabling the Spanish fugitives to rally at Carolina, where they were reinforced by levies from Grenada and Cordova.

While these events were passing in La Mancha, Estremadura was also invaded; for the king having received a despatch from Soult, dated Orense, and giving notice that the 2nd corps would be at Oporto about the 15th of March, had reiterated the orders that Lapisse should move to Abrantes, and that the Duke of Belluno should pass the Tagus, and drive Cuesta beyond the Guadiana.

Victor, who appears for some reason to have been averse to aiding the operations of the 2nd corps, remonstrated, and especially urged that the order to Lapisse should be withdrawn, lest his division should arrive too soon, and without support, at Abrantes. This time, however, the king was firm, and, on the 14th of March, the Duke of Belluno having collected five days' provisions, made the necessary dispositions to pass the Tagus.

The amount of the Spanish force immediately on that river was about 16,000 men; but Cuesta had several detachments and irregular bands in his rear, which may be calculated at 8000 more. The Duke of Belluno, however, estimated the troops in position before him at 30,000, a great error for so experienced a commander to make.

But, on the other hand, Cuesta was as ill informed ; for this was the moment when, with his approbation, Colonel D'Urban proposed to Sir John Cradock, that curiously combined attack against Victor, already noticed ; in which, the Spaniards were to cross the Tagus, and Sir Robert Wilson was to come down upon the Tietar. This, also, was the period that Mr. Frere, apparently ignorant that there were at least 25,000 fighting men in the valley of the Tagus, without reckoning the king's or Sebastiani's troops, proposed that the 12,000 British, under Sir John Cradock, should march from Lisbon to "drive the 4th French corps from Toledo," and "consequently," as he phrased it, "from Madrid." The first movement of Marshal Victor awakened Cuesta from these dreams.

The bridges of Talavera and Arzobispo were, as we have seen, held by the French ; and their advanced posts were pushed into the valley of the Tagus, as far as the Barca de Bazagona.

Cuesta's position extended from Garbin, near the bridge of Arzobispo, to the bridge of Almaraz ; his centre being at Meza d'Ibor, a position of surprising strength, running at right-angles from the Tagus to the Guadalupe. The headquarters and reserves were at Deleytosa ; and a road, cut by the troops, afforded a communication between that place and Meza d'Ibor.

On the right bank of the Tagus there was easy access to the bridges of Talavera, Arzobispo, and Almaraz ; but on the left bank no road existed, except from Almaraz, by which artillery could pass the mountains, and even that was crossed by the ridge of Mirabete, which stretching on a line parallel to the river, and at the distance of four or five miles, affords an almost impregnable position.

The Duke of Belluno's plan was to pass the Tagus at the bridges of Talavera and Arzobispo, with his infantry and a part of his cavalry, and to operate in the Sierra de Guadalupe against the Spanish right ; while the artillery and grand parc, protected by the remainder of the cavalry, were united opposite Almaraz, having with them a raft bridge to throw across at that point, a project scarcely to be reconciled with the estimate made of Cuesta's force ; for surely nothing could be more rash than to expose the whole of the guns and field stores of the army, with no other guard than some cavalry and one battalion of infantry, close to a powerful enemy, who possessed a good pontoon train, and who might, consequently, pass the river at pleasure.

The 15th, Laval's division of German infantry, and Lasalle's cavalry, crossed at Talavera, and, turning to the right, worked a march through the rocky hills ; the infantry to Aldea Nueva, on a line somewhat short of the bridge of Arzobispo ; the cavalry higher up the mountain towards Estrella.

The 16th, when those troops had advanced a few miles to the front, the headquarters, and the other divisions of infantry, passed the bridge of Arzobispo ; while the artillery and the parcs, accompanied by a battalion of grenadiers, and the escorting cavalry, moved to Almaraz, with orders to watch, on the 17th and 18th, for the appearance of the army on the heights at the other side, and then to move down to the point before indicated, for launching the raft bridge.

Alarmed by these movements, Cuesta hastened in person to Mirabete ; and directing General Henestrosa, with 8000 men, to defend the bridge of Almaraz, sent a detachment to reinforce his right wing, which was posted behind the Ibor, a small river, but at this season running with a full torrent from the Guadalupe to the Tagus.

The 17th, the Spanish advanced guards were driven, with some loss, across the Ibor. They attempted to re-form on the high rocky banks of that river ; but, being closely followed, retreated to the camp of Meza d'Ibor, the great natural strength of which was increased by some fieldworks.

Their position could only be attacked in front ; and this being apparent at the first glance, Laval's division was instantly formed in columns of attack, which pushed rapidly up the mountain ; the inequalities of ground covering

them in some sort from the effects of the enemy's artillery. As they arrived near the summit, the fire of musketry and grape became murderous ; but, at the instant when the Spaniard should have displayed all their vigour, they broke and fled to Campillo, leaving behind them baggage, magazines, seven guns, and 1000 prisoners, besides 800 killed and wounded. The French had 70 killed, and near 500 wounded.

While this action was taking place at Meza d'Ibor, Villatte's division, being higher up the Sierra, to the left, overthrew a smaller body of Spaniards at Frenedoso, making 300 prisoners, and capturing a large store of arms.

The 18th, at daybreak, the Duke of Belluno, who had superintended in person the attack at Meza d'Ibor, examined from that high ground all the remaining position of the Spaniards. Cuesta, he observed, was in full retreat to Truxillo ; but Henestrosa was still posted in front of Almaraz. Hereupon Villatte's division was detached after Cuesta, to Deleytosa ; but Laval's Germans were led against Henestrosa ; and the latter, aware of his danger, and already preparing to retire, was driven hastily over the ridge of Mirabete.

In the course of the night, the raft bridge was thrown across the Tagus ; and the next day the dragoons passed to the left bank, the artillery followed, and the cavalry immediately pushed forward to Truxillo, from which town Cuesta had already fallen back to Santa Cruz, leaving Henestrosa to cover the retreat.

The 20th, after a slight skirmish, the latter was forced over the Mazarna ; and the whole French army, with the exception of a regiment of dragoons (left to guard the raft bridge) was poured along the road to Merida.

The advanced guard, consisting of a regiment of light cavalry, under General Bordesoult, arrived in front of Miajadas on the 21st. Here the road dividing, sends one branch to Merida, the other to Medellin. A party of Spanish horsemen were posted near the town ; they appeared in great alarm, and by their hesitating movements invited a charge. The French incautiously galloped forward ; and, in a moment, 1200 or 1400 Spanish cavalry, placed in ambush, came up at speed on both flanks. General Lasalle, who from a distance had observed the movements of both sides, immediately rode forward with a second regiment ; and arrived just as Bordesoult had extricated himself from a great peril by his own valour, but with the loss of 70 killed and 100 wounded.

After this well-managed combat, Cuesta retired to Medellin without being molested, and Victor, spreading his cavalry posts on the different routes to gain intelligence and to collect provisions, established his own quarters at Truxillo, a town of some trade and advantageously situated for a place of arms. It had been deserted by the inhabitants and pillaged by the first French troops that entered it, but it still offered great resources for the army, and there was an ancient citadel, capable of being rendered defensible, which was immediately armed with the Spanish guns, and provisioned from the magazines taken at Meza d'Ibor.

The flooding of the Tagus and the rocky nature of its bed had injured the raft-bridge near Almaraz, and delayed the passage of the artillery and stores ; to remedy this inconvenience the marshal issued directions to have a boat-bridge prepared, and caused a field fort to be constructed on the left bank of the Tagus, which he armed with three guns, and garrisoned with 150 men to protect his bridge. These arrangements and the establishment of an hospital for 2000 men at Truxillo, delayed the 1st corps until the 24th of March.

Meanwhile, the light cavalry reinforced by 1200 *voltigeurs* were posted at Miajadas, and having covered all the roads branching from that central point with their scouting parties, reported that a few of Cuesta's people had retired to Medellin, that from 5000 to 6000 men were thrown into the Sierra de Guadalupe, on the left of the French ; that 4000 infantry and 2000 cavalry were behind the river Garganza, in front of Medellin, but that everything else was over the Guadiana.

The line of retreat chosen by Cuesta uncovered Merida, and, consequently, the great road between Badajos and Seville was open to the French; but Victor was not disposed to profit from this, for he was aware that Albuquerque was coming from La Mancha to Cuesta, and believing that he brought 9000 infantry and 2000 cavalry, feared that Cuesta's intention was either to draw him into a difficult country, by making a flank march to join Cartoajal in La Mancha, or by crossing the Guadiana, above Naval Villar, where the fords are always practicable, to rejoin his detachments in the Sierra de Guadalupe, and so establish a new base of operations on the left flank of the French army.

This reasoning was misplaced; neither Cuesta nor his army was capable of such operations, his line of retreat was solely directed by a desire to join Albuquerque, and to save his troops, by taking to a rugged instead of an open country, and the Duke of Belluno lost the fruits of his previous success, by overrating his adversary's skill; for, instead of following Cuesta with a resolution to break up the Spanish army, he, after leaving a brigade at Truxillo and Almaraz, to protect the communications, was contented to advance a few leagues on the road to Medellin with his main body, sending his light cavalry to Merida, and pushing on detachments towards Badajos and Seville, while other parties explored the roads leading into the Guadalupe.

The 27th, however, he marched in person to Medellin, at the head of two divisions of infantry, and a brigade of heavy cavalry. Eight hundred Spanish horse posted on the right bank of the Guadiana, retired at his approach, and crossing that river, halted at Don Benito, where they were reinforced by other squadrons, but no infantry were to be discovered. The Duke of Belluno then passed the river and took post on the road leading to Mengabril and Don Benito; hence, the situation of the French army in the evening was as follows:—

The main body, consisting of two divisions of infantry, and one incomplete brigade of heavy cavalry in position, on the road leading from Medellin to Don Benito and Mingabril.

The remainder of the dragoons, under Latour Maubourg, were at Zorita, 15 miles on the left, watching the Spaniards in the Guadalupe.

The light cavalry was at Merida, 18 miles to the right, having patrolled all that day on the roads to Badajos, Seville, and Medellin.

Ruffin's division was at Miajadas 18 miles in the rear.

In the course of the evening Victor received intelligence, that Albuquerque was just come up with 8000 men, that the combined troops, amounting to 28,000 infantry and 7000 cavalry, were in position on the table land of Don Benito, and that Cuesta, aware of the scattered state of the French army, was preparing to attack the two divisions on their march the next day.

Upon this, the Duke of Belluno, notwithstanding the strength of the Spanish army, resolved to fight, and immediately sent orders to Lasalle, to Ruffin, and to Latour Maubourg, to bring their divisions down to Medellin; but the latter was directed to leave a detachment at Miajadas to protect the route of Merida, and a brigade at Zorita, to observe the Spaniards in the Sierra de Guadalupe.

Cuesta's numbers were, however, greatly exaggerated; that general, blaming everybody but himself for his failure on the Tagus, had fallen back to Campanarios—rallied all his scattered detachments, and then returned to Villa Nueva de Serena, where he was joined, on the 27th, by Albuquerque, who brought up not a great body of infantry and cavalry as supposed, but less than 3000 infantry and a few hundred horse. This reinforcement, added to some battalions drawn from Andalusia, increased Cuesta's army to about 25,000 foot, 4000 horse, and 18 or 20 pieces of artillery; and, with this force, he, fearing for the safety of Badajos, retraced his steps and rushed headlong to destruction.

Medellin, possessing a fine stone bridge, is situated in a hollow on the left bank of the Guadiana, and just beyond the town is a vast plain or table land, the edge of which, breaking abruptly down, forms the bed of the river. The

Ortigosa, a rapid torrent, rushing perpendicularly to the Guadiana, and having steep and rugged banks, yet in parts passable for artillery, cuts their plain, which is also traversed by two roads, the one leading to Mingrabil on the right, the other to Don Benito on the left, those places being about five miles apart, and forming with Medellin an irregular triangle.

The French army, with the exception of the troops left to cover the communications and those at Zorita, was concentrated in the town at ten o'clock; and, at one, about 14,000 infantry, 2500 cavalry, and 42 pieces of artillery, went forth to fight the

BATTLE OF MEDELLIN.

The plain on the side of Don Benito was bounded by a high ridge of land, behind which Cuesta kept the Spanish infantry concealed, showing only his cavalry and some guns in advance. To make him display his lines of infantry the French general sent Lassalle's light cavalry, with a battery of six guns and two battalions of German infantry, towards Don Benito, while Latour Maubourg, with five squadrons of dragoons, eight guns, and two other battalions, keeping close to the Ortigosa, advanced towards the point of the enemy's ridge called the Retamosa. The rest of the army was kept in reserve; the division of Villatte and the remainder of the Germans, being one-half on the road of Don Benito, the other half on the road of Mengabril. Ruffin's division was a little way in rear of the other, and a battalion was left to guard the baggage at the bridge of Medellin.

As the French squadrons advanced, the artillery on both sides opened, and the Spanish cavalry guards in the plain retired slowly to the higher ground. Lassalle and Latour Maubourg then pressed forward; but as the latter, who had the shortest distance to traverse, approached the enemy's position, the whole Spanish line of battle was suddenly descried in full march over the edge of the ridge, and stretching from the Ortijos to within a mile of the Guadiana,—a menacing but glorious apparition.

Cuesta, Henestrosa, and the Duke del Parque, with the mass of cavalry, were on the left; Francisco Frias, with the main body of infantry, in the centre; Equia and the Marquis of Portazzo on the right; and, from thence to the bank of the Guadiana, Albuquerque, with some scattered squadrons, flanked the march of the whole host as it descended, with a rapid pace, into the plain. Cuesta's plan was now disclosed; his line overlapped the French left, and he was hastening to cut their army off from Medellin, but his order of battle was on a front of three miles, and he had no reserve.

The Duke of Belluno, seeing this, instantly brought his centre a little forward, and then, reinforcing Latour Maubourg with 10 guns and a battalion of grenadiers, and detaching a brigade of infantry as a support, ordered him to fall boldly in on the advancing enemy. But at the same time Lasalle, who was giving way under the pressure of his antagonists, was directed to retire towards Medellin, always refusing his left.

The Spaniards marched briskly forward into the plain, and a special body of cavalry, with 3000 infantry, advancing from their left, met Latour Maubourg in front, while a regiment of hussars fell upon the French columns of grenadiers and guns in his rear. The hussars, received with grape and a pelting fire of musketry, and charged in flank by some dragoons, were beaten at once, but the Spanish infantry, closely followed by the rest of their own cavalry, came boldly up to Latour Maubourg's horsemen, and, with a rough discharge, forced them back in disorder. The French, however, soon rallied, and smashing the Spanish ranks with artillery, and fighting all together, broke in and overthrew their enemies, man and horse. Cuesta was wounded and fell, but, being remounted, escaped.

While this was passing on the French right, Lasalle's cavalry, continually refusing their left, were brought fighting close up to the main body of the French infantry, which was now disposed on a new front, having a reserve behind the

centre. Meanwhile Latour Maubourg's division was being re-formed on the ridge from whence the Spaniards had first descended, and the whole face of the battle was changed; for the Spanish left being put to flight, the French right wing overlapped the centre of their antagonists, and the long attenuated line of the latter wavering, disjointed, and disclosing wide chasms, was still advancing without an object.

The Duke of Belluno, aware that the decisive moment of the battle had arrived, was on the point of commanding a general attack, when his attention was arrested by the appearance of a column coming down on the rear of his right wing from the side of Mingabril. A brigade from the reserve, with four guns, was immediately sent to keep this body in check, and then Lasalle's cavalry, taking ground to its left, unmasked the infantry in the centre, and the latter immediately advancing, poured a heavy fire into the Spanish ranks; Latour Maubourg, sweeping round their left flank, fell on the rear, and, at the same moment, Lasalle also galloped in upon the dismayed and broken bands. A horrible carnage ensued, for the French soldiers, while their strength would permit, continued to follow and strike, until three-fifths of the whole Spanish army wallowed in blood.

Six guns and several thousand prisoners were taken. General Frias, deeply wounded, fell into the hands of the victors; and so utter was the discomfiture that, for several days after, Cuesta could not rally a single battalion of infantry, and his cavalry was only saved by the speed of the horses.

Following General Semel 's journal,* the French loss did not exceed 300 men, a number so utterly disproportionate to that of the vanquished as to be scarcely credible, and, if correct, discovering a savage rigour in the pursuit by no means commendable; for it does not appear that any previous cruelties were perpetrated by the Spaniards to irritate the French soldiers. The right to slaughter an enemy in battle can neither be disputed nor limited; but a brave soldier should always have regard to the character of his country, and be sparing of the sword towards beaten men.


The main body of the French army passed the night of the 28th near the field of battle; but Latour Maubourg marched with the dragoons by the left bank of the Guadiana to Merida, leaving a detachment at Torre Mexia to watch the roads of Almendralego and Villa Franca, and to give notice if the remains of Cuesta's army should attempt to gain Badajos, in which case the dragoons had orders to intercept them at Lobo .

The 29th, Villatte's division advanced as far as Villa Nueva de Serena, and the light cavalry were pushed on to Campanarios. But, as all the reports agreed that Cuesta, with a few horsemen, had taken refuge in the Sierra Morena, and that the remnants of his army were dispersed and wandering through the fields and along the by-roads, without any power of re-uniting, the Duke of Belluno relinquished the pursuit. Having fixed his head-quarters at Merida, and occupied that place and Medellin with his infantry, he formed with his cavalry a belt extending from Lobo  on the right to Mingrabil on the left; but the people had all fled from the country, and even the great towns were deserted.

Merida, situated in a richly-cultivated basin, possesses a fine bridge and many magnificent remains of antiquity, Roman and Moorish; amongst others, a castle built on the right bank of the river, close to the bridge, and so perfect, that, in eight days, it was rendered capable of resisting any sudden assault; and six guns being mounted on the walls, and an hospital for 1000 men established there, a garrison of 300 men, with stores and provisions for 800, during two months, was put into it.

The king now repeated his orders that the Duke of Belluno should enter Portugal, and that General Lapisse should march upon Abrantes; but the

* It is necessary again to remark that I possess only an unauthenticated copy of General Semel 's Journal.



former again remonstrated, on the ground that he could not make such a movement and defend his communications with Almaraz, unless the division of Lapisse was permitted to join him by the route of Alcantara. But as Badajos, although more capable of defence than it had been in December, when the 4th corps was at Merida, was still far from being secure; and that many of the richer inhabitants, disgusted and fatigued with the violence of the mob government, were more inclined to betray the gates to the French than to risk a siege; Victor, whose battering train (composed of only twelve pieces, badly horsed and provided) was still at Truxillo, opened a secret communication with the malcontents.

The parties met at the village of Albuera, and everything was arranged for the surrender, when the peasants giving notice to the junta that some treason was in progress, the latter arrested all the persons supposed to be implicated, and the project was baffled. The Duke of Belluno then resigned all further thoughts of Badajos, and contented himself with sending detachments to Alcanatra, to get intelligence of General Lapisse, of whose proceedings it is now time to give some account.

OPERATIONS OF GENERAL LAPISSÉ.

This general, after taking Zamora in January, occupied Ledesma and Salamanca, where he was joined by General Maupetit's brigade of cavalry, and as Sir Robert Wilson's legion and the feeble garrisons in Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida were the only bodies in his front, universal terror prevailed. Yet he, although at the head of at least 10,000 men, with a powerful artillery, remained inactive from January to the end of March, and suffered Sir Robert, with a few hundred Portuguese, to vex his outposts, to intercept his provisions, to restrain his patrols, and even to disturb his infantry in their quarters. This conduct brought him into contempt, and enabled Wilson to infuse a spirit into the people which they were far from feeling when the enemy first appeared.

Don Carlos d'España, with a small Spanish force, being after a time placed under Sir Robert's command, the latter detached two battalions to occupy the pass of Baños, and Lapisse was thus deprived of any direct communication with Victor. In this situation the French general remained without making any vigorous effort either to clear his front or to get intelligence of the Duke of Dalmatia's march upon Oporto until the beginning of April, when he advanced towards Bejar, but, finding the passes occupied, turned suddenly to his right, dissipated Wilson's posts on the Ecla, and forced the legion, then commanded by Colonel Grant, to take refuge under the guns of Ciudad Rodrigo. He summoned that town to surrender on the 6th, and, after a slight skirmish close to the walls, took a position between the Agueda and Ledesma.

This event was followed by a general insurrection from Ciudad Rodrigo to Alcantara and from Tamames to Bejar. For Lapisse, who had been again ordered by the king to fulfil the emperor's instructions, and advance to Abrantes, instead of obeying, suddenly quitted his positions on the Agueda, and, without regarding his connection with the second corps, abandoned Leon, and made a rapid march through the pass of Perales upon Alcantara, followed closely by Sir Robert Wilson, Don Carlos d'España, the two battalions from Bejar, and a multitude of peasants, both Portuguese and Spanish.

At Alcantara, a corps of Spanish insurgents endeavoured to defend the passage of the river, but the French broke through the entrenchments on the bridge, and with a full encounter carried the town and pillaged it, after which they abandoned the place and joined the first corps at Merida on the 19th of April.

This false movement greatly injured the French cause. From that moment the conquering impulse given by Napoleon was at an end, and his armies, ceasing to act on the offensive, became stationary or retrograded, and the British, Spanish, and Portuguese once more assumed the lead. The Duke of Dalmatia, abandoned to his own resources, and in total ignorance of the situa-

tion of the corps by which his movements should have been supported, was forced to remain in Oporto; and at the moment when the French combinations were thus paralyzed, the arrival of English reinforcements at Lisbon and the advance of Sir John Cradock towards Leiria gave a sudden and violent impetus both to the Spaniards and Portuguese along the Beira frontier. Thus the insurrection, no longer kept down by the presence of an intermediate French corps, connecting Victor's and Soult's forces, was established in full activity from Alcantara, on the Tagus to Amarante, on the Tamega.

Meanwhile Cuesta was gathering another host in the Morena; for, although the simultaneous defeat of the armies in Estremadura and La Mancha had at first produced the greatest dismay in Andalusia, the Spaniards, when they found such victories as Ciudad Real and Medellin only leading to a stagnant inactivity on the part of the French, concluded that extreme weakness was the cause, and that the Austrian war had or would oblige Napoleon to abandon his projects against the Peninsula. This idea was general, and upheld not only the people's spirit but the central junta's authority, which could not otherwise have been maintained after such a succession of follies and disasters.

The misfortunes of the two Spanish generals had been equal; but Cartoajal, having no popular influence, was dismissed, while Cuesta was appointed to command what remained of both armies; and the junta, stimulated for a moment by the imminent danger in which they were placed, drew together all the scattered troops and levies in Andalusia. To cover Seville, Cuesta took post in the defiles of Monasterio, and was there joined by 800 horse and 2300 infantry, drafted from the garrison of Seville; these were followed by 1200 old troops from Cadiz; and finally, 3500 Grenadian levies, and 8000 foot, and 2500 horsemen, taken from the army of La Mancha, contributed to swell his numbers, until, in the latter end of April, they amounted to 25,000 infantry, and about 6000 cavalry. General Venegas, also, being recalled from Valencia, repaired to La Carolina, and proceeded to organize another army of La Mancha.

King Joseph, justly displeased at the false disposition made of Lapisse's division, directed that Alcantara should be immediately re-occupied; but as this was not done without an action, which belongs to another combination, it shall be noticed hereafter. It is now proper to return to the operations on the Douro, so intimately connected with those on the Guadiana, and yet so differently conducted.

CHAPTER VII.

WHEN the Bishop of Oporto beheld, from his station at Sarea, the final overthrow of his ambitious schemes in the north of Portugal, he fled to Lisbon. There he reconciled himself to the regency, became a member of that body, and was soon after created patriarch; and, as I shall have occasion to show, used his great influence in the most mischievous manner; discovering, on every occasion, the untamed violence and inherent falseness of his disposition.

Meanwhile, the fall of Oporto enabled Marshal Soult to establish a solid base of operations, and to commence a regular system of warfare. The immediate fruit of his victory was the capture of immense magazines of powder, and 197 pieces of artillery, every gun of which had been used in the action. Thirty English vessels, wind-bound in the river, and loaded with wine and provisions for a month, also fell into his hands.

Having repressed the disorders attendant on the battle, he adopted the same conciliatory policy which had marked his conduct at Chaves and Braga; and endeavoured to remedy, as far as it was possible, the deplorable results of the soldiers' fury.* Recovering and restoring a part of the plunder, he caused the inhabitants remaining in the town to be treated with respect; and invited, by

* Appendix, No. 42.

proclamation, all those who had fled to return. He demanded no contribution; and restraining with a firm hand the violence of his men, contrived, from the captured public property, to support the army, and even to succour the poorest and most distressed of the population.

Soult's ability in the civil and political administration of the Entre Minho e Douro produced an effect which he was not prepared for. The prince regent's desertion of the country was not forgotten. The national feeling was as adverse to Portugal being a dependency on the Brazils as it was to the usurpation of the French, and the comparison between Soult's government and the horrible anarchy which preceded it was all in favour of the former. His victories, and the evident vigour of his character, contrasted with the apparent supineness of the English, promised permanency for the French power; and the party, formerly noticed as being inimical to the house of Braganza, revived.

The leaders, thinking this a favourable opportunity to execute their intention, waited upon the Duke of Dalmatia, and expressed their desire for a French prince and an independent government. They even intimated their good wishes towards the duke himself, and demanded his concurrence and protection; while, in the name of the people, they declared that the Braganza dynasty was at an end.

Although unauthorized by the emperor to accede to this proposition, Soult was yet unwilling to reject a plan from which he could draw such immediate and important military advantages. Napoleon was not a man to be lightly dealt with on such an occasion; but the marshal, trusting that circumstances would justify him, encouraged the design, and, appointing men to civil employments, raised a Portuguese legion of five battalions. He acted with so much dexterity that, in 15 days, the cities of Oporto and Braga, and the towns of Bacellos, Viana, Villa de Conde, Pova de Barcim, Feira, and Ovar, sent addresses, containing the expression of their sentiments, and bearing the signatures of 30,000 persons, as well of the nobles, clergy, and merchants, as of the people.*

These addresses were burnt when the French retreated from Oporto; but the fact that such a project was in agitation has never been denied. The regency even caused inquest to be made on the matter; and it was then asserted that very few persons were found to be implicated. That many of the signatures were forged by the leaders may readily be believed; but the policy of lessening the importance of the affair is also evident; and the inquisitors, if willing, could not have probed it to the bottom.

This transaction formed the ground-work of a tale generally credited, even by his own officers, that Soult perfidiously aimed at an independent crown; and the circumstances were certainly such as might create suspicion. That the conclusion was false, is, however, proved, by the mode in which Napoleon treated both the rumour and the subject of it. Slighting the former, he yet made known to his lieutenant that it had reached his ears, adding, "I remember nothing but Austerlitz,"† and at the same time largely increased the Duke of Dalmatia's command.

The policy of Soult's conduct on this occasion, and the great influence, if not the numbers of the Portuguese malcontents, were abundantly proved by the ameliorated relations between the army and the peasantry. The fierceness of the latter subsided; and even the priests abated of their hostility in the Entre Minho e Douro. The French soldiers were no longer assassinated in that province; whereas, previous to this intrigue, that cruel species of warfare had been carried on with infinite activity, and the most malignant passions called forth on both sides.

Among other instances of Portuguese ferocity, and of the truculent violence of the French soldiers, the death of Colonel Lambeth, and the retaliation which followed, may be cited. That young officer, when returning from the marshal's

* Appendix, No. 42.

† Soult distinguished himself in that battle.

quarters to his own, was waylaid, near the village of Arrifana, and murdered; his body was then stripped, and mutilated in a shocking manner. This assassination, committed within the French lines, and at a time when Soult enforced the strictest discipline, was justifiable neither by the laws of war nor by those of humanity. No general could neglect to punish such a proceeding. The protection due to the army, and even the welfare of the Portuguese within the French jurisdiction, demanded a severe example, for the violence of the troops had hitherto been with difficulty restrained by their commander; and if, at such a moment, he had appeared indifferent to their individual safety, his authority would have been set at naught, and the unmeasured and indiscriminating vengeance of an insubordinate army executed.

Impressed with this feeling, and afflicted at the unhappy death of a personal friend, Soult directed General Thomieres to march, with a brigade of infantry, to Arrifana, and punish the criminals. Thomieres was accompanied by a Portuguese civilian; and, after a judicial inquiry, he shot five or six persons whose guilt was said to have been proved; but it is also certain that the principal actor, a Portuguese major of militia, and some of his accomplices, escaped across the Vouga to Colonel Trant; and the latter, disgusted at their conduct, sent them to Marshal Beresford. It would also appear, from the statement of a peasant, that Thomieres, or those under him, exceeded Soult's orders; for, in that statement, attested by oath, it is said that 24 innocent persons were killed, and that the soldiers, after committing many atrocious excesses, burnt the village.

These details have been related partly because they throw a light upon the direful nature of this contest, but chiefly because the transaction has been adduced by other writers as proof of cruelty in Soult, a charge not to be sustained by the facts of this case, and belied by the general tenor of his conduct, which even his enemies, while they attributed it to an insidious policy, acknowledged, at the time, to be mild and humane.* And now, having finished this political digression, in which the chronological order of events has been anticipated, I shall resume the narrative of military operations at that part where the disorders attendant on the battle of Oporto having been repressed, a fresh series of combinations were commenced, not less important than those which brought the French army down to the Douro.

The heavy blow struck on the 29th of March was followed up with activity. The boat-bridge was restored during the night; and the next day, the forts of Mazinho and St. Joa de Foz having surrendered, Franceschi's cavalry crossed the Douro, took post ten miles in advance on the Coimbra road, and pushed patrols as far as the Vouga river. To support this cavalry, General Mermet occupied a position somewhat beyond the suburb of Villa Nova. Oporto itself was held by three brigades. The dragoons of Lorge were sent to Villa da Conde, a walled town, situated at the mouth of the Ave; and General Caulaincourt was detached up the Douro to Peñafiel, with a brigade of cavalry, having orders to clear the valley of the Tamega. Another brigade of cavalry was posted on the road leading to Barca de Trofa, to protect the rear of the army; and General Heudelet was directed to forward the hospitals from Braga to Oporto, but to hold himself in readiness to open the communication with Tuy.

These dispositions made, Soult had leisure to consider his general position. The flight of the bishop had not much abated the hostility of the people, nor relieved the French from their difficulties. The communication with the Minho was still intercepted; the Tras os Montes was again in a state of insurrection; and Sylveira, with a corps of 8000 men, not only commanded the valley of the Tamega, but had advanced, after re-taking Chaves, into the Entre Minho e Douro, and was posted between the Sierra de Catalina and the Douro.

Lisbon, the ultimate object of the campaign, was 200 miles distant, and covered by a British army, whose valour was to be dreaded, and whose numbers

* Appendix, No. 42.

were daily increasing. A considerable body of natives were with Trant upon the Vouga, and Beresford's force between the Tagus and the Mondego : its disorderly and weak condition being unknown, appeared formidable at a distance.

The day on which the second corps, following the emperor's instructions, should have reached Lisbon was overpassed by six weeks ; and, as the line of correspondence with Victor was uncertain, his co-operation could scarcely be calculated upon. Lapisse's division was yet unfelt as an aiding force ; nor was it even known to Soult that he still remained at Salamanca : finally, the 3000 men expected from the Astorga country, under the conduct of the marshal's brother, had not yet been heard of.

On the other hand, the Duke of Dalmatia had conquered a large and rich city : he had gained the military command of a very fertile country, from whence the principal supplies of the British army and of Lisbon were derived : he had obtained a secure base of operations and a prominent station in the kingdom ; and if the people's fierceness was not yet quelled, they had learned to dread his talents, and to be sensible of their own inferiority in battle.

In this state of affairs, judging that the most important objects were to relieve the garrison of Tuy and to obtain intelligence of Lapisse's division, Soult entrusted the first to Heudelet and the second to Franceschi. The last-named general had occupied Feira and Oliveira, and spread his posts along the Vouga ; but the inhabitants fled to the other side of that river, and the rich valleys beyond were protected by Colonel Trant.*

This officer, well known to the Portuguese as having commanded their troops at Rorica and Vimiero, was at Coimbra when intelligence of the defeat at Braga arrived, and he immediately took the command of all the armed men in that town, among which was a small body of volunteers, students at the university. The general dismay and confusion being greatly increased by the subsequent catastrophe at Oporto, the fugitives from that town and other places, accustomed to violence, and attributing every misfortune to treachery in the generals, flocked to Trant's standard ; and he, as a foreigner, was enabled to assume an authority that no native of rank durst either have accepted or refused without imminent danger.

He advanced, at first, with about 800 men to Sardao and Aveiro, where he was joined by the Conde Barbaceña with some Portuguese cavalry, and by Generals Victoria and Eben ; but the people regarded these officers with suspicion, and Trant continued in the command, his force daily increasing by the arrival of *ordenanzas*, and even by regular troops, who, quitting their quarters, abandoned Beresford's army to join him.*

When Franceschi advanced, Trant sent a detachment by Castanheira to occupy the bridge of the Vouga ; but the men, seized with a panic, dispersed, and this was followed by the desertion of many thousand *ordenanzas*,—a happy circumstance, for the numbers that had at first collected behind the Vouga exceeded 12,000 men, and their extreme violence and insubordination excited the utmost terror, and impeded the measures necessary for defence. Trant, finally, retained about 4000 men, with which he imposed upon the French, and preserved a fruitful country from their incursions ; but he was greatly distressed for money, because the Bishop of Oporto, in his flight, laid hands on all that was at Coimbra and carried it to Lisbon.

Franceschi, although reinforced with a brigade of infantry, contented himself with chasing some insurgents that infested his left flank, while his patrols and scouts, sent forward on the side of Viseu, endeavoured to obtain information of Lapisse's division ; but that general, as we have seen, was still beyond the Agueda, and while Franceschi was thus employed in front of the French army, Caulaincourt's cavalry on the Tamega was pressed by the Portuguese, and Loison marched with a brigade of infantry to his assistance on the 9th of April.

* Appendix, No. 32, section 6.

Sylveira, however, was too strong for both ; and, on the 12th, advancing from Canavezes, obliged Loison, after a slight action, to take post behind the Souza. Meanwhile, Heudelet was hastening towards Tuy to recover the artillery and depôts, from which the army had now been separated forty days.

The 6th of April, General Lorge, who had taken Villa de Conde and cleared the coast, joined Heudelet at Bacellos. The 7th they marched to Ponte de Lima ; but the Portuguese resisted the passage vigorously, and it was not forced until the 8th.

The 10th, the French arrived in front of Valença, on the Minho ; this fortress had been maltreated by the fire from Tuy, and the garrison, amounting to 200 men, having only two days' provisions, capitulated, on condition of being allowed to retire to their homes ; but before the French could take possession, the capitulating troops disbanded and the town was deserted.

The garrison in Tuy, never having received the slightest intelligence of the army since the separation at Ribidavia, marvelled that the fire from Valença was discontinued ; and their surprise was extreme when they beheld the French colours flying in that fort, and observed French videttes on the left bank of the Minho.

La Martiniere's garrison, by the arrival of stragglers and a battalion of detachments that followed the army from St. Jago, had been increased to 3400 men ; but 1200 were in hospital, and two-thirds of the artillery horses had been eaten in default of other food. The Portuguese had passed the Minho, and, in conjunction with the Spaniards, attacked the place on the 15th of March ; but the French general, by frequent sallies, obliged them to keep up a distant blockade, and his fire mastered that from Valença.

The 22nd of March, the defeat at Braga being known, the Portuguese repassed the Minho, the Spaniards dispersed, and La Martiniere immediately sent 300 men to bring off the garrison of Vigo ; but it was too late, that place was taken, and the detachment with difficulty regained Tuy.

The peasants on the Arosa estuary had, as I have before noticed, risen, the 27th of February, while Soult was still at Orense ; they were headed at first by General Silva and by the Count de Mezeda, and, finally, a Colonel Barrios, sent by the central junta, took the command. As their numbers were very considerable, Barrios with one part attacked Tuy ; and Silva, assisted by the *Lively* and *Venus*, British frigates on that station, invested Vigo.

The garrison of the latter place was at first small ; but the paymaster-general of the 2nd corps, instead of proceeding to Tuy, entered Vigo, with the military chest and an escort of 800 men, and was blockaded there. After some slight attacks had been repulsed, the French governor negotiated for a capitulation on the 23rd of March ; but, distrustful of the peasantry, he was still undecided on the 26th. Meanwhile, some of Romana's stragglers coming from the Val des Orres, collected between Tuy and Vigo ; and Don Pablo Murillo, a regular officer, assembling 1500 retired soldiers, joined the blockading force, and in concert with Captain Mackinley, of the *Lively*, obliged the garrison to surrender on terms.

The 27th, 1300 men and officers, including 300 sick, marched out with the honours of war ; and having laid down their arms on the glacis, were embarked for an English port, according to the articles agreed upon. Four hundred and forty-seven horses, 62 covered waggons, some stores, and the military chest, containing £5000, fell into the victors' hands ; and this affair being happily terminated, the Spaniards renewed their attack on Tuy : the Portuguese once more crossed the Minho, and the siege continued until the 10th of April, when the place was relieved by Heudelet. The depôts and the artillery were immediately transported across the river, and directed upon Oporto.

The 12th, General Maucune, with a division of the 6th corps, arrived at Tuy, with the intention of carrying off the garrison, but seeing that the place was relieved, returned the next day. Heudelet having taken Viana, and the fort of

Insoa, at the mouth of the Minho, placed a small garrison in the former; and then blowing up the works of Valença, retired to Braga and Bacellos, sending Lorge again to Villa de Conde.

The sick men were transported in boats along shore, from the mouth of the Minho to Viana, Villa de Conde, and thence to Oporto; and while these transactions were taking place on the Minho, La Houssaye, with a brigade of dragoons and one of infantry, scoured the country between the Lima and the Cavado, and so protected the rear of Heudelet.

All resistance in the Entre Minho e Douro now ceased; for, at this period, the influence of the *Anti-Braganza* party was exerted in favour of the French. But on the Tras os Montes side, Sylveira being joined by General Boteilho, from the Lima, was advancing, and boasted that he would be in Oporto the 15th: and now, also, intelligence of the recapture of Chaves reaching Soult, not only explained Sylveira's boldness, but showed, that, while the latter was in arms, the tranquillity of the Entre Minho e Douro could be only momentary. Wherefore, Laborde, with a brigade of infantry, was ordered to join Loison, and attack Amarante; while La Houssaye pushed through Guimaraens upon the same point.

The 15th, Laborde reached Penafiel; and Sylveira, hearing of La Houssaye's march, retired to Villamea. The 18th, Laborde drove back the Portuguese without difficulty; and their retreat soon became a flight. Sylveira himself passed the Tamega at Amarante, and was making for the mountains, without a thought of defending that town; but Colonel Patrick, a British officer in the Portuguese service, encouraging his battalion, faced about, and rallying the fugitives, beat back the foremost of the enemy. This becoming act obliged Sylveira to return; and while Patrick defended the approaches to the bridge on the right bank with obstinate valour, the former took a position, with 5000 or 6000 men, on the heights overhanging the suburb of Villa Real, on the left bank of the river.

The 19th, La Houssaye arrived; and the French renewing their attack on the town, Patrick again baffled their efforts; but when that gallant man fell mortally wounded, and was carried across the bridge, the defence slackened, and the Portuguese went over the Tamega: the passage of the river was, however, still to be effected.

The bridges of Mondin and Cavez above, and that of Canavezas below Amarante, were destroyed: the Tamega was in full flood, and running in a deep rocky bed; and the bridge in front of the French was mined, barred with three rows of pallisades, and commanded by a battery of ten guns. The Portuguese were in position on the heights behind, from whence they could discern all that was passing at the bridge, and could reinforce at will the advanced guard, which was posted in the suburb.

PASSAGE OF THE TAMEGA, AT AMARANTE.

The 20th, the first barricade was reached by the flying sap; but the fire of the Portuguese was so deadly, that Laborde abandoned the attack, and endeavoured to construct a bridge on tressels half a mile below: this failed, and the efforts against the stone bridge were of necessity renewed. The mine at the other side was ingeniously formed; the muzzle of a loaded musket entered the chamber, and a string being tied at one end to the trigger, the other end was brought behind the entrenchments, so that an explosion could be managed with the greatest precision as to time.

The 27th, the centre barricade was burnt by Captain Brochard, an engineer officer, who devised a method of forcing the passage, so singularly bold, that all the generals, and especially General Foy, were opposed to it. The plan was, however, transmitted to Oporto; and Soult sent General Hulot, his first aide-de-camp, to report if the project was feasible. Hulot approved of Brochard's proposal, and the latter commenced his operations on the 2nd of May.

The troops were under arms, and disposed in the most convenient manner,

as near the head of the bridge as the necessity of keeping them hidden would permit ; and at eight o'clock, all being prepared, and the moon shining bright, twenty men were sent a little below the bridge, and directed to open an oblique fire of musketry against the entrenchments. This being replied to, and the attention of the Portuguese attracted, a sapper, dressed in dark grey, crawled out, and pushed with his head a barrel of powder, which was likewise enveloped in grey cloth to deaden the sound, along that side of the bridge which was darkened by the shadow of the parapet : when he had placed his barrel against the entrenchment covering the Portuguese mine, he retired in the same manner. Two others followed in succession, and retired without being discovered ; but the fourth, after placing the barrel, rose on his feet and run back, but was immediately shot at and wounded.

The fire of the Portuguese was now directed on the bridge itself ; but as the barrels were not discovered, after a time it ceased ; and a fifth sapper advancing like the others, attached a sausage seventy yards long to the barrels. At two o'clock in the morning the whole was completed ; and as the French kept very quiet, the Portuguese remained tranquil and unsuspecting.

Brochard had calculated that the effect of four barrels exploding together would destroy the Portuguese entrenchments, and burn the cord attached to their mine. The event proved that he was right ; for a thick fog arising about three o'clock, the sausage was fired, and the explosion made a large breach. Brochard, with his sappers, instantly jumped on to the bridge, threw water into the mine, cut away all obstacles, and, followed by a column of grenadiers, was at the other side before the smoke cleared away. The grenadiers being supported by other troops, not only the suburb, but the camp on the height behind, were carried without a check, and the Portuguese dispersing, fled over the mountains.

The execution of Captain Brochard's bold, ingenious, and successful project, cost only seven or eight men killed ; while in the former futile attempts above 180 men, besides many engineer and artillery officers, had fallen. It is, however, a singular fact that there was a practicable ford near the bridge, unguarded, and apparently unknown to both sides.

A short time after the passage of the Tamega, General Heudelet, marching from Braga by Guimaraens, entered Amarante. Laborde occupied the position abandoned by Sylveira, and detachments were sent up the left bank of the river to Mondin : but Loison pursued the fugitives to the heights of Villa Real and Mezamfrio. The Portuguese guarding the passage at Canavezas, hearing of the action, destroyed their ammunition, and retired across the Douro without being overtaken.

The 6th of May, the French were near Villa Real and Mezamfrio, but all the inhabitants had crossed the Douro. This being made known to Soult, he reinforced Loison, and directed him to scour the right bank of the Douro as high as Pezo de Ragoa ; to complete the destruction of Sylveira's army, and to send patrols towards Braganza, with the view of subduing the Tras os Montes, and of ascertaining if any French troops had made their appearance there ; for Bessieres had been requested to make a diversion on that side. Bessieres himself had returned to France, but the reply of his successor, Kellerman, being intercepted, it appeared that he was unable or unwilling to afford any aid.

General Laborde was now recalled, with two regiments of infantry, to Oporto ; and the communication between that town and Amarante was guarded by a brigade of dragoons, and a regiment of infantry. Meanwhile, Loison felt the Portuguese at Pezo de Ragoa, on the 7th of May : but, meeting resistance, and observing a considerable movement on the opposite bank of the Douro, he became alarmed, and fell back the same day to Mezamfrio. The next morning he returned to Amarante, his march being harassed by the peasantry, who came on with a boldness showing that some extraordinary support was at hand : and, in truth, a new actor had appeared upon the scene ; the whole

country was in commotion ; and Soult, suddenly checked in his career, was pushed backward by a strong and eager hand.

OBSERVATIONS.—SPANISH OPERATION.

1. The great pervading error of the Spaniards in this campaign was the notion that their armies were capable of taking the lead in offensive movements, and fighting the French in open countries ; whereas, to avoid general actions should have been a vital principle.

2. The resolution to fight the French having, however, been adopted, the second great error was the attaching equal importance to the lines of operation in La Mancha and Estremadura ; the one should have been considered only as an accessory ; and it is evident that the first rank belonged to La Mancha, because it was in a more open country ; because it more immediately threatened Madrid ; and because a defeat there endangered Seville more than a defeat in Estremadura would have done. In La Mancha the beaten army must have fallen back upon Seville : but in Estremadura it might retire upon Badajos. But the latter place being to the Spaniards of infinitely less importance than Madrid was to their opponents, the lead in the campaign must always have belonged to the army of La Mancha, which could, at any time, have obliged the French to fight a battle in defence of the capital.

The army of Estremadura might, therefore, have been safely reduced to 15,000 men, provided the army of La Mancha had been increased to 40,000 or 50,000 : and it would appear that, with a very little energy, the junta could have provided a larger force. It is true that they would have been beaten just the same : but that is an argument against fighting great battles, which was, certainly, the worst possible plan for the Spaniards to pursue.

3. The third great error was the inertness of Valencia and Murcia, or rather their hostility : for they were upon the verge of civil war with the supreme junta. Those provinces, so rich and populous, had been unmolested for eight months ; they had suffered nothing from Moncey's irruption ; and they had received large succours from the English government. Valencia had written her pretensions to patriotism in the bloody characters of assassination ; but, were it not for the force under Llamas which, after the defeat of Tudela, helped to defend Zaragoza, Valencia and Murcia might have been swallowed up by the ocean without any sensible effect upon the general cause. Those countries were, however, admirably situated to serve as a support to Aragon, Catalonia, Andalusia, and La Mancha, and they could, at this time, have paralyzed a large French force, by marching an army to San Clemente.

It was the dread of their doing so that made the king restrain Sebastiani from pursuing his victory at Ciudad Real ; and, assuredly, the Valencians should have moved ; for it is not so much in their numbers as in the variety of their lines of operation that a whole people find their advantage in opposing regular armies. This, the observation of that profound and original writer, General Lloyd, was confirmed by the practice of Napoleon in Spain.

FRENCH OPERATIONS.

1. To get possession of Seville and Cadiz was certainly as great an object to Napoleon as to seize Lisbon : but the truth of the maxim quoted above regulated the emperor's proceedings. If Victor had been directed at once upon Andalusia, the Portuguese and Valencians could have carried their lines of operations directly upon his flanks and rear. If Badajos and Lisbon had been the objects of his march, the Andalusians could have fallen on his left flank and cut his communications. But all such dangers were avoided by the march of Soult and Lapisse ; their direction was not only concentric, but a regular prolongation of the great line of communication with France. Ney protected the rear of one ; Bessieres the rear of the other ; and those two marshals, at the same time, separated and cut off the Asturias from the rest of Spain ; thus, all that was formidable was confined to the south of the Tagus.

For the same reason the course of conquest was to have proceeded from

Portugal to Andalusia, which would then have been assailed in front and flank at one moment, while the 4th corps held the Valencians in check. By this plan the French would never have lost their central position, nor exposed their grand line of communication to an attack.

2. That this plan, so wisely conceived in its general bearing, should fail without any of the different corps employed having suffered a defeat, nay, when they were victorious in all quarters is surprising, but not inexplicable. It is clear that Napoleon's orders were given at a time when he did not expect that a battle would have been fought at Coruña, or that the 2nd corps would have suffered so much from the severity of the weather and the length of the marches, neither did he anticipate the resistance that was made by the Portuguese, between the Minho and the Douro. The last error was a consequence of the first, for his plans were calculated upon the supposition that the rapidity of Soult's movements would forestall all defence; yet the delay cannot be charged as a fault to that marshal, whose energy was conspicuous.

3. Napoleon's attention, divided between Austria and Spain, must have been somewhat distracted by the multiplicity of his affairs. He does not seem to have made allowance for the very rugged country through which Soult had to march, at a time when all the rivers and streams were overflowing from the constant rains; and as the combinations of war are continually changing, the delay thus occasioned rendered Lapisse's instructions faulty: for, although it be true, that if the latter had marched by Guarda, upon Abrantes, while Soult advanced to Lisbon, by Coimbra, and that Victor entered the Alemtejo, Portugal would have been conquered without difficulty; yet the combination was so wide, and the communications so uncertain, that unity of action could not be insured. Soult, weakened by the obstacles he encountered, required reinforcements after the taking of Oporto; and Lapisse should have considered himself as rather belonging to Soult than Victor, and have marched upon Viseu; the Duke of Dalmatia would then have been strong enough to fight his own battle without regard to the operations in the Alemtejo.

4. The first error of the French, if the facts are correctly shown, must, therefore, be attributed to Napoleon, because he overlooked the probable chances of delay, combined the operations on too wide a scale, and gave Ciudad Rodrigo and Abrantes, instead of Lamego and Viseu, for the direction of Lapisse's march. I say, if the facts are correctly shown, for it is scarcely discreet to censure Napoleon's military dispositions, however erroneous they may *appear* to have been, and it is certain that, in this case, his errors, if errors they were, although sufficient to embarrass his lieutenants, will not account for their entire failure. Above 60,000 men were put in motion by him, upon good general principles, for the subjugation of Lisbon; and we must search in the particular conduct of the generals for the reason why *a project of Napoleon's, to be executed by 60,000 French veterans, should have ended as idly and ineffectually as if it had been concocted by the Spanish junta.*

OBSERVATIONS ON THE SEPARATE OPERATIONS OF LAPISSE, VICTOR, SOULT,
ROMANA, SYLVEIRA, AND CUESTA.
LAPISSE.

1. An intercepted letter of General Maupetit, shows the small pains taken by Lapisse to communicate with Soult. He directs that *even so many* as 300 men should patrol towards Tras os Montes, to obtain information of the 2nd corps, at a time when the object was so important that his whole force should have moved in mass rather than have failed of intelligence.

2. The manner in which he suffered Sir Robert Wilson to gather strength and to insult his outposts was inexcusable. He might have marched straight upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and dispersed everything in his front; one of those fortresses would probably have fallen, if not both, and from thence a strong detachment pushed towards Lamego would not only have ascertained the situation of the 2nd corps, but would have greatly aided its progress by

threatening Oporto and Braga. It cannot be urged that Salamanca required the presence of a large force, because in that open country the people were at the mercy of Bessiere's cavalry; and so sensible were the local junta of this, that both Salamanca and Ledesma refused assistance from Ciudad Rodrigo, when it was offered, and preferred a quiet submission.

3. When, at last, the king's reiterated orders obliged Lapisse to put his troops in motion, he made a demonstration against Ciudad Rodrigo, so feeble that it scarcely called the garrison to the ramparts, and then, as if all chance of success in Portugal was at an end, breaking through the pass of Perales, he reached Alcantara and rejoined the 1st corps; a movement equally at variance with Napoleon's orders and with good military discretion; for the 1st directed him upon Abrantes, and the 2nd would have carried him upon Viseu. The march to the latter place, while it insured a junction with Soult, would not have prevented an after-movement upon Abrantes: the obstacles were by no means so great as those which awaited him on the march to Alcantara, and the great error of abandoning the whole country, between the Tagus and the Douro, to the insurgents would have been avoided.

Here, then, was one direct cause of failure; but the error, although great, was not irreparable. If Soult was abandoned to his own resources, he had also obtained a firm and important position in the north, while Victor, reinforced by 10,000 men, was enabled to operate against Lisbon, by the Alemtejo, more efficaciously than before. But Victor seems to have been less disposed than Lapisse to execute his instructions.

VICTOR.

1. The inactivity of this marshal after the rout of Ucles has been already mentioned. It is certain that if the 4th and 1st corps had been well handled, neither Cuesta nor Cartoajal could have ventured beyond the defiles of the Sierra Morena, much less have bearded the French generals and established a line of defence along the Tagus. 50,000 French troops should in two months have done something more than maintain 50 miles of country on one side of Madrid.

2. The passage of the Tagus was successful, but can hardly be called a skilful operation, unless the Duke of Belluno calculated upon the ignorance of his adversary. Before an able general and a movable army, possessing a pontoon train, it would have scarcely answered to separate the troops in three divisions on an extent of 50 miles, leaving the artillery and parc of ammunition, protected only by some cavalry and one battalion of infantry, within two hours' march of the enemy, for three days. If Cuesta had brought up all his detachments, the Meza d'Ibor might have been effectually manned, and yet 10,000 infantry, and all the Spanish cavalry, spared to cross the Tagus at Almaraz, on the 17th; in this case Victor's artillery would probably have been captured, and his project certainly baffled.

3. The passage of the Tagus being, however, effected, Victor not only permitted Cuesta to escape, but actually lost all traces of his army, an evident fault not to be excused by pleading the impediments arising from the swelling of the river, the necessity of securing the communications, etc. If Cuesta's power was despised before the passage of the river, when his army was whole and his position strong, there could be no reason for such great circumspection after his defeat, a circumspection, too, not supported by skill, as the dispersed state of the French army, the evening before the battle of Medellin, proves.

4. That Victor was enabled to fight Cuesta, on the morning of the 28th, with any prospect of success, must be attributed rather to fortune than to talent. It was a fault to permit the Spaniards to retake the offensive after the defeat on the Tagus; nor can the first movement of the Duke of Belluno in the action be praised. He should have marched into the plain in a compact order of battle. The danger of sending Lassalle and Latour Maubourg to such a distance from the main body I shall have occasion to show in my observations on Cuesta's operations; but the after-movements of the French in this battle were well

and rapidly combined and vigorously executed, and the success was proportionate to the ability displayed.

5. The battles of Medellin and Ciudad Real, which utterly destroyed the Spanish armies and laid Seville and Badajos open; those battles in which blood was spilt like water, produced no result to the victors, for the French generals, as if they had struck a torpedo, never stretched forth their hands a second time. Sebastiani, indeed, wished to penetrate the Sierra Morena; but the king, fearful of the Valencians, restrained him. On the other hand, Joseph urged Victor to invade the Alemtejo, yet the latter would not obey, even when reinforced by Lapisse's division. This was the great and fatal error of the whole campaign, for nearly all the disposable British and Portuguese troops were thus enabled to move against the Duke of Dalmatia, while the Duke of Belluno contrived neither to fulfil the instructions of Napoleon, nor the orders of the king, nor yet to perform any useful achievement himself.

He did not assist the invasion of Portugal, he did not maintain Estremadura, he did not take Seville, nor even prevent Cuesta from twice renewing the offensive; yet he remained in an unhealthy situation until he lost more men, by sickness, than would have furnished three such battles as Medellin. Two months so unprofitably wasted by a general, at the head of 30,000 good troops, can scarcely be cited. The Duke of Belluno's reputation has been too hardly earned to attribute this inactivity to want of talent. That he was averse to aid the operations of Marshal Soult is evident, and, most happily for Portugal, it was so; but, whether this aversion arose from personal jealousy, from indisposition to obey the king, or from a mistaken view of affairs, I have no means of judging.

CUESTA.

Cuesta's peculiar unfitness for the lead of an army has been remarked more than once. It remains to show that his proceedings on this occasion continued to justify those remarks.

1. To defend a river, on a long line, is generally hopeless, and especially when the defenders have not the means of passing freely, in several places, to the opposite bank. Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus, Turenne, Napoleon, Wellington, and hundreds of others have shown how the passage of rivers may be won. Umenes, who prevented Antigonos from passing the Coprates, is, perhaps, the only example of a general baffling the efforts of a skilful and enterprising enemy in such an attempt.

2. The defence of rivers having always proved fruitless, it follows that no general should calculate upon success, and that he should exert the greatest energy, activity, and vigilance to avoid a heavy disaster; that all his lines of retreat should be kept free and open, and be concentric; and that to bring his magazines and depôts close up to the army, in such a situation, is rashness itself. Now Cuesta was inactive, and, disregarding the maxim which forbids the establishment of magazines in the first line of defence, brought up the whole of his to Deleyton and Truxillo. His combinations were ill-arranged; he abandoned Mirabete without an effort, his depôts fell into the hands of the enemy, and his retreat was confused and eccentric, inasmuch as part of his army retired into the Guadalupe, while others went to Merida, and he himself to Medellin.

3. The line of retreat upon Medellin and Campanarios, instead of Badajos, being determined by the necessity of uniting with Albuquerque, cannot be blamed, and the immediate return to Medellin was bold and worthy of praise, but its merit consisted in recovering the offensive immediately after a defeat; wherefore, Cuesta should not have halted at Medellin, thus giving the lead again to the French general; he should have continued to advance, and have fallen upon the scattered divisions of the French army, endeavouring to beat them in detail, and to rally his own detachments in the Sierra de Guadalupe. The error of stopping short at Medellin would have been apparent, if Victor, placing a rear-

guard to amuse the Spanish general, had taken the road to Seville by Almedralejos and Zafra.

4. Cuesta's general design for the battle of Medellin was well imagined, that is, it was right to have his army behind the ridge, and to defer the attack until the enemy had developed his force and order of battle in the plain, but the execution was on the lowest scale. If, instead of advancing in one long and weak line, without a reserve, Cuesta had held the greatest part of his troops in solid columns, and thrust them between Lassalle and Latour Maubourg's divisions, which were pushed out like horns from the main body of the French, those generals would have been cut off, and the battle commenced by dividing the French army into three unconnected masses, while the Spaniards would have been compact, well in hand, and masters of the general movements. Nothing could then have saved Victor, except hard fighting; but Cuesta's actual dispositions rendered it impossible for the Spaniards to win the battle by courage, or to escape the pursuit by swiftness.

5. It is remarkable that the Spanish general seems never to have thought of putting Truxillo, Guadalupe, Merida, Estrella, or Medellin in a state of defence, although most if not all those places had some castle or walls capable of resisting a sudden assault. There was time to do it, for Cuesta remained unmolested, on the Tagus, from January to the middle of March; and every additional point of support thus obtained for an undisciplined army would have diminished the advantages derived by the French from their superior facility of movement. The places themselves might have been garrisoned by the citizens and peasantry, and a week's, a day's, nay, even an hour's, delay was of importance to a force like Cuesta's, which, from its inexperience, must have always been liable to confusion.

SOULT.

1. The march of this general in one column, upon Tuy, was made under the impression that resistance would not be offered; otherwise, it is probable that a division of infantry, and a brigade of cavalry would have been sent from St. Jago or Mellid direct upon Orense, to insure the passage of the Minho; and it seems to have been an error in Ney, arising, probably, from the same cause, not to have kept Marchand's division of the 6th corps at Orense until the 2nd corps had effected an entrance into Portugal.

2. Soult's resolution to place the artillery and stores in Tuy, and march into Portugal, trusting to victory for re-opening the communication, would increase the reputation of any general. Three times before he reached Oporto he was obliged to halt, in order to fabricate cartridges for the infantry, from the powder taken in battle; and his whole progress from Tuy to that city was energetic and able in the extreme.

3. The military proceedings, after the taking of Oporto, do not all bear the same stamp. The administration of the civil affairs appears to have engrossed the marshal's attention; and his absence from the immediate scene of action sensibly affected the operations. Franceschi showed too much respect for Trant's corps. Loison's movements were timid and slow; and even Laborde's genius seems to have been asleep. The importance of crushing Sylveira was obvious. Now, there is nothing more necessary in war than to strike with all the force you can at once; but here, Caulaincourt was first sent, and being too weak, Loison reinforced him, and Laborde reinforced Loison; and all were scarcely sufficient at last to do that which half would have done at first; but the whole of these transactions are obscure. The great delay that took place before the bridge of Amarante; the hesitation and frequent recurrence for orders to the marshal indicate want of zeal, and a desire to procrastinate, in opposition to Soult's wishes. Judging from Mr. Noble's history of the campaign, this must be traced to a conspiracy in the French army, which shall be touched upon hereafter.

4. The resistance made by the Portuguese peasantry was infinitely creditable

to their courage ; but there cannot be stronger proof of the inefficacy of a like defence, when unsupported by good troops. No country is more favourable to such a warfare than the northern provinces of Portugal ; the people were brave, and they had the assistance of the organized forces under Romana, Sylveira, Eben, and the bishop : yet we find, that Soult, in the very worst season of the year, overcame all resistance, and penetrated to Oporto, without an actual loss, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, of more than 2500 men, including the 1200 sick, captured at Chaves.

ROMANA.

1. Romana remained at Oimbra and Monterey, unmolested, from the 21st of January to the 6th of March ; he had, therefore, time to reorganize his forces, and he had, in fact, 10,000 regular troops in tolerable order. He knew, on the 11th or 12th, that Soult was preparing to pass the Minho between Tuy and Guardia. He knew, also, that the people of Ribidavia and Orense were in arms ; that those on the Arosa were preparing to rise ; and that, consequently, the French must, were it only from want of food, break out of the contracted position they occupied, either by Ribidavia and Orense, or by crossing the Minho, or by retreating to St. Jago.

With these guides, the path of the Spanish general was as plain as the writing on the wall ; he was at the head of 10,000 regular troops ; two marches would have brought him to Ribidavia, in front of which town he might have occupied a position close on the left flank of the French, rallied all the insurgents about him, and have organized a formidable warfare. The French durst not have attempted the passage of the Minho while he was in front of Ribidavia ; and if they turned against him, the place was favourable for battle, and the retreat open by Orense and Monterey ; while the difficulty of bringing up artillery would hamper the pursuit. On the other hand, if Soult had retreated, that alone would have been tantamount to a victory ; and Romana would have been well placed to follow upon the rear of the French, connecting himself with the English vessels of war upon that coast as he advanced.

2. So far from contemplating operations of this nature, Romana did not even concentrate his force, but keeping it extended in small parties along 15 miles of country, indulged himself in speculations about his enemy's weakness, and the prospect of their retreating altogether from the Peninsula, until he was roused from his reveries, by finding his divisions beaten in detail, and himself forced either to join the Portuguese with whom he was quarrelling, or to break his promises to Sylveira and fly by cross roads over the mountain on his right : he adopted the latter, thus proving, that whatever might be his resources for raising an insurrection, he could not direct one ; and that he was, although brave and active, totally destitute of military talent. At a later period of the war, the Duke of Wellington, after a long and fruitless military discussion, drily observed, that either Romana or himself had mistaken their profession. Time has since shown which.

SYLVEIRA.

1. This Portuguese general's first operations were as ill-conducted as Romana's ; his posts were too extended ; he made no attempt to repair the works of Chaves, none to aid the important insurrection of Ribidavia ; but these errors cannot be fairly charged upon him, as his officers were so unruly, that they held a council of war perforce, where 30 voted for fighting at Chaves, and 29 against it ; the casting voice being given by the voter calling on the troops to follow him.

2. The after-movement, by which Chaves was recaptured, whether devised by Sylveira himself, or directed by Marshal Beresford, was bold and skilful ; but the advance to Penafiel, while La Houssaye and Heudelet could from Braga pass by Guimaraens, and cut him off from Amarante, was as rash as his subsequent flight was disgraceful. Yet, thanks to the heroic courage of Colonel Patrick, Sylveira's reputation as a general was established among his countrymen, by the very action which should have ruined him in their estimation.

BOOK VII.

CHAPTER I.

It will be remembered that the narrative of Sir John Cradock's proceedings was discontinued at the moment when that general, nothing shaken by the importunities of the regency, the representations of Marshal Beresford, or the advice of Mr. Frere, resolved to await at Lumiar for the arrival of the promised reinforcements from England. While in this position, he made every exertion to obtain transport for the supplies, remounts for the cavalry, and draught animals for the artillery; but the Portuguese government gave him no assistance, and an attempt to procure horses and mules in Morocco proving unsuccessful, the army was so scantily furnished that, other reasons failing, this alone would have prevented any advance towards the frontier.*

The singular inactivity of Victor surprised Cradock, but did not alter his resolution; yet, being continually importuned to advance, he, when assured that 5000 men of the promised reinforcements were actually off the Rock of Lisbon, held a council of war. All the generals were averse to marching on Oporto, except Beresford, and he admitted that its propriety depended on Victor's movements. Meanwhile, that marshal approached Badajos; Lapisse came down upon the Agueda, and Soult, having stormed Oporto, pushed his advanced posts to the Vouga.

A cry of treason then became general in Portugal, and both the people and the soldiers evinced a spirit truly alarming.† The latter, disregarding the authority of Beresford, and menacing their own officers, declared that it was necessary to slay 1000 traitors in Lisbon; and the regiments in Abrantes even abandoned that post, and marched to join Trant upon the Vouga. But when these disorders were at the worst, and when a vigorous movement of Victor and Lapisse would have produced fatal consequences, General Hill landed with about 5000 men and 300 artillery horses. Cradock, then, resolved to advance, moved thereto chiefly by the representations of Beresford, who thought such a measure absolutely necessary to restore confidence, to ensure the obedience of the native troops, and to enable him to take measures for the safety of Abrantes.

Thus, about the time that Tuy was relieved by the French, and that Sylveira was attacked at Penafiel by Laborde, the English army was put in motion, part upon Caldas and Obidos, part upon Rio Mayor; and the campaign was actually commenced by Cradock, when that general, although his measures had been all approved of by his government, was suddenly and unexpectedly required to surrender his command to Sir Arthur Wellesley, and to proceed himself to Gibraltar.

It would appear that this arrangement was adopted after a struggle in the cabinet, and, certainly, neither the particular choice nor the general principle of employing men of talent without regard to seniority can be censured; nevertheless, Sir John Cradock was used unworthily. A general of his rank would never have accepted a command on such terms; and it was neither just nor decent to expose him to an unmerited mortification.

Before the arrival of his successor, Cradock assembled the army at Leiria, and established his magazines at Abrantes, Santarem, and Peniché; but as the admiral feared the difficult navigation at that season would not send victuallers to the latter place, the magazines there were but scantily supplied. Meanwhile Lapisse made way by Alcantara to Merida, the re-capture of Chaves became known, and the insurrection in Beira and Tras os Montes took its full spring. Trant's force also increased on the Vouga, and Beresford, who had succeeded in restoring order among the Portuguese battalions, was more than ever urgent for

* Appendix, No. 34.

† Ibid. No. 33, section 1.

an attack upon Soult ; but Cradock, unprovided with a due proportion of cavalry, unable to procure provisions or forage, and fearful for the safety of Lisbon, refused ; and the 24th of April, hearing that his successor had arrived, he resigned the command and repaired to Gibraltar.

Sir Arthur Wellesley landed the 22nd of April, and, on the 24th, signified to the British ministers that, affairs being in the condition contemplated by them, it was his intention to assume the command of the army ;* a circumstance worthy of attention, as indicating that the defence of Portugal was even then considered a secondary object, and of uncertain promise. The deliverance of the Peninsula was never due to the foresight and perseverance of the English ministers, but to the firmness and skill of the British generals, and to the courage of troops whom no dangers could daunt and no hardships dishearten, while they remedied the eternal errors of the cabinet.

The unexpected arrival of a man known only as a victorious commander created the greatest enthusiasm in Portugal. The regency immediately nominated him marshal-general of their troops. The people, always fond of novelty, hailed his presence with enthusiasm ; and all those persons, whether Portuguese or British, who had blamed Sir John Cradock's prudent caution, now anticipating a change of system, spake largely and confidently of the future operations ; in truth, all classes were greatly excited, and an undefined yet powerful sentiment that something great would soon be achieved pervaded the public mind.

Sir Arthur's plans were, however, neither hastily adopted nor recklessly hurried forward ; like Cradock, he felt the danger of removing far from Lisbon while Victor was on the Alemtejo frontier, and he anxiously weighed his own resources against those at the enemy's disposal.† Not that he wavered between offensive and defensive movements, for a general of his discernment could not fail to perceive that if the French were acting upon any concerted plan, the false march of Lapisse to Merida had marred their combinations by placing a whole nation, with all its fortresses and all its forces, whether insurgents, regular troops, or auxiliaries, between the armies of Victor and Soult, and that neither concert nor communication could longer exist between those marshals.

Soult's offensive strength, also, was evidently exhausted ; he might establish himself firmly in the provinces beyond the Douro, but he could not, alone, force his way to Lisbon, a distance of 200 miles, in a season when the waters were full, and through a country tangled with rivers, mountains, and defiles. He could not hope, with 24,000 men, to beat a whole people in arms, assisted by an auxiliary army of as high reputation, and nearly as numerous, as his own ; and, moreover, there were discontents and conspiracy in his camp ; and of this Sir Arthur was aware.

Soult alone, then, was no longer formidable to the capital ; but that which weakened him increased the offensive power of Victor, who was now at the head of 30,000 men, and might march straight upon Lisbon, and through an open country, the only barrier being the Tagus, a river fordable in almost all seasons. Such a movement, or even the semblance of it, must perforce draw the British and native armies to that side ; and then Soult, coming down to the Mondego, might, from thence, connect his operations with Victor's by the line of the Zezere, or advance at once on Lisbon as occasion offered.

Now, to meet the exigencies of the campaign, the military resources of the English general were—

1. His central position.
2. His own British and German troops, about 26,000 in number ; of which the present under arms, including sergeants,‡ amounted to 22,000, with 3700 horses and mules.

* Appendix No. 44.

† Ibid, No. 45.

‡ In the British army, when speaking of the number present under arms, the corporals and privates only are understood. In the French army, the present under arms includes

3. The Portuguese troops of the line ; of which there might be organized and armed about 16,000.

Nearly all these troops were already collected, or capable of being collected in a short time, between the Tagus and Mondego ; and beyond the latter river, Trant and Sylveira commanded separate corps ; the one upon the Vouga, the other on the Tamega.

4. The militia and the *ordenanzas*, which may be denominated the insurgent force.

5. The fortresses of Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, Elvas, Abrantes, Peniché, and Badajos.

6. The English fleet, the Portuguese craft, and the free use of the coast and river navigation for his supplies.

7. The assistance of Cuesta's army, which amounted to 30,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry, of which 25,000 were actually at or in front of the defile of Monasterio, close to Victor's posts. Sir Arthur Wellesley's moral resources were the high courage of his own troops ; his personal popularity ; the energy of an excited people ; a favourable moment ; the presentiment of victory ; and a mind equal to the occasion.

In a strategic point of view, to fall upon Victor was best, because he was the most dangerous neighbour to Portugal ; because his defeat would prove most detrimental to the French, most advantageous to the Spaniards ; and because the greatest body of troops could be brought to bear against him.

On the other hand, Soult held a rich province, from whence the chief supply of cattle for the army was derived ; he was in possession of the second city in the kingdom, where he was forming a French party ; the feelings of the regency and the people were greatly troubled by the loss of Oporto ; and their desire to regain it was strongly expressed.

To attack Victor, it was indispensable to concert operations with Cuesta ; but that general was ill disposed towards the British, and to insure his co-operation would have required time, which could be better employed in expelling Soult. For these reasons, Sir Arthur Wellesley determined to attack the last-named marshal without delay ; intending, if successful, to establish a good system of defence in the northern provinces : and then, in conjunction with Cuesta, to turn his arms against Victor, hoping thus to relieve Galicia more effectually than by following the French into that province.

The security of Lisbon being the pivot of the operations against Soult, time was the principal object to be gained. If Victor came fiercely on, he could not be stopped, but his course might be impeded ; his path could not be blocked, but it might be planted with thorns : and to effect this, 8000 or 10,000 Portuguese troops were immediately directed upon Abrantes and Santarem, and two British battalions and two regiments of cavalry just disembarked, marched to the same places, where they were joined by three other battalions drafted from the army at Leiria.

A body of 2000 men, composed of a militia regiment and of the Lusitanian legion, which remained near Castello Branco after Lapisse had crossed the Tagus, were placed under the command of Colonel Mayne, and directed to take post at the bridge of Alcantara, having orders to defend the passage of the river, and, if necessary, to blow up the structure. At the same time, the flying bridges at Villa Velha and Abrantes were removed, the garrison of the latter place was reinforced, and General Mackenzie was appointed to command all the troops, whether Portuguese or British, thus distributed along the right bank of the Tagus.

These precautions appeared sufficient, especially as there was a general disposition to believe the French weaker than they really were. Victor could not, by a mere demonstration, shake the line of defence. If he forced the bridge every military person, whether officers, non-commissioned officers, or soldiers ; a distinction which should be borne in mind.

of Alcantara, and penetrated by the sterile and difficult route formerly followed by Junot, it would bring him, without guns, upon Abrantes; but Abrantes was already capable of a short resistance, and Mackenzie would have had time to line the rugged banks of the Zezere.

If, leaving Badajos and Elvas behind him, Victor should pass through the Alemtejo, and cross the Tagus between Abrantes and Lisbon, he was to be feared; but Cuesta had promised to follow closely in the French general's rear, and it was reasonable to suppose that Mackenzie, although he might be unable to prevent the passage of the river, would not suffer himself to be cut off from the capital, where, having the assistance of the fleet, the aid of the citizens, and the chance of reinforcements from England, he might defend himself until the army could return from the Douro. Moreover, Victor was 18 marches from Lisbon; it was only by accident that he and Soult could act in concert, while the allied army, having a sure and rapid mode of correspondence with Cuesta, was already within four marches of Oporto.

The main body of the allies was now directed upon Coimbra; and four of the best Portuguese battalions were incorporated in the British brigades. Marshal Beresford retained, under his personal command, about 6000 native troops; Trant remained steadfast on the Vouga; Sylveira on the Tamega; and Sir Robert Wilson, quitting the command of the legion, was detached, with a small Portuguese force, to Viseu, where, hanging upon Franceschi's left flank, he also communicated with Sylveira's corps by the way of Lamego.

The difficulty of bringing up forage and provisions, which had pressed so sorely on Sir John Cradock, was now somewhat lessened. The land transport was still scanty; and the admiral, dreading the long shore navigation for large vessels, was without the small craft necessary for victualling the troops by the coast; but the magazines at Caldas were partly filled, and 20 large country-boats being loaded with provisions, and the owners induced, by premiums, to make the run, had put safely into Peniché and the Mondego. In short, the obstacles to a forward movement, although great, were not insurmountable.

Sir Arthur Wellesley reached Coimbra the 2nd of May. His army was concentrated there on the 5th, in number about 25,000 sabres and bayonets; of which 9000 were Portuguese, 3000 Germans, and the remainder British. The Duke of Dalmatia was ignorant that the allies were thus assembled in force upon the Mondego, but many French officers knew it, and were silent, being engaged in a plot of a very extraordinary nature, and which was probably a part of the conspiracy previously alluded to, as being conducted through the medium of the Princess of Tour and Taxis.

The French soldiers were impatient and murmuring; their attachment to Napoleon himself was deep and unshaken, but human nature shrinks from perpetual contact with death; and they were tired of war. This feeling induced some officers of high rank, serving in Spain, to form a plan for changing the French government. Generally speaking, these men were friendly to Napoleon personally; but they were republicans in their politics, and earnest to reduce the power of the emperor. Their project, founded upon the discontent of the troops in the Peninsula, was to make a truce with the English army, to elect a chief, and march into France with the resolution to abate the pride of Napoleon, or to pull him from his throne. The conspirators at first turned their eyes upon Marshal Ney, but finally resolved to choose Gouvion St. Cyr for their leader. Yet it was easier to resolve than to execute. Napoleon's ascendancy, supported by the love and admiration of millions, was not to be shaken by the conspiracy of a few discontented men: and although their hopes were not entirely relinquished until after Massena's retreat from Portugal in 1810, long before that period they discovered that the soldiers, tired as they were of war, were faithful to their great monarch, and would have slain any who openly stirred against him.

The foregoing facts are stated on the authority of a principal mover of the

sedition ; but many minor plots had contemporary existence, for this was the spring-time of folly. In the 2nd corps the conspirators were numerous and, by their discourses and their slow and sullen execution of orders, had continually thwarted the operations of Marshal Soult, yet without exciting his suspicions ; but, as he penetrated into Portugal, their counteractions increased, and by the time he arrived at Oporto their design was ripe for execution.

In the middle of April, John Viana, the son of an Oporto merchant, appeared at Marshal Beresford's head-quarters, with proposals from the French malcontents. The latter desired to have an English officer sent to them, to arrange the execution of a plan, which was to be commenced by seizing their general, and giving him over to the British outposts : a detestable project, for it is not in the field, and with a foreign enemy, that soldiers should concert the overthrow of their country's institutions, and although it would be idle and impertinent in a foreigner to say how much and how long men shall bear with what they deem an oppressive government, there is a distinct and especial loyalty due from a soldier to his general in the field ; a compact of honour, which it is singularly base to violate ; and so it has in all ages been considered. When the Argyraspides, or Silver-shields of the Macedonians, delivered their general, Eumenes, in bonds, to Antigonus, the latter, although he had tempted them to the deed, and scrupled not to slay the hero, reproached the treacherous soldiers for their conduct, and, with the approbation of all men, destroyed them. Yet Antigonus was not a foreign enemy, but of their own kin and blood.

An English lieutenant-colonel attached to the Portuguese service reluctantly undertook the duty of meeting the conspirators, and penetrated, by night, but in uniform, behind the French outposts, by the lake of Aveiro or Ovar. He had previously arranged that one of the malcontents should meet him on the water ; the boats unknowingly passed each other in the dark, and the Englishman returned to Aveiro ; but he there found John Viana, in company with the adjutant-major, D'Argenton. The latter confirmed what Viana had declared at Thomar ; he expressed great respect for Soult, but dwelt upon the necessity of removing him before an appeal could be made to the soldiers ; and he readily agreed to wait, in person, upon Beresford, saying he was himself too strongly supported in the French army to be afraid.

Marshal Beresford was then at Lisbon, and thither D'Argenton followed ; and, having seen him and Sir Arthur Wellesley, and remained five days in that capital, returned to Oporto. While at Lisbon, he, in addition to his former reasons for this conspiracy, stated that Soult wished to make himself king of Portugal ; an error into which he and many others naturally fell, from circumstances that I have already noticed.

When Sir Arthur Wellesley arrived at Coimbra, D'Argenton appeared again at the English head-quarters ; but this time, by the order of Sir Arthur, he was conducted through by-paths, and returned convinced, from what he had seen and heard, that although the allies were in force on the Mondego, many days must elapse before they could be in a condition to attack Oporto. During his absence, D'Argenton was denounced by General Lefebre, who was falsely imagined to be favourable to the conspiracy ; passports, signed by Admiral Berkely, which this unfortunate man, contrary to Sir A. Wellesley's urgent recommendation, had insisted upon having, completely proved his guilt ; and Soult, until that moment, without suspicion, beheld with amazement the abyss that yawned beneath his feet : his firmness, however, did not desert him. He offered D'Argenton pardon, and even reward, if he would disclose the names of the other conspirators and relate truly what he had seen of the English and Portuguese armies. The prisoner, to save his life, readily told all that he knew of the British, but Sir A. Wellesley's foresight had rendered that tale useless ; and with respect to his accomplices D'Argenton was immovable. Exaggerating the importance of the conspiracy, he even defied the marshal's power, and advised him, as the safest course, to adopt the

conspirators' sentiments; nor was this boldness fatal to him at the moment, for Soult, anxious to ascertain the extent of the danger, delayed executing him, and he effected his escape during the subsequent operations.

He was not the only person who communicated secretly with the British general; Colonel Donadieu and Colonel Lafitte were engaged in the conspiracy. The latter is said to have had an interview with Sir Arthur, between the outposts of the two armies, and from the first the malcontents were urgent that the movements of the allied forces should be so regulated as to favour their proceedings; but Sir Arthur Wellesley, having little dependence upon intrigue, sternly intimated that his operations could not be regulated by their plots, and hastened his military measures.

Under the impression that Sylveira was successfully defending the line of the Tamega, the British general at first resolved to reinforce him by sending Beresford's and Sir Robert Wilson's corps across the Douro at Lamego, by which he hoped to cut Soult off from Tras os Montes, intending, when their junction was effected, to march with his own army direct upon Oporto, and to cross the Douro near that town, by the aid of Beresford's corps, which would then be on the right bank. This measure, if executed, would, including Trant's, Wilson's, and Sylveira's people, have placed a mass of 30,000 troops, regulars and irregulars, between the Tras os Montes and Soult, and the latter must have fought a battle under very unfavourable circumstances, or have fallen back on the Minho, which he could scarcely have passed at that season while pressed by the pursuing army. But the plan was necessarily abandoned when intelligence arrived that the bridge of Amarante was forced, and that Sylveira, pursued by the enemy, was driven over the Douro.

The news of this disaster only reached Coimbra the 4th of May; on the 6th, a part of the army was already in motion to execute a fresh project, adapted to the change of affairs; and as this eagerness to fall on Soult may appear to justify those who censured Sir J. Cradock's caution, it may here be well to show how far the circumstances were changed.

When Cradock refused to advance, the Portuguese troops were insubordinate and disorganized; they were now obedient and improved in discipline. Sir John Cradock had scarcely any cavalry; four regiments had since been added.

In the middle of April, Cuesta was only gathering the wrecks of his forces after Medellin; he was now at the head of 35,000 men.

The intentions of the British government had been doubtful; they were no longer so. Sir John Cradock's influence had been restricted; but the new general came out with enlarged powers, the full confidence of the ministers, and with Portuguese rank. His reputation, his popularity, and the disposition of mankind always prone to magnify the future, whether for good or bad, combined to give an unusual impulse to public feeling, and enabled him to dictate at once to the regency, the diplomatists, the generals, and the people, to disregard all petty jealousies and intrigues, and to calculate upon resources from which his predecessor was debarred. Sir Arthur Wellesley, habituated to the command of armies, was moreover endowed by nature with a lofty genius, and a mind capacious of warlike affairs.

CHAPTER II.

CAMPAIGN ON THE DOURO.

AFTER the victory at Amarante, Laborde was recalled to Oporto, but a brigade of cavalry and a regiment of infantry were left to keep up the communication with Loison; and as the insurgent General Bonthiello had re-appeared on the Lima, General Lorge's dragoons were directed on that side. Mermet's division was then pushed towards the Vouga, and thus the French army was extended

by detachments from that river to the Tamega; and the wings separated by the Douro and occupying two sides of a triangle, were without communication, except by the boat-bridge of Oporto. It required three days, therefore, to unite the army on its centre, and five days to concentrate it on either extremity.

The situation of the allies was very different;—Sir Arthur Wellesley having, unknown to Soult, assembled the bulk of the troops at Coimbra, commanded the choice of two lines of operation; the one through Viseu and Lamego, by which, in four or five marches, he could turn the French left, and cut them off from *Tras os Montes*; the other by the roads leading upon Oporto, by which, in two marches, he could throw himself unexpectedly, and in very superior numbers, upon the enemy's right, with a fair prospect of crushing it between the Vouga and the Douro.

In taking the first of these two lines, which were separated by the lofty ridges of the *Sierra de Caramula*, the march could be covered by Wilson's corps, at Viseu, and by Sylveira's, near Lamego. Along the second the movement could be screened by Trant's corps on the Vouga.

The Duke of Dalmatia's dispositions were made in ignorance of Sir Arthur Wellesley's position, numbers, and intentions. He was not even aware of the vicinity of such an antagonist, but sensible that to advance directly upon Lisbon was beyond his own strength, he already meditated to cross the Tamega, and then covered by that river and the Douro, to follow the great route of Bragança, and so enter the Salamanca country. It was in this view that Loison had been directed to get possession of Mezamfrio and Pezo de Ragoa, and the march of Mermet was only intended to support Franceschi's retreat, when the army should commence its movement towards the Tamega.

The 9th of May, D'Argenton was arrested; the film fell from Soult's eyes, and all the perils of his position broke at once upon his view. Treason in his camp, which he could not prove, a powerful enemy close in his front, the insurgents again active in his rear, and the French troops scattered from the Vouga to the Tamega, and from the Douro to the Lima, and commanded by officers, whose fidelity was necessarily suspected, while the extent of the conspiracy was unknown.

Appalling as this prospect was, the Duke of Dalmatia did not quail at the view. The general officers assured him of the fidelity of the troops; and Loison was immediately ordered to keep Mezamfrio and Ragoa, if he could, but, under any circumstances, to hold Amarante fast. The greatest part of the guns and stores at Oporto were at the same time directed upon the Tamega, and the ammunition that could not be removed was destroyed. General Lorge was commanded to withdraw the garrison from Viana, and to proceed likewise to Amarante, and while D'Argenton was closely, although vainly, pressed to discover the names of the conspirators, Soult prepared to execute his intended movement through the *Tras os Montes*. But the war was coming on with a full and swift tide; Loison, upon whose vigour the success of the operation depended, was already giving way; Sir Arthur Wellesley was across the Vouga, and Franceschi and Mermet were struggling in his grasp.

The English general resolved to operate along both the routes before spoken of, but the greater facility of supplying the troops by the coast-line, and, above all, the exposed position of the French right wing, so near the allies and so distant from succour, induced him to make the principal attack by the high road leading to Oporto.

The army was formed in one division of cavalry and three of infantry, exclusive of Beresford's separate corps.

The first division, consisting of two brigades of infantry and 12 guns, was commanded by Lieutenant-General Paget.

The second, consisting of three brigades of infantry and six guns, by Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke.

The third, consisting of two brigades of infantry and six guns, by Major-General Hill.

The cavalry by Lieutenant-General Payne.

The whole amounted to about 14,500 infantry, 1500 cavalry, and 24 guns, of which six were only three-pounders.

The 6th of May, Beresford, with 6000 Portuguese, two British battalions, five companies of riflemen, and a squadron of heavy cavalry, marched upon Lamego by the road of Viseu.

The 7th, the light cavalry and Paget's division advanced towards the Vouga by the Oporto road, but halted, on the 8th, to give Beresford time to reach the Upper Douro, before the attack on the French right should commence.

The 9th, they resumed their march for the bridge of Vouga, and, at the same time, Hill's division, taking the Aveiro road, the whole reached the line of the Vouga river that evening; but Paget's division was not brought up until after dark, and then with caution, to prevent the enemy's guards from seeing the columns, the intent being to surprise Franceschi the next morning.

That general, with all his cavalry, a regiment of Mermet's division, and six guns, occupied a village about eight miles beyond Vouga bridge called Albergaria Nova; the remainder of Mermet's infantry were at Grijon, one march in the rear, and on the main road to Oporto. Franceschi had that day informed Soult that the allied forces were collecting on the Mondego, and that Trant's posts had closed upon the Vouga; but he was far from suspecting that the whole army was upon the last river, although from the imprudent conversation of an English officer, bearing a flag of truce, he had reason to expect an attack of some kind.

Sir Arthur Wellesley's plan was partly arranged upon the suggestion of the field-officer who had met D'Argenton. He had observed, during his intercourse with the conspirators, that the lake of Ovar was unguarded by the French, although it extended 20 miles behind their outposts, and that all the boats were at Aveiro, which was in possession of the allies. On his information it was decided to turn the enemy's right by the lake.

Accordingly, General Hill embarked, the evening of the 9th, with one brigade, the other being to follow him as quickly as possible. The fishermen looked on at first with surprise; but, soon comprehending the object, they voluntarily rushed in crowds to the boats, and worked with such a will that the whole flotilla arrived at Ovar precisely at sunrise on the 10th, and the troops immediately disembarked. That day, also, Marshal Beresford, having rallied Wilson's corps upon his own, reached Pezo de Ragoa, and he it was that had repulsed Loison, and pursued him to Amarante.

Both flanks of the French army were now turned, and at the same moment Sir Arthur, with the main body, fell upon Franceschi, for, while the flotilla was navigating the lake of Ovar, the attempt to surprise that general at Albergaria Nova, was in progress. Sherbrooke's division was still in the rear; but General Cotton with the light cavalry, crossing the Vouga a little after midnight, endeavoured to turn the enemy's left, and to get into his rear; the head of Paget's division, marching a little later, was to pass through the defiles of Vouga, directly upon Albergaria, and Trant's corps was to make way between Paget's division and the lake of Aveiro.

This enterprise, so well conceived, was baffled by petty events, such as always abound in war. Sir Arthur Wellesley did not perfectly know the ground beyond the Vouga; and, late in the evening of the 9th, Colonel Trant, having ascertained that an impracticable ravine, extending from the lake to Olivera de Azemiz, would prevent him from obeying his orders, passed the bridge of Vouga, and carried his own guns beyond the defiles, in order to leave the bridge clear for the British artillery and for General Richard Stewart's brigade.

Stewart was charged to conduct the guns through the defile; but the task was difficult, several carriages broke down, and Trant's corps thus took the

lead of Paget's column, the march of which was impeded by the broken gun-carriages. Meanwhile the cavalry, under Cotton, were misled by the guides, and came, in broad daylight, upon Franceschi, who, with his flank resting upon a wood, garnished with infantry, boldly offered a battle that Cotton durst not, under such circumstances, accept. Thus, an hour's delay, produced by a few trifling accidents, marred a combination that would have shorn Soult of a third of his infantry and all his light cavalry, for it is not to be supposed that, when Franceschi's horsemen were cut off, and General Hill at Ovar, Mermet's division could have escaped across the Douro.

When Sir Arthur Wellesley came up to Albergaria with Paget's infantry, Franceschi was still in position, skirmishing with Trant's corps, and evidently ignorant of what a force was advancing against him. Being immediately attacked, and his foot dislodged from the wood, he retreated along the road to Oliveira de Azemis, and was briskly pursued by the allied infantry; but extricating himself valiantly from his perilous situation, he reached Oliveira without any serious loss; and continuing his march during the night by Feria, joined Mermet the next morning at Grijon.

Franceschi, in the course of the 10th, could see the whole of the English army, including the troops with Hill; and it may create surprise that he should pass so near the latter general without being attacked; but Hill was strictly obedient to his orders, which forbade him to act on the enemy's rear; and those orders were wise and prudent, because the principle of operating with small bodies on the flanks and rear of an enemy is vicious; and while the number of men on the left of the Douro was unknown, it would have been rash to interpose a single brigade between the advance-guard and the main body of the French. General Hill was sent to Ovar, that the line of march might be eased, and the enemy's attention distracted, and that a division of fresh soldiers might be at hand to follow the pursuit, so as to arrive on the bridge of Oporto pell mell with the flying enemy. The soldier-like retreat of Franceschi prevented the last object from being attained.

General Paget's division and the cavalry halted the night of the 10th at Oliveira; Sherbrooke's division passed the Vouga later in the day, and remained in Albergaria. But the next morning the pursuit was renewed, and the men, marching strongly, came up with the enemy at Grijon, about eight o'clock in the morning.

COMBAT OF GRIJON.

The French were drawn up on a range of steep hills across the road. A wood, occupied with infantry, covered their right flank; their front was protected by villages and broken ground, but their left was ill placed. The British troops came on briskly in one column, and the head was instantly and sharply engaged. The 16th Portuguese regiment, then quitting the line of march, gallantly drove the enemy out of the wood covering his right, and at the same time the Germans, who were in the rear, bringing their left shoulders forward, without any halt or check, turned the other flank of the French. The latter immediately abandoned the position, and being pressed in the rear by two squadrons of cavalry, lost a few killed, and about 100 prisoners. The heights of Carvalho gave them an opportunity to turn and check the pursuing squadrons; yet, when the British infantry, with an impetuous pace drew near, they again fell back; and thus fighting and retreating, a blow and a race, wore the day away.

During this combat, Hill was to have marched by the coast-road towards Oporto, to intercept the enemy's retreat; but by some error in the transmission of orders, that general, taking the route of Feria, crossed Trant's line of march, and the time lost could not be regained.

The British halted at dark, but the French, continuing their retreat, passed the Douro in the night, and at two o'clock in the morning the bridge was destroyed. All the artillery and baggage still in Oporto were immediately

directed along the road to Amarante, and Mermet's division without halting at Oporto followed the same route as far as Vallonga and Baltar, having instructions to secure all the boats, and vigilantly to patrol the right bank of the Douro. Loison, also, whose retreat from Pezo de Ragoa was still unknown, once more received warning to hold on by the Tamega without fail, as he valued the safety of the army. Meanwhile the Duke of Dalmatia commanded all the craft in the river to be secured, and having placed guards at the most convenient points, proposed to remain at Oporto during the 12th, to give time for Lorge's dragoons and the different detachments of the army to concentrate at Amarante.

Soult's personal attention was principally directed to the river in its course *below* the city; for the reports of his cavalry led him to believe that Hill's division had been disembarked at Ovar from the ocean, and he expected that the vessels would come round, and the passage be attempted at the mouth of the Douro. Nevertheless, thinking that Loison still held Mesamfrio and Pezo with 6000 men, and knowing that three brigades occupied intermediate posts between Amarante and Oporto, he was satisfied that his retreat was secured, and thought there was no rashness in maintaining his position for another day.

The conspirators, however, were also busy; his orders were neglected, or only half obeyed, and false reports of their execution transmitted to him; and, in this state of affairs the head of the British columns arrived at Villa Nova, and before eight o'clock in the morning of the 12th, they were concentrated in one mass, but covered from the view of the enemy by the height on which the convent of Sarea stands.

The Douro rolled between the hostile forces. Soult had suffered nothing by the previous operations, and in two days he could take post behind the Tamega, from whence his retreat upon Bragança would be certain, and he might, in passing, defeat Beresford, for that general's force was feeble as to numbers, and in infancy as to organization; and the utmost that Sir Arthur expected from it was that, vexing the French line of march, and infesting the road of Villa Real, it would oblige Soult to take the less accessible route of Chaves, and so retire to Galicia instead of Leon; but this could not be, unless the main body of the allied troops followed the French closely. Now, Soult, at Salamanca, would be more formidable than Soult at Oporto, and hence the ultimate object of the campaign, and the immediate safety of Beresford's corps, alike demanded that the Douro should be quickly passed. But how force the passage of a river, deep, swift, and more than 300 yards wide, while 10,000 veterans guarded the opposite bank? Alexander the Great might have turned from it without shame!

The height of Sarea, round which the Douro came with a sharp elbow, prevented any view of the upper river from the town; but the Duke of Dalmatia, confident that all above the city was secure, took his station in a house westward of Oporto, whence he could discern the whole course of the lower river to its mouth. Meanwhile, from the summit of Sarea, the English general, with an eagle's glance, searched all the opposite bank and the city and country beyond it. He observed horses and baggage moving on the road to Vallonga, and the dust of columns as if in retreat, and no large body of troops was to be seen under arms near the river. The French guards were few, and distant from each other, and the patrols were neither many nor vigilant; but a large unfinished building standing alone, yet with a short and easy access to it from the river, soon fixed Sir Arthur's attention.

This building, called the Seminary, was surrounded by a high stone wall, which coming down to the water on either side, enclosed an area sufficient to contain at least two battalions in order of battle; the only egress being by an iron gate opening on the Vallonga road. The structure itself commanded everything in its neighbourhood, except a mound, within cannon-shot, but too pointed to hold a gun. There were no French posts near, and the direct line of passage

from the height of Sarea, across the river to the building, being to the right hand, was of course hidden from the troops in the town. Here, then, with a marvellous hardihood, Sir Arthur resolved, if he could find but one boat, to make his way, in the face of a veteran army and a renowned general.

PASSAGE OF THE DOURO.

A boat was soon obtained ; for a poor barber of Oporto, evading the French patrols, had, during the night, come over the water in a small skiff ; this being discovered by Colonel Waters, a staff officer of a quick and daring temper, he and the barber, and the prior of Amarante, who gallantly offered his aid, crossed the river, and in half an hour returned, unperceived, with three or four large barges. Meanwhile, 18 or 20 pieces of artillery were got up to the convent of Sarea ; and Major-General John Murray, with the German brigade, some squadrons of the 14th dragoons, and two guns, reached the Barca de Avintas, three miles higher up the river, his orders being to search for boats, and to effect a passage there also, if possible.

Some of the British troops were now sent towards Avintas to support Murray ; while others came cautiously forwards to the brink of the river. It was ten o'clock ; the enemy were tranquil and unsuspecting ; and an officer reported to Sir Arthur Wellesley that one boat was brought up to the point of passage. "Well, let the men cross," was the reply ; and upon this simple order, an officer and 25 soldiers of the Buffs entered the vessel, and in a quarter of an hour were in the midst of the French army.

The Seminary was thus gained without any alarm being given, and everything was still quiet in Oporto : not a movement was to be seen ; not a hostile sound was to be heard : a second boat followed the first, and then a third passed a little higher up the river ; but scarcely had the men from the last landed, when a tumultuous noise of drums and shouts arose in the city ; confused masses of the enemy were seen hurrying forth in all directions, and throwing out clouds of skirmishers, who came furiously down upon the Seminary. The citizens were descried gesticulating vehemently, and making signals from their houses ; and the British troops instantly crowded to the bank of the river, Paget's and Hill's divisions at the point of embarkation, and Sherbrooke's where the old boat-bridge had been cut away from Villa Nova.

Paget himself passed in the third boat, and, mounting the roof of the Seminary, was immediately struck down, severely wounded. Hill took Paget's place ; the musketry was sharp, voluble, and increasing every moment as the number accumulated on both sides. The enemy's attack was fierce and constant ; his fire augmented faster than that of the British, and his artillery, also, began to play on the building. But the English guns, from the convent of Sarea, commanded the whole inclosure round the Seminary, and swept the left of the wall in such a manner as to confine the French assault to the side of the iron gate. Murray, however, did not appear ; and the struggle was so violent, and the moment so critical, that Sir Arthur would himself have crossed, but for the earnest representations of those about him, and the just confidence he had in General Hill.

Some of the citizens now pushed over to Villa Nova with several great boats ; Sherbrooke's people begun to cross in large bodies ; and, at the same moment, a loud shout in the town, and the waving of handkerchiefs from all the windows, gave notice that the enemy had abandoned the lower part of the city : and now, also, Murray's troops were seen descending the right bank from Avintas. By this time three battalions were in the Seminary ; and Hill, advancing to the enclosure wall, opened a destructive fire upon the French columns as they passed, in haste and confusion, by the Vallonga road. Five pieces of French artillery were coming out of the town on the left ; but, appalled by the line of musketry to be passed, the drivers suddenly pulled up, and while thus hesitating, a volley from behind stretched most of the artillerymen on the ground ; the rest, dispersing among the enclosures, left their guns on the road. This volley

was given by a part of Sherbrooke's people, who, having forced their way through the streets, thus came upon the rear. In fine, the passage was won, and the allies were in considerable force on the French side of the river.

To the left, General Sherbrooke, with the brigade of guards, and the 29th regiment, was in the town, and pressing the rear of the enemy, who were quitting it. In the centre, General Hill, holding the Seminary and the wall of the enclosure, with the Buffs, the 48th, the 66th, the 16th Portuguese, and a battalion of detachments, sent a damaging fire into the masses as they passed him; and his line was prolonged on the right, although with a considerable interval, by General Murray's Germans, and two squadrons of the 14th dragoons. The remainder of the army kept passing the river at different points; and the artillery, from the height of Sarea, still searched the enemy's columns as they hurried along the line of retreat.

If General Murray had then fallen boldly in upon the disordered crowds, their discomfiture would have been complete; but he suffered column after column to pass him without even a cannon shot, and seemed fearful lest they should turn and push him into the river. General Charles Stuart and Major Hervey, however, impatient of this inactivity, charged with the two squadrons of dragoons, and rode over the enemy's rearguard, as it was pushing through a narrow road to gain an open space beyond. Laborde was unhorsed, Foy badly wounded; and, on the English side, Major Hervey lost an arm; and his gallant horsemen, receiving no support from Murray, were obliged to fight their way back with loss.

This finished the action; the French continued their retreat, and the British remained on the ground they had gained. The latter lost 20 killed, a general and 95 men wounded; the former had about 500 men killed and wounded, and five pieces of artillery were taken in the fight; a considerable quantity of ammunition, and 50 guns (of which the carriages had been burnt) were afterwards found in the arsenal, and several hundred men were captured in the hospitals.

Napoleon's veterans were so experienced, so inured to warfare that no troops in the world could more readily recover from such a surprise, and before they reached Vallonga their columns were again in order, with a regular rearguard covering the retreat. A small garrison at the mouth of the Douro was cut off, but, guided by some friendly Portuguese, it rejoined the army in the night; and Soult, believing that Loison was at Amarante, thought he had happily escaped a great danger and was still formidable to his enemies.

Sir Arthur Wellesley employed the remainder of the 12th, and the next day, in bringing over the rear of the army, together with the baggage, the stores, and the artillery. General Murray's Germans, however, pursued, on the morning of the 13th, but not further than about two leagues on the road of Amarante. This delay has been blamed as an error in Sir Arthur; it is argued that an enemy once surprised should never be allowed to recover, and that Soult should have been followed up, even while a single regiment was left to pursue. But the reasons for halting were, first, that a part of the army was still on the left bank of the Douro;—secondly, that the troops had out-marched provisions, baggage, and ammunition, and having passed over above 80 miles of difficult country, in four days, during three of which they were constantly fighting, both men and animals required rest; thirdly, that nothing was known of Beresford, whose contemporary operations it is time to relate.

The moment of his arrival on the Douro was marked by the repulse of Loison's division, which immediately fell back, as I have already related, to Mezamfrio, followed by the Portuguese patrols only, for Beresford halted on the left bank of the river, because the British regiments were still in the rear. This was on the 10th. Sylveira, who was at Villa Real, had orders to feel towards Mezamfrio for the enemy, and the marshal's force was thus, with the assistance of the insurgents, in readiness to turn Soult from the route of Villa Real to Bragança.

Sketch of the
OF THE PASSAGE OF THE RIVER DOUR.

by

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY.


May 12th 1811.

AND OF THE STORMING OF OPORTO.

by

MARSHAL SOULT.

March 1809.



The 11th, Loison continued his retreat, and Beresford finding him so timid, followed, skirmishing with his rear-guard, and at the same time Sylveira advanced from Villa Real. On the 12th, the French outposts in front of Amarante were driven in, and the 13th Loison abandoned that town, and took the route of Guimaraens.

These events were unknown to Sir Arthur Wellesley on the evening of the 13th, but he heard that Soult, after destroying his artillery and ammunition, near Penafiel, had passed over the mountain towards Braga; and judging this to arise from Beresford's operations on the Tamega, he reinforced Murray with some cavalry, ordering him to proceed by Penafiel, and if Loison still lingered near Amarante, to open a communication with Beresford. The latter was at the same time directed to ascend the Tamega, and intercept the enemy at Chaves.

Meanwhile, the main body of the army marched in two columns upon the Minho, the one by the route of Barca de Troffa and Braga, the other by the Ponte d'Ave and Bacellos. But, on the evening of the 14th, the movements of the enemy about Braga gave certain proofs that not Valença and Tuy, but Chaves or Montalegre, would be the point of his retreat. Hereupon, the left column was drawn off from the Bacellos road and directed upon Braga, and Beresford was instructed to move by Monterey, upon Villa del Rey, if Soult took the line of Montalegre.

The 15th, Sir Arthur reached Braga. Murray was at Guimaraens on his right, and Beresford, who had anticipated his orders, was near Chaves, having sent Sylveira towards Salamonde, with instructions to occupy the passes of Ruivaens and Melgassy. But at this time Soult was 15 miles in advance of Braga, having, by a surprising effort, extricated himself from one of the most dangerous situations that a general ever escaped from. To understand this, it is necessary to describe the country through which his retreat was effected.

I have already observed that the Sierra de Cabirera and the Sierra de Catalina line the right bank of the Tamega; but, in approaching the Douro, the latter slants off towards Oporto, thus opening a rough but practicable slip of land, through which the road leads from Oporto to Amarante. Hence, the French in retreating to the latter town had the Douro on their right hand and the Sierra de Catalina on their left.

Between Amarante and Braga, which is on the other side of the Catalina, a route practicable for artillery runs through Guimaraens, but it is necessary to reach Amarante to fall into this road. Thus, Soult, as he advanced along the narrow pass between the mountains and the Douro, rested his hopes of safety entirely upon Loison's holding Amarante. Several days, however, had elapsed since that general had communicated, and an aide-de-camp was sent on the morning of the 12th to ascertain his exact position. Colonel Tholosé, the officer employed, found Loison at Amarante, but neither his remonstrances, nor the after-coming intelligence that Oporto was evacuated, and the army in full retreat upon the Tamega, could induce that general to remain there, and, as we have seen, he marched towards Guimaraens on the 13th, abandoning the bridge of Amarante without a blow, and leaving his commander and two-thirds of the army to what must have appeared inevitable destruction.

The news of this unexpected calamity reached Soult at one o'clock on the morning of the 13th, just as he had passed the rugged banks of the Souza river; the weather was boisterous, the men were fatigued, voices were heard calling for a capitulation, and the whole army was stricken with dismay. Then it was that the Duke of Dalmatia justified by his energy that fortune which had raised him to his high rank in the world. Being by a Spanish pedlar informed of a path that, mounting the right bank of the Souza, led over the Sierra de Catalina to Guimaraens, he, on the instant, silenced the murmurs of the treacherous or fearful in the ranks, destroyed the artillery, abandoned the military chest and baggage, and loading the animals with sick men and musket ammunition, repassed the Souza, and followed his Spanish guide with a hardy resolution.

The rain was falling in torrents, and the path was such as might be expected in those wild regions, but the troops made good their passage over the mountains to Pombeira, and, at Guimaraens, happily fell in with Loison. During the night they were joined by Lorge's dragoons from Braga, and thus, almost beyond hope, the whole army was concentrated.

If Soult's energy in command was conspicuous on this occasion, his sagacity and judgment were not less remarkably displayed in what followed. Most generals would have moved by the direct route upon Guimaraens to Braga; but he, with a long reach of mind, calculated from the slackness of pursuit after he passed Vallonga, that the bulk of the English army must be on the road to Braga, and would be there before him; or that, at best, he should be obliged to retreat fighting, and must sacrifice the guns and baggage of Loison's and Lorge's corps in the face of an enemy—a circumstance that might operate fatally on the spirit of his soldiers, and would certainly give opportunities to the malcontents; and already one of the generals (apparently Loison) was recommending a convention like Cintra.

But, with a firmness worthy of the highest admiration, Soult destroyed all the guns and the greatest part of the baggage and ammunition of Loison's and Lorge's divisions; then, leaving the high road to Braga on his left, and once more taking to the mountain paths, he made for the heights of Carvalho d'Este, where he arrived late in the evening of the 14th, thus gaining a day's march, in point of time. The morning of the 15th he drew up his troops in the position he had occupied just two months before at the battle of Braga; and this spectacle, where 20,000 men were collected upon the theatre of a former victory, and disposed so as to produce the greatest effect, roused all the sinking pride of the French soldiers. It was a happy stroke of generalship, an inspiration of real genius!

Soult now re-organized his army; taking the command of the rear-guard himself, and giving that of the advanced guard to General Loison. Noble, the French historian of this campaign, says "the whole army was astonished;" as if it was not a stroke of consummate policy that the rear, which was pursued by the British, should be under the general-in-chief, and that the front, which was to fight its way through the native forces, should have a commander whose very name called up all the revengeful passions of the Portuguese. *Maneta durst not surrender*; and the Duke of Dalmatia dexterously forced those to act with most zeal who were least inclined to serve him: and, in sooth, such was his perilous situation, that all the resources of his mind and all the energy of his character were needed to save the army.

From Carvalho he retired to Salamonde, from whence there were two lines of retreat. The one through Ruivaens and Venda Nova, by which the army had marched when coming from Chaves two months before; the other, shorter, although more impracticable, leading by the Ponte Nova and Ponte Miserella into the road running from Ruivaens to Montalegre. But the scouts brought intelligence that the bridge of Ruivaens, on the little river of that name, was broken, and defended by 1200 Portuguese, with artillery; and that another party had been, since the morning, destroying the Ponte Nova on the Cavado river.

The destruction of the first bridge blocked the road to Chaves; the second, if completed, and the passage well defended, would have cut the French off from Montalegre. The night was setting in, the soldiers were harassed, barefooted, and starving; the ammunition was damp with the rain, which had never ceased since the 13th, and which was now increasing in violence, accompanied with storms of wind. The British army would certainly fall upon the rear in the morning; and if the Ponte Nova, where the guard was reported to be weak, could not be secured, the hour of surrender was surely arrived.

In this extremity, Soult sent for Major Dulong, an officer justly reputed for one of the most daring in the French ranks. Addressing himself to this brave

man, he said, "I have chosen you from the whole army to seize the Ponte Nova, which has been cut by the enemy. Do you choose 100 grenadiers and 25 horsemen; endeavour to surprise the guards, and secure the passage of the bridge. If you succeed, say so, but send no other report; your silence will suffice." Thus exhorted, Dulong selected his men, and departed.

Favoured by the storm, he reached the bridge unperceived of the Portuguese, killed the sentinel before any alarm was given, and then, followed by 12 grenadiers, began crawling along a narrow slip of masonry, which was the only part of the bridge undestroyed. The Cavado river was in full flood, and roaring in a deep channel; one of the grenadiers fell into the gulf, but the noise of the storm and the river was louder than his cry; Dulong, with the 11 still creeping onwards, reached the other side, and falling briskly on the first posts of the peasants, killed or dispersed the whole. At that moment, the remainder of his men advanced close to the bridge; and some crossing, others mounting the heights, shouting and firing, scared the Portuguese supporting-posts, who imagined the whole army was upon them; and thus the passage was gallantly won.

At four o'clock the bridge being repaired, the advanced guards of the French commenced crossing; but as the column of march was long, and the road narrow and rugged, the troops filed over slowly; and beyond the Ponte Nova there was a second obstacle still more formidable. For the pass in which the troops were moving being cut in the side of a mountain, open on the left for several miles, at last came upon a torrent called the Misarella, which, breaking down a deep ravine, or rather gulf, was only to be crossed by a bridge, constructed with a single lofty arch, called the *Saltador*, or leaper; and so narrow that only three persons could pass abreast. Fortunately for the French, the *Saltador* was not cut, but entrenched and defended by a few hundred Portuguese peasants, who occupied the rocks on the farther side; and here the good soldier Dulong again saved the army: for, when a first and second attempt had been repulsed with loss, he carried the entrenchments by a third effort; but at the same instant fell deeply wounded himself. The head of the column now poured over, and it was full time, for the English guns were thundering in the rear, and the Ponte Nova was choked with dead.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, quitting Braga on the morning of the 16th, had come, about four o'clock, upon Soult's rear-guard, which remained at Salamonde to cover the passage of the army over the bridges. The right was strongly protected by a ravine, the left occupied a steep hill; and a stout battle might have been made, but men thus circumstanced, and momentarily expecting an order to retreat, will seldom stand firmly; and, on this occasion, when some light troops turned the left, and General Sherbrooke, with the guards, mounting the steep hill, attacked the front, the French made but one discharge, and fled in confusion to the Ponte Nova. As this bridge was not on the direct line of retreat, they were for some time unperceived, and gaining ground of their pursuers, formed a rear-guard; but, after a time, being discovered, some guns were brought to bear on them; and then man and horse, crushed together, went over into the gulf; and the bridge, and the rocks, and the defile beyond were strewn with mangled bodies.

This was the last calamity inflicted by the sword upon the French army in this retreat; a retreat attended by many horrid as well as glorious events; for the peasants in their fury, with an atrocious cruelty, tortured and mutilated every sick man and straggler that fell into their power; and on the other hand, the soldiers, who held together in their turn, shot the peasants; while the track of the columns might be discovered from afar by the smoke of the burning houses.

The French reached Montalegre on the 17th; and an English staff-officer, with some cavalry, being upon their rear, as far as Villella, picked up some stragglers; but Sir Arthur, with the main body of the army, halted that day at

Ruivaens. The 18th he renewed the pursuit, and a part of his cavalry passed Montalegre, followed by the guards; the enemy was, however, drawn up behind the Salas in force, and no action took place. Sylveira, indeed, had entered Montalegre, from the side of Chaves, before the British came up from Ruivaens; but instead of pursuing, he put his men into quarters; and a Portuguese officer of his division, who was despatched to Marshal Beresford with orders to move from Villa Perdrices upon Villa del Rey, loitered on the road so long that all chance of intercepting the French line of march was at an end; for though Beresford, on the 19th, pushed Colonel Talbot with the 14th dragoons as far as Ginjo, Franceschi turned in force, and obliged that officer to retire; and thus the pursuit terminated, with the capture of a few stragglers on the Salas.

Soult himself crossed the frontier by Allaritz on the 18th; and on the 19th entered Orense, but without guns, stores, ammunition, or baggage; his men exhausted with fatigue and misery, the greatest part being without shoes, many without accoutrements, and in some instances even without muskets. He had quitted Orense 76 days before, with about 22,000 men, and 3500 had afterwards joined him from Tuy. He returned with 19,500, having lost by the sword and sickness, by assassination and capture, 6000 good soldiers; of which number above 3000 were taken in hospitals,* and about 1000 were killed by the Portuguese, or had died of sickness previous to the retreat. The remainder were captured, or had perished within the last eight days. He had carried 58 peices of artillery into Portugal, and he returned without a gun; yet was his reputation as a stout and able soldier nowise diminished.


OBSERVATIONS.

The Duke of Dalmatia's arrangements being continually thwarted by the conspirators, his military conduct cannot be fairly judged of. Nevertheless, the errors of the campaign may, without injustice, be pointed out, leaving to others the task of tracing them to their true sources.

1. The disposition of the army on both sides of the Douro, and upon such extended lines, when no certain advice of the movements and strength of the English force had been received, was rash. It was doubtless, right, that to clear the front of the army and to gather information, Franceschi should advance to the Vouga; but he remained too long in the same position, and he should have felt Trant's force more positively. Had the latter officer (whose boldness in maintaining the line of the Vouga was extremely creditable) been beaten, as he easily might have been, the anarchy in the country would have increased; and as Beresford's troops at Thomar wanted but an excuse to disband themselves, the Portuguese and British preparations must have been greatly retarded.

2. That Soult, when he had secured, as he thought, all the boats on an unfordable river 300 yards wide, should think himself safe from an attack for one day, is not wonderful. The improbability that such a barrier could be forced in half an hour might have rendered Fabius careless; but there were some peculiar circumstances attending the surprise of the French army which indicate great negligence. The commanding officer of one regiment reported, as early as six o'clock, that the English were crossing the river; the report was certainly premature, because no man passed before ten o'clock; but it reached Soult, and he sent General Quesnel, the governor of Oporto, to verify the fact. Quesnel stated, on his return, and truly, that it was an error, and Soult took no further precaution. The patrols were not increased; no staff-officers appear to have been employed to watch the river, and no signals were established; yet it was but three days since D'Argenton's conspiracy had been discovered, and the extent of it was still unknown. This circumstance alone should have induced the Duke of Dalmatia to augment the number of his guards and posts

* Viz:—1800 left in Viana and Braga; 500 including the wounded taken in Oporto; 1300 taken at Chaves, by Sylveira.



Sketch (Explanatory)
of the
OPERATIONS
between the
MINHO & DOURO.
1809.

of observation, that the multiplicity of the reports might render it impossible for the malcontents to deceive him. The surprise at Oporto must, therefore, be considered as a fault in the general, which could only be atoned for by the high resolution and commanding energy with which he saved his army in the subsequent retreat.

3. When General Loison suffered Marshal Beresford to drive him from Pezo de Ragoa and Mezamfrio, he committed a grave military error; but when he abandoned Amarante, he relinquished all claim to military reputation, as a simple statement of facts will prove. The evening of the 12th he wrote to Soult that one regiment had easily repulsed the whole of the enemy's forces; yet he, although at the head of 6000 men, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, that night and without another shot being fired abandoned the only passage by which, as far as he knew, the rest of the army could escape from its perilous situation with honour. It was not General Loison's fault if England did not triumph a second time for the capture of a French marshal.

MOVEMENTS OF THE BRITISH GENERAL.

1. If Sir Arthur Wellesley's operation be looked at as a whole, it is impossible to deny his sagacity in planning, his decision and celerity in execution. When he landed at Lisbon, the nation was dismayed by previous defeats, distracted with anarchy, and menaced on two sides by powerful armies, one of which was already in possession of the second city in the kingdom. In 28 days he had restored public confidence; provided a defence against one adversary; and having marched 200 miles through a rugged country, and forced the passage of a great river—caused his other opponent to flee over the frontier, without artillery or baggage.

2. Such being the result, it is necessary to show that the success was due, not to the caprice of fortune, but to the talents of the general; that he was quick to see, and active to strike; and, first, the secrecy and despatch with which the army was collected on the Vouga belongs entirely to the man; for there were many obstacles to overcome; and D'Argenton, as the sequel proved, would, by his disclosures, have ruined Sir Arthur's combinations, if the latter had not providently given him a false view of affairs. The subsequent march from the Vouga to the Douro was, in itself, no mean effort, for it must be recollected that this rapid advance against an eminent commander, and a veteran army of above 20,000 men, was made with a heterogeneous force, of which only 16,000 men were approved soldiers, the remainder being totally unformed by discipline, untried in battle, and, only three weeks before, were in a state of open mutiny.

3. The passage of the Douro, at Oporto, would, at first sight, seem a rash undertaking; but, when examined closely, it proves to be an example of consummate generalship, both in the conception and the execution. The careless watch maintained by the French may, indeed, be called fortunate, because it permitted the English general to get a few men over unperceived; but it was not 25, nor 2500, soldiers that could have maintained themselves, if heedlessly cast on the other side. Sir Arthur, when he so coolly said—"Let them pass," was prepared to protect them when they had passed. He did not give that order until he knew that Murray had found boats at Avintas to ferry over a considerable number of troops, and, consequently, that that general, descending the Douro, could cover the right flank of the Seminary, while the guns planted on the heights of Sarea could sweep the left flank, and search all the ground enclosed by the wall round the building. If General Murray's troops only had passed, they would have been compromised; if the whole army had made the attempt at Avintas, its march would have been discovered; but in the double passage all was secured: the men in the Seminary by the guns, by the strength of the building, and by Murray's troops; the latter by the surprise on the town, which drew the enemy's attention away from them. Hence, it was only necessary to throw a few brave men into the Seminary unperceived, and

then the success was almost certain ; because, while that building was maintained, the troops in the act of passing could neither be prevented nor harmed by the enemy. To attain great objects by simple means is the highest effort of genius !

4. If General Murray had attacked vigorously, the ruin of the French army would have ensued. It was an opportunity that would have tempted a blind man to strike ; the neglect of it argued want of military talent and of military hardihood ; and how would it have appeared if Loison had not abandoned Amarante ? If Soult, effecting his retreat in safety, and reaching Zamora or Salamanca in good order, had turned on Ciudad Rodrigo, he would have found full occupation for Sir Arthur Wellesley in the north ; and he would have opened a free communication with the Duke of Belluno. The latter must then have marched either against Seville or Lisbon ; and thus the boldness and excellent conduct of the English general, producing no adequate results, would have been overlooked, or, perhaps, have formed a subject for the abuse of some ignorant, declamatory writer.

5. Sir Arthur Wellesley's reasons for halting at Oporto, the 13th, have been already noticed, but they require further remarks. Had he followed Soult headlong, there is no doubt that the latter would have been overtaken on the Souza river, and destroyed ; but this chance, arising from Loison's wretched movements, was not to be foreseen. Sir Arthur Wellesley knew nothing of Beresford's situation ; but he naturally supposed that, following his instructions, the latter was about Villa Real ; and that, consequently, the French would, from Amarante, either ascend the Tamega to Chaves, or taking the road to Guimaraens and Braga, make for the Minho. Hence, he remained where he could command the main roads to that river, in order to intercept Soult's retreat and force him to a battle ; whereas, if he had once entered the defile formed by the Douro and the Sierra de Catalina, he could only have followed his enemy in one column by a difficult route, a process promising little advantage. Nevertheless, seeing that he detached General Murray by that route at last, it would appear that he should have ordered him to press the enemy closer than he did ; but there a political difficulty occurred.

The English cabinet, although improvident in its preparations, was very fearful of misfortune, and the general durst not risk the safety of a single brigade, except for a great object, lest a slight disaster should cause the army to be recalled. Thus, he was obliged to curb his naturally enterprising disposition, and to this burthen of ministerial incapacity, which he bore even to the battle of Salamanca, may be traced that over-caution which has been so often censured as a fault, not only by military writers, but by Napoleon, who, judging from appearances, erroneously supposed it to be a characteristic of the man, and often rebuked his generals for not taking advantage thereof.

6. The marches and encounters, from the 14th to the 17th, were excellent on both sides. Like the wheelings and buffeting of two vultures in the air, the generals contended, the one for safety, the other for triumph ; but there was evidently a failure in the operations of Marshal Beresford. Soult did not reach Salamonde until the evening of the 15th, and his rear-guard was still there on the evening of the 16th. Beresford was in person at Chaves on the 16th, and his troops reached that place early on the morning of the 17th. Soult passed Montas legre on the 18th, but from Chaves to that place is only one march.

Again, Marshal Beresford was in possession of Amarante on the 13th, and as there was an excellent map of the province in existence, he must have known the importance of Salamonde, and that there were roads to it through Mondin and Cavez shorter than by Guimaraens and Chaves. It is true that Sylveira was sent to occupy Ruivaens and Melgacy ; but he executed his orders slowly, and Misarella was neglected. Major Warre, an officer of the marshal's staff, endeavoured, indeed, to break down the bridges of Ponte Nova and Ruivaens ; and it was by his exertions that the peasants, surprised at the former, had been

collected ; but he had only a single dragoon with him, and was without powder to execute this important task. The peasantry, glad to be rid of the French, were reluctant to stop their retreat, and still more to destroy the bridge of Misarella, which was the key of all the communications, and all the great markets of the Entre Minho e Douro ; and therefore sure to be built up again, in which case the people knew well that their labour and time would be called for without payment. It is undoubted that Soult owed his safety to the failure in breaking those bridges ; and it does appear that if Major Warre had been supplied with the necessary escort and materials he would have effectually destroyed them.

Sylveira did not move either in the direction or with the celerity required of him by Beresford ; there seems to have been a misunderstanding between them ; but allowance must be made for the numerous mistakes necessarily arising in the transmission of orders by officers speaking different languages ; and for the difficulty of moving troops not accustomed, or perfectly willing, to act together.

CHAPTER III.

THE Duke of Dalmatia halted at Orense the 20th, but on the 21st put his troops in motion upon Lugo, where General Fournier, of the 6th corps, with three battalions of infantry and a regiment of dragoons, was besieged by 12,000 or 15,000 Spaniards, under the command of General Mahi. But to explain this it is necessary to relate Romana's operations, after his defeat at Monterey on the 6th of March.

Having re-assembled the fugitives at Puebla de Senabria, on the borders of Leon, he repaired his losses by fresh levies, and was soon after joined by 3000 men from Castile, and thus, unknown to Ney, he had, as it were, gained the rear of the 6th corps. Villa Franca del Bierzo was, at this time, occupied by two weak French battalions, and their nearest support was at Lugo : Romana resolved to surprise them, and, dividing his forces, sent Mendizabel with one division by the valley of the Syl to take the French in rear, and marched himself by the route of Calcabellos. The French, thus surrounded in Villa Franca, after a short skirmish, in which the Spaniards lost about 100 men, surrendered, and were sent into the Asturias.

Romana then detached a part of his forces to Orense and Ponte Vedra, to assist Morillo and the insurrection in the western parts of Galicia, where, with the aid of the English ships of war, and notwithstanding the shameful neglect of the supreme central junta, the patriots were proceeding vigorously. The movable columns of the 6th corps daily lost a number of men ; some in open battle, but a still greater number by assassinations, which were rigorously visited upon the districts where they took place ; and thus, in Galicia, as in every other part of Spain, the war hourly assumed a more horrid character. Referring to this period, Colonel Barios afterwards told Mr. Frere that, to repress the excesses of Marshal Ney's troops, he, himself, had, in cold blood, caused 700 French prisoners to be drowned in the Minho ; an avowal recorded by Mr. Frere, without animadversion, but which, happily for the cause of humanity, there is good reason to believe was as false as it was disgraceful.

After the capture of Vigo, the Spanish force on the coast increased rapidly. Barios returned to Seville ; Martin Carrera assumed the command of the troops near Orense, and the Conde Noroña of those near Vigo. General Maucune returned to St. Jago from Tuy, and Ney, apprised of the loss at Villa Franca, advanced to Lugo. Romana immediately abandoned Galicia, and, entering the Asturias by the pass of Cienfuegos, marched along the line of the Gallician frontier, until he reached Navia de Suarna. Here he left Mahi, with the army, to observe Ney, but repaired, himself, to Oviedo, to redress the crying wrongs of the Asturians.

It is unnecessary to recapitulate the evil doings of the Asturian junta, which was notoriously corrupt and incapable. Romana, after a short inquiry, dismissed the members in virtue of his supreme authority, and appointed new men; but this act of justice gave great offence to Jovellanos and others. It appeared too close an approximation to Cuesta's manner, in Leon, the year before; and as the central government, always selfish and jealous, abhorred any indication of vigour or probity in a general, Romana was soon afterwards deprived of his command. Meanwhile, he was resolutely reforming abuses, when his proceedings were suddenly arrested by an unexpected event.

As soon as Ney understood that the Spanish army was posted on the Gallician side of the Asturian frontier, and that Romana was likely to excite the energy of the Asturian people, he planned a combined movement, to surround and destroy, not only Romana and his army, but also the Asturian forces, which then amounted to about 15,000 men, including the *partida* of Porlier, commonly called the Marquisetto. This force, commanded by General Ballasteros and General Vorster, occupied Infiesta, on the eastern side of Oviedo, and Castropol on the coast. Ney, with the consent of Joseph, arranged that detachments drawn together from the different corps, should penetrate the Asturias from the south-east by the pass of Pajares; that Bonnet, who always remained at the town of St. Andero, should break in, from the north-east, by the coast road; and that the 6th corps should make an irruption by the Concejo de Ibias, a short but difficult route leading directly from Lugo.

When the period for these combined movements was determined, Ney, appointing General Marchand to command in Gallicia during his own absence, left three battalions under Maucune at St. Jago, three others in garrison at Coruña under General D'Armagnac, one at Ferrol, and three with a regiment of cavalry under Fournier at Lugo; and then marched himself, with 12 battalions of infantry and three regiments of cavalry, against Mahi. The latter immediately abandoned his position at Navia de Suarna, and drawing off by his left, without giving notice to Romana, returned to Gallicia and again entered the valley of Syl. Ney, either thinking that the greatest force was near Oviedo, or that it was more important to capture Romana than to disperse Mahi's troops, continued his route by the valley of the Nareca, and with such diligence that he reached Cornellana and Grado, one march from Oviedo, before Romana knew of his approach. The Spanish general, thus surprised, made a feeble and fruitless endeavour to check the French at the bridge of Peñaflor, after which, sending the single regiment he had with him to Infiesta, he embarked on board an English vessel at Gihon, and so escaped.

The 18th of May, Ney entered Oviedo, where he was joined by Kellerman, and the next day pursued Romana to Gihon. Bonnet, likewise, executed his part, but somewhat later: and thus Vorster, being unmolested by Ney, had time to collect his corps on the coast. Meanwhile Ballasteros, finding that Bonnet had passed between him and Vorster, boldly marched upon St. Andero and retook it, making the garrison and sick men (in all 1100) prisoners. The *Amelia* and *Statira*, British frigates, arrived off the harbour at the same moment, and captured three French corvettes and two luggers, on board of which some staff-officers were endeavouring to escape.

Bonnet, however, followed hard upon Ballasteros, and, the 11th of June, routed him so completely that he, also, was forced to save himself on board an English vessel, and the French recovered all the prisoners, and, amongst them, the men taken at Villa Franca, by Romana. But, before this, Ney, uneasy for his posts in Gallicia, had returned to Coruña by the coast-road through Castropol, and Kellerman, after several trifling skirmishes with Vorster, had also retired to Valladolid. This expedition proved that Asturia was not calculated for defence, although, with the aid of English ships, it might become extremely troublesome to the French.

While Ney was in Asturia, Carrera, advancing from the side of Orense, appeared in front of St. Jago di Compostella at the moment that Colonel D'Esmenard, a staff-officer sent by the marshal to give notice of his return to Coruña, arrived with an escort of dragoons in Maucune's camp. This escort was magnified by the Spaniards into a reinforcement of 800 men; but Carrera, who had been joined by Morillo, commanded 8000, and, on the 23rd, having attacked Maucune at a place called "Campo de Estrella," totally defeated him, with a loss of 600 men and several guns. The Spaniards did not pursue, but the French retreated in confusion to Coruña. Nor was this the only check suffered by the 6th corps; for Mahi, having united a great body of peasants to his army, drove back Fournier's outposts, and closely invested him in Lugo on the 19th.

Such was the state of affairs in Galicia when Soult arrived at Orense; and as the inhabitants of that town, from whom he got intelligence of these events, rather exaggerated the success of their countrymen, the French marshal immediately sent forward an advanced guard of his stoutest men to relieve Lugo, and followed himself, by the route of Monforte, with as much speed as the exhausted state of his troops would permit. The 22nd, he reached Gutin, and the same day, his van being descried on the mountains above Lugo, Mahi broke up his camp, and fell back to Mondenedo.

The 23rd, Soult entered Lugo, where he heard of the emperor's first successes in Austria, and with renewed energy prepared for fresh exertions himself. The 30th, he was joined by Ney, who, uninformed of Mahi's position at Mondenedo, had missed a favourable opportunity of revenging the loss at St. Jago. Meanwhile Romana, disembarking at Ribadeo, joined Mahi at Mondenedo, and immediately marched along the line of the Asturias frontier, until he arrived at the sources of the Neyra, then, crossing the royal road, a little above Lugo, plunged once more into the valley of the Syl; and having gained Orense, the 6th of June, opened a communication with Carrera at St. Jago, and with the insurgents at Vigo. This movement of Romana was able, energetic, and worthy of every praise.

In pursuance of an order from the emperor, Soult now sent 1100 men, composed of dismounted dragoons and skeletons of cavalry regiments, to France; and having partially restored the artillery and equipments of the 2nd corps from the arsenals of Coruña and Ferrol, he, in concert with the Duke of Elchingen, arranged a fresh plan for the destruction of Romana, the execution of which failed, as shall be hereafter noticed; but, at present, it is necessary to resume the narrative of

VICTOR'S OPERATIONS.

After the abortive effort to gain Badajos, the Duke of Belluno, in obedience to the king's orders, proceeded to recover Alcantara. His rear was still within two marches of Merida when the head of his columns, under Lapisse, drove back some cavalry posts, entered the town of Alcantara, and the next day attempted the passage of the bridge.

The Portuguese force consisted of 2000 infantry, 50 cavalry, and six guns; and some works of defence were constructed on the right bank of the river; but, on the 14th of May, Lapisse lining the rocks on the left bank of the river, skirmished so sharply that the militia regiment of Idanha gave way. Colonel Mayne then sprung a mine, but the explosion doing little injury to the bridge, the French made good the passage. The Portuguese, who had suffered considerably, retired to the Puente de Segura, and Lapisse immediately sent patrols towards Castello Branco, Salvatierra, and Idanha Nova.

Intelligence of this attack having reached General Mackenzie, he directed preparations to be made for destroying the boat-bridge at Abrantes, and marched, in person, by Cortiçada to Sobreira Formosa; this movement, and a rumour that Soult had retreated from Oporto, afforded an excuse to Victor for again abandoning Alcantara, and resuming his former camp. During his absence,

Cuesta, true to the promise he had given, attacked the fort of Merida; but, on the return of the French advanced guard, recrossed the Guadiana, and fell back to Zafra, having first ravaged all the flat country, and obliged the inhabitants to withdraw into the mountains.

Some time before this, King Joseph had received a despatch from the French minister of war, giving notice that reinforcements had sailed from England, and warning him to lose no time in marching against Lisbon, to create a useful diversion in favour of Soult. It might be supposed that the original plan of the emperor would then have been acted upon, and this was the first thought of Joseph himself; but other circumstances created doubt and hesitation in his councils, and, finally, induced him to abandon all thoughts of Portugal.

When Napoleon returned to Paris, he imagined hostilities with Austria, although certain, would not break out so suddenly but that he should have time to organize a sufficient army in Germany, without drawing his veteran troops from Spain. Hence, he still left the imperial guards at Vittoria, and sending the Prince of Neufchatel to command the troops on the Danube, he himself remained at Paris, to superintend the preparations for opening the campaign. The Austrians were, however, not inattentive observers of the perfidy which accompanied the invasion of Spain; and aptly taking the hint, attacked the French outposts and published their own declaration of war at the same moment.

Berthier, incapable of acting a principal part, was surprised, and made a succession of false movements that would have been fatal to the French army, if the emperor, journeying day and night, had not arrived at the very hour when his lieutenant was on the point of consummating the ruin of the army. Then, indeed, was seen the supernatural force of Napoleon's genius: in a few hours he changed the aspect of affairs, in a few days, maugre their immense number, his enemies, baffled and flying in all directions, proclaimed his mastery in an art which, up to that moment, was imperfect; for never, since troops first trod a field of battle, was such a display of military skill made by man.

But previous to these successes, so threatening had been the aspect of affairs in Germany, that the imperial guards had been recalled from Vittoria, and hurried to the Danube; the great reserve of infantry was, as we have seen, struck off the rolls of the army in Spain, and the skeletons of the fourth squadron of every cavalry regiment were ordered to return to their depôts in France. Even the 5th corps, under Mortier, then on its way to Valladolid from Zaragoza, was directed to halt, and hold itself in readiness to march for Germany; and thus, while Victor was reluctant to move, while Ney was demanding more troops to preserve Galicia, and while the fate of the 2nd corps was unknown, the whole army was actually diminished by 40,000 men, and 15,000 more were paralyzed with regard to offensive operations.

These things rendered Joseph timid. Madrid, it was argued in his councils, was of more consequence than Lisbon. Soult might be already at the latter place; or, if not, he might extricate himself from his difficulties, for the capital must be covered. In pursuance of this reasoning, Sebastiani was forbidden any forward movement; and the Duke of Belluno, whose army was daily wasting with the Guadiana fever, took a position at Torre-Mocha, a central point between Truxillo, Merida, and Alcantara. His cavalry posts watched all the passages over the Guadiana and the Tagus: and his communications with Madrid, between the Tietar and the Tagus, were protected by 1200 men, detached for that purpose by the king.

But one timid measure in war generally produces another. The neighbourhood of the English force at Castel Branco increased the energy of the Spanish insurgents, who infested the valley of the Tagus, and communicated secretly with those of the Sierra de Guadalupe; hence, Victor, alarmed for his bridge at Almaraz, sent a division there the 22nd of May; and, as from that period until the 10th of June, he remained quiet: his campaign, which had opened so

brilliantly, was annulled. He had neither assisted Soult, nor crushed Cuesta, nor taken Badajos nor Seville; yet he had wasted and lost, by sickness, more men than would have sufficed to reduce both Lisbon and Seville. The Spaniards were daily recovering strength and confidence; and Sir Arthur Wellesley, after defeating Soult, had full leisure to return to the Tagus, and to combine his future operations with the Spanish armies in the south.

Information that Lapisse had forced the bridge of Alcantara reached the English general on the night of the 17th. That part of the army which was still behind Salamonde received immediate orders to retrace their steps to Oporto; and when the retreat of Soult by Orense was ascertained, the remainder of the troops, including three Portuguese brigades under Beresford, followed the same route. Colonel Trant was then appointed military governor of Oporto: and it was thought sufficient to leave Sylveira with some regular battalions and militia to defend the northern provinces; for Soult's army was considered a crippled force, which could not for a long time appear again in the field; a conclusion drawn, as we shall see, from false data, and without due allowance being made for the energy of that chief.

As the army proceeded southward, the contracted scope of Lapisse's movements was ascertained. Colonel Mayne was directed again to take post at Alcantara; and a reinforcement of 5000 men having landed at Lisbon, the rapidity of the march slackened. Passing by easy journeys through Coimbra, Thomar, and Punhete, the troops reached Abrantes the 7th of June, and encamped on the left bank of the Tagus; but there was sickness and a great mortality in his ranks.

From the moment of his arrival in Portugal, Sir Arthur Wellesley had looked to the defeat of Victor as the principal, and the operation against Soult as the secondary, object of the campaign; and the English government, acceding to his views, now gave him a discretionary power to enter the nearest provinces of Spain, if Portugal should not thereby be endangered. In his correspondence with the junta and with Cuesta, he had strongly urged the necessity of avoiding any serious collision with the enemy until the British troops could act in concert with the Spanish armies. This advice, approved of by the junta, was attended to by Cuesta; insomuch that he did not seek a battle, but he exposed his advanced posts, as if in derision of the counsel; and, disdainful of the English general's abilities, expressed his belief that the latter had no desire to act heartily, "because," said he, "the system of the British appears to be never to expose their troops; owing to which, they never gain decisive actions by land."

Cuesta's knowledge of the enemy's strength and positions was always inaccurate, and his judgment false; hence he himself not only never gained any decisive action, but lost every army entrusted to his command. He was discontented with the movement against Soult, asserting that his hold upon Galicia would only be strengthened thereby, unless that favourite folly of all Spanish generals were adopted, namely, surrounding the enemy, without regarding whether the troops to be surrounded were more or less numerous than the surrounders. Sir Arthur Wellesley, however, affirmed that if Soult were first driven over the Minho, a combined attack afterwards made upon Victor would permanently deliver Galicia; and this plan being followed, Galicia was abandoned by the French, and they never returned to that province.

When the English army was again free to act, Cuesta was importunate that a joint offensive operation against Victor should be undertaken; but, obstinately attached to his own opinions, he insisted upon tracing the whole plan of campaign. Yet his views were so opposed to all sound military principles, that Sir Arthur, although anxious to conciliate his humour, could scarcely concede the smallest point, lest a vital catastrophe should follow. Valuable time was thus lost in idle discussions which might have been employed in useful action; for the return of the British army from the Douro had falsified Victor's position at Torremocha. That marshal, as late as the 10th of June, had only one

division guarding the bridge at Almaraz ; and it was difficult for him to ascertain the movements of Sir Arthur Wellesley, covered, as they were, by the Tagus, the insurgents, and Mackenzie's corps of observation : hence, by rapid marches, it was possible for the English general, while Victor was still at Torremocha, to reach the Valley of the Tagus, and cutting the 1st corps off from Madrid, to place it between two fires.

This did not escape the penetration of either commander ; but Sir Arthur was forced to renounce the attempt, partly because of the sick and harassed condition of his troops, the want of shoes and money, and the difficulty of getting supplies ; but chiefly that Cuesta's army was scattered over the open country, between the defiles of Monasterio and the Guadiana, and, as he refused to concentrate or retire, Victor might have marched against and crushed him, and yet found time to meet the British on the Tietar.* Early in June, however, Marshal Beresford was, with three brigades, directed upon Castello Branco, and the Duke of Belluno, immediately taking the alarm, and being also assured by despatches from Madrid of Soult's retreat, resolved to recross the Tagus. But, previous to commencing this movement, he resolved to secure his flank, by causing the bridge of Alcantara to be destroyed.

Colonel Mayne, as I have already observed, had been again entrusted with that post ; but, unfortunately, his first orders to blow up the bridge if the enemy advanced were not rescinded, although the return of the army from the north rendered such a proceeding unnecessary. Mayne did not keep his instructions secret ; and Victor, hearing of them, sent a detachment to the bridge with no other view than to cause its destruction. He succeeded ; and this noble monument of Trajan's genius was overturned. But such is the nature of war that, not long afterwards, each army found its fall injurious to their interests, and, as a matter of taste and of military advantage, both sides alike sighed over the ruins of Alcantara.

Having completed this operation, Victor passed the Tagus, at Almaraz, on the 19th, without being molested by Cuesta, and, removing his boat-bridge, proceeded to take post at Plasencia. Meanwhile, Beresford was obliged to return to the defence of the northern provinces of Portugal, which Soult was again menacing, for, during the forced inactivity of the British at Abrantes, the cause of which I shall explain in another place, changes in the relative positions of the hostile armies were taking place ; and it is important that these changes should be well understood, because on them the fate of the succeeding campaign hinged.

When Ney and Soult met at Lugo, they, although still on bad terms, agreed, after some discussion, that the first should march from Coruña, by the route of St. Jago and Vigo, against Carrera and the Conde de Noroña ; and that the second, entering the valley of the Syl, should attack Romana, and drive him upon Orense, at which place it was expected that Ney, after taking or blocking Vigo, would be able to reach him, and thus the whole force of Galicia be crushed at once. Soult was then to menace the Tras os Montes, by the side of Bragança, with the view of obliging Sir Arthur Wellesley to remain in that province, while the 2nd corps opened a direct communication with Madrid and with the 1st corps.

Ney returned to Coruña ; and on the 1st of June, two divisions of infantry and a brigade of dragoons, of the 2nd corps, marched upon Monforte ; they were followed the next day by two other divisions of infantry ; and, at the same time, Franceschi, who was on the Fereira river, supported by La Housaye's dragoons, was directed, after scouring the road to St. Jago, to fall down the right bank of the Tambuga, towards Orense.

From the 2nd to the 9th the main body halted at Monforte, to get up stores from Lugo, and to scour the country on the flanks ; for Romana, in his passage, had again raised the peasantry of all the valleys. Loison also, with a division,

* Appendix, No. 16.

entered the Val des Orres, having orders to feign a movement towards Villa Franca and Puente Ferrada, as if for the purpose of meeting a French column in that direction.

The 10th, Loison passed the Syl, and took post at the Puente de Bibey.

The 12th, Franceschi, reinforced with a division of infantry, arrived at Monte Furada on the Syl, and, sending a detachment to Laronco, connected his division with Loison's. The remainder of the infantry followed this movement, and detachments were sent up the course of the Syl, and towards Dancos, on the road from Villa Franca to Lugo. Loison also forced the passage of the Puente de Bibey, and drove the insurgents to Puebla de Tribes. The French army thus cleared all the valleys opening on the course of the Upper Minho, and Romana was confined to the lower part of that river.

The 13th, Franceschi, ascending the valley of the Bibey, took post at Bollo and the bridge of the Hermitage, and then pushed his patrols even to Gudina and Monterey on one side, and into the Sierra de Porto on the other, as far as the sources of the Bibey, with a view of ascertaining: first, the exact direction which Romana would take to avoid Loison's column; secondly, to prevent the Spanish general from passing the left of the French army, and gaining the Asturias by the route of Puebla de Senabria. These precautions occupied the Duke of Dalmatia till the 19th, when, being assured that Romana had fallen back to Monterey, he judged that the latter would attempt the same march towards Puebla de Senabria, by which he had escaped after the action in the month of March. The French army was therefore directed up the valley of the Bibey, upon Viana, where there was a bridge, and where many of the mountain roads united. The same day Franceschi fell in with the head of Romana's army, and repulsed it; and the evening of the 20th the whole of the French troops were concentrated near Viana, intending to give battle to the Spaniards the next morning; but the latter retreated precipitately during the night, and many of the men dispersed.

Soult continued his movement by the left until he reached the great road running from Castile to Orense, and from thence, having sent Heudelet's division to Villa Vieja to threaten the Tras os Montes frontier, and Mermet's division and Lorge's dragoons towards La Canda to observe the road of Puebla de Senabria, he marched himself, with an advanced guard, to La Gudina, leaving Laborde and La Houssaye in reserve between Gudina and Villa Vieja. These divers movements, through the rugged passes of Galicia, led to a variety of slight skirmishes, the most important of which took place at the Puente de Bibey, a place of such prodigious strength that it is scarcely conceivable how men, with arms, could be brought to abandon such a post.

Romana's situation was now nearly hopeless, but he was saved by a misunderstanding between the French marshals. It appears that Ney, having marched from Coruña, entered St. Jago with about 10,000 men, and Carrera fell back upon Ponte Vedra, where the Conde de Noroña joined him with some fresh troops, and, assuming the command, continued the retreat to the Octavem river, behind which he took post, placing his main body at the bridge of San Payo, and sending detachments to guard some secondary points. On the 7th of June, the French came up. The Spaniards had 13,000 men, two 18-pounders, and nine field-pieces. Of these forces, 7000 men armed, 3000 unarmed, and the whole of the artillery, were in position to defend the passage at San Payo; the bridge was cut, and overlooked by a battery of two 18-pounders. Three thousand were in reserve at Redondela; and, at Vigo, about 60 stragglers from Sir John Moore's army were landed, and, in conjunction with a detachment of seamen and marines, occupied the forts. Some Spanish gun-boats, one of which was manned by English seamen, under Captain Winter, also proceeded up the river to the bridge to San Payo.

During the 7th, a desultory and useless fire took place on both sides; but, on the 8th, the French were repulsed in some feeble attempts made to force

a passage at San Payo and at Sotto Mayor, higher up the river, the loss on either side being about 100 men. These attacks were merely to keep the Spaniards employed until the reports of the officers, sent by Ney to ascertain the situation and projects of Soult's army, were received, and in the evening of the 8th those officers returned with information, obtained from the peasants, that the 2nd corps was retreating upon Castile. I have been assured by persons then on Marshal Ney's staff, that he, amazed at these tidings, rashly concluded that Soult, swayed by personal feelings, wished to endanger the 6th corps, and filled with indignation, immediately retired to Coruña; while Soult, on the other hand, viewed this retreat as a breach of their engagements, and an underhand policy to oblige him to remain in Galicia. Certain it is that by these ebullitions of temper, both Romana and Noroña were saved; for there was nothing to prevent Ney from sending a column against Orense, whilst he himself occupied Noroña, on the Octavem; and, however spirited the conduct of the Spaniards was at San Payo, it would be ridiculous to imagine that 10,000 of the best soldiers of France, led by an officer so quick and resolute as Ney, could have been resisted by an equal number of raw troops and peasants, one-third of whom were without arms. But the history of the quarrel between these marshals is involved in mystery, the clearing of which must be left to those who shall write the memoirs of the men. For the purposes of this history it is sufficient to know that there was ill-blood, and that therein the Gallicians found safety.

Soult, informed of Ney's retreat and of Sir Arthur Wellesley's arrival on the Tagus, ceased to pursue Romana, and marched to Zamora, where his sick had been before sent, and where his brother, General Soult, had conducted 3000 or 4000 stragglers and convalescents. Here, also, he requested the king to send the artillery and stores necessary to re-equip the 2nd corps; and here he proposed to give his harassed troops some rest, for they had now been for eight months incessantly marching and fighting, and men and officers were alike dispirited by the privations they had endured, and by the terrible nature of a war in which the most horrid scenes were daily enacted.

To put the king in possession of his views, Soult sent General Franceschi to Madrid; but this celebrated officer, refusing an escort, fell into the hands of the *Capuchino*. Being transferred to Seville, the central junta, with infamous cruelty, treated him as if he had been a criminal instead of a brave soldier, and confined him in a dungeon at Carthage. The citizens there, ashamed of their government, endeavoured to effect his escape; but he perished at the moment when his liberation was certain. When his young wife, a daughter of Count Mathieu Dumas, heard of his fate, she refused all nourishment; and, in a few days, by her death, added one more to the thousand instances of the strength of woman's affections.


The 25th of June, Soult reached Puebla de Senabria.

The 28th, he marched to Mombuey.

The 29th and 30th, he crossed the Esla by the bridges of San Pelayo and Castro Gonzales.

The 2nd of July, he entered Zamora, having previously rejected a proposition of Ney's, that the two corps should jointly maintain Galicia, a rejection which induced the Duke of Elchingen to evacuate that province.

To effect this, Ney formed a camp near Betanzos; and on the 22nd of July, withdrew his garrisons from Coruña and Ferrol, having previously destroyed all the stores and arsenals and disabled the land defences. Nevertheless, his influence was still so powerful that Captain Hotham, commanding the English squadron, off Coruña, seeing the hostile attitude maintained by the inhabitants, landed his seamen on the 24th, and spiked the guns on the sea-line; and, in like manner, compelled a Spanish garrison, left by Ney in the forts of Ferrol, to surrender on the 26th. The marshal, however, marched, unmolested, by the high road to Astorga, where he arrived on the 30th, having brought off all his



Sketch Explanatory of
NEY & SOULT'S
OPERATIONS IN GALLICIA,
in June 1809.

■■■ Romana & Noroña's
 ■■■ Ney and Soult's

Positions

own sick and those of the 2nd corps also, who had been left in Lugo. Thus Galicia was finally delivered.

This important event has been erroneously attributed to the exertions of the Spaniards. Those exertions were creditable to the Gallicians, although the most powerful motive of action was to protect their personal property ; and, when the French withdrew, this same motive led them to repair their losses by resisting the payment of tithes and rents, a compensation by no means relished by the proprietors or the church. But it is certain that their efforts were only secondary causes in themselves, and chiefly supported by the aid of England, whose ships, and arms, and stores were constantly on the coast.

How can the operations of the Spaniards be said to have driven the 6th corps from Galicia, when Ney retained every important post in that province to the last ; when single divisions of his army, at two different periods, traversed the country, from Coruña to Tuy, without let or hindrance ; and when the Spaniards could not prevent him from overrunning the Asturias without losing his hold of Galicia ? It is true, Soult, writing to Joseph, affirmed that the Gallicians would wear out the strongest army ; that is, if a wrong system was pursued by the French, but he pointed out the right method of subduing them, namely, in pursuance of Napoleon's views, to fortify some principal central points, from whence the movable columns could overrun the country ; and this, he estimated, would only require £50,000 and six weeks' labour. It is plain the real causes of the deliverance were : first, the quarrels between the marshals, which saved Romana and Noroña from destruction ; second, the movements of Sir Arthur Wellesley on the Tagus ; for, in an intercepted letter from Soult to Joseph, that marshal expressly assigns the danger hanging over Madrid and the 1st corps as the reason of his refusing to remain in Galicia. Now, although Soult's views were undoubtedly just, and his march provident, the latter necessarily drew after it the evacuation of Galicia ; because it would have been absurd to keep the 6th corps cooped up in that corner of the Peninsula, deprived of communication, and estranged from the general operations.

The movement of the 2nd corps, after quitting Monforte, being along the edge of the Portuguese frontier, and constantly threatening the northern provinces, drew Marshal Beresford, as I have before stated, from Castello Branco ; and all the regular Portuguese forces capable of taking the field were immediately collected by him round Almeida. The Duke del Parque was at Ciudad Rodrigo ; and as that part of Romana's force, which had been cut off by Soult's movement upon Gudina, fell back upon Ciudad Rodrigo, not less than 25,000 men, Portuguese and Spaniards, were assembled, or assembling, round those two fortresses : and the change of situation thus brought about in the armies on the northern line was rendered more important by the events which were simultaneously taking place in other parts, especially in Aragon, where General Blake, whose army had been augmented to more than 20,000 men, inflated with his success at Alcanitz, advanced to Ixar and Samper.

Suchet, himself, remained close to Zaragoza, but kept a detachment, under General Faber, at Longares and Villa Muel, near the mountains on the side of Daroca. Blake, hoping to cut off this detachment, marched himself through Carineña, and sent General Arisaga, with a column, to Bottorita ; the latter captured a convoy of provisions on the Huerba ; but Faber retired to Plasencia, on the Xalon.

The 14th of June, the advanced guards skirmished at Bottorita ; and Blake, endeavouring to surround the enemy, pushed a detachment to Maria, in the plain of Zaragoza.

The excitement produced in that city, and in Aragon generally, by this march, was so great, that Suchet doubted if he should not abandon Zaragoza, and return towards Navarre. The peasantry had assembled on many points in the mountains around, and it required great vigilance to keep down the spirit of insurrection in the city itself. The importance of that place, however, made

him resolve to fight a battle, for which the near approach of Blake, who came on in the full confidence that the French general would retreat, furnished an opportunity which was not neglected.

BATTLE OF MARIA.

The 14th, after some skirmishing, the Spanish army was concentrated at Bottorita.

The 15th, Blake slowly and unskillfully formed his troops in order of battle, near the village of Maria, and perpendicular to the Huerba, of which he occupied both banks. Towards two o'clock in the day, he extended his left wing to outflank the right of the French; but Suchet, who had just then been re-joined by Faber, and by a brigade from Tudela, immediately stopped this evolution by attacking the wing with some cavalry and light troops. The Spaniards then fell back to their line of battle; and Blake, drawing men from his right to reinforce his centre and left, was immediately engaged in a severe conflict. He repulsed the foremost of the enemy's columns; but so violent a storm arose at the moment, that neither army could see the other, although close together, and the action ceased for a time. Blake's position was so ill chosen, that he was surrounded by ravines, and had only one line of retreat, by the bridge of Maria, which was on the extremity of his right flank. Suchet, observing this error, when the storm had cleared off a little, briskly engaged the centre and left of the Spaniards, and forming his cavalry and two regiments of infantry in column, by one vigorous effort broke quite through the Spanish horse, and seized the bridge of Maria. Notwithstanding this, Blake, who was at all times intrepid, collected the infantry of his centre and left wing in a mass, and stood for the victory; but the French troops overthrew his with a great slaughter. A general, 25 guns, and many stands of colours were taken; yet few prisoners, for the darkness enabled the dispersed Spaniards to escape by the ravines; and Blake rallied them the next day at Bottorita. The French lost nearly 1000 men, and General Harispé was wounded.

During this action, a French brigade held the position of Monte Torrero, without mixing in the fight, lest the citizens of Zaragoza, being released from their presence, should rise against the garrison; but after the victory, this brigade marched down the Ebro to cut off Blake's retreat. General Laval, who commanded it, did not, however, execute his orders; and the Spanish army retired on the night of the 16th.

The 17th, the rearguard suffered some loss at Torrecilla; and on the 18th the two armies were again in presence at Belchite. Blake, reinforced by some detachments, was about 14,000 strong; but he had lost the greatest part of his artillery, and his men were dispirited. Suchet, on the contrary, having by the success at Maria awed the Aragonese, was able to bring 22 battalions and seven squadrons, or about 15,000 men, flushed with victory, into action.

BATTLE OF BELCHITE.

The Spaniards were drawn up on a range of hills half enclosing the town; their right, resting on a hermitage and some buildings, was inaccessible to cavalry; the left was also well covered; and behind the right, a hill with a building on it, overtopping all the position and occupied by a reserve, served as a rallying point, because there was an easy line of communication between it and the left wing. The centre, being on rough ground containing the town of Belchite, which had a wall and gates, was also very strong; and the whole position was so compact, that Blake, after completely filling his line, had yet a considerable reserve in hand. His dispositions were made to fight by his centre and right, his left being rather in the nature of an advanced post.

A French battalion commenced the action by skirmishing with the Spanish centre; but, at the same time, two columns of attack marched, the one against the right, the other against the left. The latter, which was the principal one, preceded by a fire of artillery, soon closed upon the Spanish troops, and Blake's guns opened from his centre and right; but an ammunition-waggon blowing

up was the signal for a panic, which, commencing on the left, reached to all parts of the line. The Spanish general then made a charge of cavalry, to retrieve the day, but it was easily repulsed, and the confusion that followed is thus described by himself :—" One regiment fled without firing a shot ; it was followed by another, and a third, all flying without having discharged a gun ; and, in a few moments, the whole position was abandoned. Thus we, the generals and officers, were left alone, without being able to rally a body which could make any opposition ; and I had the mortification to see our army dispersed, abandoning all its baggage, and throwing away its arms, and even its clothes, before a single corps of the enemy ; nor were we able to avail ourselves of the defence of any strong place, as it was impossible to collect 200 men to make head against the enemy.

Blake, although a bad general, was a man of real courage : stung to the quick by this disgrace, he reproached his troops with bitterness, demanded an inquiry into his own conduct, and, with a strong and sincere feeling of honour, restored to the junta the estate which had been conferred upon him for the success at Alcanitz.

This battle and the pursuit, in which Suchet took about 4000 prisoners, and all the artillery, ammunition, and baggage of the Spaniards, not only made him master of the operations in Aragon, but also rendered the 5th corps, under Mortier, who were now at Valladolid, completely disposable for offensive operations. Thus, on the 1st of July, there were, exclusive of Kellerman's and Bonnet's divisions, three complete *corps d'armée*, furnishing 6000 cavalry and 50,000 infantry, collected between Astorga, Zamora, and Valladolid. The inroad on Portugal had failed, and the loss of Galicia followed ; but Napoleon's admirable system of invasion was unbroken. His troops, deprived of his presiding genius, had been stricken severely and shrunk from further aggression ; they had been too widely spread for a secure grasp, but the reaction disclosed all the innate strength of his arrangements.

CHAPTER IV.

THE British army remained in the camp of Abrantes until the latter end of June. During this period, Sir Arthur Wellesley, although burning to enter Spain, was kept back by a variety of difficulties.

He had been reinforced with 5000 men immediately after his return from the Douro ; and, in the preceding operations, the killed and hurt in battle did not exceed 300 men, but the deaths by sickness were numerous. Four thousand men in hospital, and 1500 employed in escort and depôt duties, being deducted, the gross amount of the present under arms, as late even as the 25th of June, did not exceed 22,000 men ; and these were, at any moment, liable to be seriously diminished, because the ministers, still intent upon Cadiz, had authorized Mr. Frere, whenever the junta should consent to the measure, to draw a garrison for that town from Sir Arthur's force. As an army, therefore, it was weak in everything but spirit. The commissariat was without sufficient means of transport ; the soldiers nearly barefooted, and totally without pay, the military chest was empty, and the hospitals were full.

The expense, at a low estimation, was about £200,000 a month, and, with the most strenuous exertions, £160,000 only had been procured in the two months of May and June ; and of this, £13,000 had been obtained as a temporary loan in Oporto.* The rate of exchange in Lisbon was high, and, notwithstanding the increased value given to the government paper by the successes on the Douro, this rate was daily rising. The Spanish dollar was at five shillings, while Spanish gold sunk so much in value that the commissary-general sent all that he received from England, or could collect in Lisbon, to Cadiz, and other

* Appendix, No. 16.

parts, to truck for dollars ; but, in all places of commerce, the exchange was rising against England, a natural consequence of her enormous and increasing issues of paper. Those issues, the extravagant succours given to Spain, together with subsidies to Austria, made it impossible to supply the army in Portugal with specie, otherwise than by raising cash, in every quarter of the globe, on treasury-bills, and at a most enormous loss ; an evil great in itself, opening a wide door to fraud and villainy, and rendered the war between France and England not so much a glorious contest of arms as a struggle between public credit and military force, in which even victory was sure to be fatal to the former.

The want of money, sickness, Cuesta's impracticable temper, and a variety of minor difficulties, too tedious to mention, kept the army in a state of inactivity until the end of June ; but, at that period, the retreat of the 1st corps from Torremocha, and the consequent advance of Cuesta, removed one obstacle to offensive operations, and Sir Arthur, having the certainty that 8000 additional troops were off the Rock of Lisbon, then commenced his march into Spain by the northern banks of the Tagus, meaning to unite with Cuesta on the Tietar, and to arrange, if possible, a plan of operations against Madrid.

But before I embark on the full and broad stream into which the surges and eddies of the complicated warfare that succeeded Napoleon's departure from the Peninsula settled, I must give a general view of the state of affairs, that the reader comprehending exactly what strength each party brought to the encounter, may judge more truly of the result.

FRENCH POWER.

The French, having received some reinforcements of conscripts, amounted, in the beginning of July, including the king's guards, to about	Men.	Horses.
In hospital	61,000	275,000
Stragglers and prisoners borne on the states	7000	68,000
Total under arms	207,000	36,000
The military governments, lines of correspondence, garrisons, and detachments, absorbed	32,000	3000
Present under arms with the <i>corps d'armée</i>	175,000	33,000

The actual strength and situation of each *corps d'armée* was as follows :—

Under the King, covering Madrid.

	Inf. & Art.	Cav.
First corps in the valley of the Tagus	20,881	4200
Fourth corps, La Mancha	17,490	3200
Division of Dessolles, Madrid	6864	
King's French guards, Madrid, about	4000	1500
Total	49,235	8900

In Old Castile, under Marshal Soult.

	Inf. & Art.	Cav.
Second corps, Zamora, Tora, and Salamanca	17,707	2883
Fifth corps, Valladolid	16,042	874
Sixth corps, Astorga, and its vicinity	14,913	1446
Total	48,662	5203

In Aragon, under General Suchet.

	Inf. & Art.	Cav.
Third corps, Zaragoza, Alcanitz, etc.	15,226	2604

In Catalonia, under Marshal Angereau.

	Inf. & Art.	Cav.
Seventh corps, Vich, Gerona, and Barcelona	30,593	2500

In addition to these corps there were 1200 men belonging to the battering train, 4000 infantry under Bonnet, at St. Andero, and 2200 cavalry under Kellerman, in the Valladolid country.

The fortresses and armed places in possession of the French army were—St. Sebastian, Pampeluna, Bilbao, Santona, St. Andero, Burgos, Leon, Astorga, on the northern line ;

Jacca, Zaragoza, Guadalaxara, Toledo, Segovia, and Zamora, on the central line ;

Figueras, Rosas, and Barcelona, on the southern line.

It needs but a glance at these dispositions and numbers to understand with what a power Napoleon had fastened upon the Peninsula, during his six weeks' campaign. Much had been lost since his departure, but his army still pressed the Spaniards down, and, like a stone cast upon a brood of snakes, was immovable to their writhings. Nevertheless, the situation of Spain, at this epoch, was an ameliorated one compared to that which, four months before, the vehemence of Napoleon's personal warfare had reduced it to. The elements of resistance were again accumulated in masses, and the hope, or rather confidence, of success was again in full vigour ; for it was in the character of this people, while grovelling on the earth, to suppose themselves standing firm ; and, when creeping in the gloom of defeat, to imagine they were soaring in the full blaze of victory.

The momentary cessation of offensive operations on the part of the French, instead of being traced to its true sources, the personal jealousies of the marshals, and the king's want of vigour, was, as usual, attributed ; first, to fear and weakness ; secondly, to the pressure of the Austrian war. It was not considered that the want of unity, checking the course of conquest, would cease when the French army was driven to the defensive ; neither was the might of France duly weighed, while the strength of Austria was unduly exalted. The disasters at Ucles, at Almaraz, at Zaragoza, Rosas, Cardadeu, Valls, at Ciudad Real, Medellin, Braga, and Oporto, and in the Asturias, were all forgotten. The French had been repulsed from Portugal, and they had not taken Seville. This, to the Spaniards, was sufficient evidence of their weakness ; and, when the French were supposed to be weak, the others, by a curious reasoning process, always came to the conclusion that they were themselves strong. Hence, the fore-boasting at this period was little inferior to what it had been after the battle of Baylen ; and the statement of the relative numbers was almost as absurd. The utmost amount of the French force was not calculated higher than 115,000 or 120,000 men, of which about 50,000 were supposed to be on the French side of the Ebro, and the whole only waiting for an excuse to abandon the Peninsula.

SPANISH POWER.

The Spanish armies, on paper, were, as usual, numerous ; and the real amount of the regular force was certainly considerable, although very inadequate to the exigencies or the resources of the country. Before the battle of Belchite had broken Blake's strength, there were, organized and under arms, 12,000 cavalry, and about 120,000 infantry, exclusive of irregular bands and armed peasantry, who were available for particular defensive operations. After that defeat the number of regular forces capable of taking the field in the south-eastern provinces was not above 20,000 men, of which about 10,000, under Coupigny, were watching Barcelona, or again rallying under Blake ; the remainder were in Valencia, where Caro, Romana's brother, had taken the command.

In the north-western provinces there were about 25,000 men, of which 15,000 were in Galicia ; some thousands in the Asturias, under Vorster and Ballasteros, and the remainder under the Duke del Parque, who was directed to organize a new army in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo.

In Andalusia, or covering it, there were about 70,000 men. Of these 23,000 infantry, and 2500 cavalry, were assembled in the Morena, near St. Elena and

Carolina, under the command of General Venegas ; and 38,000, including 7000 cavalry, were in Estremadura, under the orders of Cuesta, who was nominally commander-in-chief of both armies.

The troops, thus divided into three grand divisions, were called the armies of *the right, the centre, the left*. The fortresses were—Gerona, Hostalrich, Lerida, Maquinenza, Tarragona, Tortosa, Valencia, Carthegena, and Alicant, for the army of the right ; Cadiz and Badajos for that of the centre ; Ciudad Rodrigo, Coruña, and Ferrol, for the army of the left.

The Spanish troops, were, however, far from being serviceable, in proportion to their numbers ; most of them were new levies, and the rest were ill-trained. The generals had lost nothing of their presumption, learnt nothing of war, and their mutual jealousies were as strong as ever. Cuesta still hating the junta, was feared and hated by that body in return ; and Venegas was placed at the head of the Carolina army as a counterpoise to him. Romana, also, was obnoxious to the junta ; and, in return, with more reason, the junta was despised and disliked by him. In Valencia and Murcia generals and juntas appeared alike indifferent to the public welfare, and satisfied if the war was kept from their own doors. In Catalonia there never was any unanimity.

Blake, who had abandoned Romana in Galicia, and who was still at enmity with Cuesta, had been, for these very reasons, invested with supreme power in Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia ; and, moreover, there were factions and bickerings among the inferior officers in the armies of Venegas and Cuesta. Albuquerque was ambitious of commanding in chief, and Mr. Frere warmly intrigued in his cause, for that gentleman still laboured under the delusion that he was appointed to direct the military instead of conducting the political service in the Peninsula.

In April, he had proposed to the junta that a force of 5000 cavalry and some infantry, taken from the armies of Cuesta and Venegas, should, under the command of the Duke of Albuquerque, commence offensive operations in La Mancha ; this, he said, would, "if the enemy refused to take notice of it," become "a very serious and perhaps a decisive movement ;" and he was so earnest that, without communicating upon the subject with Sir Arthur Wellesley, without waiting for the result of the operations against Soult, he pretended to the junta that the co-operation of the English army with Cuesta (that co-operation which it was Sir Arthur's most anxious wish to bring about) could only be obtained as the price of the Spanish government's acceding to his own proposal.* The plenipotentiary's greatest efforts were, however, directed to procure the appointment of Albuquerque to the command of an army ; but that nobleman was under the orders of Cuesta, who was not willing to part with him, and, moreover, Frere wished to displace Venegas, not that any fault was attributed to the latter, but merely to make way for Albuquerque ; a scheme so indecorous that both the junta and Cuesta peremptorily rejected it.

Mr. Frere did not hesitate to attribute this rejection to a mean jealousy of Albuquerque's high birth and talents ; but the junta had sufficient reason for their conduct, not only on this occasion, but afterwards, when they refused to give him any independent command. The duke, although a brave and patriotic and even an able soldier, was the dupe of a woman who corresponded with the French. The junta, in the fear of offending him, forbore to punish her, at first, yet, finally, they were obliged to shut her up, and they could not entrust him with a command while her dangerous influence lasted. Hence, Mr. Frere's intrigue failed to serve Albuquerque, and his military project for La Mancha fell to the ground, when Sir Arthur Wellesley, unable to perceive its advantages, strongly advised the junta not to weaken but to reinforce Cuesta's army ; not to meddle with the French either in La Mancha or Estremadura, but to preserve a strict defensive in all quarters.

The supreme junta was itself in fear of the old junta of Seville, and the folly

* Appendix, No. 8.

and arrogance of the first and its neglect of the public weal furnished ample grounds of attack, as a slight sketch of its administrative proceedings will suffice to prove. The king, after the battles of Medellin and Ciudad Real, had, through the medium of Don Joachim Sotelo, a Spanish minister in his service, made an attempt to negotiate for the submission of the junta, which was spurned by the latter, in suitable terms, for dignified sentiments and lofty expressions were never wanting to the Spanish, although, taken with their deeds, they were but as a strong wind and a few shrivelled leaves.

The junta did not fail to make the nation observe their patriotism upon this occasion, and, indeed, took every opportunity to praise their own proceedings. Nevertheless, men were not wanting in Spain most anxious, not only to check the actual abuses of power, but to lay bare all the ancient oppressions of the country, and recur to first principles, both for present reform and future permanent good government; in short, to make public avowal of the misrule which had led to their misfortunes, and, if possible, to amend it. Knowing that although national independence may co-exist with tyranny, it is inseparable from civil and religious freedom—they desired to assemble the cortes, and to give the people an earnest that national independence was worth having; to convince them that their sufferings and their exertions would lead to a sensible good, instead of a mere choice between an old and a new despotism; and this party was powerful enough to have a manifesto to their purpose drawn up by the junta, and it would have been published, if the English ministers had not interposed; for, as I have before said, their object was not Spain, but Napoleon.

Mr. Frere vigorously opposed the promulgation of this manifesto, and not ambiguously hinted that the displeasure of England, and the wrath of the partizans of despotism in Spain would be vented on the junta if any such approach to real liberty was made. In his despatches to his cabinet he wrote that, from his knowledge of the members of the junta, he felt assured they would "shrink from the idea of giving permanent effect to the measures which they held out;" and this expression he meant in their praise! but still he thought it necessary to check the tendency to freedom in the outset; and it would be injustice not to give his sentiments in his own words, sentiments which were at this time perfectly agreeable to his immediate superior, Mr. Canning, but offering a curious contrast to the political liberality which that politician afterwards thought it his interest to affect.

Writing as a Spaniard, Mr. Frere thus addressed Don Martin Garay:—

"If we have indeed passed three centuries under an arbitrary government, let us not forget that it is a price which we pay for having conquered and peopled the fairest portion of the globe; that the integrity of this immense power rests solely on these two words, religion and the king. If the old constitution has been lost by the conquest of America, our first object should be to recover it, but in such a manner as not to lose what has cost us so much in the acquisition. From this consideration, it appears to me that we ought to avoid, as political poison, any annunciation of general principles the application of which it would be impossible to limit or qualify, even when the negroes and Indians should quote them in favour of themselves. But let us allow that we have made a bad exchange in bartering our ancient national liberty for the glory and extension of the Spanish name. Let us allow that the nation has been deceived for three centuries, and that this error should, at all hazards, be immediately done away. Even though it were so, it does not appear very becoming the character of a well-educated person to pass censures upon the conduct of his forefathers, or to complain of what he has lost by their negligence or prodigality; and still less so, if it is done in the face of all the world: and what shall we say of a nation who should do this publicly, and after mature deliberation?"

The manifesto was suppressed, a new one more consonant to Mr. Frere's notions was published, and a promise to convoke the cortes given, but without

naming any specific time for that event. The junta, who, as Mr. Frere truly stated, were not at all disposed to give any effect to free institutions, now proceeded to prop up their own tottering power by severity : they had, previous to the manifesto, issued a menacing proclamation, in which they endeavoured to confound their political opponents with the spies and tools of the French ; and having before established a tribunal of public security, they caused it to publish an edict, in which all men who endeavoured to raise distrust of the junta, or who tried to overturn the government by popular commotions, or other means that had by the junta been reprobated, were declared guilty of high treason, undeserving the name of Spaniards and sold to Napoleon, their punishment to be death, and confiscation of property. Any person propagating rumours, tending to weaken or soften the hatred of the people against the French, was instantly to be arrested and punished without remission ; lastly, rewards were offered for secret information upon these heads.

This decree was not a dead letter. Many persons were seized, imprisoned, and executed, without trial, or knowing their accusers. But the deepest stain upon the Spanish character, at this period, was the treatment experienced by prisoners of war. Thousands, and amongst them part of Dupont's troops, who were only prisoners by a breach of faith, were sent to the Balearic Isles, but no order was taken for their subsistence. When remonstrated with, the junta cast 7000 ashore on the little desert rock of Cabrera. At Majorca, numbers had been massacred by the inhabitants in the most cowardly and brutal manner, but those left on Cabrera suffered miseries that can scarcely be described. The supply of food, always scanty, was often neglected altogether : there was but one spring on the rock, which dried up in summer ; clothes were never given to them except by the English seamen, who, compassionating their sufferings, often assisted them in passing the island. Thus, afflicted with hunger, thirst, and nakedness, they lived like wild beasts while they could live, but perished in such numbers, that less than 2000 remained to tell the tale of this inhumanity ; and surely it was no slight disgrace that the English government failed to interfere on such an occasion.

But what were the efforts made for the defence of the country by this inhuman junta, which, having been originally assembled to discuss the form of establishing a central government, had, unlawfully, retained their delegated power, and used it so shamefully ? There was a Spanish fleet, and a sufficient number of sailors to man it, in Carthagena. There was another fleet, and abundance of seamen, in Cadiz. Lord Collingwood, and others, pressed the junta, constantly and earnestly, to fit these vessels out, and to make use of them, or at least to place them beyond the reach of the enemy. His remonstrances were unheeded ; the sailors were rendered mutinous for want of pay, and even of subsistence, and the government would neither fit out ships themselves, nor suffer the English seamen to do it for them ; and at the very period when the Marquis of Romana and the insurgents in Galicia were praying for a few stands of arms and £5000 from Sir John Cradock, the junta possessed many millions of money, and their magazines, in Cadiz, were unable to contain the continually increasing quantity of stores and arms arriving from England, which were left to rot as they arrived, while, from every quarter of the country not yet subdued, the demand for these things was incessant.*

The fleet in Cadiz harbour might have been at sea in the beginning of February. In a week it might have been at Vigo, with money and succours of all kinds for the insurgents in Galicia ; after which, by skilful operations along the coast from Vigo to St. Sebastian, it might have occupied an enormous French force on that line of country. But instead of a fleet, the junta sent Colonel Barrios, an obscure person, to steal through by-ways, and to take the command of men who were not in want of leaders. In the same manner, the fleet in Carthagena might have been employed on the Catalonian and French

coasts ; but, far from using their means, which were really enormous, with energy and judgment, the junta carried on the war by encouraging virulent publications against the French, and confined their real exertions to the assembling of the unfortunate peasants in masses, to starve for awhile, and then to be cut to pieces by their more experienced opponents.

The system of false reports, also, was persevered in without any relaxation : the French were beaten on all points ; the marshals were slain or taken ; their soldiers were deserting, or flying in terror at the sight of a Spaniard ; Joseph had plundered and abandoned Madrid ; and Zaragoza had not fallen. Castro, the envoy to the Portuguese regency, so late as April, anxiously endeavoured to persuade that government and the English general that Zaragoza had never been subdued, and that the story of its fall was a French falsehood. In June, official letters were written to Marshal Beresford, from the neighbourhood of Lugo, dated the very day upon which Soult's army relieved that town, not to give intelligence of the event, but to announce the utter defeat of that marshal, and the capture of Lugo itself ; the amount of the killed and wounded, and the prisoners taken, being very exactly stated ; and this with such an appearance of truth as to deceive Beresford, notwithstanding his previous experience of the people he had to deal with.

But the proofs of corruption and incapacity in the junta are innumerable, and not confined to the records of events kept by British officers. Romana, a few months later, upon the question of appointing a regency, thus describes their conduct : "He himself," he said, "had doubted if the central junta was a lawful government, and this doubt was general in the provinces through which he had passed ; yet he had, to preserve the nation from anarchy, not only yielded obedience to it, but he had likewise forced the provinces of Galicia, Leon, and Asturias to do the same ; because he thought that an illegal government might be useful if it deserved the confidence of the people, and that they respected its authority. The central junta, however, was not thus situated : the people, judging of measures by their effects, complained that the armies were weak, the government without energy ; that there were no supplies ; that the promised accounts of the public expenditure were withheld ; and yet, all the sums drawn from America, all the succours granted by England, the rents of the crown, and the voluntary contributions were expended. The public employments were not given to men of merit and true lovers of their country. Some of the members of the junta rendered their power subservient to their own advantage ; others conferred lucrative appointments on their relations and dependents. Ecclesiastical offices had been filled up to enable individuals to seize those rents for themselves which ought to be appropriated for the public service. There was no unity to be found : many of the junta cared only for the interest of their particular province, as if they were not members of the Spanish monarchy ; confirming the appointments of the local juntas, without regard to fitness ; and even assigning recompenses to men destitute of military knowledge, who had neither seen service nor performed the duties assigned to them."

"The junta, divided into sections, undertook to manage affairs in which they were unversed, and which were altogether foreign to their professions. Horses, taken from their owners under pretence of supplying the armies, were left to die of hunger in the sea-marshes : and, finally, many important branches of administration were in the hands of men, suspected, both from their own conduct and from their having been creatures of that infamous favourite who was the author of the general misery."

It was at this period that the celebrated Partidas first commenced the guerilla, or petty warfare, which has been so lauded, as if that had been the cause of Napoleon's discomfiture. Those bands were infinitely numerous, because every robber, that feared a jail, or that could break from one ; every smuggler,* whose trade had been interrupted ; every friar, disliking the tram-

* The bands formed of smugglers were called *Quadrillas*.

mels of his convent ; and every idler, that wished to avoid the ranks of the regular army, was to be found either as chief or associate in the Partidas.

The French, although harassed by the constant and cruel murders of isolated soldiers, or followers of the army, and sometimes by the loss of convoys, were never thwarted in any great object by these bands ; but the necessity of providing subsistence, and attaching his followers to his fortunes, generally obliged the guerilla chief to rob his countrymen ; and, indeed, one of the principal causes of the sudden growth of this system was the hope of intercepting the public and private plate, which, under a decree of Joseph, was being brought in from all parts to be coined in Madrid ; for that monarch was obliged to have recourse to forced loans, and the property of the proscribed nobles, and suppressed convents, to maintain even the appearance of a court.

This description will apply to the mass of the Partidas ; but there were certainly some who were actuated by nobler motives ; by revenge ; by a gallant enterprising spirit ; or, by an honest ambition, thinking to serve their country better than by joining the regular forces. Among the principal chiefs may be placed, Renovales, and the two Minas, in Navarre and Aragon ; Porlier named the *marquisetto*, and Longa, in the Asturias and Biscay ; Juan Martin, or *El Empecinado*, who vexed the neighbourhood of Madrid ; Julian Sanchez, in the Gata and Salamanca country ; Doctor Rovera, Perena, and some others, in Catalonia ; Juan Paladea, or *El Medico*, between the Moreno and Toledo ; the Curate Merino, *El Principe*, and Saornil, in Castile ; the friar Sapia, in Soria, and Juan Abril, near Segovia.

But these men were of very different merit. Renovales, a regular officer, raised the peasantry of the valleys between Pampeluna and Zaragoza, after the fall of the latter city ; but he was soon subdued. Juan Martin, Rovera, Julian Sanchez, and the student Mina, discovered most military talent, and Sanchez was certainly a very bold and honest man ; but Espoz y Mina, the uncle and successor of the student, far outstripped his contemporaries in fame. He shed the blood of his prisoners freely, but rather from false principle, and under peculiar circumstances, than from any real ferocity, his natural disposition being manly and generous ; and, although not possessed of any peculiar military genius, he had a sound judgment, surprising energy, and a constant spirit.

By birth a peasant, he despised the higher orders of his own country, and never would suffer any hidalgo, or gentleman, to join his band. From 1809, until the end of the war, he maintained himself in the provinces bordering on the Ebro ; often defeated, and chased from place to place, he gradually increased his forces ; until, in 1812, he yet was at the head of more than 10,000 men, whom he paid regularly, and supplied from resources chiefly created by himself ; one of which was remarkable :—He established a treaty with the French generals, by which articles, not being warlike stores, coming from France, had safe conduct from his partida, on paying a duty, which Mina appropriated to the subsistence of his followers.

That the guerilla system could never seriously affect the progress of the French, is proved by the fact, that the constant aim of the principal chiefs was to introduce the customs of regular troops ; and their success against the enemy was proportionate to their progress in discipline and organization. There were not less than 50,000 of these irregular soldiers, at one time, in Spain ; and so severely did they press upon the country that it may be assumed as a truth that if the English army had abandoned the contest, one of the surest means by which the French could have gained the good-will of the nation would have been the extirpating of the Partidas. Nevertheless, one great and unquestionable advantage was derived by the regular armies, and especially by the British, from the existence of these bands. The French corps could never communicate with each other, nor combine their movements, except by the slow method of sending officers with strong escorts ; whereas, their adversaries could correspond by post, and even by telegraph, an advantage equal to a reinforcement of 30,000 men.

PORTUGUESE POWER.

The Portuguese military system has been already explained. The ranks of the regular army, and of the militia, were filling; the arms and equipments were supplied by England; and means were taken to give effect to the authority of the *captains mor*, or chiefs of districts, under whom the *ordenanzas* were to be gathered for the defence of the country. The people having been a second time relieved from an invasion, by the intervention of a British army, were disposed to submit implicitly to the guidance of their deliverers; but the effect of former misgovernment pervaded every branch of administration, political and municipal, and impeded the efforts made to draw forth the military resources of the kingdom. It is a curious fact that, not only at this period, but until the end of the war, such was the reluctance of the people to become soldiers, that, notwithstanding their undoubted hatred of the French, their natural docility, and the visible superiority of the soldiers' condition over that of the peasant or artisan, the recruiting was always difficult; and the odious spectacle was constantly exhibited, of men marched in chains to reinforce armies, which were fighting in what was a popular, and ought to have been a sacred cause.

The actual number of regular troops, armed and organized, was not above 15,000, and, notwithstanding the courage displayed by those employed in the late operations, Marshal Beresford was doubtful of their military qualities, and reluctant to act separately from the British troops. The most important fortresses in a condition for defence were Elvas, Albuquerque, and Almeida, in the first line; Abrantes and Peniché, in the second; the citadel and forts of Lisbon and Palmela, in the third. But there were many other walled places, capable, if armed, of standing a siege, and presenting a variety of strong points for the irregular force of the country to assemble upon; and hence, Portugal offered, not only great resources in men, but a base of operations solid in itself; central with respect to the French armies, and enabling the English general to act without reference to the Spanish government or Spanish commanders; an advantage more justly appreciated at the end of the campaign than at the commencement. Such were the relative situations of the contending hosts in the Peninsula; yet, to take an enlarged view of affairs, it is necessary to look beyond the actual field of battle; for the contest in Spain, no longer isolated, was become an integral part of the great European struggle against France.

Napoleon, after his first successes near Ratisbon, entered Vienna, and attempted to carry the war to the left bank of the Danube; but a severe check, received at the battle of Esling on the 21st of May, so shook his moral ascendancy in Europe, that he deemed it necessary to concentrate all the disposable strength of his empire for one gigantic effort, which should restore the terror of his name. The appearance of inactivity assumed by him, while thus mightily gathering his forces, deceived his enemies; and, as their hopes rose, their boasts became extravagant, more especially in England, where to express a doubt of his immediate overthrow was regarded as a heinous offence; and where the government, buoyed up with foolish expectations, thought less of supporting a noble and effectual warfare in Portugal than of nourishing and aiding the secondary and rather degrading hostility of conspirators, malcontents, and military adventurers in Germany.

While Sir Arthur Wellesley was waiting impatiently on the Tagus for the scanty reinforcements afforded him, two other armies were simultaneously preparing to act against the extremities of the French empire; the one, consisting of about 12,000 men, drawn from Sicily, was destined to invade Italy, the southern parts of which had been denuded of troops to oppose the Austrians on the Tagliamento. The other was assembled on the coast of England, where above 40,000 of the finest troops the nation could boast of, and a fleet of power to overthrow all the other navies of the world combined, composed an armament, intended to destroy the great marine establishment which the French emperor had so suddenly and so portentously created at Antwerp. So vast an

expedition had never before left the British shores ; neither any one so meanly conceived, so improvidently arranged, so calamitously conducted, for the marine and land forces, combined, numbered more than 80,000 fighting men, and those of the bravest ; yet the object in view was comparatively insignificant, and even that was not obtained. Delivered over to the leading of a man, whose military incapacity has caused the glorious title of Chatham to be scorned, this ill-fated army, with spirit, and strength, and zeal to have spread the fame of England to the extremities of the earth, perished, without a blow, in the pestilent marshes of Walcheren ! And so utterly had party spirit stifled the feeling of national honour that public men were found base enough to reprobate the convention of Cintra, to sneer at Sir John Moore's operations, and yet to declare the Walcheren expedition wise, profitable, and even glorious.

The operation against Italy was less unfortunate rather than more ably conducted, and it was equally abortive. What with slow preparations, the voyage, and the taking of the petty islands of Ischia and Procida, 13 weeks were wasted ; and yet, during that period, Murat, conscious of his inability to resist, was only restrained from abandoning Naples by the firmness of his queen, and the energy of Salicetti, the minister of police. We have seen that it was the wish of the ministers to have the troops in Sicily employed in the south of Spain, but, yielding to the representations of Sir John Stuart, they permitted him to make this display of military foolery : yet it is not with the bad or good success of these expeditions that this history has to deal, but with that palpable and direful ministerial incapacity which suffered two men, notoriously unfitted for war, to waste and dissipate the military strength of England on secondary objects, while a renowned commander, placed at the most important point, was left without an adequate force.

For the first time since the commencement of the Peninsula war, 60,000 Spanish troops, well armed and clothed, were collected in a mass, and in the right place, communicating with a British force. For the first time since Napoleon swayed the destiny of France, the principal army of that country had met with an important check : the great conqueror's fortune seemed to waver, and the moment had arrived when the British government was called to display all its wisdom and energy. The Duke of York had performed his duty ; he had placed above 90,000 superb soldiers, all disposable for offensive operations, in the hands of the ministers ; but the latter knew not their value, and, instead of concentrating them upon one, scattered them upon many points. Sir Arthur Wellesley might have had above 80,000 British troops on the frontiers of Portugal, and he was a general capable of wielding them. He was forced to commence a campaign, upon which the fate of the Peninsula, a quick triumph or a long-protracted agony of 12,000,000 of people depended, with only 22,000 ; while 60,000 fighting men, and ships numerous enough to darken all the coasts of Spain, were waiting, in Sicily and England, for orders which were to doom them, one part to scorn, and the other to an inglorious and miserable fate. Shall the deliverance of the Peninsula, then, be attributed to the firmness and long-sighted policy of ministers who gave these glaring proofs of improvidence, or shall the glory of that great exploit lighten round the head of him who so manfully maintained the fierce struggle, even under the burden of their folly ?

BOOK VIII.

CHAPTER I.

CAMPAIGN OF TALAVERA.

IN the foregoing book the real state of affairs in the Peninsula has been described; but it appeared with a somewhat different aspect to the English general, because false informations, egregious boasts, and hollow promises, such as had been employed to mislead Sir John Moore, were renewed at this period; and the allied nations were influenced by a riotous rather than a reasonable confidence of victory. The English newspapers teemed with letters, describing the enemy's misery and fears: nor was the camp free from these inflated feelings. Marshal Beresford was so credulous of French weakness as publicly to announce to the junta of Badajos that Soult's force, wandering and harassed by continual attacks, was reduced to 8000 or 10,000 distressed soldiers. Nay, Sir Arthur Wellesley himself, swayed by the pertinacity of the tale-makers, the unhesitating assurances of the junta, perhaps, also, a little excited by a sense of his own great talents, was not free from the impression that the hour of complete triumph was come.

The Spanish government and the Spanish generals were importunate for offensive movements, and lavish in their promises of support; and the English general was as eager, for he was at the head of gallant troops, his foot was on the path of victory, and he felt that, if the Duke of Belluno was not quickly disabled, the British army, threatened on both flanks, would, as in the case of Sir John Cradock, be obliged to remain in some defensive position, near Lisbon, until it became the scorn of the French, and an object of suspicion and hatred to the Spanish and Portuguese people.

There were three lines of offensive operations open:—

1. To cross the Tagus, join Cuesta's army, and, making Elvas and Badajos the base of movements, attack Victor in front.—This line was circuitous. It permitted the enemy to cover his front by the Tagus; the operations of the allies would have been cramped by the Sierra de Guadalupe on one side, and the mountains lying between Albuquerque and Alcantara on the other; and strong detachments must have been left to cover the roads to Lisbon, on the right bank of the Tagus. Finally, the communication between the Duke of Belluno and Soult being free, Beresford's corps would have been endangered.

2. To adopt Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo as the base of movements, and to operate in conjunction with Beresford, the Duke del Parque, and Romana, by the line of Salamanca, while Cuesta and Venegas occupied the attention of the 1st and 4th corps on the Tagus.—The objections to this line were, that it separated the British troops from the most efficient and most numerous, and obliged them to act with the weakest and most irregular of the Spanish armies; that it abandoned Cuesta to the ruin which his headstrong humour would certainly provoke; and as the loss of Seville or of Lisbon would inevitably follow, the instructions of the English ministers (which enjoined the defence of the latter city as paramount to every object save the military possession of Cadiz,) would have been neglected.

3. To march upon Plasencia and Almaraz, form a junction with Cuesta, and advance against Madrid, while Venegas operated in the same view, by the line of La Mancha.—The obstacles in the way of this plan were—first, that it exposed Cuesta to be defeated by Victor before the junction, and that, after the junction, the combinations would still be dependent upon the accuracy of Venegas's movements; second, that Sir Arthur Wellesley's march, with reference to Soult's corps, would be a flank march: an unsafe operation at all

times, but, on this occasion, when the troops must move through the long and narrow valley of the Tagus, peculiarly dangerous. Nevertheless, this line was adopted, nor were the reasons in favour of it devoid of force.

The number of French immediately protecting Madrid was estimated at 50,000; but confidential officers, sent to the head-quarters of Cuesta and Venegas, had ascertained that their strength was not overstated at 38,000, for the first, and 25,000 for the second, all well armed and equipped, and the last certainly the best and most efficient army that the Spaniards had yet brought into the field. Now the English force in Portugal amounted to 30,000 men, exclusive of the sick, 22,000 being under arms on the frontier, and 8000 at Lisbon: here, then, was a mass of 50,000 regular troops that could be brought to bear on 50,000; besides which there were Sir Robert Wilson's legion, about 1000 strong, and the Spanish *Partidas* of the Guadalupe and the Sierra de Bejar.

The ridge of mountains which separate the valley of the Tagus from Castile and Leon being, as has been already related, impracticable for artillery, except at the passes of Baños and Perales, it was supposed that the 20,000 men under Beresford and the Duke del Parque would be sufficient to block those lines of march, and that Romana, moving by the *Tras os Montes*, might join the Duke del Parque, and thus 30,000 men, supported by two fortresses, would be ready to protect the flank of the British army in its march from Plasencia towards Madrid. A vain calculation, for Romana remained ostentatiously idle at Coruña, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, never having seen the Spanish troops in action, thought too well of them; and having had no experience of Spanish promises he trusted them too far; and, at the same time, made a false judgment of the force and position of his adversaries. The arrival of the 6th corps at Astorga and of the 5th at Valladolid were unknown to him: the strength of the 2nd corps, and, perhaps, the activity of its chief, were also underrated. Instead of 15,000 or 20,000 harassed French troops, without artillery, there were 70,000 fighting-men behind the mountains!

The 27th of June, the English army, breaking up from the camp of Abrantes, and being organized in the following manner, marched into Spain:—

				<i>Artillery.</i>	
Six brigades		30 guns,		Com ^d by Maj.-Gen. Howorth.	
				<i>Cavalry.</i>	
Three brigades,		3047 sabres,		Com ^d . by Lt.-Gen. Payne.	
				<i>Infantry.</i>	
1st div. of 4 brigades,		6023 bayonets,		Com ^d . by Lt.-Gen. Sherbrooke.	
2nd do. 2 do.		3947 do.		do. Maj.-Gen. Hill.	
3rd do. 2 do.		3736 do.		do. Maj.-Gen. Mackenzie.	
4th do. 2 do.		2957 do.		do. Br.-Gen. Campbell.	
<hr/>					
5 divs. 13 brigades.		19,710 sabres and bayonets.			
<hr/>				1287 Engineers, artillery, and waggon-train.	

Grand total . . . 20,997 men, and 30 pieces of artillery.

Besides this force, the 40th regiment, so long detained at Seville by Mr. Frere, had arrived in Lisbon, and the troops on their march from that city, being somewhat less than 8000 bayonets, were organized in three brigades, commanded by Major-General Lightfoot and Brigadier-Generals Robert and Catlin Craufurd. But the leading brigade, under Robert Craufurd, only quitted Lisbon on the 28th of June.

The army moved by both banks of the Tagus; one column proceeding through Sobreira Formosa, the other by Villa Velha, where a boat-bridge was established. The 1st of July the head-quarters were at Castello Branco, and from thence the troops continued their route, in one column, by Moralejo and Coria; but a flanking brigade, under General Donkin, was directed through Ceclaven and Torijoncillos, and explored the country between Zarza Mayor and the Tagus. The 8th, the head-quarters were established at Plasencia. The

10th the army arrived at that place, and was soon after joined by a regiment of cavalry and two battalions of infantry from Lisbon.

At this period Cuesta was at Almaraz, and Victor, of whose intermediate movements it is time to take notice, was at Talavera de la Reyna. When that marshal had retired from Torremocha, the valley of the Tagus was exhausted by the long sojourn of the 4th and 1st corps; but the valley of Plasencia was extremely fertile, and untouched, and the Duke of Belluno, whose troops, weakened by the tertian sickness, required good nourishment, resolved to take post there, and keep a bridge at Bazagona, on the Tietar, by which he could, in two marches, fall upon Cuesta, if he ventured to pass the Tagus at Almaraz. At Plasencia, also, he could open a communication with the 2nd and 5th corps, and observe closely the movements of the English army on the frontier of Portugal. The bridge at Bazagona was finished on the 21st of June, and the French light troops were scouring the country towards Plasencia, when the king, who had already withdrawn a division of infantry and a large part of the cavalry of the 1st corps to reinforce the 4th, ordered the Duke of Belluno to retire instantly to Talavera, leaving rear-guards on the Tietar and at Almaraz. This order, which arrived on the 22nd of June, was the result of that indecision which none but truly great men, or fools are free from; the first because they can see their way clearly through the thousand difficulties that encumber and bewilder the mind in war; the last, because they see nothing.

On the present occasion, General Sebastiani had reported that Venegas was reinforced, and ready to penetrate by La Mancha; and the king, swayed by this false information, disturbed by the march of Cuesta, and still more by Blake's advance against Zaragoza (the result of which was then unknown), became so alarmed that he commanded St. Cyr to move into Aragon, repaired himself to Toledo with his guards and reserve, withdrew the light cavalry and a division of infantry from Victor, obliged that marshal to fall back on Talavera; and even commanded Mortier to bring up the 5th corps from Valladolid to Villa Castin, near Avila, although, following Napoleon's orders, it should have gone to Salamanca.

In the hope of meeting Venegas, Joseph penetrated as far as the Jabalon river, in La Mancha; and as the Spaniard, fearful of the tempest approaching him, took shelter in the Morena, the king, leaving some posts of the 4th corps at Toledo, restored the light cavalry to the 1st corps, and, with his guards and reserve, returned to Madrid. But while he had been pursuing a shadow, Victor was exposed to great danger; for the Jabalon is six long marches from Madrid, and hence, for ten days, the Duke of Belluno, with only two divisions of infantry and 2000 cavalry, in all about 14,000 men, had remained at Talavera without any support, although 60,000 men were marching against him from different points.

Victor did not suffer as he might have done; but his numerical weakness was certainly the safety of Cuesta. For that general, having followed the retreat of the 1st corps from Torremocha, crossed the Tagus, at Almaraz, on the 23rd of June, and pushed an advanced guard towards Oropesa. He had 38,000 men, yet he remained tranquil while (at a distance of only 12 miles) 14,000 French made a flank movement that lasted three days; and his careless method of acting, and his unskilful dispositions, were so evident, that the French cavalry, far from fearing, were preparing to punish him, when he suddenly took the alarm, and, withdrawing to Almaraz, occupied himself in finishing his bridges over the Tagus.

The 28th, Victor, having removed his hospitals and depôts from Arzobispo, took a position behind the Alberche, keeping, however, three battalions and the cavalry at Talavera, with advanced posts at Calera and Gamonal. A small detachment, also, watched the course of the Tagus from the mouth of the Alberche to that of the Guadarama, and a movable column was sent to Escalona to observe the Vera de Plasencia and passes leading upon Avila. In executing this retrograde movement, Victor, having no means of transport,

burnt ten out of the fifteen pontoons supporting his bridge over the Tietar, and, for the same reason, he threw a considerable quantity of powder and shot into the river. His troops had been four days on quarter rations, and were suffering from sickness and hunger; and the Tagus was fordable in several places. The danger of his position is evident. The British were, however, still at Abrantes, and Cuesta knew not how to profit by this opportunity before the king returned from La Mancha.

Such was the position of the different armies when the British general arrived at Plasencia. He had seen Soult's letters, found upon General Franceschi, and thus ascertained that the 2nd corps was at Zamora, and from Franceschi himself, who passed as a prisoner, at the same time he learned the arrival of the 5th corps at Valladolid; but the march of Ney's corps was not suspected, and the tenor of Soult's letters led to the notion that Galicia was to be retained. A letter of Victor's to Joseph, dated the 23rd of June, and written in the most desponding language, had been likewise intercepted; and as Soult's correspondence also gave a strong picture of *his* difficulties, the general impression that the French armies were not only weak but utterly dismayed was rather augmented than lessened by this information. Sir Arthur Wellesley, however, could not but have some distrust, when he knew that *two corps* were beyond the mountains, on his left; and though far from suspecting the extent of his danger, he took additional precautions to protect that flank, and renewed his instructions to Beresford to watch the enemy's movements, and to look carefully to the defence of the *Puerto Perales*. But the pass of Baños was still to be guarded, and for this purpose Sir Arthur applied to Cuesta.

The Spanish general was at first unwilling to detach any men to that quarter, but he finally agreed that two battalions from his army and two others from the town of Bejar, at the other side of the pass, should unite to defend Baños, and that the Duke del Parque should also send a detachment to the pass of Perales. Although these measures appeared sufficient to obviate danger from Soult's corps, weakened as it was supposed to be, they were evidently futile to check the real force under that marshal; and they were rendered absolutely ridiculous by Cuesta, who sent two weak battalions, of 300 men each, and with only 20 rounds of ammunition per man: and yet this was only a part of a system which already weighed heavily on the English general.

The 10th, Sir Arthur Wellesley proceeded to Cuesta's head-quarters, near the Col de Mirabete, to confer with him on their future operations. Ever since the affair of Valdez, in 1808, the junta had been sorely afraid of Cuesta, and, suspecting that he was meditating some signal vengeance, they endeavoured to raise up rivals to his power. In this view they had lavished honours and authority upon Blake; but the defeat at Belchite having crushed their hopes in that quarter, they turned their eyes upon Venegas, and increased his forces, taking care to give him the best troops. Still Cuesta's force was formidable, and to reduce it was the object both of Mr. Frere and the junta: the motive of the first being to elevate the Duke of Albuquerque; the intention of the others being merely to reduce the power of Cuesta.

Whatever might have been the latter's ultimate intention, with respect to the junta, it is certain that his natural obstinacy and violence were greatly increased by a knowledge of these proceedings, and that he was ill-disposed towards the English general, as thinking him a party concerned in these intrigues. When, therefore, Sir Arthur, at the instigation of Mr. Frere, proposed that a draft of 10,000 Spanish troops should be detached towards Avila and Segovia, Cuesta replied that it should be done by the British, and absolutely refused to furnish more than two battalions of infantry and a few cavalry to strengthen Sir Robert Wilson's Partizan corps, which was destined to act on the enemy's right. This determination again baffled Mr. Frere's project of placing the Duke of Albuquerque at the head of an independent force, and obliged the supreme junta to fall upon some other expedient for reducing Cuesta's power; and it was

fortunate that the old Spaniard resisted the proposal, because the 10,000 men would have gone straight into the midst of the 5th corps, which, in expectation of such a movement, was then at Villa Castin, and, having been rejoined by the detachment of Colonel Briche, from Catalonia, was 18,000 strong, and supported by Kellerman's division of cavalry at Valladolid.

The discussion between the generals lasted two days ; but, with the approbation of the supreme junta, it was finally agreed that the British and Spanish armies, under Sir Arthur and Cuesta, should march, on the 18th, against Victor ; and that Venegas, advancing, at the same time, through La Mancha, should leave Toledo and Aranjuez to his left, and push for Fuente Duenas and Villa Maurique on the Upper Tagus. If this movement should draw Sebastiani, with the 4th corps, to that side, Venegas was to keep him in play while the allied forces defeated Victor. If Sebastiani disregarded it, Venegas was to cross the Tagus and march upon Madrid, from the south-east, while Sir Robert Wilson, reinforced by some Spanish battalions, menaced that capital from the opposite quarter.

Previous to entering Spain, Sir Arthur had ascertained that the valleys of the Alagon and the Arago and those between Bejar and Ciudad Rodrigo were fertile and capable of nourishing the army, and he had sent commissaries to all these points to purchase mules, and to arrange with the alcaldes of the different districts for the supply of the troops. He had obtained the warmest assurances, from the supreme junta, that every needful article should be forthcoming, and the latter had also sent the intendant-general, Don Lonzano de Torres, to the British head-quarters, with full powers to forward all arrangements for the supply of the English troops. Relying upon these preparations, Sir Arthur had crossed the frontier with few means of transport and without magazines, for Portugal could not furnish what was required, and, moreover, the Portuguese peasants had an insuperable objection to quitting their own country ; a matter apparently of little consequence, because Mr. Frere, writing officially at the time, described the people of Estremadura as viewing " the war in the light of a crusade, and carrying it on with all the enthusiasm of such a cause ! "

From Castello Branco to Plasencia is but seven days' march, yet that short time was sufficient to prove the bad faith of the junta, and the illusion under which Mr. Frere laboured. Neither mules for the transport of ammunition and provisions, nor the promised help of the authorities, nor aid of any kind could be procured ; and Don Lonzano de Torres, although, to Sir Arthur, he freely acknowledged the extent of the evil, the ill-will of the inhabitants, and the shameful conduct of the supreme junta, afterwards, without shame, asserted that the British troops had always received and consumed double rations, and were in want of nothing ; an assertion in which he was supported by Don Martin de Garay, the Spanish secretary of state ; the whole proceeding being a concerted plan, to afford the junta a pretext for justifying their own and casting a slur upon the English general's conduct, if any disasters should happen.*

Sir Arthur Wellesley, seriously alarmed for the subsistence of his army, wrote, upon the 16th, to Mr. Frere and to general O'Donoghue, the chief of Cuesta's staff ; representing to both the distress of his army, and intimating his resolution *not to proceed beyond the Alberche*, unless his wants were immediately supplied ; faithful, however, to his agreement with Cuesta, he prepared to put the army in motion for that river. It was known at Plasencia, on the 15th, that Ney had retreated from Coruña ; but it was believed that his corps had been recalled to France ; and no change took place in the plan of campaign. It was not suspected that the 6th corps had then been sixteen days at Astorga !

The valley of the Tagus, into which the army was about to plunge, is intersected by several rivers, with rugged banks and deep channels ; but their courses being very little out of the parallel of the Tagus, the Alberche is in a manner enclosed by the Tietar. Now, Sir Robert Wilson, with 4000 Portuguese

and Spanish troops, had ascended the right bank of the latter river, and gained possession of the passes of Arenas, which lead upon Avila, and of the pass of San Pedro Bernardo, which leads upon Madrid. In this position he covered the Vera de Plasencia, and threatened Victor's communications with the capital. The French marshal was alarmed; and a movement of the whole army in the same direction would have obliged him to abandon the Lower Alberche, because, two marches from Arenas, in the direction of Escalona and Macqueda, would have placed Sir Arthur Wellesley between the 1st corps and Madrid. But, on the other hand, the line of country was too rugged for rapid movements with a large body; and it was necessary first to secure a junction with Cuesta, because Victor, having recovered his third division on the 7th of July, was again at the head of 25,000 men. With such a force he could not be trusted near the Spaniards; and the British general resolved to cross the Tietar at the Venta de Bazagona, and march by Miajadas upon Oropesa.

The 16th, two companies of the *staff corps*, with a working party of 500 men, marched from Plasencia to Bazagona, to throw a bridge over the Tietar. The Duke of Belluno had wasted many days in dragging up fifteen pontoons from the Tagus, to form his bridge at that place; and when he retired upon Talavera, he destroyed the greatest part of the equipage; but the English officer employed on this occasion pulled down an old house in the neighbourhood, felled some pine trees in a wood three miles distant; and, uniting intelligence with labour, contrived, without other aid than a few hatchets and saws, in one day, to throw a solid bridge over the Tietar.

The 18th, the army crossed that river, and taking the route of Miajadas, reached Talayuela.

The 19th, the main body halted at Centinello and Casa de Somas; the advanced posts at Venta de St. Juliens.

The 20th, the troops reached Oropesa; but as their marches had been long, and conducted through a difficult country, they halted the 21st; on which day, Cuesta, who had moved from Almaraz by Naval Moral and Arzobispo, passed Oropesa, and united his whole force at Velada, except a small detachment, which marched along the south bank of the Tagus, to threaten the French by the bridge of Talavera.

The Duke of Belluno, aware of these movements, had supported his posts at Talavera with a division of infantry, which was disposed in successive detachments behind that town. His situation appeared critical; because the allies, covered by the Alberche, might still gain a march and reach Escalona before him; and from thence either push for Madrid, by the pass of Brunete, or, taking post at Maqueda, cut him off from the capital. But his sources of information were sure; and he contented himself with sending a regiment of hussars to Cazar de Escalona, to watch the Upper Alberche, and to support the movable column opposed to Sir Robert Wilson.

The 21st, the allies being between Oropesa and Velada, Victor recalled all his foraging parties, altered his line of retreat from the Madrid to the Toledo road, removed his parc from St. Ollalla to Cevolla, and concentrated two divisions of infantry behind the Alberche.

The 22nd, the allies moved in two columns, to drive the French posts from Talavera; and Cuesta, marching by the high-road, came first up with the enemy's rear-guard near the village of Gamonal; but then commenced a display of ignorance, timidity, and absurdity, that has seldom been equalled in war; the past defeats of the Spanish army were rendered quite explicable; the little fruit derived from them by Marshal Victor quite inexplicable. General Latour Maubourg, with 2000 dragoons, came boldly on to the table-land of Gamonal, and sustaining a cannonade, not only checked the head of the Spanish leading column, but actually obliged General Zayas, who commanded it, to display his whole line, consisting of 15,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry; nor did the French horsemen give back at all, until the appearance of the red uniforms on

their right informed them that it was time to retire. Then, and not till then, Latour Maubourg, supported by some infantry, retreated behind the Alberche, and without loss, although many batteries, and at least 6000 Spanish horse, were close on his rear; but the latter could never be induced to make even a partial charge, however favourable the opportunity, and by two o'clock the whole French army was safely concentrated on its position. Ruffin's division on the left touched the Tagus, and protected the bridge over the Alberche, which was more immediately defended by a regiment of infantry and 14 pieces of artillery. Villatte's and Lapisse's divisions, drawn up in successive lines, on some high ground that overlooked the surrounding country, formed the right; the heavy cavalry were in second line near the bridge; and in this situation Victor rested the 22nd and 23rd.

It was at all times difficult to obtain accurate information from the Spaniards by gentle means; hence, the French were usually better supplied with intelligence than the British; while the native generals never knew anything about the enemy until they felt the weight of his blows. Up to this period, Sir Arthur's best sources of information had been the intercepted letters of the French; and now, although the latter had been in the same position, and without any change of numbers since the 7th, the inhabitants of Talavera could not, or would not, give any information of their strength or situation; nor could any reasonable calculation be formed of either, until some English officers crossed the Tagus, and, from the mountains on the left bank of that river, saw the French position in reverse.

The general outline of an attack was, however, agreed upon for the next morning, but the details were unsettled; and when the English commander came to arrange these with Cuesta, the latter was gone to bed. The British troops were under arms at three o'clock the next morning, but Cuesta's staff were not aroused from slumber until seven o'clock; and the old man finally objected to fight that day, alleging, among other absurd reasons, that it was Sunday. But there was something more than absurdity in these proceedings. Victor, who was not ignorant of the weak points of his own position, remained tranquil, the 23rd, being well assured that no attack would take place, for it is certain that he had a correspondence with some of the Spanish staff; and the secret discussions between Sir Arthur Wellesley and Cuesta, at which only one staff officer of each party was present, became known to the enemy in twenty-four hours after; indeed, Cuesta was himself suspected of treachery by many, yet apparently without reason.

In the course of the 23rd, the Spanish officer commanding the advanced posts reported that the French guns were withdrawn, and that it was evident they meant to retreat; Cuesta then became willing to attack, and proposed, in concert with Sir Arthur Wellesley, to examine Victor's position; but, to the surprise of the English commander, the Spaniard arrived in a coach drawn by six horses, to perform this duty; and when the inequalities of the ground obliged him to descend from his vehicle, he cast himself at the foot of a tree, and in a few moments went to sleep. Yet he was always ready to censure and to thwart every proposal of his able coadjutor. This time, however, he consented to fall upon the enemy; and the troops were in motion early in the morning of the 24th; but the Duke of Belluno was again duly informed of their intention; and having withdrawn his movable column from Escalona, and relinquished the road to Madrid, retreated during the night to Torijos. Thus, the first combination of the allies failed entirely; and each hour the troops of the enemy were accumulating round them, for Venegas, who should have been at Fuente Duenas, high up on the Tagus, had not even passed Damyel; and the king was collecting his whole strength in front, between Toledo and Talavera: while Soult was fast gathering his more formidable power behind the mountains of Bejar.

The English general was indeed still ignorant of the danger which threatened

him from the Salamanca country, or he would, doubtless, have withdrawn at once to Plasencia, and secured his communications with Lisbon, and with Beresford's troops ; but other powerful reasons were not wanting to prevent his further advance. Before he quitted Plasencia he had completed contracts with the Alcaldes, in the Vera de Plasencia, for 250,000 rations of forage and provisions ; and this, together with what he had before collected, would have furnished supplies for 10 or 12 days, a sufficient time to beat Victor, and carry the army into a fresh country ; but, distrustful, as he had reason to be, of the Spaniards, he again gave notice to Cuesta and the junta, that *beyond the Alberche* he would not move, unless his wants were immediately supplied ; for hitherto the rations contracted for had not been delivered ; and his representations to the junta and to Cuesta were by both equally disregarded ; there were no means of transport provided ; the troops were already on less than half allowance, and absolute famine approached ; and when the general demanded food for his soldiers, at the hands of those whose cause he came to defend, he was answered with false excuses, and insulted by false statements. Under any circumstances this would have forced him to halt ; but the advance having been made in the exercise of his own discretion, and not at the command of his government, there could be no room for hesitation : wherefore, remonstrating warmly, but manfully, with the supreme junta, he announced his resolution to go no farther, nay, even *to withdraw from Spain altogether*.

It is evident that without these well-founded reasons for pausing, Cuesta's conduct, and the state of his army, offered no solid ground for expecting success by continuing the forward movement ; but the faithless and perverse conduct of the supreme junta, although hidden as yet from Sir Arthur Wellesley, far exceeded the measure even of Cuesta's obdurate folly. That body, after having agreed to the plan upon which the armies were acting, concluded, in the fulness of their ignorance, that the combined troops in the valley of the Tagus would be sufficient to overthrow Joseph ; and, therefore, secretly ordered Venegas not to fulfil his part, arguing to themselves, with a cunning stupidity, that it would be a master stroke of policy to save him from any chance of a defeat ; hoping thus to preserve a powerful force, under one of their own creatures, to maintain their own power. This was the cause why the army of La Mancha had failed to appear on the Tagus : and thus the welfare of millions was made the sport of men who yet were never tired of praising themselves, and have not failed to find admirers elsewhere.

As the Spaniards are perfect masters of the art of saying everything and doing nothing, Sir Arthur's remonstrances drew forth many official statements, plausible replies, and pompous assertions, after their manner, but produced no amelioration of the evils complained of. Mr. Frere, also, thought it necessary to make some apology for himself, asserting that the evil was deep rooted, and that he had had neither time nor power to arrange any regular plan for the subsistence of the English armies. But all the evils that blighted the Spanish cause were deep seated ; and yet Mr. Frere, who could not arrange a plan for the subsistence of the troops, that indispensable preliminary to military operations, and which was really within his province, thought himself competent to direct all the operations themselves which were in the province of the generals. He had found leisure to meddle in all the intrigues of the day ; to aim at making and unmaking Spanish commanders ; to insult Sir John Moore ; to pester Sir John Cradock with warlike advice ; and to arrange the plan of campaign, for Sir Arthur Wellesley's army, without that officer's concurrence.

CHAPTER II.

THE English general's resolution to halt at Talavera made little impression upon Cuesta. A French corps had retreated before him, and Madrid, nay, the Pyrenees themselves, instantly rose on the view of the sanguine Spaniard :

he was resolved to be the first in the capital, and he pushed forward in pursuit, reckless alike of military discipline and of the friendly warnings of Sir Arthur; who vainly admonished him to open his communications as quickly as possible with Venegas, and to beware how he let the enemy know that the British and Spanish armies were separated. In the fulness of his arrogant vanity, Cuesta crossed the Alberche on the 24th, and being unable to ascertain the exact route of the French, pursued them, by the road of Toledo, as far as Cebolla, and by the road of Madrid as far as El Bravo. On the 25th, still inflated with pride, he caused the troops at Cebolla to move on to Torrijos, and marched himself to St. Ollalla. The 26th, he discovered that he had been pursuing a tiger. Meanwhile, Sir Arthur Wellesley, foreseeing the consequence of this imprudence, had sent General Sherbrooke, with two divisions of British infantry and all the cavalry, across the Alberche, to Cazalegas, where, being centrically situated with respect to Talavera, St. Ollalla, and Escalona, he could support the Spaniards, and, at the same time, hold communication with Sir Robert Wilson, who had been at the latter town since the 23rd. But a great and signal crisis was at hand, the full importance of which cannot be well understood without an exact knowledge of the situation and proceedings of all the armies involved in this complicated campaign.

The 30th of June, Soult, when at Zamora, received a despatch from the emperor, dated near Ratisbon, conferring on him the supreme command of the 2nd, 5th, and 6th corps, with orders to concentrate them, and act decisively against the English. "Wellesley," said Napoleon, "will probably advance, by the Tagus, against Madrid: in that case, pass the mountains, fall on his flank and rear, and crush him;" for, at that distance, and without other information than what his own sagacity supplied, this all-knowing soldier foresaw the leading operations even as soon and as certainly as those who projected them.

The Duke of Dalmatia immediately imparted these instructions to the king, and, at the same time, made known his own opinions and designs with respect to the probable projects of the allies. He was ignorant of the precise object and exact position of Sir Arthur Wellesley, but, judging from the cessation of hostility in the north, that the English were in march with the design of joining Cuesta, and acting by the line of the Tagus, he proposed to concentrate the 3rd corps at Salamanca, besiege Ciudad Rodrigo, and menace Lisbon, which, he justly observed, would bring the English army back to the northern provinces of Portugal; and if, as some supposed, the intention of Sir Arthur was to unite at Bragança with Romana, and open the campaign to the north of the Douro, the French army would still be in a suitable position to oppose them.

In pursuance of this opinion, Soult ordered Mortier to approach Ciudad Rodrigo, with the double view of preparing for the siege and covering the quarters of refreshment so much needed by the 2nd corps after its fatigues. Ney also was directed to march with the 6th corps, by the left bank of the Esla, to Zamora; but the spirit of discord was strong, and it was at this moment that the king, alarmed by Sebastiani's report, drew the 5th corps to Villa Castin; while Marshal Ney, holding it imprudent to uncover Astorga and Leon, mortified, also, at being placed under the orders of another marshal, refused to move to Zamora. Soult, crossed by these untoward circumstances, sent the division of light cavalry, under his brother, and one of infantry, commanded by Heudelet, from Zamora and Toro to Salamanca, with orders to explore the course of the Tormes, to observe Alba and Ledesma, and especially to scour the roads leading upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Plasencia: these troops relieved a division of dragoons belonging to Kellerman, who was still charged with the general government of the province.

The 10th of July, the march of the British upon Plasencia became known, and it was manifest that Sir Arthur had no design to act north of the Douro; wherefore the Duke of Dalmatia resolved to advance, with the remainder of the 2nd corps, to Salamanca, and, partly by authority, partly by address, he

obliged Ney to put the 6th corps in movement for Zamora, leaving Fournier's dragoons to cover Astorga and Leon. Meanwhile, King Joseph, having returned from his fruitless excursion against Venegas, was at first incredulous of the advance of Sir Arthur Wellesley and Cuesta, but he agreed to Soult's project against Ciudad Rodrigo, and ordered Mortier to return to Valladolid, where that marshal arrived, with his first division, on the 16th of July: his second division, under General Gazan, halted, however, at Medina del Campo and Nava del Rey, on the route from Salamanca to Valladolid, and an advanced guard was sent forward to Alba de Tormes.

The 13th of July, Soult, being assured that the British army was on the eastern frontier of Portugal, and that considerable reinforcements had been disembarked at Lisbon, became certain that Sir Arthur meant to operate by the line of the Tagus; wherefore he again addressed the king to move him to an immediate siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, promising to have the three corps under his own command in full activity in 15 days, provided his demands were complied with, the most important being—first, the formation of a battering-train; second, the concentration of an immense number of detachments, which weakened the active corps; third, a reinforcement of 15,000 or 20,000 conscripts, drawn from France, to enable the old troops, employed on the line of communication, to join the *corps d'armée*. The 1st corps should, he said, continue to watch the Spanish army of Estremadura, and be prepared either to prevent it from uniting with the English to disturb the siege, or to join the 1st, 2nd, and 6th corps, and give battle, if that should become necessary. The siege might thus be pressed vigorously, Ciudad would fall, Almeida be next invested, and the communications of the English army with Lisbon threatened.

The 17th, the king replied, through Marshal Jourdan, that he approved of the plan, but had not means to meet several of Soult's demands, and he proposed that the latter should reinforce Kellerman and Bonnet, with 10,000 men, to enable them to seize the Asturias, and thus strengthen the communications with France. This drew from the Duke of Dalmatia the following remonstrance:—"Under present circumstances we cannot avoid some sacrifice of territory. Let us prepare, first, by concentrating, on a few points capable of defence and covering the hospitals and depôts which may be on the extremity of our general position. This will not be so distressing as it may appear, because the moment we have beaten and dispersed the enemy's masses we shall recover all our ground." Then reiterating his own advice he concluded thus:—"I conceive it impossible to finish this war by detachments. It is large masses only, the strongest that you can form, that will succeed." It is remarkable that Sir Arthur Wellesley, writing at this time, says, "I conceive that the French are dangerous only when in large masses."

Meanwhile, Heudelet's division, having pushed back the advanced guards of the Duke del Parque upon Ciudad Rodrigo, ascertained that a great movement of troops was taking place near that city, and that Sir Arthur Wellesley, advancing quicker than was expected, had already reached Plasencia; wherefore, on the 18th, Soult directed Mortier to march upon Salamanca with the 5th corps, and, at the same time, reinforced Heudelet's division with Merle's; the latter's place, at Zamora, being supplied by a division of the 6th corps, the remainder of which continued on the Esia, fronting the Tras os Montes. Thus, not less than 50,000 men were at or close to Salamanca, with their cavalry-posts pointing to the passes of Baños, on the very day that Sir Arthur Wellesley crossed the Tietar to effect his junction with Cuesta. Yet, neither through the Duke del Parque, nor Beresford, nor the guerillas, nor the peasantry, did intelligence of this formidable fact reach him!

Having put the three corps in motion, Soult despatched General Foy to Madrid, with information of Sir Arthur's march, and to arrange the future combinations of the two armies. "It is probable," he said, "that the concentration of my army at Salamanca will oblige the English general to change

his plan ; but, if he shall already have advanced on the road to Madrid, we should assemble all our forces, both on the Tagus and on this side, fall upon him altogether, and crush him. Thus, his campaign will be finished, and our operations may go on with advantage."

Foy arrived, the 22nd, at Madrid ; and, a few hours afterwards, intelligence reached the king that the allies were at Talavera, in front of the 1st corps, and that Sir Robert Wilson (whose strength was much exaggerated) was at Escalona. The die was now cast ; Joseph directed Soult to march immediately upon Plasencia, then, leaving General Belliard, with only 3000 men, in the Retiro, set out himself, with his guards and reserve, by the road of Mostoles, to join Victor at Talavera. The 23rd, being at Naval-Carneiro, he received notice that the 1st corps would retreat that night to Torrijos, and, in two days, would be behind the Guadarama river ; whereupon, turning to the left, Joseph descended the Guadarama to Vargas, and effected his junction with the Duke of Belluno on the 25th.

During this time, Sebastiani, who had been watching Venegas near Damyel, deceived that general, and, returning to Toledo by forced marches, left 3000 men there, with the design of obliging him to cross the Tagus, at Aranjuez. With the remainder of the 4th corps Sebastiani joined the king : and thus nearly 50,000 fighting men and 90 pieces of artillery were concentrated, on the morning of the 26th, behind the Guadarama, and within a few miles of Cuesta's advanced guard. But, on the side of the allies, the main body of the Spaniards was at St. Ollalla ; Sherbrooke with two divisions and the cavalry, at Casalegas ; and the rest of the English in Talavera. So that, while the French were concentrated and in full march to attack ; the allies were separated in four nearly equal and unconnected parts, of which three were enclosed, as it were, in a net, between the Alberche and the Tagus ! On such an occasion Napoleon would have been swift and deadly.

In retiring upon Toledo, instead of Madrid, the Duke of Belluno showed himself an able commander. Toledo was the strategic pivot upon which every movement turned. It was the central point, by holding which the army of Venegas was separated from the allies on the Alberche. If the latter advanced, Soult's operations rendered every forward step a stride towards ruin. If, leaving Venegas to his fate, they retired, it must be rapidly, or there would be neither wisdom nor safety in the measure. The king knew that Foy would reach Soult the 24th, and as that marshal had already assembled his army about Salamanca, which was only four days' march from Plasencia, he might be in the valley of the Tagus by the 30th ; hence, to insure complete success, the royal army needed only to keep the allies in check for four or five days. This was the plan that Soult had recommended, that the king promised to follow, and that Marshal Jourdan strenuously supported. The unskilful proceedings of Cuesta and Venegas, the separation of the allies, the distressed state of the English army, actually on the verge of famine (a circumstance that could hardly be unknown to Victor), greatly facilitated the execution of this project, which did not preclude the king from punishing the folly of the Spanish general, whose army, scattered and without order, discipline, or plan, so strongly invited an attack.

I have said that Cuesta was playing with a tiger : he had some faint perception of his danger on the 25th, and he gave orders to retreat on the 26th ; but the French, suddenly passing the Guadarama, at two o'clock in the morning of that day, quickly drove the Spanish cavalry out of Torrijos, and pursued them to Alcabon. Here General Zayas had drawn up 4000 infantry, 2000 horsemen, and eight guns, on a plain, and offered battle.

COMBAT OF ALCABON.

The Spanish right rested on the road of Domingo Peres, and the left on a chapel of the same name. The French cavalry, under Latour Maubourg, advanced in a parallel line against the Spaniards, and a cannonade commenced ;

but, at that moment, the head of the French infantry appearing in sight, the Spaniards broke, and fled in disorder towards St. Ollalla, followed, at full gallop, by the horsemen, who pressed them so sorely that the panic would, doubtless, have spread through the whole army, but for the courage of Albuquerque, who, coming up with a division of 3000 fresh cavalry, held the enemy in play, while Cuesta retreated, in the greatest disorder, towards the Alberche.

After reaching St. Ollalla, the French slackened their efforts; the main body halted there, and the advanced guards, save a few cavalry-posts, did not pass El Bravo, and no attempt was made to profit from the unconnected position of the allies—a gross and palpable error; for either by the sword or dispersion, the Spaniards lost, on that day, not less than 4000 men; and such was their fear and haste that it required but a little more perseverance in the pursuit to cause a general route. Albuquerque, alone, showed any front; but his efforts were unavailing, and the disorder continued to increase until General Sherbrooke, marching out of Cazalegas, placed his divisions between the scared troops and the enemy. Still the danger was imminent; there was no concert between the commanders, the ground on the left of the Alberche was unfavourable to a retiring party, and, as yet, no position upon which the combined forces could retire had been agreed upon! What, then, would have been the consequence if the whole French army had borne down, compact and strong, into the midst of the disordered masses?

Sir Arthur Wellesley, who, at the first alarm, had hastened to the front, seeing the confusion beyond the Alberche, knew that a battle was at hand; and, being persuaded that in a strong defensive position only could the Spaniards be brought to stand a shock, earnestly endeavoured to persuade Cuesta, while Sherbrooke's people could yet cover the movement, to withdraw to Talavera, where there was ground suited for defence; but Cuesta's uncouth nature again broke forth; his people were beaten, dispirited, fatigued, bewildered; clustered on a narrow slip of low, flat land, between the Alberche, the Tagus, and the heights of Salinas; and the first shot fired by the enemy must have been the signal of defeat; yet it was in vain that Sir Arthur Wellesley pointed out those things, and entreated of him to avoid the fall of the rock that trembled over his head; he replied, that his troops would be disheartened by any further retreat, that he would fight where he stood: and in this mood he passed the night.

The 27th, at daylight, the British general renewed his solicitations, at first, fruitlessly, but when the enemy's cavalry came in sight, and Sherbrooke prepared to retire, Cuesta sullenly yielded, yet turning to his staff with frantic pride, observed that "he had first made the Englishman go down on his knees." Sir Arthur Wellesley, by virtue of his genius, now assumed the direction of both armies. General Mackenzie's division and a brigade of light cavalry were left on the Alberche, to cover the retrograde movement: but the rest of the allied troops was soon in full march for the position, which was about six miles in the rear. Sir Robert Wilson, who had reached Naval Carneiro on the 25th, and opened a communication with Madrid, and who would certainly have entered that capital but for the approaching battle, was also recalled. He returned, on the 28th, to Escalona, and hung on the enemy's rear, but did not attempt to join the army.

Between the Alberche and the town of Talavera the country was flat, and covered with olives and cork-trees; and, on the north, nearly parallel to the Tagus, and at a distance of about two or three miles, a chain of round but steep hills bounded the woody plain. Beyond these hills, but separated from them by a deep and rugged valley, something less than half a mile wide, was the high mountain-ridge which divides the bed of the Alberche from that of the Tietar. Hence, a line drawn perpendicularly from the Tagus would cross the first chain of hills at the distance of two miles, and at two miles and a half would fall on the mountains.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, taking the town of Talavera, which was built close to

the river, as his fixed point, placed the right of the Spaniards there, drawing their army up in two lines, with the left resting upon a mound, where a large field-redoubt was constructed, and behind which a brigade of British light cavalry was posted. The front was covered by a convent, by ditches, mud walls, breastworks, and felled trees. The cavalry was posted behind the infantry; and the rear was supported by a large house in the wood, well placed, in case of defeat, to cover a retreat on to the main roads leading from Talavera to Arzobispo and Oropesa. In this position they could not be attacked seriously, nor their disposition be even seen; and, thus, one-half of the line necessary to be occupied by the allies was rendered nearly impregnable, and yet held by the worst troops.

The front of battle was prolonged by the British infantry. General Campbell's division, formed in two lines, touched the Spanish left; General Sherbrooke's division stood next to Campbell's, but arranged on one line only, because General Mackenzie's division, destined to form the second, was then near the Alberche. It was intended that General Hill's division should close the left of the British, by taking post on the highest hill, in the chain before mentioned, as bounding the flat and woody country; but, by some accident, the summit of this height was not immediately occupied.

The whole line, thus displayed, was about two miles in length, the left being covered by the valley between the hill and the mountain; and from this valley a ravine, or water-course, opened, deeply, in the front of the British left, but being gradually obliterated in the flat ground about the centre of the line. Part of the British cavalry was with General Mackenzie, and in the plain in front of the left, and part behind the great redoubt, at the junction of the allied troops.* The British and Germans under arms that day were somewhat above 19,000 sabres and bayonets, with 30 guns. The Spaniards after their previous defeat could only produce from 33,000 to 34,000 men; but they had 70 guns. The combined army, therefore, offered battle with 44,000 infantry, nearly 10,000 cavalry, and 100 pieces of artillery; and the French were coming on with at least 80 guns, and, including the king's guards, nearly 50,000 men, of which above 7000 were cavalry. But what a difference in the quality of the troops! The French were all hardy veterans, while the genuine soldiers of the allied army did not exceed 19,000.

The king, having passed the night of the 26th at St. Ollalla, put his troops in motion again before daylight on the 27th. Latour Maubourg, with the cavalry, preceded the column, and the 1st and 4th corps, the royal guards, and reserve, followed in succession. The appearance of the leading squadrons, near Cazalegas, hastened, as we have seen, Cuesta's decision, and, about one o'clock in the afternoon, the 1st corps reached the heights of Salinas, from whence the dust of the allies, as they took up their position, could be perceived; but neither their situation nor disposition could be made out, on account of the forest, which, clothing the country from the Tagus nearly to the foot of the first range of hills, masked all their evolutions. The Duke of Belluno, however, being well acquainted with the ground, instantly guessed their true position; and, in pursuance of his advice, the king ordered the 4th corps to march against the left of the allies; the cavalry against the centre, and Victor himself, with the 1st corps, against the right: the guards and the reserve supported the 4th corps.

Two good routes, suitable to artillery, led from the Alberche to the position; the one, being the royal road to Talavera, was followed by the 4th corps and the reserve; the other, passing through a place called the *Casa des Salinas*, led directly upon Sir Arthur Wellesley's extreme left, and was followed by the 1st corps: but to reach this Casa, which was situated near the plain in front of the British left wing, it was necessary to ford the Alberche, and to march for a mile or two through the woods. A dust which was observed to rise near the Casa itself indicated the presence of troops at that place; and, in fact, General

Mackenzie's division, and a brigade of light cavalry, were there posted: the infantry in the forest, the cavalry on the plain; but no patrols were sent to the front; and this negligence gave rise to the

COMBAT OF SALINAS.

For, about three o'clock, Lapisse and Ruffin's division having crossed the Alberche, marched in two columns towards the *Casa de Salinas*, and their light infantry came so suddenly on the British outposts that the latter were surprised, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, who was in the Casa, nearly fell into the enemy's hands. The French columns followed briskly, and charged so hotly that the English brigades were separated; and being composed principally of young battalions, got into confusion, one part fired upon another, and the whole were driven into the plain. But, in the midst of the disorder, the 45th, a stubborn old regiment, and some companies of the 5th battalion of the 60th, were seen in perfect array; and when Sir Arthur rode up to the spot, the fight was restored, and maintained so steadily that the enemy was checked. The infantry, supported by two brigades of cavalry, then crossed the plain, and regained the left and centre of the position, having lost about 400 men. General Mackenzie, with one brigade, immediately took post in second line behind the guards; the other, commanded by Colonel Donkin, finding the hill on the left unoccupied, drew up there, and so completed the position. The cavalry was formed in column behind the left of the line.

Victor, animated by the success of this first operation, brought up Villatte's division, together with all the artillery and light cavalry, to the Casa de Salinas; then, issuing from the forest, rapidly crossed the plain; and advancing, with a fine military display, close up to the left of the position, occupied an isolated hill directly in front of Colonel Donkin's ground, and immediately opened a heavy cannonade upon that officer's brigade. Meanwhile, the 4th corps and the reserve approaching the right more slowly, and being unable to discover the true situation of Cuesta's troops, sent their light cavalry forward to make that general show his lines. The French horsemen rode boldly to the front, and commenced skirmishing with their pistols, and the Spaniards answered them with a general discharge of small arms; but then, 10,000 infantry, and all the artillery, breaking their ranks, fled into the rear: the artillery-men carried off their horses; the infantry threw away their arms, and the Adjutant-General O'Donoghue was amongst the foremost of the fugitives. Nay, Cuesta himself was in movement towards the rear. The panic spread, and the French would fain have charged; but Sir Arthur Wellesley, who was at hand, immediately flanked the main road with some English squadrons: the ditches on the other side rendered the country impracticable; and the fire of musketry being renewed by those Spaniards who remained, the enemy lost some men, and finally retreated in disorder.

The greatest part of Cuesta's runaways fled as far as Oropesa, giving out that the allies were totally defeated, and the French army in hot pursuit; thus the rear became a scene of incredible disorder: the commissaries went off with their animals; the paymasters carried away their money chests; the baggage was scattered; and the alarm spread far and wide: nor is it to be concealed, that some English officers disgraced their uniform on this occasion. Cuesta, however, having recovered from his first alarm, sent many of his cavalry regiments to head the fugitives, and drive them back; and a part of the artillery, and some thousands of the infantry, were thus recovered during the night; but, in the next day's fight, the Spanish army was less by 6000 men than it should have been and the great redoubt in the centre was silent for want of guns.

COMBAT ON THE EVENING OF THE 27TH.

The hill on the left of the British army was the key of the whole position. It was steep and rugged on the side towards the French, and it was rendered more inaccessible by the ravine at the bottom; but towards the English side it was of a smooth ascent. Victor, however, observing that the extreme summit

was unoccupied, and that Donkin's brigade was feeble, conceived the design of seizing it by a sudden assault. The sun was sinking; and the twilight and the confusion among the Spaniards on the right appeared so favourable to his project that, without communicating with the king, he immediately directed Ruffin's division to attack, Villatte to follow in support, and Lapisse to fall on the German legion, so as to create a diversion for Ruffin, but without engaging seriously himself. The assault was quick and vigorous: Colonel Donkin beat back the enemy in his front, but his force was too weak to defend every part; and many of the French turned his left, and mounted to the summit behind him. At this moment, General Hill was ordered to reinforce him; and it was not yet dark when that officer, while giving orders to the colonel of the 48th regiment, was fired at by some troops from the highest point. Thinking they were stragglers from his own ranks, firing at the enemy, he rode quickly up to them, followed by his brigade-major, Fordyce; and in a moment found himself in the midst of the French. Fordyce was killed; and Hill's own horse was wounded by a grenadier, who immediately seized the bridle; but the general, spurring the animal hard, broke the man's hold, and galloping down the descent met the 29th regiment, and, without an instant's delay, led them up with such a fierce charge, that the enemy could not sustain the shock.

The summit was thus recovered; and the 48th regiment and the 1st battalion of detachments were immediately brought forward, and, in conjunction with the 29th and Colonel Donkin's brigade, presented a formidable front of defence; and in good time, for the troops thus beaten back were only a part of the 9th French regiment, forming the advance of Ruffin's division; but the two other regiments of that division had lost their way in the ravine; hence the attack had not ceased, but only subsided for a time. Lapisse was in motion, and soon after opened his fire against the German legion; and all the battalions of the 9th, being re-formed in one mass, again advanced up the face of the hill with redoubled vigour. The fighting then became vehement; and, in the darkness, the opposing flashes of the musketry showed with what a resolute spirit the struggle was maintained, for the combatants were scarcely twenty yards asunder, and for a time the event seemed doubtful; but soon the well-known shout of the British soldier was heard, rising above the din of arms, and the enemy's broken troops were driven once more into the ravine below. Lapisse, who had made some impression on the German legion, immediately abandoned his false attack, and the fighting of the 27th ceased. The British lost about 800 men, and the French about 1000 on that day. The bivouac fires now blazed up on both sides, and the French and British soldiers became quiet; but, about twelve o'clock, the Spaniards on the right being alarmed at some horse in their front, opened a prodigious peal of musketry and artillery, which continued for twenty minutes without any object; and during the night, the whole line was frequently disturbed by desultory firing from both the Spanish and English troops, by which several men and officers were unfortunately slain.

The Duke of Belluno, who had learned, from the prisoners, the exact position of the Spaniards, until then unknown to the French generals, now reported his own failure to the king, and proposed that a second attempt should be made in the morning at daylight; but Marshal Jourdan opposed this, as being a partial enterprise, which could not lead to any great result. Victor, however, was earnest for a trial, and, resting his representation on his intimate knowledge of the ground, pressed the matter so home, that he won Joseph's assent, and immediately made dispositions for the attack. The guns of the 1st corps, being formed in one mass, on the height corresponding to that on which the English left was posted, were enabled to command the great valley on their own right, to range the summit of the hill in their front, and obliquely to search the whole of the British line to the left, as far as the great redoubt between the allied armies.

Ruffin's division was placed in advance, and Villatte's in rear, of the artillery; but the former kept one regiment close to the ravine.

Lapisse occupied some low table-land, opposite to Sherbrooke's division.

Latour Maubourg's cavalry formed a reserve to Lapisse; and General Beaumont's cavalry formed a reserve to Ruffin.

On the English side, General Hill's division was concentrated; the cavalry was massed behind the left, and the parc of artillery and hospitals established under cover of the hill, between the cavalry and Hill's division.

COMBAT ON THE MORNING OF THE 28TH.

About daybreak, Ruffin's troops were drawn up, two regiments abreast, supported by a third, in columns of battalions; and in this order went forth against the left of the British, a part directly against the front, and a part from the valley on the right, thus embracing two sides of the hill. Their march was rapid and steady; they were followed by Villatte's division, and their assault was preceded by a burst of artillery that rattled round the height and swept away the English ranks by whole sections. The sharp chattering of the musketry succeeded, the French guns were then pointed towards the British centre and right, the grenadiers instantly closed upon General Hill's division, and the height sparkled with fire. The inequalities of the ground broke the compact formation of the troops on both sides, and small bodies were seen here and there struggling for the mastery with all the virulence of a single combat; in some places the French grenadiers were overthrown at once, in others they would not be denied, and reached the summit; but the reserves were always ready to vindicate their ground, and no permanent footing was obtained. Still the conflict was maintained with singular obstinacy; Hill himself was wounded, and his men were falling fast; but the enemy suffered more, and gave back, step by step at first, and slowly, to cover the retreat of their wounded; but, finally, unable to sustain the increasing fury of the English, and having lost above 1500 men in the space of 40 minutes, the whole mass broke away in disorder, and returned to their own position, covered by the renewed play of their powerful artillery.

To this destructive fire no adequate answer could be made, for the English guns were few, and of small calibre; and when Sir Arthur Wellesley desired a reinforcement from Cuesta, the latter sent him only two pieces; yet even those were serviceable, and the Spanish gunners fought them gallantly. The principal line of the enemy's retreat was by the great valley, and a favourable opportunity for a charge of horse occurred; but the English cavalry, having retired during the night for water and forage, were yet too distant to be of service. However, these repeated efforts of the French against the hill, and the appearance of some of their light troops on the mountain, beyond the left, taught the English general that he had committed a fault in not prolonging his flank across the valley; and he hastened to rectify it. For this purpose, he placed the principal mass of his cavalry there, with the leading squadrons looking into the valley, and, having obtained, from Cuesta, General Bassecour's division of infantry, posted it on the mountain itself, in observation of the French light troops. Meanwhile, the Duke of Albuquerque, discontented with Cuesta's arrangements, came, with his division, to Sir Arthur Wellesley, who placed him behind the British, thus displaying a formidable array of horsemen, six lines in depth.

Immediately after the failure of Ruffin's attack, King Joseph, having, in person, examined the whole position of the allies, from left to right, demanded of Jourdan and Victor if he should deliver a general battle. The former replied that the great valley and the mountain being unoccupied, on the 27th, Sir Arthur Wellesley's attention should have been drawn to the right by a feint on the Spaniards; that, during the night, the whole army should have been silently placed in column, at the entrance of the great valley, ready, at daybreak, to form a line of battle, on the left, to a new front, and so have attacked the hill from whence Victor had been twice repulsed. Such a movement, he said, would have obliged the allies to change their front also, and, during this

operation, they might have been assailed with hopes of success. But this project could not now be executed; the English, aware of their mistake, had secured their left flank by occupying the valley; and the mountain and their front was inattackable. *Hence, the only prudent line was to take up a position on the Alberche, and await the effect of Soult's operations on the English rear.*

Marshal Victor opposed this counsel; he engaged to carry the hill on the English left, notwithstanding his former failures, provided the 4th corps would attack the right and centre at the same moment; and he finished his argument by declaring that, if such a combination failed, "It was time to renounce making war."

The king was embarrassed. His own opinion coincided with Jourdan's; but he feared that Victor would cause the emperor to believe a great opportunity had been lost; and, while thus wavering, a despatch arrived from Soult, by which it appeared that his force could only reach Plasencia between the 3rd and 5th of August. Now, a detachment from the army of Venegas had already appeared near Toledo, and that general's advanced guard was approaching Aranjuez. The king was troubled by the danger thus threatening Madrid, because all the stores, the reserve artillery, and the general hospitals of the whole army in Spain were deposited there; and, moreover, the tolls received at the gates of that town formed almost the only pecuniary resource of his court, so narrowly did Napoleon reduce the expenditure of the war.

These considerations overpowered his judgment, and, adopting the worse and rejecting the better counsel, he resolved to succour the capital; but, before separating the army, he determined to try the chance of a battle. Indecision is a cancer in war: Joseph should have adhered to the plan arranged with Soult; the advantages were obvious, the ultimate success sure, and the loss of Madrid was nothing in the scale, because it could only be temporary; but, if the king thought otherwise, he should have decided to fight for it at once; he should have drawn the 5th corps to him, prepared his plan, and fallen, with the utmost rapidity, upon Cuesta, the 26th; his advanced guard should have been on the Alberche that evening, and, before 12 o'clock on the 27th, the English army would have been without the aid of a single Spanish soldier. But, after neglecting the most favourable opportunity when his army was full of ardour, he now, with singular inconsistency, resolved to give battle, when his enemies were completely prepared, strongly posted, and in the pride of success, and when the confidence of his own troops was shaken by the partial action of the morning.

While the French generals were engaged in council, the troops on both sides took some rest, and the English wounded were carried to the rear; but the soldiers were suffering from hunger; the regular service of provisions had ceased for several days, and a few ounces of wheat, in the grain, formed the whole subsistence of men who had fought, and who were yet to fight, so hardly. The Spanish camp was full of confusion and distrust. Cuesta inspired terror, but no confidence; and Albuquerque, whether from conviction or instigated by momentary anger, just as the French were coming on to the final attack, sent one of his staff to inform the English commander that Cuesta was betraying him. The aide-de-camp, charged with this message, delivered it to Colonel Donkin, and that officer carried it to Sir Arthur Wellesley. The latter, seated on the summit of the hill which had been so gallantly contested, was intently watching the movements of the advancing enemy; he listened to this somewhat startling message without so much as turning his head, and then drily answering—"Very well, you may return to your brigade," continued his survey of the French. Donkin retired, filled with admiration of the imperturbable resolution and quick penetration of the man; and, indeed, Sir Arthur's conduct was, throughout that day, such as became a general upon whose vigilance and intrepidity the fate of 50,000 men depended.

BATTLE OF TALAVERA.

The dispositions of the French were soon completed. Ruffin's division, on the extreme right, was destined to cross the valley, and, moving by the foot of the mountain, to turn the British left.

Villatte's orders were to menace the contested height with one brigade, and to guard the valley with another, which, being strengthened by a battalion of grenadiers, connected Ruffin's movement with the main attack.

Lapisse, supported by Latour Maubourg's dragoons, and by the king's reserve, was instructed to pass the ravine in front of the English centre, and to fall, with half his infantry, upon Sherbrooke's division, while the other half, connecting its attack with Villatte's brigade, mounted the hill, and made a third effort to master that important point.

Milhaud's dragoons were left on the main road, opposite Talavera, to keep the Spaniards in check; but the rest of the heavy cavalry was brought into the centre, behind General Sebastiani, who, with the 4th corps, was to assail the right of the British army. A part of the French light cavalry supported Villatte's brigade in the valley, and a part remained in reserve.

A number of guns were distributed among the divisions, but the principal mass remained on the hill, with the reserve of light cavalry; where, also, the Duke of Belluno stationed himself, to direct the movements of the 1st corps.

From nine o'clock in the morning until mid-day the field of battle offered no appearance of hostility; the weather was intensely hot, and the troops, on both sides, descended and mingled, without fear or suspicion, to quench their thirst at the little brook which divided the positions; but, at one o'clock in the afternoon, the French soldiers were seen to gather round their eagles, and the rolling of drums was heard along the whole line. Half an hour later, the king's guards, the reserve, and the 4th corps were descried, near the centre of the enemy's position, marching to join the 1st corps; and, at two o'clock, the table-land and the height on the French right, even to the valley, were covered with the dark and lowering masses. At this moment some hundreds of English soldiers, employed to carry the wounded to the rear, returned in one body, and were, by the French, supposed to be Sir Robert Wilson's corps joining the army; nevertheless, the Duke of Belluno, whose arrangements were now completed, gave the signal for battle: and 80 pieces of artillery immediately sent a tempest of bullets before the light troops, who, coming on swiftly and with the violence of a hail-storm, were closely followed by the broad, black columns, in all the majesty of war.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, from the summit of the hill, had a clear view of the whole field of battle; and first he saw the 4th corps rush forwards, with the usual impetuosity of French soldiers, and clearing the intersected ground in their front fall upon Campbell's division with infinite fury; but that general, assisted by Mackenzie's brigade, and by two Spanish battalions, withstood their utmost efforts. The English regiments, putting the French skirmishers aside, met the advancing columns with loud shouts, and, breaking in on their front, and lapping their flanks with fire, and giving no respite, pushed them back with a terrible carnage. Ten guns were taken; but, as General Campbell prudently forbore pursuit, the French rallied on their supports, and made a show of attacking again: vain attempt! The British artillery and musketry played too vehemently upon their masses, and a Spanish regiment of cavalry charging on their flank at the same time, the whole retired in disorder, and the victory was secured in that quarter.

But, while this was passing on the right, Villatte's division, preceded by the grenadiers, and supported by two regiments of light cavalry, was seen advancing up the great valley against the left, and, beyond Villatte's, Ruffin was discovered marching towards the mountain. Sir Arthur Wellesley immediately ordered Anson's brigade of cavalry, composed of the 23rd light dragoons and the 1st German hussars, to charge the head of these columns; and this brigade,

coming on at a canter, and increasing its speed as it advanced, rode headlong against the enemy, but, in a few moments, came upon the brink of a hollow cleft, which was not perceptible at a distance. The French, throwing themselves into squares, opened their fire; and Colonel Arenstchild, commanding the hussars, an officer whom forty years' experience had made a master in his art, promptly reined up at the brink, exclaiming, in his broken phrase, "I will not kill my young mens!"

The English blood was hotter! The 23rd, under Colonel Seymour, rode wildly down into the hollow, and men and horses fell over each other in dreadful confusion. The survivors, still untamed, mounted the opposite bank by twos and threes; Seymour was wounded; but Major Frederick Ponsonby, a hardy soldier, rallying all who came up, passed through the midst of Villatte's columns, and, reckless of the musketry from each side, fell, with inexpressible violence, upon a brigade of French *chasseurs* in the rear. The combat was fierce but short; Victor had perceived the first advance of the English, and detached his Polish lancers, and Westphalian light-horse, to the support of Villatte; and these fresh troops coming up when the 23rd, already overmatched, could scarcely hold up against the *chasseurs*, entirely broke them. Those who were not killed or taken made for Bassecour's Spanish division, and so escaped, leaving behind 207 men and officers, or about half the number that went into action.

During this time the hill, the key of the position, was again attacked, and Lapisse, crossing the ravine, pressed hard upon the English centre; his own artillery, aided by the great battery on his right, opened large gaps in Sherbrooke's ranks, and the French columns came close up to the British line in the resolution to win; but they were received with a general discharge of all arms and so vigorously encountered, that they gave back in disorder; and, in the excitement of the moment, the brigade of English guards, quitting the line, followed up their success with inconsiderate ardour. The enemy's supporting columns and dragoons advanced, the men who had been repulsed turned again, and the French batteries pounded the flank and front of the guards.

Thus maltreated, the latter drew back, and, at the same moment, the German legion, being sorely pressed, got into confusion. Hill's and Campbell's divisions, on the extremities of the line, still held fast; but the centre of the British was absolutely broken, and the fate of the day seemed to incline in favour of the French, when, suddenly, Colonel Donellan, with the 48th regiment, was seen advancing through the midst of the disordered masses. At first, it seemed as if this regiment must be carried away by the retiring crowds, but, wheeling back by companies, it let them pass through the intervals, and then, resuming its proud and beautiful line, marched against the right of the pursuing columns, and plied them with such a destructive musketry, and closed upon them with such a firm and regular pace, that the forward movement of the French was checked. The guards and the Germans immediately rallied; a brigade of light cavalry came up from the second line at a trot; the artillery battered the enemy's flanks without intermission, and the French, beginning to waver, soon lost their advantage, and the battle was restored.

In all actions there is one critical and decisive moment which will give the victory to the general who knows how to seize it. When the guards first made their rash charge, Sir Arthur Wellesley, foreseeing the issue of it, had ordered the 48th down from the hill, although a rough battle was going on there; and, at the same time, he directed Cotton's light cavalry to advance. These dispositions gained the day. The French relaxed their efforts by degrees; the fire of the English grew hotter; and their loud and confident shouts—sure augury of success—were heard along the whole line.

In the hands of a great general, Joseph's guards and the reserve, which were yet entire, might have restored the combat: but all combination was at an end on the French side. The 4th corps, beaten back on the left with the loss of ten guns, was in confusion; the troops in the great valley on the right, amazed at

the furious charge of the 23rd, and awed by the sight of four distinct lines of cavalry, still in reserve, remained stationary. No impression had been made on the hill; Lapisse himself was mortally wounded, and, at last, his division giving way, the whole army retired to its position, from whence it had descended to the attack. This retrograde movement was covered by skirmishers and an increasing fire of artillery; and the British, reduced to less than 14,000 sabres and bayonets, and exhausted by toil, and the want of food, could not pursue. The Spanish army was incapable of any evolution, and about six o'clock all hostility ceased, each army holding the position of the morning. But the battle was scarcely over when, the dry grass and shrubs taking fire, a volume of flames passed with inconceivable rapidity across a part of the field, scorching, in its course, both the dead and the wounded.

On the British side two generals (Mackenzie and Langworth), 31 officers of inferior rank, and 767 serjeants and soldiers were killed upon the spot; and three generals, 192 officers, 3718 serjeants and privates wounded. Nine officers, 643 serjeants and soldiers were missing; thus making a total loss of 6268, in the two days' fighting, of which 5422 fell on the 28th.

The French suffered more severely. Two generals and 944 killed; 6294 wounded, and 156 prisoners; furnishing a total of 7389 men and officers, of which 4000 were of the 1st corps. Of 17 guns captured, ten were taken by General Campbell's division, and seven were left in the woods by the French.


The Spaniards returned above 1200 men killed and wounded, but the correctness of the report was very much doubted at the time.

The 29th, at daybreak, the French army quitted its position, and, before six o'clock, was in order of battle on the heights of Salinas, behind the Alberche. That day, also, General Robert Crawford reached the English camp, with the 43rd, 52nd, and 95th or rifle regiment, and immediately took charge of the outposts. These troops, after a march of 20 miles, were in *bivouac* near Malpartida de Plasencia, when the alarm, caused by the fugitive Spanish, spread to that part. Crawford allowed the men to rest for a few hours, and then, withdrawing about 50 of the weakest from the ranks, commenced his march with the resolution not to halt until he reached the field of battle. As the brigade advanced, crowds of the runaways were met with; and those not all Spaniards, propagating the vilest falsehoods: "the army was defeated,"—"Sir Arthur Wellesley was killed,"—"the French were only a few miles distant;" and some, blinded by their fears, affected even to point out the enemy's advanced posts on the nearest hills. Indignant at this shameful scene the troops hastened, rather than slackened, the impetuosity of their pace; and leaving only 17 stragglers behind, in 26 hours they had crossed the field of battle in a close and compact body, having, in that time, passed over 62 English miles, and in the hottest season of the year, each man carrying from 50 to 60 pounds weight upon his shoulders. Had the historian Gibbon known of such a march, he would have spared his sneer about the "delicacy of modern soldiers!"

OBSERVATIONS.

1. The moral courage evinced by Sir Arthur Wellesley, when, with such a coadjutor as Cuesta, he accepted battle, was not less remarkable than the judicious disposition which, finally, rendered him master of the field. Yet it is doubtful if he could have maintained his position had the French been well managed, and their strength reserved for the proper moment, instead of being wasted on isolated attacks during the night of the 27th, and the morning of the 28th. A pitched battle is a great affair. A good general will endeavour to bring all the moral, as well as the physical, force of his army into play at the same time, if he means to win, and all may be too little.

Marshal Jourdan's project was conceived in this spirit, and worthy of his reputation; and it is possible that he might have placed his army, unperceived, on the flank of the English, and by a sudden and general attack have carried the key of the position, and so commenced his battle well: but Sir Arthur



Wellesley's resources would not then have been exhausted. He had foreseen such a movement, and was prepared, by a change of front, to keep the enemy in check with his left wing and cavalry; while the right, marching upon the position abandoned by the French, should cut the latter off from the Alberche. In this movement the allies would have been reinforced by Wilson's corps, which was near Cazalegas, and the contending armies would then have exchanged lines of operation. The French could, however, have gained nothing, unless they won a complete victory; but the allies would, even though defeated, have ensured their junction with Venegas. Madrid and Toledo would have fallen; and before Soult could unite with Joseph, a new line of operations, through the fertile country of La Mancha, would have been obtained. But these matters are only speculative.

2. The distribution of the French troops for the great attack cannot be praised. The attempt to turn the English left with a single division was puerile. The allied cavalry was plainly to be seen in the valley; how, then, could a single division hope to develop its attack upon the hill, when 5000 horsemen were hanging upon its flank? and, in fact, the whole of Ruffin's, and the half of Villatte's division, were paralyzed by the charge of a single regiment. To have rendered this movement formidable, the principal part of the French cavalry should have preceded the march of the infantry; but the great error was fighting at all, before Soult reached Plasencia.

3. It has been said, that to complete the victory Sir Arthur Wellesley should have caused the Spaniards to advance; but this would, more probably, have led to a defeat. Neither Cuesta, nor his troops, were capable of an orderly movement. The infantry of the 1st and 4th corps were still above 20,000 strong; and, although a repulsed, by no means a discomfited force. The cavalry, the king's guards, and Dessolle's division, had not been engaged at all, and were alone sufficient to beat the Spaniards. A second panic, such as that of the 27th, would have led to the most deplorable consequences, as those who know with what facility French soldiers recover from a repulse will readily acknowledge. This battle was one of hard honest fighting, and the exceeding gallantry of the troops honoured the nations to which they belonged. The English owed much to the general's dispositions and something to fortune. The French owed nothing to their commander; but when it is considered that only the reserve of their infantry was withheld from the great attack on the 28th, and that, consequently, above 30,000 men were closely and unsuccessfully engaged for three hours with 16,000 British, it must be confessed that the latter proved themselves to be truly formidable soldiers; yet the greatest part were raw men, so lately drafted from the militia regiments that many of them still bore the number of their former regiments on their accoutrements.

CHAPTER III.

THE French rested the 29th at Salinas; but in the night the king marched with the 4th corps and the reserve to St. Ollalla, from whence he sent a division to relieve Toledo. The 31st, he halted. The 1st of August he marched to Illescas, a central position, from whence he could interpose between Venegas and the capital. The Duke of Belluno, with the 1st corps, remained on the Alberche, having orders to fall upon the rear-guard of the allies, when the latter should be forced to retire, in consequence of Soult's operations. Meantime, Sir Robert Wilson, who, during the action was near Cazalegas, returned to Escalona; and Victor, displaying an unaccountable dread of this small body, which he supposed to be the precursor of the allied army, immediately retired, first to Marquedá, then to Santa Cruz del Retamar, and was even proceeding to Mostoles, when a retrograde movement of the allies recalled him to the Alberche.

The British army was so weak, and had suffered so much, that the 29th and 30th were passed by Sir Arthur in establishing his hospitals at Talavera, and in fruitless endeavours to procure provisions, and the necessary assistance to prevent the wounded men from perishing. Neither Cuesta nor the inhabitants of Talavera, although possessing ample means, would render the slightest aid, nor would they even assist to bury the dead. The corn secreted in Talavera was alone sufficient to support the army for a month; but the troops were starving, although the inhabitants, who had fled across the Tagus with their portable effects at the beginning of the battle, had now returned. It is not surprising that, in such circumstances, men should endeavour to save their property, especially provisions; yet the apathy with which they beheld the wounded men dying for want of aid, and those who were found sinking from hunger, did in no wise answer Mr. Frere's description of them, as men who "looked upon the war in the light of a crusade, and carried it on with all the enthusiasm of such a cause."

This conduct left an indelible impression on the minds of the English soldiers. From that period to the end of the war their contempt and dislike of the Spaniards were never effaced; and long afterwards, Badajos and St. Sebastian suffered for the churlish behaviour of the people of Talavera. The principal motive of action with the Spaniards was always personal rancour: hence, those troops who had behaved so ill in action, and the inhabitants, who withheld alike their sympathy and their aid from the English soldiers to whose bravery they owed the existence of their town, were busily engaged after the battle, in beating out the brains of the wounded French as they lay upon the field; and they were only checked by the English soldiers, who, in some instances, fired upon the perpetrators of this horrible iniquity.

Cuesta also gave proofs of his ferocious character; he, who had shown himself alike devoid of talent and real patriotism, whose indolence and ignorance of his profession had banished all order and discipline from his army, and whose stupid pride had all but caused its destruction, now assumed the Roman general, and proceeded to decimate the regiments that had fled in the panic on the 27th. Above 50 men he slew in this manner; and if his cruelty, so contrary to reason and the morals of the age, had not been mitigated by the earnest intercession of Sir Arthur Wellesley, more men would have been destroyed in cold blood by this savage old man, than had fallen in the battle.

Hitherto the allied generals had thought little of the Duke of Dalmatia's movements, and their eyes were still fixed on Madrid; but, the 30th, information was received at Talavera, that 12,000 rations had been ordered, for the 28th, at Fuente Dueña by that marshal, and 24,000 at Los Santos, a town situated between Alba de Tormes and the pass of Baños. Cuesta, conscious of the defenceless state of the latter post, suggested that Sir Robert Wilson should be sent there; but Sir Arthur Wellesley wished Wilson to remain at Escalona, to renew his intercourse with Madrid, and proposed that a Spanish corps should go. Indeed, he still slighted the idea of danger from that quarter, and hoped that the result of the battle would suffice to check Soult's march. Cuesta rejected this proposal at the moment, and again, on the 31st, when Sir Arthur renewed his application; but, on the 1st of August, it was known that Soult had entered Bejar; and then, on the 2nd, General Bassecour was detached by Cuesta to defend the Puerto de Baños, from which he was absent four long marches, while the enemy had been, on the 31st, within one march.

The day that Bassecour marched, intelligence arrived that Soult had entered Plasencia. Baños had been abandoned to the enemy without a shot; for the battalions from Bejar had dispersed, and those sent by Cuesta had been withdrawn to Almaraz by their general, the Marquis de la Reyna, who also proclaimed that he would destroy the boat-bridge at that place. This news roused Cuesta; he proposed that half the allied army should march to the rear, and attack Soult. Sir Arthur Wellesley refused to divide the English

army, but offered to go or stay with the whole; and, when the other desired him to choose, he answered that he would go, and Cuesta appeared satisfied.

On the night of the 2nd of August, letters were received from Wilson, announcing the appearance of the French near Nombella, whither he, unconscious of the effect produced by his presence at Escalona, had retreated with his infantry, sending his artillery to St. Roman, near Talavera. As Sir Arthur Wellesley could not suppose that Sir Robert Wilson's corps alone would cause the 1st corps to retire, he naturally concluded that Victor's design was to cross the Alberche at Escalona, crush Wilson, and operate a communication with Soult by the valley of the Tietar. As such a movement, if persisted in, would necessarily dislodge Cuesta from Talavera, Sir Arthur, before he commenced his march, obtained the Spanish general's promise that he would collect cars, for the purpose of transporting as many of the English wounded as were in a condition to be moved, from Talavera, to some more suitable place. This promise, like all the others, was shamefully violated; but the British general had not yet learned the full extent of Cuesta's bad faith, and thinking that a few days would suffice to drive back Soult, marched, on the 3rd of August, with 17,000 men, to Oropesa, intending to unite with Bassecour's division, and to fight Soult, whose force he estimated at 15,000.

Meanwhile, Soult being, by the return of General Foy, on the 24th of July, assured of the king's concurrence in the combined movements to be executed, ordered Laborde, Merle, and La Houssaye to march from Zamora and Toro upon Salamanca and Ledesma, and to scour the banks of the Tormes. The 6th corps was also directed upon the same place; and, the 25th, Soult repaired to Salamanca in person, intending to unite the three corps there. Hearing, however, of Victor's retrograde movement from the Alberche to the Guadarama, he desired Marshal Mortier to march, on the 28th, to Plasencia, by Fuente Roble and Bejar, and he placed La Houssaye's and Lorge's dragoons under his command: the remainder of the 2nd corps and the light cavalry were to follow when the 6th corps should be in motion. This done, Soult wrote to the king, saying, "My urgent desire is that your majesty may not fight a general battle before you are certain of the concentration of all my forces near Plasencia. The most important results will be obtained if your majesty will abstain from attacking until the moment when a knowledge of my march causes the enemy to retrace his steps, which he must do, or he is lost."

The 29th, the 5th corps was at Fuente Roble; but information being received that Beresford, with an army, had reached Almeida on the 27th, the march was covered by strong detachments on the side of Ciudad Rodrigo. The long-expected convoy of artillery and ammunition for the 2nd corps had, however, arrived in Salamanca the 29th; and Ney wrote, from Toro, that he also would be there the 31st.

The 30th, the 5th corps drove the Marquis de la Reyna from the pass of Baños, and took post at Aldea Nueva del Camina and Herbas; and the 2nd corps, quitting Salamanca, arrived, the same day, at Siete Carrera.

The 31st, the 5th corps entered Plasencia; the 2nd corps reached Fuente la Casa, Fuente Roble, San Estevan, and Los Santos.

Plasencia was full of convalescents, detachments, and non-combatants; and when the French arrived, about 2000 men, including 500 of the Lusitanian legion, evacuated the town, taking the road to Moraleja and Zarza Mayor; but 400 sick men, following the enemy's accounts, were captured, together with a few stores. During these rapid marches, the French were daily harassed by the Spanish peasantry: the villages were also deserted; the cavalry wandered far and near to procure subsistence; and several slight skirmishes and some pillage took place.

The 1st of August, the 2nd corps passed the Col de Baños, and the head of the column entered Plasencia, which was, like other places, deserted by the greatest part of the inhabitants. Vague reports that a battle had been fought

between the 26th and 29th was the only intelligence that could be procured of the situation of the allies; and, on the 2nd, the advanced guard of the army marched to the Venta de Bazagona, while scouting parties were, at the same time, directed towards Coria, to acquire news of Marshal Beresford, who was now said to be moving along the Portuguese frontier.

The 3rd of August, the 5th corps and the dragoons, passing the Tietar, reached Toril; the outposts were pushed to Cazatejada and Sierra de Requemada; but the 2nd corps remained at Plasencia, awaiting the arrival of the 6th corps, the head of which was now at Baños. Hence, on the 3rd of August, the king and Sebastiani being at Illescas and Valdemoro, Victor at Maqueda, Cuesta at Talavera, Sir Arthur Wellesley at Oropesa, and Soult on the Tietar; the narrow valley of the Tagus was crowded in its whole length by the contending troops.

The allies held the centre, being only one day's march asunder; but their force, when concentrated, was not more than 47,000 men. The French could not unite under three days, but their combined forces exceeded 90,000 men, of which 53,000 were under Soult; and this singular situation was rendered more remarkable by the ignorance in which all parties were as to the strength and movements of their adversaries.* Victor and the king, frightened by Wilson's Partizan corps of 4000 men, were preparing to unite at Mostoles, while Cuesta, equally alarmed at Victor, was retiring from Talavera. Sir Arthur Wellesley was supposed, by Joseph, to be at the head of 25,000 British; and the former, calculating on Soult's weakness, was marching, with 23,000 Spanish and English, to engage 53,000 French; while Soult, unable to ascertain the exact situation of either friends or enemies, little suspected that the prey was rushing into his jaws. At this moment the fate of the Peninsula hung by a thread, which could not bear the weight for 24 hours; yet fortune so ordained that no irreparable disaster ensued.

At five o'clock in the evening of the 3rd, it was known at the English headquarters that the French were near Naval Moral, and, consequently, between the allies and the bridge of Almaraz.


At six o'clock, letters from Cuesta advised Sir Arthur that the king was again advancing, and that, from intercepted despatches addressed to Soult, it appeared that the latter must be stronger than was supposed; hence, Cuesta said that, wishing to aid the English, he would quit Talavera that evening: in other words, abandon the British hospitals!

To this unexpected communication Sir Arthur replied that the king was still some marches off, and that Venegas should be directed to occupy him on the Upper Tagus; that Soult's strength was exceedingly overrated, and Victor's movements not decided enough to oblige the Spanish army to quit Talavera. Hence he required that Cuesta should at least wait until the next morning, to cover the evacuation of the English hospitals. But, before this communication reached Cuesta, the latter was in full march; and, at daybreak on the 4th, the Spanish army was descried moving, in several columns, down the valley towards Oropesa, where Bassecour's division soon after joined it from Centinello, and, at the same time, the cavalry patrols found the French near Naval Moral.

Sir Arthur Wellesley having, by this time, seen the intercepted letters himself, became convinced that Soult's force was not overrated at 30,000; and the Duke of Dalmatia, who had also intercepted some English letters, learned that on the 1st of August, the allies were still at Talavera, and ill-informed of his march. Thus, the one general perceived his danger and the other his advantage at the same moment.

Mortier was immediately ordered, by the Duke of Dalmatia, to take a position with the 5th corps at Cazatejada, to seize the boat-bridge at Almaraz, if it was not destroyed, and to patrol towards Arzobispo. The 2nd corps was, likewise, directed upon the same place; and the head of the 6th entered

* Appendix, No. 1, section 4.



Plasencia. The further progress of the allies was thus barred in front; the Tagus was on their left; impassable mountains on their right; and it was certain that Cuesta's retreat would immediately bring the king and Victor down upon their rear. The peril of this situation was apparent to every soldier in the British ranks, and produced a general inquietude. No man felt the slightest confidence in the Spaniards, and the recollection of the stern conflict at Talavera, aided by a sense of exhaustion from long abstinence, depressed the spirits of men and officers. The army was, indeed, ready to fight, but all persons felt that it must be for safety, not for glory.

In this trying moment, Sir Arthur Wellesley abated nothing of his usual calmness and fortitude. He knew not the full extent of the danger; but, assuming the enemy in his front to be 30,000 men, and Victor to have 25,000 others in his rear, he judged that to continue the offensive would be rash, because he must fight and beat those two marshals separately within three days, which, with starving and tired troops, inferior in number, was scarcely to be accomplished. But, to remain where he was on the defensive was equally unpromising, because the road from Talavera to Arzobispo led through Calera, in the rear of Oropesa; and thus Victor could intercept the only line of retreat, and a battle must then be fought, in an unfavourable position, against the united forces of the enemy, estimated, as we have seen, to be above 50,000 men. One resource remained: to pass the bridge of Arzobispo immediately, and take up a line of defence behind that river, before the French could seize the Col de Mirabete, and so cut off the road to Truxillo and Merida—a hard alternative; but the long-cherished error relative to Soult's weakness had dried up the springs of success, and left the campaign, like a withered stem, without fruit or foliage.

Cuesta doggedly opposed this project; asserting that Oropesa was a position suitable for a battle, and that he would fight there. Further concession to his humours would have been folly, and Sir Arthur sternly declared that he would move forthwith, leaving the Spanish general to do that which should seem meet to him; and, assuredly, this decided conduct saved the Peninsula, for not 50,000 but 90,000 enemies were at hand.

It was now six o'clock in the morning, the baggage and ammunition were already in motion for the bridge of Arzobispo; but the army, which had been reinforced by a troop of horse-artillery, and some convalescents that escaped from Plasencia, remained in position for several hours, to cover the passage of the stores and the wounded men from Talavera; the latter having just arrived at Calera in the most pitiable condition. About noon, the road being clear, the columns marched to the bridge; and, at two o'clock, the whole army was in position at the other side, the present danger was averted, and the combinations of the enemy were baffled. During the passage, several herds of swine, which, following the custom of the country, were feeding in the woods, under charge of the swineherds, were fallen in with; and the soldiers, instigated by hunger, broke their ranks, and ran in upon the animals as in a charge, shooting, stabbing, and, like men possessed, cutting off the flesh while the beasts were yet alive; nor can this conduct be much censured under the circumstances of the moment; yet it was a severe misfortune to the poor peasants, whose property was thus destroyed.

From Arzobispo, the army moved towards Deleytoza; but General Crawford's brigade, with six pieces of artillery, was directed to gain the bridge of Almaraz by a forced march, lest the enemy, discovering the ford below that place, should cross the river, and seize the Puerto de Mirabete. The roads were exceedingly rugged, and the guns could only be dragged up the Meza d'Ibor by the force of men. Nevertheless, Crawford reached his destination on the evening of the 5th, and the head-quarters were established at Deleytoza on the 7th, the artillery being at Campillo, the rear-guard occupying the Meza d'Ibor. The sick and wounded were then forwarded to Merida; but the paucity of transport was such, that Sir Arthur Wellesley was obliged to unload both ammunition and

treasure carts for the conveyance of these unfortunate men. Meanwhile Soult, little thinking that his object was already frustrated, continued his march on the 5th, and Mortier took post at Naval Moral; the advanced guard entered Puebla de Naciada, and the patrols, scouring the roads to Oropesa and the bridge of Arzobispo, fell in with and were chased by the Spanish cavalry from Arzobispo; for Cuesta would not retire on the 4th, and was in the act of passing the bridge when the French came in view. The movements were now hurried on both sides; before dark, the Spanish army was across the Tagus, with the exception of a rear-guard, which remained on the right bank that evening, but it was driven across the river, on the morning of the 6th, by the 5th corps, which afterwards took post at Valdeveja and Puebla de Naciada. Ney also reached Naval Moral, and the 2nd corps entered Gordo.

The 7th, Mortier examined the Spanish position, and reported that Cuesta, having thrown up entrenchments, and placed 20 guns in battery, to rake the bridge, which was also barricaded, had left two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry to hold the post, and withdrawn the rest of his army towards Meza d'Ibor. Hereupon, Soult detached his light cavalry towards Talavera, to communicate with the king, and brought up the 2nd corps to Arzobispo. Meanwhile, the Duke of Belluno having, on the 5th, ascertained the retreat of the allies from Talavera, retraced his steps, and entered that town on the 6th. Thus the English wounded left there, fell into his hands, and their treatment was such as might be expected from a gallant and courteous nation, for, between the British soldiers and the French, there was no rancour, and the generous usages of a civilized and honourable warfare were cherished.

The 7th, Victor crossed the Tagus, at the bridge of Talavera, and pushed his advanced guard to Aldea Nueva de Balbaroya, on the left bank, within a few leagues of the Spanish position, which Soult was preparing to attack in front, for he had observed that, at a certain point, the Spanish horses, when brought to drink, came far into the stream, and the place being sounded in the night of the 7th, a deep but practicable ford was discovered, about half a mile above the bridge.

The 5th and 2nd corps and a division of the 6th were concentrated to force this passage, early on the morning of the 8th; but Soult being just then informed of Victor's movement, and perceiving that Albuquerque had withdrawn the Spanish cavalry, leaving only a rear-guard in the works, judged that the allies were retreating; wherefore, without relinquishing the attack at Arzobispo, he immediately sent the division of the 6th corps back to Naval Moral, and, at the same time, transmitted a plan of the ford below Almaraz, directed Ney to cross the Tagus there, seize the Puerto de Mirabete, and be in readiness to fall upon the allies, as they came out from the defiles between Deleytoza and Truxillo.

Meanwhile, the heat of the day had induced Albuquerque to seek shelter for his horsemen in a wood, near Azutan, a village about five miles from the bridge; and the Spanish infantry, keeping a bad guard, were sleeping or loitering about without care or thought, when Mortier, who was charged with the direction of the attack, taking advantage of their want of vigilance, commenced the passage of the river.

COMBAT OF ARZOBISPO.

The French cavalry, about 6000 in number, were secretly assembled near the ford, and, about two o'clock in the day, General Caulaincourt's brigade suddenly entered the stream. The Spaniards, running to their arms, manned the batteries, and opened upon the leading squadrons; but Mortier, with a powerful concentric fire of artillery, immediately overwhelmed the Spanish gunners; and Caulaincourt, having reached the other side of the river, turned to his right, and taking the batteries in reverse, cut down the artillerymen, and dispersed the infantry who attempted to form. The Duke of Albuquerque, who had mounted at the first alarm, now came down with all his horsemen in

one mass, but without order, upon Caulaincourt, and the latter was, for a few moments, in imminent danger; but the rest of the French cavalry, passing rapidly, soon joined in the combat; one brigade of infantry followed at the ford, another burst the barriers on the bridge itself, and, by this time, the Spanish foot were flying to the mountains. Albuquerque's effort was thus frustrated, a general route ensued, and five guns and about 400 prisoners were taken.

Soult's intention being to follow up this success, he directed that the 1st corps should move, in two columns, upon Guadalupe and Deleytoza, intending to support it with the 2nd and 5th, while the 6th corps crossed at Almaraz, and seized the pass of Mirabete. This would undoubtedly have completed the ruin of the Spanish army, and forced Sir Arthur to make a rapid and disastrous retreat; for so complete was the surprise and so sudden the overthrow, that some of the English foragers also fell into the hands of the enemy; and that Cuesta's army was in no condition to have made any resistance, if the pursuit had been continued with vigour, is clear, from the following facts:—

1. When he withdrew his main body from the bridge of Arzobispo to Perálada de Garbin, on the 7th, he left 15 pieces of artillery by the roadside, without a guard. The defeat of Albuquerque placed these guns at the mercy of the enemy, who were, however, ignorant of their situation, until a trumpeter attending an English flag of truce, either treacherously or foolishly, mentioned it in the French camp, from whence a detachment of cavalry was sent to fetch them off. 2. The British military agent, placed at the Spanish head-quarters, was kept in ignorance of the action; and it was only by the arrival of the Duke of Albuquerque, at Deleytoza, on the evening of the 9th, that Sir Arthur Wellesley knew the bridge was lost. He had before advised Cuesta to withdraw behind the Ibor river, and even now contemplated a partial attack to keep the enemy in check; but when he repaired in person to that general's quarter, on the 10th, he found the country covered with fugitives and stragglers, and Cuesta as helpless and yet as haughty as ever. All his ammunition and guns (40 pieces) were at the right bank of the Ibor, and, of course, at the foot of the Meza, and within sight and cannon-shot of the enemy, on the right bank of the Tagus. They would have been taken by the first French patrols that approached, but that Sir Arthur Wellesley persuaded the Spanish staff-officers to have them dragged up the hill, in the course of the 10th, without Cuesta's knowledge.

In this state of affairs, the impending fate of the Peninsula was again averted by the king, who recalled the 1st corps to the support of the 4th, then opposed to Venegas. Marshal Ney, also, was unable to discover the ford below the bridge of Almaraz; and, by the 11th, the allies had re-established their line of defence. The head-quarters of the British were at Jaraicejo, and those of the Spaniards at Deleytoza: the former, guarding the ford of Almaraz, formed the left; the latter, occupying the Meza d'Ibor and Campillo, were on the right. The 12th, Cuesta having resigned, General Equia succeeded to the command, and gave hopes of a better co-operation; but the evil was in the character of the people. The position of the allies was, however, compact and central; the reserves could easily support the advanced posts; the communication to the rear was open; and, if defended with courage, the Meza d'Ibor is impregnable. To pass the Tagus at Almaraz, in itself a difficult operation, would be of no avail to the enemy, while the Mirabete and Meza d'Ibor were occupied, because his troops would be enclosed in the narrow space between those ridges and the river.

The Duke of Dalmatia, thus thwarted, conceived that Sir Arthur Wellesley would endeavour to re-pass the Tagus by Alcantara, and so rejoin Beresford and the 5000 British troops under Catlin Crawford and Lightburn, which were, by this time, near the frontier of Portugal. To prevent this he resolved to march at once upon Coria, with the 2nd, 5th, and 6th corps, to menace the communications both of Sir Arthur and Beresford with Lisbon, and, at the same time, prepare for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; but Marshal Ney absolutely

refused to concur in this operation : he observed that Sir Arthur Wellesley was not yet in march for Alcantara ; that it was exceedingly dangerous to invade Portugal in a hasty manner ; and that the army could not be fed between Coria, Plasencia, and the Tagus ; finally, that Salamanca, being again in possession of the Spaniards, it was more fitting that the 6th corps should retake that town, and occupy the line of the Tormes to cover Castile.

This reasoning was approved by Joseph ; he dreaded the further fatigue and privations that would attend a continuance of the operations during the excessive heats, and in a wasted country ; and he was strengthened in his opinion by the receipt of a despatch from the emperor, dated Schoenbrunn, the 29th of July, in which any further offensive operations were forbid, until the reinforcements which the recent victory of Wagram enabled him to send should arrive in Spain. The 2nd corps was, consequently, directed to take post at Plasencia. The 5th corps relieved the 1st at Talavera ; and the English wounded being, by Victor, given over to Marshal Mortier, the latter, with a chivalrous sense of honour, would not permit his own soldiers, although suffering severe privations themselves, to receive rations until the hospitals were first supplied. The 6th corps was now directed upon Valladolid, for Joseph was alarmed lest fresh insurrection, excited and supported by the Duke del Parque, should spread over the whole of Leon and Castile. Ney marched, on the 11th, from Plasencia ; but, to his surprise, found that Sir Robert Wilson, with about 4000 men, part Spaniards, part Portuguese, was in possession of the pass of Baños. To explain this, it must be observed, that when the British army marched from Talavera, on the 3rd, Wilson, being at Nombella, was put in communication with Cuesta. He had sent his artillery to the army on the 3rd, and on the 4th, finding that the Spaniards had abandoned Talavera, he fell back with his infantry to Vellada, a few miles north of Talavera. He was then 24 miles from Arzobispo ; and, as Cuesta did not quit Oropesa until the 5th, a junction with Sir Arthur Wellesley might have been effected : but it was impossible to know this at the time ; and Wilson, very prudently, crossing the Tietar, made for the mountains, trusting to his activity and local knowledge to escape the enemy. Villatte's division pursued him, on the 5th, to Nombella ; a detachment from the garrison of Avila was watching for him in the passes of Arenas and Monbeltran, and General Foy waited for him in the Vera de Plasencia. Nevertheless, he baffled his opponents, broke through their circle at Viandar, passed the Gredos at a ridge called the Sierra de Lanes, and, getting into the valley of the Tormes, reached Bejar : from thence, thinking to recover his communications with the army, he marched towards Plasencia, by the pass of Baños, and thus, on the morning of the 12th, met with Ney, returning to the Salamanca country.

The dust of the French column being seen from afar, and a retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo open, it is not easy to comprehend why Sir Robert Wilson should have given battle to the 6th corps. His position, although difficult of approach, and strengthened by the piling of large stones in the narrowest parts, was not one in which he could hope to stop a whole army ; and, accordingly, when the French, overcoming the local obstacles, got close upon his left, the fight was at an end. The first charge broke both the legion and the Spanish auxiliaries, and the whole dispersed. Ney then continued his march, and, having recovered the line of the Tormes, resigned the command of the 6th corps to General Marchand, and returned to France. But, while these things happened in Estremadura, La Mancha was the theatre of more important operations.

CHAPTER IV.

WHEN the Duke of Belluno retired from Salinas to Maqueda, the king, fearing that the allies were moving up the right bank of the Alberche, carried his reserve, in the night of the 3rd, to Mostoles ; but the 4th corps remained at Illescas, and

sent strong patrols to Valdemoro. Wilson, however, retired, as we have seen, from Nonibella on the 4th; and the king, no longer expecting the allies in that quarter, marched in the night to Valdemoro, where he was joined by the 4th corps from Illescas.

The 5th, the Duke of Belluno returned to St. Ollalla; and the king marched against General Venegas, who, in pursuance of the secret orders of the junta, before mentioned, had loitered about Daymiel and Tembleque until the 27th of July. The 29th, however, Venegas reached Ocaña, his advanced posts being at Aranjuez, his rear-guard at Yepes, and one division, under Lacy, in front of Toledo. The same day, one of the *Partidas*, attending the army, surprised a small French post on the other side of the Tagus; and Lacy's division skirmished with the garrison of Toledo.

The 30th, Venegas heard of the battle of Talavera; and at the same time Lacy reported that the head of the enemy's columns was to be seen on the road beyond Toledo. Hereupon, the Spanish commander reinforced Lacy, and gave him Mora as a point of retreat; but, on the 2nd of August, being falsely informed by Cuesta that the allied troops would immediately march upon Madrid, Venegas recalled his divisions from Toledo, pretending to concentrate his army at Aranjuez, in order to march also upon the capital; but he had no intention of doing so; for the junta did not desire to see Cuesta, at the head of 60,000 men, in that city; and, previous to the battle of Talavera, had not only forbidden him to enter Madrid, but appointed another man governor. This prohibition would, no doubt, have been disregarded by Cuesta; but Venegas was obedient to their secret instructions, and under pretence of danger to his flanks, if he marched on the capital, remained at Aranjuez, where his flank being equally exposed to an enemy coming from Toledo, he yet performed no service to the general cause.

The 3rd, he pushed an advanced guard to Puente Largo; and leaving 600 infantry, and some cavalry, near Toledo, concentrated his army between Aranjuez and Ocaña; and in this position he remained until the 5th, when his advanced guard was driven from the Puente Largo, and across the Tagus. His line of posts on that river was then attacked by the French skirmishers, and, under cover of a heavy cannonade, his position was examined by the enemy's generals; but when the latter found that all the bridges above and below Aranjuez were broken down, they resolved to pass the Tagus at Toledo. With this intent, the French army recrossed the Xarama river, and marched in the direction of that city; but Venegas, still keeping his posts at Aranjuez, foolishly dispersed his other divisions at Tembleque, Ocaña, and Guardia. He himself was desirous of defending La Mancha. The central junta, with more prudence, wished him to retreat into the Sierra Morena; but Mr. Frere proposed that his army should be divided; one part to enter the Morena, and the other to march by Cuença, upon Aragon, and so to menace the communications with France! The admirable absurdity of this proposal would probably have caused it to be adopted, if Sebastiani's movements had not put an end to the discussion. That general, crossing the Tagus at Toledo, and at a ford higher up, drove the Spaniards' left back upon the Guazalate. This was on the 9th of August; on the 10th, Venegas concentrated his whole army at Almonacid, and, holding a council of war, resolved to attack the French on the 12th; but the time was miscalculated. Sebastiani advanced on the 11th, and commenced

THE BATTLE OF ALMONACID.

The army of Venegas, including 2000 cavalry, was somewhat more than 25,000 strong, with 40 pieces of artillery. It was the most efficient Spanish force that had yet taken the field; it was composed of the best regiments in Spain, well armed and clothed; and the generals of division were neither incapacitated by age, nor destitute of experience, most of them having been employed in the previous campaign. The village of Almonacid was in the centre of the Spanish position; and, together with some table-land in front of

it, was occupied by two divisions of infantry under General Castejon. The left wing, under General Lacy, rested on a hill which covered the main road to Consuegra. The right wing, commanded by General Vigodet, was drawn up on some rising ground covering the road to Tembleque. A reserve, under General Giron, and the greatest part of the artillery, were posted behind the centre, on a rugged hill, crowned by an old castle. The cavalry were placed at the extremity of each wing.

General Dessolles, with the French reserve, was still some hours' march behind, but Sebastiani, after observing the dispositions made by Venegas, resolved to attack him with the 4th corps only. The Polish division immediately marched against the front; Leval's Germans turned the flank of the hill on which the Spanish left was posted; and two French brigades were directed upon the centre. After a sharp fight, the Spanish left was put to flight; but Venegas, outflanking the victorious troops with his cavalry, charged and threw them into disorder. At this moment, the head of Dessolles's column arrived, and enabled Sebastiani's reserves to restore the combat; and then the Spanish cavalry, shattered by musketry, and by the fire of four pieces of artillery, was, in turn, charged by a French regiment of horse, and broken. Venegas rallied his troops again on the castle-hill, behind the village; but the king came up with the remainder of the reserve, and the attack was renewed. The Poles and Germans continued their march against the left flank of the Spaniards; nine fresh battalions fell upon their centre, and a column of six battalions forced the right. The height and the castle were thus carried at the first effort. Venegas attempted to cover his retreat by making a stand in the plain behind; but two divisions of dragoons charged his troops before they could re-form, and the disorder became irremediable. The Spaniards, throwing away their arms, dispersed in every direction, and were pursued and slaughtered by the horsemen for several hours.

Following the French account, 3000 of the vanquished were slain, and 4000 taken prisoners; and all the guns, baggage, ammunition, and carriages fell into the hands of the victors whose loss did not exceed 1500 men. The remnants of the defeated army took shelter in the Sierra Morena. The head-quarters of the 4th corps were then established at Aranjuez; those of the 1st at Toledo; and the king returned in triumph to the capital.

The allied troops, however, still held their position at Deleytosa and Jaraicejo, and Sir Arthur Wellesley was not, at the first, without hopes to maintain himself there, or even to resume offensive operations; for he knew that Ney had returned to Salamanca, and he erroneously believed that Mortier commanded only a part of the 1st corps, and that the remainder were at Toledo. On the other hand, his own strength was about 17,000 men; Beresford had reached Moraleja, with from 12,000 to 14,000 Portuguese; and between the frontier of Portugal and Lisbon there were at least 5000 British troops, composing the brigades of Catlin Crawford and Lightburn. If Soult invaded Portugal, the intention of the English general was to have followed him. If the French remained in their present position, he meant to recross the Tagus, and, in conjunction with Beresford's troops, to fall upon their right at Plasencia. For his own front he had no fear; and he was taking measures to restore the broken arch of the Cardinal's bridge over the Tagus, with a view to his operation against Plasencia, when the misconduct of the Spanish government and its generals again obliged him to look solely to the preservation of his own army.

From the 23rd of July, when the bad faith of the junta, the apathy of the people in Estremadura, and the wayward folly of Cuesta, had checked the forward movements of the British, the privations of the latter, which had commenced at Plasencia, daily increased. It was in vain that Sir Arthur, remonstrating with Cuesta and the junta, had warned them of the consequences; it was in vain that he refused to pass the Alberche until the necessary supplies

were secured.* His reasonings, his presentations, and even the fact of his having halted at Talavera, were alike disregarded by men who, judging from their own habits, concluded that his actions would also be at variance with his professions.

If he demanded food for his troops, he was answered by false statements of what had been supplied, and falser promises of what would be done : and the glorious services rendered at Talavera, far from exciting the gratitude or calling forth the activity of the Spanish authorities, seemed only to render them the more perverse. The soldiers in the ranks were weakened by hunger, the sick were dying for want of necessary succours, the commissaries were without the means of transport ; and when Sir Arthur Wellesley applied for only 90 artillery horses to supply the place of those killed in the action, Cuesta, on the very field of battle, and with the steam of the English blood still reeking in his nostrils, refused this request, and, two days after, abandoned the wounded men to an enemy that he and his countrymen were hourly describing as the most ferocious and dishonourable of mankind.

The retreat of the allies across the Tagus increased the sufferings of the troops, and the warmth of their general's remonstrances rose in proportion to the ill-treatment they experienced ; but the replies, nothing abating in falseness as to fact, now became insulting both to the general and his army : " The British were not only well but over supplied : "—" they robbed the peasantry, pillaged the villages, intercepted the Spanish convoys, and openly sold the provisions thus shamefully acquired : "—" the retreat of the army across the Tagus was unnecessary ; Soult ought to have been destroyed ; and the English general must have secret motives for his conduct, which he dare not avouch : "—and other calumnies of the like nature.

Now, from the 20th of July to the 20th of August, although the Spaniards were generally well fed, the English soldiers had not received ten full rations. Half a pound of wheat in the grain, and, twice a week, a few ounces of flour, with a quarter of a pound of goat's flesh, formed the sole subsistence of men and officers ; and this scanty supply was procured with much labour, for the goats were to be caught and killed by the troops ; and it was, perhaps, upon this additional hardship that the accusation of selling provisions was founded, for, in such cases, it is in all armies the custom that the offal belongs to the men who slaughter the animals. But the famine in the camp was plainly proved by this very fact ; for a goat's offal sold, at this time, for three and even four dollars, or about double the usual price of the whole animal ; and men and officers strove to outbid each other for the wretched food.

It has been said that the British soldiers are less intelligent in providing for themselves, and less able to sustain privations of food than the soldiers of any other nation. This is one of many vulgar errors which have been promulgated respecting them. How they should be constantly victorious, and yet inferior to all other nations in military qualification, does not, at first sight, appear a very logical conclusion ; but the truth is, that, with the exception of the Spanish and Portuguese, who are, undoubtedly, more sober, the English soldiers possess all the most valuable military qualities in as high, and many in a much higher degree than any other nation. They are as rapid and as intelligent as the French, as obedient as the German, as enduring as the Russian, and more robust than any ; and, with respect to food, this is sure, that no man, of any nation, with less than two pounds of solid food of some kind daily, can do his work well for any length of time. A general charge of pillaging is easily made and hard to be disproved ; but it is certain that the Spanish troops themselves did not only pillage, but wantonly devastate the country, and that without any excuse ; for, with the exception of the three days succeeding the defeat of Arzobispo, their rations were regular and sufficient : and, with respect to the interruption of their convoys by the British soldiers, the reverse was the fact.†

* Appendix, No. 7.

† Ibid, No. 18.

The Spanish cavalry intercepted the provisions and forage destined for the English army, and fired upon the foragers, as if they had been enemies.

Before the middle of August there were, in the six regiments of English cavalry, 1000 men completely dismounted, and the horses of 700 others were unserviceable. The baggage animals died in greater numbers; the artillery cattle were scarcely able to drag the guns; and one-third of the reserve ammunition was given over to the Spaniards, because the ammunition carts were required for the conveyance of sick men, of which the number daily increased.

Marshal Beresford experienced the same difficulties in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. The numerous desertions that took place in the Portuguese army, when it became known that the troops were to enter Spain, prevented him from taking the field so soon as he had expected; but, in the last days of July, being prepared to act, he crossed the Portuguese frontier, and, from that moment, the usual vexatious system of the Spaniards commenced.* Romana still continued at Coruña; but the Duke del Parque was full of mighty projects, and indignant that Beresford would not blindly adopt his recommendations. Both generals were ignorant of the real strength of the French; but the Spaniard was confident, and insisted upon offensive movements, while Beresford, a general by no means of an enterprising disposition when in the sole command of an army, contented himself with taking up a defensive line behind the Agueda. In this, however, he was justified; first, by his instructions, which obliged him to look to the pass of Perales and the defence of the frontier line; secondly, by the state of his army, which was not half organized, and without horsemen or artillery; and, thirdly, by the conduct of the Spanish authorities.

The Portuguese troops were not only refused provisions, but those which had been collected by Sir Arthur Wellesley, and put into the magazines at Ciudad Rodrigo, with a view to operate in that quarter, were seized by the cabildo, as security for a debt pretended to be due for the supply of Sir John Moore's army. The claim itself was of doubtful character, for Cradock had before offered to pay it if the cabildo would produce the voucher for its being due, a preliminary which had not been complied with. There was also an English commissary at Ciudad Rodrigo, empowered to liquidate that and any other just claim upon the British military chest; but the cabildo, like all Spaniards, mistaking violence for energy, preferred this display of petty power to the interests of the common cause. Meanwhile, Soult having passed the Sierra de Gredos, by the Baños, Beresford, moving in a parallel direction, crossed the Sierra de Gata, at Perales; reached Moraleja about the 12th of August, and having rallied the troops and convalescents cut off from Talavera, marched to Salvatierra, where he arrived the 17th, and took post behind the Elga, covering the road to Abrantes.

The supreme junta now offered Sir Arthur Wellesley the rank of captain-general, and sent him a present of horses; and when he, accepting the rank, refused the pay, as he had before refused that of the Portuguese government, they pressed him to renew offensive operations; but, acting as if they thought the honours conferred upon the general would amply compensate for the sufferings of the troops, the junta made no change in their system. These things convinced Sir Arthur Wellesley that Spain was no longer the place for a British army, and he relinquished the idea of further operations in that country. Sending his cavalry to the neighbourhood of Cáceres, he broke down another arch of the Cardinal's bridge, to prevent the enemy from troubling him, and, through the British ambassador, informed the junta that he would immediately retire into Portugal.

This information created the wildest consternation; for, in their swollen self-sufficiency, the members of the government had hitherto disregarded all warnings upon this subject, and now acting as, in the like case, they had acted

* Appendix, No. 17.

the year before, with Sir John Moore, they endeavoured to avert the consequences of their own evil doings by vehement remonstrances and the most absurd statements:—"The French were weak and the moment most propitious for driving them beyond the Pyrenees:"—"the uncalled for retreat of the English would ruin the cause:" and so forth. But they had to deal with a general as firm as Sir John Moore; and, in the British ambassador, they no longer found an instrument suited to their purposes.

Lord Wellesley, a man with too many weaknesses to be called great, but of an expanded capacity, and a genius at once subtle and imperious, had come out on a special mission,—and Mr. Frere, whose last communication with the junta had been to recommend another military project, was happily displaced; yet, even in his private capacity, he made an effort to have some of the generals superseded; and the junta, with a refined irony, truly Spanish, created him *Marquis of Union*.

At Cadiz, the honours paid to Lord Wellesley were extravagant and unbecoming, and his journey from thence to Seville was a scene of triumph; but these outward demonstrations of feeling did not impose upon him beyond the moment. His brother's correspondence and his own penetration soon enabled him to make a just estimate of the junta's protestations. Disdaining their intrigues, and fully appreciating a general's right to direct the operations of his own army, he seconded Sir Arthur's remonstrances with firmness, and wisely taking the latter's statements as a guide and basis for his own views, urged them upon the Spanish government with becoming dignity.

The junta, on their part, always protesting that the welfare of the British army was the principal object of their care, did not fail to prove, very clearly upon paper, that the troops, ever since their entry into Spain, had been amply supplied: and that no measure might be wanting to satisfy the English general, they invested Don Lorenzo Calvo, a member of their body, with full powers to draw forth and apply all the resources of the country to the nourishment of both armies. This gentleman's promises and assurances, relative to the supply, were more full and formal than M. de Garay's, and equally false. He declared that provisions and forage, in vast quantities, were actually being delivered into the magazines at Truxillo, when, in fact, there was not even an effort making to collect any. He promised that the British should be served, although the Spanish troops should thereby suffer; and, at the very time of making this promise, he obliged the alcaldes of a distant town to send into the Spanish camp provisions which had been already purchased by an English commissary. In fine, Lord Wellesley had arrived too late; all the mischief that petulance, folly, bad faith, violence, and ignorance united, could inflict, was already accomplished, and, while he was vainly urging a vile, if not a treacherous government, to provide sustenance for the soldiers, Sir Arthur withdrew the latter from a post where the vultures, in their prescience of death, were already congregating.

The 20th, the main body of the British army quitted Jaraicejo, and marched by Truxillo upon Merida. The light brigade, under Crawfurd, being relieved at Almaraz by the Spaniards, took the road of Caceres to Valencia de Alcantara. But the pass of Mirabete bore amply testimony to the previous sufferings of the troops; Crawfurd's brigade, which, only three weeks before, had traversed 60 miles in a single march, were now with difficulty, and after many halts, able to reach the summit of the Mirabete, although only four miles from their camp; and the side of that mountain was covered with baggage, and the carcasses of many hundred animals that died in the ascent.

The retreat being thus commenced, the junta, with the malevolence of anger engendered by fear, calumniated the man to whom, only ten days before, they had addressed the most fulsome compliments, and to whose courage and skill they owed their own existence. "It was not the want of provisions," they said, "but some other motive that caused the English general to retreat." This was openly and insultingly stated by Garay, by Eguia, and by Calvo, in their

correspondence with Lord Wellesley and Sir Arthur; and at the same time the junta industriously spread a report that the true reason was their own firm resistance to the ungenerous demands of the English ministers, who had required the cession of Cadiz and the island of Cuba, as the price of further assistance.

At Talavera, Sir Arthur Wellesley had been forced to give over to the Spaniards the artillery taken from the enemy. At Meza d'Ibor, he had sacrificed a part of his ammunition, to obtain conveyance for the wounded men, and to effect the present movement from Jaraicejo, without leaving his sick behind, he was obliged to abandon all his parc of ammunition, and stores, and then the Spanish generals, who had refused the slightest aid to convey the sick and wounded men, immediately found ample means to carry off all these stores to their own magazines. In this manner, almost bereft of baggage and ammunition, those soldiers, who had withstood the fiercest efforts of the enemy, were driven, as it were, ignominiously from the country they had protected to their loss.

The 24th, the head-quarters being at Merida, a despatch from Lord Wellesley was received. He painted in strong colours the terror of the junta, the distraction of the people, and the universal confusion; and with a natural anxiety to mitigate their distress, he proposed that the British army should, notwithstanding the past, endeavour to cover Andalusia, by taking, in conjunction with the Spanish army, a defensive post behind the Guadiana, in such manner that the left should rest on the frontier of Portugal: to facilitate this he had, he said, presented a plan to the junta for the future supply of provisions, and the vicinity of the frontier and of Seville would, he hoped, obviate any difficulty on that point. But he rested his project entirely upon political grounds; and it is worthy of observation that he who, for many years had, with despotic power, controlled the movements of immense armies in India, carefully avoided any appearance of meddling with the general's province. "I am," said he, "fully sensible not only of the *indelicacy*, but of the inutility of attempting to offer to you any opinion of mine in a situation where your own judgment must be your best guide."—"Viewing, however, so nearly, the painful consequences of your immediate retreat into Portugal, I have deemed it to be my duty to submit it to your consideration the possibility of adopting an intermediate plan."

On the receipt of this despatch, Sir Arthur Wellesley halted at Merida for some days. He was able in that country to obtain provisions, and he wished, if possible, to allay the excitement occasioned by his retreat; but he refused to co-operate again with the Spaniards. "Want, he said, had driven him to separate from them, but their shameful flight at Arzobispo would alone have justified him for doing so. To take up a defensive position behind the Guadiana would be useless, because that river was fordable, and the ground behind it weak. The line of the Tagus, occupied at the moment by Eguia, was so strong, that if the Spaniards could defend anything they might defend that. His advice then was that they should send the pontoon-bridge to Badajos, and remain on the defensive at Deleytoza and Almaraz. But it might be asked, was there no chance of renewing the offensive? To what purpose? The French were as numerous, if not more so than the allies; and with respect to the Spaniards at least, superior in discipline and every military quality. To advance again was only to play the same losing game as before. Bafios and Perales must be guarded, or the bands in Castile would again pour through upon the rear of the allied army; but who was to guard these passes? The British were too few to detach, and the Spaniards could not be trusted; and if they could, Avila and the Guadarama passes remained, by which the enemy could reinforce the army in front,—for there were no Spanish troops in the north of Spain capable of making a diversion.

"But there was a more serious consideration, namely, the constant and

shameful misbehaviour of the Spanish troops before the enemy. We, in England," said Sir Arthur, "never hear of their defeats and flights, but I have heard Spanish officers telling of 19 or 20 actions of the description of that at the bridge of Arzobispo, accounts of which I believe have never been published." "In the battle of Talavera," he continued, "in which the Spanish army, with very trifling exception, was not engaged,—whole corps threw away their arms and run off, when they were neither attacked nor threatened with an attack. When these dastardly soldiers run away they plunder everything they meet. In their flight from Talavera they plundered the baggage of the British army, which was at that moment bravely engaged in their cause."

For these reasons he would not, he said, again co-operate with the Spaniards; yet by taking post on the Portuguese frontier, he would hang upon the enemy's flank, and thus, unless the latter came with very great forces, prevent him from crossing the Guadiana. This reasoning was conclusive; but ere it reached Lord Wellesley, the latter found that so far from his plans relative to the supply having been adopted, he could not even get an answer from the junta; and that miserable body at one moment stupefied with fear, at the next bursting with folly, now talked of the enemy's being about to retire to the Pyrenees, or even to the interior of France: and assuming the right to dispose of the Portuguese army as well as of their own, importunately pressed for an immediate, combined, offensive operation, by the troops of the three nations, to harass the enemy in his retreat; but at the same time they ordered Eguia to withdraw from Deleytoza, behind the Guadiana.

The 31st, Eguia reached La Serena; and Venegas having rallied his fugitives in the Morena, and being reinforced from the depôts in Andalusia, the two armies amounted to about 50,000 men, of which 8000 or 10,000 were horse: for, as I have before observed, the Spanish cavalry seldom suffered much. But the tide of popular discontent was now setting full against the central government. The members of the ancient junta of Seville worked incessantly for their overthrow. Romana, Castaños, Cuesta, Albuquerque, all, and they were many, who had suffered dishonour at their hands, were against them; and the local junta of Estremadura insisted that Albuquerque should command in that province.

Thus pressed, the supreme junta considering Venegas as a man devoted to their wishes, resolved to increase his forces. For this purpose they gave Albuquerque the command in Estremadura, but furnished him with only 12,000 men, sending the remainder of Eguia's army to Venegas; and at the same time, making a last effort to engage the British general in their proceedings, they offered to place Albuquerque under his orders, provided he would undertake an offensive movement.* By these means, they maintained their tottering power: but their plans being founded upon vile political intrigues, could in no wise alter Sir Arthur Wellesley's determination, which was the result of enlarged military views. He refused their offers; and the 4th of September, his headquarters were established at Badajos. Meanwhile, Romana delivered over his army to the Duke del Parque, and repaired to Seville. Venegas again advanced into La Mancha, but at the approach of a very inferior force of the enemy, retired with all the haste and confusion of a rout, to the Morena. The English troops were then distributed in Badajos, Elvas, Campo Mayor, and other places, on both banks of the Guadiana. The brigades already in Portugal were brought up to the army, and the lost ammunition and equipments were replaced from the magazines at Lisbon, Abrantes, and Santarem. Beresford, leaving some light troops and militia on the frontier, retired to Thomar, and this eventful campaign of two months terminated.

The loss of the army was considerable; above 3500 men had been killed, or had died of sickness, or fallen into the enemy's hands. Fifteen hundred horses had perished from want of food, exclusive of those lost in battle; the spirits of

* Appendix, No. 17.

the soldiers were depressed ; and a heart-burning hatred of the Spaniards was engendered by the treatment endured. To fill the cup, the pestilent fever of the Guadiana, assailing bodies which fatigue and bad nourishment had already predisposed to disease, made frightful ravages. Dysentery, that scourge of armies, raged ; and, in a short time, above 5000 men died in the hospitals.

CHAPTER V.

OBSERVATIONS.

DURING this short, but important campaign, the armies on both sides acted in violation of that maxim which condemns "double external lines of operation," but the results vindicated the soundness of the rule. Nothing permanent or great, nothing proportionate to the number of the troops, the vastness of the combinations, or the reputation of the commanders, was achieved ; yet, neither Sir Arthur Wellesley nor the Duke of Dalmatia can be justly censured, seeing that the last was controlled by the king, and the first by circumstances of a peculiar nature. The French marshal was thwarted by superior authority ; and the English general, commanding an auxiliary force, was obliged to regulate his movements, not by his own military views, but by the actual state of the Spaniards' operations, and with reference to the politics and temper of that people.

La Mancha was the true line by which to act against Madrid, but the British army was on the frontier of Portugal. The junta refused Cadiz, as a place of arms ; and without Cadiz, or some other fortified sea-port, neither prudence, nor his instructions, would permit Sir Arthur to hazard a great operation on that side. Hence he adopted, not what was most fitting, in a military sense, but what was least objectionable among the few plans that could be concerted at all with the Spanish generals and government. Now, the latter being resolved to act with strong armies, both in Estremadura and La Mancha, the English general had but to remain on a miserable defensive system in Portugal, or to unite with Cuesta in the valley of the Tagus. His territorial line of operations was therefore a matter of necessity, and any fair criticism must be founded on the management of his masses after it was chosen. That he did not greatly err in his conception of the campaign, is to be inferred from the fact, that Napoleon, Soult, Victor, and Jourdan, simultaneously expected him upon the very line he followed. He was thwarted by Cuesta at every step, Venegas failed to aid him, and the fatal error relative to Soult's forces, under which he laboured throughout, vitiated all his operations ; yet he shook the intrusive monarch roughly, in the midst of 50,000 men.

Let the project be judged, not by what did happen, but by what would have happened if Cuesta had been active, and if Venegas had performed his part loyally. The junction of the British and Spanish forces was made at Naval Moral, on the 22nd of July. The Duke of Belluno, with 21,000 men, was then in position behind the Alberche, the 4th corps near Madrilejos in La Mancha, and Joseph at Madrid, where General Foy had just arrived, to concert Soult's movement upon Plasencia.

It is evident that the king and Sebastiania could not reach the scene of action before the 25th or 26th of July, nor could Soult influence the operations before the 1st or 2nd of August. If then, the allied army, being 60,000 strong, with 100 pieces of artillery, had attacked Victor on the morning of the 23rd, it is to be presumed that the latter would have been beaten, and obliged to retreat, either upon Madrid or Toledo ; but the country immediately in his rear was open, and 10,000 horsemen could have been launched in the pursuit. Sir Robert Wilson, also, would have been on Victor's flank, if, neglecting a junction with the 4th corps, that marshal had taken the road to Madrid ; and if that of Toledo, the 1st and 4th corps would have been separated from the king, who

did not reach Vargas until the evening of the 25th, but who would not, in this case, have been able to advance at all beyond Naval Carneiro.

Now, admitting that, by superior discipline and experience, the French troops had effected their retreat on either line without any serious calamity, what would have followed?

1. If Victor joined the king, the latter could only have retired, by Guadalaxara, upon the 3rd corps, or have gone by the Guadarama towards Soult.

2. If Victor joined Sebastiani, the two corps must have retreated to Guadalaxara, and the king would have joined them there, or, as before said, have pushed for the Guadarama to join Soult.

No doubt, that marshal, having so powerful an army, would, in either case, have restored Joseph to his capital, and have cut off Sir Arthur's communication with Portugal by the valley of the Tagus. Nevertheless, a great moral impression would have been produced by the temporary loss of Madrid, which was, moreover, the general depôt of all the French armies; and, meanwhile, Venegas, Cuesta, and Sir Arthur Wellesley would have been united, and on one line of operations (that of La Mancha), which, under such circumstances, would have forced the junta to consent to the occupation of Cadiz. In this view it must be admitted that the plan was conceived with genius.

Victor's position on the Alberche was, however, strong; he commanded 25,000 veterans; and, as the Spaniards were very incapable in the field, it may be argued that a general movement of the whole army to Escalona, and from thence to Maqueda, would have been preferable to a direct attack at Salinas; because the allies, if thus suddenly placed in the midst of the French corps, might have beaten them in detail, and would certainly have cut the king off from the Guadarama, and forced him back upon the Guadalaxara. But, with Cuesta for a colleague, how could a general undertake an operation requiring celerity and the nicest calculation?

The false dealing of the junta no prudence could guard against; but experience proves that, without extraordinary good fortune, some accident will always happen to mar the combinations of armies acting upon "double external lines." And so it was with respect to Venegas; for that general, with a force of 26,000 men, suffered himself to be held in check for five days by 3000 French, and at the battle of Almonacid showed that he knew neither when to advance nor when to retreat.

The patience with which Sir Arthur Wellesley bore the foolish insults of Cuesta, and the undaunted firmness with which he fought to protect the Spanish army, require no illustration. When the latter fell back from St. Ollalla on the 26th, it was impossible for the British to retreat with honour; and there is nothing more memorable in the history of this war, nothing more creditable to the personal character of the English chief, than the battle of Talavera, considered as an isolated event. Nevertheless, that contest proved that the allies were unable to attain their object; for, notwithstanding Victor's ill-judged partial attacks on the night of the 27th and morning of the 28th, and notwithstanding the final repulse of the French, all the advantages of the movements, as a whole, were with the latter. They were, on the 31st of July, including the garrison of Toledo, still above 40,000 men; and they maintained their central position, although it was not until the 1st of August that Soult's approach caused any change in the views of the allied generals; and this brings us to the fundamental error of Sir Arthur Wellesley's operations.

That so able a commander should engage himself in the narrow valley of the Tagus with 20,000 British and 40,000 Spanish troops, when 50,000 French were waiting for him at the further end, and above 50,000 more were hanging on his flank and rear, shows that the greatest masters of the art may err. He who wars walks in a mist through which the keenest eyes cannot always discern the right path. "Speak to me of a general who has made no mistakes in war," said Burenne, "and you speak of one who has seldom made war."

Sir Arthur Wellesley thus excused his error:—"When I entered Spain I had reason to believe that I should be joined by a Spanish army in such a respectable state of discipline and efficiency, as that it had kept in check, during nearly three months after a defeat, a French army, at one time superior, and at no time much inferior.

"I had likewise reason to believe that the French corps in the north of Spain were fully employed; and although I had heard of the arrival of Marshal Soult at Zamora, on the 29th of June, with a view to equip the remains of his corps, I did not think it possible that three French corps consisting of 34,000 men, under three marshals, could have been assembled at Salamanca without the knowledge of the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, or of the junta of Castile; that these corps could have been moved from their stations in Galicia, the Asturias, and Biscay, without setting free, for general operations, any Spanish troops which had been opposed to them, or without any other inconvenience to the enemy than that of protracting, to a later period, the settlement of his government in those provinces; and that they could have penetrated into Estremadura, without a shot being fired at them by the troops deemed sufficient to defend the passes by the Spanish generals." But thus it was that, like the figures in a phantasmagoria, the military preparations of Spain, however menacing in appearance, were invariably found to be vain and illusory.

That Sir Arthur Wellesley's error was not fatal is to be attributed to three causes:—

1. The reluctance of Marshal Ney to quit Astorga; 2. The march of the 5th corps upon Villa Castin instead of Salamanca; 3. The vehemence with which Victor advised the battle of Talavera: in short, jealousy among the marshals, and the undecided temper of the king.

If Soult had not been thwarted, he would have concentrated the three corps near Salamanca before the 20th, and he would have reached Plasencia before the 28th of July. The allies must then have forced their way into La Mancha, or been crushed; but could they have done the former without another battle? without the loss of all the wounded men? Could they have done it at all? The British, including Robert Crawford's brigade, were 17,000 fighting men on the 29th, but wasted with fatigue and hunger. The Spaniards were above 30,000; but in them no trust could be placed for an effort requiring fine discipline and courage of the highest order. The intrusive king was at the head of 40,000 good troops. Venegas, at once ignorant and hampered by the intrigues of the junta, was as nought in the operations; but Soult's step, stealthy while the situation of affairs was obscure, would have been impetuous when a light broke on the field of battle; and it is scarcely possible to conceive that the allies could have forced their way in front before that Marshal would have fallen on their rear.

FRENCH OPERATIONS.

The intrusive monarch was finally successful; yet it may be safely affirmed that, with the exception of uniting his three corps behind the Guadarama, on the evening of the 25th, his proceedings were an uninterrupted series of errors. First, he would not suffer Soult to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo with 70,000 men, in the end of July. To protect Madrid from the army of Venegas overbalanced, in his mind, the advantages of this bold and grand project, which would inevitably have drawn Sir Arthur Wellesley from the Tagus, and which, interrupting all military communication between the northern and southern provinces, and ensuring possession of Castile and Leon, would, by its success, have opened a roadway to Lisbon. But Cuesta and Venegas, meanwhile, would have marched against Madrid! Cuesta and Venegas, acting on external lines, and whose united forces did not exceed 65,000 men! And the king, holding a central position, with 50,000 French veterans, was alarmed at this prospect, and rejecting Soult's plan, drew Mortier, with the 5th corps, to Villa

Castin. Truly this was to neglect the bearing fruit-tree from fear of the nettle at its stem!

Sir Arthur Wellesley's advance to Talavera was the result of this great error; but he having thus incautiously afforded Soult an opportunity of striking a fatal blow, a fresh combination was concerted. The king, with equal judgment and activity, then united all his own forces near Toledo, separated Venegas from Cuesta, pushed back the latter upon the English army, and obliged both to stand on the defensive, with eyes attentively directed to their front, when the real point of danger was in the rear. This was skilful; but the battle of Talavera which followed was a palpable, an enormous fault. The allies could neither move forward nor backward, without being infinitely worse situated for success than in that strong position, which seemed marked out by fortune herself for their security. Until the 31st, the operations of Venegas were not even felt; hence, till the 31st, the position on the Alberche might have been maintained without danger; and on the 1st of August, the head of Soult's column was at Plasencia.

Let us suppose that the French had merely made demonstrations on the 28th, and had retired behind the Alberche the 29th; would the allies have dared to attack them in that position? The conduct of the Spaniards, on the evening of the 27th, answers the question; and, moreover, Joseph with an army compact, active, and experienced, could, with ease, have baffled any efforts of the combined forces to bring him to action; he might have covered himself by the Guadarama and by the Tagus, in succession, and the farther he led his opponents from Talavera, without uncovering the line of La Mancha, the more certain the effect of Soult's operation: but here we have another proof that double external lines are essentially vicious.

The combined movement of the French was desirable, from the greatness of the object to be gained, and safe, from the powerful force on each point. The occasion was so favourable that, notwithstanding the imprudent heat of Victor, the reluctance of Ney, and the unsteady temper of the king, the fate of the allies was, up to the evening of the 3rd, heavy in the scale. Nevertheless, as the central position held by the allies, cut the line of correspondence between Joseph and Soult, the king's despatches were intercepted, and the whole operation, even at the last hour, was baffled. The first element of success in war is, that everything should emanate from a single head; and it would have been preferable that the king, drawing the 2nd and 5th corps to him by the pass of the Guadarama, or by that of Avila, should, with the 80,000 men thus united, have fallen upon the allies in front. Such a combination, although of less brilliant promise than the one adopted, would have been more sure; and the less a general trusts to fortune the better—she is capricious!

When one Spanish army was surprised at Arzobispo, another completely beaten at Almonacid, and when Wilson's Portuguese corps was dispersed at Baños, the junta had just completed the measure of their folly by quarrelling with the only force left that could protect them. The French were, in truth, therefore, the masters of the Peninsula; but they terminated their operations at the very moment when they should have pursued them with redoubled activity; for the general aspect of affairs and the particular circumstances of the campaign were alike favourable.

Napoleon was victorious in Germany; and of the British expeditions against Italy and Holland, the former had scarcely struggled into life,—the latter was already corrupting in death. Hence, Joseph might have been assured that he would receive reinforcements, but that none of any consequence could reach his adversaries; and, in the Peninsula, there was nothing to oppose him. Navarre, Biscay, Aragon, and the Castiles were subdued; Gerona closely beleaguered; and the rest of Catalonia, if not quiescent, totally unable to succour that noble city. Valencia was inert; the Asturias still trembling; and in Galicia there was nothing but confusion. Romana, commanding 15,000

infantry, but neither cavalry nor artillery, was still at Coruña, and durst not quit the mountains. The Duke del Parque held Ciudad Rodrigo, but was in no condition to make head against more than a French division. The battle of Almonacid had cleared La Mancha of troops. Estremadura and Andalusia were, as we have seen, weak, distracted, and incapable of solid resistance. There remained only the English and Portuguese armies, the one being at Jaraceijo, the other at Moraleja.

The line of resistance may, therefore, be said to have extended from the Sierra Morena to Coruña—weak from its length; weaker, that the allied corps, being separated by mountains, by rivers, and by vast tracts of country, and, having different bases of operation, such as Lisbon, Seville, and Ciudad Rodrigo, could not act in concert, except offensively; and with how little effect in that way the campaign of Talavera had proved. But the French were concentrated in a narrow space, and having only Madrid to cover, were advantageously situated for offensive or defensive movements.

The allied forces were, for the most part, imperfectly organized, and would not, altogether, have amounted to 90,000 fighting men. The French were above 100,000, dangerous from their discipline and experience, more dangerous that they held a central position, and that their numbers were unknown to their opponents; and, moreover, having, in four days, gained one general and two minor battles, their courage was high and eager.

At this period, by the acknowledgment of the Spaniards themselves, the fate of the country depended entirely upon the British troops, and, doubtless, the latter were soldiers of no ordinary stamp; but there is a limit to human power, in war as well as in other matters. Sir Arthur Wellesley was at the head of some 17,000 men, of all arms, and about 5000 were somewhere between Lisbon and Alcantara: but the whole French army could, in two days, have been concentrated in the valley of the Tagus. Soult, alone, of all the associated generals, appears to have viewed this crisis with the eye of a great commander. Had he been permitted to follow up the attack at Arzobispo, on the 8th of August, what could the 17,000 starving British troops, encumbered with the terror-stricken Spaniards, have effected against the 70,000 French that would have stormed their positions on three sides at once? The hardy, enduring English infantry might, indeed, have held their ground in one battle, but could they have fought a second? Would not a movement of the 1st corps by Guadalupe, would not famine alone, have forced the 10,000 or 12,000 men remaining (if, indeed, so many were left) to abandon the banks of the Tagus, to abandon, also, their parcels of ammunition and their wounded men, and to retreat towards Portugal; and to retreat, also, with little hope, harassed as they would have been by 6000 horsemen, for Soult had 18 regiments of cavalry?

Let it be supposed, however, that the strength of the Meza d'Ibor and the Mirabete had baffled all the enemy's efforts, and that, seeing the allies fixed in those positions, the 6th corps, in pursuance of Soult's second proposal, had crossed the frontier of Portugal. Sir Arthur Wellesley, contemplating such an event, affirmed that he meant to follow them in any movement they might make against Lisbon; but there were two ways of following, the one by the south and the other by the north bank of the Tagus. Now, if he designed to cross the Tagus at the Cardinal's bridge, and so, connecting his right with Beresford, to hang on the enemy's rear, it could only have been while he was ignorant of Venegas's defeat, and when he imagined the French to have but 30,000 men in the valley of the Tagus; but they had above 70,000; and, without endangering Madrid, they could have invaded Portugal with, at least, 50,000 men under arms.

If, on the other hand, he designed to move by the south side of the Tagus, the French line of march upon Abrantes and Lisbon was shorter than his; and Beresford, who only reached Moraleja on the 12th, would have been cut off, and thrown back upon Almeida. It is true that Marshal Ney alleged the difficulty of feeding the troops in the country about Plasencia and Coria, and the

prudence of Soult's project might, in that respect, have been somewhat questionable. But the Duke of Elchingen was averse to *any* invasion of Portugal ; and, to an unwilling mind, difficulties are enlarged beyond their due proportion. Moreover, his talents were more remarkable in a battle than in the dispositions for a campaign ; and Soult's opinion must on this occasion be allowed greater weight, because the Vera de Plasencia and the valleys of the Bejar and the Gata mountains were certainly exceedingly fertile, they had been little injured, and the object was, not to fix a base of operations, but to obtain a momentary subsistence until a richer country could be opened.

Admitting, however, that a march on Lisbon was not feasible at that moment, there could have been no well-founded objection to the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, which Soult again proposed. The emperor's instructions were indeed pleaded ; but those were general, founded upon the past errors of the campaign, which made him doubtful of the future ; they were not applicable to the peculiar circumstances of the moment, and would have been disregarded by a general with a tithe of his own genius. Fortunately for Spain, the intrusive king was not a great commander. When he might have entered the temple of victory with banners flying, he stretched himself at the threshold and slept.

The departure of the English army was a remarkable epoch in the Peninsular war. The policy of combining operations with the Spanish armies, and of striking directly at the great masses of the French, had been fairly acted upon, and had failed ; and the long-cherished delusion, relative to Spanish enthusiasm and Spanish efficiency, was at last dissipated. The transactions of the campaign of 1809 form a series of practical comments upon the campaign of 1808. All the objections which had been made to Sir John Moore's conduct, being put to the test of experience, proved illusory, while the soundness of that general's views was confirmed in every particular. The leading events of the two campaigns bear a striking resemblance to each other.

Both Sir Arthur Wellesley and Sir John Moore advanced from Portugal to *aid the Spanish armies*. The first general commanded 25,000, the last 20,000 men ; but there was this difference : that, in 1808, Portugal was so disorganized as to require a British force to keep down anarchy ; whereas, in 1809, Portugal formed a good base of operations, and a Portuguese army was acting in conjunction with the British.

Sir John Moore was joined by 6000 men, under Romana, and there was no other Spanish army in existence to aid him.

Sir Arthur Wellesley was joined by 38,000 Spaniards, under Cuesta, and he calculated upon 26,000, under Venegas ; while from 20,000 to 25,000 others were acting in Galicia and Leon.

Sir John Moore was urged to throw himself into the heart of Spain, to aid a people represented as abounding in courage and every other military virtue. Judging of what he could not see by that which was within his view, he doubted the truth of these representations, and thinking that a powerful army, commanded by a man of the greatest military genius, was likely to prove formidable, he was unwilling to commit his own small force in an unequal contest. Nevertheless, feeling that some practical demonstration of the difficulties to be encountered was required by the temper of the times, he made a movement, too delicate and dangerous to be adopted, unless for a great political as well as military purpose.

To relieve the southern provinces, and to convince the English government and the English public that they had taken a false view of affairs, were the objects of his advance to the Carrion river ; but, although he carried his army forward with a boldness that marked the consciousness of superior talents, he never lost sight of the danger he was incurring by exposing his flank to the French emperor. To obviate this danger as much as possible, he established a second line of retreat upon Galicia, and he kept a watchful eye upon the cloud gathering at Madrid. Arrived in front of Soult's corps, and being upon the

point of attacking him, the expected storm burst, but, by a rapid march to Benevente, Moore saved himself from being taken in flank and rear and destroyed. Benevente was, however, untenable against the forces brought up by Napoleon, and, the retreat being continued to Coruña, the army, after a battle, embarked.

It was objected—firstly, that Moore should have gone to Madrid ; secondly, that he should have fought at Astorga, at Villa Franca, and at Lugo, instead of at Coruña ; thirdly, that he overrated the strength of the enemy, and undervalued the strength and enthusiasm of the Spaniards ; and that, being of a desponding temper, he lost the opportunity of driving the French beyond the Ebro, for, that a battle gained (and it was assumed that a battle must have been gained had he attacked) would have assuredly broken the enemy's power, and called forth all the energies of Spain.

Sir John Moore reasoned that the Spanish enthusiasm was not great, that it evaporated in boasting and promises, which could not be relied upon ; that the British army was sent as an auxiliary, not as a principal force ; and that the native armies being all dispersed before he could come to their assistance, the enemy was far too strong to contend with single-handed ; wherefore, it was prudent to re-embark, and to choose some other base of operations, to be conducted upon sounder views of the actual state of affairs, or to give up the contest altogether ; for that little or no hope of final success could be entertained, unless the councils and dispositions of the Spaniards changed for the better. He died ; and the English ministers, adopting the reasoning of his detractors, once more sent an auxiliary army to Spain ; although the system still existed which he had denounced as incompatible with success.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, a general of their own choice, and assuredly a better could not have been made, was placed at the head of this army ; and, after giving Soult a heavy blow on the Douro, he also advanced to deliver Spain. Like Sir John Moore, he was cramped for want of money ; and, like Sir John Moore, he was pestered with false representations, and a variety of plans, founded upon short-sighted views, and displaying great ignorance of the art of war ; but, finally, he adopted, and, as far as the inveterate nature of the people he had to deal with would permit, executed a project, which, like Sir John Moore's, had for its object to overpower the French in his front, and, by forcing them to concentrate, relieve the distant provinces and give full play to the enthusiasm of the Spaniards.

When Sir John Moore advanced, there were no Spanish armies to assist him ; the French were above 320,000 strong, and of these 250,000 were disposable to move against any point ; moreover, they were commanded in person by Napoleon, of whom it has been said by the Duke of Wellington, that his presence, alone, was equal to 40,000 good troops.

When Sir Arthur Wellesley advanced, the French forces in the Peninsula did not exceed 260,000 men, of which only 100,000 could be brought to bear on his operations ; and he was assisted by 60,000 Spaniards, well armed, and tolerably disciplined. His plans were certainly laid with great ability upon the data furnished to him ; but he trusted to Spanish promises and to Spanish energy, and he did not fail to repent his credulity ; nevertheless, he delivered and gained that battle which Sir John Moore had been reproached for not essaying ; but it was found that a veteran French army, even of inferior numbers, was not to be destroyed, or even much dispirited, by one defeat ; and while this battle was fighting, Soult, with 50,000 men, came down upon the flank and rear of the English, a movement precisely similar to that which Napoleon had made from Madrid upon the flank and rear of Sir John Moore. This last general saved himself by crossing the Esla, in the presence of the French patrols ; and in like manner, Sir Arthur evaded destruction by crossing the Tagus, within view of the enemy's scouts, so closely timed was the escape of both.

When Sir John Moore retreated, the Spanish government, reproaching him,

asserted that the French were on the point of ruin, and Romana, even at Astorga, continued to urge offensive operations.

When Sir Arthur Wellesley retired from Jaraceijo, the junta in the same manner asserted that the French were upon the point of retiring from Spain, and General Equia proposed offensive operations. In explaining his motives, and discussing the treatment he had met with, Sir John Moore wrote thus to his own government: "The British were sent to aid the Spanish armies, but they are not equal to encounter the French, who have at least 80,000 men, and we have nothing to expect from the Spaniards, who are not to be trusted; they are apathetic, lethargic, quick to promise, backward to act, improvident, insensible to the shame of flying before the enemy, they refuse all assistance, and I am obliged to leave ammunition, stores, and money, behind. The Spanish armies have shown no resolution, the people no enthusiasm nor daring spirit, and that which has not been shown hitherto, I know not why it should be expected to be displayed hereafter." Such were his expressions.

When Sir Arthur Wellesley had proved the Spaniards, he also, writing to his government says:—"We are here worse off than in a hostile country;—never was an army so ill used;—the Spaniards have made all sorts of promises;—we had absolutely no assistance from the Spanish army; on the contrary, we were obliged to lay down our ammunition, to unload the treasure, and to employ the cars in the removal of our sick and wounded. The common dictates of humanity have been disregarded by them, and I have been obliged to leave ammunition, stores, and money behind. Whatever is to be done must be done by the British army, but that is certainly not capable, singly, to resist a French army of at least 70,000 men."

The last advice given to the government by Sir John Moore was against sending an auxiliary force to Spain. Sir Arthur Wellesley, in the same spirit, withdrew his troops; and, from that moment to the end of the struggle, he warred indeed for Spain, and in Spain, but never with Spain. "I have fished in many troubled waters, but Spanish troubled waters I will never try again," was his expression when speaking of this campaign, and he kept his word. That country became, indeed, a field on which the French and English armies contended for the destiny of Europe; but the defeats or victories, the promises or the performances of the Spaniards scarcely influenced the movements. Spain, being left to her own devices, was beaten in every encounter, foiled in every project, yet made no change in her policy; and while Portugal endeavoured to raise her energy on a level with that of her ally, Spain sought to drag down England to the depth of folly and weakness in which she herself was plunged. The one would not sacrifice an atom of false pride to obtain the greatest benefits; the other submitted, not with abject dependence, but with a magnanimous humility, to every mortification, rather than be conquered; and the effects of their different modes were such as might be expected. Portugal, although assaulted by an infinitely greater number of enemies, in proportion to her strength, overthrew the oppressors the moment they set foot upon her soil; while in Spain, town after town was taken, army after army dispersed, every battle a defeat, and every defeat sensibly diminished the heat of resistance. Napoleon once declared that a nation resolved to be free could not be conquered, and the Spaniards re-echoed the sentiment in their manifestoes, as if to say it was all that was necessary. But Napoleon contemplated a nation, like the Portuguese, making use of every means of defence, whether derived from themselves or, their alliances; not a people puffed with conceit, and lavish of sounding-phrases, such as "perishing under the ruins of the last wall," yet beaten with a facility that rendered them the derision of the world; a people unable to guide themselves, yet arrogantly refusing all advice. Such a nation is ripe for destruction, and such a nation was Spain.

The campaign of 1809 finished the third epoch of the war, and it was prolific of instruction. The jealousy of the French marshals, the evils of dis-

union, the folly of the Spanish government, and the absurdity of the Spanish character, with respect to public affairs, were placed in the strongest light ; while the vast combinations, the sanguinary battles, the singular changes of fortune, the result so little suitable to the greatness of the efforts, amply demonstrated the difficulty and the uncertainty of military affairs. It was a campaign replete with interest ; a great lesson from which a great commander profited. Sir Arthur Wellesley had now experienced the weakness of his friends and the strength of his enemies, and he felt all the emptiness of public boasting. Foreseeing that if the contest was to be carried on, it must be in Portugal, and that unless he himself could support the cause of the Peninsula, it must fall, his manner of making war changed. His caution increased tenfold ; yet, abating nothing of his boldness, he met and baffled the best of the French legions in the fulness of their strength. He was alike unmoved by the intrigues of the Portuguese regency, and by the undisguised hatred of the Spanish government ; and when some of his own generals, and one of them on his personal staff, denouncing his rashness and predicting the ruin of the army, caused the puny energy of the English ministers to quail as the crisis approached, he, with gigantic vigour, pushed aside these impediments, and, steadily holding on his own course, proved himself a sufficient man, whether to uphold or to conquer kingdoms.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

[The following five Notes, dictated by the Emperor Napoleon, and signed by General Bertrand, were found in King Joseph's portfolio, at the battle of Vittoria.]

NO. I.—OBSERVATIONS ADDRESSÉES AU GÉNÉRAL SAVARY SUR LES AFFAIRES D'ESPAGNE.

Le 13 Juillet, 1808.

1ere. Observation.—Les affaires des Français en Espagne seroient dans une excellente position si la division Gobert avait marché sur Valladolid, et si la division Frère eut occupé San Clemente, ayant une colonne mobile à trois ou quatre journées sur la route du Général Dupont.

Le Gal. Gobert ayant été dirigé sur le Général Dupont, le Gal. Frère étant avec le Maréchal Moncey, harassé et affaibli par des marches et des contremarches, la position de l'armée Française est devenue moins belle.

2e. Observation.—Le Maréchal Bessières est aujourd'hui à Medina del Rio Secco avec 15 mille hommes, infanterie, cavalerie, artillerie. Le 15 ou le 16, il attaquera Bénavente, se mettra en communication avec le Portugal, jettera les rebelles en Galice, et s'emparera de Léon. Si toutes les opérations réussissent ainsi, et d'une manière brillante, la position de l'armée Française redeviendra ce qu'elle était.

Si le Général Cuesta se retire de Bénavente sans combattre, il se retirait sur Zamora, Salamanque, pour venir gagner Avila et Segovia, certain qu'alors le Maréchal Bessières ne pourrait point le poursuivre, puisque, dans cette supposition, il serait menacé par l'armée de Galice, dont l'avant-garde est réunie à Léon.

Alors il faut que le général qui commande à Madrid puisse promptement réunir 6000 à 7000 hommes pour marcher sur le Général Cuesta. Il faut que la citadelle de Segovie soit occupée par quelques pièces de canon, 300 à 400 convalescens, avec six semaines de biscuit.

C'est une grande faute de n'avoir pas occupé cette citadelle, quand le major-général l'a mandé. De toutes les positions possibles, Ségovie est la plus dangereuse pour l'armée : capitale d'une province, assise entre les deux routes, elle ôterait à l'armée toutes ses communications, et l'ennemi une fois posté dans cette citadelle, l'armée Française ne pourrait plus l'en déloger. Trois ou 400 convalescens et un bon chef de bataillon, une escouade d'artillerie, rendront le château de Ségovie imprégnable pendant bien de tems, et assureront à l'armée l'importante position de Ségovie.

Si le Général Cuesta se jette en Galice, sans combattre, sans éprouver de défaite, la position de l'armée devient toujours meilleure ; à plus forte raison, s'il est jetté en Galice après avoir éprouvé une forte défaite.

3me. Observation.—Si le Maréchal Bessières, arrivé devant Bénavente, reste en présence sans attaquer le Gal. Cuesta, ou s'il est repoussé, son but sera toujours de couvrir Burgos, en tenant le plus possible l'ennemi en échec ; il peut être renforcé de 3000 hommes de troupes de ligne, qui accompagnent le roi, mais alors il n'y a point à hésiter. Si le Maréchal Bessières a fait une marche rétrograde sans bataille, il faut sur le champ lui envoyer 6000 hommes de renforts. S'il a fait son mouvement après une bataille, où il ait éprouvé de grandes pertes, il faudra faire de grandes dispositions : rappeler à marche forcée sur Madrid le Gal. Frère, le Gal. Caulaincourt, le Gal. Gobert, le Gal. Vedel, et laisser le Gal. Dupont sur les montagnes de la Sierra Morena, ou le rapprocher même de Madrid, en le tenant toujours, cependant, à sept ou huit marches, afin de pouvoir écraser le Gal. Cuesta et toute l'armée de Galice, pendant que le Gal. Dupont servira d'avantgarde pour tenir l'armée d'Andalousie en échec.

4me. Observation.—Si le Général Dupont éprouvait un échec, cela serait de peu de conséquence. Il n'aurait d'autre résultat que de lui faire repasser les montagnes ; mais le coup qui serait porté au Maréchal Bessières serait un coup porté au cœur de l'armée, qui donnerait le *tétanos*, et qui se ferait sentir à toutes les points extrêmes de l'armée. Voilà pourquoi il est très malheureux que toutes les dispositions ordonnées n'aient pas été suivies. L'armée du Maréchal Bessières devrait se trouver avoir au moins huit mille hommes de plus, afin qu'il n'y eut aucune espèce de chance contre l'armée du Maréchal Bessières.

La vraie manière de renforcer le Général Dupont, ce n'est pas de lui envoyer des troupes, mais c'est d'envoyer des troupes au Maréchal Bessières. Le Général Dupont et le Général Vedel sont suffisans pour se maintenir dans les positions qu'ils ont retranchés ; et si le Maréchal Bessières avait été renforcé, et l'armée de Galice écrasée, le Général Dupont immédiatement après se trouverait dans la meilleure position, non seulement par des forces qu'on pourrait alors lui envoyer, mais encore par la situation morale des affaires. Il n'y a pas un habitant de Madrid, pas un paysan des vallées qui ne sente que toutes les affaires d'Espagne aujourd'hui sont dans l'affaire du Maréchal Bessières. Combien n'est-il pas malheureux que dans cette grande affaire on se soit donné volontairement 20 chances contre soi.

5me. Observation.—L'affaire de Valence n'a jamais été d'aucun considération. Le Maréchal Moncey seul était suffisant. C'était une folie que de songer à le secourir. Si le Mal. Moncey ne pouvait pas prendre Valence, 20 mille hommes de plus ne le lui auraient pas fait prendre, parcequ'alors c'était un affaire d'artillerie, et non une affaire d'hommes : car on ne prend pas d'un coup de collier une ville de 80 ou 100 mille âmes, qui a barricadé ses rues, mis de l'artillerie à toutes les portes et dans toutes les maisons. Or, dans cette hypothèse, le Mal. Moncey était suffisant pour former une colonne mobile, faire face à l'armée de Valence, et faire sentir dans toute leur force les horreurs de la guerre.

Le Gal. Frère ne pouvait donc rien pour faire prendre Valence, et le Gal. Frère pouvait beaucoup posté à San Clemente, soit qu'il dût revenir à Madrid, soit qu'il dût prendre une position intermédiaire pour secourir le Gal. Dupont.

C'était une autre erreur que de songer à faire aller le Mal. Moncey à Valence pour ensuite le faire marcher en Murcie et sur Grenade. C'était vouloir fondre ce corps d'armée en détail et sans fruit. Comme le dit fort bien le Général Dupont, il valait mieux lui envoyer directement un régiment que de lui envoyer trois dans cette direction là.

Dans les guerres civiles ce sont les points importants qu'il faut garder : il ne faut pas aller partout. Si cependant on a dirigé le Mal. Moncey sur Valence, c'était à une époque où la situation des affaires n'était pas la même ; c'était lorsque l'armée de Valence pouvait envoyer en Catalogne ou à Saragosse comme elle en menaçait.

6me. Observation.—Le but de tous les efforts de l'armée doit être de conserver Madrid. C'est là qu'est tout. Madrid ne peut être menacé que par l'armée de Galice. Elle peut l'être aussi par l'armée de l'Andalousie, mais d'une manière beaucoup moins dangereux, parcequ'elle est simple et directe, et que par toutes les marches que fait le Gal. Dupont sur ses derrières, il se renforce. Les Généraux Dupont et Vedel étaient suffisans, ayant plus de 20,000 hommes ; les Mal. Bessières ne l'est pas proportionnellement, vu que sa position est plus dangereuse. Un échec que recevrait le Gal. Dupont serait peu de chose ; un échec que recevrait le Mal. Bessières serait plus considérable et se ferait sentir à l'extrémité de la ligne.

Résumé.—Faire reposer et rapprocher de Madrid le Gal. Frère, les Gal. Caulaincourt, le Gal. Gobert, afin qu'ils puissent arriver à Madrid avant le Gal. Cuesta, si celui-ci battait le Mal. Bessières. Immédiatement après l'événement qui aura lieu le 15 ou le 16, prendre un part selon les événemens qui auront eu lieu, et dans le but d'écraser l'armée ennemie en Galice.

Si le Maréchal Bessières a eu grand succès, sans éprouver de grandes pertes, tout sera bien dans la direction actuelle. S'il a un succès après avoir éprouvé beaucoup de pertes, il faut se mettre en mesure de le renforcer. S'il se tient en observation sans attaquer, il faut le renforcer. S'il a été défait et bien battu, il faut se concentrer et rassembler toutes ses troupes dans le cercle de sept ou huit journées de Madrid, et étudier les dispositions dans les différentes directions pour savoir où placer les avantgardes, afin de profiter de l'avantage qu'on a d'être au milieu, pour écraser successivement avec toutes ses forces les divers corps de l'ennemi. Si on n'ordonne pas sur le champ au Gal. Dupont de repasser les montagnes, c'est qu'on espère que malgré la faute faite, le Mal. Bessières a la confiance (qu'on partage) qu'à la rigueur il est suffisant pour écraser l'ennemi. Le Mal. Bessières a eu le bon esprit de tellement réunir toutes ses forces, qu'il n'a pas même laissé un seul homme à St. Ander. Quelqu'avantage qu'il y eut à laisser là un millier d'hommes, il a senti qu'un millier d'hommes pouvait décider sa victoire.

Quant à la division du Gal. Verdier devant Saragosse, elle a rempli aux trois quarts son but. Elle a désorganisé tous les Arragoniens, a porté le découragement parmi eux, les a réduits à défendre les maisons de leur capitale, a soumis tous les environs, a bloqué la ville, et réuni tous les moyens pour s'en emparer sans que cela devienne trop coûteux.

Voilà l'esprit de la guerre d'Espagne.

[Dictated by the Emperor Napoleon. Taken at the battle of Vittoria.]

No. II.—NOTE POUR LE ROI D'ESPAGNE.

Bayonne, le Juillet, 1808.

L'armée d'Espagne a son quartier général à Madrid ; voici sa composition actuelle :

1. *Corps des Pyrénées Occidentales.*

Le Maréchal Bessières commande le corps des Pyrénées Occidentales, qui est fort de 23 mille hommes, infanterie, cavalerie, artillerie, occupe la place de St. Sebastian, les trois Biscays, les montagnes de St. Ander, la place de Burgos, et est chargée de combattre l'armée ennemie des Asturies et de Galice.

Toutes les troupes sont en mouvement pour composer l'armée de la manière suivante.

Division du Gal. Mouton.	1ere. brigade, le Gal. Reynaud.	{ le 4e. regt. d'infanterie légère 15e. d'infanterie de ligne 1er. baton. de Paris en marche total 3000 hom. présens sous les armes, et 6 pièces de canon, ci 3000 hes.	5100 hes.
	(Cette brigade marche sur Bénévent.) 2e. brigade, le Gal. Rey.	{ 2e. regt. d'infanterie légère 12e. idem total 2100 hommes et 6 pièces de canon, ci 2100 (Cette brigade est à Burgos avec le roi, et doit joindre sa division.)	
Division du Gal. Merle.	Brigade d'Armagnac	1800	8400 hes.
	Brigade Gaulois	1800	
	Brigade Sabathier	2800	
	Brigade Ducos	2000	
	et 16 pièces de canon.		
Garde.	{ Infanterie et 6 pièces de canon.	1900 hes.	
	(Toutes ces troupes marchent sur Bénévent.)		
Cavalerie.	10e. de chasseurs	450	1950 hes.
	22e. id.	550	
	Garde	306	
	(Ces troupes marchent sur Bénévent.) Escadrons de dragons	200	
	(Ces escadrons sont en marche et ont dépassé la frontière.)		
	26e. de chasseurs	450	
	(Arrivant à Bayonne sous peu de jours.) Total de la cavalerie	1950 hes.	
Les forces actives du Maréchal Bessières sont donc de 17,000 hes. Il n'en a guère que 15,000 pour l'affaire de Bénévent.			
S'il obtenait à Bénévent et à Léon un grand succès contre l'armée de Galice, peut-être, serait-il convenable pour profiter de la victoire et de la terreur des premiers moments de se jeter dans la Galice. Toutefois, il devrait d'abord prendre position à Léon, en s'emparant de la plaine, jettant l'ennemi dans les montagnes, et interceptant au moins à Astorga la communication de la grande route.			
Garnison de Burgos.—Il y a dans le château de Burgos une garnison de dépôt *			600 hes.
Colonne du Général Bonnet.—Il y a encore à Burgos le gal. de division Bonnet, faisant partie du corps du Mal. Bessières : ce gal. va avoir sous ses ordres une colonne mobile de 1200 hommes, pour maintenir la tranquillité dans la ville et ses environs. Cette colonne est composée comme il suit :			
	4e. bataillon du 118e., formant	450 hes.	1500 hes.
	(Actuellement existant à Burgos.)		
	3e. bataillon du dépôt gal. actuellement à Vittoria	450	
	2 compies. du 4e. d'infanterie légère, formant un petit bataillon	400	
	(En marche, ayant passé la frontière.)		
		1300 hes.	
	Escadron de dragons (en marche)	200	
	2 pièces de canon en marche.		
		1500 hes.	
	A reporter		19,450 hes.

* Note.—These two words are added in Napoleon's own handwriting.

De l'autre part

Colonne d'Aranda.—Cette colonne, formée du 1^{er}. bataillon de marche, fort de 1000 hes. et de 4 pièces de canon, peut se réunir au besoin avec la colonne du Gal. Bonnet: elles doivent assurer la communication jusqu'aux montagnes en avant d'Aranda, ci 19,450 hes.

Colonne de Vittoria.—Le général de brigade Monthion, et le Colonel Barerre, occupent Vittoria avec une colonne composée comme il suit: 1000 hes.

2 compagnies du 15 ^e . de ligne, formant un petit bataillon de	300 hes.
Le 2 ^e . baton. du 12 ^e . d'infanterie légère.	600
Le 2 ^e . baton. du 2 ^e . id.	600

(Ce qui fait en infanterie)				
1 escadron de dragons (en marche)				1500 hes.
2 pièces de canon.				200

(Tous ces corps sont en marche) 1700 ci 1700

Garnison de St. Sebastian.—Le Général Thouvenot commande à St. Sebastian avec mille hommes de garnison, ci 1000

Recapitulation.—Le corps du Mal. Bessièrès est de 23,150

Et 36 pièces de canon.

Les detachemens et troisièmes bataillons des corps qui sont aux divisions actives du Mal. Bessièrès pourront sous 15 jours le rejoindre, vu qu'ils seront remplacés à Vittoria et à Burgos par d'autres corps.

2. Arragon.

Jusqu'à cette heure les troupes qui sont en Arragon, faisaient partie du corps des Pyrénées Occidentales. Mais le corps des Pyrénées Occidentales se portant sur la Galice, il devient indispensable d'en faire une division à part.

Aujourd'hui, ce commandement comprend Pampelune, la Navarre, et les troupes qui forment le siège de Saragosse, sous les ordres du Général Verdier.

Ces troupes sont divisées en quatre brigades, et sont composées ainsi qu'il suit:

3 regimens d'infanterie de ligne de la Vistule, ayant sous les armes	3600 hes.
Les 4 ^e ., 6 ^e ., et 7 ^e . bataillons de marche	1500
Le 3 ^e . bataillon du 14 ^e . provisoire	1300
Le 1 ^{er} . regiment supplémentaire	900
Les 47 ^e ., 15 ^e ., et 70 ^e .	1600
Un bataillon des gardes nationales d'élite	600

La cavalerie consiste dans un regiment de lanciers Polonais	Total	9500 hes.
Plus un escadron de marche	700 }	1100
	400 }	

A Pampelune le Gal. Dagout commande. Indépendamment d'une dépôt de 800 hommes, formant la garnison de la citadelle; il a une colonne (ci 800

mobile composée du 1^{er}. bataillon de marche du Portugal, du troisième bataillon du 118^e., fort de 650 hommes, et d'un escadron de dragons, ce qui forme un total de 1400 hommes disponibles pour se porter sur tous les points de la Navarre, et sur les communications de Saragosse, pour y mettre l'ordre: ci

Artillerie	1400
	200

Il y a donc en cernement en Arragon et en Navarre

Aussitôt que Saragosse sera pris, et que le corps de l'Arragon sera constitué, il sera nécessaire de faire entrer au corps du Marl. Bessièrès le bataillon du 47^e., celui du 15^e., et les trois bataillons du 14^e. provisoire; ce qui augmentera le Mal. Bessièrès de deux mille hommes, afin de tenir les corps réunis. Il est possible qu'on fasse partir de Bayonne le 19,300 hommes de bonnes troupes de ligne, pour se diriger sur Saragosse et enlever la prise de cette place, si toutefois elle n'est pas encore prise.

Si Saragosse était pris, le corps du Mal. Bessièrès pourrait être renforcé de ces trois mille hommes d'élite et de 2000 hommes du corps de Saragosse, ce qui lui ferait un corps nombreux pour la campagne de Galice.

Indépendamment de Saragosse, les rebelles occupent la ville de Jaca et plusieurs points dans les vallées. A tous les débouchés des vallées en France il y a un général de brigade avec une colonne mobile. On attendra la prise de Saragosse pour entrer dans ces vallées et y marcher dans les deux sens. En général l'esprit des vallées est bon; mais des troupes de contrebandiers que les chefs des rebelles ont enrégimentés les vexent.

3. Catalogne.

Le Général Duhesme occupe Barcelone, qui est une place qui a deux très belles forteresses, qui la dominent. C'est la plus grande ville de la monarchie.

Les Général Duhesme a deux divisions, la division Chabran et la division Lechi, formant 11,000 hes. d'infanterie, 1600 hes. de cavalerie et 18 pièces de canon.

Le Général Duhesme a eu plusieurs événemens; il a brûlé un grand nombre de villages, et maintenu en respect le pays à 15 lieues à la ronde.

La ville de Gérone, n'ayant pas été occupée, les insurgés de la Catalogne ont établis là leur Junte, d'où ils donnent le mouvement au reste de la province. 2000 insurgés assiégeaient le fort de Figuéras. On y avait heureusement laissé 300 Français: ils ont été obligés de tirer beaucoup de coups de canon et de brûler le village.

Le gal. de division Reille, avec deux bataillons Toscans, a marché sur Figuéras, l'a débloqué, le 6 du mois, et y a fait entrer une grande quantité de vivres, dont on manquait. Le 10, il réunissait sa division, qui arrivait de divers points de la France; il avait déjà 6000 hommes, et il doit avoir aujourd'hui 9000 hes.; il doit s'assurer de Roses et marcher sur Gérone, établir ses communications avec le Général Duhesme et ensemble pacifier la Catalogne.

Les forces réunies des Généraux Duhesme et Reille s'élèvent donc à 22,000 hes.

Ainsi le corps des Pyrénées Occidentales est fort de	23,000
Celui d'Arragon, de	13,000
Celui de Catalogne, de	22,000

Total 68,000 hes.

Nous venons de faire connaître la situation de l'armée dans les provinces de la Biscaye, de St. Ander, de la Castille, de la Navarre, de l'Arragon et de la Catalogne; c'est à dire, sur toute la frontière de France.

Voici actuellement la situation dans les autres points:

Le deux corps qui se sont rendus à Madrid sous les ordres du Général Dupont et du Mal. Moncey portaient, et portent encore; le premier, le nom de corps d'observation de la Gironde, commandé par le Gal. Dupont; le second, le nom de corps d'observation des Côtés de l'Océan, commandé par le Mal. Moncey.

Le corps d'observation de la Gironde est composé de trois divisions: deux sont en Andalousie avec le Général Dupont; la 3eme., celle du Général Frere, doit être à présent à San Clemente.

Le corps d'observation des Côtés de l'Océan est composé également de trois divisions. La première est avec le Maréchal Moncey, sous Valence: les deux autres sont à Madrid, et dissimulés en différentes colonnes, pour maintenir la communication avec le Général Dupont. Les états de situation vous feront connaître la force de ces divisions: mais on peut en général les considérer les unes dans les autres comme fortes de 6000 hommes présens sous les armes.

Il y a à Madrid deux bataillons de la garde, formant 1000 hommes, et à-peu-près 900 hommes de cavalerie de la garde.

Ainsi il y a à Madrid, et du côté de Valence et de l'Andalousie, la valeur de 40,000 hommes d'infanterie, huit mille hommes de cavalerie et 80 pièces de canon attelées.

Le Général Junot a en Portugal trois divisions, formant présens sous les armes, compris son artillerie, sa cavalerie, 23 mille hommes.*

Telle est la situation de l'armée en Espagne et en Portugal.

1ere. Observation.—Les événemens qui se passent aujourd'hui et demain amélioreront beaucoup la situation de toutes les affaires, en jettant dans la Galice le Général Cuesta, en lui ôtant ses communications avec l'Estramadure, Madrid et l'Andalousie, en assurant notre communication avec le Portugal, et en assurant la soumission des provinces de Salamanque, Zamora, Toro, &c.

La manière dont ces événemens auront lieu décideront à entrer sur le champ en Galice, à soumettre les Asturies, ou à différer encore quelques jours.

2e. Observation.—La Navarre et la Biscaye se sont maintenues tranquilles.

En Arragon le plat pays a été soumis, les rebelles ont été battus plusieurs fois; avec deux seuls bataillons, 8 à 10 mille insurgés ont été détruits ou dispersés; le découragement est à dernier point parmi eux. Ils se sont défendus dans leurs maisons à Saragosse; on les a bombardés; on leur a fait beaucoup de mal; on achève aujourd'hui de bloquer la ville en jettant un pont sur l'Ebre. Une fois cette ville soumise, il n'y a pas de doute que tout l'Arragon ne devienne tranquille. Une partie des troupes sera cependant nécessaire pour maintenir la province; une petite partie pourra aider à la soumission de la Catalogne. La partie qui est nécessaire pour le bien du service du Maréchal Bessières ira le rejoindre. Ainsi cet événement équivaldra à un secours considérable.

* Note by the Author.—This calculation was made under the supposition that General Avril had joined Dupont.

3eme. Observation.—La première opération du Général Reille a débloqué Figuières : il soumet à présent tous les environs. Il ne tardera pas sans doute à s'emparer de Gérone et à établir sa communication par terre avec le Général Duhesme. La réduction de Gérone entamera probablement celle de Lerida ; on pourra avoir alors une colonne de deux trois ou mille hommes, qu'on dirigera par Tortose sur Valence.

4me. Observation.—On n'a point de nouvelles de l'expédition de Valence, et le Maréchal Moncey a huit mille hommes. Avec ces forces il n'a rien à craindre. Il peut ne pas prendre la ville, qui est très grande, si les paysans s'y sont renfermés et ne craignent point de la ruiner : mais le Mal. Moncey se maintiendra dans le plat pays, occupera les revoltés, qu'il empêchera de se porter ailleurs, et fera porter au pays tout le poids de la guerre.

5me. Observation.—On compte que le Général Dupont a aujourd'hui près de 20,000 hommes. Si les opérations du maréchal Bessières réussissent bien, il n'y aura pas d'inconvénient à appuyer encore le Général Dupont et à lui permettre de reprendre l'offensive. Ainsi les deux points importants, et où on fera une véritable guerre réglée, sont la Galice et l'Andalousie, parceque les troupes du camp de St. Roche, de Cadix, des Algarves, sont près de 25 mille hommes, qu'elles ont pris parti pour la sédition de Seville en Andalousie, et que tout ce qui était à Porto a pris parti pour les rebelles de Galice.

Le point le plus important de tous est celui du Mal. Bessières, comme on l'a déjà vu dans la note qu'on a envoyé. On doit tout faire pour que ce corps n'éprouve aucun mouvement rétrograde, aucun échec ; celui du Général Dupont vient après.

Les affaires de Saragosse sont au 3e. ordre ; celles de Valence ne sont qu'en 4me.

Voilà la véritable situation des affaires militaires du royaume.

Il paraît convenable de former dans l'Arragon une division de 10 à 12 mille hommes que pourra commander le Gal. Verdier. Il devra correspondre directement avec l'état major du roi, avec le Mal. Bessières (pour s'entendre), avec le Gal. Duhesme pour se concerter, et avec le général de la 11e. division militaire, que se tiendra à Bayonne, afin de connaître toujours la situation de cette frontière. Son commandement doit embrasser la Navarre et tout l'Arragon.

Alors l'armée sera composée du corps des Pyrénées Occidentales, de la division de l'Arragon (il est inutile d'en faire un corps), du corps de la Catalogne composé de trois divisions, y compris celle du Général Reille, et des six divisions que forment les corps d'observation de la Gironde et des Côtés de l'Océan.

Cela fera à-peu-près 12 divisions réunies et en outre un certain nombre de petites colonnes mobiles et de garnisons.

[Dictated by the Emperor Napoleon. Taken at Vittoria.]

No. III.—NOTE SUR LA POSITION ACTUELLE DE L'ARMÉE EN ESPAGNE.

Bayonne, le 21 Juillet, 1808.

1ere. Observation.—La bataille de Medina del Rio Secco a mis les affaires de l'armée dans la meilleure situation. Le Maréchal Bessières ne donne plus aucune inquiétude, et toutes les sollicitudes doivent se tourner du côté du Général Dupont.

2e. Observation.—Dans la position actuelle des affaires, l'armée Française occupe le centre ; l'ennemi, un grand nombre de points de la circonférence.

3me. Observation.—Dans une guerre de cette nature, il faut du sang froid, de la patience, et du calcul ; et il ne faut pas épuiser les troupes en fausses marches et contremarches ; il ne faut pas croire, quand on a fait une fausse marche de trois à quatre jours, qu'on l'aie réparé par une contremarche : c'est ordinairement deux fautes au lieu d'une.

4me. Observation.—Toutes les opérations de l'armée ont réussies jusqu'à cette heure, autant qu'elles devaient réussir. Le Général Dupont s'est maintenu au-delà des montagnes, et dans le bassin de l'Andalousie ; trois fois il a défait les insurgés. Le Maréchal Moncey a défait les insurgés à Valence ; il n'a pas pu prendre la ville, ce qui est une chose qui n'est pas extraordinaire. Peut-être eût-on pu désirer qu'il eût pu se camper à une journée de la ville, comme a fait le Général Dupont ; mais, enfin, qu'il soit à une journée ou à cinq, comme à Saint Clement, la différence n'est pas très grande. En Arragon, on a battu partout. Saragosse n'a pas été pris ; il est aujourd'hui cerné ; et une ville de 40 à 50 mille âmes, défendue par une mouvement populaire, ne se prend qu'avec du tems et de la patience. Les histoires des guerres sont pleines des catastrophes des plus considérables pour avoir brusqué et s'être enfoncé dans les rues étroites des villes. L'exemple de Buenos Ayres, et des 12 milles Anglais d'élite qui y ont péri, en est une preuve.

5me. Observation.—Ainsi la position de l'armée est bonne, le Maréchal Moncey étant à Saint Clément, ou environs, et les Généraux Gobert et Vedel réunis au Général Dupont en Andalousie ; ce serait une faute, à moins d'incidents et d'un emploi immédiat, à donner à ces troupes dans un autre point, que de concentrer toutes les troupes trop près de Madrid.

L'incertitude des événemens du Maréchal Bessières, et les 25 chances qu'il avoit contre lui sur cent, pouvaient déterminer à faire arrêter la marche de toutes les troupes qui s'éloignaient de la capitale, afin que les colonnes pussent être rappelés à Madrid si le Maréchal Bessières était battu, et pussent arriver dans cette ville avant l'ennemi ; mais ce serait une faute si on eut fait retrograder ces colonnes, et si on eut agi comme si le Maréchal Bessières avait été battu, lorsque quelques jours avant on agissait comme si l'armée de Galice n'existait pas. 500 chevaux et 1800 hommes d'infanterie dirigés sur Valladolid étaient tous ce qu'il fallait. Si cette colonne était partie trois jours plutôt, elle y serait arrivée le 15. Le Maréchal Bessières a été vainqueur, et avait pour être vainqueur 75 chances contre 25 ; mais la fatigue qu'on a donné à l'armée, et les mouvemens rétrogrades qu'on a ordonné inutilement, puisque même le Maréchal Bessières battu, on avait 8 à 10 jours pour réunir l'armée, ont fait un mal moral et physique. Il faut espérer que la nouvelle de la victoire arrivée à tems aura mis l'état major à même d'arrêter tout mouvement sur Madrid, et que chaque colonne se trouvera plus près du point où elle doit se trouver.

6me. Observation.—Dans la situation actuelle des affaires, le plus important de tous est le Général Dupont. On doit lui envoyer le reste de la division Gobert, et employer d'autres troupes pour maintenir la communication ; il faut tenir la tête de la division du Maréchal Moncey, sur Saint Clement, et menacer toujours la province de Valence. Si le Maréchal Bessières a battu sans effort, et avec peu de perte, l'armée de Galice, et a eu moins de huit mille hommes engagés, il n'y a pas de doute qu'avec 20 milles le Général Dupont ne culbute tout ce qu'il a devant lui.

7me. Observation.—La brigade du Général Rey rend à l'armée plus qu'elle n'a perdu par le détachement qui a été fait sur Valladolid. Toutes les probabilités humaines sont que le Maréchal Bessières n'a plus besoin d'aucun renfort, du moins pour être maître de toute la Castille et du royaume de Léon. Ce n'est que lorsqu'on aura reçu la nouvelle de ce qu'il aura fait à Bénévent et à Léon qu'on pourra décider s'il doit attaquer la Galice.

8me. Observation.—Le Général Verdier, en Arragon, a cerné Saragosse : le 14eme. et le 44eme. de ligne partent demain pour s'y rendre. Les partis Français vont jusqu'à moitié chemin de Lerida, de Barbastro, et de Jaca. Dans dix jours toute l'artillerie sera arrivée. Cette belle et bonne brigade de troupes de ligne porte à près de quinze mille hommes l'armée du Général Verdier. Il est probable que Saragosse tombera bientôt, et que les deux tiers de ces 15 milles hommes deviendront disponibles.

9eme. Observation.—Ainsi le corps du Maréchal Bessières a pris l'offensive, il est depuis sa victoire renforcé de la brigade Lefebvre et de la brigade Gaulois ; il est donc dans le cas de conserver l'offensive. Le corps du Général Verdier en Arragon a battu partout les insurgés, a cerné la ville avec des forces beaucoup moindres ; il vient d'être considérablement renforcé ; ainsi il peut donner une nouvelle activité aux opérations du siège, et conserver son activité offensive sur les deux rives de l'Ebre. Le corps de Catalogne a joliment agi, ayant pour point d'appui Barcelonne, l'ajonction sera faite aujourd'hui ou demain devant Gérone, avec le Génl. Reille.

10eme. Observation.—Voilà pour les trois corps d'armée situés du côté de la France. La communication de Madrid avec la France est important sous tous les points de vue. Il faut donc que les colonnes qui viennent d'être organisées à Burgos et à Vittoria et qui seront journellement renforcées et augmentées, soient laissées dans ces stations.

Ci joint la note de la formation de ces colonnes. Elles sont presque toutes composées de 3eme. bataillons et de conscrits, mais avec de bons cadres ; 15 à 20 jours de stations à Burgos et à Vittoria les mettront à-peu-près à l'école de bataillon. Ce serait une très grande faute que de rappeler trop tôt ces troupes pour en renforcer les cadres principaux ; il faut attendre jusqu'à ce qu'on ait pu les remplacer à Vittoria et à Burgos par de nouvelles troupes.

11eme. Observation.—Il n'y a donc rien à craindre du côté du Maréchal Bessières, ni dans le nord de la Castille, ni dans le royaume de Léon.

Il n'y a rien à craindre en Arragon ; Saragosse tombera un jour plus tôt ou un jour plus tard.

Il n'y a rien à craindre en Catalogne.

Il n'y a rien à craindre pour les communications de Burgos à Bayonne, moyennant les deux colonnes organisées dans ces deux villes, et qui seront renforcées. S'il y avait des événemens en Biscaye, la force qui se réunit à Bayonne, formant une réserve, seroit suffisante pour mettre tout en ordre.

S'il arrive à Burgos quelque événement trop considérable pour que la colonne mobile qui est à Burgos puisse y mettre ordre, le Maréchal Bessières ne sera pas assez loin pour ne pouvoir faire un détachement.

Le Général Monthion a la surveillance de toutes les Biscayes. Le Général Bonnet à Burgos est chargé de maintenir la communication de Vittoria avec le Maréchal Bessières et avec Madrid. Il est nécessaire que ces deux généraux correspondent tous les jours entr'eux et avec le Général Drouet, qui est laissé en réserve à Bayonne, de même que le Génl. Verdier de Saragosse et le Génl. Dagoult de Pampelune doivent correspondre

tous les jours avec le Général Drouet à Bayonne, et avec Madrid, par le canal de Bayonne et de Vittoria : jusqu'à ce que les communications directes soient rétablies, un courrier partant de Madrid peut se rendre par Vittoria, Tolosa, Pampelune, devant Saragosse. Le seul point important donc aujourd'hui est le Général Dupont. Si l'ennemi parvenait jamais à s'emparer des défilés de la Sierra Morena, il serait difficile de l'en chasser ; il faut donc renforcer le Génl. Dupont, de manière qu'il ait 25 mille hommes, compris ce qu'il faudra pour garder les passages des montagnes et une partie du chemin de La Manche. Il pourra disposer les troupes de manière que le jour où il voudra attaquer, la brigade de deux à trois mille hommes, destinée à garder les montagnes, arrive au camp du Génl. Dupont à marches forcées, et soit successivement remplacée par les colonnes qui seraient en arrière, de sorte que le Génl. Dupont ait pour le jour de la bataille plus de 23 mille hommes à mettre en ligne.

Une fois qu'on aura bien battu l'ennemi, une partie des troupes se dissipera, et selon que la victoire sera plus ou moins décidée, on pourra faire continuer le mouvement à d'autres troupes sur le Général Dupont.

12eme. Observation.—Saragosse pris, on aura des troupes disponibles, soit pour renforcer l'armée de Catalogne, soit pour marcher sur Valence de concert avec le Maréchal Moncey, soit pour renforcer le Maréchal Bessièrès et marcher en Galice, si après la victoire qu'il a déjà remporté, et celle qu'il remportera à Léon, il ne croit pas assez fort pour s'y porter d'abord.

13eme. Observation.—Il serait important de choisir deux points intermédiaires entre Andujar et Madrid, pour pouvoir y laisser garnison permanente, un commandant, un dépôt de cartouches, munitions, canons, magasins de biscuit, des fours, du farine, et un hôpital, de sorte que 3 à 400 hommes défendent le magasin et l'hôpital contre toute une insurrection. Il est difficile de croire qu'il n'y ait point quelque château ou donjon, pouvant être retranché promptement et propre à cela. C'est par ce seul moyen qu'on peut raccourcir la ligne d'opération, et être sur d'avoir toutes les trois ou quatre grandes marches, une manutention et un point de répos.

14eme. Observation.—En resumé, le partage de l'armée paraît devoir être celui-ci :

Corps de Catalogne, tel qu'il existe à-peu-près	20,000 hes.
Corps d'Arragon, tel qu'il existe à-peu-près 15 mille hommes, jusqu'à ce que Saragosse soit pris	
Corps du Maréchal Bessièrès, ce qu'il a à-peu-près	15,000
Colonne de Burgos	17,000
Colonne de Vittoria	2000
Garnison de St. Sébastian	2000
Corps d'Aranda	1500
	1000

Total du corps du Marl. Bessièrès 24,000 hes.

Après la prise de Saragosse, lorsque les affaires de Catalogne seront un peu apaisées, on pourra, selon les circonstances, ou renforcer le Maréchal Bessièrès, ou renforcer le Général Dupont, ou entreprendre l'opération de Valence.

Aujourd'hui, le seul point qui menace, où il faut promptement avoir un succès, c'est du côté du Général Dupont, avec 25 mille hommes infanterie, cavalerie, et artillerie comprise : il a beaucoup plus qu'il ne faut pour avoir de grands résultats ; à la rigueur, avec 21 mille hommes présent sur le champ de bataille, il peut hardiment prendre l'offensive, il ne sera pas battu, et il aura pour lui plus de 80 chances.

[Dictated by Napoleon. Taken at Vittoria.]

No. IV.—NOTE SUR LES AFFAIRES D'ESPAGNE.

St. Cloud, le 30 Août, 1808.

1ere. Observation.—Dans la position de l'armée d'Espagne on a à craindre d'être attaqué sur le droite par l'armée de Galice, sur le centre par l'armée venant de Madrid, sur le gauche par l'armée venant de Saragosse et Valence. Ce serait une grande faute que de laisser l'armée de Saragosse et de Valence prendre position à Tudela.

Tudela doit être occupé, parceque c'est une position honorable, et Milagro une position obscure.

Tudela est sur les communications de Pampelune, a un beau pont en pierre, est l'aboutissant d'un canal sur Saragosse. C'est une position offensive sur Saragosse telle que l'ennemi ne peut pas la négliger ; cette position seule couvre la Navarre. En gardant Tudela, on garde une grande quantité de bateaux, qui nous seront bientôt nécessaires pour le siège de Saragosse.

Si l'ennemi était maître de Tudela, toute la Navarre s'insurgerait, l'ennemi pourrait arriver à Estella, en négligeant la position de Milagro et en coupant la communication avec Pampelune.

D'Estella il serait sur Tolosa ; il y serait sans donner le tems de faire les dispositions convenables ; il n'est pas à craindre, au contraire, que l'ennemi fasse aucune opération sur Pampelune ; tant que nous aurons Tudela, il serait lui-même coupé sur Saragosse.

Le général qui commande à Tudela peut couvrir les hauteurs de redoutes ; si c'est une armée d'insurgés, s'en approcher et la battre, la tenir constamment sur le défensive par les reconnoissances et ses mouvemens sur Saragosse.

Et si, au lieu de cela, une partie de l'armée de ligne Espagnole marchait sur Tudela, le général Français repassera l'Ebre, s'il y est forcé, disputera le terrain sur Pampelune, et donnera le tems au général en chef de l'armée Française de prendre ses mesures. Ce corps d'observation remplira alors son but, et aucune opération prompte sur Tolosa ni Estella n'est à craindre.

Au lieu qu'en occupant la position de Milagro, l'ennemi sera à Estella, le même jour qu'on l'apprendra au quartier général. Si on occupe Tudela, il faut s'y aider de redoutes, et s'y établir, n'y conserver aucune espèce d'embarras, et les tenir tous dans l'ampelune. Si l'ennemi l'occupe, il faut l'en chasser, et s'y établir ; car dans l'ordre défensif, ce serait une grande faute, qui entraînerait de fâcheuses conséquences.

2e. *Observation.*—La position de Burgos était également importante à tenir, comme ville de haute réputation, comme centre de communication et de rapports.

Delà des partis non seulement de cavalerie, mais encore de deux ou de trois mille hommes d'infanterie, et même quatre ou cinq mille hommes en échelons peuvent poster les premières patrouilles d'housards dans toutes les directions jusqu'à deux marches, et parfaitement informés de tout ce qui se fait, en instruire le quartier général, de manière que si l'ennemi se présente en force sur Burgos, les différentes divisions puissent à temps s'y porter pour le soutenir et livrer la bataille, ou si cela n'est pas jugé convenable, éclairer les mouvemens de l'ennemi, lui laisser croire qu'on veut se porter sur Burgos, et pouvoir ensuite faire sa retraite pour se porter ailleurs.

Un corps de 12 à 15 mille hommes ne prend-il pas 20 positions dans la journée au seul commandement d'un adjudant major ? et nos troupes seraient-elles devenues des levées en masse, qu'il faudroit placer 15 jours d'avance dans les positions où on voudroit qu'elles se battent ?

Si cela eut été jugé ainsi, le corps du Maréchal Bessières eut pris la position de Miranda ou de Briviesca ; mais lorsque l'ennemi est encore à Madrid, lorsqu'on ignore où est l'armée de Galice, et qu'on a le soupçon que les rebelles pourront employer une partie de leurs efforts contre le Portugal, prendre, au lieu d'une position menaçante, offensive, honorable comme Burgos, une position honteuse, borgne comme Trevino, c'est dire à l'ennemi, "Vous n'avez rien à craindre ; portez vous ailleurs ; nous avons fait nos dispositions pour aller plus loin, ou bien nous avons choisi un champ de bataille pour nous battre ; venez ici, vous ne craignez pas d'être inquiétés." Mais que fera le Général Français, si l'on marche demain sur Burgos ? laissera-t-il prendre par 6000 insurgés la citadelle de cette ville, ou si les Français ont laissés garnison dans le château (car on ignore la position et la situation de l'armée), comment une garnison de 4, 6. ou 800 hommes se retirera-t-elle dans une si vaste plaine ? Et des lors c'est comme s'il n'y avoit rien : l'ennemi maître de cette citadelle, on ne la reprendra plus.

Si, au contraire, on veut garder la citadelle, on veut donc livrer bataille à l'ennemi ; car cette citadelle ne peut pas tenir plus de trois jours ; et si on veut livrer bataille à l'ennemi, pourquoi le Mar. Bessières abandonne-t-il le terrain où on veut livrer bataille ?

Ces dispositions paraissent mal raisonnées, et quand l'ennemi marchera on fera essuyer à l'armée un affront qui demoralisera les troupes, n'y eut-il que des corps légers ou des insurgés qui marchassent.

En résumé, la position de Burgos devait être gardée ; tous les jours à trois heures du matin on devait être sous les armes, et à une heure du matin il devait partir des reconnoissances dans toutes les directions. On devait ainsi recueillir des nouvelles à huit ou dix lieux à la ronde, pour qu'on peut prendre ensuite le parti que les circonstances indiqueraient.

C'est la première fois qu'il arrive à une armée de quitter toutes les positions offensives, pour se mettre dans de mauvaises positions défensives, d'avoir l'air de choisir des champs de bataille, lorsque l'éloignement de l'ennemi, les mille et une combinaisons différentes qui peuvent avoir lieu, ne laissent point la probabilité de prévoir si la bataille aura lieu à Tudela, entre Tudela et Pampelune, entre Soria et l'Ebre, ou entre Burgos et Miranda.

La position de Burgos, tenue en force et d'une manière offensive, menace Palencia, Valladolid, Aranda. Madrid même. Il faut avoir longtems fait la guerre pour la concevoir ; il faut avoir entrepris un grand nombre d'opérations offensives pour savoir comme le moindre événement ou indice encourage ou décourage, décide une opération ou une autre.

En deux mots, si 15 mille insurgés entrent dans Burgos, se retranchent dans la ville, et occupent le château, il faut calculer une marche de plusieurs jours pour pouvoir s'y poster et reprendre la ville ; ce qui ne sera pas sans quelque inconvénient ; si pendant ce tems-là la véritable attaque est sur Logrono ou Pampelune, on aura fait des contremarches in-

utiles, qui auront fatigué l'armée ; et enfin, si l'ennemi occupe Logrono, Tudela, et Burgos, l'armée Française serait dans une triste et mauvaise position.

Quand on tiens à Burgos de la cavalerie sans infanterie, n'est-ce pas dire à l'ennemi qu'on ne veut pas y tenir ; n'est-ce pas l'engager à y venir ? Burgos a une grande influence dans le monde par son nom, dans la Castille parceque c'en est la capitale, dans les opérations parcequ'elle donne une communication directe avec St. Ander. Il n'est pas permis à 300 lieues, et n'ayant pas même un état de situation de l'armée, de prescrire ce qu'on doit faire ; mais on doit dire que si aucune force majeure ne l'empêche, il faut occuper Burgos et Tudela.

Le corps détaché de Tudela a son mouvement assuré sur Pampelune, a la rôle de garder la Navarre, a ses ennemis à tenir en échec, Saragosse et tous les insurgés. Il était plus que suffisant pour surveiller Tudela, l'Ebre, et Pampelune, pour dissiper les rassemblemens s'il n'y avait que des insurgés, contenir l'ennemi, donner des renseignemens, et retarder la marche sur Pampelune. Si au lieu des insurgés, c'est l'armée ennemie qui marche de ce côté, il suffit encore pour donner le tems à l'armée de Burgos, à celle de Miranda, de marcher réunie avec 36 mille hommes, soit pour prendre l'offensive, soit pour prendre en flanc l'ennemi qui marche sur Pampelune, soit pour se replier et rentrer dans la Navarre, si toute l'armée ennemie avait pris cette direction.

Si ces observations paraissent bonnes et qu'on les adopte, que l'ennemi n'ait encore montré aucun plan, il faut que le général qui commande le corps de Saragosse fasse construire quelque redoutes autour de Tudela, pour favoriser ses champs de bataille, réunisse des vivres de tous les côtés, et soit là dans une position offensive sur Saragosse en maintenant sa communication avec Logrono par sa droite, mais au moins par la rive gauche de l'Ebre. Il faut que le Maréchal Bessières, avec tout son corps, renforcé de la cavalerie légère, soit campé dans le bois près Burgos, la citadelle bien occupée ; que tous les hôpitaux, les dépôts, les embarras soient au delà de l'Ebre ; qu'il soit là en position de manœuvrer, tous les jours, à trois heures du matin, sous les armes, jusqu'au retour de toutes les reconnaissances, et éclairant le pays dans la plus grande étendue ; que le corps du Mal. Moncey soit à Miranda et à Briviesca, tous ses embarras et hôpitaux derrière Vittoria, toujours en bataille avant le jour, et envoyant des reconnaissances sur Soria et les autres directions de l'ennemi.

Il ne faut pas perdre de vue que les corps des Maréchaux Bessières et Moncey, devant être réunis, il faut se lier le moins possible avec Logrono, et cependant considérer le corps du Général Lefebvre comme un corps détaché, qui a une ligne d'opération particulière sur Pampelune et un rôle séparé ; vouloir conserver Tudela comme une partie contigue de la ligne, c'est se dessemencer beaucoup. Enfin, faire la guerre, c'est à dire, avoir des nouvelles par les curés, les alcaldes, les chefs de couvent, les principaux propriétaires, les postes : on sera alors parfaitement informé.

Les reconnaissances qui tous les jours se dirigeront du côté de Soria, de Burgos, sur Palencia, et du côté d'Aranda, peuvent former tous les jours trois postes d'interception, trois rapports d'hommes arrêtés, qu'on traitera bien, et qu'on relâchera quand ils auront donné les renseignemens qu'on desire. On verra alors venir l'ennemi, on pourra réunir toutes ses forces, lui dérober des marches, et tomber sur ses flancs au moment où il méditera un projet offensif.

3me. Observation.—L'armée Espagnole d'Andalousie étoit peu nombreuse. Toutes les Gazettes Anglaises, et les rapports de l'officier Anglais qui étoit au camp, nous le prouvent. L'inconcevable ineptie du Général Dupont, sa profonde ignorance des calculs d'un général en chef, son tâtonnement, l'ont perdu. 18 mille hommes ont posé les armes, six mille seulement se sont battus, et encore ces 6000 hommes que le Genl. Dupont a fait battre à la pointe du jour, après les avoir fait marcher toute la nuit, étoient un contre trois. Malgré tout cela, l'ennemi c'est si mal battu, qu'il n'a pas fait un prisonnier, pris une pièce de canon, gagné un pouce de terrain, et l'armée de Dupont est restée intacte dans sa position ; ce qui sans doute a été un malheur ; car il eût mieux valu que cette division eût été mise en déroute, éparpillée, et détruite, puisque les divisions Vedel et Dufour, au lieu de se rendre par la capitulation, auraient fait leur retraite. Comment ces deux divisions ont-elles été comprises dans la capitulation ? c'est par la lacheté insupportable et l'imbécillité des hommes qui ont négocié, et qui porteront sur l'échaffaud la peine de ce grand crime national.

Ce que l'on vient de dire prouve que les Espagnols ne sont pas à craindre ; toutes les forces Espagnols ne sont pas capables de culbuter 25 mille Français, dans une position raisonnable.

Depuis le 12 jusqu'au 19, le Général Dupont n'a fait que des bêtises, et malgré tout cela, s'il n'avait pas fait la faute de se séparer de Vedel, et qu'il eût marché avec lui, les Espagnols auraient été battus et culbutés. A la guerre les hommes ne sont rien, c'est un homme qui est tout. Jusqu'à cette heure nous n'avons trouvé ces exemples que dans l'histoire de nos ennemis : aujourd'hui, il est fâcheux que nous puissions les trouver dans la nôtre.

Une rivière, fût-elle aussi large que la Vistule, aussi rapide que le Danube à son embouchure, n'est rien si on n'a des débouchés sur l'autre rive, ut une tête prompte à reprendre l'offensive. Quand à l'Ebre, c'est moins que rien ; on ne la regarde que comme une trace.

Dans toutes ces observations, on a parlé dans la position où se trouvait l'armée du 20 au 26, lorsqu'elle n'avait nulle part nouvelle de l'ennemi.

Si on continue à ne prendre aucune mesure pour avoir des nouvelles, on n'apprendra que l'armée de ligne Espagnol est arrivée sur Tudela et Pampelune, qu'elle est sur les communications, sur Tolosa, que lorsqu'elle y sera déjà rendue. On a fait connaître dans la note précédente comment on faisait à la guerre pour avoir des nouvelles. Si la position de Tudela est occupée par l'ennemi, on ne voit pas que l'Ebre soit tenable. Comment a-t-on évacué Tudela, lorsqu'on avait mandé dans des notes précédentes qu'il fallait garder ce point, et que l'opinion même des généraux qui venaient de Saragosse étaient d'occuper cette importante position.

[Dictated by Napoleon. Taken at Vittoria.]

No. V.—NOTE SUR LES AFFAIRES D'ESPAGNE.

St. Cloud, Août, 1808.

1ere. Observation.—Tudela est importante sous plusieurs points de vue : il a un pont sur l'Ebre, et protège parfaitement la Navarre : c'est le point d'intersection du canal qui va à Saragosse.

Les convois d'artillerie et de vivres mettent pour se rendre de Pampelune à Tudela trois jours, de Tudela à Saragosse trois jours. Mais en se servant du canal, on va de Tudela à Saragosse en 14 heures. Lorsque donc les vivres, les hôpitaux, sont à Tudela, c'est comme s'ils étaient à Saragosse.

La première opération qui doit faire l'armée lorsqu'elle reprendra son système d'offensive, et qu'elle sera forte de tous ses moyens, ce doit être d'investir et de prendre Saragosse ; et si cette ville résiste comme elle l'a fait la première fois, en donner un exemple qui retentisse dans toute l'Espagne.

Une vingtaine de pièces de 12 de campagne, une vingtaine d'obusiers de six pièces de campagne, une douzaine de mortiers, et une douzaine de pièces de 16 et de 24, parfaitement approvisionnée, seront nécessaires, ainsi que des mineurs pour remplir ce but.

Il n'est aucun de ces bouches de feu qui doit consommer son approvisionnement de campagne.

Un approvisionnement extraordinaire de 80 mille coups de canon, bombes ou obus, paraît nécessaire pour prendre cette ville.

Il faudrait donc, pour ne pas retarder la marche de la grande armée, 15 jours avant qu'elle ne puisse arriver, commencer le transport de Pampelune à Tudela, et que dans les 48 heures après l'investissement de Saragosse, l'artillerie y arrivât sur des bateaux, de manière que quatre jours après on put commencer trois attaques à la fois, et avoir cette ville en peu de jours, ce qui serait une partie des succès, en y employant 25 à 30 mille hommes, ou plus s'il était nécessaire.

On suppose que, si l'ennemi a pris position entre Madrid et Burgos, il aura été battu.

Il faut donc occuper Tudela. Ce point est tellement important qu'il serait à désirer qu'on put employer un mois à le fortifier et à s'y retrancher de manière qu'un millier d'hommes avec 8 à 10 pièces de canon s'y trouvassent en sûreté et à l'abri de toutes les insurrections possibles. Il ne faut pas surtout souffrir que les revoltés s'y retranchât ; ce serait deux sièges au lieu d'une ; et il serait impossible de prendre Saragosse avant d'avoir Tudela, à cause du canal.

On trouvera ci-joint des observations du Colonel Lacoste sur Tudela : puisque les localités empêchent de penser à le fortifier, il eût été utile de l'occuper au lieu de Milagro, qui n'aboutit à rien.

2de. Soria n'est je crois qu'à deux petits marches des positions actuelles de l'armée. Cette ville s'est constamment mal comportée. Une expedition qui se porterait sur Soria, la désarmerait, en prendrait une trentaine d'hommes des plus considérables, qu'on enverrait en France pour otages, et qui enfin lui ferait fournir des vivres pour l'armée, serait d'un bon effet.

3me. Une troisième opération qui serait utile serait l'occupation de St. Ander. Il serait bien avantageux qu'elle put ce faire par la route directe de Bilbao à St. Ander.

4eme. Il faut s'occuper de désarmer la Biscaye et la Navarre ; c'est un point important ; tout Espagnol pris les armes à la main doit être fusillé.

Il faut veiller sur la fabrique d'armes de Palencia, ne point laisser travailler les ouvriers pour les rebelles.

Le fort de Pancorvo doit être armé et fortifié avec la plus grande activité. Il doit y

avoir dans ce fort des fours, des magasins de bouches et de guerre. Situé presque à mi-chemin de Bayonne à Madrid, c'est une poste intermédiaire pour l'armée, et un point d'appui pour les opérations de la Galicie.

Il y a dans l'armée plus de généraux qu'il n'en faut; deux seraient nécessaires au corps qui était sous Saragosse. Les généraux de division La Grange, Belliard, et Grandjean sont sans emploi, et tous trois bons généraux.

Il faut renvoyer, le plus promptement possible, le régiment et le général Portugais pour joindre leurs corps à Grenoble, où il doit se former.

5^{me}. On ne discutera pas ici si la ligne de l'Ebre est bonne, si elle a la configuration requise pour être défendue avec avantage.

On discutera encore moins si on eût pu ne pas évacuer Madrid, conserver la ligne du Duero, ou prendre une position qui eût couvert le siège de Saragosse et eût permis d'attendre que cette ville fut prise; toutes ces questions sont oiseuses.

Nous nous contenterons de dire, puisqu'on a pris la ligne de l'Ebre, que les troupes s'y desout et s'y reposent, qu'elle a au moins l'avantage que le pays est plus sain, étant plus élevé, et qu'on peut y attendre que les chaleurs soient passées.

Il faut surtout ne point quitter cette ligne sans avoir un projet déterminé, que ne laisse aucune incertitude dans les opérations à suivre. Ce serait un grand malheur de quitter cette ligne pour être ensuite obligé de la reprendre.

A la guerre les trois quarts sont des affaires morales; la balance des forces réelles n'est que pour un autre quart.

6^{me}. En gardant la ligne de l'Ebre il faut que le général ait bien prévu tout ce que l'ennemi peut faire dans tous les hypothèses.

L'ennemi peut se présenter devant Burgos, partir de Soria, et marcher sur Logrono, ou, en partant de Saragosse, se porter sur Estella, et menacer ainsi Tolosa. Il faut, dans tous ces hypothèses, qu'il n'y ait point un longtems perdu en délibérations, qu'on puisse se ployer de sa droite à sa gauche, et de sa gauche à sa droite, sans faire aucun sacrifice. Car dans des manœuvres combinées, les tâtonnements, l'irrésolution qui naissent des nouvelles contradictoires qui se succèdent rapidement, conduisent à des malheurs.

Cette diversion de Saragosse sur Tolosa est une des raisons qui a longtems fait penser que la position de Tudela devait être gardée, soit sur la rive droite, soit avec la faculté de repasser sur la rive gauche. Elle est offensive sur Saragosse, elle prévient à tems de tous les mouvemens qui pourraient se faire de ce côté.

7^{me}. Une observation qu'il n'est pas hors de propos de faire ici c'est, que l'ennemi, qui a intérêt de masquer ses forces, en cachant le véritable point de son attaque, opère de manière que le coup qu'il veut porter n'est jamais indiqué d'une manière positive, et le général ne peut deviner que par la connaissance bien approfondie de sa position, et la manière dont il fait entrer son système offensive, pour protéger et garantir son système défensive.

8^{me}. On n'a point de renseignements sur ce que fait l'ennemi. On dit toujours qu'on ne peut pas avoir des nouvelles, comme si cette position était extraordinaire dans une armée, comme si on trouvait ordinairement des espions. Il faut en Espagne, comme partout ailleurs, envoyer des parties qui enlèvent tantôt le curé ou l'alcalde, tantôt un chef de couvent ou le maître de poste, et surtout toutes les lettres, quelquefois le maître de la poste, aux douanes, ou celui qui en fait les fonctions, ou les met aux arrêts jusqu'à ce qu'ils parlent, en les faisant interroger deux fois par jour; on les garde en ôtage, et on les charge d'envoyer des piétons, et de donner des nouvelles.

Quand on saura prendre des mesures de force et de vigueur, on aura des nouvelles; il faut intercepter toutes les postes, toutes les lettres.

Le seul motif d'avoir des nouvelles peut déterminer à faire un gros détachement de quatre à cinq milles hommes, qui se portent dans une grande ville, prennent les lettres à la poste, se saisissent des citoyens les plus aisés de leurs lettres, papiers, gazettes, etc.

Il est hors de doute que même dans la ligne des Français les habitants sont tous informés de ce qui se passe: à plus forte raison hors de la ligne. Qui empêche donc, qu'on prenne les hommes marquants, et qu'on les renvoie ensuite sans les maltraiter?

Il est donc de fait, lorsqu'on n'est point dans un désert, et qu'on est dans un pays peuplé, que si le général n'est pas instruit, c'est qu'il n'a pas su prendre les mesures convenables pour l'être.

Les services que les habitants rendent à un général ennemi, ils ne le font jamais par affection, ni même pour avoir de l'argent; les plus réels qu'on obtient c'est pour avoir de sauve-gardes, et de protections; c'est pour conserver ses biens, ses jours, sa ville, son monastère.

[The original of the following memoir is a rough draft, written by King Joseph. It has many erasures and interlineations, and was evidently composed to excuse his retreat from Madrid. The number of the French troops was undoubtedly greater than is here set down, unless the infantry alone be meant.]

No. VI.

Lorsqu'on a quitté Madrid à la nouvelle de *la defection* d'un corps de vingt-deux mille hommes, il y avoit dans Madrid dix-sept mille hommes, au corps du Maréchal Bessières quinze mille cinq cent, au corps de Saragosse onze mille sept cent : l'armée se composait donc de quarante-cinq mille hommes ; mais ces trois corps étaient distans entre eux de près de cent lieux. La première idée fut de réunir le corps de Madrid à celui de Léon, à Burgos, et par suite d'entrer en communication avec celui de Saragosse, avec lequel l'état major de Madrid n'avoit jamais eu aucune relation directe, et dont il ignorait absolument la situation et la composition.

Vingt jours après sa sortie de Madrid le roi s'est trouvé à la tête d'une armée de cinquante mille hommes. Le feu de la sedition n'a pas pu se communiquer sur les points parcourus par les trois corps d'armée alors réunis ; les communications avec la France ont été gardées ; l'insurrection de Bilbao a été éteinte dans le sang de 1200 insurgés. Peu de jours après, 20,000 d'entre eux réunis à 60 lieux delà, à Tudela, à l'autre extrémité de la ligne, ont été dispersés et poursuivis rigoureusement. Les provinces de la Biscaye, de Burgos, et le royaume de Navarre ont été contenus. Une organisation intérieure a préparé les moyens de nourrir l'armée, d'approvisionner les places de Pampelune, St. Sebastien, les forts de Pancorvo et de Burgos, en rendant le moins insupportable possible à ces provinces cette charge évidemment disproportionnée à leurs moyens.

Le matériel de l'artillerie a été réparé et mis en état d'agir, l'armée réorganisée, les hommes et les chevaux sont aujourd'hui en bon état.

C'est ainsi que s'est passé le mois d'Août et partie de Septembre. Les renforts arrivés de France ont à peine indemnisé l'armée des pertes qu'elle a éprouvées par les maladies et le siège de Saragosse.

Voici sa force, et son organisation actuelle :

Le corps de droite, commandé par M. le Maral. Bessières, est forte de 18,000 hommes.

Celui de gauche, commandé par M. la Maral. Moncey, est de 18,000 hommes.

Celui du centre, aux ordres de M. le Maral. Ney, est de onze mille hommes.

La reserve du roi est de quatre mille hommes.*

Le corps de droite occupe le pays depuis Burgos jusqu'à Pancorvo, et Ponte de Lara.

Le corps de gauche depuis Tudela jusqu'à Logrono.

Le corps du centre depuis Logrono jusqu'à Haro.

La reserve Miranda.

La nouvelle position prise par l'armée depuis que les événemens de l'Andalousie avaient fait présager une guerre réelle en Espagne, était évidemment commandée par les simples notions de la saine raison, qui ne pouvait permettre sa séparation à plus de dix jours de marche, de trois corps d'armée, dont le plus fort n'arrivait pas à 18,000 hommes, au milieu d'une nation de onze millions d'habitans, qui se déclarait ennemi, et se mettait universellement en état de guerre.

Cinquante mille Français ont pu se tenir avec succès sur une ligne de plus de 60 lieux, gardant les deux grandes communications de Burgos et de Tudela contre des ennemis qui n'ont pu jusqu'ici porter sur l'un ou l'autre de ces points plus de 25,000 hommes ; puisque 15,000 Français pouvaient être réunis sur l'une ou l'autre de ces deux communications principales en 24 heures.

Si les corps d'armée dirigés sur l'Espagne devaient arriver dans le mois de Septembre, ce système défensif et offensif à la fois se continuerait avec avantage, puisqu'il tend à refaire l'armée, à attendre celle qui doit arriver, et continue à menacer l'ennemi ; mais il ne saurait se prolonger jusqu'au mois de Novembre. L'ennemi n'a pu rester trois mois sans faire de grands progrès ; bientôt il sera en état de prendre l'offensif avec de grands corps organisés, obéissans à une administration centrale, qui aura eu le tems de se former à Madrid. Tout nous annonce que le mois d'Octobre est une de ces époques décisives qui donne à celui qui sait s'en emparer la priorité des mouvemens et des succès dont la progression est incalculable.

Quel est le parti à prendre dans la position où se trouve l'armée, et avec l'assurance qu'elle a ? de voir entrer en Espagne dans le mois de Novembre deux cent mille Français.

Six manières de voir se présentent à l'esprit.

1^{ere}. D'essayer de rester encore dans l'état où l'on est.

Ce système est évidemment insoutenable. De Tudela à Burgos et à Bilbao il y a plus

* On ne comprend pas dans ces calculs les garnisons de Pampelune, St. Sebastien, Vittoria, Tolosa, Bilbao, etc. : il n'est pas question non plus de l'armée de Catalogne.

de 60 lieus. L'ennemi pourra attaquer la gauche de cette ligne avec quarante mille hommes, la droite avec quarante mille hommes, le centre avec des forces égales. Tudela et la Navarre jusqu'à Logrono demandent 25,000 hommes pour être défendues. Burgos ne peut être défendue que par une armée en état de résister aux forces réunies de MM. Blake, Cuesta, qui peuvent présenter 80,000 hommes. Il est douteux que les 20,000 bayonnettes qu'il serait possible de leur présenter puissent les battre complètement. Si le succès est douteux, ces 20,000 hommes seront harcelés par les insurgés, qui pourront alors soulever les trois provinces, les séparer totalement d'avec le corps de gauche et de la France.

2^{de}. Porter le corps du centre et la réserve par Tudela au devant de l'ennemi sur la route de Saragosse, ou sur celle d'Albazan; ou réunirait ainsi 30,000 hommes, on chercherait l'ennemi, et nul doute on le battrait si on le rencontrait de ce côté.

Le Maréchal Bessières serait chargé d'observer la grande communication de Burgos à Miranda, laisserait garnison dans le château de Burgos, dans le fort de Pancorvo, occuperait l'ennemi, surveillerait les mouvemens des montagnes de Reynosa, les débarquemens possibles de Santander. Sa tâche serait difficile si l'on considère que le défilé de Pancorvo n'est pas le seul accessible à l'artillerie, qu'à trois lieus delà on arrive sur Miranda par une route praticable à l'artillerie, que quelques lieus plus loin l'Ebre offre un troisième passage sur le point de la chaîne qu'il traverse entre Haro et Miranda.

3^{eme}. Laisser le Maréchal Moncey à la défense de la Navarre, et se porter avec le corps du centre et la réserve sur Burgos. Réuni au Maréchal Bessières on pourrait chercher l'ennemi, et attaquer avec avantage, on marcherait à lui avec trente mille hommes, et on n'attendrait pas qu'il fut réuni avec toutes ses forces. Il serait peut-être possible de donner pour instruction au Maréchal Moncey, dans le cas où il serait débordé sur sa gauche, et qu'il ne verrait pas probabilité de battre l'ennemi, de faire un mouvement par sa droite, et se porter par Logrono sur Briviesca, où il se réunirait au reste de l'armée. Dans ce cas, la Navarre s'insurgerait, les communications avec la France seraient coupées, mais l'armée réunie dans la plaine serait assez forte pour attendre les corps qui arrivent de France, et qui seront assez forts pour pénétrer partout. Il serait aussi possible que, dans tous les cas, le Maréchal Moncey se maintienne dans le camp retranché de Pampelune; manœuvrant autour de cette place, il y attendrait le résultat des opérations des deux corps d'armée qui auraient été au devant de l'ennemi dans la plaine de Burgos, et l'arrivée des corps de la grande armée.

4^{eme}. Passer l'Ebre, et chercher à amener l'ennemi à une bataille dans la plaine que est entre Vittoria et l'Ebre.

5^{eme}. Se retirer appuyant sa gauche sur Pampelune, et sa droite dans les montagnes de Mondragone.

6^{eme}. Laisser une garnison en état de se défendre pendant six semaines à Pampelune, St. Sebastien, Pancorvo, et Burgos, réunir le reste de l'armée, marcher à la rencontre de l'ennemi sur l'une ou l'autre des grandes communications, le battre partout où on le trouverait, attendre, ou près de Madrid, ou dans le pays où les mouvemens de l'ennemi et la possibilité de vivre aurait porté l'armée, les troupes de France; on abandonnerait ses derrières, ses communications; mais la grande armée serait assez forte pour en ouvrir pour elle-même. Et quant à l'armée qui est en Espagne, réunie ainsi elle serait en état de braver tous les efforts, de déconcerter tous les projets de l'ennemi, et d'attendre dans une noble attitude le mouvement général qui sera imprimé par votre majesté lors de l'arrivée de toutes les troupes dans ce pays.

De tous les projets le dernier paraît préférable; il est plus noble et aussi sur que le 5^{eme}.

Ces deux projets sont seuls entiers absolument offensif ou absolument défensif. On peut les regarder, l'un et l'autre, comme propres à assurer la conservation de l'armée jusqu'à l'arrivée des renforts. Le dernier a sur l'autre l'avantage d'arrêter le progrès de l'ordre nouveau qui s'établit en Espagne; il est plus digne des troupes Françaises, et du frère de votre majesté. Il est aussi sur que celui de la sévère et honteuse défensive proposée par l'article cinq. Je l'ai communiqué au Maral. Jourdan et au Maral. Ney, qui l'un et l'autre sont de cet avis. Je ne doute point que les autres maréchaux ne partagent leur opinion.

Au premier Octobre je puis avoir la réponse de V. M., et même avant, puisque je lui ai manifesté cette opinion par ma lettre du 14 Septembre.

Si V. M. approuve ce plan, il sera possible qu'elle n'ait pas de mes nouvelles jusqu'à l'arrivée des troupes; mais je suis convaincu qu'elle trouvera les affaires dans une bien meilleure situation qu'en suivant aucun des autres cinq projets.

Miranda, le 16 Sept., 1808.

No. VII.

Extrait de la Lettre du MAJOR GÉNÉRAL au GÉNÉRAL SAVARY, à Madrid.

Bayonne, 12e. Juillet, 1808

Section 1.—J'ai rendu compte à l'empereur, general, de votre lettre du 8me. S. M. trouve que vous vous êtes dégarni de trop de monde à Madrid, que vous avez fait marcher trop de troupes au secours du Gal. Dupont, qu'on ne doit pas agir offensivement jusqu'à ce que les affaires de la Galice soient éclairées. De tous les points de l'armée, général, le plus important est la Galice, parceque c'est la seule province qui ait réellement conclu un traité avec l'Angleterre. La division de ligne des troupes Espagnoles qui était à Oporto s'est joint à celle qui était en Galice, et enfin par la position de cette province extrêmement près de l'Angleterre. Indépendamment de ces considérations, la position la rend encore plus intéressante; car les communications de l'armée se trouveraient compromises si le Maréchal Bessières n'avait pas un entier succès, et il faudrait bien alors reposer toutes vos troupes, et marcher isolément au secours du Maréchal Bessières. Encore une fois, général, vous vous êtes trop dégarni de Madrid, et si un bon régiment de cuirassiers, quelque pièces d'artillerie, et 1000 à 1200 hommes d'infanterie avaient pu arriver à l'appui du Maréchal Bessières, le 14, cela lui aurait été d'un éminent secours. *Q'importe que Valence soit soumis? Q'importe que Saragosse soit soumis?* Mais, général, le moindre succès de l'ennemi du côté de la Galice aurait des inconvénients immenses. Instruit comme vous l'étiez des forces du Général Cuesta, de la désertion de troupes d'Oporto, etc. . . . S. M. trouve que pour bien manœuvrer il aurait fallu vous arranger de manière à avoir du 12e. au 15e. 8000 hommes pour renforcer le Maréchal Bessières. Une fois nos derrières débarassées, et cette armée de Galice détruite, tout le reste tombe et se soumit de soi-même, etc., etc.

Extrait de la Lettre, etc.

Bayonne, 13 Juillet, 1808.

Section 2.—Nous recevons vos lettres du 9e. et du 10e. général. L'empereur me charge de vous faire connaître que si le Général Gobert était à Valladolid, le Général Frère à San Clemente ayant une colonne dans la Manche, si 300 à 400 convalescens, un bon commandant, 4 pièces de canon, un escouade d'artillerie, et vingt mille rations de biscuit étaient dans le château de Ségovie, la position de l'armée serait superbe et à l'abri de toute sollicitude. La conduite du Général Frère ne paraît pas claire. Les nouvelles qu'il a eues de Maréchal Moncey paraissent apocryphes. Il est possible que ses 8000 hommes et son artillerie n'aient pas été suffisans pour enlever la ville de Valence. Cela étant, le Maréchal Moncey ne l'enlèverait pas d'avantage avec 20,000 hommes, parcequ'alors c'est une affaire de canons et de mortiers, etc., etc. . . . *Valence est comme la Catalogne et l'Arragon; ces trois points sont secondaires.* Les deux vrais points importants sont le Général Dupont et particulièrement le Maréchal Bessières, parceque le premier a devant lui le corps du camp de St. Roch et le corps de Cadix, et le Maréchal Bessières parcequ'il a devant lui les troupes de la Galice et celles qui étaient à Oporto. Le Général Dupont a près de 20,000 hommes; il ne peut pas avoir contre lui un pareil nombre de troupes; il a déjà obtenu des succès très marquans, et au pis aller il ne peut être contraint qu'à repasser les montagnes, ce qui n'est qu'un événement de guerre. Le Maréchal Bessières est beaucoup moins fort que le Général Dupont, et les troupes Espagnoles d'Oporto et de la Galice sont plus nombreuses que celles de l'Andalousie, et les troupes de la Galice n'ont pas encore été entamées. Enfin le moindre insuccès du Maréchal Bessières intercepte tous les communications de l'armée et compromettrait même sa sûreté. Le Général Dupont se bat pour Andujar, et le Maréchal Bessières se bat pour les communications de l'armée et pour les opérations les plus importants aux affaires d'Espagne, etc., etc.

Extrait de la Lettre, etc., etc.

Bayonne, 18 Juillet, 1808, à dix heures du soir.

Section 3.—Je reçois, général, vos lettres du 14. L'aide-de-camp du Maréchal Moncey a donné à sa majesté tous les détails sur ce qui s'est passé. La conduite du maréchal a été belle. Il a bien battu les rebelles en campagne. Il est tout simple qu'il n'ait pu entrer à Valence; c'étoit une affaire de mortiers et de pièces de siège. Sa position à San Clement est bonne, de là il est à même de remarcher sur Valence. De reste, général, *l'affaire de Valence est une affaire du second ordre, même celle de Saragosse*, qui cependant est plus importante. L'affaire du Maréchal Bessières était d'un intérêt majeur pour les affaires d'Espagne, et la première après cette affaire c'est celle du Général Dupont, et c'est le moment de laisser le Général Gobert suivre la route. Le Maréchal Moncey se repose; le Général Reille marche sur Gironne: ainsi trois colonnes pourront marcher ensemble sur Valence; le corps du Général Reille, celui de Saragosse, et celui du Maréchal Moncey, ce qui formera les 20,000 hommes que ce maréchal croit nécessaire.

Mais l'empereur, général, trouve que vous avez tort de dire qu'il n'y a rien été fait depuis six semaines. On a battu les rassemblemens de la Galice, de St. Ander, ceux d'Arragon et de Catalogne, qui dans leur aveuglement croyaient qu'ils n'avaient qu'à marcher pour détruire les Français : le Maréchal Moncey, les Généraux Duhesme, Dupont, Verdier, ont fait de bonne besogne, et tous les hommes sensés en Espagne ont changé dans le fonds de leur opinion, et voient avec la plus grande peine l'insurrection. Au reste, général, les affaires d'Espagne sont dans la situation la plus prospère depuis la bataille de Medina del Rio Seco, etc., etc. Le 14e. et le 44e. arrivent demain ; après demain ils partent pour le camp de Saragosse ; *non pas que ces troupes puissent avancer la reddition, qui est une affaire de canon*, mais elles serviraient contre les insurgés de Valence, s'ils voulaient renforcer ceux de Saragosse. Enfin, si le Général Gobert et les détachemens qui sont à moitié chemin pour rejoindre le Général Dupont font juger à ce général qu'il a des forces suffisantes pour battre le Général Castaños, il faut qu'elles continuent leur direction, et qu'il attaque l'ennemi, s'il croit devoir le faire, etc., etc.

(Cette lettre a été écrite le jour de la bataille de Baylen.)

Extrait de la Lettre, etc.

Bordeaux, 3 Août, 1818.

Section 4.—Les événemens du Général Dupont sont une chose sans exemple, et la rédaction de sa capitulation est de niveau avec la conduite tenue jusqu'à cette catastrophe. L'empereur pense qu'on n'a pas tenu compte du vague de la rédaction de l'acte, en permettant que les corps en échellons sur la communication entre vous et le Général Dupont aient marché pour se rendre aux Anglais : car on ne doit pas presumer qu'ils aient la loyauté de laisser passer les troupes qui s'embarquent. Comme vous ne parlez pas de cela, on pense que vous avez retiré ces échellons sur Madrid. Après avoir lu attentivement la relation du Général Dupont, on voit qu'il n'a capitulé que le lendemain de la bataille, et que les corps des Généraux Vedel et Dufour, qui se trouvent compris pour quelque chose dans la capitulation (on ne sait pourquoi), ne se sont pas battus. Par la relation même du Général Dupont, tout laisse penser que l'armée du Général Castaños n'était pas à beaucoup près aussi forte qu'on le dit, et qu'il avait réuni à Baylen tout ce qu'il avait de forces. S. M. ne lui calcule pas plus de 25,000 hommes de troupes de ligne et plus de 15,000 paysans. Par la lettre du Général Belliard *il paraît que l'ordre est donné de lever le siège de Saragosse*, ce qui serait prématuré ; car vous comprendrez qu'il n'est pas possible qu'on ne laisse un corps d'armée, qui couvre Pampelune, et contienne la Navarre, sans quoi l'ennemi peut cerner Pampelune, insurger la Navarre, et alors la communication de France par Tolosa serait coupée, et l'ennemi sur les derrières de l'armée. Supposant l'ennemi réuni à Pampelune, la ville bloquée, il peut de trouver en cinq à six marches sur les derrières de Burgos. L'armée qui assiège Saragosse est donc à peu près nécessaire pour contenir la Navarre, les insurgés de l'Arragon et de Valence, et pour empêcher de percer sur notre flanc gauche ; car si, comme le dit le Général Belliard, le Général Verdier se porte avec ses troupes à Logrono, en jetant 2000 hommes dans Pampelune, la communication de Bayonne, qu'eut sur le champ être interceptée le Général Verdier, serait mieux à Tudela qu'à Logrono. Si le Général Castaños s'avance, et que vous puissiez lui livrer la bataille, on ne peut en prévoir que les plus heureux résultats : mais de la manière dont il a marché vis-à-vis du Général Dupont, tout donne à croire qu'il mettra la plus grande circonspection dans ses mouvemens. Si par le canal des parlementaires l'on peut établir une suspension d'armes sans que le roi y soit pour rien en apparence, cette espèce d'armistice pourrait se rompre en se prévenant de part et d'autre huit jours d'avance, donnant aux Français la ligne du Duero passant par Almazan pour joindre l'Ebre. Cette suspension d'armes, que les insurgés pourraient regarder comme avantageuse, afin de s'organiser à Madrid ne nous serait pas défavorable, parcequ'on verrait pendant ce temps l'organisation que prendraient les parties insurgés de l'Espagne, et ce que veut la nation, etc. etc.

Le MAJOR GENERAL au ROI D'ESPAGNE.

Nantes, 11 Août, 1808.

Section 5.—Sire, le Général Savary ni vos ministres Azanza et Urquijo ne sont arrivés : il paraît qu'il y a des rassemblemens à Bilbao d'après les nouvelles que nous recevons. S. M. pense qu'il est important d'y faire marcher le plutôt possible une colonne pour y rétablir l'ordre. *V. M. sait que la moitié de Saragosse était en notre pouvoir, et que sous peu on espérait avoir le reste de la ville. Lorsque le Général Belliard a donné l'ordre de lever le siège, il eût été à désirer que cet ordre fut conditionnel, comme cela paraissait être l'intention de V. M., ainsi qu'on le voit dans sa correspondance ; c'est à dire, que le siège ne fut levé que dans le cas où l'on n'aurait pas cru être maître de la ville avant cinq ou six jours.* Cela aurait présenté des circonstances meilleurs ; car si le Général Verdier évacue en entier la Navarre et l'Arragon, il est à craindre que la Navarre ne s'insurge, et Pampelune ne tarderait pas à être cernée. J'ai mandé à V. M. que déjà

des corps entiers de la grande armée sont en mouvement pour se rendre en poste en Espagne. Les dispositions les plus vigoureuses sont prises de tous côtés, et *dans six semaines ou deux mois l'Espagne sera soumise*. L'empereur, qui continue à jouir d'une bonne santé, quoiqu'il soit très occupé, part dans une heure pour continuer sa route sur Angers, Tours, et Paris. V. M. doit être persuadée que toutes nos pensées sont sur elle et sur l'armée qu'elle commande.

No. VIII.

Letter from MR. DRUMMOND to SIR ALEXANDER BALL.

MY DEAR SIR,

Palermo, July 4th, 1808.

His highness the Duke of Orleans has applied to me to write to you on a subject about which he appears to be extremely interested. I take it for granted that you are acquainted with all the events which have lately happened in Spain. The duke thinks that the appearance of a member of the house of Bourbon in that country might be acceptable to the Spaniards, and of great service to the common cause. In this I perfectly concur with his highness, and if you be of the same opinion you will probably have no objection to send a ship here to carry his highness to Gibraltar. He himself is exceedingly sanguine. We have letters from London down to the 5th of June. Portugal has followed the example of Spain, and Lisbon is probably now in other hands: an invitation has been sent to Sir Charles Cotton.

(Signed)

WILLIAM DRUMMOND.

P.S. “ * * * * *

MR. DRUMMOND to SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

DEAR SIR,

Palermo, July 24th, 1808.

This letter will be delivered to you by his royal highness Prince Leopold, second son of the King of the Two Sicilies. This prince goes immediately to Gibraltar to communicate immediately with the loyal Spaniards, and to notify to them that his father will accept the regency, if they desire it, until his nephew Ferdinand the Seventh be delivered from captivity. Don Leopold and his cousin the Duke of Orleans will offer themselves as soldiers to the Spaniards, and will accept such situations as may be given to them suitable to their illustrious rank. If their visit should not be acceptable to the Spaniards, Don Leopold will return to Sicily, and his serene highness the Duke of Orleans will proceed to England. Being of opinion that the appearance of an Infant of Spain may be of the greatest utility at the present crisis, and in all events can hardly be productive of harm, I have urged his Sicilian majesty to determine upon this measure, which I conceive to be required at his hands, in consequence of the manifesto of Palafox, which you have probably seen. At the distance of 1000 miles, however, we cannot be supposed to be accurately informed here of many circumstances with which you probably may be intimately acquainted; Prince Leopold therefore will be directed to consult with you, and to follow your advice, which I have no doubt you will readily and cheerfully give him. I take the liberty at the same time of recommending him to your care and protection.

(Signed)

WM. DRUMMOND.

Extract of a Letter from SIR HEW DALRYMPLE to LORD CASTLEREAGH.

MY LORD,

Gibraltar, August 10th, 1808.

Last night the *Thunderer* arrived here, having on board the Duke of Orleans, the second Prince of the Two Sicilies, and a considerable number of noblemen and others, the suite of the latter. As the ship came to anchor at a late hour, I had not the honour of seeing the Duke of Orleans until near ten at night, when he came accompanied by Captain Talbot. The duke first put into my hands a letter from Mr. Drummond, as Captain Talbot did a despatch from Sir Alexander Ball, copies of which I have the honour to enclose. As the latter seemed bulky, I did not immediately open it, and therefore did not immediately remark that Sir Alexander Ball *did not seem aware* that the Prince of the Two Sicilies was coming down, much less that he meditated establishing his residence at Gibraltar for the avowed purpose of negotiating for the regency of Spain. Of this object the Duke of Orleans made no mystery, and proceeded to arrange the time and manner of the prince's reception in the morning, and the accommodation that should be prepared for him, suited to his rank, and capable of containing his attendants. I took early occasion first to remark the ill effect this measure might produce in Spain at the moment when the establishment of a central government had become obviously necessary, and would naturally lead to much intrigue and disunion, until the sentiments of the people and the armies (which would naturally assemble for the purpose of expelling the enemy from their territory) should be pronounced. . . .

*Extract of Letter from LORD CASTLEREAGH to SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.**Downing Street, Nov. 4th, 1808.*

I have great pleasure, however, in assuring you that the measures pursued by you on that delicate and important subject (the unexpected arrival of Prince Leopold and the Duke of Orleans at Gibraltar) received his majesty's entire approbation. . . .

(Signed) CASTLEREAGH.

No. IX.

SIR A. WELLESLEY to SIR HARRY BURRARD,

SIR, *Head-quarters, at Lavos, August 8th, 1808.*

Having received instructions from the secretary of state that you were likely to arrive on the coast of Portugal with a corps of 10,000 men, lately employed in the north of Europe under the orders of Sir John Moore, I now submit to you such information as I have received regarding the general state of the war in Portugal and Spain, and the plan of operations which I am about to carry into execution.

The enemy's force at present in Portugal consists, as far as I am able to form an opinion, of from 16,000 to 18,000 men, of which number there are about 500 in the fort of Almeida, about the same number in Elvas, about 600 or 800 in Peniché, and 1600 or 1800 in the province of Alemtejo, at Setuval, etc.; and the remainder are disposable for the defence of Lisbon, and are in the forts of St. Julian and Cascaes, in the batteries along the coast as far as the rock of Lisbon, and the old citadel of Lisbon, to which the enemy have lately added some works.

Of the force disposable for the defence of Lisbon, the enemy have lately detached a corps of about 2000, under General Thomieres, principally I believe to watch my movements, which corps is now at Alcobaça; and another corps of 4000 men, under General Loison, was sent across the Tagus into Alemtejo on the 26th of last month, the object of which detachment was to disperse the Portuguese insurgents in that quarter, to force the Spanish corps, consisting of about 2000 men, which had advanced into Portugal as far as Evora from Estremadura, to retire, and then to be enabled to add to the force destined for the defence of Lisbon the corps of French troops which had been stationed at Setuval and in the province of Alemtejo; at all events, Loison's corps will return to Lisbon, and the French corps disposable for the defence of that place will probably be about 14,000 men, of which at least 3000 must be left in the garrisons and forts on the coast and in the river.

The French army under Dupont, in Andalusia, surrendered on the 20th of last month to the Spanish army under Castanos; so that there are now no French troops in the south of Spain. The Spanish army of Galicia and Castile, to the northward, received a check at Rio Seco, in the province of Valladolid, on the 14th of July, from a French corps supposed to be under the command of General Bessieres, which had advanced from Burgos.

The Spanish troops retired on the 15th to Benevente, and I understand there has since been an affair between the advanced posts in that neighbourhood, but I am not certain of it; nor am I acquainted with the position of the Spanish army, or of that of the French, since the 14th July. When you will have been a short time in this country, and will have observed the degree to which the deficiency of real information is supplied by the circulation of unfounded reports, you will not be surprised at my want of accurate knowledge on these subjects.

It is however certain that nothing of importance has occurred in that quarter since the 14th of July; and from this circumstance I conclude that the corps called Bessieres' attacked the Spanish army at Rio Seco solely with a view to cover the march of King Joseph Buonaparte to Madrid, where he arrived on the 21st July. Besides their defeat in Andalusia, the enemy, as you may probably have heard, have been beat off in an attack upon Saragossa, in Arragon, in another upon the city of Valencia (in both of which it is said they have lost many men); and it is reported that in Catalonia two of their detachments have been cut off, and that they have lost the fort of Figueras in the Pyrenees, and that Barcelona is blockaded. Of these last-mentioned actions and operations I have seen no official accounts, but the report of them is generally circulated and believed; and at all events, whether these reports are founded or otherwise, it is obvious that the insurrection against the French is general throughout Spain; that large bodies of Spaniards are in arms; amongst others, in particular, an army of 20,000 men, including 4000 cavalry, at Almaraz on the Tagus, in Estremadura, and that the French cannot carry on their operations by means of small corps. I should imagine from their inactivity, and from the misfortunes they have suffered, that they have not the means of collecting a force sufficiently large to oppose the progress of the insurrection and the efforts of the insur-

gents, and to afford supplies to their different detached corps, or that they find that they cannot carry on their operations with armies so numerous as they must find it necessary to employ without magazines.

In respect to Portugal, the whole kingdom, with the exception of the neighbourhood of Lisbon, is in a state of insurrection against the French; their means of resistance are, however, less powerful than those of the Spaniards, their troops had been completely dispersed, their officers had gone off to the Brazils, and their arsenals pillaged, or in the power of the enemy, and their revolt under the circumstances in which it has taken place is still more extraordinary than that of the Spanish nation.

The Portuguese may have in the northern part of the kingdom about 10,000 men in arms, of which number 5000 are to march with me towards Lisbon. The remainder, with a Spanish detachment of about 1500 men which came from Galicia, are employed in a distant blockade of Almeida, and in the protection of Oporto, which is now the seat of government.

The insurrection is general throughout Alemtejo and Algarve to the southward, and Entre Minho e Douero and Tras los Montes and Beira to the northward; but for want of arms the people can do nothing against the enemy.

Having consulted Sir C. Cotton, it appeared to him and to me that the attack proposed upon Cascaes Bay was impracticable, because the bay is well defended by the fort of Cascaes and the other works constructed for its defence, and the ships of war could not approach sufficiently near to silence them. The landing in the Passa d'Arcos in the Tagus could not be effected without silencing fort St. Julian, which appeared to be impracticable to those who were to carry that operation into execution.

There are small bays within which might admit of landing troops, and others to the northward of the Rock of Lisbon, but they are all defended by works which must have been silenced; they are of small extent, and but few men could have landed at the same time. There is always a surf on them which affects the facility of landing at different times so materially as to render it very doubtful whether the troops first landed could be supported in sufficient time by others, and whether the horses for the artillery and cavalry, and the necessary stores and provisions, could be landed at all. These inconveniences attending a landing in any of the bays near the Rock of Lisbon would have been aggravated by the neighbourhood of the enemy to the landing-place, and by the exhausted state of the country in which the troops would have been landed. It was obviously the best plan, therefore, to land in the northern parts of Portugal, and I fixed upon Mondego Bay as the nearest place which afforded any facility for landing, excepting Peniché, the landing-place of which peninsula is defended by a fort occupied by the enemy, which it would be necessary to attack regularly in order to place the ships in safety.

A landing to the northward was farther recommended, as it would insure the co-operation of the Portuguese troops in the expedition to Lisbon. The whole of the corps placed under my command, including those under the command of General Spencer, having landed, I propose to march on Wednesday, and I shall take the road by Alcobaça and Obidos, with a view to keep up my communication by the sea-coast, and to examine the situation of Peniché, and I shall proceed towards Lisbon by the route of Maffra, and by the hills to the northward of that city.

As I understand from the secretary of state that a body of troops under the command of Brigadier-General Ackland may be expected on the coast of Portugal before you arrive, I have written to desire he will proceed from hence along the coast of Portugal to the southward; and I propose to communicate with him by the means of Captain Bligh, of the *Alfred*, who will attend the movements of the army with a few transports, having on board provisions and military stores. I intend to order Brigadier-General Ackland to attack Peniché, if I should find it necessary to obtain possession of that place, and if not I propose to order him to join the fleet stationed off the Tagus, with a view to disembark in one of the bays near the Rock of Lisbon as soon as I shall approach sufficiently near to enable him to perform that operation. If I imagined that General Ackland's corps was equipped in such a manner as to be enabled to move from the coast, I should have directed him to land at Mondego, and to march upon Santarem, from which station he would have been at hand either to assist my operations, or to cut off the retreat of the enemy, if he should endeavour to make it either by the north of the Tagus and Almeida, or by the south of the Tagus and Elvas; but as I am convinced that General Ackland's corps is intended to form a part of some other corps which is provided with a commissariat, that he will have none with him, and consequently that his corps must depend upon the country; and as no reliance can be placed upon the resources of this country, I have considered it best to direct the general's attention to the sea-coast; if, however, the command of the army remained in my hands, I should certainly land the corps which has lately been under the command of Sir John Moore at Mondego, and should move it upon Santarem. I have the honour to enclose a return of the troops, etc., etc.

(Signed)

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY to SIR HARRY BURRARD.

SIR,

Camp at Lugar, 8 miles north of Lerya, August 10, 1808.

Since I wrote to you on the 8th inst. I have received letters from Mr. Stuart and Colonel Doyle at Corunna, of which I enclose copies. From them you will learn the state of the war in that part of Spain, and you will observe that Mr. Stuart and Colonel Doyle are of opinion that Marshal Bessieres will take advantage of the inefficiency of the Gallician army under General Blake to detach a corps to Portugal to the assistance of General Junot; we have not heard yet of that detachment, and I am convinced it will not be made till King Joseph Buonaparte will either be reinforced to such a degree as to be in safety in Madrid, or till he shall have effected his retreat into France, with which view it is reported that he left Madrid on the 29th of last month.

I conceive, therefore, that I have time for the operations which I propose to carry on before a reinforcement can arrive from Leon, even supposing that no obstacles would be opposed to its march in Spain or Portugal; but it is not probable that it can arrive before the different reinforcements will arrive from England; and as Marshal Bessieres had not more than 20,000 men in the action at Rio Seco on the 14th July, I conceive that the British troops, which will be in Portugal, will be equal to contend with any part of that corps which he may detach.

The possibility that, in the present state of affairs, the French corps at present in Portugal may be reinforced, affords an additional reason for taking the position of Santarem, which I apprised you in my letter of the 8th I should occupy, if the command of the army remained in my hands after the reinforcements should arrive. If you should occupy it, you will not only be in the best situation to support my operations, and to cut off the retreat of the enemy, but if any reinforcements of French troops should enter Portugal, you will be in the best situation to collect your whole force to oppose him, etc., etc.

(Signed)

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

NO. X.—ARTICLES OF THE DEFINITIVE CONVENTION FOR THE EVACUATION OF PORTUGAL BY THE FRENCH ARMY.

The generals commanding in chief, etc., etc., being determined to negotiate, etc., etc.

Article 1. All the places and forts in the kingdom of Portugal occupied by the French troops shall be given up to the British army in the state in which they are at the period of the signature of the present convention.

Art. 2. The French troops shall evacuate Portugal with their arms and baggage, they shall not be considered as prisoners of war, and on their arrival in France they shall be at liberty to serve.

Art. 3. The English government shall furnish the means of conveyance for the French army, which shall be disembarked in any of the ports of France between Rochefort and L'Orient inclusively.

Art. 4. The French army shall carry with it all its artillery of French calibre, with the horses belonging thereunto, and the tumbrils supplied with 60 rounds per gun: all other artillery, arms, and ammunition, as also the military and naval arsenals, shall be given up to the British army and navy, in the state in which they may be at the period of the ratification of the convention.

Art. 5. The French army shall carry with it all its equipments, and all that is comprehended under the name of property of the army; that is to say, its military chest, and carriages attached to the field commissariat and field hospital; or shall be allowed to dispose of such part of the same on its account, as the commander-in-chief may judge it unnecessary to embark. In like manner, all individuals of the army shall be at liberty to dispose of their private property of every description, with full security hereafter for the purchasers.

Art. 6. The cavalry are to embark their horses, as also the generals and other officers of all ranks. It is however fully understood that the means of conveyance for horses, at the disposal of the British commanders, are very limited; some additional conveyance may be procured in the port of Lisbon. The number of horses to be embarked by the troops shall not exceed 600, and the number embarked by the staff shall not exceed 200. At all events every facility will be given to the French army to dispose of the horses belonging to it which cannot be embarked.

Art. 7. In order to facilitate the embarkation, it shall take place in three divisions, the last of which will be principally composed of the garrisons of the places, of the cavalry, the artillery, the sick, and the equipment of the army. The first division shall embark within seven days of the date of the ratification, or sooner if possible.

Art. 8. The garrison of Elvas and its forts, and of Peniché and Palmela, will be em-

barked at Lisbon; that of Almeida at Oporto, or the nearest harbour. They will be accompanied on their march by British commissaries, charged with providing for their subsistence and accommodation.

Art. 9. All the sick and wounded who cannot be embarked with the troops are intrusted to the British army. They are to be taken care of whilst they remain in this country at the expense of the British government, under the condition of the same being reimbursed by France when the final evacuation is effected. The English government will provide for their return to France, which will take place by detachments of about 150 or 200 men at a time. A sufficient number of French medical officers shall be left behind to attend them.

Art. 10. As soon as the vessels employed to carry the army to France shall have disembarked in the harbours specified, or in any other of the ports of France to which stress of weather may force them, every facility shall be given them to return to England without delay, and security against capture until their arrival in a friendly port.

Art. 11. The French army shall be concentrated in Lisbon, and within the distance of about two leagues from it. The English army will approach within three leagues of the capital, and will be so placed as to leave about one league between the two armies.

Art. 12. The forts of St. Julian, the Bugio, and Cascaes shall be occupied by the British troops on the ratification of the convention. Lisbon and its citadel, together with the forts and batteries as far as the lazaretto or Trafaria on one side, and fort St. Joseph on the other, inclusively, shall be given up on the embarkation of the second division; as also shall the harbour and all armed vessels in it of every description, with their rigging, sails, stores, and ammunition. The fortresses of Elvas, Almeida, Peniché, and Palmela shall be given up as soon as the British troops can arrive to occupy them. In the mean time the general-in-chief of the British army will give notice of the present convention to the garrisons of those places, as also to the troops before them, in order to put a stop to all further hostilities.

Art. 13. Commissioners shall be named on both sides to regulate and accelerate the execution of the arrangements agreed upon.

Art. 14. Should there arise doubts as to the meaning of any article, it will be explained favourably to the French army.

Art. 15. From the date of the ratification of the present convention, all arrears of contributions, requisitions, or claims whatever of the French government against subjects of Portugal, or any other individuals residing in this country, founded on the occupation of Portugal by the French troops, in the month of December, 1807, which may not have been paid up, are cancelled; and all sequestrations laid upon their property, movable or immovable, are removed, and the free disposal of the same is restored to the proper owners.

Art. 16. All subjects of France, or of powers in friendship or alliance, domiciliated in Portugal, or accidentally in this country, shall be protected; their property of every kind, movable and immovable, shall be respected; and they shall be at liberty either to accompany the French army or to remain in Portugal. In either case their property is guaranteed to them, with the liberty of retaining or of disposing of it, and passing the produce of the sale thereof into France, or any other country where they may fix their residence; the space of one year being allowed them for that purpose. It is fully understood that shipping is excepted from this arrangement, only however in as far as regards leaving the port, and that none of the stipulations above mentioned can be made the pretext of any commercial speculations.

Art. 17. No native of Portugal shall be rendered accountable for his political conduct during the period of the occupation of this country by the French army; and all those who have continued in the exercise of their employments, or who have accepted situations under the French government, are placed under the protection of the British commanders; they shall sustain no injury in their persons or property; it not having been at their option to be obedient or not to the French government, they are also at liberty to avail themselves of the stipulations of the 16th article.

Art. 18. The Spanish troops detained on board ship, in the port of Lisbon, shall be given up to the commander-in-chief of the British army, who engages to obtain of the Spaniards to restore such French subjects, either military or civil, as may have been detained in Spain without having been taken in battle, or in consequence of military operations, but on occasion of the occurrences of the 29th of last May, and the days immediately following.

Art. 19. There shall be an immediate exchange established for all ranks of prisoners made in Portugal since the commencement of the present hostilities.

Art. 20. Hostages of the rank of field officers shall be mutually furnished, on the part of the British army and navy, and on that of the French army, for the reciprocal guarantee of the present convention. The officer of the British army shall be restored on the completion of the articles which concern the army; and the officer of the navy on

the disembarkation of the French troops in their own country. The like is to take place on the part of the French army.

Art. 21. It shall be allowed to the general-in-chief of the French army to send an officer to France with intelligence of the present convention. A vessel will be furnished by the British admiral to convey him to Bourdeaux or Rochefort.

Art. 22. The British admiral will be invited to accommodate his excellency the commander-in-chief and the other principal officers of the French army on board ships of war.

Done and concluded at Lisbon this 30th day of August, 1808.

(Signed)

GEORGE MURRAY, quarter-master-general.
KELLERMAN, le général de division.

ADDITIONAL ARTICLES.

Art. 1. The individuals in the civil employment of the army, made prisoners either by the British troops or by the Portuguese, in any part of Portugal, will be restored, as is customary, without exchange.

Art. 2. The French army shall be subsisted from its own magazines up to the day of embarkation; the garrisons up to the day of the evacuation of the fortresses. The remainder of the magazines shall be delivered over in the usual forms to the British government, which charges itself with the subsistence of the men and horses of the army from the above-mentioned periods till their arrival in France, under the condition of being reimbursed by the French government for the excess of the expense beyond the estimation to be made by both parties, of the value of the magazines delivered up to the British army. The provisions on board the ships of war in the possession of the French army will be taken on account by the British government, in like manner with the magazines of the fortresses.

Art. 3. The general commanding the British troops will take the necessary measures for re-establishing the free circulation of the means of subsistence between the country and the capital.

Done and concluded at Lisbon this 30th day of August, 1808.

(Signed)

GEORGE MURRAY, quarter-master-general.
KELLERMAN, le général de division.

Ratified, etc. etc.

No. XI.—1st. *Letter from* BARON VON DECKEN *to the* GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY IN PORTUGAL.

SIR,

Oporto, August 18th, 1808.

The Bishop of Oporto having expressed to me his wish to see me in private, in order to make an important communication, which he desired to be kept secret, I went to his palace last night at a late hour. The bishop told me that he had taken the government of Portugal in his hands to satisfy the wish of the people, but with the intention to re-establish the government of his lawful sovereign; and he hoped that his majesty the King of Great Britain had no other point in view in sending troops to this country. After having given him all possible assurance on that head, the bishop continued, that as the prince regent, in leaving Portugal, had established a regency for the government of this country during his absence, he considered it his duty to resign the government into the hands of that regency as soon as possible. My answer was, that I had no instruction from my government on that head, but that I begged him to consider whether the cause of his sovereign would not be hurt in resigning the government into the hands of a regency which, from its having acted under the influence of the French, had lost the confidence of the nation, and whether it would not be more advisable for him to keep the government until the pleasure of the prince regent was known. The bishop allowed that the regency appointed by the prince regent did not possess the confidence of the people, that several members of it had acted in such a manner as to show themselves as friends and partisans of the French, and that, at all events, all the members of the late regency could not be re-established in their former power; but that he was afraid that the provinces of Estremadura, Alemtejo, and Algarvé, would not acknowledge his authority if the British government did not interfere. After a very long conversation, it was agreed that I should inform our ministers with what the bishop had communicated to me, and in order to lose no time in waiting for an answer, the bishop desired me to communicate the same to you, expressing a wish that you would be pleased to write to him an official letter, in order to express your desire that he might continue the government until the pleasure of his sovereign was known, for the sake of the operations of the British and Portuguese troops under your command.

The secretary of the bishop, who acted as interpreter, told me afterwards, in private, that the utmost confusion would arise from the bishop resigning the government at this moment, or associating with people who were neither liked nor esteemed by the nation.

I beg leave to add, that although the bishop expressed the contrary, yet it appeared to me that he was not averse to his keeping the government in his hands, if it could be done by the interference of our government. I have the honour to be, etc., etc.

(Signed) FREDERICK VON DECKEN, brig.-gen.

2nd. DITTO to DITTO.

SIR,

Oporto, August 22, 1808.

Your excellency will have received the secret letter which I had the honour to send you by Brigadier-General Stuart, on the 18th, respecting the communication of his excellency the Bishop of Oporto, relative to his resignation of the government into the hands of the regency established by the prince regent. In addition to what I have had the honour to state upon that subject, I beg leave to add that his excellency the bishop has this day desired me to make your excellency aware, in case it might be wished that he should keep the government in his hands until the pleasure of the prince regent may be known, that he could not leave Oporto; and the seat of government must in that case necessarily remain in this town. His excellency the bishop thinks it his duty to inform you of this circumstance as soon as possible, as he foresees that the city of Lisbon will be preferred for the seat of government as soon as the British army have got possession of it. If the seat of the temporary government should remain at Oporto, the best method to adopt with respect to the other provinces of Portugal appears to be, to cause them to send deputies to that place for the purpose of transacting business relative to their own provinces; in the same manner as the provinces of Entre Douro y Minho and Tras los Montes now send their representatives. One of the principal reasons why his excellency the bishop can only accede to continue at the head of the government under the condition of remaining at Oporto is, because he is persuaded that the inhabitants of this town will not permit him to leave it, unless by order of the prince regent. It might also be advisable to keep the seat of government at Oporto, as it may be supposed that Lisbon will be in a state of great confusion for the first two months after the French have left it. I have the honour to be, sir, etc., etc. (Signed) FREDERICK VON DECKEN, brig.-gen.

3rd.

Oporto, August 28.

SIR,

Your excellency will have received my secret letters of the 18th and 22nd instant relative to the temporary government of this kingdom. His excellency the Bishop of Oporto has received lately deputies from the province of Alemtejo and the kingdom of Algarve. Part of Estremadura, viz., the town of Leria, has also submitted to his authority, and it may be therefore said that the whole kingdom of Portugal has acknowledged the authority of the temporary government, of which the Bishop of Oporto is at the head, with the exception of Lisbon and the town of Setubal (St. Ubes). Although the reasons why these towns have not yet acknowledged the authority of the temporary government may be explained by their being in possession of the French, yet the bishop is convinced that the inhabitants of Lisbon will refuse to submit to the temporary government of Oporto, in which they will be strongly supported by the members of the former regency established by the prince regent, who of course will be very anxious to resume their former power. The bishop in assuming the temporary government complied only with the wishes of the people: he was sure that it was the only means of saving the country; but having had no interest of his own in view, he is willing to resign the authority which he has accepted with reluctance, as soon as he is convinced that it can be done without hurting the cause of his sovereign, and throwing the country into confusion. There is every reason to apprehend that the inhabitants of the three northern provinces of Portugal will never permit the bishop to resign the government, and submit to the former regency. They feel extremely proud of having first taken to arms, and consider themselves as the deliverers and saviours of their country; and as the inhabitants of Lisbon will be as much disinclined to submit to the temporary government of Oporto; a division of the provinces, which will excite internal commotion, will naturally follow, if not supported by your excellency. It has appeared to me that the best way to reconcile these opposite parties would be in endeavouring to unite the present government at Oporto with such of the members of the former regency who have not forfeited by their conduct the confidence of the people; and having opened my idea to the bishop, his answer was, that he would not object to it if proposed by you. I therefore take the liberty of suggesting, that the difficulty above mentioned would be in a great measure removed if your excellency would be pleased to make it known after Lisbon has surrendered, that until the pleasure of the prince regent was known, you would consider the temporary government established at Oporto as the lawful government, with the addition of the four members of the late regency, who have been pointed out to me by the bishop as such who have behaved faithfully to their sovereign and country; viz., *Don Francisco Noronha, Francisco da Cunha, the Monteiro Mor, and the principal Castro.*

These members to be placed at the head of the different departments, and to consider the bishop as the president, whose directions they are to follow, a plan which will meet with the less difficulty, as the president of the former regency, named by the prince regent, has quitted Portugal, and is now in France. The circumstance that Lisbon is now in a state of the greatest confusion will furnish a fair pretext for fixing the seat of the temporary government in the first instance at Oporto, to which place the gentlemen above named would be ordered to repair without loss of time, and to report themselves to the bishop. Independent of the reasons which I had the honour of stating to your excellency in my letter of the 22nd instant, why it is impossible for the bishop to leave Oporto, I must beg leave to add, that, from what I understand, the greater part of the inhabitants of Lisbon are in the French interest, and that it will require a garrison of British troops to keep that city in order. The Bishop of Oporto, although convinced of the necessity of considering Lisbon at present as a military station, and of placing a British commandant and a British garrison there, yet from a desire that the feelings of the inhabitants might be wounded as little as possible, wishes that you would be pleased to put also some Portuguese troops in garrison at Lisbon, together with a Portuguese commandant, who, though entirely under the orders of the British governor, might direct the police in that town, or at least be charged with putting into execution such orders as he may receive from the British governor under that head. If your excellency should be pleased to approve of this proposal, the bishop thinks Brigadier Antonio Pinto Bacelar to be the properest officer of those who are now with the Portuguese army to be stationed at Lisbon, and who might also be directed to organise the military force of the province of Estremadura. The bishop is fully convinced that the temporary government of the country cannot exist without the support of British troops: he hopes that our government will leave a corps of 6000 men in Portugal after the French have been subdued, until the Portuguese troops may be sufficiently organised and disciplined to be able to protect their own government. I have the honour to be, sir, your most obedient and humble servant,

FREDERICK VON DECKEN, brig.-gen.

No. XII.

Letter from GENERAL LEITE to SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.—Translation.

MOST ILLUSTRIOUS AND MOST EXCELLENT SIR,

Strength is the result of union, and those who have reason to be grateful should be most urgent in their endeavours to promote it. I therefore feel it to be my duty to have recourse to your excellency to know how I should act without disturbing the union so advantageous to my country. The supreme junta of the Portuguese government established at Oporto, which I have hitherto obeyed as the representatives of my sovereign, have sent me orders by an officer, dated the 1st instant, to take possession of the fortress of Elvas as soon as it shall be evacuated. After having seen those same Spaniards who got possession of our strong places as friends, take so much upon themselves as even to prevent the march of the garrison which I had ordered to replace the losses sustained in the battle of Evora, which deprived me of the little obedience that was shown by the city of Beja, always favoured by the Spanish authorities; after having seen the Portuguese artillery which was saved after the said battle taken possession of by those same Spaniards, who had lost their own, without being willing even to lend me two 3-pounders to enable me to join his excellency the Monteiro Mor; after having the arms which were saved from the destructive grasp of the common enemy made use of by those same Spaniards, *who promised much and did nothing*; after having seen a Spanish brigadier dispute my authority at Campo Mayor, where I was president of the junta, and from whence his predecessor had taken away 60,000 crowns without rendering any account; in a word, after having seen the march of these Spaniards marked by the devastation of our fields, and the country deserted to avoid the plunder of their light troops, I cannot for a moment mistake the cause of the orders given by the supreme junta of Oporto. A corps of English troops having yesterday passed Estrémos, on their road to Elvas, knowing that in a combined army no officer should undertake any operation which may be intended for others, thereby counteracting each other, I consulted Lieutenant-General Herre (Hope), who has referred me to your excellency, to whom in consequence I send ~~the~~ ^{my} letter, and explain verbally everything you may wish to know which relates to my sovereign and the good of my country, already so much indebted to the English nation. God preserve your excellency many years.

(Signed)

FRANCISCO DE PAILO LEITE, lieut.-general.

(Dated) *Estremoz, 16th September, 1808.*

To the most illustrious and most excellent Sir Hew Dalrymple.

Extract of a Letter from SIR HEW DALRYMPLE to LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR JOHN HOPE.

SIR,

Head-quarters, Benefico, 25th Sept., 1808.

Impediments having arisen to the fulfilment of that article of the convention which relates to the cession of Elvas by the French to the British army, in consequence of the unexpected and unaccountable conduct of the commander-in-chief of the army of Estremadura, in bombarding that place, and endeavouring to impose upon the French garrison terms of capitulation different from those which were agreed upon by the British and French generals in chief; and as the British corps sent to take possession of the above fortress, and to hold it in the name of the prince regent until reinforced by a body of Portuguese troops, is not of sufficient strength to preclude the possibility of insult, should the general above mentioned persevere in the contemptuous and hostile disposition he has hitherto shown; I have therefore thought it advisable to order the remainder of your division, and General Paget's advanced guard, to cross the Tagus, and to occupy cantonments as near as possible to the place above mentioned. In the mean time Colonel Graham is gone to Badajos to expostulate with General Galluzzo on the singular and very inexplicable line of conduct he has seen cause to adopt. . . .

NO. XIII.—JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM SIR JOHN MOORE'S AND OTHER CORRESPONDENCE.

SECTION I.—RELATING TO WANT OF MONEY.

SIR JOHN MOORE to LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK, *Oct. 22, 1808.*

"Sir David Baird has unfortunately been sent out without money. He has applied to me, and I have none to give him." . . . "I undertake my march in the hope that some will arrive; if it does not, it will add to the number of a great many distresses."

SIR JOHN MOORE to GENERAL HOPE, *Oct. 22, 1808.*

"Baird has sent his aide-de-camp Gordon to me: he is without money, and his troops only paid to September. He can get none at Coruña."

SIR JOHN MOORE to SIR DAVID BAIRD, *Oct. 22, 1808.*

"We are in such want of money at this place that it is with difficulty I have been able to spare 8000*l.*, which went to you in the *Champion* this day."

SIR JOHN MOORE to LORD CASTLEREAGH, *Oct. 27, 1808.*

"It is upon the general assurance of the Spanish government that I am leading the army into Spain without any established magazines. In this situation nothing is more essentially requisite than money, and unfortunately we have been able to procure very little here."

SIR JOHN MOORE to MR. FRERE, *Nov. 10, 1808.*

"I understand from Sir David Baird that you were kind enough to lend him £40,000 from the money you brought with you from England. We are in the greatest distress for money. I doubt if there is wherewithal after the 24th of this month to pay the troops their subsistence."

SIR JOHN MOORE to LORD CASTLEREAGH, *Nov. 24, 1808.*

"I am without a shilling of money to pay, and I am in daily apprehension that from the want of it our supplies will be stopped. It is impossible to describe the embarrassments we are thrown into from the want of that essential article."

SECTION II.—RELATING TO ROADS.

SIR JOHN MOORE to GENERAL ANSTRUTHER, *at Almeida, dated Lisbon, Oct. 12, 1808.*

"A division under Beresford is marching upon Coimbra, and a part of it will proceed on to Oporto or not, as information is received from you, that the road from thence to Almeida is or is not practicable. Some officers of the Spanish engineers, employed in the quarter-master-general's department, with commissaries, are sent from Madrid to obtain information on the subjects you will want with respect to roads, subsistence, etc., etc., from Almeida to Burgos."

SIR JOHN MOORE to LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK, *Oct. 22, 1808.*

"Colonel Lopez has no personal knowledge of this part of Spain; but what he has told me accords with other information I had before received, that the great Madrid road was the only one by which artillery could travel; the French brought theirs from Ciudad Rodrigo to Alcantara, but by this *it was destroyed*." . . . "The difficulty of obtaining correct information of roads, and the difficulties attending the subsistence of troops through Portugal, are greater than you can believe."

SIR JOHN HOPE to SIR JOHN MOORE, *Madrid, Nov. 20, 1808.*

"I sent Wills, of the Engineers, by Placentia to Salamanca, and before this time I suppose he may have made his report to you of the roads from the Tagus at Almaraz and Puente de Cardinal to Salamanca." . . . "Delancy is upon this road, and I have directed him to communicate with you at Salamanca, as soon as possible."

SIR JOHN MOORE to LORD CASTLEREAGH, *Oct. 27, 1808.*

"I am under the necessity of sending Lieutenant-General Hope with the artillery, etc., by the great road leading from Badajos to Madrid, as *every information* agreed that no other was fit for the artillery."

Substance of a report from CAPTAIN CARMICHAEL SMYTH, of the Engineers,
26th Dec., 1808.

"The country round about Astorga is perfectly open, and affords no advantage whatsoever to a small corps to enable it to oppose a large force with any prospect of success. In retreating, however, towards Villa Franca, at the distance of about two leagues from Astorga, the hills approaching each other form some strong ground; and the high ground in particular in the rear of the village of Rodrigatos appears at first sight to offer a most advantageous position. One very serious objection presents itself nevertheless to our making a stand near Rodrigatos, or indeed at any position before we come to the village of Las Torres (about one league from Bemibre), as the talus, or slope of the ground, from Manzanal (close to Rodrigatos) until Las Torres, would be in favour of an enemy should we be forced at Rodrigatos, and we should be consequently obliged to retreat downhill for nearly two leagues, the enemy having every advantage that such a circumstance would naturally give them.

"From Las Torres to Bemibre the ground becomes more open, but with the disadvantage, however, of the slope being still against us. From Bemibre to Villa Franca there is great variety of ground, but no position that cannot easily be turned, excepting the ground in the rear of Calcavillos, and about one league in front of Villa Franca. This is by far the strongest position between Astorga and Villa Franca. It is also necessary to add that the position at Rodrigatos can easily be turned by the Foncevadon road (which, before the establishment of the Camina real, was the high-road towards Coruña). This is not the case with the position in front of Villa Franca, as the Foncevadon road joins the Camina real at Calcavillos in front of the proposed position."

SECTION III.—RELATING TO EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.

SIR JOHN MOORE to LORD CASTLEREAGH, *Oct. 9, 1808.*

"At this instant the army is without equipment of any kind, either for the carriage of the light baggage of regiments, artillery stores, commissariat stores, or other appendages of an army, and not a magazine is formed on any of the routes by which we are to march."

SIR JOHN MOORE to LORD CASTLEREAGH, *Oct. 18, 1808.*

"In none of the departments is there any want of zeal, but in some of the important ones there is much want of experience." . . . "I have no hope of getting forward at present with more than the light baggage of the troops, the ammunition immediately necessary for the service of the artillery, and a very scanty supply of medicines."

SIR JOHN MOORE'S *Journal.*

"My anxiety is to get out of the rugged roads of Portugal before the rains."

SIR JOHN MOORE to LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK, *Oct. 22, 1808.*

"The season of the year admitting of no delay, there was a necessity for beginning the march, and trusting for information and supplies as we get on; unfortunately our commissariat is inexperienced, and a — of a contractor, Mr. Sattaro, has deceived us."

SIR DAVID BAIRD to SIR JOHN MOORE, *Oct. 29, 1808.*

"The want of provisions for the men and forage for the horses has been one of the most serious obstacles we have had to contend with. Nor do I at present feel at all easy upon that subject."—"The horses are suffering very severely, both for want of proper accommodations and food."—"From Lord Castlereagh's letter, I was led to expect that every preparation for our equipment had been made previous to our leaving England; I need hardly say how different the case was, and how much I have been disappointed."

MR. STUART to SIR JOHN MOORE, *Nov. 17, 1808.*

"The continued slowness of the junta is the only explanation I can offer for the want of proper arrangements on the routes for the reception of the English troops."

SECTION IV.—RELATING TO THE WANT OF INFORMATION.

SIR JOHN MOORE'S *Journal*, Nov. 28, 1808.

"I am not in communication with any of the (Spanish) generals, and neither know their plans nor those of the government. No channel of information has been opened to me, and I have no knowledge of the force or situation of the enemy, but what, as a stranger, I pick up."

DITTO, *Salamanca*.

"It is singular that the French have penetrated so far (Valladolid), and yet no sensation has been made upon the people. They seem to remain quiet, and the information was not known through any other channel but that of a letter from the captain-general of the province to me."

SIR DAVID BAIRD to SIR JOHN MOORE, *Astorga*, Nov. 19, 1808.

"The local authorities have not only failed in affording us the least benefit in that respect (supplies), but have neglected to give us any kind of information as to the proceedings of the armies or the motions of the enemy."

DITTO, *Astorga*, 23rd November.

"It is clearly apparent how very much exaggerated the accounts generally circulated of the strength of the Spanish armies have been."—"It is very remarkable that I have not procured the least intelligence, or received any sort of communication from any of the official authorities at Madrid, or either of the Spanish generals."

SIR DAVID BAIRD to SIR JOHN MOORE, *Villa Franca*, Dec. 12, 1808.

"I also enclose a letter from the Marquis of Romana; you will be fully able to appreciate the degree of reliance that may be placed on the *verbal* communication made to him by the extraordinary courier from Madrid. It was from the same kind of authority that he derived the information he conveyed to me of a *supposed* brilliant affair at Somosierra, which turned out to be an inconsiderable skirmish altogether undeserving of notice."

COLONEL GRAHAM to SIR JOHN MOORE, *Madrid*, Oct. 4, 1808.

"The deputies sent over knew nothing but just concerning their own provinces, and *pour se faire valoir*, they exaggerated everything; for example, those of the Asturias talked louder than anybody, and Asturias as yet has never produced a man to the army; thus government, with all their wish to get information (which cannot be doubted), failed in the proper means."

LORD WM. BENTINCK to SIR JOHN MOORE, *Madrid*, Nov. 20, 1808.

"I must at the same time take the liberty of stating my belief, that reliance cannot be placed upon the correctness of information, even if such information should not be kept back, which does not come through the channel of a British officer. It is the choice of officers, rather than the system, that seems to have failed."

MR. STUART to SIR JOHN MOORE, *Madrid*, Nov. 19, 1808.

"In your direct communications with Spanish generals, you must, however, be contented with their version of the state of affairs, which I do not think can always be relied on, because they only put matters in the view in which they wish you to see them."

DITTO, Nov. 29.

"The calculation of force which the junta hope may be united in the army under your command will be as follows, if no impediment prevents the different corps reaching the points selected for their junction:—

		<i>Remarks by the Author.</i>
British	35,000	They were only 23,500.
La Romana	20,000	only 5000 armed.
San Juan	15,000	Totally dispersed.
Levies from the south, say	10,000	None ever arrived.
	<hr/> 80,000	Real total, 28,500.

LIEUT. BOOTHBY, *Royal Engineers*, to SIR JOHN MOORE, *La Puebla*, Jan. 1, 1809.

"I shall consider of any means that may more completely insure the earliest information of the enemy's movements towards this quarter; but the Spaniards are the most difficult people in the world to employ in this way, they are so slow, so talkative, and so credulous."

SECTION V.—RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF THE LOCAL JUNTAS.

SIR DAVID BAIRD to SIR JOHN MOORE, *Coruña, Oct. 24, 1808.*

"The answer of the supreme government to our application as read by Mr. Frere last night in the presence of the junta of this province, is certainly very different from what I expected. Instead of expressing an anxiety to promote our views and dissatisfaction at the impediments thrown in the way of our measures by the Gallician government, it merely permits us to land here in the event of its being found impracticable to send us by sea to St. Andero, and directs that if our disembarkation takes place, it should be made in detachments of 2000 or 3000 men each ! to be successively pushed on into Castile, without waiting for the necessary equipment of mules and horses."

SIR DAVID BAIRD to SIR JOHN MOORE, *Coruña, Nov. 7.*

"We have received no sort of assistance from the government."

DITTO, *Astorga, Nov. 19.*

"Had the Spanish government afforded us any active assistance, the state of our equipments would have been much more advanced."

COLONEL GRAHAM to SIR JOHN MOORE, *Madrid, Oct. 4, 1808.*

"All this instead of at once appointing the fittest men in the country to be ministers, looks much like private interest and patronage being the objects more than the public good."

COLONEL GRAHAM to SIR JOHN MOORE, *Tudela, Nov. 9, 1808.*

"It is hoped that the Aragonese army will come over to fill it" (the line) "up, but being an independent command, no order has yet been sent. An express went after Palafox, who will return here this morning, and then it is hoped, that he will send an order to General O'Neil at Sanguessa to march instantly; and further, it is hoped that General O'Neil will obey this order without waiting for one from his immediate chief, Palafox, the captain-general of Aragon, who is at Saragoza; at all events, there is a loss of above 24 hours by the happy system of independent commands, which may make the difference of our having 18,000 men more or less in the battle that may be fought whenever the French are ready." . . . "Making me compliments of there being no secrets with their allies, they" (the members of the council of war) "obliged me to sit down, which I did for a quarter of an hour, enough to be quite satisfied of the miserable system established by this junta." . . . "In short, I pitied poor Castaños and poor Spain, and came away disgusted to the greatest degree."

COLONEL GRAHAM to LORD W. BENTINCK, *Centruenigo, Nov. 13, 1808.*

"If anything can make the junta sensible of the absurdity of their conduct this will. It would indeed have been more felt if a great part of the division had been lost, as might well have happened. But the difficulty of passing so many men with artillery, and in small boats, and the time that would have been required so great, that I can hardly persuade myself these people can be so foolish as ever seriously to have entertained the idea. But with whatever intentions, whether merely as a pretence for assuming the command for the purpose of irritating Castaños; whether from the silly vanity of exercising power, and doing something which, if by great good luck it had succeeded, might have proved what might be done with a more active commander; or whether from a real conviction of the excellence of the scheme, it must be equally evident to every military man, indeed to every man of common sense, that it is impossible things can succeed in this way; and then the junta itself interferes, and to worse purpose."

CASTAÑOS'S *Vindication.*

"The nation is deceived in a thousand ways; as an example, it believed that our armies were greatly superior to those of the enemy, reckoning 80,000 men that of the centre, when your excellencies" (the junta) "knew that it only amounted to 26,000 men."—"Madrid possessed money and riches; the nobles and loyal inhabitants of that capital wished to give both the one and the other; but whilst the armies were suffering the horrors of famine, naked, and miserable, the possessions and jewels of the good Spaniards remained quiet in Madrid, that they might be soon seized by the tyrant, as they were in the end."

STUART'S *Despatch, August 7, 1808.*

"No province shares the succours granted by Great Britain, although they may not be actually useful to themselves. No gunboats have been sent from Ferrol to protect St. Ander or the coast of Biscay; and the Asturians have in vain asked for artillery from the dépôts of Galicia. The stores landed at Gihon, and not used by the Asturians, have remained in that port and in Oviedo, although they would have afforded a seasonable relief to the army of General Blake. The money brought by the *Pluto* for Leon, which has not raised a man, remains in the port where it was landed."

MAJOR COX to SIR HEW DALRYMPLE, *Seville, August 3, 1808.*

"I freely confess that I cannot help feeling some degree of apprehension that this great and glorious cause may be ruined by the baneful effects of jealousy and division."

MAJOR COX to SIR HEW DALRYMPLE, *Seville, August 27.*

"The fact is, their" (the junta of Seville) "attention has been for some time past so much occupied by vain and frivolous disputes, and by views of private interest and advantage, that they seem to have neglected entirely every concern of real importance, and almost to have lost sight of the general interest of the country."—"A million of dollars have, I understand, been sent out."—"It certainly would not be prudent to intrust so large a sum to the management of the temporary government of a particular province, without having a sufficient security for its proper application. My own opinion is, that the less money which is given to them the better, until the general government is formed. This junta have shown too evident signs of a wish to aggrandize themselves, and a disinclination to afford those aids to other provinces, which they had it in their power to grant, not to afford just grounds of suspicion, that their boasted loyalty and patriotism have at times been mixed with unworthy considerations of self-interest and personal advantage."

DITTO, *Sept. 5.*

"By Mr. Duff's present instructions, he would have had no option" (distributing the money), "even though the *iniquitous project of partition*, which your excellency knows was once contemplated, were still in existence."

DITTO, *Sept. 7.*

"A dispute between the two juntas" (Seville and Grenada), "which had nearly been productive of the most serious consequences, and would probably have ended in open hostility, had it not been prevented by the moderate, but decided conduct of General Castaños."

DITTO, *Sept. 10.*

"The supreme junta of Seville have latterly manifested very different views, and, I am sorry to say, they seem almost to have lost sight of the common cause, and to be wholly addicted to their particular interests: instead of directing their efforts to the restoration of their legitimate sovereign and the established form of national government, they are seeking the means of fixing the permanency of their own, and endeavouring to separate its interests from those of the other parts of Spain. To what other purpose can be attributed the order given to General Castaños, not to march on any account beyond Madrid? To what the instructions given to their deputy, Don Andrea Miniano, to uphold the authority, and preserve the integrity of the junta of Seville; to distinguish the army to which he is attached by the name of the army of Andalusia; to preserve constantly the appellation, and not to receive any orders but what came directly from this government? And above all, what other motive could induce the strong and decided measure of enforcing obedience to those orders, by withholding from General Castaños the means of maintaining his troops, in case of his refusing to comply with them?"—"What has been the late occupation of the junta of Seville? Setting aside the plans which were formed for augmenting the Spanish army in these provinces, and neglecting the consideration of those which have been proposed in their stead, their attention has been taken up in the appointment of secretaries to the different departments, in disposing of places of emolument, in making promotions in the army, appointing canons in the church, and instituting orders of knighthood. Such steps as these make their designs too evident."

CAPTAIN CARROL to SIR DAVID BAIRD, *Llanes, Dec. 17, 1808.*

"This province" (Asturias), "the first to declare war with France, has, during seven months, taken no steps that I can discover to make arrangements against the event of the enemy's entering the province."—"What has been done with the vast sums of money that came from England, you will naturally ask? Plundered and misapplied: every person who had or has anything to do with money concerns endeavouring to keep in hand all he can, and be ready, let affairs turn out as they may, to help himself."

LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK to SIR HEW DALRYMPLE, *Seville, Sept. 19, 1808.*

"Notwithstanding the professions of the junta, their conduct has evidently fallen short of them, and I think it would be very desirable that more money should not fall into their hands."

MAJOR COX to SIR HEW DALRYMPLE, *Seville, 10th and 27th July.*

"The proclamation of Florida Blanca was received here some time ago, but was carefully suppressed by the government."

"Other publications containing maxims similar to those inculcated by the proclamation of Florida Blanca have appeared, but are suppressed here with equal care."

SECTION VI.—CENTRAL JUNTA.

LORD WM. BENTINCK to SIR JOHN MOORE, *Madrid, Oct. 4, 1808.*

"I am sorry to say that the new government do not seem to proceed with the dispatch and energy which the critical situation of the country demands."

DITTO to SIR H. BURRARD, *Madrid, Oct. 8.*

"In my last letter I adverted to the inactivity and apparent supineness which prevailed in the central council in regard to the military, as well as to the other business of the government."

DITTO to SIR JOHN MOORE, *Nov. 8.*

"But it is upon the spot where the exact state of the armies, and the extraordinary inefficiency of the government, whose past conduct promises so little for the future, are known, that the danger must be the more justly appreciated."—"The most simple order, however urgent the case, cannot be obtained from the government without a difficulty, solicitation, and delay, that is quite incredible."

SIR JOHN HOPE to SIR JOHN MOORE, *Madrid, Nov. 20, 1808.*

"It is perfectly evident that they" (the junta) "are altogether without a plan as to their future military operations, either in the case of success or misfortune. Every branch is affected by the disjointed and inefficient construction of their government."

MR. STUART to SIR JOHN MOORE, *Madrid, Oct. 18, 1808.*

"Lord William Bentinck, as well as myself, have made repeated representations, and I have given in paper after paper to obtain something like promptitude and vigour; but though loaded with fair promises in the commencement, we scarcely quit the members of the junta before their attention is absorbed in petty pursuits and the wrangling which impedes even the simplest arrangements necessary for the interior government of a country."—"In short, we are doing what we can, not what we wish: and I assure you we have infamous tools to work with."

MR. STUART to SIR JOHN MOORE, *Seville, Jan. 2, 1809.*

"Morla's treason is abused, but passed over; and the arrival of money from Mexico, which is really the arrival of spoil for the French, seems to have extinguished every sentiment the bad views and the desperate state of things ought to have created."

MR. STUART to SIR JOHN MOORE, *Jan. 10, 1809.*

"Castaños, Heredia, Castelar, and Galluzzo, are all here. These unfortunate officers are either prisoners or culprits, waiting the decision of government on their conduct in the late transactions. If the state of affairs should allow the government to continue in existence they will probably wait many months, for no determination is to be expected from people who have in no one instance punished guilt or rewarded merit since they ruled the country. The junta indeed, to say the truth, is at present absolutely null, and although they represent the sovereign authority I have never witnessed the exercise of their power for the public good."

MR. FRERE to SIR JOHN MOORE, *Las Santos, Dec. 16, 1808.*

"The subject of the ships in Cadiz has not escaped me, but I thought it so *very dangerous* to suggest to the junta any idea except that of living and dying on Spanish ground, that I avoided the mention of any subject that could seem to imply that I entertain any other prospects."

SECTION VII.—RELATING TO THE PASSIVE STATE OF THE PEOPLE.

SIR JOHN MOORE'S *Journal, Dec. 9, 1808.*

"In this part the people are passive. We find the greatest difficulty to get people to bring in information."

SIR JOHN MOORE to MR. FRERE, *Sahagun, Dec. 23, 1808.*

"If the Spaniards are enthusiastic or much interested in this cause, their conduct is the most extraordinary that was ever exhibited."

SIR JOHN MOORE to LORD CASTLEREAGH, *Astorga, Dec. 31, 1808.*

"I arrived here yesterday, where, contrary to his promise and to my expectation, I found the Marquis la Romana, with a great part of his troops. Nobody can describe his troops to be worse than he does, and he complains as much as we do of the indifference of the inhabitants, his disappointment at their want of enthusiasm; and said to me in direct terms, that had he known how things were, he neither would have accepted the command

not have returned to Spain. With all this, however, he talks of attacks and movements which are quite absurd, and then returns to the helpless state of his army and of the country."

MR. STUART to SIR JOHN MOORE, *Nov. 17, 1808.*

"The tranquillity of Madrid is truly wonderful."

SIR DAVID BAIRD to SIR JOHN MOORE, *Dec. 6.*

"Destitute as we are of magazines, and without receiving even a show of assistance either from the government or inhabitants of the country, who, on the contrary, in many instances, even thwarted our plans and measures; we could not have advanced without exposing ourselves to almost certain destruction."

SIR DAVID BAIRD to LORD CASTLEREAGH, *Astorga, Nov. 22, 1808.*

"Major Stuart, of the 95th regiment, who was despatched in front of this place to obtain information, reports that the inhabitants appear perfectly depressed by their losses, and seem to abandon all hope of making a successful resistance."

CAPTAIN CARROL to SIR JOHN MOORE, *Dec. 17, 1808.*

"On my arrival at Oviedo all was confusion and dismay; the confidence between the people, the army, and the junta destroyed." . . . "Is it to be expected that the peasantry can be as hearty in the cause of patriotism as if they were treated with justice?"

LIEUT. BOOTHBY to SIR J. MOORE, *La Puebla, Jan. 1, 1809.*

"The Spanish soldiers now here (about 700) are merely on their way to the Marquis de la Romana; and as to any neighbouring passes, there are no people whom I can call upon to occupy them, or should expect to defend them, however naturally strong they may be, for I see no people who are thinking of the enemy's advance with any sentiments beyond passive dislike, and hopes of protection from God and the English army."

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL to the DUKE OF DALMATIA, *Dec. 10, 1808.*

"The city of Madrid is quite tranquil, the shops are all open, the public amusements are resumed."

GENERAL THOUVENOT to the PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL, *St. Sebastian, Nov. 29, 1808.*

"The successes obtained by the armies of the emperor, and those which are also foreseen, begin to make a sensible impression upon the authorities of the country, who become from day to day more affable towards the French, and more disposed to consider the king at their legitimate sovereign."

The COMMANDANT MESLIN to the PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL, *Vittoria, Nov. 29, 1808.*

"The public feeling is still bad, still incredulous of our successes." . . . "As to the tranquillity of the country, it appears certain."

MR. FRERE to SIR JOHN MOORE, *Merida, Dec. 14, 1808.*

"A thousand barriers would be interposed against that deluge of panic which sometimes overwhelms a whole nation, and of which at one time I was afraid I saw the beginning in this country." . . . "The extinction of the popular enthusiasm in this country, and the means which exist for reviving it, would lead to a very long discussion."

SECTION VIII.—MISCELLANEOUS.

LORD COLLINGWOOD to SIR H. DALRYMPLE, *Ocean, Cadiz, June 23, 1808.*

"At Minorca and Majorca they describe themselves to be strong, and having nothing to apprehend. However, they made the proposal for entering into a convention with us for their defence, and in the course of it demanded money, arms, and the protection of the fleet. When, in return for them, it was required that their fleet should be given up to us, to be held for their king Ferdinand, or that a part of them should join our squadron against the enemy, they rejected all those proposals: so that whatever we did for them was to be solely for the honour of having their friendship."

CAPTAIN WHITTINGHAM to SIR HEW DALRYMPLE, *June 12, 1808.*

"12th June. I returned to Xerez at three o'clock a.m. The general sent for me and requested I would go without delay to Gibraltar, and inform Lieut.-General Sir Hew Dalrymple that he at present occupied Carmona with 3000 men (regulars), having his head-quarters at Utrera, where his regular force would amount to 12,000 men; that it was not his intention to attempt to defend Seville; that the heavy train of artillery, consisting of 80 pieces, was already embarked for Cadiz, under the pretext that they were wanting for the defence of its works; and that everything was prepared for burning the harness,

timbers, etc., etc., of the field-pieces; that he intended to fall gradually back upon Cadiz, if forced to retreat; and that he did not at present desire that any English troops should be landed, till their numbers should amount to 8000 or 10,000 men, lest the ardour of the people should oblige him to commence an offensive system of warfare before the concentration of a considerable Spanish and English force should afford reasonable hopes of success."

CAPTAIN WHITTINGHAM to SIR H. DALRYMPLE, *Utrera, June 29, 1808.*

"The president approved of the idea, condemned the policy which had led Spain to attempt to establish manufactories by force, and showed clearly that the result had been the loss of a considerable branch of the revenue, the increase of smuggling, and consequently an enormous expense, in the payment of nearly *one hundred thousand* custom or rather excise officers, distributed about the country, and the ruin of numberless families seduced by the prospect of immediate profit to engage in illicit traffic."

LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK to SIR H. DALRYMPLE, *Madrid, Oct. 2, 1808.*

"A passage of Lord Castlereagh's letter, of which I received from you a copy, instructed you, if possible, to ascertain the intentions of the Spanish government after the expulsion of the French. Though not positively directed by you to ask this information, yet the occasion appeared to make the question so natural, and seemingly of course, and even necessary, that I availed myself of it, and gave to General Castanos, to be laid before Count Florida Blanca, a memorandum, of which I enclose a copy, marked A."

Extract from the copy marked A.

"It seems probable in such case that no diversion could be more effectual or more formidable to Buonaparte than the march of a large combined British and Spanish army over the Pyrenees, into that part of France where there are no fortified places to resist their passage into the very heart of the country, and into that part where great disaffection is still believed to exist."

MAJOR FLETCHER, *Royal Engineers*, SIR JOHN MOORE, *Betanzos, Jan. 5, 1809.*

"I have the honour to report to your excellency that, in obedience to your orders, I have examined the neck of land between the harbour of Ferrol and the bridge of Puente de Humo. This ground does not appear to possess any position that has not several defects." . . . "I did not find any ground so decidedly advantageous, and containing a small space, as to render it tenable for the van-guard of an army to cover the embarkation of the main body." . . . "I should have sent this report much sooner, but found it impossible to procure post-horses until my arrival at Lugo, and since that time I have had very bad ones."

DITTO to DITTO, *Coruña, Jan. 6, 1809.*

"I am therefore led to suggest, that as Coruña is fortified, reveted, and tolerably flanked (though the ground about it is certainly not favourable), as it could not be carried by a coup-de-main if properly defended, as it contains a great quantity of cover for men; and as, even against artillery, it might make resistance for some days, it may be worth consideration whether, under present circumstances, it may not be desirable to occupy it in preference to the peninsula of Betanzos, should the army not turn off for Vigo."

NO. XIV.—JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM SIR JOHN MOORE'S CORRESPONDENCE.

SIR J. MOORE to MR. FRERE, *Salamanca, Nov. 27, 1808.*

"The movements of the French give us little time for discussion. As soon as the British army has formed a junction I must, upon the supposition that Castaños is either beaten or retreated, march upon Madrid, and throw myself into the heart of Spain, and thus run all risks and share the fortunes of the Spanish nation, or I must fall back upon Portugal." . . . "The movement into Spain is one of greater hazard, as my retreat to Cadiz or Gibraltar must be very uncertain. I shall be entirely in the power of the Spaniards, but perhaps this is worthy of risk, if the government and people of Spain are thought to have still sufficient energy, and the means to recover from their defeats; and by collecting in the south be able, with the aid of the British army, to resist, and finally repel, the formidable attack which is prepared against them."

SIR J. MOORE'S *Journal, Salamanca, Nov. 30, 1808.*

"In the night of the 28th I received an express from Mr. Stuart, at Madrid, containing a letter from Lieut.-Colonel Doyle, announcing the defeat of Castaños's army near Tudela. They seem to have made but little resistance, and are, like Blake's, flying; this

renders my junction with Baird so hazardous that I dare not attempt it; but even were it made, what chance has this army, now that all those of Spain are beaten, to stand against the force which must be brought against it? The French have 80,000 in Spain, and 30,000 were to arrive in 20 days from the 15th of this month. As long as Castaños's army remained there was a hope, but I now see none. I am therefore determined to withdraw the army."

DITTO, *Dec. 9.*

"After Castaños's defeat, the French marched for Madrid, the inhabitants flew to arms, barricaded their streets, and swore to die rather than submit. This has arrested the progress of the French, and Madrid still holds out; this is the first instance of enthusiasm shown; there is a chance that the example may be followed, and the people be roused; in which case there is still a chance that this country may be saved. Upon this chance I have stopped Baird's retreat, and am taking measures to form our junction whilst the French are wholly occupied with Madrid. We are bound not to abandon the cause as long as there is hope; but the courage of the populace of Madrid may fail, or at any rate they may not be able to resist; in short, in a moment things may be as bad as ever, unless the whole country is animated and flock to the aid of the capital, and in this part the people are passive."

SIR JOHN MOORE to LORD CASTLEREAGH, *Salamanca, Dec. 10, 1808.*

"I certainly think the cause desperate, because I see no determined spirit anywhere, unless it be at Zaragoza. There is however a chance, and whilst there is that I think myself bound to run all risks to support it. I am now differently situated from what I was when Castaños was defeated; I have been joined by General Hope, the artillery, and all the cavalry (Lord Paget, with three regiments, is at Toro); and my junction with Sir David Baird is secure, though I have not heard from him since I ordered him to return to Astorga."

DITTO to DITTO, *Dec. 12.*

"I shall threaten the French communications and create a diversion, if the Spaniards can avail themselves of it; but the French have in the north of Spain from 80,000 to 90,000 men, and more are expected. Your lordship may therefore judge what will be our situation if the Spaniards do not display a determination very different from any they have shown hitherto."

SIR JOHN MOORE'S *Journal, Sahagun, Dec. 24, 1808.*

"I gave up the march on Carrion, which had never been undertaken but with the view of attracting the enemy's attention from the armies assembling in the south, and in the hope of being able to strike a blow at a weak corps, whilst it was still thought the British army was retreating into Portugal; for this I was aware I risked infinitely too much, but something I thought was to be risked for the honour of the service, and to make it apparent that we stuck to the Spaniards long after they themselves had given up their cause as lost."

SIR J. MOORE to LORD CASTLEREAGH, *Coruña, Jan. 13, 1808.*

"Your lordship knows that had I followed my own opinion, as a military man, I should have retired with the army from Salamanca. The Spanish armies were then beaten; there was no Spanish force to which we could unite; and from the character of the government, and the disposition of the inhabitants, I was satisfied that no efforts would be made to aid us, or favour the cause in which they were engaged. I was sensible, however, that the apathy and indifference of the Spaniards would never have been believed; that had the British been withdrawn, the loss of the cause would have been imputed to their retreat; and it was necessary to risk this army to convince the people of England, as well as the rest of Europe, that the Spaniards had neither the power nor the inclination to make any efforts for themselves. It was for this reason that I marched to Sahagun. As a diversion it has succeeded. I brought the whole disposable force of the French against this army, and it has been allowed to follow it, without a single movement being made by any of what the Spaniards call armies to favour its retreat."

No. XV.

This despatch from the Count of Belvedere to the Count of Florida Blanca, relative to the battle of Gamonal, is an example of the habitual exaggerations of the Spanish generals. Translation:—

Since my arrival at Burgos I have been attacked by the enemy: in two affairs I repulsed him; but to-day, after having sustained his fire for 13 hours, he charged me with double my force, besides cavalry, as I believe he had 3000 of the latter, and

6000 infantry at least, and I have suffered so much that I have retired on Lerma, and mean to assemble my army at Aranda de Douero. I have sustained a great loss in men, equipage, and artillery; some guns have been saved, but very few. Don Juan Henestrosa, who commanded in the action, distinguished himself, and made a most glorious retreat: but as soon as the cavalry attacked, all was confusion and disorder. I shall send your excellency the particulars by an officer when they can be procured. The volunteers of Zafra, of Sezena, of Valentia, and the first battalion of infantry of Truxillo, and the provincials of Badajoz had not arrived at Burgos, and consequently I shall be able to sustain myself at Aranda, but they are without cartridges and ammunition. I lament that the ammunition in Burgos could not be brought off. The enemy followed me in small numbers: I am now retiring (10 p.m.), fearing they may follow me in the morning. I yesterday heard from General Blake, that he feared the enemy would attack him to-day, but his dispositions frustrated the enemy's designs, beginning the action at 11 at night.

(Signed)

CONDE DE BELVEDERE.

NO. XVI.—EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM THE DUKE OF DALMATIA TO THE AUTHOR.

Dans la même lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire vous me priez aussi, monsieur, de vous donner quelques lumières sur la poursuite de Mr. le Général Sir John Moore, quand il fit sa retraite sur la Corogne en 1809. Je ne pense pas que vous desiriez des détails sur cette opération, car ils doivent vous être parfaitement connus, mais je saisirai avec empressement l'occasion que vous me procurez pour rendre à la mémoire de Sir John Moore le témoignage que ses dispositions furent toujours les plus convenables aux circonstances, et qu'en profitant habilement des avantages que les localités pouvaient lui offrir pour seconder sa valeur, il m'opposa partout la résistance la plus énergique et la mieux calculée; c'est ainsi qu'il trouva une mort glorieuse devant la Corogne, au milieu d'un combat qui doit honorer son souvenir.

Paris, ce 15 Novembre, 1824.

NO. XVII.—LETTER FROM MR. CANNING TO MR. FRERE.

SIR,

London, Dec. 10, 1808.

The messenger, Mills, arrived here yesterday with your despatches, No. 19 to No. 26 inclusive; and at the same time advices were received from Lieutenant-General Sir David Baird, dated on the 20th ultimo at Astorga, which state that general to have received intelligence from Sir John Moore of the complete defeat of General Castaños's army, and of the determination taken by Sir John Moore, in consequence, to fall back upon Portugal, while Sir David Baird is directed by Sir John Moore to re-embark his troops, and to proceed to the Tagus. Thus at the same moment at which I receive from you the caution entertained in your No. 20, that a retreat into Portugal would be considered by the central junta as indicating an intention to abandon the cause of Spain, his majesty's government receive the information that this measure has actually been adopted, but under circumstances which, it is to be supposed, could not have been in the contemplation of the central junta. To obviate, however, the possibility of such an impression, as you apprehend, being produced upon the Spanish government by the retreat of the British armies, I lose no time in conveying to you his majesty's commands, that you should forthwith give the most positive assurance that the object of this retreat is no other than that of effecting in Portugal the junction which the events of the war have unfortunately rendered impracticable in Spain, with the purpose of preparing the whole army to move forward again into Spain whenever and in whatever direction their services may be best employed in support of the common cause. In proof of this intention, you will inform the Spanish government that an additional reinforcement of cavalry is at this moment sailing for Lisbon, and that the British army in Portugal will be still further augmented, if necessary, so as to make up a substantive and effective force adequate to any operation for which an opportunity may be offered in the centre or south of Spain, according to the course which the war may take. But while you make this communication to the Spanish government it is extremely necessary that you should accompany it with a distinct and pressing demand for the communication to you and to the British general of whatever be the plan of operations of the Spanish armies. Sir John Moore complains that he had not received the slightest intimation of any such plan at the date of his last despatch of the 20th ultimo; and I am afraid the appointment which you mention in your No. 20 of the British and Spanish armies will not have taken place till after the defeat of the

Spanish armies will have entirely disposed of that question for the present. The language of Sir David Baird, with respect to defect of information, is precisely the same as that of Sir John Moore. Sir D. Baird has indeed had the advantage of some intercourse with the Marquis de la Romana; but the Marquis de la Romana himself does not appear to have been in possession of any part of the views of his government, nor to have received any distinct account of the numbers, state, or destination even, of either of the armies, which he was himself appointed to command. The British government has most cautiously and scrupulously abstained from interfering in any of the counsels of the junta, or presuming to suggest to them by what plan they should defend their country. But when the question is as to the co-operation of a British force, they have a right, and it is their duty to require, that some plan should have been formed, and being formed, should be communicated to the British commander, in order that he may judge of and (if he shall approve) may be prepared to execute the share intended to be assigned to him. You will recollect that the army which has been appropriated by his majesty to the defence of Spain and Portugal is not merely a considerable part of the disposable force of this country: it is, in fact, the British army. The country has no other force disposable. It may by a great effort reinforce the army for an adequate purpose; but another army it has not to send. The proposals, therefore, which are made somewhat too lightly for appending parts of this force, sometimes to one of the Spanish armies, sometimes to another, and the facility with which its services are called for, wherever the exigency of the moment happens to press, are by no means suited to the nature of the force itself, or consonant to the views with which his majesty has consented to employ it in Spain. You are already apprised by my former despatch (enclosing a copy of General Moore's instructions), that the British army must be kept together under its own commander, must act as one body for some distinct object, and on some settled plan.

It will decline no difficulty, it will shrink from no danger, when, through that difficulty and danger, the commander is enabled to see his way to some definite purpose. But, in order to this, it will be necessary that such purpose should have been previously arranged, and that the British army should not again be left as that of Sir John Moore and Sir David Baird have recently been, in the heart of Spain, without one word of information, except such as they could pick up from common rumour, of the events passing around them. Previously, therefore, to General Sir John Moore's again entering Spain, it will be expected that some clear exposition should be made to him of the system upon which the Spaniards intend to conduct the war; the points which they mean to contest with the advancing enemy, and those which, if pressed by a series of reverses, they ultimately propose to defend.

The part assigned to the British army in the combined operation must be settled with Sir John Moore, and he will be found not unambitious of that in which he may be opposed most directly to the enemy. The courage and constancy displayed by the junta, under the first reverses, are in the highest degree worthy of admiration.* And if they shall persevere in the same spirit, and can rouse the country to adequate exertions, there is no reason to despair of the ultimate safety of Spain. But it is most earnestly to be hoped, that the same confidence which they appear to have placed in the ability of their armies, under Blake and Castaños, to resist the attacks of the enemy, will not be again adopted as their guide, again to deceive them in the ulterior operations of the war. It is to be hoped that they will weigh well their really existing means of defence against the means of attack on the part of the enemy, and that if they find them unequal to maintain a line of defence as extended as they have hitherto attempted to maintain, they will at once fall back to that point, wherever it may be, at which they can be sure that their stand will be permanent, and their resistance effectual. It is obvious, that unless they can resist effectually in the passes of the Guadarama, or in the Sierra Morena, the ultimate point of retreat, after a series of defeats more or less numerous and exhausting, according as they shall the sooner or the later make up their minds to retreat, is Cadiz. Supported by Cadiz on one side, and by the fortress of Gibraltar on the other, the remaining armies of Spain might unquestionably make such a stand, as no force which France could bring against them could overpower; and the assistance of the British army would be in this situation incalculably augmented by the communication with Gibraltar and the sea. I am aware of the jealousy with which the mention of a British force of any sort coupled with the name of Cadiz will be received. But the time seems to be arrived at which we must communicate with each other (the Spanish government and England) without jealousy or reserve. His majesty has abjured, in the face of the world, any motive of interested policy,—you are authorized to repeat in the most solemn manner, if necessary, that abjuration. But if in the midst of such sacrifices and such exertions as Great Britain is making for Spain; if after having foregone all objects of partial benefit, many of which

* The extract which follows this letter furnishes a curious comment on this passage.

the state of Spain (if we had been so ungenerous as to take that advantage of it) would have brought within our reach, the fair opinion of the British government cannot be received without suspicion; there is little hope of real cordiality continuing to subsist under reverses and misfortunes, such as Spain must but too surely expect, and such as are at all times the tests of sincerity and confidence. It is the opinion of the British government that the last stand (if all else fails) must be made at Cadiz. It is the opinion of the British government, that this stand will be made in vain *only* if the necessity of resorting to it is too late acknowledged, and the means of making it effectually not providently prepared. It is the opinion of the British government, that on no account should the naval means of Spain be suffered to fall into the hands of France, or those of France to be recovered by her. It is their opinion that this may be prevented, but to prevent it, the object must be fairly looked at beforehand; and it is hoped that a spirit of distrust unworthy both of those who entertain it, and of those with respect to whom it is entertained, will not be suffered to interfere between an object of so great importance and the means of insuring its accomplishment. It is absolutely necessary to lose no time in bringing this subject fairly before the Spanish government, and if in doing so, you should see either in M. Cevallos or in Count Florida Blanca marks of that distrust and suspicion which must fatally affect any measure of co-operation between the British and Spanish forces, it will be right that you should at once anticipate the subject, and you are at liberty to communicate this despatch *in extenso*, as the surest mode of proving the openness with which the British government is desirous of acting, and the disdain which it would feel of any imputation upon its disinterestedness and sincerity. But while this object is thus to be stated to the central government, it is not to this object alone that the services of the British army are to be appropriated. The commander-in-chief will have both the authority and the inclination to listen to any proposal for any other practicable undertaking. And it is only in the event of no such object or undertaking being presented to him in Spain, that he is directed to confine himself to the defence of Portugal. I am, etc., etc., etc.

(Signed)

GEORGE CANNING.

Extracts from a Letter from MR. CANNING to MR. FRERE, of the same date as the above.

December 10, 1808.

The timely preparation of the fleets of France and Spain, now in the harbour of Cadiz, is also a point to be pressed by you with earnestness, but at the same time with all the delicacy which belongs to it. In the event of *an emigration to America* it is obvious that this preparation should be made beforehand. And in the case of this project not being adopted, and of a resolution being taken to defend Cadiz to the utmost, it would still be desirable that the fleets should be prepared for removal to Minorca, in order to be out of the reach of any use which the disaffected in Cadiz (of whom General Morla is represented to have expressed considerable apprehensions) might be disposed to make of them for compromise with the enemy.

Extract from a Letter from MR. CANNING to MR. FRERE.

December 11, 1808.

SIR, Complaints have been justly made of the manner in which the British troops, particularly those under Sir David Baird, have been received in Spain.

The long detention of Sir David Baird's corps on board the transports at Coruña may but too probably have contributed to render the difficulties of a junction between the two parts of the British army insurmountable, by giving the enemy time to advance between them. In addition to this it is stated, that there was a total want of preparation for supply of any sort, and the unwillingness with which those supplies appear to have been administered, have undoubtedly occasioned as much disappointment as inconvenience to the British commanders. Unless some change is effected in these particulars when the army again moves into Spain, the advance of the British troops through that country will be attended with more difficulty than a march through a hostile country.

No. XVIII.—RETURN OF BRITISH TROOPS EMBARKED FOR PORTUGAL AND SPAIN,
IN 1808.—(Extracted from the Adjutant-General's returns.)

Artil.	Caval.	Infantry.	Total.	
357	349	8688	9394	Commanded by Sir A. Wellesley; embarked at Cork the 15th, 16th, and 17th June, 1808; sailed 12th July; landed at Mondego, August 1st.
379	...	4323	4702	Commanded by Generals Ackland and Anstruther; embarked at Harwich, July 18th and 19th; landed at Meceira, August 20th, 1808.
66	...	4647	4713	Commanded by General Spencer; embarked at Cadiz; landed at Mondego, August 3rd.
712	563	10,049	11,324	Commanded first by Sir John Moore, secondly by Sir Harry Burrard; embarked at Portsmouth, April, 1808; sailed to the Baltic; returned and sailed to Portugal, July 31st; landed at Maceira, August 29th.
...	672	672	Landed at Lisbon, Dec. 31st, 1808.
186	...	943	1129	Embarked at Gibraltar; sailed Aug. 14th; landed at the Tagus in September.
94	...	929	1023	Commanded by Gen. Beresford; embarked at Madeira; sailed Aug. 17th; landed at the Tagus in September.
...	672	672	Commanded by General C. Stewart; embarked at Gravesend; landed at Lisbon; September 1st.
798	...	10,271	11,069	Commanded by Sir D. Baird; embarked at Falmouth; sailed Oct. 9th; arrived at Coruña, 13th Oct.; landed 29th ditto.
...	...	1622	Two regiments sent round to Lisbon from Sir D. Baird's force.
...	2021	2021	Commanded by Lord Paget; embarked at Portsmouth; landed at Coruña, October 30th.
2592	4277	41,472	46,719	
			1622	Add two regiments sent to Lisbon from Coruña.
			48,341	Grand total, of which 800 were artificers, waggon-train, and commissariat.

No. XIX.—RETURNS OF KILLED, WOUNDED, AND MISSING, OF THE ARMY UNDER
THE COMMAND OF SIR A. WELLESLEY.

1808. August.	Officers.			Men.			Total.
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	
15th, Brillos	1	1	0	1	5	21	29
17th, Rorica	4	19	4	66	316	70	479
21st, Vimiero	4	35	2	131	499	49	720
Grand total for the campaign	9	55	6	198	820	140	1228

No. XX.—BRITISH ORDER OF BATTLE, BORICA, AUG. 17TH, 1808.—(Extracted from the Adjutant-General's states.)

the Regent and General's States.

		Regiments.		
Right wing.	1st brigade, Maj.-Gen. Hill	{ 5th 9th 38th	} 2780	7246
	3rd ditto, Maj.-Gen. Nightingale	{ 29th 82nd	} 1722	
	5th ditto, C. Crawford	{ 45th 50th 91st	} 2744	
Left wing.	4th brigade, Brig.-Gen. Bowes	{ 6th 32nd	} 1829	5846
	2nd ditto, Maj.-Gen. Ferguson	{ 36th 40th 71st	} 2681	
	6th ditto (light), Brig.-Gen. Fane	{ 95th, 2nd bn. 60th, 5th bn.	} 1336	
Artillery, 18 guns, 6 and 9 lbs.			660	660
Cavalry			240	240
				<hr/>
Total British				13,992
Portuguese, Col. Trant	{ Infantry of the line, 1000 Light troops 400 Cavalry 250			1650
Grand total, British and Portuguese, including sick men, etc., etc.				<hr/> 15,642

No. XXI.—BRITISH ORDER OF BATTLE, VIMIERO, 21ST AUG., 1808.—(Extracted from the Adjutant-General's states.)

		Regiments.		
Right wing.	{ 1st brigade, Gen. Hill	{ 5th 9th 38th	} 2780	2780
Centre.	{ 6th ditto, Brig.-Gen. Fane	{ 50th 60th 95th, 2nd. bn.	} 2293	4953
	{ 7th ditto, Brig.-Gen. Anstruther	{ 9th 43rd, 2nd bn. 52nd, 2nd bn. 97th	} 2660	
Left wing.	{ 2nd brigade, Maj.-Gen. Ferguson	{ 36th 40th 71st	} 2681	7612
	{ 3rd ditto, Maj.-Gen. Nightingale	{ 29th 82nd	} 1722	
	{ 4th ditto, Brig.-Gen. Bowes	{ 6th 32nd	} 1829	
	{ 8th ditto, Maj.-Gen. Ackland	{ 2nd 20th	} 1380	
Reserve.	{ 5th brigade, Brig.-Gen. C. Crawford	{ 45th 50th 91st	} 2744	2744
Artillery, 18 guns, 6 and 9 lbs.			660	660
Cavalry, 20th light dragoons			240	240
				<hr/>
		Total British		18,989
Portuguese, Col. Trant	{ Infantry Cavalry	{ 1400 250		1650
Grand total, including sick, wounded, and missing				<hr/> 20,639

No. XXII.—RETURN OF SIR HEW DALRYMPLE'S ARMY, OCT. 1ST, 1808.
Head-quarters, Bemfica.

	Fit for duty.	Hospital.	Detached.	Total.
Cavalry	1402	128	28	1558
Artillery	2091	146	6	2234
Infantry	25,678	3196	454	29,328
Total	29,171	3470	488	

Grand total, including artificers, waggon-train, etc , etc.	• •	33,129
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NO. XXIII.—EMBARKATION RETURN OF THE FRENCH ARMY UNDER GENERAL JUNOT.

	Present under arms.			Detached.			Absent without pay.				Total.			Criminals.
	Officers.	Men.	Horses.	Officers.	Men.	Horses.	Hospital.		Prisoners.		Officers.	Men.	Horses.	Men.
	Officers.	Men.	Horses.	Officers.	Men.	Horses.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Horses.	Men.
Infantry	273	15,860	...	52	2078	0	46	3281	17	895	...	22,635	...	13
Cavalry	48	1722	1176	...	1	1	...	195	1	1974
Artillery	21	1015	472	...	6	1121
Engineers	14	3	17

Guns . . .	10	8 lbs.	} 35
	16	4 lbs.	
Howitzers . .	4	6 inch.	

Grand total 25,747 men, 1655 horses and 35 pieces of artillery.

Note —On the staff of each division there are

1 general of division.

2 generals of brigade.

7 aides de camp.

1 inspector of reviews.

1 commissary of engineers.

2 officers of engineers.

Artillery—1 general, 4 colonels, 2 chefs de bataillon.

Engineers—1 colonel, 2 captains. The remainder in the divisions.

No. XXIV.

The following extract from a minute made by His Royal Highness the Duke of York in 1808 proves that 60,000 men could have been provided for the campaign of 1808-9 in *Spain*, without detriment to other services.

"There are present in Portugal,

Cavalry	.	.	.	1640	} 31,446
Infantry 34 battalions	.	.	.	29,806	

"Under orders to embark,	{	Cavalry	3410	} 14,829
		Infantry	11,419	

Total . 46,275

"Of this force the 20th dragoons and 8 battalions should remain in Portugal. The
disposable force would then be

	Cavalry.	Infantry.
--	----------	-----------

From Portugal	1313	23,575
Under orders	3200	11,419
Force to be drawn from Sicily		8000

Total	4513	42,994
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“To this may be added four regiments of cavalry } And the two brigades of guards }	2560	2434
---	------	------

Grand total .	7073	45,428
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"When to this you add 4 battalions of infantry, which may be spared, and the artillery, it will form a corps of above 60,000 rank and file."

Note.—The detail of names and strength of the regiments are omitted to save space.

No. XXV.

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY UNDER THE COMMAND OF SIR JOHN MOORE.

<i>2nd Division.</i> Lt.-Gen. Hope.			<i>3rd Division.</i> Lt.-Gen. Fraser.			<i>1st Division.</i> Lt.-Gen. Baird.		
Brigades.			Brigades.			Brigades.		
1st.	2nd.	3rd.	1st.	2nd.		1st.	2nd.	3rd.
4 batns.	3 batns.	3 batns.	4 batns.	3 batns.		2 batns.	3 batns.	3 batns.
<i>2nd Flank Brigade.</i> German. Br.-Gen. Alten.			<i>Reserve.</i> M.-Gen. Paget.			<i>1st Flank Brigade.</i> Col. B. Crawford.		
2 battalions.			Brigades. 1st. 2nd.			3 battalions.		
			3 batns.	2 batns.				
<i>Cavalry.</i> Lord Paget.			<i>Artillery.</i> Col. Harding.					
Brigades. 1st. 2nd.			11 brigades.					
3 regs. 2 regs.			66 pieces.					

Return of SIR JOHN MOORE'S army, Dec. 19, 1808, extracted from the Adjutant-General's morning state of that day.

	Fit for duty.	Hospital.	Detached.	Total.
Cavalry	2278	182	794	3254
Artillery	1358	97	...	1455
Infantry	22,222	3756	893	26,871
Deduct	25,858	4035	1687	31,580
	2275	Men composing four battalions, viz.		
	23,583	Total number under arms.		

{ 3rd reg. left in Portugal.
76th } Between Villa
51st } Franca and
59th } Lugo.

Note.—Of 66 guns 42 were attached to the divisions, the remainder in reserve, with the exception of one brigade of 3 lbs.

No. XXVI.

The following General Return, extracted from especial regimental reports, contains the whole number of non-commissioned officers and men, cavalry and infantry, lost during Sir John Moore's campaign :—

Lost at or previous to the arrival of the army at the position of		Total.
Lugo	{ Cavalry, 95 Infantry, 1302 }	1397
Of this number 200 were left in the wine-vaults of Bemibre, and nearly 500 were stragglers from the troops that marched to Vigo.		
Lost between the departure of the army from Lugo and the embarkation at Coruña	{ Cavalry, 9 Infantry, 2627 }	2636
Grand total		4033

Of the whole number above 800 contrived to escape to Portugal, and being united with the sick left by the regiments in that country, they formed a corps of 1876 men, which being re-embodied under the name of the battalions of detachments, did good service at Oporto and Talavera.

The pieces of artillery abandoned during the retreat were six 3-pounders.

These guns were landed at Coruña without the general's knowledge; they never went beyond Villa Franca, and, not being horsed, were thrown down the rocks when the troops quitted that town.

The guns used in the battle of Coruña were spiked and buried in the sand, but the French discovered them.

N.B.—Some errors may have crept into the regimental states, in consequence of the difficulty of ascertaining exactly where each man was lost, but the inaccuracies could not affect the total amount above fifty men more or less.

No. XXVII.

The following states of the Spanish armies are not strictly accurate, because the original reports from whence they have been drawn were generally very loose, and often inconsistent and contradictory. Nevertheless it is believed that the approximation is sufficiently close for any useful purpose.

STATE I.—*Army of Andalusia.*

	Armed peasantry.	Regulars.
1808.		
19th July, Baylen	Unknown	29,000
1st Sept. { Madrid	—	30,000
{ La Mancha		
{ Sierra Morena		

STATE II.—*Numbers of the Spanish armies in October, 1808, according to the reports transmitted to SIR JOHN MOORE by the military agents.*

	Regulars.	Armed peasantry, incorporated with the regular troops.	
Troops upon the Ebro, and in Biscay	75,000	70,000	145,000
In Catalonia	20,000	—	20,000
In march from Aragon to Catalonia	10,000	—	10,000
Ditto new levies from Grenada	—	10,000	10,000
In the Asturias	18,000	—	18,000
Total	123,000	80,000	
Grand total			203,000

STATE III.—*Real numbers of the Spanish Armies in line of battle, in the months of October, November, and December, 1808.*

	1st Line.			
	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Guns.	
Army of Palafox	550	17,500	20	} Defeated and dispersed at Tudela.
Army of Castaños	2200	24,500	48	
Army of Blake	100	30,000	26	} Ditto at the battles of Zornoza and Espinosa.
Army of Romana	1404	8000	25	
Asturians	—	8000	—	} Ditto at Gamonal.
Army of Count Belvedere	1150	11,150	30	
Total	5404	99,150	149	
Deduct Romana's cavalry and guns, which never came into the line of battle	1404	—	25	
Total, brought into 1st line of battle	4000	99,150	124	

		<i>2nd Line.</i>		
		Infantry.	Cavalry.	
General St. Juan's division	12,000	—	—	{ Were beaten at the Somosierra 30th November; murdered their general at Talavera, December 7th, and dispersed.
Fugitives from Gamonal, commanded by General Heredia	4000	—	—	
Fugitives from Blake's army, re-organised by Romana	6000	1400	—	{ Fled from Segovia and Sepulveda, December 2nd, and dispersed at Talavera, 7th.
Asturian levies under Ballesteros	5000	—	—	
Fugitives assembled by Gal-luzo behind the Tagus	6000	—	—	{ Beaten at Mancilla, 29th December; retired into Galicia. Infantry dispersed there.
Total, brought into 2nd line	33,000	1400		{ Were not engaged.
				{ Defeated and dispersed, 24th Dec., by the 4th corps, at Almaraz.

To cover Moore's advance, there were on the Ebro, in Biscay, and in the Asturias, according to the Spanish and the military agents' reports . . . 173,000
 The real number brought into the field was . . . 103,150

Exaggeration . . . 69,850

Note.—The real amount includes the sick in the field hospitals.

No. XXVIII.

SECTION I.—STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY CALLED "THE FIRST PART OF THE ARMY OF SPAIN," DATED OCT. 1, 1808.

Head-quarters, Vittoria.

King Joseph, commander-in-chief.

General Jourdan, major-general.

General Belliard, chief of the staff.

Recapitulation, extracted from the imperial states, signed by the Prince of Neufchatel.

Officers included, present under arms.

	Men.	Horses
Division imperial guard, commanded by Gen. Dorsenne	2423	786
Do. reserve cavalry, imperial gendarmes, and other troops	5417	944
Corps of Marshal Bessieres	15,595	2923
Do. Marshal Ney	13,756	2417
Do. Marshal Moncey, 16,636	22,640	3132
Garrison of Pampeluna 6004		
Garrisons of Vittoria, Bilbao, St. Sebastian, Tolosa, Montdragon, Salinas, Bergara, Villa Real, Yrun, and other places of less note	8479	1458
Troops disposable at Bayonne and the vicinity, or in march upon that place	20,005	5196
Do. employed as movable columns in the defence of the frontier from Bayonne to Belgrade	6042	261
In Catalonia, Gen. Duhesme	10,142	1638
Fort of Fernando Figueras, Gen. Reille	4027	557
Division of Gen. Chabot	1434	—
Total	110,660	19,312

Note.—At this period the Spaniards and the military agents always asserted that the French had only from 35,000 to 45,000 men of all weapons.

State of the French Army, called "The Second Part of the Army of Spain," October 1st. 1808.

This army, composed of the troops coming from the grand army and from Italy, was by an imperial decree, dated 7th September, divided into six corps and a reserve.

Present under arms.

	Men.	Horses.
1st corps, Marshal Victor, Duke of Belluno .	29,547	5552
5th do. Mortier, Duke of Treviso .	24,405	3495
6th do. destined for Ney, Duke of Elchingen .	22,694	3945
Infantry of the Viceroy of Spain's guards .	1213	—
Cavalry ditto .	456	551
1st division of dragoons .	3695	3994
2nd ditto .	2940	3069
3rd ditto .	2020	2238
4th ditto .	3101	3316
5th ditto .	2903	3068
Division of General Sebastiani .	5808	185
5th regiment of dragoons .	556	531
German division .	6067	381
Polish ditto .	6818	—
Dutch brigade .	2280	751
Westphalian light horse .	522	599
General Souham's division .	7259	—
Ditto Pino's ditto .	6803	—
24th regiment of dragoons .	664	731
Regiment of royal Italian chasseurs .	560	512
Regiment of Napoleon's dragoons .	500	474
Artillery and engineers in march for Perpignan .	1706	1430
Total of 2nd part	132,530	34,786
Total of 1st part	110,660	19,312

Grand total . . . 243,190 men and 54,098 horses.

SECTION II.—GENERAL STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN, OCTOBER 10th, 1808.

	Present under arms.		Detached.		Hospital.	Prisoners.	Effective.		
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.			Men.	Cav. Hors.	Art. Hors.
1st corps, Duke of Belluno	28,797	5615	2201	219	2939	—	3329	2501	
2nd "	20,093	3219	7394	1199	5536	30	3616	802	
3rd "	18,867	3186	11,082	2472	7522	219	4537	821	
4th "	22,859	2410	955	40	2170	—	1791	659	
5th "	24,552	3833	188	6	1971	2	1805	2034	
6th "	29,568	4304	3381	257	5051	33	2465	2096	
7th "	35,657	5254	1302	198	4948	200	4045	1404	
8th "	19,059	2247	2137	1	3528	1006	1776	472	
Reserve	34,924	23,604	3533	733	3553	392	21,225	3112	
1st hussars and 27th chasseurs	1424	1463	256	208	74	—	1675	—	
Artillery and engineers in march, coming from Germany	3446	958	107	—	—	—	—	958	
Movable columns for the defence of the frontiers of France	8588	477	107	—	146	19	268	209	
Total	247,834	56,567	32,536	5329	37,419	1901	46,828	15,068	

Of this (French number { Auxiliaries Total .	Under arms.					Detached.		Hospital.	Prisoners.	Effective.		
	Artillery.		Cavalry.		Infantry.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Cav. Hors.	Art. Hors.
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.							
						17,868	15,107	34,172	35,761	152,770	29,647	5052
1503	968	4782	4831	36,739	2889	277	6018	130	52,061	5261	815	
	19,371	16,075	38,954	189,509	32,536	5329	37,419	1901	319,690	46,828	15,068	

Grand total . . 319,690 men and 61,896 horses.

1148 officers of the staff. 298 battalions. 184 squadrons.

*State of the French army in Spain, the EMPEROR NAPOLEON commanding,
15th November, 1808.*

Officers of the staff, 1064. Battalions, 290. Squadrons, 181.

SECTION IV.—THE STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN PORTUGAL, JANUARY 1ST, 1808.

(Extracted from the imperial returns.)

General Junot, commander-in-chief. General Thiebault, chief of the staff.

1st division, General De Laborde	}	26 battalions, 7 squadrons.
2nd ditto, General Loison		
3rd ditto, General Trvot		
Cavalry, General Kellerman		
10 guns of 8 lbs.	}	36 pieces.
22 ditto 4 lbs.		
4 6-inch howitzers.		

4 5-inch howitzers.				Present under arms.	Effective.		
				Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.
				16,190	1114	24,735	1377
At Salamanca, or in march to join the army in Portugal				4795	1296	4795	1296
				<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
		Total . . .		20,985	2310	29,530	2673

State of the French army in Portugal, 23rd May, 1808.

[illegible]

SECTION V.—STATE OF THE "2ND ARMY OF OBSERVATION OF THE GIRONDE,"
1ST FEBRUARY, 1808, SPAIN.

General Dupont, commanding.
20 battalions, and 1 division of cavalry.
Head-quarters, Valladolid.

Present under arms.		Detached.		Hospital.	Effective.	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Horses.
20,729	2884	1303	334	2277	24,309	3218.
Total		. . 24,309 men and 3218 horses.				

SECTION VI.—STATE OF THE "ARMY OF OBSERVATION DE CÔTÉ D'OCEAN,"
1ST FEBRUARY, 1808, SPAIN.

Marshal Moncey, commanding.

Head-quarters, Vittoria.

Present under arms.		Detached.		Hospital.	Effective.	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Horses.
21,878	2547	2144	—	4464	28,486	2547
	Train of the guard				225	509
Grand total				28,711 men and 3301 horses.		

No. XXIX.

The following letters from Lord Collingwood did not come into my possession before the present volume* was in the press. It will be seen that they corroborate many of the opinions and some of the facts that I have stated, and they will doubtless be read with the attention due to the observations of such an honourable and able man.

To SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

MY DEAR SIR,

Ocean, Gibraltar, 30th August, 1808.

I have been in great expectation of hearing of your progress with the army, and hope the first account will be of your success whenever you move. I have heard nothing lately of Junot at Cadiz; but there have been accounts not very well authenticated, that Joseph Buonaparte, in his retiring to France, was stopped by the mass rising in Biscay, to the amount of 14,000 well-armed men, which obliged him to return to Burgos, where the body of the French army was stationed.

At Saragossa the French, in making their fourteenth attack upon the town, were defeated, repulsed with great loss, and had retired from it. There is a deputy here from that city with a commission from the Marquis de Palafox to request supplies. The first aid upon their list is for 10,000 or 15,000 troops. The deputy states they have few regulars in the province, and the war has hitherto been carried on by all being armed. In this gentleman's conversation I observe, what I had before remarked in others, that he had no view of Spain beyond the kingdom of Aragon; and in reply to the observations I made on the necessity of a central government, he had little to say, as if that had not yet been a subject of much consideration. I have great hope that General Castaños, Cuesta, and those captains-general who will now meet at Madrid will do something effectual in simplifying the government. In a conversation I had with Morla on the necessity of this, he seemed to think the juntas would make many difficulties, and retain their present power as long as they could.

I hope, my dear sir, you will give some directions about this puzzling island (*Perexil*), which it appears to me will not be of any future use; but the people who are on it will suffer much in the winter, without habitations, except tents; I conceive the purpose for which it was occupied is past, and will probably never return; whenever they quit it, they should bring the stores away as quietly as possible; for if I am not mistaken, the emperor has an intention to keep them, and will remonstrate against them going. I hope you have received good accounts from Lady Dalrymple, etc.

I am to sail to-day for Toulon, where everything indicates an intention in the French to sail. Mr. Duff brought a million of dollars to Seville, and has instructions to communicate with the junta; but he appears to me to be too old to do it as Major Cox has done: he is still there, and I conclude will wait for your instructions. Mr. Markland would accept with great thankfulness the proposal you made to him to go to Valencia.

I beg my kind regards, etc.

COLLINGWOOD.

P.S.—Prince Leopold is still here, and I understand intends to stay until he hears from England. I have given passports for Dupont and a number of French officers to go to France on parole, 93 in number. General Morla was impatient to get them out of the country. The Spaniards were much irritated against them; they were not safe from their revenge, except in St. Sebastian's castle.

To SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Ocean, off Toulon, October 18, 1808.

MY DEAR SIR,

I have received the favour of your letters of the 27th August and 5th September, and beg to offer you my sincere congratulations on the success of the British army in Portugal, which I hope will have satisfied the French that they are not those invincible creatures which Buonaparte had endeavoured to persuade them they were.

It is a happy event to have rescued Portugal from the government of France, and their carrying off a little plunder is a matter of very secondary consideration; perhaps it may have the good effect of keeping up the animosity of the Portuguese who suffer, and incite them to more resistance in future.

The great business now is to endeavour to establish that sort of government, and organise that sort of military force, which may give security to the country; and the great difficulty in Portugal will be to find men who are of ability to place at the head of the several departments, who have patriotism to devote themselves to its service, and vigour to maintain its independence. In a country exhausted like Portugal, it will require much ingenious expedient to supply the want of wealth and of everything military. If it is not found in the breasts of those to whom the people look up, Portugal will remain in a hapless and uncertain state still.

I have not heard from Sir Charles Cotton how he settled his terms with the Russian admiral; but as he has got possession of the ships to be sent to England, they cannot but be good: the hoisting the English flag on the fort which surrendered to our troops, I conclude, would be explained to the Portuguese as not to be understood as taking possession by England for other purpose than to be restored to its prince, as was done at Madeira; but in this instance it ought to have been thought necessary to deprive Siniavin of the argument he would have used of the neutrality of the Portuguese flag, with whom his nation was not at war.

I left Cadiz the moment everything in that quarter was pacific; and Mr. Duff arrived there with a million of dollars for their use; this money was sent to the junta of Seville, where I am afraid there are many members unworthy of the trust.

I have only heard once from Cox since I left that quarter. After getting the money, Father Gil seemed to have dropt his communications with Major C., and their discussions were not of a nature to excite much public interest; they consisted more in private bickerings than of grave consult for the public weal. Tilly seems to have been entirely disappointed in his project, both in respect to the annexation of southern Portugal to Andalusia and the pension of 12,000 dollars for his service in the supreme council: of those you will be informed by Major Cox. I am afraid I related the proceedings to his majesty's ministers of events which were passing almost under my eye, and gave my opinion on them with too great freedom; I mean with a freedom that is not usual; but they were facts of which, without being possessed, his majesty's ministers could not have a knowledge of the real state of affairs in Spain; and the sentiments those facts inspired were necessary to explain my motives and the rule of conduct which I pursued. And still I consider the great and only danger to which Spain is now exposed is the supposition that the whole nation is possessed of the same patriotism which, in Andalusia, Aragon, and Valencia, led to such glorious results. It is far otherwise: there are not many Castañoses, nor Cuestas, nor Palafoxes; and take from Spain the influence of the clergy, and its best source of power would be lost: wherever this influence is least, the war is languid.

I wrote to you some time since to represent the state of Catalonia. Nothing can be more indifferent to the cause than they appear to be; yet the common peasantry have not less spirit nor less desire to repel their enemy. They have no leaders. Palacio, the captain-general, stays at Villa Franca, west of Barcelona, talking of what he intends to do; and the people speak of him as either wanting zeal in their cause or ability to direct them; while the French from Barcelona and Figueras do just what they please. When the French attacked Gerona he did nothing to succour it. The greatest discomfiture they suffered was from Lord Cochrane, who, while they were employed at the siege, blew up the road, making deep trenches in a part where the fire of his ships could be brought upon them; and when they came there he drove them from their guns, killed many, and took some cannon.

The French fleet is here quite ready for sea, and I am doing all that is in my power to meet them when they do come out. It is an arduous service: the last ten days we have had gales of wind incessantly: the difficulty of keeping a sufficient squadron is very great. I think the storms from those Alpine mountains are harder than in England, and of more duration.

I beg my best regards to Captain Dalrymple, and my sincerest wishes for every success to attend you.

I am, my dear Sir Hew, your obedient and most humble servant,

COLLINGWOOD.

P.S.—In the letter which I wrote to you on the state of Catalonia I represented the

necessity of sending a body of British troops to Catalonia. There is no other prospect of the French being kept in any bounds. The avenues to France are as open now as at any time they have been. I have kept a ship always at Rosas Bay; her marines have garrisoned the castle, and her company assisted in repairing the works. The French appear to have designs on that place. The presence of the English alone prevents them. If 18,000 men were here of our army I think they would make Mr. Palacio come forward and put the whole country into activity, which till then I don't think they ever will be.

COLLINGWOOD.

They want an English resident at Gerona, that they may have somebody to apply to for succour . . .

[The rest torn off in the original.]

To SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

MY DEAR SIR,

Ocean, off Minorca, April 8, 1809.

I received the favour of your letter a few days ago, which gave me great pleasure, after all the trouble and vexations you have had, to hear you were all well.

I was exceedingly sorry when I saw the angry mood in which the convention in Portugal was taken up, even before the circumstances which led to it were at all known. Before our army landed in Portugal the French force was reported to be very small. I remember it being said that a body of 5000 troops were all that was necessary to dispossess Junot. I conclude the same sort of report went to England; and this, with the victory that was obtained, led people to expect the extermination of the few French which were supposed to be there; and when once the idea is entertained people shut their eyes to difficulties.

I remember what you told me, the last time I saw you off Cadiz, of the communications which might be made to you by an officer who possessed the entire confidence of ministers. I thought then, that whatever ministers had to communicate to a commander-in-chief, could not be done better than by themselves; for intermediate communications are always in danger of being misunderstood, and never fail to cause doubts and disturb the judgment. I hope now it is all over, and your uneasiness on that subject at an end.

My labours I think will never cease. I am worn down by fatigue of my mind; with anxiety and sorrow; my health is very much impaired; and while our affairs require an increased energy, I find myself less able to conduct them, from natural causes. I give all my thoughts and time, but have interruptions, from my weak state of body, which the service will scarcely admit of. I never felt the severity of winter more than this last. They were not gales of wind, but hurricanes; and the consequence is, that the fleet has suffered very much, and many of the ships very infirm. I would not have kept the sea so long, because I know the system of blockading must be ruinous to our fleet at last; and in no instance that I can recollect has prevented the enemy from sailing. In the spring we are found all rags, while they, nursed through the tempest, are all trim. I would not have done it; but what would have become of me if, in my preserving the ships, the French had sailed and effected anything in that quarter? The clamour would have been loud, and they would have sought only for the cause in my treachery or folly, for none can understand that there is any bad weather in the Mediterranean. The system of blockade is ruinous; but it has continued so long, and so much to the advantage of the mercantile part of the nation, that I fear no minister will be found bold enough to discontinue it. We undertake nothing against the enemy, but seem to think it enough to prevent him taking our brigs: his fleet is growing to a monstrous force, while ours every day gives more proof of its increasing decrepitude.

Of the Spaniards I would not say much; I was never sanguine in the prospect of success, and have no reason to change my opinion: the lower class of people, those who are under the influence of priests, would do anything were they under proper direction; but directors are difficult to be found. There is a canker in the state: none of the superior orders are serious in their resistance to the French, and have only taken a part against them thus far from the apprehension of the resentment of the people. I believe the junta is not free from the taint of the infection, or would they have continued Vives Don Miguel in high and important command after such evident proofs as he gave of want of loyalty? I do not know what is thought of Infantado in England; but in my mind the man, the duke (for his rank has a great deal to do with it), who would seat himself in Buonaparte's council at Bayonne, sign his decrees, which were distributed in Spain, and then say he was forced to do it, is not the man who will do much in maintaining the glory or the independence of any country. No such man should be trusted now. The French troops are mostly withdrawn from Spain, except such as are necessary to hold certain strong posts, and enable them to return without impediment. Figueras, Barcelona, and Rosas, are held here in Catalonia, and of course the country quite open to them. Will the Spaniards dispossess them? The junta does not seem to know anything of the provinces at a distance from them. At Tarragona the troops are ill-clothed, and without pay; on one

occasion they could not march against the enemy, having no shoes; and yet at Cadiz they have 51,000,000 dollars. Cadiz seems to be a general depôt of everything they can get from England. If they are not active the next two months Spain is lost.

I hope, Lady Dalrymple, etc., etc.

I ever am, my dear sir, your very faithful and obedient servant,

COLLINGWOOD.

No. XXX.

SECTION I.—GENERAL STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN, EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER-ROLLS, SIGNED BY THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL.

Commanded by the Emperor Napoleon, in person, 15th Jan., 1809.

Present under arms.		Detached.		Hospital.	Prisoners.	Total.	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Horses.
241,010	48,821	24,549	3521	58,026	826	324,411	52,342

King Joseph, commanding—15th Feb., 1809.

Present under arms.		Detached.		Hospital.	Prisoners.	Total Effective.	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Horses.
193,446	3339	36,326	9523	56,404	1843	288,219	43,704

Note.—The imperial guards, the reserve of infantry, and several thousand non-commissioned officers and old soldiers, wanted for the war in Austria, in all above 40,000 men, were struck off the rolls since the last returns.

1st July, 1809.

Present under arms.		Detached.		Hospital.	Prisoners. and Stragglers.	Total Effective.	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Horses.
24,082	31,537	19,596	4513	60,785	7301	288,766	36,050
Deduct detached men comprised in governments						19,596	4513
Real total.....						269,170	31,537

15th July, 1809.

196,144	31,131	19,122	4608	58,200	8089	281,585	35,739
Deduct detached in governments						19,122	4608
Real total.....						262,463	31,131

15th August, 1809.

183,560	30,319	12,697	3930	58,588	7403	266,248	34,880
Deduct for governments						12,697	3930
Real total.....						253,551	30,950

SECTION II.—RETURN OF THE FRENCH ARMY BY CORPS.

Troops immediately under the king—1st June, 1809.

The king's guards, about 5000 men, of all arms, are never borne on the rolls.

First Corps, Marshal Victor commanding.

Head-quarters, Torremocha.

		Present under arms.		Total.
4 divisions of infantry	41 battalions	21,268	32,819
2 ditto cavalry	27 squadrons	5232	7344
Artillery and equipage	40 companies	2984	3610
Number of guns, 48				

Total present under arms..... 29,484 Grand total 43,773

First Corps—21st June, 1809.

Head-quarters, Almaraz.

3 divisions of infantry	33 battalions	18,367	25,633
2 ditto cavalry	20 squadrons	4259	5762
Artillery and equipage	"	2535	2860

Total present under arms..... 25,161 Grand total 34,255

First Corps—15th July, 1809.
Head-quarters, Cazalegas.

		Present under arms.	Total.
3 divisions of infantry	33 battalions	18,890	26,373
2 ditto cavalry	18 squadrons	3781	5080
Artillery and equipage	"	2586	3005

Total present under arms..... 25,257 Grand total 34,458

First Corps—1st August, 1809.
Head-quarters, Maqueda.

3 divisions of infantry	33 battalions	15,066	25,068
2 ditto cavalry	18 squadrons	4987	4983
Artillery and equipage	"	2362	2873

Total present under arms..... 22,415 Grand total 32,924

Fourth Corps, General Sebastiani—10th July, 1809.
Head-quarters, Alcala.

3 divisions of infantry	27 battalions	17,100	25,960
2 ditto cavalry	25 squadrons	3670	5859
Number of artillerymen omitted in the returns		—	—
30 guns			

Total present under arms..... 20,770 Grand total 31,819

3 divisions of infantry	15th August, 1809.		
2 ditto cavalry	27 battalions	14,259	25,801
	25 squadrons	3420	5801

Total present under arms..... 17,679 Grand total 31,602

Division of Reserve, General Dessolles—15th July, 1809.

1 division of infantry	Head-quarters, Madrid.		
	10 battalions	7681	10,254
	Number of guns unknown.		

Kellerman's division—21st April, 1809.
Head-quarters, Astorga.

	Men.	Horses.	Guns.
Total, composed of detachments	8753	805	8

10th June, 1809.

Head-quarters, Oviedo.

	Under arms.	Total.
	Men.	Horses.
Total, composed of detachments	7423 ...	2549 ...

15th July, 1809.

Head-quarters, Valladolid.		
8 squadrons	2291 ...	2360 ...
6 guns		2469
		2393

SECTION III.

1st February, 1809.

Division Lapisse infantry	12 battalions	7692
Brigade Maupetit cavalry	6 squadrons	910

Total under General Lapisse at Salamanca . . . 8602 sabres and bayonets.
Number of guns and artillerymen unknown.

SECTION IV.—RETURN OF TROOPS UNDER THE IMMEDIATE COMMAND OF MARSHAL SOULT.

Second Corps, Soult—15th July, 1809.
Head-quarters, Toro.

	Present under arms.	Total.
4 divisions of infantry	47 battalions	16,626
3 ditto cavalry	19 squadrons	2883
Artillery	"	1081
40 guns		1620

Total present under arms..... 20,590 Grand total 41,348

Fifth Corps, Mortier.
Head-quarters, Valladolid.

		Present under arms.	Total.
2 divisions of infantry	24 battalions	15,036	19,541
1 brigade of cavalry	6 squadrons	896	1491
Artillery	"	648	803
30 guns			
Total present under arms.....		16,580	Grand total 21,835

Sixth Corps, Ney.
Head-quarters, Benevente.

			Total.
2 divisions of infantry	24 battalions	13,700	17,517
1 ditto cavalry	10 squadrons	1446	2092
Artillery	"	1113	1293
37 guns			
Total present under arms.....		16,259	Grand total 20,972

General total under Soult, 15th July, 1809.

	Under arms.	Total.
95 battalions—35 squadrons	53,529	84,155
107 guns		

SECTION V.—TROOPS EMPLOYED IN THE SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA, UNDER MARSHAL LASNES.
15th January, 1809.

	Present under arms.	Detached.	Hospital.	Total effective.
Third corps	17,406	5789	13,668	36,863
Fifth corps	18,284	—	4189	22,473
Total...	35,690	5789	17,857	59,336
15th February, 1809.				
Third corps	16,035	5891	13,259	35,269
Fifth corps	17,933	1735	3859	23,626
Total...	33,968	7526	17,118	58,895

SECTION VI.—RETURN OF THE SEVENTH CORPS, GENERAL ST. CYR.

Present under arms.		Detached.		Hospital.		Prisoners.		Total.	
Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Horses.
41,386	—	6589	543	48,518	5403				
15th May, 1809.									
42,246	2341	10,243	435	55,265	5537				
15th June, 1809.									
42,146	1699	10,222	406	54,473	5365				

No. XXXI.

SECTION I.—STATE OF SPAIN.

COLONEL KEMMIS to SIR J. CRADOCK, *December 17, 1808.*

"In consequence of the unfavourable news from Spain, yesterday, the populace, in Badajos, murdered a Spanish colonel, and one or two more of note."

LIEUTENANT ELLIS (*an officer employed to gain intelligence*) to COLONEL KEMMIS, *Loboa, December 27.*

"The French entered Truxillo, yesterday, at eleven o'clock; and, from the circumstance of their having reconnoitred the intermediate villages, might be expected to arrive at Merida in two hours after we left it."

COLONEL KEMMIS to SIR JOHN CRADOCK, *Elvas, December 28.*

"Badajos cannot make resistance in any degree, either to check or to stop the progress of the enemy. From the statement made to me, last night, by the governor, they want arms, ammunition, and provisions."—"The enemy marched into Truxillo, on the 26th, at half-past 12 o'clock in the day; but, at two, on the following morning, a French officer arrived there, and they fell back four leagues."

LIEUTENANT ELLIS to COLONEL KEMMIS, *December 28.*

"I proceeded cautiously to Truxillo. The main body of the enemy, 6000 in number, had retired across the bridge of Almaraz, and had not taken the road to Madrid, but had proceeded to Plasencia, leaving behind more than half the requisition for money which had been imposed on the town of Truxillo."

MR. STUART to SIR JOHN MOORE, *Seville, January 2, 1809.*

"The corps of 4000 infantry and 2000 cavalry, which had marched from Talavera, and had actually passed the bridge of Almaraz, has fallen back, and is already near Plasencia, on its way northward."—"The extreme attention of Buonaparte being at this moment directed to the English army, everything which can be collected is opposed to you alone."

SECTION II.

MR. STUART to SIR J. MOORE, *December 27, 1808.*

"You will receive, together with this, several letters from Doyle, which describe events in Catalonia *no way differing from what we have witnessed in other parts of Spain!*"—"The junta have established themselves here, and, whatever may have been the expectation which their alarm on the road may have induced Mr. Frere to form of their future proceedings, *a culpable relapse into their former apathy* seems susceptible of no other remedies but such as will be much stronger than any Spaniard is likely to adopt."—"Although Caro promised to write every particular of his conversation with you to the junta, I have hitherto been unable to see his letter. I therefore thought it expedient to put the whole to writing, and, *at the same time, to express my conviction both of the justice and propriety of your whole conduct during the late events, when it was impossible, under any circumstances, to have adopted other determination consistently with the safety of the army committed to your charge.* Though I doubt if this will stop the clamour which has been raised on the subject; and, though events have probably since taken place, which may materially change the state of affairs, it may be satisfactory to tell you that Mr. Frere *appears* to enter into the reasons alleged by you, and to feel, in their full force, the motives which induced you to act so cautiously. and to ground no operation on the hope of any effectual support from the Spaniards."

MR. STUART to SIR J. MOORE, *Seville, January 2.*

"The president, Florida Blanca, died two days since, and I was in hopes that the junta would have availed themselves of this event to make some change in their government."—"I see, however, little but good disposition, and *am still to look for that energy* in rewarding service and punishing treachery which can alone mend matters."

MR. STUART to SIR J. MOORE, *Seville, January 10.*

"Reding is at *Tarragona*, expecting to be attacked, and possessing a force composed chiefly of peasantry, but of which he certainly cannot command above 10,000 men in a situation to face his opponents at any given point."—"Whittingham arrived here yesterday, last from the Duke of Infantados' head-quarters. He assures me the duke had already 20,000 men when he *left Cuenca.*"—"On the side of *Extremadura*, matters are not going on well: Galluzzo, who allowed the enemy to pass the bridges, is here prisoner, and his corps is placed under the command of Cuesta. I cannot say, however, that I see much activity since the change; parties of the enemy cover the country between Madrid and Almaraz, while the corps of 6000 men, which had been pushed forward from Madrid, have, I understand, already passed Plasencia, and probably are on the other side of the Puerto, for the purpose of falling on the Salamanca country, and, if possible, cutting off your communication with Ciudad Rodrigo."

SECTION III.

MR. FRERE to MR. CANNING, *Seville, May 8.*

"Besides the advantages which may be looked for from placing so extensive a command under a person of such tried abilities as General Blake, it is to be hoped that it will put an end to the distractions arising from the contracted views of those who directed the provincial junta, particularly that of Valencia, which have been so embarrassing to his predecessors."

MR. FRERE to MR. CANNING, *Seville, July 10, 1809.*

"As the devastations which have been committed have, in many instances, deprived the peasants of the means of paying what is due to the proprietors and to the church, a general spirit of resistance to all claims of this kind has begun to show itself."

SIR JOHN CRADOCK to LORD CASTLEREAGH, *December 24, 1808.*

"I much fear that alarm and despondency has gained ground about Badajos and that part of Spain, and that there is so little co-operation in the acts of their several juntas, and such a want of subordination and common consent among the armed bodies, to which the defence of the country is entrusted, against such a united force as that of the French, that extreme confusion prevails everywhere."

COLONEL KEMMIS to SIR JOHN CRADOCK, *Elvas, December 30.*

"He (Lieutenant Ellis) has been living with General Cuesta for the last two days,—who has assured him that the Spanish troops, in Madrid, forced their way through the French army; and he expressed great sorrow in adding that, though a Spanish force is often collected, the smallest check disperses them; that in few instances depôts were provided, and those ill supplied,"—"that, such was the dispersion and flight of the Spanish armies, between Badajos and Madrid, there did not remain a single man."

COLONEL KEMMIS to LIEUT.-COLONEL REYNEL, *military secretary to Sir John Cradock, Seville, February 7, 1809.*

"In passing through the Sierra Morena mountains, where nature has done much for the defence of this province, it was painful to observe the pitiful works they were about to throw up. In this whole direction there is but one body that has anything like the appearance of a soldier, viz., dismounted cavalry."

GENERAL MACKENZIE to SIR JOHN CRADOCK, *Cadiz, February 9, 1809.*

"The Spaniards here seem lulled in the most fatal security. They are ignorant of the events in the north of Spain, or will not give credit when they do hear them. Vague reports of the Emperor of Austria's having declared war, and Buonaparte's return to France, gain unlimited credit."—"The equipment of the fleet goes on very slowly, though there is no want of exertion now on the part of Admiral Purvis or Mr. Stuart; offers of every assistance are daily made, but they will neither work themselves nor permit our people to work for them. The preparations of the ships for carrying off the French prisoners goes on equally ill."

DUC DE ALBUQUERQUE to MR. FRERE, *Talavera, July 31, 1809.*

"During our marches we stop to repose, like flocks of sheep, without taking up any position, so that, if the enemy knew the condition we were in, they would defeat us wherever they attacked us. If, in the evening of the 26th, I had not gone out directly with my division, and succeeded in checking the enemy, the whole army would have dispersed, and all the artillery and baggage, which were in the streets of St. Ollalla, would have been lost; and as a proof of what would have happened, had not the enemy, who was within musket-shot, been checked, for many had already thrown away their arms, etc., the commissaries abandoning more than 1500 rations of bread, the carts occupying and blocking up the streets of the town; and to this, I repeat, we are daily exposed, as we march, as if it were on a pilgrimage, without any regard to distance, order, or method, and with the whole parc of artillery, which ought always to remain at the distance of two, three, or more leagues."

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY to LORD WELLESLEY, *Merida, September 1, 1809.*

"I am much afraid, from what I have seen of the proceedings of the central junta, that, in the distribution of their forces, they do not consider military defence and military operations so much as they do political intrigue and the attainment of trifling political objects."

LORD WELLESLEY to MR. CANNING, *Seville, September 2, 1809.*

"While the intelligence received from Sir Arthur Wellesley, to the date of the 24th instant, continued to furnish irresistible proofs of the failure of every promise or effort made by this government for the immediate relief of our troops, no satisfaction was afforded to me respecting any permanent plan for their future supply."—"The troops of Portugal, which entered Spain under General Beresford, suffered similar distress, and experienced similar ill-treatment; although the efforts of Portugal, in the cause of Spain, have been as gratuitous as those of Great Britain; and although Spain possesses no claim, of any description, to the aid of a Portuguese army."—"In this calamity, the people of Spain cannot fail to acknowledge the natural consequences of their own weakness, nor to discover the urgent necessity of enforcing a more steady, pure, and vigorous system, both of council and action. A relaxed state of domestic government and an indolent reliance on the activity of foreign assistance have endangered all the high and virtuous objects for which Spain has armed and bled. It must now be evident that no alliance can protect her from the inevitable result of internal disorder and national infirmity. She must amend and strengthen her government; she must improve the administration of her

resources, and the structure and discipline of her armies, before she can become capable of deriving benefit from foreign aid. Spain has proved untrue to our alliance, because she is not true to herself."—"Until some great change shall be effected in the conduct of the military resources of Spain, and in the state of her armies, no British army can safely attempt to co-operate with the Spanish troops in the territory of Spain."

No. XXXII.—JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM SIR J. CRADOCK'S
CORRESPONDENCE, MSS.

SECTION I.—STATE OF PORTUGAL.

SIR J. CRADOCK to SIR R. WILSON, *Oporto, December 8, 1808.*

"I press this measure" (to move the legion from Oporto to Villa Real) "upon your adoption, for many reasons, etc., etc.; but the more especially that it will give an impulse to military preparation in general, and tend to eradicate the notion that, since the evacuation of Portugal by the French, the prospect of a future war is at an end."

SIR J. CRADOCK to SIR J. MOORE, *December 9, 1808.*

"I have pressed the adoption of such measures as appeared most likely to revive some notion of danger, and the necessity of activity and energy."

SIR J. CRADOCK to LORD CASTLEREAGH, *December 14, 1808, Lisbon.*

"The inaction of the regency was apparent at Oporto to a lamentable degree; and, though I saw General Bernadim Frere, I could not gain from him any information as to the state or numbers of the Portuguese troops, where they were stationed, or who commanded them. I apprehend, from his conversation, that the general officers are all of equal authority; and that even seniority had not its usual effect. He concluded his observations to me with the strong expression, 'That, from the evacuation of Portugal by the French, the nation had thought all war at an end.'"

SIR J. CRADOCK to SIR J. MOORE, *December 28, 1808.*

"Mr. Villiers and myself have both concurred upon the absolute necessity to arouse and animate the Portuguese to some sense of their situation."

COLONEL KEMMIS to SIR J. CRADOCK, *Elvas, December 30, 1808.*

"The apathy of the Portuguese is not to be expressed. Their general, Leite, is a most excellent character: a theorist, and, like his countrymen, supine."

Extract from the Report of LIEUTENANT BROTHERTON (an officer employed to obtain intelligence in the north of Portugal), *February 11, 1809. Head-quarters of Romana's army.*

"From the totally defenceless state in which the two northern provinces are left, it will require at least eight days (I speak from authority) to prepare anything like adequate means of defence."

SECTION II.—LUSITANIAN LEGION.

LORD CASTLEREAGH to SIR J. CRADOCK, *November 27, 1808.*

"Its formation was proposed by the Chevalier de Souza."—"The pay, allowances, and clothing were settled by the Chevalier de Souza; the former regulated, as I understood, upon the scale of increased pay, which the provisional government of Oporto had adopted for all the troops they were in progress of levying."

SIR J. CRADOCK to LORD CASTLEREAGH, *December 24, 1808.*

"I have considerable doubt if ever they" (the legion) "can be incorporated, with effect and conciliation, with the body of the Portuguese army."—"They are viewed with extreme jealousy by the regency; and the commanding officers of the Portuguese battalion resisted, universally, the allowing of volunteers from their regiments to enter into the legion."

SIR J. CRADOCK to LORD CASTLEREAGH, *January 19, 1809.*

"The Lusitanian legion continues to give considerable uneasiness, from its peculiar state, under present circumstances."

CAPTAIN MORGAN, *Lusitanian legion, to SIR J. CRADOCK, January 19, 1809.*

"Should a retreat be adopted, Sir Robert would not retire to Oporto. It is the government of a mob, of which he has had too much experience."

SECTION III.—PORTUGUESE ARMY.

SIR J. CRADOCK to SIR J. MOORE, December 9, 1808.

"I am sorry to state that I find, as far as my limited observation reaches, the Portuguese army, and every other military concern, *in the worst possible state.*"

SIR J. CRADOCK to MR. VILLIERS December, 18, 1809.

"I am sure that the state of the Portuguese army is quite misunderstood in England; and that a reliance is placed upon it for the defence of the country that is entirely without foundation. Their" (Portuguese) "ministers will avow this to you after ten minutes' conversation."—"Even of the reduced numbers of their men enrolled (not amounting to 20,000 at the very highest computation), to make anything out of them, it is necessary to recur to first principles, and give them *officers, arms, clothing, accoutrements, horses, etc.*; and I need not say that money is wanting to effect this: and the ministers positively declare that they have none; and that no collection of their forces can take place, much less a movement to the frontier, without a supply."—"M. Forjas, secretary to the government, in answer to a strong question from me, stated that *their army have not in possession 10,000 firelocks fit for use.*"

SIR J. CRADOCK to LORD CASTLEREAGH, December 24, 1808.

"I am exerting myself to bring to account 'the supposed Portuguese army.'"—"Your lordship will perceive that I talk of the regulars as if it were a regular force; but I should be guilty of a deceit, that might lead to bad consequences, if I did not fairly state that I conceive them to be of no moment at this time."

SIR J. CRADOCK to MR. VILLIERS, January 8, 1809.

"I am ready to go to the utmost verge of prudence; but Mr. Frere, when he talks of Portuguese troops and arrangements, really (as I believe you will allow) *fait bâtir les châteaux.*"

MAJOR-GENERAL COTTON to SIR J. CRADOCK, April 7, 1809.

"I yesterday inspected the Portuguese cavalry."—"This cavalry is unformed, and totally unfit for any sort of service."

SIR J. CRADOCK to LORD CASTLEREAGH, February 12.

"It appears that a report has reached your lordship that a conscription for horses in this country had been attended with great effect, and that above 3000 had been collected. It is, indeed, a matter of serious concern that such *serious misrepresentations* should be transmitted; for it is a well-known fact that many of the Portuguese regiments of cavalry are without horses; and, if I am to pursue the subject, their *battalions of infantry are one-half without arms or clothing!* But the total want of all means of regulations for subsistence forms so deplorable a view, in the event of co-operation, that the result, in my opinion, cannot be attended with success. *It is, however, but justice to say, that the disposition of the Portuguese seems well-inclined and faithful to the common cause; and that a very efficient soldiery may be formed under more favourable circumstances.*"

SIR J. CRADOCK to MR. FRERE, February 27, 1809.

"I fear that your excellency is led to entertain a more favourable notion of the efficacy of the Portuguese army than, in any shape, it is entitled. In short, my opinion is that they want everything that constitutes a respectable force, except about 10,000 English arms. I believe they have no others. Many of their *cavalry regiments are without horses, without swords, pistols, etc.* Their *battalions are not clothed; and as to subsistence, they live at free quarters upon the villages where they are stationed.* To take the field with effect, or an assurance of food, seems to me out of the question. Since the first moment of my arrival, I wished to procure the advance of a small Portuguese force to Alcantara; but it has been impossible. It is a matter of serious lamentation that such misrepresentations of the Portuguese force should go home, or reach your excellency."

SIR J. CRADOCK to LORD CASTLEREAGH, April 3.

"No reliance whatever can be placed upon the Portuguese troops in their present state. *If I said that the whole were ready to mutiny or revolt, I believe I speak General Beresford's sentiments. They will not be commanded by their own officers, and they do just as they please.*"

SECTION IV.—CONDUCT OF THE REGENCY—TREATMENT OF FRENCH PRISONERS.

SIR J. CRADOCK to MR. VILLIERS, January 26, 1809.

"I have hitherto directed that these prisoners should be subsisted at our charge, but I have no authority in this measure; they are *in a most deplorable state, and really are a disgrace to all concerned.*"

SIR J. CRADOCK to MR. VILLIERS, *February 5, 1809.*

"It is absolutely necessary that the regency should give in an answer about the French prisoners. The whole is an unauthorised heavy charge, for which I give my warrant; and I see no end to the case: and, added to this, *their situation is a reflection upon humanity.*"

SECTION V.—NEGLECT, DUPLICITY, AND TIMIDITY.

COLONEL KEMMIS to SIR J. CRADOCK, *Elvas, December 17.*

"Lalippe, on which the very existence of Elvas depends, has not been supplied with provisions as I have been taught to expect."

COLONEL KEMMIS to SIR J. CRADOCK, *Elvas, December 25.*

"The great importance of this fort" (Lalippe) "is well known to the Portuguese; and, therefore, they are jealous, notwithstanding the miserable condition of their troops, and total incapacity to defend the fort, if attacked."

SIR J. CRADOCK to MR. VILLIERS, *December 26, 1808.*

"The promises and apparently satisfactory language of the Portuguese government are, in my opinion, by no means sufficient to meet the case. I want to see some steps actually taken before my mind is decided that the nation will defend itself."—"Indeed I am told, on good authority, that the government are afraid to allow the people to arm."—"The moment I see any materials to work upon, it will be my most anxious duty to give every effect," etc.—"But under the present inactivity and indifference it is," etc.

Reports of Colonel Donkin, quarter-master-general, to SIR J. CRADOCK, March 21.

"I cannot, however, order officers of my department to check this irregularity" (forcing quarters) "when it originates solely in the neglect of the Portuguese civil magistrates; for troops will not obey orders, which expose them wantonly to great privations."

SIR J. CRADOCK to MR. VILLIERS, *March 25.*

"I have repeatedly urged this subject" (quarters of troops) "to the regency, in the strongest manner, but, as you perceive, without effect."

SIR J. CRADOCK to LORD CASTLEREAGH, *March 17.*

"Whatever suits the momentary purpose, upon the most superficial view, seems to be the guide in the Portuguese councils. Ultimate objects, which, in the course of things, must arrive, are never brought into the calculation."

CRADOCK to BERKELEY, *January 17.*

"The regency seem to decline giving any specific directions relative to the guns in fort St. Julian and the river batteries, and, *above all, not to write anything*; but they are very willing, to acquiesce in anything we shall do, only anxious that, on a future day, *it shall appear to be our act, not theirs.*"

ADMIRAL BERKELEY to SIR J. CRADOCK, *February 19, 1809.*

"I imagine Mr. Villiers has transmitted a copy of the extraordinary note sent him by the regency; in which they complain of the conduct of the artillery officer who dismantled the Bugio fort, and intimate their intention of sending for all the guns and powder from fort St. Julian; and add many particulars, as novel as they are suspicious."—"Whether the language of this note arises from duplicity, or any other cause, it is equally to be resisted; and, therefore, stated some facts which may be retorted upon them, and which will not place their conduct in the *most favourable point of view towards their own sovereign or Great Britain.*"

Extract from an official note, drawn up by SIR JOHN CRADOCK, Lisbon,
February 20, 1809.

"It was told me, two or three times, by Mr. Villiers, that M. Forjas, or some other member of the regency, had expressed extreme solicitude about the forts on the Tagus, etc."—"I always urged Mr. Villiers to get from M. Forjas, or any other member, a declaration of what they wished, that we might exactly conform to it; for they seem to be anxious to go beyond what we should venture to propose. Mr. Villiers, after some time, told me that the Portuguese government were *unwilling to put down anything upon paper*, or give any specific instruction; but they would willingly leave all the arrangement to us."—"After the above statement, which I declare, upon my honour, to be the accurate description of what has passed, I must express my surprise, and even indignation, at the protest now made by the regency; and when it is considered that the Bugio fort is often inaccessible for a week together, this part of their complaint is shameful to the highest degree. *Their general object is, however, to be distinguished.*"

SECTION VI.—ANARCHY IN PORTUGAL.

SIR J. CRADOCK to LORD CASTLEREAGH, *February 20, 1809.*

"*Northern parts.*—It may be difficult to manage any money transactions in Oporto, for the populace in that town have been suffered to become the masters; and it was by an exchange of public and private property that the commissariat money has been lately secured."

SIR J. CRADOCK to MR. VILLIERS, *February, 1809.*

"To gratify a mob, the other day, at Oporto, a guard of the 60th regiment was given up, and disarmed by Baron Eben."

CAPTAIN BROTHERTON to SIR J. CRADOCK, *March 17, 1809, Lamego.*

"Considering the tumults, and the state of effervescence of the public mind, and the blind fury of the populace—it will neither be useful nor safe to remain amongst them."

SIR J. CRADOCK to LORD CASTLEREAGH, *March 26, 1809*

"The disposition is good, but the proceedings are those of an ungovernable mob, *exposed to the evil effects of designing persons.*"—"I confine myself to the north of Portugal and Oporto, for the same excesses have not taken place at this side the Douro; but the principles of insubordination, I should fear, would prevail."—"If the confusion and anarchy that prevail at Oporto will permit a defence some exertion may be expected."—"Ammunition has been abundantly supplied, *but no quantity would meet the consumption expended in the manner it has been in the Tras os Montes:* an attempt to save which was, I believe, the occasion of Bernadim Friere's death."

SIR J. CRADOCK to LORD CASTLEREAGH, *March 30, 1809.*

"The anarchy that prevails at Oporto must, I fear, render every exertion unavailable for defence; and such is the ungovernable spirit of the populace, *that it is very difficult to say what part they might take if the proceedings of the British did not suit their views.*"

SIR J. CRADOCK to MR. FRERE, *March 29.*

"Oporto and all its concerns, with the bishop, nominally, at its head, is in the hands of a wild ungovernable populace, *that has already committed the most cruel excesses.* I fear the same spirit exists in what is called the Portuguese army."

SIR J. CRADOCK to MR. FRERE, *January 29, Lisbon.*

"Without a British force in Lisbon, the authority of the regency would pass away, and the scenes of Oporto would take place here."

Report of CAPTAIN LAWSON, January 30, Lisbon.

"Last night, my servant returning from the post-office was attacked by a party of Portuguese pikemen, headed by one of their own officers, who severely wounded the horse in two places, and slightly in several places, and obliged him, the servant, to put himself under the protection of the guard at the town-major's office, to save his own life: the outrage was committed without the slightest provocation."

GENERAL LANGWERTH to SIR J. CRADOCK, *February 1, Lisbon.*

"The orderly, with the general orders, on his way to St. Julian's, was stopped by a Portuguese sergeant and twenty men with pikes; the sergeant forced the orderly to deliver the letter containing the orders, broke it open, read the contents, and returned the enclosed receipt; the same guard stopped Captain Clives, Royal Grenadier army, and Lieutenants Beurman and Liners; these officers were in full uniform."

GENERAL SONTAG's *Official Report, February 3.*

"Mr. Usher, deputy purveyor, and Mr. M'Carty, interpreter, both British subjects, arrived this day from Oporto, went to Moore's Hotel, where they were arrested and brought to the minister of police. Mr. Usher was in his British uniform."

SIR J. CRADOCK to LORD CASTLEREAGH, *January 30.*

"Some unpleasant incidents have lately occurred on the part of the Portuguese armed inhabitants of Lisbon towards British individuals, but I cannot persuade myself that they have proceeded from any fixed evil disposition."—"The British army has not, in any instance, departed from the most regular discipline, and continues to manifest the greatest temper and moderation."—"The excesses on the part of the Portuguese commence by an *uncontrolled pursuit, without any authority from the police, after all persons whom they please to call Frenchmen*, and, in their indiscriminate career, they often attack every foreigner, and will not even abstain from those in our service. Those persons seek refuge

in our guard-room, and though the guards and patrols have positive orders not to interfere under any pretext with the police, yet it is very difficult to smother the feelings of humanity when the wretched persons are flying from a furious and unauthorised rabble. Mr. Villiers has exerted himself much with the regency to check this disorder, and prevent the assembly of armed persons in the streets at night, who beat drums and discharge their pieces at all hours: but as yet his remonstrances have not had the desired effect."

MR. VILLIERS to SIR J. CRADOCK, *January 30.*

"Finding the people beat to arms, and paraded about the streets after dark, on the very evening after the regency had settled that these irregularities should be restrained, I addressed the ministers of the home department upon the subject; and as other excesses came to my knowledge, I followed up my complaint."

SIR J. CRADOCK to MR. VILLIERS, *January 30.*

"I have, this morning, been taking such steps as appear necessary to secure our general situation from insult; and, at the same time, if practicable, not to manifest a distrust in the Portuguese nation, which, if sanctioned from head-quarters, would destroy any reason for our being here. I can assure you, every officer and soldier has received impressions that it is most difficult to act against, but I am determined to persevere in keeping the army from aggression to the last moment."

SIR J. CRADOCK to MR. VILLIERS, *February.*

"When I reflect upon the frequent declarations of individual members of the regency, that they cannot control the populace; that there are at least 70,000 armed inhabitants in Lisbon; that the regency dare not let them parade (their exercise has been at an end for some time, and the regency, at this moment, say they cannot look upon themselves as responsible), it appears impossible that I should depart from the reasoning of my own mind, to meet a sensation of *I do not know whom*, and lessen the proper military appearance of our only guard. We are now beyond the power of surprise or insult, and I cannot, as my own individual act, alter the state of things. However, I never am devoted to my own way of thinking, and if you recommend the measure (the political reasoning, when the enemy is at a distance, may always be weighed against military regulation), or see any good consequences, I will immediately order back the guns to their former station in the artillery barracks."

MARSHAL BERESFORD to SIR J. CRADOCK, *April 7, Santarem.*

"I, this morning, met no less than *three expresses*, communicating to me the horrible state of mutiny, for I can call it no less, in which the troops everywhere are, and the inhabitants are in equal insubordination, and they encourage each other. I find two or three regiments have marched away (to what they call to oppose the enemy) where they pleased, in despite of their officers and generals, who are entirely commanded by them. This you will say is a pleasing state to be in; however, we must face it, and I hope for the best result, and I am sanguine enough to look for such. Colonel Tranter will shortly have a pretty strong corps, if the regiments continue thus to volunteer for him."

MR. VILLIERS to SIR J. CRADOCK, *February 15.*

"I should almost doubt whether the British subjects could be left in safety in Lisbon."

SECTION VII.—FALSE INTELLIGENCE.

SIR J. CRADOCK to COLONEL DONKIN.

"I believe it is certain that we cannot depend upon the activity of the Portuguese government upon this head" (intelligence), "either as to promptitude or security."

COLONEL DONKIN to SIR J. CRADOCK, *January 1, Lisbon.*

"Experience has shown how utterly impossible it is to get correct intelligence here; an enemy may be within four or five days' march of this city before it is known, unless he attacks on the very line our troops occupy."

SIR J. CRADOCK to MR. FRERE, *March 29.*

"It is singular how imperfectly all intelligence, though of such important events, reaches this, and we have not had, for two days, any account from Oporto."

SIR J. CRADOCK to LORD CASTLEREAGH, *March 26.*

"Yesterday the Chevalier de Castro stated, from authority, a movement on the part of the French, quite different from a direct report from the junta of Badajos."

No. XXXIII

SECTION I.—EXTRACTS FROM SIR J. CRADOCK'S INSTRUCTIONS.

LORD CASTLEREAGH to SIR J. CRADOCK, *December 24, 1808.*

"Upon the actual approach of the enemy towards Lisbon, in such strength as may render further resistance ineffectual, you will take care that measures be taken, in due time, for withdrawing both the British army and *such Portuguese as may be desirous of accompanying it.*"—"The British admiral will be directed to take effectual measures, with your assistance, for depriving the enemy of all the resources, more especially those of a naval description, which the Tagus contains. Everything of a naval and military description, that cannot be brought away, must, in the last extremity, be destroyed."

LORD CASTLEREAGH to SIR J. CRADOCK, *November 25, 1808.*

"I am to signify his majesty's pleasure that, in the event of any application being made to you from the regency of Portugal, on the subject of the occupation of the fortresses with his majesty's troops, you do *refer the subject to Mr. Villiers*, who has received instruction, etc., and you will not make any alteration as to the mode prescribed for garrisoning the fortresses *without directions from Mr. Villiers.*"

LORD CASTLEREAGH to GENERAL SHERBROOKE, *January 12, 1809.*

"Sir J. Cradock will be directed to comply with any requisition you may make *for horses for your guns*, or any other species of supply the service may require."

Extracts from certain queries put to LORD CASTLEREAGH by SIR J. CRADOCK, with the answers thereto.

QUERY.

"What may be the situation of my command?"

"In what light is the force under my command to be considered?" etc., etc.

"May any Portuguese battalions be levied for English pay?"

"If any want of provisions should appear in Portugal, may I be allowed to adopt measures, in conjunction with the regency, for obtaining a supply?"

"If any Portuguese corps can be got into such forwardness as to be fit to enter Spain, and they should be willing to join Sir J. Moore, are they to be put on British pay?"

ANSWER.

"The relations with the government of Portugal will be arranged when Mr. Villiers arrives."

"Ditto."

"The taking Portuguese battalions into English pay will, if adopted, be managed *through Mr. Villiers.*"

"The general measures of supplying Portugal with provisions will be *referred to Mr. Villiers.*"

"*Mr. Villiers will be authorised to enter upon the discussion of this subject with the regency, availing himself of your assistance,*" etc.

No. XXXIV.—JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM SIR J. CRADOCK'S PAPERS.

WANT OF SUPPLIES.

COMMISSARY RAWLINGS, *deputy-commissary-general, to CRADOCK, December 22.*

"Your excellency is aware of the exhausted state of this country. The difficulties encountered by Sir J. Moore were of the most serious nature, even before the sources of supply were so much drained as they now are."

WANT OF TRANSPORT AND SUPPLIES.

SIR J. CRADOCK to LORD CASTLEREAGH, *17th March.*

"I have been obliged to send officers of the artillery and commissariat department to Gibraltar to attempt the supply of horses from the Barbary coast; and, such is our actual want, that the proper movement of even the force we have is nearly impracticable."

SIR J. CRADOCK to LORD CASTLEREAGH, *March 26.*

"The means of transport are so confined that I must not expose any to loss; and the artillery must be preserved with the greatest care, for I cannot equip more than two brigades of six-pounders, and one light brigade of three-pounders, the latter being of a very inferior description."

COMMISSARY RAWLINGS to SIR J. CRADOCK, *March 20.*

"The precarious tenure of this country by British troops has hitherto precluded the possibility of establishing such an advantageous contract for the public as, in more permanent cases, might necessarily be expected: we have literally been supplied from hand to mouth."

COLONEL ROBE to SIR J. CRADOCK, *March 20.*

"It is necessary for me to add that every exertion has been made to supply the artillery with horses and mules by the deputy-commissary-general, but, from the exhausted state of the country, and the demands upon it for the Portuguese army, no more than two brigades have been furnished with those animals, and these are much too slight for the general service of the artillery."

SIR J. CRADOCK to MR. VILLIERS, *March 20.*

"From the first moment of my arrival in this country, unceasing exertion has been employed to purchase and procure them" (horses and mules) "at any price or by any means, but the adequate supply for even the former small number of the British army could not be obtained. I have also made repeated representations to England."

SIR J. CRADOCK to MR. FRERE, *March 29.*

"I want 800 horses and mules for the common conveyance of provision and the equipment of the artillery."

COMMISSARY RAWLINGS to SIR J. CRADOCK, *April 9.*

"Some of the persons employed to provide cattle for the troops have returned without effecting their mission. This disappointment must be attributed to the movements of the enemy in the north, from whence our supply has hitherto been obtained."

SIR J. CRADOCK to MARSHAL BERESFORD, *Caldas, April 18.*

"You can form no adequate idea of the difficulty to procure supplies. The subject of forage for the cavalry keeps me in alarm without intermission, and there is no certainty for a single day. The country appears to be without the ability to furnish straw."—"In short, the supply is just for the day, and barely sufficient."—"I have begged of Mr. Villiers to desire the regency would send a person, in special authority, to this district to furnish supplies, if they are to be found. I shall act like the French, and make requisition, with this difference, that we are ready to pay for everything to the utmost."

CRADOCK to BERKELEY, *Caldas, April 17.*

"Such is the dearth of supply in this part of the country, and even in advance as far as we could go, that, unless victuallers are sent (or some other arrangement to the same effect) to Peniché and St. Martinho Bay, we cannot maintain our position. We cannot advance, for all our means of transport are gone back to Lisbon; and even in a retreat the cavalry could not be fed."—"If there is insurmountable risk in sending the victuallers to Peniché, I request your declaration to this effect; for I must, in that case, retire the army to a station close to Lisbon, to be fed from thence."

CRADOCK to VILLIERS, *April 17.*

"This letter is plainly to state that, unless some victuallers are sent, even at risk, to Peniché and St. Martinho Bay, we cannot maintain our position, and must retreat."—"If the articles are in the country we must have them, and all ceremony must be dispensed with. The enemy would have them without paying for them: we must equally exact and pay."

CRADOCK to BERESFORD, *April 20.*

"All the recommendations you point out upon the assistance to be derived from the coast have been long since acted upon to the utmost of my exertions; but the difficulties started by the admiral and the commissary were so great, that I cannot say I have much dependence upon immediate aid."

GENERAL COTTON to CRADOCK, *April 21.*

"I wish I could once see the cavalry together: but I much fear that before that happens they will be very much out of condition. The 14th have already fallen off very much, owing to the frequent want of straw and their being supplied with Indian corn, which they will not eat: added to these circumstances, the commissary obliges the cavalry to carry (on the horses) three days' forage."

G. HARRISON to MR. RAWLINGS, *Treasury Chambers, February 25.*

"It having been represented to the lords commissioners of his majesty's treasury that the troops at Lisbon are experiencing the greatest hardships from the want of shoes, I have received their lordships' commands," etc., etc.

SIR J. CRADOCK to COLONEL WILLOUGHBY GORDON, *military secretary, February 11.*

"I trust that the importance of the subject will plead my excuse for thus repeating my representations of the wretched state of the clothing and the greatcoats in particular of his majesty's troops serving in this country."

LORD CASTLEREAGH to GENERAL SHERBROOKE, *January 12.*

"Sir John Cradock will be directed to comply with any requisition you make for horses for your guns, or any other species of supply the service may, from time to time, require."

No. XXXV.

SECTION I.—MISCELLANEOUS.

CAPTAIN MORGAN, *Lusitanian Legion, to SIR J. CRADOCK, Lisbon, January 19, 1809.*

"I left Sir R. Wilson very critically situated, occupying a pass on the Agueda. Sir Robert is wholly unsupported; he has been advised by Colonel Guard to fall back; and, from his information, he imagines that Sir John Moore is withdrawing his troops through Galicia. On the other hand, he has received *positive orders from you** to defend the frontiers, and pressing letters to that effect from the Bishop of Oporto."

SIR J. CRADOCK to LORD CASTLEREAGH, *30th January.*

"The regency and the Bishop of Oporto are not pleased at his" (Sir R. Wilson) "quitting the bounds of Portugal."

DITTO to DITTO, *6th March.*

"I had a letter from Sir R. Wilson, from Ciudad Rodrigo (24th February), wherein he says, that many French prisoners state their expectations that the French army will retire behind the Ebro. Sir Robert's own persuasion is *that the French will retire altogether from Spain.*"

SECTION II.

GENERAL CAMERON to SIR J. CRADOCK, *Lamego, January 16.*

"I have collected several detachments of recovered men belonging to Sir J. Moore's army, whom I found scattered in all directions, without necessaries, and some of them committing every possible excess that could render the name of a British soldier odious to the nation."

SIR J. CRADOCK to ADMIRAL BERKLEY, *March 16.*

"There are about 120 persons confined on board the *Rosina*, whose conduct has rendered them a disgrace to the army."

SECTION III.

CAPTAIN BROTHERTON to SIR J. CRADOCK, *Coimbra, Head-quarters of Romana, February 21.*

"The Marquis of Romana seems to think that the serious *intention of the enemy is to retreat from Galicia* altogether; and even that he will find much difficulty in *extricating himself*. I must confess that *I am not so sanguine*; and I judge that the present retrograde movement from the Minho is more with an intent to advance from Orense on Montalegre, and in this direction."

CAPTAIN BROTHERTON to SIR J. CRADOCK, *March.*

"I still believe Romana had intention to fall back on Chaves, and join himself to the Portuguese army. *His troops had been much vexed by the unfriendly conduct of the Portuguese*, and a cordial co-operation was not to be expected; but that he should separate altogether is what I neither could expect nor conceive. He suddenly informed me of his resolution to retreat to Bragança. He had just received a letter from Sylveira, which he also answered to that effect, and which created no small surprise, as a plan of operation had already been settled between them."

MAJOR VICTOR ARENTCHILD to SIR J. CRADOCK, *Oporto, March 16.*

"General Sylveira has only one regiment with him; and his conduct has been such, that the people have lost all confidence in him, and consider him a traitor. I merely mention this to your excellency as the opinion of the public. . . . The Marquis of Romana's army is retreating to Orres, in Galicia, and is, I fear, in a wretched condition. The opinion entertained of him is far from good."

* Note by Sir J. Cradock. This is not a correct statement, but quite the contrary; it must have been the bishop.

MR. COMMISSARY BOYS to MR. COMMISSARY RAWLINGS, *Almeida, January 13.*

"Sir John Moore, with his army, was retreating, and 10,000 men had deserted from the Marquis of Romana, and were pillaging the country."

LORD CASTLEREAGH to MARSHAL BERESFORD, *February 15.*

"The Portuguese government having solicited that a British general officer should be appointed to command and organize their army, his majesty has been graciously pleased to select you for this important trust."

MR. CANNING to MR. FRERE, *January 23.*

"No effort appears to have been made by the Spaniards, either to second the British operations, or even to defend Ferrol, or save the naval means (whatever they may be) in that harbour."

No. XXXVI.—EXTRACTS FROM MR. FRERE'S CORRESPONDENCE.

(N.B. The Italics are not in the original.)

MR. FRERE to SIR JOHN CRADOCK, *Seville, March 14.*

"Our hope of offensive operations in Aragon is so much diminished by the defeat of General Reding, that I should much doubt whether any reinforcements, such as we could now send there, would enable us to attempt them with the prospect of a degree of success, such as might compensate for the inconvenience liable to arise from the derangement of calculations which may have been formed at home."—"On the other hand, there seems reason to apprehend, that General Soult may at last, in consequence of the resistance he has experienced, *desist from his unaccountable project, of entering Portugal and occupying Galicia.* His return would, of course, add largely to the disposable and movable force of the enemy, while it would not increase ours by any force of that description."—"In this view of the subject there are two points for the employment of a British force; one, *by making a push to drive the enemy from Salamanca, and the neighbouring towns,* while the Asturians should make an effort on their side to occupy Leon and Astorga, thus re-establishing the communications between the northern and southern provinces. The other, by moving from the bridge of Alcantara along the northern bank of the Tagus, in concert with General Cuesta, to attack and *drive the enemy from Toledo, and consequently from Madrid.* In the latter alternative, the British could have the advantage of acting in concert with a disciplined army. They would, likewise, have immediately the start of any reinforcement from the army of General Soult, supposing him to abandon Galicia for the sake of moving southward; and these movements would not tend in the same degree to draw him from his present position, in which, for so many reasons, *it is desirable he should continue.* It would, I should imagine, at the same time, cover Andalusia, and the points of the greatest interest and importance in this province, more effectually than the same force employed in any other manner."

MR. FRERE to SIR JOHN CRADOCK, *March 22.*

"The 40th remains here: under the present circumstances I could not think of their removal, unless to meet a British force from Elvas."

MR. FRERE to SIR A. WELLESLEY, *Seville, May 4.*

Extracted from Parliamentary Papers, 1810.

"As it was my object to obtain *a diversion in La Mancha as the price of co-operation* on your part, and the impression which they (the junta) received from Colonel Alava's report was, that your intention was, after defeating or driving Soult into Galicia, to come down upon Estremadura to attack General Victor, I was under some disadvantage, inasmuch as they imagined that the point which I wanted to make a condition was already conceded."

No. XXXVII.—EXTRACTS RELATIVE TO CADIZ.

SIR JOHN CRADOCK to MR. VILLIERS, *January 16.*

"The troops from England for Cadiz may or may not arrive, at least we may expect delay; but I think the subject of sending a force from this requires immediate deliberation and settlement. I am prepared to appropriate for this service any number that may be deemed proper under existing circumstances. It is only upon the political part of the subject I can have any hesitation, and whether the Spaniards will receive the force as they ought. The orders from England are to send it if the supreme junta shall make the requisition. The question is, whether we shall anticipate the demand or not?"

SIR JOHN CRADOCK to MR. FRERE, *January 29.*

"This measure (sending troops to Cadiz) is certainly one of considerable responsibility to those concerned; but upon its adoption Mr. Villiers, Admiral Berkeley, and myself, could not well hesitate, after the despatches that were communicated to us, as addressed to you, as well as those directed to ourselves, which placed Cadiz in so prominent a point of view, upon the unfavourable termination of the campaign in the north of Spain.—"The force in Portugal is weakened to a degree, especially in British regiments, that reduces it to almost nothing; but I may look to the arrival of the force of 5000 men, announced to be on their way; and if it is intended to maintain Portugal, it will be but fair to replace the present detachment from them."

SIR JOHN CRADOCK to GENERAL MACKENZIE, *March 9.*

"I yesterday received orders from his majesty's government to press, in the most expeditious manner, the immediate return of the forces under your command to the Tagus."

SIR JOHN CRADOCK to LORD CASTLEREAGH, *March 9.*

"Your lordship will find, by the present communication, that Major-General Mackenzie, at the express desire and advice of Mr. Frere, has actually left Cadiz with his whole force (the 40th regiment, from Seville, will be united), and proceeded to Tarragona, unless your lordship's orders may have overtaken Major-General Sherbrooke, who passed this port four days ago (without any communication). It may be presumed that he will follow the same course, upon the same motives that influenced General Mackenzie; and at present a new scene of operations is entered upon in that part of Spain."

No. XXXVIII.—NARRATIVE OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF MAJOR-GENERAL MACKENZIE'S DETACHMENT FROM LISBON TO CADIZ.

The detachment sailed from Lisbon on the 2nd of February, 1809, and arrived in Cadiz harbour on the 5th, at night. I immediately waited on Rear-Admiral Purvis, and from him I learnt there are some difficulties started by the Marquis Villel (the commissioner from the central junta, as well as a member of it) to our landing and occupying Cadiz. I then waited on Sir George Smith, on shore, where this intelligence was, in some degree, confirmed; but Sir George still expressed an expectation that the objections would be got over. These objections had been, it seems, but lately started. Next morning I saw Mr. Charles Stuart, who was acting under a diplomatic authority from Mr. Frere, and had a conference with him and Sir G. Smith, when I explained the nature of my orders, and it was determined to wait on the Marquis Villel. Mr. Stuart explained to the marquis that the object of my coming was to offer our assistance in the occupation and defence of Cadiz, and in making the necessary preparations for such an event; that we were only the advance of a larger corps coming from England, to act from this side against the common enemy. The marquis hesitated, and, after some speeches of compliment, said his authority did not extend so far; that he must wait for instructions from the central government; and, in the mean time, said he could not permit our landing at Port St. Mary's. This I declined, as an unnecessary loss of time, and contrary to my orders; and it was then agreed to wait for the decision of the central junta from Seville. I thereupon wrote to Mr. Frere, and sent him a copy of my instructions from Sir J. Cradock.

The decision of the junta was received on the 8th; and I received a letter from Mr. Frere, which put an end, for the moment, to our hope of occupying Cadiz. The reason assigned by the junta was of the most flimsy nature, viz. "That they had ordered two of their own battalions to occupy Cadiz;" a measure which was evidently the thought of the moment, and a mere pretext.

Although I cannot presume to judge of the evil political consequences which might arise from such a measure, as alluded to in Mr. Frere's, yet I had every reason to believe, as well from the opinion of Sir G. Smith, as of all others conversant in the sentiments of the people of Cadiz, that our landing and occupying the place would be a very popular measure. Mr. Frere's letter expressed a great desire that we should not appear to have made an offer that was refused; and was desirous that we should not immediately depart, but that we should land and occupy the cantonments offered to us. On consulting with Sir G. Smith and Mr. Stuart, this appeared to be contrary to the grounds on which we had set out; but as we were equally desirous not to appear at variance with the Spanish government, we agreed to submit to Mr. Frere, whether it would not be better for the troops to remain for the present in their transports, as we had already stated that we were in expectation of being immediately joined by a force from England, the scene of whose operations was uncertain; and our remaining in the harbour under this idea would answer every purpose Mr. Frere proposed by a landing.

I had, besides, some military objections to a landing; for, without reckoning the uncertainty of an embarkation from Port St. Mary's, I knew how dilatory all proceedings are in Spain. That if we were once placed in the scattered cantonments proposed, and we had a sudden call for embarkation, above a week would have been lost in effecting it; and from former experience, the effects of a certain disorder would, probably, have thrown a large number of our men into the hospitals. It is further evident that the detachment could not have been re-embarked without some stain on the national honour. It must have very soon marched into the interior of Spain, and thus have involved our country in its support, without having obtained the object for which it was detached,—the possession of Cadiz. On all these considerations I thought it right to defer landing, until we should hear further from Mr. Frere, to whom both Mr. Stuart and myself wrote, and I presume he was satisfied with the reasons given. In all these proceedings I had the cordial approbation of Sir G. Smith, who, notwithstanding unfavourable appearances, seemed sanguine to the last that the point would be carried. I therefore wrote to Sir J. Cradock, by the *Hope* brig, on the 9th, stating what had been done, and that we should remain in Cadiz harbour (with Mr. Frere's approbation) until we received orders from him or from England. And I wrote, by the same conveyance, to the same purport, to Lord Castlereagh.

On the 15th, we had the misfortune to lose Sir G. Smith, who died that morning; and on the 18th, I received a letter from Mr. Frere, in which he seemed to have altered his opinion as to the propriety of our occupying Cadiz, and stating that the only mode which appeared to him likely to succeed in obtaining the possession was my leaving a small part of my detachment there, and proceeding with the rest to join Cuesta's army; that, as a force was expected from England for the same purpose for which my detachment came, what I left behind might follow me on their arrival.

I confess I was much disappointed at this proposal, the whole of my detachment not appearing more than equal to the charge of the place; but as it had not been laid before the junta, I considered it my duty to state the objections to it, as they arose out of my instructions. Such a measure would have completely committed our country, in a particular point, in the interior, with a very small detachment, a thing which I was instructed his majesty's ministers wished to avoid; whilst the admittance of a handful of men could not be considered as any possession of the place where there were about 4000 volunteers well drilled. I therefore submitted to Mr. Frere, to defer the proposition of this measure until the arrival of troops from England, which might be looked for, according to his statement, every hour. We should be, then, in a condition to take possession of Cadiz effectually, and advance, in some point, respectably, towards the enemy. If, however, Mr. Frere should determine to bring forward the measure immediately, I further informed him, that I was ready to move on, as soon as we could obtain the necessary equipments.

Mr. Stuart embarked on the 21st, on board the *Ambuscade*, on a secret mission. On the 22nd, and before I received any further communication from Mr. Frere, a popular commotion broke out suddenly at Cadiz, in consequence of the measure which the junta had adopted, of marching some of their own troops into the town, as the reason (or rather pretext) for declining to receive us. The regiment now on its march in was composed of Poles, Swiss, and other foreigners, deserters from the French army, whose entrance the people were determined to resist. The utmost care was taken to prevent our officers or soldiers from taking any part whatever on this occasion; and, except in some cases where I was applied to by the governor, for the interference of some British officers, as mediators, we steered perfectly clear. It was now evident that the people were favourable to our landing and occupying the town, for it was frequently called for during the tumult.

As soon as I could safely send an account of this commotion to Mr. Frere, I despatched an officer (Captain Kelly, assistant quarter-master-general) with a detail. The *Disguard* sailed on the 24th, for Lisbon and England, by which ship I informed Sir J. Cradock, as well as Lord Castlereagh, of all that had passed since my last; and just at that time Colonel Roche arrived from Seville. He was sent down, by Mr. Frere, to Cadiz, in consequence of Mr. Stuart's mission. I had till now expected Mr. Frere's decision, on the subject of the proposition in his letter of the 18th; but as so much time had elapsed, I conjectured he might have dropped it for the present; and conceiving that something favourable to the object of my mission might be drawn from the present state of things, I had a full conversation with Colonel Roche on the subject. He told me the junta were dissatisfied with our not having accepted the cantonments offered to us; but he did not seem to think our views unattainable, particularly at the present moment. I asked his opinion as to the practicability of General Stuart's being admitted, with two of my three battalions, into Cadiz, if I advanced with the third to Seville to join the 40th regiment, thus making an equal division of my force. Colonel Roche was of opinion that this would be acceded to; and I, therefore, despatched him, as soon as possible, with a proposal to this effect to Mr. Frere. Though two battalions could not be considered a sufficient garrison, yet,

from the evident popularity of our troops, and the speedy expectation of a reinforcement from England, I thought it would be extremely proper to make the trial. It also appeared to me that by advancing to Seville I should not run much risk of involving those two battalions in any operations before the arrival of General Sherbrooke, which could embarrass him in the execution of the orders he might bring from home.

This proposition certainly exceeded anything authorised by my instructions, but, I trust, the circumstances will be found to warrant it.

After Colonel Roche's departure for Seville, Captain Kelly returned from thence, on the 26th, with a verbal confidential message from Mr. Frere, stating that Marshal Soult was marching from Galicia into Portugal, in three columns, and that Mr. Frere would write to me by express, or by next post. On the 27th, I received this promised letter, enclosing the copy of an intercepted letter from Soult to Joseph Buonaparte; and Mr. Frere expresses his opinion that my detachment may now be more useful in Portugal than at Cadiz.

Knowing, as I did before I left Lisbon, that every proper step was taking for evacuating Portugal, in case of necessity, and that nothing else than succours from home could enable Sir John Cradock to hold his ground there, it became more than ever necessary to ascertain whether his army will be received into Cadiz, in case of the evacuation of Portugal. In case the present negotiation succeeded, I had arranged with Admiral Purvis to send a frigate with the intelligence to Lisbon immediately. If it failed, everything was in readiness to sail with the detachment thither; for, although the assistance I should bring might not be sufficient of itself to make any alteration in the resolutions already taken, yet, if reinforcements arrived from England, we should be a welcome addition.

On the morning of the 2nd of March I received a letter from Colonel Roche, dated February 28, stating that my proposition had not yet been decided on, but that it would be taken into consideration that day. He expressed much apprehension of a party in the French interest.

The morning of the 3rd having passed without any letter from Mr. Frere or Colonel Roche, as I had been assured by the latter I should receive, at furthest by the post of that morning, I despatched another courier, dreading some accident. In the afternoon, however, I received a long and important letter from Mr. Frere, from which I concluded the negotiation had failed (although he did not say so in terms); and a letter I received shortly afterwards from Colonel Roche confirmed this failure. Mr. Frere's letter entered very minutely into the state of the Spanish and French armies; mentioned the failure of Soult's attempt to penetrate into Portugal by the Minho, and the improbability of his persisting in it, from the position of the Spanish army, assisted by the Portuguese. He then points out, in strong terms, the essential use my detachment could be of at Tarragona, in giving spirit and vigour to the cause in that country, where it is most in need of support.

As the return of my detachment to Portugal, except in the case of resisting the enemy, would not have a favourable appearance; and the proceeding to Tarragona would so evidently show our determination to support the general cause, and leave the Spanish government without an excuse afterwards for refusing to admit our troops into Cadiz, it was my intention to have complied with Mr. Frere's solicitations, as the employment of my detachment on the sea-coast would easily admit of its being afterwards withdrawn, without committing any other British force for its support; and the motives urged by Mr. Frere were so strong, that I scarcely thought myself vindicable in hesitating to comply.

I accordingly wrote on the night of the 3rd March to this effect to Mr. Frere, Sir J. Cradock, and Lord Castlereagh. But on the 4th, in the evening, Captain Cooke, of the Coldstream Guards, arrived from England with despatches for General Sherbrooke, who had not yet arrived. Captain Cooke came in the *Eclair* brig of war, and had stopped at Lisbon, which he left again on the evening of the 2nd, and brought me a message to the following purport from Sir J. Cradock, viz. "That he was determined to defend Portugal to the utmost of his power; that in this situation he considered my detachment as the choice part of his little army; that the enemy were actually on the borders, though there was not yet any intelligence of their having entered Portugal; and that unless some extraordinary circumstance, of which he could form no idea, prevented it, he should look for my immediate return to Lisbon."

This order, of course, put an end to all further deliberation. The idea of proceeding to Tarragona was abandoned. I wrote to this effect to Mr. Frere, and embarked at midnight on the 4th. Contrary winds detained in Cadiz harbour the whole of the 5th; but on the 6th the fleet sailed, and arrived in the Tagus on the 12th.

I trust, in the whole of these proceedings, in a very intricate and delicate situation, an honest and anxious desire has been evinced on my part, to accomplish the object of my mission: the failure of which, I am persuaded, will be found to arise from the apprehensions and disunion of the central junta, and not from the inclinations of the people of Cadiz.

(Signed)

J. R. MACKENZIE,

Major-general.

Lisbon, March 13, 1809.

No. XXXIX.—COMMUNICATIONS WITH MINISTERS—NEGLECT OF PORTUGAL.

SECTION I.

MR. CANNING to MR. VILLIERS, *January 24, 1809*:

"You are aware, by my despatch, No. 4, of the 24th of December, enclosing copies, etc., etc., that, in the event of the evacuation of Portugal, by the force under Sir J. Cradock's command, an event rendered the more probable by the transactions in Galicia."

LORD CASTLEREAGH to SIR J. CRADOCK, *February 6*.

"Should you be compelled to evacuate Portugal," etc.

ADMIRAL BERKELEY to SIR J. CRADOCK, *February 6*.

"The period of the British army's stay in this place appearing to draw near to its conclusion."

SECTION II.

SIR J. CRADOCK to COLONEL GUARD, *January 3*.

"The garrisons of Elvas and Almeida have engaged my most serious thoughts."—"But, as they were occupied by the command of his majesty's ministers, and we remain without any fresh instructions under the present critical circumstances."

SIR J. CRADOCK to GENERAL RICHARD STEWART, *January 10*.

"I feel what a risk I run in thus leaving Lisbon defenceless, but I obey the original orders of government."

SIR J. CRADOCK to GENERAL RICHARD STEWART, *January 12*.

"We are still without any instructions whatever from England."

SIR J. CRADOCK to CAPTAIN HALKET, *January 13*.

"Though we cannot say when it may take place, and it shall be deferred to the last moment, in hopes of hearing from England, yet I believe it to be our duty to prepare everything for the event of an embarkation."

SIR J. CRADOCK to ADMIRAL BERKELEY, *January 17*.

"I lament to say that there appears nothing before us but the resolution to remain in Portugal to the last proper moment, awaiting orders from England."

SIR J. CRADOCK to MR. FRERE, *January 19*.

"With our force inferior and ill-composed, as it is, we are determined to remain to the last proper moment, in the hopes of receiving orders from England."

SIR J. CRADOCK to ADMIRAL BERKELEY, *February 9*.

"The orders we daily expect may be either for immediate embarkation, or to maintain Portugal."—"I am persuaded we have but this one wish, which is to act for the credit of our country, and endeavour, under the want of all information, to discover what may be the object of the government we serve."

SIR J. CRADOCK to GENERAL MACKENZIE, *February 26*.

"Since the 14th of January we are without instructions from England."

SECTION III.

SIR J. CRADOCK to MR. VILLIERS, *January 15*.

"What appears to be my duty is to keep the fixed idea that the army in Portugal should remain to the last moment."

SIR J. CRADOCK to MR. VILLIERS, *February 15*.

"I am just favoured with your communication about the dangerous effects likely to be produced by the measure of withdrawing the troops from Lisbon to occupy the military position of Oyeras, Passo d'Arcos, etc. I fear (though the contrary was intended to be expressly stated) that you are led into the idea that the position in question was solely intended for embarkation. My avowed design was to await (in a military post suited to our force) orders from England, or to defend ourselves with reasonable prospect of success against any attempt from the enemy, or even from thence to make a forward movement, should future events lead to such a proceeding."—"What I must object to is to take up a false position, say Alcantara, or other heights about the town, which would only defend a certain position and leave the remainder to the power of the enemy, one which we must leave upon his approach and seek another bearing the appearance of flight and yet not securing our retreat. The whole having announced the intention to defend Lisbon, but

giving up that idea upon the appearance of the enemy: for positions liable to be turned on every side cannot be persevered in by an inferior force."—"My political reasoning upon this subject was contained in the letter I wrote the admiral, and, I must repeat, it continues unweakened," etc.—"After your strong representations of this morning, I shall certainly not persevere; and, as there is no instant necessity for the measure, will await the progress of events."

No. XL.

STATE AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE FORCE UNDER SIR J. CRADOCK, JANUARY 6, 1809,
EXTRACTED FROM THE HEAD-QUARTER STATES.

Garrisons.	Artillery.	Disposable for the Field.		
		Cavalry.	Infantry.	
Santarem	68	190	2,492	General Richard Stewart.
Saccavem	97	169	1450	General M'Kenzie.
Lisbon	...	518	...	General Cotton.
	236	attached to different battalions.
	<u>165</u>	<u>879</u>	<u>4178</u>	
			Total ...	5222
Almeida	38	...	1440	
Elvas	33	...	679	
Oporto	379	
Lisbon and Forts	<u>315</u>	<u>...</u>	<u>2682</u>	
Total	<u>481</u>	<u>...</u>	<u>5170</u>	

General total 10,392
Note.—Every man capable of bearing arms is included in this state.

Order of Battle, April 6, 1809, Ouldas.

Sir J. Cradock, commander-in-chief.

Major-General Sherbrooke, second in command.

Artillery.—Major-General Howarth.

Cavalry.—Major-General Cotton.

Under arms.

First line, five brigades	...	10,418
Second line, three brigades	...	3810
Reserve, one brigade	...	1858
Cavalry	...	800

Total ... 16,886

State of the Army under SIR A. WELLESLEY, April 22.

Head-quarters, Leiria.

	Under arms.			Sick.	Command.	Effective.
Artillery	441	88	408	937
Cavalry	1439	13	418	1870
Infantry	16,539	1937	314	18,790
Total	18,419	2038	1140	21,597

	6lb.	3lb.	Howitzers.	Total.
Number of guns	20	6	4	30

State of SIR A. WELLESLEY'S Army, May 1, 1809.

Head-quarters, Coimbra.

Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Waggon train.	Total rank and file.
1413	3074	19,510	230	24,227
			Deduct { Hospital	2357
			{ Absent	1217

Total present under arms ... 20,653

State of SIR A. WELLESLEY'S Army, June 25, 1809.

Artillery.	Cavalry.	Head-quarters, Abrantes.	Infantry.	Waggon train.	Total rank and file.
1586	...	3736	...	21,267	...
				406	26,995
				Deduct {	Hospital 3246
					Commands 1396

30 pieces of artillery.

Total present under arms ... 22,353

State of SIR A. WELLESLEY'S Army, July 25, 1809.

Artillery.	Cavalry.	Head-quarters, Talavera.	Infantry.	Waggon train.	Total rank and file.
1584	...	3734	...	29,694	...
				398	35,410
				Deduct {	Hospital 4827
					Commands 1596

30 pieces of artillery.

Total present under arms ... 28,987
Deduct regiments on march ... 9141

Real present under arms ... 19,846

State of SIR A. WELLESLEY'S Army, September 25, 1809.

Artillery.	Cavalry.	Head-quarters, Badajoz.	Infantry.	Waggon train.	Total rank and file.
1947	...	4273	...	28,409	...
In Hospital	389	35,018
Command and missing	8827		
			2526	Total absent	11,353
				Total present under arms	23,765

No XLI.

SECTION I.

MARSHAL BERESFORD to SIR J. CRADOCK.

SIR,

March 29, 1809.

I have the honour to annex your excellency a copy of requisitions, from their excellencies the government of this kingdom, for the speedy succouring of Oporto, which your excellency is informed is so immediately in danger, from the approach of the French army, whose advance posts are now within four leagues of that town.

I annex, for the information of your excellency, the instructions which, under the existing circumstances, I had issued to the general commanding beyond the Douro; but the object of which has been frustrated by events, at once unfortunate and melancholy.

The corps of Brigadier-General Victoria, consisting of two battalions of the line, which, on the appearance of the urgent danger in the north, I had directed to cross the Douro, are now in Oporto, as is the second battalion of the Lusitanian legion, part of the regiment of Valenca, and some regiments of militia; but I cannot get any return of the troops there, though, I understand, the number is considerable; and to this must be added a considerable number of ordenanza from without, and the armed population which will, I understand, amount to 8000 or 10,000 men, and of the arms come from England 3000 stand that were sent to the army north of the Douro, are probably now in Oporto, with a proportion of ammunition. I have thought it right to give this statement of the actual state of things at Oporto, as far as I can get information of, that your excellency may be aware of it; and it is with regret that I farther add that there prevails, in the town, the greatest anarchy and insubordination,—and that, in short, by the latest accounts, the populace entirely govern the law, civil and military.

Upon the subject of marching a British force to Oporto under the actual circumstances, and under the consideration of the various points from which the enemy at present threaten us, we had yesterday a full discussion, and which renders it unnecessary for me now to recapitulate the several reasons which induced me to submit to your excellency's consideration the propriety of advancing the British force to Leiria, to be then pushed on to Oporto, or otherwise, as the information from different parts may render expedient. But my principal reason was that, as there appeared an intention of co-operation (of which, however, there is no certainty) between the Marshals Victor and Soult, it would be most desirable, by either driving back or overcoming one before the other could give his co-

operating aid to defeat their plan, and if we should, or not, be able. To do this would be merely a matter of calculation of time, as, supposing, on our arrival at Leiria, Oporto offered a prospect of holding out till we could reach it, and that Victor continued his southern pursuit of Cuesta, he would get so distant from us, as to permit the army, pushing from Leiria to Oporto, without apprehension from the army of Victor, who, by the time he could possibly hear of our movement, would be in the Sierra Morena, which would clearly show that his principal object, and from which he did not seem willing to be diverted, was either the destruction of Cuesta's army, to enter more securely into Portugal, or to push to Seville; but, at all events, he would be too distant to give us apprehensions of any surprise upon this capital, as we have daily information of his movements, and which would enable us, wherever we were in Portugal, even to reach it before him. If, however, the final co-operation of these two armies is intended for the conquest of this kingdom, and that Soult does not think that of his army from Galicia and that from Salamanca sufficient, then he will satisfy himself, until Victor is ready to act with him, in the possession of the country beyond the Douro, where he will refresh and rest his troops, re-equip them, and otherwise provide them, to be ready for the projected co-operation,—whilst the army from Salamanca will, probably, satisfy itself with the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and act and wait in conjunction with Soult, both waiting till Victor has settled his present objects, and then all co-operating.

It is for your excellency to judge, under the actual circumstances, of the propriety of this movement towards Oporto, not only for the British troops, but, also, of those of the allies, as, by my instructions, I must consider you as commanding the allied armies; and the time is now certainly arrived, for what efforts they can make being combined: undoubtedly, their being employed in separate projects will cause each falling separately, and without advantage to the common cause.

I would, however, certainly, under present circumstances, be unwilling to send the few troops I could spare from the army, between the Tagus and the Mondego, to Oporto, as, unsupported by British, I fear it would be losing so many men, that on a future occasion, with such support, may weigh in the scale; and indeed, the very insubordinate state of the troops, of which I have just received a second report and complaint, from General Miranda, would render it highly unwise to send them to a town in the state that Oporto now is, where the best disposed troops, except a great body went there, if they were not debauched to insubordination, would be borne down by the multitude; and it is to be feared that whatever Portuguese troops enter the town will fall with it, as the temper of the people prevents the possibility of even any preparations for retreat, in case of misfortune, to the outward and very extended lines of defence. Having stated so much, I must leave the question to your excellency, etc.

I have the honour, etc.

W. C. BERESFORD.

SIR J. CRADOCK to MARSHAL BERESFORD.

DEAR SIR,

Lisbon, March 29, 1809.

I have the honour to acknowledge, at the earliest moment, your excellency's letter of this evening, conveying a copy of the request from the regency, etc., that I should move the British troops to the succour of Oporto, at this moment menaced, etc.

Upon a subject of such importance, I experience considerable relief, that the general view of approaching circumstances has been, for a length of time, within my reflection, and that all my reasoning (whatever it may be) has been transmitted to the government in England, and the part I am now called upon to act is simply but the execution of those measures I have long thought it prudent to pursue, and which the present critical and involved state of affairs seem to confirm and give no reason to alter in any part.

It has always appeared, to my judgment, that the enemy has but two objects to attain in this kingdom. The possession of Lisbon and Oporto, I believe it to be universally admitted, and I need not point out to your discrimination the infinitely superior value of the former above the latter. There are such positive local disadvantages attached to Oporto, independent of its remote position, that no military disposition, in which a small English army is to bear part, can apply. It pains me, therefore, to decline obedience to an application from so high an authority as the governors of the kingdom. It may be their duty to make the request, though I much doubt if their judgment goes along with it; but it appears to be mine not to transfer the small British force, under my command, (totally inadequate to separate objects,) from the defence of this part of the kingdom to the very doubtful succour of a place 200 miles distant, and by a movement to the north with this professed view, feel myself engaged in a war that leaves Lisbon and the Tagus defenceless and unprotected from the inroads of other bodies of the enemy that may be prepared to combine in a general invasion.

I shall hasten, therefore, from all general observation, to the exact case before us, and state, in a concise manner, our actual situation, leaving to your judgment, how far it may

be necessary to communicate some particulars that relate to the British army, and lay before the governors and your excellency the best ideas I can form for the employment of the British auxiliary force, in conjunction with the Portuguese, for the ultimate protection of Portugal under the pressure of all existing circumstances.

It may be granted that the enemy, with a force from 17,000 to 20,000, a considerable portion of which (it is said 5000) is cavalry, is directly menacing Oporto, there is reason to believe that the division at Salamanca, estimated from 9000 to 12,000, with a powerful force of artillery, is moving to Ciudad Rodrigo, either for the investment of that place, or to act in conjunction with General Soult, by an advance into the Upper Beira. In the present view it is necessary to state, with the weight it so well deserves, that the united forces of Generals Victor and Sebastiani are, apparently, pursuing General Cuesta, just retiring before them; but it appears that a part of the enemies had diverged to Merida, and had spread alarm and dismay, even to the town of Badajos, on the frontiers of Portugal, from whence, to the heights of Almeida, or the opposite of Lisbon, through the whole of the Alemtejo: except the weak garrison of Elvas, there is nothing to interrupt the immediate passage.

Against such an attempt from the enemy I derive no security from the contiguity of General Cuesta's army; for, besides the general disinclination he has so strongly marked to the British character, he has other objects to pursue, and his principal wish is to gain time for the organization of his own force. To a person so well acquainted with Portugal, and the circumstances of the present hour, as your excellency is, it is quite superfluous to enter upon further details, etc. It is only required to lay before you, in confidence, the exact amount of the British forces, as the real point upon which the whole subject depends: I may state it at 12,000 effective men, to take the field, if the necessary garrison to maintain Lisbon in some tranquillity and retain possession of the maritime forts is left. It may be increased to 14,000, if these points are risked; but even to gain the advantage of numbers to so limited a force, I cannot recommend the measure, for the anarchy that prevails at Oporto, and would be, perhaps, worse at Lisbon, is more to be dreaded than the presence of an enemy, and may render all exertion useless. The necessary means of transport for our army, notwithstanding every effort, from the earliest moment, are quite inadequate, and not more than two and a half brigades of artillery (15 guns) can be equipped. To adventure upon an advance to Oporto, 200 miles from Lisbon, when the very object is, perhaps, at this moment lost, seems to be a point only to gratify the good feelings of every soldier, but quite opposed to the sober dictates of the understanding, and the ultimate view of things. If the British army sets out with the declared object to succour Oporto, or expel the enemy, the impression on the public mind is the same; nothing but the accomplishment will suit the English character; and I confess that the best reasoning of my judgment, upon every public and private principle, for the credit of the British army, and the hope of any effectual assistance from the Portuguese nation is, that the British troops should never make one retrograde step: from that moment I will date the extinction of all Portuguese aid, military as well as civil. The British army, from its description, may disregard this common occurrence in war, but I am persuaded, in the present state of the Portuguese army, and with the sentiments of suspicion now alive, all explanation would be vain, and that it would be left to the small body of English, alone, to sustain the whole future conflict.

I have now only to state what my inferior judgment points out; and as the arduous situation of command is allotted to me, I must try to execute to the best of my power. I shall remain faithful to my first principles, and persevere in the defence of Lisbon and the Tagus. I invite the co-operation of the Portuguese force, and, under your guidance and auspicious control, I look to a very powerful accession of strength. I am convinced nothing will be done by them in detached parties or in any isolated situation. They will acquire confidence by number, and emulation will arise, a rapid discipline will ensue from their connection with us, and the whole, animated by your presence, will give the best promise of success. Until we have consulted again, I shall not say whether our general position should be at Lumiar, extending the whole right to Saccavem, or any other station more in advance. At this moment I have only to express the indispensable circumstance of some fixed basis, upon which the allied army will act, and by our united strength try to counteract the peculiar disadvantages that attend the defence of Portugal from positions that cannot be properly embraced, and always leave some part exposed.

Allow me to conclude, with the solemn expression of my own conviction, that nothing will give so much chance of a prosperous result to the arduous scene in which we are engaged (either as to reality or view) as the knowledge to the enemy, that, before he conquers Portugal, he must defeat an army of some magnitude, determined to fight him, and awaiting his approach, unbroken and not exposed to the danger of a false movement. Such a conquest cannot be an easy one, and must prove, if he pursue it, a powerful diversion in favour of Spain.

It will gain me the sincerest pleasure, etc.

JOHN CRADOCK.

No. XLII.—JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF
MARSHAL SOULT.CAPTAIN BROTHERTON to COLONEL DONKIN, *Quarter-master-general, Lamego,*
March 17, 1809.

"The enemy has, however, on this occasion, practised those arts which Frenchmen are so expert in—circulating proclamations and insidiously abandoning, for a moment, their usual system of terror, plunder, and desolation, *treating the inhabitants with feigned moderation and kindness.*"

SIR J. CRADOCK to LORD CASTLEREAGH, *April 20, 1809, Caldas.*

"It also appears to be the object of the enemy to ingratiate himself with the populace of Oporto, *by even feeding them* and granting other indulgences."—"It is also said that a Portuguese legion, to consist of *six thousand* men, has been instituted."

Extract from SOULT'S Official Report of the Expedition to Portugal.

"Dans, quinze jours. Les villes de *Braga, Oporto, Bacellos, Viana, Villa de Conde, Povoia de Barcim, Feira, et Ovar*, eurent exprimé leurs vœux, des nombreuses deputations se rendirent à Oporto pour les remettre au Maréchal Soult et le prier de le faire parvenir à l'empereur. Des adresses qui renfermaient l'expression de ce vœu étaient couverts de plus de trente mille signatures du clergé, de la noblesse, des négocians, et du peuple."—"Pendant son séjour à Oporto. Le M. Soult fit des proclamations et rendit divers arrêtés sur l'administration et la police de la province *Entre Minho e Douro*. Il nomma au nom de l'empereur aux emplois qui étaient vacans et apres avoir reçu la manifestation politique des habitants il organisa la garde national ainsi qu'une légion de cinq bataillons."—"Aucune contribution ne fût frappé les fonds trouvés dans les caisses royales suffirent pour fournir aux besoins des troupes, *et même pour donner de secours aux Portugais.*"

Intercepted letter of the DUKE OF DALMATIA'S to GENERAL LA MARTINIERE,
Orense, March 2, 1809.

"J'ai reçu votre lettre du 27 Jan. j'éprouve toutes les dispositions que vous avez faites je vous ai déjà dit que vous pouviez disposer pour le service des fonds qui sont dans la caisse royale de Tuy. Faites entrer en ville le plus de subsistance que vous pourriez. Si de valence on vous tire de coups de canon envoyez leurs des bombes. Bientôt vous pourrez mettre les chevaux au vert, mais faites les garder. Dans les equipages qui sont à Tuy. Il y'a douze cent pair de souliers, de cuir pour un égal nombre et un peu de drap, vous pouvez en disposer pour votre troupe. Ralliez au dépôt général tout ce qui appartient au corps d'armée et qui étoit resté en arriere, ainsi vous auriez bientôt une petite armée qui se soutiendra d'elle même et faire la police dans le province dont vous devez tirer de quoi vivre, soignez bien les hospitaux et n'envoiez personne sur Ribidavia. J'espère que sous peu je vous aurai ouvert une autre communication, le province d'Orense est en très grande partie pacifié, je marche sur les débris du corps de Romana pour en finir avec eux, ils sont du côté de Monterey. Si apres cet expédition il y avoit encore en Gallice des troubles, je reviendrai avec toute mon armée pour les apaiser et alors malheur à ceux qui les auroient occasionné: *je veux la paix et la tranquillité, que les habitans se livrent aux travaux de la campagne, qu'ils soient protégés et que la troupe se conduise bien. Les mutins et les malintentionnés François et Espagnols, doivent être sévèrement punies.* Il faut de tems en tems des exemples. Je crois que vous pourriez correspondre avec moi par des gens du pays. Mais il faut bien leur payer ou leur promettre, qu'en arrivant pres de moi ils le seront généreusement et prendre de gages pour repondre de leur fidelité, donnez de vos nouvelles au Général Marchand. Pour le même moyen dite au Colonel l'Abbeville de bien mettre en état son artillerie.

"MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE."

No. XLIII.—SIR A. WELLESLEY to SIR J. CRADOCK.

Lisbon, April 23.

Mr. Villiers will have informed you of my arrival here yesterday, and of the concurrence of my opinion with that which you appear to entertain in respect to the further movements to the northward. I conclude that you will have determined to halt the army at Leiria. I think that, before any further steps are taken in respect to Soult, it would be desirable to consider the situation of Victor; how far he is enabled to make an attack upon Portugal, and the means of defence of the east of Portugal while the British will be to the northward, and, eventually, the means of defence of Lisbon and the Tagus, in case this attack should be made upon the country.

All these subjects must have been considered by you; and, I fear, in no very satisfactory light, as you appear to have moved to the northward unwillingly: and I should be glad to talk them over with you.

In order to consider of some of them, and to make various arrangements, which can be made only here, I have requested Marshal Beresford to come here, if he should not deem his absence from the Portuguese troops, in the present state, likely to be disadvantageous to the public service; and I have directed him to let you know whether he will come or not.

It might, probably, also be more agreeable and convenient to you to see me here than with the army; and if this should be the case, it would be a most convenient arrangement to me to meet you here. I beg, however, that you will consider this proposition only in a view to your own convenience and wishes. If you should, however, choose to come, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will bring with you the adjutant-general and quarter-master-general, the chief engineer and the commanding officer of the artillery, and the commissary.—Ever yours, etc., ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

N.B.—Some paragraphs of a private nature are omitted.

No. XLIV.

EXTRACTS OF A LETTER FROM SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY TO LORD CASTLEREAGH.

Lisbon, April 24, 1809.

"I arrived here on Saturday, and found that Sir John Cradock and General Beresford had moved up the country, to the northward, with the troops under their command respectively; the former to Leiria, and the latter to Thomar. Sir John Cradock, however, does not appear to have entertained any decided intention of moving forward; on the contrary, indeed, he appears, by his letters to Mr. Villiers, to have intended to go no further till he should hear that Victor's movements were decided, and, therefore, I consider affairs in this country to be exactly in the state in which, if I found them, it was the intention of the king's minister that I should assume the command; and, accordingly, I propose to assume it as soon as I shall communicate with Sir John Cradock. I have written to him, and to General Beresford, to apprize him that I conceive advantage will result from our meeting here, and I expect them both here as soon as possible. In respect to the enemy, Soult is still at Oporto, and he has not pushed his posts to the southward further than the river Vouga. He has nothing in Tras os Montes since the loss of Chaves, of which you have been most probably apprized; but he has some posts on the river Tamega, which divides that province from Minho, and it is supposed that he wishes to reserve for himself the option of retreating through Tras os Montes into Spain, if he should find it necessary. General Silveira, with a Portuguese corps, is in Tras os Montes, but I am not acquainted with its strength or its composition. General Lapisse, who commands the French corps, which, it was supposed, when I left England, was marching from Salamanca into Portugal, has turned off to his left, and has marched along the Portuguese frontier to Alcantara, where he crossed the Tagus, and thence he went to Merida, on the Guadiana, where he is in communication with, indeed I may say, part of the army of Victor; he has an advanced post at Montejo, nearer to the Portuguese frontier than Merida. Victor has continued at Medellin since the action with Cuesta; he is either fortifying that post, or making an entrenched camp there. Cuesta is at Llerena, collecting a force again, which, it is said, will soon be 25,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry, a part of them good troops; I know nothing of the Marquis de la Romana, or of anything to the northward of Portugal. I intend to move upon Soult, as soon as I can make some arrangements upon which I can depend for the defence of the Tagus, either to impede or delay Victor's progress, in case he should come in while I am absent. I should prefer an attack upon Victor, in concert with Cuesta, if Soult was not in possession of a fertile province of this kingdom and of the favourite town of Oporto, of which it is most desirable to deprive him; and if any operation upon Victor, connected with Cuesta's movements, did not require time to concert it, which may as well be employed in dislodging Soult from the north of Portugal. If Soult should go, I think it most advisable, for many reasons, in which I need not enter at present, to act upon the defensive in the north of Portugal, and to bring the British army to the eastern frontier. If the light brigade should not have left England, when you receive this letter, I trust that you will send them off without loss of time; and I request you to desire the officer commanding them to endeavour to get intelligence, as he will go along the coast, particularly at Aveiro and the mouth of the Mondego; and I wish that he should stop at the latter place for orders, if he should find that the British army is engaged in operations to the northward, and if he should not already have received orders at Aveiro. The 23rd dragoons might also receive

directions to a similar purport. The hussars, I conclude, have sailed before this time. We are much in want of craft here; now that we are going to carry on an operation to the northward constant convoys will be necessary, and the admiral does not appear to have the means in his power of supplying all that is required of him. The 24th regiment arrived this day, etc., etc.

(Signed)

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

No. XLV.

*Letter from SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY to LORD CASTLEREAGH.**Abrantes, June 22, 1809.*

MY LORD,

When I wrote to you last I was in hopes that I should have marched before this time, but the money is not yet arrived. Things are in their progress as they were when I wrote on the 17th. The French are continuing their retreat. Sebastiani has fallen back towards Toledo, and Venagas has advanced, and Cuesta had his head-quarters at Truxillo, on the 19th. I am apprehensive that you will think I have delayed my march unnecessarily since my arrival upon the Tagus. But it was, and is, quite impossible to move without money. Not only were the officers and soldiers in the greatest distress, and the want of money the cause of many of the disorders of which I have had occasion to complain; but we can no longer obtain the supplies of the country, or command its resources for the transport of our own supplies either by land or by water. Besides this, the army required rest, after their expedition to the frontiers of Galicia, and shoes, and to be furnished up in different ways; and I was well aware that, if necessity had not obliged me to halt at the present moment, I should have been compelled to make a longer halt some time hence. To all this add, that, for some time after I came here, I believed that the French were retiring (as appears by my letters to your lordship), and that I should have no opportunity of striking a blow against them, even if I could have marched. I hope that you will attend to my requisitions for money; not only am I in want, but the Portuguese government, to whom Mr. Villiers says that we owe £125,000. I repeat, that we must have £200,000 a month, from England, till I write you that I can do without it; in which sum I include £40,000 a month for the Portuguese government, to pay for 20,000 men. If the Portuguese government are to receive a larger sum from Great Britain, the sum to be sent to Portugal must be proportionably increased. Besides this, money must be sent to pay the Portuguese debt and our debts in Portugal. There are, besides, debts of Sir John Moore's army still due in Spain, which I am called upon to pay. In short, we must have £125,000, and £200,000 a month, reckoning from the beginning of May, etc.

(Signed)

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

No. XLVI.

*Letter from LORD WELLINGTON to the MARQUIS WELLESLEY.**Badajos, October 30, 1809.*

MY LORD,

I have had the honour of receiving your excellency's despatch (marked I.), of the 17th instant, containing a copy of your note to M. de Garay, of the 8th of September, and a copy of his note, in answer to your excellency, of the 3rd of October.

I am not surprised that M. de Garay should endeavour to attribute to the irregularities of the English commissariat the deficiencies of supplies and means of transport experienced by the British army in its late service in Spain; I am not disposed to justify the English commissariat where they deserve blame; but I must think it but justice to them to declare that the British army is indebted to their exertions for the scanty supplies it receives.

From some of the statements contained in M. de Garay's note it would appear that the British army had suffered no distress during the late service; others have a tendency to prove that great distress was suffered, at a very early period, by both armies; particularly the quotation of a letter from General Cuesta, of the 1st of August, in answer to a complaint which I am supposed to have made, that the Spanish troops and *their prisoners* were better supplied than the British army. The answer to all these statements is a reference to the fact that the army suffered great distress for want of provisions, forage, and means of equipment; and, although that distress might have been aggravated, it could not have been occasioned by the inexperience or irregularity of the English commissariat.

I know nothing of the orders which M. de Garay states were sent by the government to the different provincial juntas, to provide provisions and means of transport for the British army on its passage through the different towns in the provinces. If such orders were sent, it was obvious that the central junta, as a government, have no power or influence over the provincial juntas and magistrates, to whom their orders were addressed, as they produced no effect; and the supplies, such as they were, were procured only by the requisitions and exertions of the English commissaries. But it is obvious, from M. de

Garay's account of these orders, that the central junta had taken a very erroneous view of the operations to be carried on by the army, and of the provision to be made for the troops while engaged in those operations. The government provided, by their orders, for the troops only while on their passage through the towns; relying upon their immediate success, and making no provision for the collection of one body, of not less than 50,000 men, even for one day. At the same time that they were guilty of this unpardonable omission, which paralyzed all our efforts, they rendered that success doubtful, by countermanding the orders given to General Venegas by General Cuesta, and thus exposing the combined armies to a general action with the enemy's concentrated force. The effect of their orders will appear more fully in the following detail:—

As soon as the line of my operations in Spain was decided, I sent a commissary to Ciudad Rodrigo, to endeavour to procure mules to attend the army, in concert with Don Lozano des Torres, that city and its neighbourhood being the places in which the army commanded by the late Sir John Moore had been most largely supplied. M. de Garay expresses the astonishment of the government that the British army should have entered Spain unprovided with the means of transport, notwithstanding that a few paragraphs preceding this expression of astonishment, he informs your excellency, in the name of the government, that they had given orders to the provincial juntas of Badajos and Castile (at Ciudad Rodrigo) and the magistrates, to provide and supply us with the means which, of course, they must have been aware that we should require. No army can carry on its operations if unprovided with means of transport; and the British army was, from circumstances, particularly in want at that moment.

The means of transport commonly used in Portugal are carts, drawn by bullocks, which are unable, without great distress, to move more than 12 miles in a day, a distance much shorter than that which the state of the country in which the army was to carry on operations in Spain, and the nature of the country, would oblige the army to march. The number of carts which we had been able to bring from Portugal was not sufficient to draw our ammunition, and there were none to carry provisions.

Having failed in procuring, at Ciudad Rodrigo and in the neighbourhood, the means of transport which I required, I wrote to General O'Donaghue, on the 16th of July, a letter, in which, after stating our wants and the failure of the country in supplying them, I gave notice that if they were not supplied I should discontinue my co-operation with General Cuesta, after I should have performed my part in the first operation which we had concerted, viz., the removal of the enemy from the Alberche; and, if not supplied as I required, I should eventually withdraw from Spain altogether. From this letter of the 16th July, it will appear that I called for the supplies, and gave notice that I should withdraw from Spain if they were not furnished, not only long previous to the retreat across the Tagus of the 4th of August, but even previous to the commencement of the operations of the campaign.

Notwithstanding that this letter of the 16th of July was communicated to the central junta, both by Mr. Frere and General Cuesta, the British army has, to this day, received no assistance of this description from Spain, excepting 20 carts, which joined at Merida, ten on the 30th of August, and ten on the 2nd of September; and about 300 mules of about 500 which were hired at Bejar, and joined at a subsequent period. None of the mules stated to have been hired and despatched to the army from Seville, or by Igea or Cevallos, or the two brigades of 40 each, or the horses, have ever joined the British army; and I conclude that they are with the Spanish army of Estremadura, as are the remainder of the (100) ten brigades of carts which were intended and are marked for the British army. But none of these mules or carts, supposing them to have been sent from Seville for our use, reached Estremadura till after the 21st of August, the day on which, after five weeks' notice, I was obliged to separate from the Spanish army.

It is not true, therefore, that my resolution to withdraw from Spain, as then carried into execution, was "sudden," or ought to have surprised the government: nor does it appear to have been perilous from what has since appeared in this part of Spain.

I ought, probably, on the 16th of July, to have determined to suspend all operations till the army should be supplied with the means required; but having, on the 11th of July, settled with General Cuesta a plan of operations to be carried into execution by the armies under the command of General Venegas, General Cuesta, and myself, respectively, I did not think it proper to disappoint General Cuesta. I believed that General Venegas would have carried into execution that part of the plan of operations allotted to his army, although I was afterwards disappointed in that expectation; and I preferred that the British army should suffer inconvenience than that General Venegas's corps should be exposed alone to the attack of the enemy; and, above all, I was induced to hope that I should be supplied.

Accordingly, I marched, on the 18th of July, from Plasencia, the soldiers carrying on their backs their provisions to the 21st, on which day a junction was formed with General Cuesta's army; and, from that day to the 24th of August, the troops or their horses did

not receive one regular ration. The irregularity and deficiency, both in quality and quantity, were so great that I considered it a matter of justice to the troops to remit to them, during that period, half of the sum usually stopped from their pay for rations.

The forage for the horses was picked up for them by their riders wherever they could find it, and was generally wheat or rye, which are considered unwholesome food; and the consequence was that, exclusive of the loss by engaging with the enemy, the army lost, in the short period of five weeks, not less than 1500 horses.

I have no knowledge of what passed between General Cuesta and Don Lozano des Torres and the intendant of provisions of the Spanish army. I never saw the latter gentleman excepting twice; the first time on the 22nd of July, when he waited upon me to claim, for the Spanish army, 16,000 rations of bread which had been brought into Talavera, and had been sent to my quarters, and which were delivered over to him, notwithstanding that the British troops were in want; and the second time, on the 25th of July, when he waited upon me, also at Talavera, to desire that the ovens of that town might be delivered over for the use of the Spanish army, they having moved to St. Ollalla, and the British army being still at Talavera. This request, which was not complied with, is an example of the preference which was given to the British troops while they were in Spain.

The orders stated to have been given by the central to the provincial juntas and magistrates, were not more effectual in procuring provisions than in procuring means of transport. In the interval between the 15th and 21st of July, the British commissaries had made contracts with the magistrates in the different villages of the Vera de Plasencia, a country abounding in resources of every description, for the delivery at Talavera, on different days before the 24th of July, of 250,000 rations of provisions. These contracts were not performed; the British army was consequently unable to move in pursuit of the enemy when he retired on that day; and, I conclude, that the French army have since subsisted on these resources.

The British army never received any salt meat, nor any of the rice or other articles stated to have been sent from Seville for their use, excepting to make up the miserable ration by which the men were only prevented from starving during the period to which I have adverted; nor was it attended by the troop of biscuit bakers, nor did it enjoy any of the advantages of their labours, nor was the supposed magazine of 400,000 pounds of biscuit ever performed. These are notorious facts, which cannot be disputed, of the truth of which every officer and soldier in the army can bear testimony. I assure your excellency, that not only have the supplies furnished to the army under my command been paid for whenever the bills for them could be got in, but the old debts due to the inhabitants for supplies furnished to the army, under the command of Sir John Moore, have been discharged; and I have repeatedly desired the Spanish agents, and others acting with the army, and the different juntas with which I have communicated, to let the people know that all demands upon the British government, which could be substantiated, would be discharged.

I beg to refer your excellency to my despatches of the 21st of August, No. 12, for an account of the state of the magazine at Truxillo, on the 20th of August. Of the state of supplies and provisions at that period, Lieutenant-Colonel Walters had, by my desire, made an arrangement with the Spanish commissariat for the division of the magazine at Truxillo between the two armies; and he as well as I was satisfied with the principle and detail of that arrangement. But if the British army received only one-third of a ration on the 18th of August, and only one-half of a ration on the 19th, not of bread, but of flour; if the horses of the army received nothing; and if the state of the magazine at Truxillo was such, at that time, as to hold out no hope, not of improvement (for it was too late to wait for improvement), but of a full and regular supply of provisions and forage of all descriptions, I was justified in withdrawing from Spain. In point of fact, the magazine at Truxillo, which, under the arrangement made by Lieutenant-Colonel Waters, was to be the sole source of the supply to both armies, did not contain, on the 20th of August, a sufficiency to supply one day's demand upon it.

But it is said that M. de Calvo promised and engaged to supply the British army; upon which I have only to observe that I had trusted too long to the promises of the Spanish agents, and that I had particular reason for want of confidence in M. de Calvo; as, at the moment he was assuring me that the British army should have all the provisions the country could afford, in preference to, and to the exclusion of the Spanish army, I had in my possession an order from him (of which your excellency has a copy), addressed to the magistrates of Guadalupe, directing him to send to the head-quarters of the Spanish army provisions which a British commissary had ordered to be prepared and sent to the magazines at Truxillo, to be divided between both armies, in conformity to the agreement entered into with the Spanish commissaries by Lieutenant-Colonel Waters.

As the state of the magazine at Truxillo was the immediate cause (as far as the want of provisions went) of my withdrawing from Spain, I beg to observe to your excellency that I was not mistaken in my opinion of its insufficiency; as, if I am not misinformed,

General Equia's army suffered the greatest distress in the neighbourhood of Truxillo, even after that part of the country and the magazines had been relieved from the burthen of supporting the British army.

In respect to the conduct of the operations in Spain by the Spanish general officers, many things were done of which I did not approve; some contrary to my expectations, and some contrary to positive agreements.

M. de Garay has stated that the orders of the Marquis de Romana were framed in conformity with suggestions from Marshal Beresford; and thence he infers that the operations of that corps were approved of by me.

The Marquis de Romana was still at Coruña on the 5th, and I believe as late as the 9th of August; and the armies of Estramadura retired across the Tagus on the 4th of August. This reference to dates shows that there was, and could have been, no connection in the operations of those different armies. In fact, I knew nothing of the Marquis de Romana's operations; and till I heard, on the 3rd of August, that Marshal Ney's corps had passed through the mountains of Estramadura at Baños, and was at Naval Moral, I did not believe that that part of the enemy's army had quitted Astorga, or that the marquis was at liberty, or had it in his power to quit Galicia.

Marshal Beresford's corps was collected upon the frontiers of Portugal in the end of July, principally for the purpose of forming the troops; and it was hoped he would keep in check the enemy's corps under Soult, which was at Zamora, and threatened Portugal; that he would act as a corps of observation in that quarter, and on the left of the British army; and I particularly requested Marshal Beresford to attend to the Puerto de Perales. But I never intended, and never held out any hope to the Spanish officers that the corps under Marshal Beresford could effect any operation at that period of the campaign, and never was a party to any arrangement of an operation in which that corps was to be concerned.

In the cases in which measures were carried on in a manner of which I did not approve, or which I did not expect, or contrary to the positive agreement, those who acted contrary to my opinion may have been right; but still they acted in a manner of which they were aware I did not approve: and the assertion in the note, that the operations were carried on with my concurrence, is unfounded.

I expected, from the communications I had with General Cuesta, through Sir Robert Wilson and Colonel Roche, that the Puerto de Baños would have been effectually occupied and secured; and, at all events, that the troops appointed to guard that point, upon which I was aware that all the operations, nay, the security, of the army depended, would not have retired without firing a shot.

It was agreed, between General Cuesta and me, on the 11th of July, that General Venegas, who was under his command, should march by Trembleque, Ocaña, Puente Dueños, to Arganda, near Madrid; where he was to be on the 22nd and 23rd of July, when the combined armies should be at Talavera and Escola. This agreement was not performed, and the consequence of its non-performance (which had been foreseen) occurred, viz., that the combined armies were engaged with the enemy's concentrated force. I have heard that the cause of the non-performance of this agreement was that the central junta had countermanded the orders which General Venegas had received from General Cuesta; of which countermand they gave us no notice. I shall make no observation upon this proceeding, excepting that the plan of operations, as agreed upon with me, was not carried into execution, by General Venegas, in this instance.

It was agreed, by General Cuesta, on the 2nd of August, that when I marched against Soult on the 3rd, he would remain at Talavera. That agreement was broken when he withdrew from Talavera, in my opinion, without sufficient cause. And it is also my opinion that he ought not to have withdrawn, particularly considering that he had the charge of my hospital, without my consent. I do not conceive that if General Cuesta had remained at Talavera, it would have made any difference in the result of the campaign. When Soult added 34,000 to the numbers already opposed to the combined armies in Estramadura, the enemy was too strong for us; and it was necessary that we should retire across the Tagus. But if General Cuesta had held the post of Talavera, according to agreement, I should have been able to remove my hospital, or, at least, to know the exact situation of every individual left there; and I think that other disadvantages might have been avoided in the retreat.

When adverting to this part of the subject, I cannot avoid to observe upon the ambiguity of language used in the note respecting the assistance afforded by General Cuesta to remove the hospital from Talavera. That assistance amounted to four carts on the 4th of August, at Oropesa. In the subsequent removal of the wounded, and of the men subsequently taken sick, we had absolutely no assistance from the Spanish army or the country. We were obliged to lay down our ammunition, which was delivered over to the Spanish army, and to unload the treasure, and employ the carts in the removal of the wounded and sick. At Truxillo, in particular, assistance which could have been afforded

was withheld, on the 22nd and 23rd of August, M. de Calvo and Don Lozano des Torres being in the town.

In respect to the refusal to make movements recommended by me, I am of opinion that if General Bassecourt had been detached towards Plasencia on the 30th of July, when I recommended that movement, and if the troops had done their duty, Soult would have been stopped at the Tietar, at least for a sufficient length of time to enable me to secure the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz; and here again the hospital would have been saved.

He was not detached, however, till the 2nd; and then I understood, from M. de Garay's note, that it was General Cuesta's opinion that the movement was useless.

It could not have been considered as useless by General Cuesta on the 30th, because the proposition for making a detachment from the combined armies originated with himself on that day; and it could not have been considered as useless even on the morning of the 2nd, as, till the evening of that day, we did not receive intelligence of the arrival of Soult at Plasencia. A reference to the date of the period at which the general considered this detachment as useless would have been desirable.

I cannot account for the surprise stated to have been felt by General Cuesta upon finding the British army at Oropesa on the morning of the 4th of August. The army had left Talavera on the morning of the 3rd, and had marched to Oropesa, six leagues, or 24 miles, on that day; which I conceive a sufficient distance for a body of men which had been starving for many days before. The accounts received, on the evening of the 3rd, of the enemy's position at Naval Moral, and of his strength, and of General Cuesta's intended march on that evening, leaving my hospital to its fate, were sufficient to induce me to pause and consider our situation, and, at least, not to move before daylight on the 4th; shortly after which time, General Cuesta arrived at Oropesa.

Upon considering our situation at that time, it was evident to me that the combined armies must retire across the Tagus, and that every moment's delay must expose them to the risk of being cut off from their only remaining point of retreat. A battle, even if it had been successful, could not have improved our situation; two battles, or probably three, must have been fought and gained before our difficulties, resulting from the increased strength of the enemy in Estremadura, could be removed. I did not consider the British army, at least, equal to such an exertion at that moment. It is unnecessary to make any observation upon the Spanish army; but the occurrences at Arzobispo, a few days afterwards, showed that they were not equal to any great contest.

M. de Garay complains of the alteration in the line of our operations, and of the sudden changes in the direction of our marches, to which he attributes the deficiency of our supplies, which, in this part of the note, he is disposed to admit that the British army experienced. I know of but one alteration in the plan of operations and in the direction of the march, which was occasioned by the circumstances to which I have just referred.

When intelligence was first received of the arrival of the enemy at Plasencia, and of the retreat, without resistance, of the corps appointed to guard the Puerto de Baños, my intention was to move towards Plasencia, to attack the enemy's corps which had passed through the Puerto. That intention was altered, only when I heard of the number of which that corps consisted; and when I found that, by General Cuesta's movement from Talavera, the rear of the army was not secure, that the only retreat was liable to be cut off, and that the enemy had it in their power, and at their option, to join or to attack us in separate bodies.

It could not be attributed to me, that this large reinforcement was allowed to enter Estremadura, or that we had not earlier intelligence of their approach.

The Puerto de Baños was abandoned, without firing a shot, by the Spanish troops sent there to guard it; and the junta of Castile, if they knew of the collection of the enemy's troops at Salamanca, sent no notice of it; and no notice was in fact received, till the accounts arrived that the enemy had ordered rations at Fuente Noble and Los Santos; and they arrived on the following day. But when the enemy arrived at Naval Moral, in Estremadura, in such strength, and the post of Talavera was abandoned, the central junta will find it difficult to convince this country and the world that it was not expedient to alter the plan of our operations and the direction of our march.

But this alteration, instead of aggravating the deficiency of our supplies, ought to have alleviated our distresses, if any measures had been adopted at Seville to supply the British army, in consequence of my letter of the 16th July. The alteration was from the offensive to the defensive; the march was retrograde; and if any supplies had been prepared and sent, the army must have met them on the road, and must have received them sooner. Accordingly, we did meet supplies on the road, but they were for the Spanish army; and although our troops were starving at the time, they were forwarded, untouched, to their destination.

I have sent to Marshal Beresford a copy of that part of M. de Garay's note which refers to the supplies for the Portuguese army under his command, upon which he will

make his observations, which I propose to forward to your excellency. I shall here, therefore, only repeat that the want of magazines, and the apathy and disinclination of the magistrates and people in Spain to furnish supplies for the armies, even for payment, were the causes that the Portuguese army, as well as the British army, suffered great distress from want, while within the Spanish frontier.

Till the evils, of which I think I have reason to complain, are remedied, till I shall see magazines established for the supply of the armies, and a regular system adopted for keeping them filled, and an army, upon whose exertions I can depend, commanded by officers capable and willing to carry into execution the operations which may have been planned by mutual agreement, I cannot enter upon any system of co-operation with the Spanish armies. I do not think it necessary now to enter into any calculations to show the fallacy of M. de Garay's calculations of the relative numerical strength of the allies, and of the enemy, in the Peninsula; if the fallacy was not so great, as I am certain it is, I should be of the same opinion, respecting the expediency of co-operating with the Spanish troops. But if the British and the Portuguese armies should not actively co-operate with them, they will at least do them no injury; and if M. de Garay is not mistaken, as I believe he is, in his calculations of numbers; and if the Spanish armies are in the state of efficiency in which they are represented to be, and which they ought to be, to invite our co-operation, the deficiency of 36,000 men, which the British and Portuguese armies might add to their numbers, can be no objection to their undertaking, immediately, the operations which M. de Garay is of opinion would give to his countrymen the early possession of those blessings for which they are contending.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed)

WELLINGTON.

No. XLVII.

COPY OF A LETTER FROM GENERAL HILL TO SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

SIR, *Camp, August 17, 1809.*

I beg leave to report to you that the parties sent out by the officers of my division, yesterday, to procure forage, were, in more instances than one, opposed by the Spaniards. The following circumstances have been made known to me, and I take the liberty of repeating them for your excellency's information.

My servants were sent about three leagues on the Truxillo road, in order to get forage for me; and after gathering three mule loads, a party of Spanish soldiers, consisting of five or six, came up to them with their swords drawn, and obliged them to leave the corn they had collected. My servants told me, that the same party fired two shots towards other British men employed in getting forage. The assistant-commissary of my division, likewise, states to me, that the men he sent out for forage were fired at by the Spaniards.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed)

R. HILL,
Major-general.

Copy of a Letter from COLONEL STOPFORD to LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SHERBROOKE.

SIR, *Faraceijo, August 16, 1809.*

I beg leave to inform you that I have just received intimations of some Spaniards having fired at some of the guards, for taking some forage. As there is no forage given us by the commissary, I wish to know what I am to do, in order to get some for the horses.

(Signed)

E. STOPFORD,
Second brigade of guards.

LETTER FROM MAJOR-GENERAL F. PONSONBY TO COLONEL NAPIER.

After the very handsome manner in which you have mentioned my name, in your account of the battle of Talavera, it may appear extraordinary that I should trouble you with this letter; but my silence might be interpreted into the wish of taking praise to myself which I do not deserve.

The whole of your account of the charge made by General Anson's brigade is substantially correct; you have given the reason for it, and the result; but there are two points in the detail, which are inaccurate. The first affecting the German hussars; the other respecting myself.

The Germans, on the left of the 23rd, could not reach the French columns, from the impracticability of the ravine where they charged; this I ascertained, by personal observation, the following day; the obstacle was much less serious where the 23rd attacked, headed by General Anson and Colonel Seymour. The mountain torrent, which gradually decreased as it descended into the plain, was about thirty yards in front of the enemy, and the 23rd, though much broken in passing this obstacle, charged up to the columns, and was repulsed; no rally could be attempted; but the right squadron, under Captain Drake, having an easier passage of the ravine, and no French column immediately in front, passed through the intervals, and caused much confusion, which, together with the delay occasioned by the charge, prevented the masses of infantry which were in readiness on the French right flank, from joining in the general attack on our line.

You will perceive that this account, which I believe to be the exact truth, does not, in the slightest degree, affect the accuracy of your description of the movement; but if I am correct, it proves that the Germans were obliged to halt by an insuperable difficulty, and that I had no particular merit in the execution of the charge of the 23rd.

Believe me, very sincerely yours,

F. PONSONBY.

Malta, Dec. 30, 1829.

NOTE SUR LA SITUATION ACTUELLE DE L'ESPAGNE.

Roche fort, le Août, 1808.

1. Les événemens inattendus du Général Dupont sont une preuve de plus que le succès de la guerre dépend de la prudence, de la bonne conduite, et de l'expérience du général.

2. A la seule lecture du rapport du Colonel d'Affry, on avoit diviné tous les événemens; après une perte aussi considérable, on ne peut être surpris que le roi et les généraux jugent convenable de concentrer l'armée et d'évacuer Madrid.

En examinant avec attention, non les rapports mensongers des individus qui parlent dans leur sens, mais les faits tels qu'ils se sont passés, on est convaincu : premièrement, que le Général Castaños n'avoit pas plus de vingt-cinq mille hommes de troupe de ligne et de quinze mille paysans; un jour on sera à même de vérifier ce qui sera avancé ici. Secondement, que si le Général Dupont les eut attaqués ou se fût battu; avec tout son corps réuni, il les eut complètement défaits.

3. On pense qu'on aura tout le tems d'évacuer les blessés de Madrid qui arrivent à Aranda; il faudra occuper aussi longtems qu'il sera possible les hauteurs de Buitrago, afin de donner le temps au Maréchal Bessières de revenir de son mouvement de Gallice; qu'il faut reorganiser la province de Burgos, les trois Biscayes, et la province de Navarre; elle comprendront facilement que, dans ce moment plus que jamais, elles doivent rester fidèles et se bien conduire sous peine d'être traitées avec toute la rigueur de la guerre.

4. On pense que l'armée doit être divisée en trois corps, *le corps principal*, ou de centre, où commande le roi, qu'on porteroit à 30,000 hommes campé à Aranda; le corps de droite, du Maréchal Bessières d'environ 15 mille hommes faisant face à ce qui pourroit arriver de Gallice ou d'Estramadura, occupant Valladolid par une division, ayant une autre division intermédiaire avec le corps du centre, et une troisième division de plus sur sa droite, selon les circonstances; enfin le *corps de gauche*, ou d'Arragon destiné à maintenir la Navarre et le pays environnant, occupant Logrono et Tudela et liant sa droite au corps du centre, par une division qui au besoin renforceroit ce corps et devra maintenir Soria par un corps volant.

Le corps du centre, et le corps de droite doivent s'appuyer sur Burgos et le corps d'Arragon doit avoir son appui sur Pampelune.

5. Pour organiser le corps du centre dans ce bût, on croit qu'on doit le renforcer de la brigade du 14me. et 44me. de ligne, 200 chevaux et 8 pièces de canon, qu'on tireroit du corps devant Saragosse; de la brigade du Général Mouton composée du 4me. légère, 15me. légère, du bataillon de Paris, et de huit pièces de canon; de la brigade commandée par le Maréchal Ney, et qui est déjà à une marche en avant de Bayonne, composée du 43me., et du 51me. de ligne, du 26me. de chasseurs, et de 6 pièces de canon; enfin de 4 escadrons de marche de dragons et d'une régiment Polonais de la garde; on réuniroit le 3me. bataillon aux deux premiers de tous les régimens d'infanterie, et on méleroit les jeunes soldats aux anciens.

On évalue à environ dix mille hommes de renfort que recevrait le corps du centre, qui seroit alors composé: savoir des 18,000 qui le forment à présent 18,000

Du renfort évalué à 10,000

Le détachement du dépôt du 4me. légère, 15me. légère.

14me., 44me., 43me., et 51me. de ligne, le 2me. et 12me. légère rejoindront insensiblement et porteront ce corps à 30,000 hommes.

Ces trente mille hommes ne sauroient être en meilleure mains, que sous les ordres du Maréchal Ney, hormis une réserve de 4 à 5 mille hommes destinés à la garde du roi, et que le roi conserveroit auprès de sa personne et feroit marcher avec le Général Saligny, ou avec le Général Savary quand il le jugeroit nécessaire.

Le corps du centre ce tiendrait à la hauteur d'Aranda, ses communications bien assurées avec le Maréchal Bessières à Valladolid, des têtes de pont bien établies à Aranda et à Valladolid. Ce corps se nourrira par Burgos et devra non seulement maintenir la tranquillité dans cette province, mais encore assurer ses communications avec le corps de Saragosse qui occupera Tudela et Logrono.

Le corps du Maréchal Bessières, fort de quinze mille hommes, devra occuper Valladolid en faisant face à ce qui arrivera d'Estramadure et de Castille, ayant ses trois divisions en échelons et se nourrissant de la province de Valladolid, Placentia, et Leon.

On enverra le Maréchal Moncey pour commander le corps du Général Verdier, et on chargera le maréchal du commandement de la Biscaye et de tous les derrières.

On estime qu'on peut retirer du camp sous Saragosse le 14^{me}. et 44^{me}. de ligne, 200 chevaux, et 8 pièces de canon, le reste doit être formé en trois divisions, et destiné, à maintenir la Navarre. La position de Logrono est trop près, il faut occuper au moins jusqu'à Tudela pour soumettre la Navarre, et tout ce qui bougeroit. Dans l'ordre offensif, deux divisions peuvent se porter en marche forcée sur l'armée.

6. Il ne faut point faire une guerre timide, ni souffrir aucun rassemblement armé à deux marches d'aucun corps d'armée. Si l'ennemi s'approche, il ne faut point se laisser décourager par ce qui s'est passé, se confier dans sa supériorité, marcher à lui et le battre. L'ennemi prendra lui même probablement une marche très circonspecte : il y sera réduit du moment qu'il aura eu quelque exemple.

Dans cette situation de choses, toutes les fois qu'on seroit sérieusement attaqué par l'ennemi, on pourra lui opposer le corps du roi, qui doit toujours être ensemble, et les deux tiers du corps du Maréchal Bessières. Se maréchal doit toujours tenir un tiers de son corps, à une demi journée, un tiers à une journée du corps du centre, et un tiers sur la droite, suivant les circonstances, également, un tiers du corps du Général Verdier doit se tenir à la gauche du roi, pour le joindre si cela étoit nécessaire, de sorte que dans un jour le roi puisse réunir 40 mille hommes.

7. Il faut débiter par des coups d'éclat, qui relèvent le moral du soldat et qui fassent comprendre à l'habitant qu'il doit rester tranquille, un des premiers coups le plus important à porter, et qui seroit utile pour reléver l'opinion et compenser l'évacuation de Madrid, seroit que la brigade du 14^{me}. et 44^{me}. qu'on rappelle de Saragosse, aidée d'un détachement du corps du centre, soumette Soria, le désarme et le fasse rester tranquille. Attaquer et culbuter tout ce qui se présentera doit être l'instruction générale, donnée au Maréchal Bessières, au Maréchal Ney, et au Général Verdier, de sorte qu'à une marche, ou à une marche et demie du corps François, il n'y ait aucun rassemblement d'insurgés; on est d'opinion que si l'avant garde du Général Castaños s'avance sur l'Aranda et dépasse les montagnes de Buitrago il faut, avec tout ce qu'on réunira dans un jour, marcher à lui sans lui donner le tems de s'y établir sérieusement, le culbuter, le jeter au delà des montagnes, et si l'affaire est décisive, se reporter sur Madrid. L'ennemi doit essayer de déloger l'armée Française de cette position, par trois points, par la Gallice et l'Estramadure, par la droite d'Aranda, et enfin par les rassemblemens des provinces d'Arragon, de Valence et autres de Castille. Toutes ces combinaisons sont difficiles à l'ennemi, et si on dissipe ces rassemblemens à mesure qu'ils se formeront sur tous les points et qu'on les tiennent à distance d'une ou deux marches du cantonnement François, si alternativement les François prennent l'offensive, tantôt à leur droite, en renforçant le Maréchal Bessières, pendant que le centre se tiendra dans une bonne position derrière la rivière, et à l'abri de toute attaque, tantôt au centre avec le corps du roi, les deux tiers du corps de droite, et un tiers du corps de gauche, l'ennemi sera bientôt obligé à la plus grande circonspection.

8. On auroit pu aussi conserver Madrid en renforçant le corps qui s'y trouve, du 14^{me}. et 44^{me}. de ligne, de la brigade du Général Mouton, de celle du Général Le Febvre, qui en dernier lieu a été renvoyée au Maréchal Bessières, et enfin du renfort qu'amène le Maréchal Ney. On auroit ainsi renforcé le corps de Madrid de plus de 14 mille hommes, et il est douteux que l'ennemi eut voulu se mesurer avec des forces aussi considérables et s'exposer à une perte certaine.

9. Si de fortes raisons obligeoient d'évacuer Aranda, on perdrait l'espoir de rétablir ses communications avec le Portugal. Dans le cas où un événement quelconque porteroit à évacuer le Duero et à se concentrer sur Burgos pour se réunir là avec le Maréchal Bessières, le corps du Général Verdier peut communiquer par l'Ebre, et avoir toujours son mouvement isolé pour maintenir la Navarre, contenir l'Arragon, tous les rassemblemens de ce côté, et protéger la route principale.* Pendant cet intervalle des renforts journaliers arriveront à l'armée, jusqu'à ce qu'enfin les divisions de la grande armée qui sont en marche, soient sur les Pyrénées.

On a recommandé de tous tems le petit fort de Pancorvo. Il est nécessaire de l'occuper,

même quand on ne garderoit pas la ligne de l'Ebre, c'est une vedette d'autant plus utile qu'elle domine la plaine, et seroit un obstacle si jamais l'ennemi s'en emparoit.*

10. La troisième position qui se présente à l'armée, c'est la gauche à Pampelune, et la droite sur Vittoria, maintenant ainsi ses communications avec les places importantes de St. Sebastien et de Pampelune. Au reste toutes ces notes peuvent difficilement être de quelque utilité, les évènements modifient nécessairement les dispositions, tout dépend d'ailleurs de saisir un moment.

11. Résumé. Le premier but est de se maintenir à Madrid si cela est possible.

Le second, de maintenir ses communications avec le Portugal en occupant la ligne du Duero.

Le troisième, de conserver l'Ebre.

Le quatrième de conserver ses communications avec Pampelune et St. Sebastien afin que la grande armée arrivant, on puisse en peu de tems culbuter et anéantir tous les révoltés.

Rocheport, 6 Août, 1808.

LIEUT.-GEN. BERTRAND.

* [Note in Napoleon's own hand.] On ne doit pas oublier qu'en approchant de France tout favorise la desertion.

END OF VOL. I.